[Cite as State v. Glaze,
2020-Ohio-53.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 18CA011289
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MATTHEW GLAZE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 16CR095318
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 13, 2020
CARR, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Matthew Glaze, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The unfortunate circumstances of this case arise out of a traffic accident that
occurred in Amherst Township on the morning of July 2, 2016. As Glaze was entering an
intersection while driving his Chevy Suburban, he struck a Chevy Cruze containing three
women. The Chevy Cruze then collided with a van stopped at the intersection. Two passengers
in the Chevy Cruze died as a result of the accident. The driver of the Chevy Cruze and the driver
of the van suffered injuries.
{¶3} On December 8, 2016, the Lorain County Grand Jury returned a 13-count
indictment against Glaze. Glaze was charged with four counts of aggravated vehicular homicide,
one count of aggravated vehicular assault, one count of vehicular assault, one count of tampering
2
with evidence, two counts of possession of drugs, one count of driving under suspension, two
counts of driving under the influence, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On
February 17, 2017, the grand jury returned a supplemental indictment charging Glaze with two
additional counts of vehicular assault. Thereafter, the grand jury again supplemented the
indictment with one count of aggravated vehicular assault as well as another count of vehicular
assault. Glaze pleaded not guilty to the charges at arraignment.
{¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial where Glaze was found guilty of all the
charges against him. After determining that a number of the counts were allied offenses, the trial
court imposed a total prison sentence of 14 years.
{¶5} On appeal, Glaze raises five assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE IS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE
FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Glaze contends the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide. In his second
assignment of error, Glaze contends that his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide were
against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees with both assertions.
3
{¶7} Glaze was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation
of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), which states, “[n]o person, while operating or participating in the
operation of a motor vehicle, … shall cause the death of another … [a]s the proximate result
of committing a violation of [R.C. 4511.19(A)].” Glaze was also convicted of two counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), which provides that, “[n]o
person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, … shall cause the
death of another … [r]ecklessly[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(C), a person acts “recklessly”
when “with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a
certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
such circumstances are likely to exist.”
Sufficiency Challenge
{¶8} Glaze challenges his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide to the extent
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted recklessly.1
{¶9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before
the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279
(1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
1
At sentencing, the trial court determined that Glaze’s convictions under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a)
(counts four and five) merged with his convictions under R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) (counts one and
two).
4
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} At trial, the State presented evidence supporting the following narrative. On the
morning of July 2, 2016, Glaze was involved in a car accident at the intersection of State Route
113 and State Route 58 in Amherst Township. Glaze was driving a Chevy Suburban when he
drove into the back of a Chevy Cruze that was stopped at the intersection. The Chevy Cruze
contained three women. L.V. was driving the sedan while I.C. and M.M. were passengers. After
being struck from behind by the Suburban, the Chevy Cruze collided with a van driven by R.T.
I.C. and M.M. died as a result of the accident. L.V. and R.T. sustained injuries.
{¶11} Ryon Berkel observed Glaze driving westbound on State Route 113 just prior to
the accident. As Berkel was preparing to exit his driveway, he saw Glaze approaching at a high
rate of speed. Berkel testified that Glaze’s vehicle was “going left of center as it was
approaching me. That’s what made me hesitate.” Berkel further testified that in addition to
veering outside of his lane, Glaze was “hauling ass[,]” traveling at an estimated speed of 70-75
miles per hour on road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour.2 Berkel observed that Glaze was
not in a normal driving position. Instead, Glaze had a “slouched look” and “was up on top of the
wheel.” Berkel saw “parts flying everywhere” when Glaze collided with another vehicle as he
entered the intersection of State Route 113 and State Route 58. Berkel could not recall seeing
the Suburban’s brake lights prior to the crash.
2
Berkel testified that his ability to gauge a vehicle’s “rate of closure” was informed by his
experience as a Division III driver in the National Hot Rod Association, where he races quick
rod and super rod.
5
{¶12} Stephen Konkiel, who drives a truck for Hillandale Farms, was travelling
southbound of State Route 58 on the morning of the incident. At the time of the collision,
Konkiel was stopped at a red light as cars traveled from east to west on State Route 113.
