Slip opinions decided 2021 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

Right to speedy trial

App.R. 26(B), ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, murder, vehicular homicide, trial strategy, appellate strategy, professional judgment, and jury instructions. The jury convicted appellant of murder for running over a person with her car during a violent altercation. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for not arguing vehicular homicide, when precedent exists for the principle that vehicular homicide is not a lesser included offense of murder. Instead, he argued in the exercise of professional judgment, inter alia, insufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, and the failure to instruct on accident.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely application good cause delay. The untimely application for reopening was denied where the application did not contain any argument or information to establish good cause for the delayed filing.

Motion to suppress excessive detention impermissible search. At the point where the original reason for detaining appellant was cleared, further detainment of appellant was impermissible and making a search of appellant's backpack a condition for his release an impermissible search.

Aggravated menacing, cross-examination recross-examination abuse of discretion blanket ban Evid.R. 611(B) reasonable limit. Appellant-defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated menacing. We found that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant's trial counsel to recross a state witness. We found that the trial court had imposed a blanket ban on recross-examination and that this was against Ohio's policy of allowing broad cross-examination.

Motion to suppress excessive detention impermissible search. At the point where the original reason for detaining appellant was cleared, further detainment of appellant was impermissible and making a search of appellant's backpack and person a condition for his release an impermissible search.

The trial court did not err in declining to enforce a promissory note and mortgage agreement, as there was a failure of consideration. The court also did not err in awarding damages for breach of a construction contract, as the contractor failed to substantially complete the project on time as agreed. However, the court did err in computing the damages, and the case will be remanded for the court's correction of a minor matter. In addition, the court did not err in concluding that the contractor acted recklessly with respect to the breach of contract. Finally, the court did not err in rejecting a quasi-contract claim for services performed by a third party, as there was no agreement to pay her and she provided nothing of value. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for correction of the judgment entry.

Appellant's 30-month sentence for aggravated possession of drugs was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record the record does not support appellant's claim that that his due process rights were violated because the court relied on inaccurate information. No ineffective assistance of counsel shown. Judgment affirmed.

Following an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find that there are no issues with arguable merit for appellant to advance on appeal. Appellate counsel's potential assignment of error concerning the validity of appellant's guilty plea lacks arguable merit because the record of the plea hearing indicates that the trial court complied with the requirements set forth in Crim.R. 11(C). Appellant's pro se arguments challenging his sentence and the indicted charges also lack arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in failing to address Husband's retirement benefits in its distribution of marital property. Because the issue of spousal support can be determined only after an equitable division of marital property, R.C. 3105.171(C)(3), the court's distribution of the retirement account on remand will necessarily require it to reconsider the issue of spousal support. The trial court's order making Husband responsible for "all outstanding bills associated with the prior marital residence" did not set forth with sufficient specificity what he was required to pay. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

Appellant's convictions for felony murder, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, and tampering with evidence were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of felony murder thus the trial court did not err by not giving a reckless homicide instruction. Further, although voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of felony murder, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in its refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Finally, the trial court did not err by not merging the improper discharge of a firearm conviction into the felony murder conviction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for violating a protection order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, as such, was based upon sufficient evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Restoration Damages, Measure of Damages, Expert Testimony

On application for reinstatement.

Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the trial court's partial compliance with Crim.R. 11. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with court of appeals' remand instructions while the appeal was pending in the Ohio Supreme Court.

Sentence was contrary to law because the trial court found the violation of a community control sanction was also a violation of postrelease control.

R.C. 3109.04 termination of shared parenting plan in camera interview contempt attorney fees. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating shared parenting plan and designating father residential parent and custodial guardian of two of parties' three children trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a second in camera interview before terminating shared parenting plan trial court did not err in awarding father attorney fees for mother's contempt, but matter was remanded where contempt attorney fee award reflected total fee bill.

Trial court's award of permanent custody to children services is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where mother is in prison for child endangerment for failing to protect an older child from rape and sexual abuse done by mother's boyfriend. Legal custody to paternal grandmother not in the children's best interest where grandmother knew of the abuse and did not stop it, and where she cannot care for children's special needs.

Trial court grant of summary judgment is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. Summary judgment, de novo review, trade secrets, breach of contract, intentional torts

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for domestic violence is not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testifies that appellant choked, punched, and slapped her following an argument, and where her mother contemporaneously observed the injuries, and photographs of the injuries were entered into evidence.

Summary judgment in favor of defendant-hospital on plaintiff's claim for negligent credentialing is appropriate where plaintiff fails to obtain a prior determination that defendant-doctor's malpractice proximately caused plaintiff's injury. Defendant-doctor's testimony purportedly conceding the essential elements of a malpractice claim is not a prior determination by adjudication or stipulation.

operating a vehicle under the influence – snowmobile – sufficiency – operation – circumstantial evidence – manifest weight – harmless beyond a reasonable doubt – prior determination

The trial court's findings are clearly and convincingly supported by the record, and thus the defendant-appellant's sentence is not contrary to law.

APPELLATE REVIEW - lack of a final, appealable order R.C. 2505.02(B) Need final judgment by the trial court for this court to have jurisdiction entry is prefatory to the issuance of a final order and contemplates that further action must be taken.

The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the eggshell skull rule, nor was the jury's verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence, where appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the proximate cause of the injuries he received to his right shoulder were sustained while in the course of, and arising out of, his employment with appellant rather than the result of natural deterioration. Therefore, because appellee was able to prove the injuries to his right shoulder were sustained while in the course of, and arising out of, his employment with appellant, the trial court did not err by confirming the jury's verdict finding appellee was entitled to participate in the benefits provided to him under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act.

The trial court did not err in awarding jailtime credit for two concurrent sentences, but not awarding the same jailtime credit for a sentence that was run consecutive to the concurrent sentences where the one-time credit reduced the entire prison sentence by the amount of time appellant served in jail prior to his sentencing.

The trial court did not err by sentencing appellant to serve 180 days in jail for each of the three first-degree misdemeanor offenses for which he pled guilty where the sentence imposed for each of the three offenses fell within the statutory limits for a first-degree misdemeanor and the trial court considered the necessary sentencing statutes prior to specifying the three sentences would be served consecutively.

guilty plea, knowingly, intelligently, speedy trial, appellate rights

R.C. 2945.371(A), competence to stand trial, second comptency evaluation

Motion for judgment on pleadings

On application for reinstatement.

Appellant's convictions for murder, aggravated robbery and having weapons while under disabililty supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial court did not err in affirming the Ohio Department of Commerce's denial of appellant's application for a medical marijuana cultivator level I provisional license. Appellant was not denied due process. Additionally, reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the application denial. Judgment affirmed.

SPEEDY TRIAL-R.C. 2941.401 - The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon speedy trial grounds because R.C. 2941.401's speedy trial limit of 180 days was not exceeded where the tolling provisions of R.C. 2945.72 apply

shared parenting, residential parent, best interest, abuse of discretion, contempt, child support, manifest weight, harmless error

legal custody with protective supervision final, appealable order live controversy necessary for relief on appeal child's custody has changed since appeal filed

summary judgment, qualified immunity, third-party attorney malpractice, malice, sufficient evidence, unredacted subpoena

ineffective assistance, reopened appeal, weapons while under disability, corpus delicti, R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a), R.C. 2901.13(G)

felony murder, felonious assault, ineffective assistance, jury instructions, plain error, sufficiency, manifest weight, Crim.R. 29, self-defense

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

ineffective assistance of counsel guilty plea speedy trial a waiver

Civ.R. 56, summary judgment tenure. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee university regarding the denial of appellant's application for tenure is reversed. A university has broad discretion to make decisions about such matters that "must be left for evaluation by the professionals, particularly since they often involve inquiry into aspects of arcane scholarship beyond the competence of individual judges." Gogate v. Ohio State Univ., 42 Ohio App.3d 220, 226, 537 N.E.2d 690 (10th Dist.1987). However, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the university committed procedural errors that prejudiced the appellant's application for tenure and promotion. Accordingly, summary judgment was improper.

Guilty pleas attempted domestic violence nonexistent offense invited error motion to withdraw guilty pleas Crim.R. 32.1 manifest injustice evidentiary hearing ineffective assistance of counsel mental health evaluation R.C. 2945.371(A) referral to mental health docket R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) review of felony sentences R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 excessive sentences court costs. Defendant's challenge to his guilty plea to attempted domestic violence on the basis that it was a nonexistent offense was invited error. Defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to advise him that he was pleading guilty to a nonexistent offense and that, if he had known this, he would not have pled guilty and would have, instead, insisted upon going to trial. Trial court did not err in failing to order a mental health evaluation before accepting defendant's guilty pleas where no issue was raised below as to defendant's competency to enter a guilty plea or as to his sanity at the time he committed the offenses at issue and there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant exhibited any outward signs of incompetency. Defendant made no showing that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate defendant's mental health, failing to request a transfer to the mental health docket, failing to explore sanity and blackout defenses or failing to provide mitigating mental health information to the trial court for consideration during sentencing. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without an evidentiary hearing where defendant submitted no affidavits or any other relevant evidentiary materials in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and did not point to any specific facts in the record that could otherwise support his claim of manifest injustice. Trial court complied with its obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when sentencing defendant. An appellate court cannot review a defendant's sentences to determine whether they are excessive or otherwise not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Trial court order imposing court costs reversed case remanded for trial court to vacate imposition of court costs.

Medical malpractice pro se plaintiff dismissal for failure to file affidavit of merit motion for leave to amend complaint state of limitations cognizable event service by mail presumption of proper service motion for relief from judgment. Dismissal of pro se plaintiff's medical malpractice complaint against 20 defendants affirmed. Complaint was filed after the statute of limitations expired, and plaintiff failed to file the affidavit of merit required by Civ.R. 10(D).

Violation of protection order R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) furthermore clause R.C. 2919.27(B)(3) manifest weight of the evidence prior conviction as essential element of the crime. The defendant's conviction for violating a protection order is not against the manifest weight of the evidence despite conflicting witness testimony. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence that the defendant had a prior conviction for violating a protection order. Such evidence was necessary to prove the element of the "furthermore clause" that the defendant had a prior conviction for violating a protection order.

Consecutive sentences clearly and convincingly rape sexual battery first-time offender R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Defendant-appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences on the grounds that the record does not clearly and convincingly support the findings made by the trial court. Defendant argues that because he was a first-time offender and that there is nothing to indicate he would reoffend. The record clearly and convincingly supported the imposition of consecutive sentences because of the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, the trauma of the victim, and the risk the defendant posed in the future.

