[Cite as State v. Aldrich,
2020-Ohio-4104.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
MADISON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2019-06-016
: OPINION
- vs - 8/17/2020
:
MICHAEL W. ALDRICH, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISION COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CRI20180127
Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Rachel M. Price, 59 North Main
Street, London, Ohio 43140, for appellee
Shannon M. Treynor, 63 North Main Street, P.O. Box 735, London, Ohio 43140, for
appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael Aldrich, appeals his conviction in the Madison County
Court of Common Pleas for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. For
the reasons detailed below, we affirm.
{¶2} On June 22, 2018, Deputy Loura Higaki was on patrol in the village of Mount
Sterling. While patrolling, Deputy Higaki noticed a white Chevy Trailblazer backed
Madison CA2019-06-016
suspiciously in front of the Family Dollar. The passenger in the vehicle was a woman with
blue hair who had just exited the vehicle to enter the nearby Milton Bank. When Deputy
Higaki ran the license plate for the vehicle, she discovered that the tags were expired.
{¶3} Shortly thereafter, the woman returned to the vehicle, which was driven by a
man, later identified as Aldrich. When they pulled out from the Family Dollar, Deputy Higaki
initiated a traffic stop by activating her lights and sirens. Aldrich initially pulled his vehicle
over, but as Deputy Higaki parked her cruiser, Aldrich suddenly took off.
{¶4} A high-speed chase ensued beginning in the small residential village. During
the chase, Aldrich ran two stop signs and turned onto Route 207, also a residential area,
and traveled at speeds of between 90 and 100 m.p.h. Aldrich also passed by two
playgrounds and was observed weaving across the center line as cars traveled in the
opposite lane. After approximately six minutes, Deputy Higaki was ordered to discontinue
her pursuit for safety reasons.
{¶5} Subsequently, the Madison County Sheriff's office began an investigation.
During the course of the investigation, Deputy Kelly Sparks was sent to Pickaway County
upon receiving information that a white Chevy Trailblazer had been abandoned. Though
the license plates had been removed, Deputy Sparks was able to confirm that the vehicle
was the same involved in the high-speed chase after matching the VIN number.
{¶6} Once Deputy Sparks confirmed that this was the correct vehicle, she
photographed both the exterior of the vehicle and the contents of the vehicle, which included
stolen fishing items, clothing, and a wallet containing Aldrich's state issued identification
card. Also, Deputy Sparks observed that a nylon tow strap was holding part of the vehicle
together where there had once been a steel bolt.
{¶7} On August 8, 2018, Aldrich was indicted on one count of failure to comply in
violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
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The jury found Aldrich guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Aldrich to
a 30-month prison term and imposed a mandatory five-year driver's license suspension.
Aldrich now appeals, raising three assignments of error for review.
{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶9} THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DUPLICATIVE AND PREJUDICIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENT OF WILLFULNESS.
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Aldrich alleges the trial court erred by
permitting "motive testimony" that he argued was both unnecessary and prejudicial to his
case. We find Aldrich's argument is without merit.
{¶11} A trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence,
including evidence of other acts under Evid.R. 404(B). State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d
73,
2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 67. A reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions
absent an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice. Id.; State v. Vore, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA2011-08-093,
2012-Ohio-2431, ¶ 40.
{¶12} Evid.R. 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. Such evidence may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. Evid.R. 404(B).
{¶13} "Evidence that an accused committed a crime other than the one for which he
is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused's propensity or
inclination to commit crime or that he acted in conformity with bad character." State v.
Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521,
2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 15. "[E]vidence of other acts is admissible
if it is offered for a purpose other than to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity with that character, Evid.R. 404(B), it is relevant when offered for that
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purpose, Evid.R. 401, and the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its
probative value, Evid.R. 403." Kirkland, 2014-Ohio-1966 at ¶ 68, citing
Williams at ¶ 20.
{¶14} In this case, the state introduced evidence that Aldrich had stolen fishing
equipment in his vehicle and a suspended driver's license. Aldrich claims this evidence is
prejudicial because it was unnecessary to prove the "willful" element contained in R.C.
2921.331(B) because the state could have established that "by the mere fact that the
vehicle moved after being ordered to stop." This court has rejected similar arguments in
State v. Harner, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2019-10-012, 2020-Ohio-3071.