Konkiel’s eyes were drawn to the van travelling westbound on State Route 113 that was stopped
in the left hand turn lane. Konkiel noticed the van, driven by R.T, because it had a “rainbow
flame” paint job. The Chevy Cruze, driven by L.V., was stopped behind the van. Out of the
corner of his eye, Konkiel saw Glaze’s Suburban coming at a very high rate of speed. The
Suburban crashed into the rear of L.V.’s car. Konkiel described the accident as a “violent
impact” that “sounded like an explosion going off.” The collision propelled the Chevy Cruze
into the van. Konkiel explained that the van ended up in the middle of the intersection while the
Suburban went through the intersection and off the road. R.T. saw the Suburban’s brake lights
come on after it came to a stop in a field, suggesting that the brakes were functional. Both
Konkiel and R.T. testified that they saw Glaze exit his Suburban after the accident and throw an
object into the bushes.
{¶13} In recalling the incident, L.V. testified that she pulled into the left turn lane on
State Route 113 as she prepared to turn onto State Route 58. There was a red light and L.V.
came to a complete stop behind the van driven by R.T. L.V. did not remember the details of the
accident, only that she was laughing with her friends before she suddenly “saw black.” When
L.V. was taken to an ambulance at the scene, she observed the damage to the back end of her
vehicle and passed out.
{¶14} First responders arrived on the scene immediately after the accident. Konkiel
notified Officer Matthew Gramlich that Glaze had thrown something into the bushes.
Thereafter, law enforcement discovered a pipe in that area that tested positive for cocaine.
6
Officer Gramlich found an empty pill bottle with Glaze’s name on it in the grass near Glaze’s
vehicle. The prescription was for oxycodone. Upon approaching Glaze, Officer Gramlich
noticed that Glaze had constricted pupils. Testing on the pill bottle indicated that it contained
heroin residue. While Glaze was initially alert, he gradually became sluggish and started to “nod
off” while answering questions. A paramedic at the scene also noticed that Glaze’s pupils were
constricted and that his eyes did not respond to light or motion. Based on their observations of
Glaze, both Officer Gramlich and the paramedic suspected that Glaze was under the influence of
drugs.
{¶15} Glaze was transported to the hospital where urine and blood samples were
collected. Dr. Gabrielle Morris, a neurological surgeon, examined Glaze in the emergency room.
Glaze’s urine tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and benzodiazepines. The blood tests were
negative for illegal substances. Dr. Morris concluded that Glaze had a “polypharmacy induced
altered mental state” based on the urine test results. While Dr. Morris did diagnose Glaze with a
concussion, she emphasized that, “in the setting of a positive tox screen and a negative CT
[scan,]” Glaze’s altered mental state could only have been caused by polypharmacy, not a
concussion. The State’s toxicology expert, Dr. John Wyman, testified that a euphoric high from
cocaine lasts for a relatively short period of time. The period of euphoria can be followed by a
period of dysphoria where the user experiences a crash, characterized by discomfort, fatigue, and
agitation. Dr. Wyman noted that the blood sample in this case was collected two and a half
hours after the accident. Dr. Wyman testified cocaine will only appear in the blood samples for a
short period of time before the body metabolizes the substance and turns it into benzoylecgonine,
which would appear in a urine sample for a longer period of time.
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{¶16} Lieutenant Robert Gable, who serves as a drug recognition expert for the Ohio
State Highway Patrol, evaluated Glaze at the hospital. Glaze told Lieutenant Gable that his
brakes failed as he approached the intersection. When Glaze struggled with certain field sobriety
tests,3 Lieutenant Gable inquired as to why Glaze might be giving signs of impairment. Glaze
indicated that he ingested Xanax and Lithium prior to going to bed at 1:30 am. Upon further
interrogation, Glaze “admitted that that morning, prior to the crash, he was arguing with his wife
and that he may have taken one oxycodone, one Xanax, and one Lithium around 6:30 in the
morning.”
{¶17} The crux of Glaze’s argument on appeal is that the State failed to demonstrate that
he acted recklessly because there was no evidence that he was under the influence at the time of
the incident. Glaze emphasizes that while his blood test showed no signs of drugs, his urine
tested positive for cocaine. Glaze contends that “[i]t is clear that any ingested cocaine was
already through the blood, metabolized, and in the urine[,]” meaning that “[t]here [was] no
reckless conduct because there was no intoxication as the drug was in the metabolized waste
form.” Glaze further points to his own medical history, noting that he has dealt with syncope
and that he has a prescription to take opiates.
{¶18} Glaze’s sufficiency challenge is without merit. We remain mindful that we must
construe the evidence in favor of the State when resolving a sufficiency challenge. Jenks, 61
Ohio St.3d at 279. The State presented evidence that, at the time of the deadly collision, Glaze
was driving a Suburban at an excessive rate of speed and was weaving in and out of his lane.
3
While Glaze performed well on the horizontal and vertical gaze nystagmus tests, Lieutenant
Gable had to continually remind Glaze to keep his eyes open during those tests. Glaze gave
clues of impairment on certain divided attention skills tests, including the walk-and-turn test and
the one-leg-stand test.