Jury instruction aggravated robbery theft define common usage sufficient evidence plain error removal of juror for cause retaliation abuse of discretion.

R.C. 5311.23 breach of contract declaration and bylaws condominium unit owners' association summary judgment. The trial court's judgment granting partial summary judgment to the condominium unit owners' association was affirmed. There was no ambiguity in the declaration or bylaws that all unit owners must pay their share of the parking costs under the parking lease even if they did not have a parking space assigned to their unit.

Child support motion to modify child support R.C. 3119.79. The trial court's judgment modifying child support is affirmed because the court did not apply the child support statutes retroactively to mother's child support obligation incurred before the effective date of amended R.C. Chapter 3119. The amended statutory provisions only impacted her child support obligations after the effective date.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment foreclosure note mortgage. In a foreclosure action, where the plaintiff presents evidence to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment, the defendant's speculation and unsupported assertions to the contrary do not demonstrate genuine issues of material fact for trial. Where the plaintiff's evidence demonstrates that it is the holder of the note, has an interest in the mortgage and the amount of principal and interest due, the defendant's unsubstantiated claims to the contrary are an insufficient basis by which to deny summary judgment.

The magistrate properly found that the consolidated cases must be dismissed for failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2969.25(A). Relator's objections overruled and magistrate's decision adopted with the modification clarifying that both cases must be dismissed without any consideration of the merits of either motion of OAPA to dismiss filed in case No. 19-534 granted and consolidated actions in mandamus dismissed.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting domestic violence/assault victim's out-of-court statements to sister under Evid.R. 803(2), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Trial court's admission of the statements did not violate his right to confrontation under either the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a continuance to procure victim's appearance at trial where victim ignored subpoena issued by city, defendant did not specify the proposed length of the continuance, defendant did not proffer summary of victim's anticipated testimony. Defendant's convictions for domestic violence and assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Magistrate decision dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of territorial jurisdiction reviewed and adopted pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4).

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The record establishes that appellant's guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

Business partner, appellant, brought suit against second partner and the second partner's wife, appellee, alleging that the second partner converted business property and used that property to open a competing business and renovate the couple's home. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to wife on appellant's civil conspiracy claim based on that conduct. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to wife on conversion claim to the extent that there was evidence that her husband converted the property as a partner in and on behalf of the new competing business in which she was a partner. As to the second partner's other alleged acts of conversion, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to his wife on appellant's conversion claim. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of the minor child to Children Services. There was competent, credible evidence that granting permanent custody of the child to Children Services was in the best interest of the child. The magistrate did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing Mother made the request at the hearing itself and failed to establish good cause for continuing the hearing at the last minute. Judgment affirmed.

Children services agency was under no duty to investigate all possible relative placements for a child before seeking permanent custody of the child. The juvenile court did not err when it found that placement of the child with Maternal Grandmother was not in the best interest of the child. Mother failed to establish that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the permanent custody hearing. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that awarding permanent custody to children services was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by adjudicating appellant delinquent for committing rape. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit appellant fails to show that counsel's allegedly deficient conduct with respect to the State's plea offer prejudiced him, and appellant fails to show that the cumulative effect of counsel's allegedly deficient conduct constituted ineffective assistance. The trial court's limitation of appellant's cross-examination of the victim was not prejudicial the testimony sought was given in response to other questions. Lastly, the adjudication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the evidence supported a finding that the sexual conduct was compelled by force. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

A jury found that appellant-wife fraudulently transferred real estate and four bank accounts to appellant-husband. The trial court properly considered the appellants' objection to allegedly inadmissible evidence being used by the jury. The magistrate who conducted the parties' jury trial properly entered judgment on the jury's verdicts. The appellee's claim for fraudulent transfer of real estate was not barred by res judicata. The trial court did not err in upholding the magistrate's decision allowing the appellants' prior attorney to testify despite a claim that his testimony disclosed privileged communications. The trial court correctly upheld the magistrate's decision denying a mistrial. The trial court did not err in upholding the magistrate's denial of a directed-verdict motion. The trial court's judgment is not subject to reversal with respect to finding a fraudulent transfer based on the transfer of money from a bank account held by the appellants jointly to another bank account held by the appellants jointly. With respect to the questioned account, the evidence supported a conclusion that there was a previous fraudulent transfer of assets solely in wife's name to a joint account with husband, within the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court did not err in upholding a finding that one of the appellants transferred assets to the other appellant with actual intent to hinder, defraud, or delay a creditor. The trial court did not err in upholding a finding that funds allegedly returned to the transferor appellant should be included as a fraudulent transfer the jury was free to disbelieve that the transferee appellant actually returned the funds to the transferor appellant. The trial court did not err in upholding a finding that the appellee suffered damages as a result of fraudulent transfers. The trial court did not err in overruling objections to the magistrate's denial of the appellants' summary-judgment motion. The appellants have not demonstrated error in the denial of a motion in limine. The trial court did not err in upholding the denial of the appellants' motion for sanctions and a related motion to dismiss. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted on one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and one count of sexual battery, and he was sentenced to a term in prison on each count. The trial court incorrectly stated at appellant's sentencing hearing that a prison term was presumptively necessary, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13, for the offense of sexual battery. Although the presumption did not apply because the victim of the offense was over the age of 13, the trial court's error was harmless. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

Trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant's brother threatened witness where defendant was not shown to have been involved in those threats and threats were not offered for proper purpose such as to explain why a witness's story changed or why a witness did not immediately come forward to police. Reversal was required because state failed to show that admission of improper evidence did not affect defendant's substantial rights.

Action properly commenced against appellant where his first name was incorrectly stated in the caption of the complaint, but the body of the complaint and all subsequent filings used his correct name. Service by ordinary mail proper where sent to correct address with correct surname and not returned. Default judgment award that is different in kind than that prayed for is ground for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5).

Where court imposed consecutive sentences in multiple judgment entries and applied full amount of jail-time credit in one judgment entry and zero days credit in second judgment entry, concern that error could occur should the first sentence someday be declared void raises only a potential controversy. Judgments currently and correctly reflect single reduction to aggregate sentence. Appellant fails to explain how jail-time credit was miscalculated and error is not evident from the record.

Lucas County Juvenile Court did not err in appellant's probable cause bindover hearing. The transfer of appellant's murder case to the adult division of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court was not improper. Judgment affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel-admission of medical records

Sentence supported by clear and convincing evidence guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made denial of motion to withdraw plea was not an abuse of discretion.

Deceased confidential informant joinder of indictments mistrial, sentence

Crim.R. 33 new trial, interpreter, Sup.R. 88, R.C. 2311.14

R.C. 4549.02(B)(4) – R.C. 4510.11(G) – R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) – R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) – failure to stop – driving under suspension – restitution

grandparent visitation – R.C. 3109.12 – juvenile court subject matter jurisdiction – R.C. 2151.23 – void ab initio – complaint – standing

radar—speeding—manifest weight

The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it allocated the parties' parenting time schedule by awarding each parent nearly equal parenting time, nor did the domestic relations court abuse its discretion by designating appellee as their child's residential parent for school purposes where appellee testified that he would send the child to public school whereas appellant testified that she planned to homeschool the child during her workday as a dog groomer at a dog grooming facility.

Appellant is not entitled to have his guilty plea vacated for failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) where the trial court corrected its overstatement of the maximum penalty appellant faced under the Reagan Tokes Act for his convictions to two counts of rape prior to sentencing, provided appellant with the opportunity to withdraw his plea, something appellant indicated through counsel that he did not wish to do, and where appellant failed to show any prejudice from the court's overstatement of the maximum sentence.

Trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s maximum penalty provision during plea colloquy. Even if there was not compliance here, appellant did not demonstrate any prejudice.

Defendant-Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence.

The trial court erred by concluding that the writing evidencing an alleged option contract between plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants' predecessor trustee contained the essential terms of the alleged contract. In addition, the trial court erred by concluding that the doctrine of part performance applies to remove the alleged option contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. Accordingly, the trial court should have sustained defendants-appellants' objections to the magistrate's decision and determined that the alleged option contract is unenforceable.

The trial court did not err in its sentencing of the defendant-appellant. Judgment affirmed.

Because the division of property and qualified domestic relations orders are not void, the trial court erred by vacating the orders entered subsequent to the parties' divorce decree. Because the trial court failed to fully and properly consider defendant-appellant's objection to the magistrate's decision, the matter is remanded for the trial court to consider defendant-appellant's objection.

CRIMINAL LAW: sentencing R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 no appellate review pursuant to R.C. 2953.08.

CIVIL - final order temporary custody order substantial right special proceeding R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) no just reason for delay Civ.R. 54(B)

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing waiver of constitutional arguments allied offenses of similar import R.C. 2941.25 Grand Theft Aggravated Robbery Attempted Murder seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal.

child support abuse of discretion income ownership interest living expenses R.C. 3119.23(G)

gross sexual imposition Alford plea heightened Alford inquiry constitutional error de novo review factual basis innocence

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—A judge's failure to respond to allegations of bias and prejudice may result in the judge's disqualification to avoid the appearance of impropriety—Affidavit granted.

probate, estate, contingent claim, medical bill, covered services, R.C. 2117.06, R.C. 2117.37

ASSAULT: The defendant's conviction for assault under R.C. 2903.13 was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim's testimony was sufficient to establish that the defendant caused physical harm to the victim the trial court was entitled to reject the defendant's claim that he did not touch the victim.

Manifest Weight/Sufficiency

R.C.2151.35(B)(1)/Dispositional hearing

Denial of motion to suppress results of K9 sniff

Plea speedy trial constitutional delay prejudice. - Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where the delay was mostly attributed to the defendant and no prejudice from the delay was shown.

Constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act S.B. 201 failure to object to sentence manifest weight of the evidence.

Motion to stay and to compel arbitration unconscionable arbitration clause R.C. Chapter 2711 Ohio Home Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA). Appellants failed to prove that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable and further failed to show that their claims fell outside of their agreement to arbitrate. There was no abuse of discretion where the trial court granted appellees' motion to stay trial and compel arbitration. Whether the contract is void based on a HSSA violation is left to the arbitrator, and, here, that claim is premature.

R.C. 2929.14/consecutive sentences. The trial court engaged in the correct analysis evidence in the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act S.B. 201 failure to object to sentence. Because defendant failed to object to his sentence or raise a constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Act at his sentencing hearing, we decline to address his constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal.

