06/01/2021
DA 18-0562
Case Number: DA 18-0562
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 138N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JEDEDIAH KEITH LARSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Carter, Cause No. DC 17-01
Honorable Nickolas C. Murnion, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan Krauss, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Corbit S. Harrington, Carter County Attorney, Ekalaka, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 7, 2021
Decided: June 1, 2021
Filed:
cir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Jedediah Keith Larson appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault in the
Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Carter County. Larson contends the District Court erred
when it answered the jury’s question seeking a definition of “reasonable apprehension,”
because the definition the court provided allowed the jury to convict based solely on the
victim’s subjective belief of death or serious bodily injury. We affirm.
¶3 In March 2017, Larson punched his then girlfriend in the head three times, choked
her, and threw her against the metal bars of a hide-a-bed. The State charged Larson with
partner or family member assault (PFMA), aggravated assault, and unlawful restraint.
During deliberations, the jury inquired twice about the definition of “reasonable
apprehension,” an element of the aggravated assault charge under § 45-5-202(1), MCA.
After consultation with counsel, the District Court responded: “Reasonable apprehension
refers to fear that is justified under the circumstances, as judged by the subjective standard
of the ‘reasonable man.’” The jury convicted Larson of PFMA and aggravated assault and
acquitted him of unlawful restraint. Larson appeals his conviction of aggravated assault.
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¶4 We review a court’s jury instructions in a criminal case to determine whether, as a
whole, they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v.
Bieber, 2007 MT 262, ¶ 67,
339 Mont. 309,
170 P.3d 444. We apply the same standard of
review to a court’s decision to provide or deny the jury’s request for additional information
pursuant to § 46-16-503, MCA. Bieber, ¶ 67.
¶5 As pertinent to the current case, a person commits aggravated assault under
§ 45-5-202, MCA, “if the person . . . purposely or knowingly, with the use of physical force
or contact, causes reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury or death in another.”
“The standard for determining whether a person has suffered emotional distress or
reasonably apprehended bodily injury is that of a reasonable person under similar
circumstances.” State v. McCarthy,
1999 MT 99, ¶ 27,
294 Mont. 270,
980 P.2d 629 (citing
State v. Martel,
273 Mont. 143,150,
902 P.2d 14, 19 (1995)). That is, “[w]hen faced with
the conduct complained of, would a reasonable person feel apprehension?” Martel,
273 Mont. at 150,
902 P.2d at 19. We have explained the “reasonable person standard is
an objective one.” Martel,
273 Mont. at 150,
902 P.2d at 19.
¶6 Larson’s main objection on appeal is with the use of the word “subjective” in the
provided definition. Larson argues the definition provided by District Court did not
instruct the jury to apply an objective standard as required by our caselaw because the
definition stated “as judged by the subjective standard of the ‘reasonable man.’” Larson
argues the use of the word “subjective” allowed the jury to convict based solely on the
victim’s subjective fears.
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¶7 The reasonable person standard sets an “objective” or universal standard of conduct,
or what a reasonable person would perceive under the circumstances. This is in contrast
to a “subjective” or individualized standard, or what the individual in a particular case
personally perceived. The District Court’s instruction did not instruct the jury the victim’s
subjective fears were sufficient to convict Larson, but rather instructed the jury to consider
what a reasonable person would perceive under the circumstances. The court told the jury
reasonable apprehension must be “justified under the circumstances, as judged by the
subjective standard of the ‘reasonable man.’” The District Court’s instruction properly
instructed the jury to consider whether a reasonable person would reasonably apprehend or
perceive a risk of serious bodily injury under the circumstances, not just whether the victim
personally apprehended or perceived a risk of serious bodily injury. Larson’s reading of
the instruction requires the reader to ignore the final clause “of the ‘reasonable man.’”
While it arguably would have been better practice to first consult our caselaw and use
particular language therefrom to instruct the jury on “reasonable apprehension,” rather than
start with a commercial legal website, we conclude the District Court’s instruction fully
and fairly instructed the jury on the definition of “reasonable apprehension,” under the
circumstances of this case.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
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applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and application of the
law were correct. Affirmed.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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