8
There was further evidence that Glaze was slouched over the wheel as he sped toward the
intersection where, without braking, he plowed into a car stopped at the light and killed two
people. Upon exiting the vehicle, he attempted to discard a pipe with cocaine residue by
throwing it into some nearby bushes. Law enforcement also found a pill bottle containing heroin
residue near Glaze’s vehicle. Both law enforcement and emergency personnel were suspicious
that Glaze was under the influence. Glaze’s urine sample tested positive for a number of drugs,
including cocaine and opioids. Dr. Wyman testified that after experiencing a high, cocaine users
can experience a period of dysphoria that includes a number of negative physical symptoms.
Multiple witnesses observed Glaze in an altered mental state after the accident and Dr. Morris
testified that the altered mental state could not have been a result of a concussion, but instead
was the result of polypharmacy. The aforementioned evidence, when construed in the light most
favorable to the State, demonstrated that Glaze acted recklessly in causing the deaths of I.C. and
M.M.
{¶19} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Manifest Weight Challenge
{¶20} Glaze’s manifest weight challenge also focuses on whether he acted recklessly.
Glaze renews his position that his “body had already metabolized the cocaine and the State’s
own expert testified that once the cocaine is metabolized, the high would be gone.” Glaze
further argues that he suffered a concussion during the crash, which could explain the symptoms
he displayed as well as his poor performance on field sobriety tests. Finally, Glaze emphasizes
that he suffers from a number of medical conditions, including syncopal episodes, which law
enforcement would not have been qualified to detect immediately following the accident.
9
{¶21} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be
against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997);
Eastley v. Volkman,
132 Ohio St.3d 328,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12.
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the
conflicting testimony.”
Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An
appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of
the evidence only in exceptional cases.
Otten at 340.
{¶22} Glaze’s manifest weight challenge is without merit. Glaze correctly notes that the
State’s toxicology expert, Dr. Wyman, testified that once someone’s body metabolizes cocaine,
the euphoric high is gone. However, Dr. Wyman further testified that the period of euphoria can
be followed by a period of “dysphoria and depression[.]” Dr. Wyman indicated that based upon
his review of the reports in this matter, it appeared Glaze was behaving in a manner consistent
with opioid impairment after the crash. Moreover, while Glaze contends that his altered mental
state may have been due to a concussion, Dr. Morris concluded that his altered mental state was
due to polypharmacy. Dr. Morris specifically observed that while Glaze had a concussion, “[h]e
did not have any brain injury that required admission, observation, or any further care.” Though
Glaze further contends that law enforcement was not qualified to understand his various medical
ailments, including syncopal episodes, the State presented ample evidence, independent of the
10
observations of law enforcement, that Glaze was impaired at the time of the accident. Under
these circumstances, we cannot say that this is the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its
way.
Conclusion
{¶23} As Glaze’s convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide were supported by
sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence, Glaze’s first and second
assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE STATE COULD PRESENT
EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL OF THE DYSPHORIC AFFECTS OF
COCAINE AS IT RELATES TO ACCIDENTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS
UNRELIABLE.
{¶24} In his third assignment of error, Glaze contends that the trial court erred in
permitting Dr. Wyman to testify because the State failed to demonstrate that his testimony
regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. Glaze maintains that the trial court’s
analysis fell short of the reliability standard set forth in Evid.R. 702(C) and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). This Court disagrees.
{¶25} This Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.
Wade v. Mancuso, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010978, 2018-Ohio-1563, ¶ 37. An abuse of
discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶26} Evid.R. 702 states:
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or
experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among
lay persons;
11
(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony;
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other
specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a
procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following
apply:
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is
objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts,
or principles;
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the
theory;
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will
yield an accurate result.
{¶27} “In evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, several factors are to be
considered: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been
subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether
the methodology has gained general acceptance.” State v. Schmidt, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
13CA010499, 2015-Ohio-146, ¶ 9, quoting Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.,
80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611
(1998), citing
Daubert at 593-594. “A trial court’s role in determining whether an expert’s
testimony is admissible under Evid.R. 702(C) focuses on whether the opinion is based upon
scientifically valid principles, not whether the expert’s conclusions are correct or whether the
testimony satisfies the proponent’s burden of proof at trial.” Miller at paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶28} After the State gave notice of its intent to call Dr. Wyman as an expert witness,
Glaze filed a request for a Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of Dr. Wyman’s testimony.
The matter proceeded to a hearing.