Self-defense jury instructions manifest weight, ineffective assistance

Divorce decree laches

Meaning of "Agricultural Use Value" and Property Valuation

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea on manifest injustice grounds following affirmance of defendant's convictions on direct appeal

Appellant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that appellant caused the injuries sustained by the victim in this case therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The jury was free to believe the testimony of the victim in this case, and appellant's conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because the jury found his testimony more credible than that of appellant. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by abusing its discretion in allowing the state to present evidence of a prior conviction of felonious assault for the purposes of impeaching appellant's credibility, and even if there was error such error was harmless. Judgment affirmed.

Objection overruled action dismissed. The magistrate properly determined that relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus must be dismissed for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C). Magistrate's decision adopted, action for mandamus sua sponte dismissed.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

State's appeal. The trial court erred in finding that the Reagan Tokes Act violates the separation of powers doctrine and in imposing a definite two-year sentence that was not in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Act. Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to obey a discovery order or in finding appellant in contempt for the disobedience. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant and his attorney, jointly and severally, to pay attorney fees as a discovery sanction. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

The State adduced sufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions for two counts of theft, and his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, appellant received the specific sentence that he requested in a sentencing memorandum filed with the trial court. Pursuant to the doctrine of invited error, he cannot now challenge his sentence as being contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

There is no judgment for this court to review on appeal. The notice of appeal filed herein indicates that appellant only appealed from the trial court's judgment overruling her motion to withdraw her guilty plea to felonious assault in Case No. 2018-CR-4041. In this case, appellant pled guilty to improperly handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and appellant never moved to withdraw that plea. As a result, there is no judgment in this case for this court to review on appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's denial of a civil protection order when she failed to file objections, as required by Civ.R. 65.1. Moreover, because she failed to file a transcript of the full hearing before the magistrate, we must presume that the evidence supported the magistrate's findings. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by dismissing appellants' claims for unjust enrichment and a violation of equal protection for lack of jurisdiction. The claims sound in law and must be brought in the Court of Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over legal claims against appellee. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant Rhododendron has not identified anywhere in the record where it sought a delay under Civ.R. 56(F) or otherwise alleged prejudice as a result of the trial court's considering the appellees' summary-judgment motion without first resolving a pending motion to compel discovery. This failure by Rhododendron waived the issue. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee Thomas Bradley Harris on a claim alleging a violation of Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The record reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris misappropriated a trade secret under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) by knowingly using "design-history files" from a company called NovoSource without consent in a way that violated a duty to limit his use of the files. A trier of fact reasonably might find the existence of such a duty based on testimony about an oral agreement between Harris and Andrew Cothrel, the CEO of NovoSource, limiting Harris' use of the files. The record reveals no genuine issue of material fact, however, as to whether appellees Andrew Rynearson or Jack Diamond misappropriated the design-history files by impermissibly using them. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against appellant Rhododendron on two counts alleging breach of contract. Rhododendron brought the claims as assignee and successor in interest to the rights of NovoSource. But the contracts at issue were not among the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. The contracts explicitly were excluded from the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. Finally, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against Rhododendron on three other counts. The appellees' summary-judgment motion partially incorporated by reference arguments made in their earlier motion to dismiss counts one, two, and fourteen. But the act of incorporating by reference arguments made in a prior motion to dismiss did not impermissibly "convert" the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellant cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's decision to grant a civil stalking protection order when he failed to file objections in the trial court, as required by Civ.R. 65.1. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court decision to impose consecutive sentences affirmed because the trial court made the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry, and the record supports the trial court's findings.

Trial court order properly denied appellant's motion to intervene. Judgment affirmed. Intervenion, abuse of discretion, forfeiture

Appellant's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence the interview with licensed social worker was admissible in evidence, the prosecutor's conduct did not prejudice defense, Reagan Tokes Law is not ripe for review and no cumulative error occurred.

In a divorce proceeding, a trial court may properly exercise flexibility in order to achieve an equitable division of marital property.

Appeal of maximum sentence

Ineffective assistance

OVI - Manifest Weight - Sufficiency of the Evidence

speedy trial – sufficiency – manifest weight – expert witness – ineffective assistance – aggravated possession of drugs – methamphetamine

Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented evidence that appellant created a substantial risk to his daughter's health and caused serious public inconvenience or alarm while he was armed during a domestic dispute that resulted in a police standoff. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial where no error occurred at trial that affected materially his substantial rights thereby denying him a fair trial.

Appellant was not provided with ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to obtain his consent prior to waiving his speedy trial rights for it is well-established that a defendant is bound by his counsel's waiver of speedy trial rights even though the waiver might have been executed without his consent. Appellant was also not provided with ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress raising a chain of custody issue for it is equally well-established that a challenge to the chain of custody is an issue not properly raised in a motion to suppress, but in a motion in limine. Additionally, the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds because the 270-day time limit set forth in R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) had not yet expired before appellant entered his no contest plea when considering there were several tolling events that bring the total number of days chargeable to the state back down below the required 270-day time limit. These tolling events included, but were not limited to, appellant filing a motion for a continuance and a motion to suppress. Finally, the trial court's decision to sentence appellant to an indefinite term of a minimum of five years in prison and a maximum of seven-and-one-half years in prison was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court properly considered the necessary sentencing statutes, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, correctly imposed postrelease control, and accurately sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory range for the first-degree felony offense.

While appellant's individual sentences were not contrary to law, the trial court erred in ordering appellant to serve his sentences consecutively without first making the requisite consecutive sentence findings.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling plaintiff-appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision or by designating defendant-appellee as the residential parent of plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee's minor child.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Defendant-appellant failed to properly argue that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

A jury may make multiple inferences from the same fact, but a jury may not make an inference from an inference.

On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court committed any alleged errors. Under App.R. 16(A), an appellant must cite to legal authorities in support of his or her argument. Further, App.R. 9(B) generally requires an appellant to file a transcript of any proceedings relevant to the appeal with the appellate court.

Trial court properly considered and weighed the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - divorce temporary orders Rule 75 hearing credibility of witnesses financial misconduct equitable distribution of marital assets third party defendant temporary restraining order business income abuse of discretion unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable totality of the circumstances competent, credible evidence R.C. 3105.171 tracing of separate property valuation of marital property commingling of property property acquired during marriage manifest weight of the evidence joinder R.C. 3105.18 payment of marital expenses spousal support consideration of statutory factors child support R.C. 3119.04 due process App.R. 9 supplementing the record on appeal attorney fees R.C. 3105.73(A) valuation of business expert witness testimony exchange of expert reports unfair prejudice inadmissible testimony affirmed.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal reason does not justify delay of three and a half years before filing of notice.

CRIMINAl - final order jurisdiction pending appeal Crim.R. 32(C) guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary traffic case Traf.R. 1 petty offense Traf.R. 2 effect of guilty plea Traf.R. 10(D)

Aggravated Menacing - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Bad Acts Evidence - Evid. R. 404(B) - Harmless Error

failure to purge contempt, sentence imposed

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), wishes of the child, in camera interview

Reagan Tokes Law separation of powers due process R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2967.271 indefinite sentence ripeness habeas corpus

Because the trial court did not adequately comply with R.C. 2929.14(C), consecutive sentences are contrary to law and matter remanded for re-sentencing.

Trial court decision denying postconviction petition without a hearing is affirmed. Defendant's convictions for offenses indicted with gun specifications when the specifications were dismissed as part of a plea agreement were not void ab initio. Surplus language in judgment entry did no prejudice defendant.

Appellant's conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

On application for reinstatement.

spousal support – modification – R.C. 3105.18(E) – R.C. 3105.18(F) – res judicata – manifest weight

R.C. 2953.32 – R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a) – R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b) – R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) – application for sealing – ineligible offender – offense of violence – misdemeanor assault

Crim.R. 33, motion for new trial, juror misconduct, nondisclosure of information during voir dire, dishonest answer, prejudice to defendant, valid basis, challenge for cause, Crim.R. 24, bias, impartial juror

child support, CSEA, administrative termination order, Civ.R. 60(B), jurisdiction, reconsider, continue child support order, Castle child, R.C. 3119.86, disabled adult child

domestic violence – assault – self-defense – cell phone recording – no exhibits – record incomplete – presume regularity

Fourth amendment/Extension of traffic stop/Motion to suppress/Drug sniffing dog/Merger of offenses/Consecutive sentences/Expert witnesses/Consecutive sentences

Fourth amendment/Extension of traffic stop

Writ of habeas corpus

Writ of Restitution Granted

delinquent juvenile court jurisdiction R.C. 2152.10 R.C. 2152.12 probable cause hearing aggravated murder amenability hearing rehabilitation bindover hearing non-adjudicatory proceeding abuse of discretion standard guilty plea waiver nonjurisdictional defects motion to suppress ineffective assistance of counsel forfeit plain error

Sexual predator clear and convincing evidence Megan's Law manifest weight of the evidence Eppinger. The trial court made an adequate record for reviewing the trial court's determination that the defendant was a sexual predator under Megan's Law. The trial court made the statutory findings necessary to classify the defendant as a sexual predator and those findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Frivolous conduct malicious malice willingly bad faith evidence motion deposition abuse of discretion sanction attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the affidavit of a witness who did not testify in person during the sanctions hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendants' motion for attorney fees and sanctions under Civ.R. 11. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the claims of defamation, malicious prosecution, civil trespass, and malicious damage of property were not frivolously filed. However, the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the aiding and abetting malicious prosecution claim was warranted under existing law.

Postconviction relief untimely ineffective assistance of counsel conflict of interest eyewitness amended petition abuse of discretion. Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief with four claims then filed an amended petition for postconviction relief with a fifth claim. The trial court denied his petition as untimely and did not have a hearing. Despite that the court gave a full and fair hearing to each of the appellant's claims. The appellant submitted affidavits of additional eyewitness testimony that he argues shows he did not commit the murder he was convicted of. He argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present these witnesses. We found that the eyewitness's testimony was not credible. At trial, the state presented evidence that the appellant was familiar with guns, through photos and evidence that guns were found in his room. Appellant now presents affidavit testimony that he argues would have eliminated the prejudicial effect of the state's evidence. However, we do not find that counsel's failure to present the evidence was prejudicial because the jury did not believe the appellant's self-defense argument. Finally, appellant presented affidavit testimony that his attorney had a conflict of interest. We did not find a conflict of interest. Accordingly, we did not find that the trial court abused its discretion.

