[Cite as Koscho v. Hill,
2021-Ohio-110.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
CHRISTOPHER A. KOSCHO, : Case No. 19CA3699
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v. : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
RYLIE HILL, :
Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED 1/14/2021
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Bradley S. Nicodemus, The Nicodemus Law Office, LPA, Baltimore, Ohio, for appellant.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Christopher Koscho appeals from a judgment of the Ross County Common
Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, increasing his child support obligation. Koscho contends
that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that his annual income from
employment was $88,050, that there was insufficient evidence to support his assertion
that the child’s mother had an ownership interest in a business, and that he was not
entitled to a child support deviation for benefits the child’s mother receives from sharing
living expenses with her boyfriend. Because Koscho failed in his burden to show that the
trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, we overrule his
assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} In 2012, Christopher Koscho and Rylie Hill had a child together. In July
2018, the Ross County Child Support Enforcement Agency conducted an administrative
review of a court support order which required that Koscho pay child support of $656.06
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 2
per month plus a processing fee. The agency recommended that as of August 1, 2018,
Koscho pay $814.54 per month plus a processing fee when private health insurance is
provided for the child or $886.60 per month when private health insurance is not
provided. Koscho requested an administrative hearing, and the hearing officer
recommended that the court revise the current support order to $909.14 per month plus
a processing fee when private health insurance is provided or $944.10 per month plus a
processing fee when private insurance is not provided. Koscho challenged the hearing
officer’s findings and recommendations and moved the court for a modification of his
support obligation.
{¶3} A magistrate conducted a hearing at which Hill testified that she lives with
her boyfriend, Kenny Adkins, in a home he owns that is situated on about 40 acres of
land. She testified that the property has “been paid for for a long time” and that she does
not pay Adkins rent. When asked whether Adkins provides for her and her child, Hill
stated, “Eh, normal, how normal couples provide, I guess.” Hill testified that she does
part-time sales work for Performance Motors, which is one of the businesses Adkins
owns. She indicated that Performance Motors does not withhold taxes from her checks
because she is classified as a subcontractor. The record includes copies of checks
made payable to Hill that were drawn on a Performance Motors account and contain
blank memo lines and illegible signatures. The record also includes copies of Hill’s 2017
federal and state individual income tax returns which indicate that they were prepared by
an individual at H&R Block. On her federal tax return, Hill reported $0 in wages, salaries,
and tips, and she reported $4,015 in business income. She included the $4,015 on
Schedule C-EZ, which is titled “Net Profit From Business” and includes the phrase “(Sole
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 3
Proprietorship)” under the title. On the schedule, she identified herself as a proprietor,
identified the principal business or profession as a motorcycle, ATV, and all other motor
vehicle dealer, and identified the business name as Kenny Adkins. In addition, she
included the $4,015 on Schedule SE, which is titled “Self-Employment Tax.” Hill also
reported the $4,015 as “Schedule C – Profit or Loss From Business (Sole
Proprietorship)” on the 2017 Ohio Schedule IT BUS form. On that form, she used her
own name as the name of the business entity and indicated that her percentage of
ownership was 100%. When Koscho’s attorney questioned why Hill had filed an
“ownership tax form” even though she testified that she did not have an ownership
interest in Performance Motors, Hill testified, “I don’t really understand what you’re
asking, because I don’t really know how taxes work but I know that I have no ownership
whatsoever in his business. Its [sic] his business. I am just an employee, … I don’t
how it’s all [sic], I guess it’s a subcontractor for his car lot … which is Performance
Motors.” Hill indicated that if her tax returns showed that she had an ownership interest,
it was because her “accountant made a mistake.”
{¶4} Koscho testified that he is a widower and has two minor children in addition
to the child with Hill. He is the sole provider for the other children and incurs about
$4,200 a year in child-care costs for them so that he can work for the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Koscho testified that he works from home and needs a hardline phone
and high-speed internet to do his job, which cost him about $160 a month. The record
includes Koscho’s tax returns and W-2s for 2016, 2017, and 2018, and leave and
earnings statements from his last two paychecks from 2018 and first two paychecks from
2019. According to the earnings statements, his hourly rate is $42.19 and his adjusted
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 4
basic pay is $88,050. Koscho testified that his hourly rate is $42.19 but that he does not
earn $88,050 a year and that one could look at his earnings statements for “every single
year since 2002,” i.e., when he started working for the Department of Veterans Affairs,
and see he has never received his adjusted basic pay. He could not explain why his
earnings statements state that his adjusted basic pay is $88,050. According to his last
earnings statement for 2018, his gross pay that year was $79,578.48.
{¶5} The magistrate overruled Koscho’s objections to the hearing officer’s
findings and recommendations and ordered him to pay $909.14 per month plus a
processing fee for the period from August 1, 2018, to March 27, 2019, and based on a
statutory amendment, ordered him to pay $774.63 per month plus a processing fee
beginning March 28, 2019. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision. However,
Koscho filed objections asserting the magistrate had erred in finding that his income from
employment was $88,050, finding Hill did not have an ownership interest in Performance
Motors, not granting a deviation from the amount of child support that would otherwise
result from the basic child support schedule and applicable worksheet under R.C.