{¶29} At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted that the scope would be “the
limited issue of dysphoria with cocaine.” Dr. Wyman testified that he has a doctoral degree in
12
toxicology and comparative pharmacology as well as a bachelor’s and master’s degrees in
microbiology. Dr. Wyman is also board certified in general toxicology and forensic toxicology.
With respect to this case, Dr. Wyman prepared a report after reviewing the State Highway
Patrol’s lab report, crash report, and investigative report, as well as the report from the drug
recognition expert. Dr. Wyman also reviewed witness statements and Glaze’s hospital records.
Dr. Wyman acknowledged that he had to prepare an amended report, or a second report, due to
the fact that he mistook the urine test results for the blood test results and initially concluded that
Glaze must have been “repeatedly dosing[,]” or binging, on cocaine. Upon recognizing the
issue, Dr. Wyman prepared a corrected report.
{¶30} In addition to opining that Glaze was under the influence of opioids at the time he
was driving, Dr. Wyman inferred that Glaze may have been experiencing dysphoria related to his
cocaine use. This inference was based on the fact that while there was evidence that Glaze had
used cocaine, the cocaine was no longer present in Glaze’s blood. Dr. Wyman explained that
“when you’ve used cocaine, initially you have euphoria, but after it’s metabolized it reverts to a
state of dysphoria.” In elaborating, Dr. Wyman explained that, as a central nervous system
stimulant, cocaine causes neurotransmitters to be released into the body resulting in effects that
last for a relatively brief period of time. When the body metabolizes the cocaine and it leaves the
blood, the user will experience dysphoria, or a “crash[.]” In a state of dysphoria, the user is
“extremely uncomfortable[]” and can experience fatigue, drowsiness, paranoia, and anxiousness.
Based on the reports he reviewed, Dr. Wyman concluded that Glaze may have been suffering
from dysphoria associated with cocaine use and that Glaze was likely impaired at the time of the
accident due to opioid exposure.
13
{¶31} Dr. Wyman explained that toxicologists are aware of the notion of dysphoria
associated with cocaine and that it has been the subject of scientifically peer-reviewed articles.
In the middle of the hearing, the trial court inquired as to whether Dr. Wyman would be
testifying with respect to the results of tests he conducted in specific regard to Glaze. The State
indicated that Dr. Wyman did not perform any tests and that other witnesses would be testifying
regarding the results of toxicology tests. The State indicated that Dr. Wyman’s testimony would
serve solely to educate the jury regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine. Dr. Wyman testified
that his understanding of dysphoria as a result of cocaine elimination stemmed from his
education, experience, and training, as well as scientific literature. Dr. Wyman referenced an
article written by Daniel Isenschmid, Ph.D., that detailed the negative effects of dysphoria and
how it can lead to impaired driving. Dr. Wyman noted that Isenschmid’s article referenced other
scientific papers on the subject and was published in the Forensic Science Review, a highly
regarded toxicology journal. Dr. Wyman further testified that he was not aware of any criticisms
or addendums to the article’s findings in the years that followed its publication in 2002.
{¶32} Following the hearing, the trial court issued a journal entry noting that the
stipulated purpose of the hearing was to determine if Dr. Wyman’s testimony regarding the
dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. The trial court ultimately concluded that the
“dysphoria associated with cocaine use is well known and accepted in the scientific community”
and that Dr. Wyman’s testimony was based on reliable scientific, technical, and specialized
information.
{¶33} On appeal, Glaze contends that the trial court’s analysis failed to meet the
reliability standard set forth in Daubert and Evid.R. 702(C) and, instead, appeared to be rooted in
the lesser “general accepted” standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
14
(D.C.Cir.1923). Glaze emphasizes that Dr. Wyman never conducted any tests himself and never
examined Glaze. Glaze further argues that the reliability of Dr. Wyman’s testimony was
undermined when he had to prepare a second report because his first report was based on a
mistaken understanding of the blood and urine test results.
{¶34} To the extent that Glaze contends that the trial court disregarded the Daubert
standards, “the test of scientific reliability is a flexible one, and the factors outlined in Daubert
‘neither necessarily nor exclusively app[ly] to all experts or in every case.’” State v. Jackson, 9th
Dist. Summit Nos. 27132, 27200, 27133, 27158, 2015-Ohio-5246, ¶ 74, quoting Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). A trial court has “considerable leeway” in
determining how to evaluate the reliability of an expert’s testimony. Jackson at ¶ 74, quoting
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. at 152.