Summary judgment vehicle Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act CSPA misrepresentation breach of warranty discrimination R.C. 1345.02(A) R.C. 1345.03(A) R.C. 4112.021(B)(1)(a) financing loan interest rate buy rate customer rate lowest rate limited warranty. Summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee car dealership was upheld on claims of violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and discrimination. Dealership, which offered to help appellant obtain financing "at the best and lowest rate available" for a pre-owned vehicle, had no duty to disclose its financing arrangement with the lender or the buy rate for a loan, and there was no evidence of an unfair or deceptive act, an unconscionable act or practice, or any misrepresentation with regard to the financing. The limited warranty, which covered "the engine and transmission only," did not cover the air conditioning compressor under the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. There was no evidence of discrimination.

Motion to withdraw dismissed Anders. - Counsel's motion to withdraw granted and appeal dismissed pursuant to Anders where an appeal would be wholly frivolous.

Petition for postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 substantive grounds for relief guilty plea. The trial court did not err in denying a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing because the defendant failed to demonstrate any substantive ground for relief.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) breach of lease agreement request for admissions Civ.R. 36 default admissions contradictory information in admissions genuine issue of material fact. Where tenant failed to respond to landlord's request for admissions and did not move implicitly or explicitly to withdraw or amend the default admissions, trial court properly granted summary judgment to landlord on the issue of liability for breach of lease agreement. However, because tenant's default admissions — the sole evidence landlord relied on to support its summary judgment motion — contained contradictory information regarding its damages, landlord did not meet its burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. Trial court, therefore, erred to the extent it granted summary judgment in favor of landlord on the issue of damages.

Sua sponte dismissal Civ.R. 12(B)(6) res judicata statute of limitations. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff-appellant's claims against defendants where the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the claims were barred by res judicata, and the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion of ODPS to dismiss for lack of standing. The collective bargaining agreement does not contain a provision giving appellant the independent right to submit his grievance to arbitration therefore, appellant does not have standing to petition a court to vacate the award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider whether biological mother, by her words and actions, agreed to permanently share legal custody of children with ex-spouse. Trial court's finding that biological mother had sole legal custody of the children was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court's decision granting the motion for permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court decision denying defendant-appellant's motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief vacated and appeal dismissed. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine motion where case was no direct appeal and reviewing court had not issued an order remanding the case to the trial court for consideration of Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellants' emergency motion for a continuance of the trial. Appellants failed to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by the trial court's denial of the motion, and in the absence of a transcript being filed by appellants it is impossible to discern from the record any such prejudice. Judgment affirmed.

summary judgment in favor of surface owner Marketable Title Act extinguished mineral interest no exception applied Dormant Mineral Act claim that interest was abandoned moot

The record of appellant's prior direct appeal from his conviction for aggravated burglary included a copy of the plea hearing transcript. Thus, the trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion seeking an order requiring that the plea hearing transcript be filed in the appellate court. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant appeals the maximum, consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Moreover, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a mechanism for an appellate court to modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding that the sentence is contrary to law because it is clearly and convincingly not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Jones, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6729, __ N.E.3d __. Finally, we cannot conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the consecutive sentence findings were not supported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in treating the appellant's pro se filing seeking "summary judgment" as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 or in dismissing it on that basis. The appellant's substantive arguments also fail on their merits, including arguments that he should have been convicted of attempting to commit offenses rather than being complicit in the commission of those offenses and that he could not be convicted of a firearm specification where he personally did not display, brandish or use a firearm and did not have direct contact with the victim. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of one count of felonious assault following her guilty plea. Counsel filed an Anders brief on appeal, asserting as potential assignments of error that appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. These arguments are without arguable merit, and our independent review of the record reveals no other non-frivolous issues for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court issued an order which sealed the record of appellee's federal conviction. The trial court erred by including in that order a provision which would prevent the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation from performing a future authorized criminal record check seeking information regarding appellee's federal conviction. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The juvenile court granted permanent custody of appellant's child to a children services agency. The record reflects that the child was in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 months out of a 22-month period. The record also supports the juvenile court's determination that granting permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in imposing partially consecutive sentences for the appellant's aggravated drug trafficking convictions. The record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court also indicated that it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. This court may not vacate or modify the appellant's sentence based on an argument that the record fails to support the trial court's analysis or consideration of those statutory factors. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring in judgment only.)

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for de novo resentencing or to correct sentence. Appellant's arguments were barred by res judicata, his sentence was not void, and the trial court was not the appropriate forum to challenge the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's calculation of the expiration date of his maximum indefinite sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellant's prejudicial misjoinder argument was barred by res judicata. Moreover, the evidence regarding the charge of aggravated burglary, which was dismissed pursuant to Crim.R. 29 at the conclusion of the State's case, did not create "compelling prejudice" such that appellant was entitled to a new trial on the remaining counts due to prejudicial misjoinder, or spillover prejudice. The record strongly suggests that the firearm used in the offense was not destroyed, as stated in the State's inventory report pursuant to R.C. 2953.75(A). Nevertheless, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's application for post-conviction DNA testing of the firearm on the ground that an exclusion result would not be outcome determinative. Judgments affirmed.

CRIMINAL-ARRAIGNMENT - Trial court erred where, based on review of the record provided, Appellant was not fully apprised of his right to a jury trial and of the requirements pursuant to Crim.R. 23(A) to timely demand one in writing and we cannot simply assume because Appellant was later appointed a lawyer that he must have been fully informed.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

CRIMINAL LAW - evidence must support jury instruction on lesser included offenses, involuntary intoxication trial court's jury tree, aid to assist jury answer to jury question clarified instructions expert witnesses, would confuse jury did not invoke right to remain silent gruesome photographs, not prejudicial, repititive, or cumulative sufficient evidence of purposeful to commit murder manifest weight supported the jury's verdict consecutive sentences, not contrary to law, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS – mandamus, prohibition, procedendo legal malpractice summary judgment adequate legal remedy lack of judicial authority not patent and unambiguous.

CIVIL - For cases filed in Ohio state courts, the Ohio.R.Civ.Pro. Apply, not the FRCP Supreme Court of Ohio's Guidelines for Assignments of Judges have not been adopted as rules pursuant to Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution and are not binding on Ohio courts the Rules of Superintendence are not the equivalent of rules of procedure and have no force equivalent to a statute appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review the appointment of a visiting judge so appointed by the Supreme Court of Ohio failure to abide by trial court's local rules regarding attorney's withdrawal did not merit reversal where appellant acknowledges notice of intent to withdraw was sent to her via email appellant in a civil case generally has no right to the appointment of counsel unsolicited emails from appellant to opposing counsel's firm relating to an unrelated case did not create a conflict of interest with opposing counsel's representation of defendant-appellees appeal is not the appropriate vehicle for an alleged violation of R.C.149.43 trial court did not err in granting directed verdict for several defendants when no allegations of their wrong-doing, or even their names, were presented in plaintiff's opening statements there is generally no constitutional right to discovery plaintiff was not entitled to additional discovery time-extensions when neither she nor her attorney pursued the request for over two years trial court did not err in limiting opening statements to 20 minutes when counsel agreed, denied needing additional time, and time limit was applied equally to all parties testimony of plaintiff's doctor from another unrelated case was inadmissible hearsay trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous for failing to include a separate instruction on destruction of timber and "willful and wanton conduct" where these claims were included in other instructions appellant may not raise issues of summary judgment on appeal when she did not move for summary judgment below affirmed.

CIVIL - sanctions granted against plaintiff-appellant even once an appeal is taken, a trial court may consider collateral issues not related to the merits of the action trial court did not err by sealing the jury's names, contact information, and verdict forms from litigious plaintiff-appellant res judicata bars claims that were or could have been brought in prior appeal appellant's conduct below was frivolous violations of Loc.R. do not generally constitute grounds for reversal affirmed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION - final appealable order contempt finding of contempt and imposition of sanction failure to impose sanction

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - resentencing law of the case doctrine intervening inconsistent Supreme Court decision R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 apply to individual sentences due process of law sentence vacated de novo sentencing hearing resentence on remand no reasonable expectation of finality vindictiveness R.C. 2953.08(G) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sentencing court's findings appellate review consecutive sentences not disproportionate to conduct and danger to public cruel and unusual punishment proportionality review of individual sentences consecutive and lengthy sentences must be reserved for the worst offenses and offenders.

JUVENILE - custody minor child no prior shared-parenting order R.C. 3109.04(E) change of circumstances guardian ad litem forensic custody evaluator father designated legal custodial parent no abuse of discretion disqualify guardian ad litem no error in denying motion due process motion for new trial denial of motion to modify visitation no error.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules for the Government of the Bar—Indefinite suspension.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain witnesses' testimonies. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence of an out-of-court identification of defendant-appellant at trial. The trial court did not err in excusing two prospective jurors "for cause". Defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant-appellant's misconduct-at-an-emergency conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In the act of granting judicial release, a trial court implicitly reserves the right to reimpose the remaining balance of an offender's prison term.

Appellant did not demonstrate that her sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Trial court's imposition of reserved prison term was supported when defendant violated community control by committing multiple new felonies.

Defendant-appellant's guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence.

The trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence is supported by the record.

Defendant-appellant was not denied a fair trial on the basis of the cumulative-error doctrine. Defendant-appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, because the trial court failed to make all of the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing hearing, defendant-appellant's sentences are contrary to law.

In the process of imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must consider the overriding purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12.

Defendant-appellant's guilty and no contest pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Because defendant-appellant entered a no contest plea to the charge of reckless homicide, any error relating to his objections to the State's evidence during his trial for murder did not materially affect his conviction for reckless homicide. Because the bill of information was sufficient to charge the offense of reckless homicide, by pleading no contest to the bill of information, defendant-appellant is foreclosed from challenging the factual merits of the reckless homicide charge. Defendant-appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The trial court did not err by overruling defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of her right to a speedy trial.

Evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Civ.R. 60(B) – motion for relief from judgment – eviction – material terms of lease – public housing – community service – operative facts

child support—res judicata—CSEA

The trial court did not abuse its discretion providing wife a set amount of time to refinance a marital mortgage to remove husband's liability. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that spousal support for wife was appropriate even though there was some evidence that wife had lived with another man before the initiation of the divorce action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion setting the duration of the spousal support award. However, the trial court provided insufficient reasoning or analysis in its decision on the issues of spousal support amount and the reservation of jurisdiction to modify spousal support for this court to be able conduct a meaningful review. The matter was reversed and remanded for the trial court to provide sufficient detail and analysis on these two issues.