3119.23(J) for his work-related expenses (phone and internet), not granting a deviation
under R.C. 3119.23(M) or (Q) based on his responsibility for his other children for whom
he incurs child-care costs in order to work, and not granting a deviation under R.C.
3119.23(G) and (K) because Hill benefited from sharing living expenses with her
boyfriend.
{¶6} The trial court found that the magistrate’s factual findings were accurate
and overruled the objections. The court found that Koscho’s income from employment
was $88,050 per year and that there was “insufficient evidence” to support the assertion
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 5
that Hill had an ownership interest in Performance Motors. In addition, the court found
that the evidence did not support a finding that the amount of child support calculated
pursuant to the basic child support schedule and applicable worksheet would be unjust
or inappropriate. The court found most of Koscho’s requests for a deviation were
“speculative and not supported by the record.” The court also found that Hill was
“essentially the sole and primary care giver” for the parties’ child and Koscho does
receive some credit for his other children on the child support worksheet. The court
ordered him to pay the child support amounts in the magistrate’s decision.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶7} Koscho presents the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred when determining appellant, Christopher Koscho’s,
income.
II. The trial court erred when determining appellee, Rylie Hill, does not have
an ownership interest in a business and thereby additionally erred in
determining appellee’s income.
III. The trial court erred in determining that appellee, Rylie Hill, does not
receive benefits from shared living expenses and thus appellant, Mr.
Koscho is entitled to a deviation of his child support obligation.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶8} “In general, appellate courts will not reverse trial court decisions that relate
to child support matters unless the court abused its discretion.” In re Z.C., 4th Dist. Ross
No. 19CA3693, 2020-Ohio-3635, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion is “an unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or … a view or action that no
conscientious judge could honestly have taken.” State v. Brady,
119 Ohio St.3d 375,
2008-Ohio-4493,
894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 6
A. Employment Income
{¶9} In the first assignment of error, Koscho contends that the trial court abused
its discretion when it determined his income. Koscho asserts that “[t]here is competent
and credible evidence” that his income from employment is not $88,050 because he
testified that he has never earned his adjusted basic pay, that he does not know how the
government arrives at that amount, and that his actual pay appears in a different section
of his earnings statements which shows his gross pay for 2018 was $79,578.48, which is
consistent with information on his W-2 for 2018.
{¶10} The trial court’s finding that Koscho’s annual income from employment is
$88,050 was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Koscho’s earnings
statements state that his adjusted basic pay is $88,050. Although Koscho testified that
one could look at his earnings statements since 2002 and see that he has never earned
his adjusted basic pay, he failed to substantiate that testimony with documentary
evidence. Koscho is correct that his earnings statements reflect that his gross income in
2018 was $79,578.48. However, he did not present any evidence that his hourly rate
was $42.19 for the entirety of 2018. If it had been, he would have only earned 1,886.19
hours of regular pay that year ($79,578.48/$42.19) even though the 2018 earnings
statements he submitted indicate he earns 80 hours of regular pay every two weeks, and
his hourly rate is based on a 2087-hour work year. See generally 5 U.S.C. 5504(b)(1)
(“When, in the case of an employee, it is necessary for computation of pay under this
subsection to convert an annual rate of basic pay to a basic hourly … rate … [t]o
derive an hourly rate, divide the annual rate by 2,087”); 5 U.S.C. 5504(c)(1)(A)
(“employee” includes “an employee in or under an Executive agency”); 5 U.S.C. 105
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 7
(“For the purpose of this title, ‘Executive agency’ means an Executive department …”);
5 U.S.C. 101 (Department of Veterans Affairs is an Executive department). The two
2019 earnings statements Koscho submitted indicate that he was on track to earn over
$88,050 for work performed in 2019. Those statements show he earns 80 hours of
regular pay every two weeks at a rate of $42.19 an hour. If he received eight hours of
regular pay for each of the 261 weekdays in 2019 (including federal holidays), his gross
pay for those 2088 hours would have been $88,092.72. ($42.19 x 8 x 261).
{¶11} Koscho has not shown the trial court abused its discretion when it found
that his annual income from employment is $88,050. Accordingly, we overrule the first
assignment of error. In doing so, we observe that in the argument for this assignment of
error, Koscho mentions his testimony about his child-care costs and work-related
expenses. However, he does not explain how those expenses are relevant to the trial
court’s finding that his income from his employer is $88,050 a year. In his objections to
the magistrate’s decision, Koscho argued that these expenses warranted a child support
deviation under R.C. 3119.23(J) (extraordinary work-related expenses), R.C. 3119.23(M)
(responsibility for the support of others), and R.C. 3119.23(Q) (any other relevant factor).
However, he did not assign as error the trial court’s rejection of those arguments, so we
do not address those issues.