{¶35} In this case, the trial court pressed the State on the requirements of Evid.R. 702
and participated in the examination of Dr. Wyman. The State acknowledged that Dr. Wyman did
not perform any testing on Glaze and that his testimony would be limited to the dysphoric effects
of cocaine. Dr. Wyman testified that in addition to his training and education, his opinion
regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was based on scientific literature that had been peer
reviewed. Dr. Wyman further testified that he was not aware that any findings in the Isenschmid
article had been disputed in the years since its publication. Moreover, though Glaze notes that it
was necessary for Dr. Wyman to prepare a second report, Dr. Wyman acknowledged the mistake
in his initial report and noted that his testimony with respect to Glaze would be predicated on the
corrected report. Under these circumstances, Glaze cannot prevail on his argument that the State
failed to demonstrate that Dr. Wyman’s testimony was reliable.
{¶36} The third assignment of error is overruled.
15
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT
TO TWO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.14.
{¶37} In his fourth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences. This Court disagrees.
{¶38} Glaze’s argument focuses on the first three counts in the indictment. With respect
to count one, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in relation to the death of
M.M. and sentenced to a mandatory term of six years in prison. As to count two, Glaze was
convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in relation to the death of I.C. and sentenced to a
mandatory term of six years in prison. In regard to count three, Glaze was convicted of
aggravated vehicular assault in relation to L.V. and sentenced to a mandatory term of two years
in prison. The trial court ordered that the sentences for count one, count two, and count three
were to be served consecutively for a total prison sentence of 14 years.
{¶39} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that “[i]f multiple prison terms are imposed on an
offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect
the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses
to the public[.]” The court must also find “any” of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant
to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
16
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c)
{¶40} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bonnell held that, “[i]n order to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d
209,
2014-Ohio-3177, at syllabus.
{¶41} Glaze does not dispute that the trial court made a finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(b) in support of its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Instead, Glaze
contends that his conduct was not more egregious, and thus did not warrant consecutive
sentences, simply because there were multiple passengers in the Chevy Cruze that he struck.
Glaze maintains that if there had only been one occupant of the Chevy Cruze, “[his] behavior
would be the same but he would have only had one sentence.”
{¶42} “As long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the
correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings,
consecutive sentences should be upheld.” State v. Kilmire, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27319, 27320,
2015-Ohio-665, ¶ 16, quoting
Bonnell at ¶ 29.
{¶43} Given the record before us, we can only conclude that Glaze’s argument is
without merit. “When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
findings as part of the sentencing hearing[; h]owever, a word-for-word recitation of the language
of the statute is not required[.]” Id. Here, the trial court made findings pursuant to R.C.
17
2929.14(C)(4)(b) at the sentencing hearing in support of its decision to impose consecutive
sentences. The trial court further incorporated these findings into its sentencing entry. While
Glaze maintains that his sentence would have been different if L.V. had not had passengers in
her vehicle on the date of the incident, the unfortunate facts of this case are that Glaze’s conduct
resulted in two people losing their lives and a third person suffering serious injuries. Glaze has
not pointed this Court to any authority indicating that a trial court errs by imposing consecutive
sentences when a defendant causes a collision that injures or kills multiple passengers in the
same vehicle. This Court’s own research reveals otherwise. See, e.g., State v. Lambert, 2d Dist.
Champaign No. 2018-CA-28, 2019-Ohio-2837, ¶ 34; State v. Owens, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-
1215,
2016-Ohio-3092, ¶ 34; State v. Long, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2000-09-022,
2001 WL
433371, *2-3 (Apr. 30, 2001). Under these circumstances, the record supports the trial court’s
decision to impose consecutive sentences.
{¶44} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING, CONTRARY TO LAW AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS, WHICH ARE DISPROPORTIONATE WITH
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED ON SIMILAR DEFENDANTS.
{¶45} In his fifth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the length of his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Glaze points to
two other defendants who were recently sentenced for aggravated vehicle homicide in the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas and maintains that the sentence he received was grossly
disproportionate to the sentences handed down in those cases. This Court disagrees.
{¶46} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “[a]s a general rule, a sentence that
falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment.”
18
McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69 (1964). Here, Glaze has neither demonstrated that
any of his individual sentences fell outside the accepted statutory range, nor has he shown that
the trial court failed to comply with statutory provisions in ordering those sentences be served
consecutively. Moreover, a review of the record reveals that Glaze did not raise the
constitutionality issue and present comparators below. Accordingly, he has forfeited the issue on
appeal. See generally State v. White, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 94CA005936,
1995 WL 338423, *5
(June 7, 1995). It follows that Glaze’s final assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶47} Glaze’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
19
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
GIOVANNA V. BREMKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.