Appellant's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that she was in fear of imminent physical harm based upon appellant's threatening text message. The trial court properly admitted evidence of appellant's past violence toward the victim because such evidence was admitted to demonstrate why the victim feared appellant, not that he was guilty based upon a propensity.

Ex-husband appeals domestic relations court decision modifying child support order and awarding attorney's fees to ex-wife. Ex-husband asked court to modify support order based on claim that he operated rental property business at a loss. Court did not abuse discretion in failing to credit ex-husband for numerous claimed business expenses paid in cash. Ex-husband's lack of record-keeping and poor record-keeping resulted in an inability to present the court with credible, verifiable evidence of business expenses. Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an attorney fee sanction for frivolous conduct, ex-husband improperly requested administrative review of child support order, repeatedly advanced meritless claims, and for improper conduct at the hearing. Insufficient evidence presented to the court on the reasonableness of ex-wife's attorney's billings and the ex-husband was not permitted to cross-examine the ex-wife or her attorney on his legal fees. Matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable fee award.

Probate court erred in finding that Father's consent was not necessary, as the court failed to issue a decision that reflects consideration of the issue of justifiable cause for Father's failure to communicate. Though it is undisputed that Father's contact with the child was de minimis, the court did not address the second element of the necessary analysis that the failure to do so was without "justifiable cause."

The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress where circumstantial evidence proved the single-car accident occurred shortly before the officer arrived and the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating a vehicle while under the influence. The trial court erred in failing to suppress the results of the defendant's breathalyzer test, as the state failed to prove it substantially complied with the department of health regulations as set forth in the Ohio Administrative Code.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion denying appellant's petition to terminate his juvenile offender registration and declassify him of his Tier I sex offender classification.

Defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-cocaine conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Unauthorized practice of law—Nonlawyer holding self out as lawyer and preparing legal documents for others—Permanent injunction issued and civil penalty imposed.

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas affirmed a decision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (UCRC) finding appellant to be a liable employer for certain employees under employment compensation law. It is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct its appellate review of the UCRC's decision. The decision of the common pleas court does not permit meaningful appellate review. Therefore, this court declines at this time to address the merits of appellant's assignments of error. Case reversed and remanded to the common pleas court with instructions to conduct its review, pursuant to R.C. 4141.26(D)(2), so that this court may conduct a meaningful appellate review of its decision, within the scope of our duties pursuant to R.C. 4141.26(D)(2).

The trial court did not err in finding appellant's claim the trial court failed to inform him of his appeal rights was precluded by res judicata. Appellant's additional assignments of error that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea, erred in its imposition of restitution, and that trial counsel was ineffective are also barred under res judicata as they were either raised or could have been raised in a prior appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Technical violation of Community Control

ADAM WALSH ACT – CLASSIFICATION – CRIM.R. 11 – SEX OFFENSES – VOYEURISM: The trial court erred by failing to impose the statutorily mandated Tier I sex offender classification as part of defendant's sentence for voyeurism in violation of R.C. 2907.08. The trial court's failure to inform defendant of the effect of his guilty pleas to petty offenses pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(1) was a complete failure to comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(E) where there is a complete failure to comply with the rule, a prejudice analysis is not necessary and the guilty pleas must be vacated.

SENTENCING – R.C. 2953.08 – R.C. 2929.11 – R.C. 2929.12: R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when determining what sentence best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

CRUELTY TO COMPANION ANIMALS – IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION – HEARSAY – EVID.R. 404(B): Defendant's convictions for cruelty to companion animals under R.C. 959.131(D)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where testimony established that defendant was the custodian or caretaker of the animals and that he tortured, tormented, or committed an act of cruelty against them. The trial court did not err in admitting a witness's in-court identification of defendant based on a telephone call between the witness and defendant where the person to whom the witness spoke on the phone identified himself as the defendant and provided a social security number that the witness verified belonged to the defendant. The trial court erred in determining that statements made to a deputy were nonhearsay statements that were offered to explain subsequent police conduct because the statements connected defendant to the offenses, but admission of the hearsay statements was harmless error where defendant admitted to ownership of the animals and to his inability to care for them. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the conditions of other animals that were not the subject of the offenses where the evidence was irrelevant and in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), but admission of this evidence was harmless error where the record contained ample evidence that the animals that were the subject of the offense were malnourished and were kept in filthy conditions and where defendant admitted to ownership of the animals and to his inability to care for them.

MURDER – COMPLICITY – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY — WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE – PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT – COUNSEL: Defendant's convictions on two counts of murder under the theory of complicity were supported by sufficient evidence where his intent could be inferred by the evidence that defendant started an altercation, threatened to shoot others while touching his side, and gave his gun to the shooter before starting the altercation. Defendant's convictions were not against the weight of the evidence because the jury was entitled to believe the testimony of the witnesses and the state was not required to submit physical evidence or recover a weapon to satisfy its burden. Comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument did not rise to the level of plain error where the defendant failed to demonstrate that he would not have been convicted in the absence of the comments. [See CONCURRENCE: The prosecutor's comments were highly improper even though they did not rise to the level of plain error.] Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call an expert in crime scene reconstruction because counsel thoroughly cross-examined the state's expert, and any testimony that a crime scene reconstructionist would have provided was purely speculative.

Domestic violence civil protection order

On certification of default.

On certification of default.

HABEAS CORPUS-RES JUDICATA-SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS - A habeas corpus petitioner's failure to comply with R.C. 2725.04 and R.C. 2969.25 requires the dismissal of an action in habeas corpus, and although habeas corpus actions are typically exempt from the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine will be applied to bar successive petitions.

Sentencing-Consecutive Sentences-R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)-Cruel and Unusual Punishment

CIVIL – magistrate's decision abuse of discretion standard written contract real estate unique property parole evidence record establishes offer, acceptance, and consideration no misrepresentation, fraud, surprise, or mistake no evidence that the "common remedy" of specific performance will cause the seller any hardship or injustice.

Anders v. California motion to withdraw mootness housing court Cleveland Codified Ordinances 3103.25 community control violation collateral consequences. Appellant challenges a decision finding him in violation of his community control sanctions following a conviction for housing code violations. Although the record raises questions as to whether appellant should have been charged with housing code violations at all, he has served his sentence for violating the terms of his community control. Because the appellant has served his sentence and has presented no evidence of collateral consequences, his appeal is dismissed as moot. Appellate counsel's motions to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California are also moot.

Spousal support, R.C. 3105.18, additional support, secured lien, R.C. 3105.171, equitable lien, corporate shares, separation agreement, contract interpretation, integrated agreement. In the direct appeal, the trial court correctly determined that the plain language of the separation agreement reflects the intent of the parties to encumber husband's stock with a secured lien of future support and equitable lien over current and future support. An equitable lien does not grant possession. Cross-appellant waived the issue of current ownership of the secured stock on appeal by failing to argue it in the trial court below.

Sufficient evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, voyeurism, criminal trespass, and invasion of privacy. The evidence was sufficient to prove that the appellant committed voyeurism when he placed his cellphone under the victim's restroom stall and recorded her. His conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because, in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, it was clear that the trial court did not lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding the appellant guilty. In addition, the state was not required to prove that the appellant committed criminal trespass, only that he invaded the privacy of the victim.

Felonious assault aggravated menacing serious physical harm R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) concussion unconscious sufficient evidence manifest weight complicity R.C. 2923.03(A) conspiracy jury instruction plain error Crim.R. 52(B). Affirmed convictions for felonious assault and aggravated menacing. The state presented sufficient evidence to establish serious physical harm where the victim was struck by appellant's accomplice, lost consciousness, sought medical treatment, was diagnosed with a concussion, and was still feeling the effects of the concussion at the time of trial. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. No plain error occurred by giving a jury instruction on conspiracy.

Resentencing hearing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentence findings incorporation into sentencing journal entry identical language nunc pro tunc order. Although the trial court must incorporate the consecutive sentence findings it made at the sentencing hearing into its sentencing journal entry, it is not required, when doing so, to use the identical language it used when making those findings at the sentencing hearing. Trial court made all of the requisite findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the resentencing hearing but did not incorporate all of its consecutive sentence findings into its sentencing journal entry. Consecutive sentences affirmed but case remanded for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc order incorporating all of the consecutive sentence findings it made at the resentencing hearing into its sentencing journal entry.

R.C. 2903.214. Testimony by petitioner that respondent engaged in conduct over two occasions that consisted of aggressive, nonverbal threats and of direct threats is competent, credible evidence that supports a trial court's grant of a criminal stalking protection order.

Crim.R. 48 dismissal. A dismissal by the municipal court of a refiled OVI charge without findings of fact and reasons for the dismissal pursuant to Crim.R. 48 requires reversal of the dismissal.

Legal custody magistrate notice electronic mail objection jurisdiction divested notice of appeal ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for the appellants was provided adequate notice of the magistrate's decision via electronic mail. The trial court was divested of jurisdiction to address the pending motion for relief from judgment upon the filing of the instant notice of appeal. The constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel extends to criminal and permanent custody proceedings.

Magistrate's decision objections to magistrate's decision service Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii). The trial court properly adopted the magistrate's decision and entered an independent judgment finding that the appropriation of defendant's property was necessary and served a legitimate public purpose. The magistrate's decision was supported by competent, credible evidence. Trial court's denial of an untimely motion for extension of time to file objections to the magistrate's decision was affirmed where the moving party failed to demonstrate good cause for its failure to file timely objections or a timely motion for extension of time.

Appellant's request of the magistrate for findings of fact and conclusions of law were timely filed as the clerk improperly notified appellant of the "non-acceptance" of the request on the grounds that motions must be accompanied by a request for a hearing or a proposed order or entry. Neither party pointed to authority to support the clerk's "non-acceptance" notice and this court's research revealed no such authority applicable to the facts of this case. Notwithstanding, with regard to appellant's claims for contempt against appellee, the magistrate's decision included more than sufficient requisite findings and conclusions and no additional findings and conclusions were necessary. Therefore, appellant's objections to the magistrate's findings and conclusions, with regard to appellant's claims for contempt, were untimely as the deadline for filing those objections was not tolled. With regard to appellant's claim for attorneys fees expended defending against appellee's claims for contempt, the magistrate did not include sufficient requisite findings and conclusions. Therefore, appellant's timely request for findings and conclusions tolled the deadline for filing the objections until the time the magistrate filed a decision that included such findings and conclusions. Appellant's objections to the magistrate's findings and conclusions with regard to appellant's claims for attorney fees were timely filed. Appellant's assignments of error are overruled in part and sustained in part. Case affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to rule on appellant's objections to the magistrate's findings and conclusions with regard to his claims for attorney's fees expended defending against appellee's claims for contempt

On motion for immediate interim remedial suspension.