B. Business Ownership
{¶12} In the second assignment of error, Koscho contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it found that there was insufficient evidence to show that Hill
had an ownership interest in Performance Motors and therefore erred when it
determined her income. Koscho maintains that Hill’s checks from Performance Motors
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 8
and tax returns clearly establish her ownership interest. He asserts that Hill did not
produce any documentary evidence to show that she was a subcontractor and claims the
checks “provided an indicia of ownership withdrawals” because “[t]hey are handwritten
checks without any tax withholdings or other deductions consistent with paychecks” and
lack “any indication of payment for contract services.” He asserts that it would be
inconsistent for Hill to be a subcontractor and file Schedule C-EZ because it is used to
report business income from a sole proprietorship. He states that “[i]t stresses credulity
to believe that a court can ignore a federally promulgated and nationally recognized tax
form, with the purpose of reporting business income on personal income taxes, and
determine a Form 1040 Schedule C – which speaks for itself as the trial court noted – is
not competent and credible evidence of business ownership.” He asserts that Hill
claimed a business tax credit on her Ohio tax return and claimed 100% ownership of
Performance Motors on her 2017 Ohio Schedule IT BUS form. Koscho asserts we
would have to “ignore common sense” to believe that Hill’s accountant would mistakenly
“identify an employee or contractor as a business owner.” Koscho also claims the
magistrate prevented him from making a full inquiry into Hill’s ownership interest, and we
should reverse and remand for him to conduct further inquiry and investigation into Hill’s
“ownership in Performance Motors for determination of her true income.”
{¶13} The trial court’s determination that there was insufficient evidence to show
that Hill had an ownership interest in Performance Motors was not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Hill testified that she does not have an ownership interest
in Performance Motors and indicated that the business does not withhold taxes from her
checks because she is a subcontractor. See generally United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 9
22, 26 (1st Cir.2014) (“Employers are required to withhold Social Security, Medicare, and
federal income taxes from their employees’ paychecks and to remit those payroll taxes to
the IRS, along with matching contributions for Social Security and Medicare,” but these
“withholding requirements generally apply only with respect to employees, not with
respect to independent contractors”). Nothing on the face of the checks from
Performance Motors shows that they were ownership withdrawals as opposed to
payments for services rendered.
{¶14} Hill’s tax returns do not mandate a finding that she has an ownership
interest in Performance Motors. None of the cases Koscho cites stand for the
proposition that income earned as a subcontractor cannot be reported as business
income on the schedules Hill’s accountant used, and our research has revealed caselaw
that suggests it can be if Hill qualifies as an independent contractor. See Rodriguez v.
Commr. of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2012-286,
104 T.C.M. (CCH) 425,
2012 WL
4795576, *5 (Oct. 9, 2012) (“Independent contractors … may report their compensation
less related expenses as business income on Schedule C …”). In any event, even if
Hill’s tax returns suggest she has an ownership interest in the business, Hill testified that
she has “no ownership whatsoever” in the business, so her accountant must have made
a mistake. Koscho only speculates that an accountant would not make such an error
and that additional questioning of Hill, which the magistrate purportedly prevented, would
have revealed beneficial information about her income.
{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that there was insufficient evidence to show that Hill had an
ownership interest in Performance Motors. We overrule the second assignment of error.
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 10
C. Benefits from Sharing Living Expenses
{¶16} In the third assignment of error, Koscho contends the trial court erred when
it found he was not entitled to a child support deviation under R.C. 3119.23(G) because
Hill benefits from sharing living expenses with her boyfriend. Koscho asserts that Hill
and their child “receive great benefit from their living arrangements” because they live in
her boyfriend’s home on 40 acres of land, she does not pay rent, her boyfriend owns a
number of businesses the court precluded Koscho’s counsel from inquiring about, her
boyfriend provides for her and the minor child, and they share expenses as a normal
couple would. Koscho claims that if Hill truthfully testified about her income, she would
not be able to “expense-share with her boyfriend on a 40-acre farm.” He asserts that “it
is evident that she receives great benefit and has a high standard of living, given her
living situation with her boyfriend, who also owns other businesses.”
{¶17} R.C. 3119.22 states:
The court may order an amount of child support that deviates from the
amount of child support that would otherwise result from the use of the
basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet if, after
considering the factors and criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the
Revised Code, the court determines that the amount calculated pursuant to
the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet would be
unjust or inappropriate and therefore not be in the best interest of the child.
Under R.C. 3119.23(G), one of the factors the court “may consider … in determining
whether to grant a deviation” under R.C. 3119.22 is “[b]enefits that either parent receives
from … sharing living expenses with another person.”
{¶18} The trial court’s decision to not grant a deviation based on R.C. 3119.23(G)
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. It is unclear from the record how
much of a benefit Hill gets from sharing living expenses with her boyfriend. Although Hill
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 11
testified that she does not pay rent to Adkins, the record does not contain any other
evidence about Hill’s living expenses except summer child care, and her testimony that
Adkins provides for her and the child “as normal couples provide, I guess” is vague.
Koscho only speculates that because Hill’s boyfriend owns property and multiple
businesses, she and the child enjoy a standard of living that makes the amount
calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet
unjust or inappropriate. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion when it declined to grant a deviation based on R.C.
3119.23(G). Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶19} Having overruled the assigned errors, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 19CA3699 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of
this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