{¶15} In Harnar, this court found that evidence of a defendant's suspended driver's
license and outstanding warrants was "relevant to the failure to comply offense, was used
for a legitimate purpose, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶16} In this case, in order to prove a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), the state had
to prove that Aldrich acted willfully in fleeing from Deputy Higaki. Therefore, evidence that
Aldrich was driving with a suspended license and had stolen fishing equipment in his vehicle
was relevant to and presented for the legitimate purpose of showing Aldrich's motive and
intent in fleeing from the deputy. Id. at ¶ 29, citing State v. Craig, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-
CA-61, 2018-Ohio-1987, ¶ 45; see also State v. Kaser, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-98-11,
1998
Ohio App. LEXIS 5096 (Oct. 15, 1998). For the same reason, the photograph of Aldrich's
identification card also served as additional incidental proof that he had been the driver of
the white Chevy Trailblazer. See Evid.R. 404(B). The evidence was therefore presented
for a valid purpose other than to show Aldrich's propensity or inclination to commit crime or
that he acted in conformity with bad character. See Kirkland,
2014-Ohio-1966 at ¶ 69.
{¶17} Additionally, the probative value of the other-acts evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Deputy Sparks' testimony that
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Aldrich had a suspended license and possessed stolen fishing equipment was brief and
general in nature. The testimony did not mention propensity or inclination to commit crime
or that he acted in conformity with bad character. Rather, the focus of the state's inquiry
was measured towards the legitimate willful element of the offense. After reviewing the
record, this court is not concerned that the challenged testimony affected the outcome of
the case. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in allowing Deputy Sparks
to testify about this other-acts evidence or by permitting photographs of the relevant
evidence to be presented to the jury.
{¶18} Finally, Aldrich makes passing reference to testimony presented by Deputy
Sparks that the Chevy Trailblazer was held together by nylon tow straps instead of a steel
bolt. Though he does not present any argument in this assignment of error as to why that
testimony would be improper, we note that evidence that the vehicle was structurally
unsound is relevant for purposes of establishing that he created a "substantial risk of serious
physical harm to persons or property" by operating his vehicle with a passenger and
throughout a residential neighborhood at speeds between 90 and 100 m.p.h. Having found
no error in the admission of evidence, we find Aldrich's first assignment of error is without
merit and is overruled.
{¶19} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶20} THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF
FAILURE TO COMPLY AS A FELONY OFFENSE.
{¶21} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶22} THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶23} In his second and third assignments of error, Aldrich argues that his conviction
is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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We disagree.
{¶24} The concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are
legally distinct. State v. Wright, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-08-152, 2014-Ohio-985, ¶ 10.
Nonetheless, as this court has observed, a finding that a conviction is supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Jones,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049,
2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19. "Because sufficiency is
required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of
the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency." State v. Hart, 12th Dist.
Brown No. CA2011-03-008,
2012-Ohio-1896, ¶ 43.
{¶25} A manifest weight challenge scrutinizes the proclivity of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue over another. State v.
Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. In assessing whether
a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court examines the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of the witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of
fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Morgan, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2013-
08-146 and CA2013-08-147,
2014-Ohio-2472, ¶ 34.
{¶26} Aldrich was convicted of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police
officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), which provides:
(B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to
elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible
signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to
a stop.
To constitute a third-degree felony, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the "operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused a substantial risk of
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serious physical harm to persons or property." R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).
{¶27} On appeal, Aldrich does not dispute that he was driving the Chevy Trailblazer
during the high-speed chase. Rather, he argues that his conduct did not cause a
"substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property." In so doing, Aldrich
argues that the "substantial risk" of harm was merely hypothetical.
{¶28} Following review, we find Aldrich's argument to be without merit. The state
presented evidence that Deputy Higaki initiated a traffic stop by activating her lights and
sirens. Though Aldrich initially pulled over, he suddenly took off. A high-speed chase
ensued in a residential area where Aldrich ran two stop signs, passed several playgrounds,
and encountered several vehicles traveling in the opposite direction. After approximately
six minutes, the chase was called off for safety reasons. When the vehicle was later
discovered, Deputy Sparks noted that Aldrich's vehicle was held together by a nylon tow
strap instead of a steel bolt. That Aldrich claims the "substantial risk" to other people or
property was "merely hypothetical" is belied by the record. Aldrich actions clearly posed a
substantial risk to other people and property in the community, not to mention the risk to his
passenger. Moreover, this was a matter that was fully argued to the jury below. While
Aldrich argues differently, the jury, as trier of fact, was in the best position to judge the
credibility of the witness. State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-07-076 and
CA2019-08-080, 2020-Ohio-3501, ¶ 24. As his conviction is supported by sufficient
evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, Aldrich's second and
third assignments of error are overruled.
{¶29} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
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