The trial court did not err in concluding that awarding permanent custody to the children services agency was in the children's best interests. Judgments affirmed.

A finding by the trial court under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) that reasonable efforts at reunification were unnecessary was not a prerequisite to a children services agency's seeking permanent custody of appellant's child. In addition, the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's determination that awarding permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest. The appellant, who was the child's only legal parent, was serving a 13-year prison sentence for conduct that included sexually abusing the child, and no one else was willing to accept custody. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of felonious assault and aggravated robbery. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was not denied a fair trial based on the jury's composition or because the trial court allegedly did not permit trial counsel to use available peremptory challenges. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling a motion for a mistrial, which was prompted by a statement made by the prosecutor during the State's opening statement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a report created by an analysis of the victim's cellular telephone. The convictions were based on sufficient evidence and they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by failing to merge the offenses. It cannot be concluded by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's findings in support of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were not supported by the record. Finally, neither R.C. 2929.08(G)(2)(a) nor (b) provides a basis for this court to conclude that appellant's sentence was not supported by R.C. 2929.11 or R.C. 2929.12 or that the sentence was contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the court finds the appeal is frivolous and there are no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The record reflects the appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pled guilty to one count of carrying a concealed weapon (a firearm) in exchange for dismissal of another charge. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison. Appellant's record included four prior felony convictions, three prior prison terms, multiple misdemeanor violations, and failures at prior supervision. At the originally-scheduled sentencing, when appellant learned he would be sentenced to prison, he fled the courthouse and a warrant had to be issued for his arrest. Any claim that the sentence was contrary to law or that the sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to the record is frivolous. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in requiring appellants to approve appellee's plat as proper for recording pursuant to R.C. 711.09(C). Appellee was not precluded from relief based on the doctrines of laches or waiver. Finally, appellants' subdivision regulation impermissibly conflicts with R.C. 711.09(C) by excluding the planning commission from the time constraints in the statute. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's two motions to be transported from prison to attend his divorce hearing or alternatively to participate through video conferencing. The trial court did not err in failing to award appellant spousal support while he was incarcerated or in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the issue following his release from prison. The trial court did not err in its division of the parties' personal property or in refusing to allow appellant to store his property at appellee's residence until his release from prison. Judgment affirmed.

Having conducted a thorough and independent review of the record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we have not identified any potential assignments of error having arguable merit. Therefore, we conclude that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Judgment affirmed.

pro se App.R. 16 damages forfeit plain error

R.C. 3107.07(A) R.C. 3107.07(K) consent to adoption untimely objections invited error

Ohio Board of Tax Appeals' reliance upon appellant's recent purchase of property to establish the property's true value was not unreasonable or unlawful.

Trial court properly imposed restitution but failed to find appellant had ability to pay non-mandatory costs, requiring reversal and vacating judgment, in part.

Denial of an indigent defendant's motion for transcript is a final appealable order, but where appellant had no pending motion at the time of request, and apparent remedy sought is unavailable, denial of motion for transcript affirmed is within the trial court's discretion.

Appellant's convictions were not for allied offenses and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue in favor of allied offenses.

A trial court has no jurisdiction to determine a motion to withdraw and vacate a guilty plea after the original judgment has been affirmed by a reviewing court. Proper remedy if a registration statute is unconstitutional does not include vacating a guilty plea. The denial of the motion to vacate by the trial court is affirmed.

Because R.C. 5164.57(A)(1) conditions the Ohio Department of Medicaid ("ODM")'s authority to recover Medicaid overpayments on ODM's provision of notice to the provider within the requisite five-year period, the notice requirement in R.C. 5164.57(A)(1) is "mandatory" and not "directory." Judgment reversed, cause remanded.

Evid.R. 103(A) – objection – motion to strike – curative instruction – timeliness – general objection – specific basis – prejudice – directed verdict – judgment notwithstanding the verdict

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Further, to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must estabalish both deficient performance and prejudice under the Strickland test.

Defendant-appellant's sentence is contrary to law. Defendant-appellant failed to satisfy his burden that resentencing is necessary in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice absent the State's breach of the negotiated plea agreement.

Ex-husband appeals decision denying request to offset spousal support and property equalization payment against ex-wife's unpaid child support and to modify spousal support due to change in circumstances. Court did not abuse discretion denying request to offset. Ex-husband failed to present evidence of inability to pay decree obligations due to ex-wife's failure to pay child support. Ex-husband failed to present evidence that offset would be in the children's best interest. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying ex-husband's request to modify spousal support based upon alleged discovery that spousal support payments were nondeductible from gross income. Ex-husband indicated that the result would lower his income tax refund but failed to present sufficient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances meriting modifying the order.

The juvenile court did not abuse it discretion denying appellants' motion to appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to R.C. 2151.281(C) and Juv.R. 4(B)(3) because appellants did not appear to be mentally incompetent. Mother forfeited her constitutional challenge to R.C. 2151.281(C) by not raising it before the trial court. The children services agency did not need to prove that it made reasonable efforts at the permanent custody hearing because the juvenile court had made reasonable efforts findings at earlier stages of the proceeding. There was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody to the public children services agency and the decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that appellants could not adequately care for their children without some kind of parent-mentor or monitoring system in place.

Defendants condominium association and property management company appeal from decision in favor of plaintiffs, condominium owners, in negligence action alleging slip and fall on ice. Plaintiffs also asserted cause of action for breach of contract, alleging defendants assumed contractual duty of care relating to snow and ice maintenance via condominium owners' association's rules and regulations. Trial court decision failed to resolve breach of contract claim. Decision also did not include Civ.R. 54(B) language certifying " no just reason for delay." Appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds for lack of final appealable order.

Res judicata Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Review of Felony Sentences, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) Clear and convincing evidence Consecutive Sentences, 2929.14(C)(4) Presentence Investigation, R.C. 2951.03(A) Abuse of Discretion Ohio Risk Assessment System R.C. 5120.114(A)

Non-constitutional requirements of Crim. R. 11 (C) Allied offenses Post-release control sentencing entry Sentencing

Admin. Appeal - Zoning - Amendment to Zoning Resolution - Mootness - Retroactivity

Juvenile sexual imposition, M1 to M3 - insufficient evidence of prior delinquency adjudication

Guilty Plea - Failure to inform of effect of plea - motion to dismiss counsel - competency to stand trial - Reagan Tokes - ripeness for review - allied offenses - IAC

Merger of allied offenses

legal custody, finding of unsuitability

ineffective assistance of counsel

On application for reinstatement.

On application for reinstatement.

On application of reinstatement.

PLEAS – CRIM.R. 11(C) – APPELLATE REVIEW: Where defendant concedes that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C), but urges the appellate court to consider evidence from outside the record to find that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently tendered, defendant's conviction must be affirmed, because the appellate court cannot consider evidence outside the record on direct appeal.

AGGRAATED ROBBERY – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – EVIDENCE – COUNSEL – SENTENCING : Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery was not against the weight or sufficiency of the evidence where the victim identified the defendant as the robber and strong circumstantial evidence tied the defendant to the robbery. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to employ a fingerprint expert, because the decision to employ an expert was a matter of trial strategy and the defendant cannot show prejudice. State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6729, precludes the appellate court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial court on the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

CHILDREN – PARENTAL TERMINATION – CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of five children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where clear and convincing evidence showed that mother had not remedied the conditions that caused the children to be placed outside the home, the children's fathers had abandoned them, and various relatives could not provide a legally secure placement for the children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling custody petitions filed by the children's relatives where competent, credible evidence supported the court's determination that it was not in the children's best interest to grant custody to those relatives.

CHILDREN – PERMANENT CUSTODY– BEST INTEREST – R.C. 2151.414: Where the record demonstrates that a legally secure placement for the child could be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, the trial court's determination that a grant of permanent custody was in the child's best interest was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Felonious assault aggravated vehicular assault admissible evidence computer generated data hearsay sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence speedy trial violation jury instructions consecutive sentences preliminary hearing. Defendant's convictions for felonious assault, aggravated vehicular assault, and other felony offenses are affirmed. There is overwhelming evidence in the record that defendant drove his vehicle at a high speed while his girlfriend was on the hood of the car. Defendant crashed, and his girlfriend sustained severe injuries including permanent brain damage.

Civil stalking protection order R.C. 2903.214 final appealable order App.R. 4 sanctions for contempt, R.C. 2705.05. A civil stalking protection order ("CSPO") issued under R.C. 2903.214 is a final appealable order. A finding of contempt and imposition of a sanction for contempt of a CSPO is a final appealable order. An appellant alleging error in the issuance of a CSPO or a finding of contempt must timely appeal those orders. A trial court may award expenses to protected parties of a CSPO for bringing a contempt action, and the trial court is not required to consider the contemnor's ability to pay the expenses. An award of parking fees and one day of lost wages to protected parties of a CSPO who appeared at a contempt hearing is not an abuse of discretion.

Manifest weight toolmark analysis touch DNA reliability gruesome photographs autopsy trajectory prejudice probative aid.- Reliability of toolmark and touch DNA analysis goes to the weight of the evidence. It is within the province of the jury to attach the amount of weight to the evidence on the expert testimony regarding toolmark and touch DNA analysis that it deemed appropriate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs, even if deemed gruesome, because the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. The photographs illustrated the medical examiner's testimony on trajectory of the gunshot wounds. Additionally, the photographs aided the jury in understanding the state's case.

Domestic violence effective assistance of counsel strategy manifest weight credibility contest. -Defendant failed to withstand his burden of demonstrating that counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the record reveals that counsel reviewed all evidence prior to trial. Trial counsel's decision to not use the victim's recorded phone calls could have been a matter of strategy. A conviction based on a credibility contest is not against the manifest weight when the victim's testimony is corroborated by other evidence, and the defendant's testimony is not.

Objections to a magistrate's decision Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) breach of contract accord and satisfaction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled the defendant's objections to the magistrate's recommendation. The trial court's judgment entry does not need to include a detailed explanation to show that the trial court engaged in an independent review of the record. Neither party made an argument about accord and satisfaction at trial.

Motion to release surety from obligation R.C. 2937.40. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to release surety from obligation where there was nothing in the record to indicate bond was ever posted and there was, therefore, no surety to discharge or release.

Reagan Tokes Act fines

Denial of motion for new trial

R.C. 2929.19 (B)(3)(a)/Sexual offender registration/Sentencing entry/Voidable sentence

Stalking civil protection order/Mootness/Collateral consequences exception/Civ.R. 65.1(G)/Necessity of transcript

Aggravated burglary with gun specification possession of firearm, jury question

Final, appealable order - trial court's judgment of conviction not a final, appealable order when judgment does not resolve all counts contained in indictment.

Magistrate's decision affirmed and adopted, and petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed.

Res judicata bars appellant from raising an issue on appeal from the revocation of his community control sanctions that could have and should have been raised on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction in which community control was first imposed. Therefore, we need not address appellant's arguments regarding his failure to appear and the trial court's failure to obtain a "waiver of presence" from him before holding a pretrial hearing prior to conviction. Appellant's failure to report to the probation department and failure to complete his drug and alcohol assessment were nontechnical violations of his community control, because the conditions were specifically tailored to address matters related to his misconduct. Accordingly, the 90-day prison maximum established in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) for prison terms resulting from technical community control violations did not apply to appellant's sentence, and the trial court did not err when it sentenced him to 12 months in prison. Judgment affirmed.

The State provided legally sufficient evidence to support appellant's aggravated menacing conviction therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Judgment affirmed.

The record before the trial court on appellee's motion for summary judgment did not give rise to any genuine issue of material fact, and the trial court did not commit an error of law in determining, on appellee's cause of action for declaratory judgment, that the covenant not to compete at issue in the case was not enforceable. In addition, the trial court was not positively required to reform the covenant and did not err by declining to exercise its discretion to reform the covenant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's judgment granting permanent custody of a child to a children services agency was not an abuse of discretion because there was competent, credible evidence in the record that permitted the trial court to clearly and convincingly find that: (1) the child could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him and (2) granting permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent personal email non-record search. Requester sought email from a former employee's personal email account, containing listed search terms. The former employee attested that his personal account contained no responsive email that documented his duties or activities in the prosecutor's office. Although requester demonstrated that the former employee had exchanged personal emails with individuals involved in a criminal case he had prosecuted, the special master found no clear and convincing evidence that these would constitute records of official activity, or that respondent's office was required to conduct a separate search of the personal account for putative records.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 courts disciplinary counsel rules for superintendence rules for government of the bar. Requester sought records from respondent, which is an arm of the Ohio Supreme Court responsible for attorney and judicial disciplinary complaints. The special master found that the court of claims lacked jurisdiction over the claim, which is governed instead by Sup.R. 44-47.

On respondent's objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the court overruled the objections, adopted the report and recommendation, and ordered respondent to disclose all records that were withheld or redacted based on attorney-client privilege in accordance with the special master's recommendation.

On requester's objection to a special master's recommendation to dismiss requester's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the court found the objection lacked merit. The court sua sponte dismissed requester's complaint in accordance with R.C. 2743.75(D).

Order granting motion to dismiss not final and appealable as plaintiff can rectify deficiencies in complaint

indigent parent, appointed counsel, adoption proceeding, equal protection, due process

voluntary manslaughter, inferior-degree offense, jury instructions past incidents reasonably sufficient provocation aggravated murder sentence R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12

Trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record where appellant has previously been convicted of statutory rape, has failed to comply with the terms of his probation, has clearly not been rehabilitated, and where he has raped a 12-year-old child multiple times and in multiple ways over the course of several months.

Trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying motion for relief from judgment where the record demonstrates that there was no mistake between the parties regarding who was to be responsible for paying the first and second mortgages on the marital home.

Appellant voluntarily served his misdemeanor sentence without seeking a stay pending appeal and failed to point to any evidence of a collateral disability or loss of civil rights arising from the conviction, so his appeal is moot.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for postconviction relief on the legitimate basis of res judicata, regardless of collateral timeliness considerations. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for trafficking in marijuana and possession of marijuana were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The exclusion of certain portions of appellant's interview with law enforcement was proper were such portions were not relevant and discussed sentencing matters that fell outside the province of the jury. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to disqualify the Clermont County Prosecutor's Office as appellant could not show actual prejudice resulted from her evening with an assistant prosecuting attorney and the mere appearance of impropriety is insufficient to warrant the disqualification of an entire prosecutor's office.

The common pleas court did not err by granting the Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss filed by appellee, a children services agency, upon finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed on appellant's purported administrative appeal from the children services agency's decision upholding a substantiated disposition of abuse by appellant against the alleged child victim.

The probate court gave proper jury instructions regarding undue influence and testamentary capacity where the trial court was in the proper position to determine what jury instructions to include based on the evidence elicited at trial and where the test used in the instructions stated the law correctly. The trial court did not commit plain error by determining that appellant was not entitled to damages where a litigant is not entitled to a jury trial in probate court and there is no statutory right to have damages determined by a jury.

The juvenile court did not err in its decision denying the paternal grandfather a continuance or by granting legal custody to the child's foster family. The juvenile court heard substantial evidence as to the relevant factors. The child is bonded with his foster family and has been in their custody and care for nearly two years. To the contrary, the child's paternal grandfather was essentially a stranger to him, having met him only briefly the day prior to the hearing.

CRIMINAL LAW - CSPO manifest weight R.C. 2919.25 R.C. 2913.02 cohabitation lived with one another in the past five years invitation by petitioner irrelevant whether respondent violated CSPO competing versions of events, credibility of the witnesses for the trier of fact.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion to dismiss as appellant failed to comply with R.C. 2743.48 by not obtaining a preliminary factual determination from the court of common pleas that he qualifies as a wrongfully imprisoned individual. As such, the Court of Claims of Ohio lacks jurisdiction over appellant's claim for wrongful imprisonment. Judgment affirmed.

Adoption granted consent not required R.C. 3107.07(A)

Permanent Custody, Manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence

Planned permanent living arrangement manifest weight and sufficiency

speedy trial, manifest weight of the evidence

PLEAS – CRIM.R. 11(C): Where the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) before accepting his guilty pleas, defendant entered the pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and the court did not err in accepting defendant's guilty pleas the record did not support defendant's claim that his guilty plea in one case was coerced by the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and revocation of his bond prior to sentencing in another case.

COUNSEL – PROCEDURE/RULES – CONTINUANCE – R.C. 2917.11(A)(4) – EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendant a continuance where defendant previously had had two attorneys and four continuances and another continuance would not have accomplished defendant's stated purpose of obtaining additional discovery. Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct by hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public right-of-way, in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(4), was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant was lying on the sidewalk in front of a dance studio, he twice refused to move after being asked to do so, and a child had to step off of the curb and into the street to avoid defendant.

JUVENILE – DELINQUENCY – PROBATION: The juvenile court erred in adjudicating the juvenile delinquent for violating probation where the court never actually placed the juvenile on probation or ordered the juvenile to comply with the conditions of probation.

JURISDICTION – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs-appellants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement where an entry of dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b) previously had been entered on the record and where the dismissal entry neither included the terms of the settlement agreement nor expressly stated that the trial court was retaining jurisdiction over the parties' agreement.

CHILD-CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – EVIDENCE – WAIVER: The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was not against the weight or sufficiency of the evidence where the trial court properly analyzed all R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors and its analysis was well-supported by the record. In re K.M., 159 Ohio St.3d 544, 2020-Ohio-995, 152 N.E.3d 245, allows the parties to expressly (but not implicitly) waive the 90 day deadline for disposition in R.C. 2151.35(B)(1).

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25(C)

Maximum consecutive sentences were properly considered and imposed by the trial court.

The trial court did not err in adjudicating Appellant delinquent by reason of gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) Appellant was not subject to an custodial interrogation during a law enforcement interview.

Mandamus sua sponte dismissal Crim.R. 48 jurisdiction preliminary hearing interlocutory orders dismissal indictment grand jury R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit of prior civil action amended complaint. Relator's complaint for writ of mandamus was dismissed, sua sponte, where relator sought a writ directing respondent to vacate orders in a municipal court case that had already terminated by operation of law when the municipal court case was dismissed in 2013. Relator's complaint was also fatally defective where it did not include an affidavit of prior civil actions required by R.C. 2969.25(A) and the filing of an amended complaint could not cure the defect.

Mandamus, coroner's records, R.C. 313.10(A)(2) coroner's records exceptions, R.C. 149.43(B)(8). The relator's complaint for a writ of mandamus, in order to compel the respondent-coroner to provide coroner's records is denied. Pursuant to R.C. 313.10(A)(2), certain coroner's records are exempt from disclosure: (1) preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner's direction or supervision (2) photographs of a decedent made by the coroner or by anyone acting under the coroner's direction or supervision (3) suicide notes (4) medical and psychiatric records provided to the coroner, a deputy coroner, or a representative of the coroner or a deputy coroner under section 313.091 of the Revised Code (5) records of a deceased individual that are confidential law enforcement investigatory records as defined in section 149.43 of the Revised Code and (6) laboratory reports generated from the analysis of physical evidence by the coroner's laboratory that are discoverable under Crim.R. 16. The records requested by the relator fall within the exceptions contained in R.C. 313.10(A)(2). In addition, the relator has failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) which provides that a public office or person responsible for public records is not required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction or a juvenile adjudication to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution or concerning what would be a criminal investigation or prosecution if the subject of the investigation or prosecution were an adult, unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information that is subject to release as a public record under this section and the judge who imposed the sentence or made the adjudication with respect to the person, or the judge's successor in office, finds that the information sought in the public record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person.

Mandamus, procedendo, App.R. 9(C) statement, moot, R.C. 2731.03, judicial discretion. In order to obtain a writ of mandamus, it must be demonstrated that (1) the relator possesses a clear legal right to the relief requested, (2) that the respondent possesses a clear legal duty to provide the requested relief, and (3) there exists no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. To be entitled to a writ of procedendo, the relator must show (1) a clear legal right to require the respondent to proceed to judgment, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to proceed to judgment, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Herein, the relator seeks mandamus and procedendo to compel the respondent-judge to rule on a pending motion to settle and approve an App.R. 9(C) statement of proceedings and also enter a sealing order and transmit a sealed exhibit as part of the record in a pending appeal. Attached to the respondent-judge's motion to dismiss are copies of judgment entries that demonstrate settlement and approval of the submitted App.R. 9(C) statement, that the document submitted for in camera inspection was ordered sealed for the purposes of the pending appeal, and ordered the clerk of courts to transmit the sealed document to the court of appeals. Neither procedendo nor mandamus will compel the performance of a duty already performed. The relator's complaint for mandamus and procedendo is moot. In addition, mandamus may not be employed by the relator to control the respondent-judge's judicial discretion when settling the App.R. 9(C) statement. Finally, this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not entertain questions regarding the form and content of an App.R. 9(C) statement. Such questions can only be addressed on appeal.

App.R. 26(B), ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, perjured testimony, probable cause, search warrant, indictment, attempted murder, record evidence, and gunshot. Appellant argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that there was no probable cause for the indictment of attempted murder because the indictment and the search warrant were secured by perjured evidence. This court rejected that argument because appellant did not convince the court of perjury and because his arguments rested, at least in part, on matters outside the record.

R.C. 2923.161 R.C. 2901.22 R.C. 2903.11 knowingly sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Where the evidence established that the defendant fired a gun into two different apartments, the defendant may not be convicted of more than two counts of improper discharge. A sufficiency challenge to an improper discharge conviction on the basis that the state did not prove the defendant did so knowingly, fails where the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was aware he was in a first-floor apartment and that by shooting into the ceiling, the bullet would probably go into the apartment upstairs. The state presented sufficient evidence to prove improper discharge where direct and circumstantial evidence established that the defendant, standing outside, fired a gun into an apartment, striking an occupant inside. Convictions for improper discharge and felonious assault are not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the defendant does not claim, and the record does not contain conflicts in the evidence, the resolution of which created a manifest miscarriage of justice. De minimis inconsistency in testimony does not create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Foreclosure summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) standing objections to a magistrate's decision Civ.R. 53(D) Civ.R. 56(F). The trial court's judgment and decree of foreclosure was affirmed. Appellants' arguments had no merit because they failed to raise them in their objections to the magistrate's decision. Further, appellants failed to file an affidavit with their brief opposing appellee's summary judgment motion as required by Civ.R. 56(F).

Motion to withdraw guilty pleas Crim.R. 32.1 manifest injustice evidentiary hearing jurisdiction convictions affirmed res judicata unsubstantiated assertions. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas under Crim.R. 32.1 because it had no jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion after appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions. Even if trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion, consideration of his claims would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata because defendant raised, or could have raised, any claims related to the ineffectiveness of his defense counsel and the unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary nature of his guilty pleas in his direct appeal or his prior petition for postconviction relief. Further, defendant's conclusory allegations and assertions, unsupported by affidavits or other relevant evidentiary materials, were insufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice or to warrant a hearing on his motion.

Jurisdiction final appealable order mootness doctrine forcible entry and detainer stay of execution. The panel lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the arguments presented in light of the fact that the claims with respect to the forcible entry and detainer action were mooted by the defendant's surrender of the premises and in light of the pending counterclaim that has yet to be resolved.

Felony Murder, Felony Assault, Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence, Jury Instructions, IAC, Evid. R. 901 & 403(A)

Land Installment Contract - Forfeiture

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's summary judgment motion and denying appellant's summary judgment motion. Based on the applicability of a coverage exclusion provision in the insurance policy at issue, appellant is not entitled to indemnification for its settlement payment in litigation resulting from taxpayer overpayments to appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting the motion of Franklin County Children Services for permanent custody. Competent, credible evidence supported the trial court's finding that granting the motion was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

SEX OFFENSES – REGISTRATION – SENTENCING ENTRY: Where the municipal court did not include in its sentencing entry defendant's tier sex-offender classification under Ohio's version of the Adam Walsh Act, that sanction was never imposed, and there is no order in place requiring defendant to register as a sex offender therefore, defendant has no duty to register as a Tier I sex offender.

MOTION TO QUASH – SUBPOENA – HEARSAY – JUDICIAL BIAS: The trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion to quash defendant's subpoena, but the error was harmless because the subpoena was plainly without merit and the outcome of the trial would not have been different if the court had conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to quash. Statements made by the trial judge during trial did not constitute hearsay the judge was not a witness or party and the statements were not offered in evidence. There is no indication in the record that the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion to quash or its reasonable limitations on defendant's cross-examination of the police officer were the result of judicial bias.

CHILDREN – PERMANENT CUSTODY – LEGAL CUSTODY: Mother could not show that grants of legal and permanent custody of her two children were against the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence supported the court's decision to grant permanent custody of one child to Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody of the other child to a relative.

Appellant's conviction for violating a protection order was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish the violation. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence was jointly recommended by appellant and the State of Ohio, the trial court sentenced appellant in conformity with the joint recommendation, and the sentence was authorized by law. Thus, under R.C. 2953.08(D), appellant's sentence is not subject to appellate review. Further, the record establishes that appellant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for appellee based on immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. Appellant's injury was caused in connection with appellee's efforts to rehabilitate existing sewer pipes using cured-in-place pipe. This was a governmental function to which the general grant of immunity applied. Judgment affirmed.

The appellant's brief does not set forth an assignment of error with a supporting argument. Thus, there is no appellate issue to resolve. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Evidence that appellant ran from police officers, who were attempting to serve him with an arrest warrant, and failed to comply with multiple orders to stop and to get on the ground was sufficient to support his convictions for resisting arrest and obstructing official business. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's community control was lawfully revoked based upon an admitted violation of the condition requiring him to obey federal, state, and local laws and ordinances. At the revocation hearing, appellant admitted that, in the course of speaking with a counselor in jail, he threatened to hire someone to harm his ex-girlfriend. The substance of the threat was thereafter communicated to the ex-girlfriend. A violation of community control sanctions was both admitted and established. Judgment affirmed.

Conviction for having weapons while under disability supported by sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and no error in jury instruction regarding self-defense, with trial counsel not ineffective in failing to challenge inclusion of both "duty to retreat" and "no duty to retreat" instruction as to involuntary manslaughter charge. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed where there was no dispute as to appellant's lack of success in meeting requirements for reunification, and best interest of the child outweighed appellant's desire to place child with family friend, after child had bonded with her foster family and a biological sister adopted by them.

Motion to Vacate Civil Rule 60 (B)(4)

Merger/Allied offenses

The trial court did not err in releasing escrow funds to the tenant where the landlord was provided sufficient notice of its noncompliance with R.C. 5321.04, and the testimony at the hearing established the home was uninhabitable during the months the tenant escrowed the rent.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law where the one-year sentence imposed by the trial court was within the statutory range for a fifth-degree felony and appellant's community control violations were not technical because appellant committed a new fifth-degree felony by using fentanyl.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion for merger where the single count of trafficking in persons for which he pled guilty was not an allied offense of similar import with any of the four illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material that he pled guilty to as the offenses were committed separately, one before any of the others. The trial court also did not err by sentencing appellant to an indefinite prison sentence under the newly enacted Reagan Tokes Law where the law does not violate an offender's due process rights nor does the law violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Appellant's conviction for the failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, a felony of the third-degree, was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state demonstrated appellant caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property in his operation of the motor vehicle while fleeing from law enforcement.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(A), R.C. 2969.25(C)

Habeas corpus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to discharge and substitute the defendant-appellant's trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Relator-appellee failed to comply with the statutory requirements for inmate civil actions as required by R.C. 2969.25 and 2969.26, and thus, his mandamus action should have been dismissed by the trial court. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.

custody, unauthorized practice of law, standing, party, nonparty

CIVIL - summary judgment liability insurance supplemental complaint judgment creditor R.C. 3929.05 R.C. 3929.06 affirmative defense notice cooperation help waiver prejudice improper cancellation collusion.

CIVIL - wrongful discharge public policy clarity element termination of a registered nurse "interference" with the practice of nursing employment at-will summary judgment

APPELLATE REVIEW - Single sentence imposed after guilty finding on two crimes unable to determine to which offense sentence applies lack of jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea colloquy Crim.R. 11(C) right to a jury trial totality of the record reasonably intelligible jail-time credit plain error R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) determination and notification at the sentencing hearing no demonstration of prejudice.

CRIMINAL LAW - condition of community control letter of apology compelled speech First Amendment plain error matter of first impression.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal.

OMVI - R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)(d) - No Contest Plea - Motion in Limine - Waiver - Continuance

Denial of change to HPC services

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Denial of change to Level IV community privileges

Award of permanent custody of appellant's three children the social services agency was not against the weight of the evidence where the agency presented clear and convincing evidence that appellant's children could not be placed with her within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her, and permanent custody to the agency was in the best interest of the children. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel because she failed to show that, but for the alleged errors of trial counsel, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. Because the record did not support the existence of an actual or apparent conflict of interest arising from independent trial counsel's representation of all three children, and because appellant did not show that, but for trial counsel's alleged errors, there was a reasonable probability of a different result, appellant's oldest child was not denied his right to legal counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Convictions for felony murder and having weapons under disability supported by sufficient evidence and manifest weight of the evidence

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, the Cincinnati Insurance Company ("CIC".) No genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the damage to Kean's property is due to fungi or wet rot as the evidence unequivocally shows the damage to Kean's residence is fungi and wet rot damage. Neither did the trial court err in finding that the insurance policy at issue clearly and unambiguously provides that CIC's obligation to reimburse Kean for damages to his residence caused by fungi or wet rot is limited to a maximum of $10,000. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding CIC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Kean's claim of bad faith. Judgment affirmed.

Plaintiff's complaint alleging false imprisonment against Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation barred by res judicata

Defendant's successive Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his counseled guilty plea barred by res judicata

adjudication – dependent – admissible evidence – expert opinion – stipulation – reasonable efforts – manifest weight of the evidence – disposition – dismiss without prejudice – R.C. 2151.35 – Juv.R. 34 – Am. Sub. H.B. 197 – Ohio Supreme Court tolling order – R.C. 2151.419

suppression—manipulate—Terry—pat down—contraband—plain feel

Grandparent's complaint for custody R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and R.C. 2151.23(A)(2)

Will Contest - Undue Influence

Ineffective assistance cruel and usual punishment

Slip and fall/Summary judgment

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel R.C. 2937.16 through 2937.18 R.C. 2941.48 material witness warrant due process standing prejudice Crim.R. 52(A) harmless error aggravated burglary R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) abduction R.C. 2905.02. The application for reopening was denied where appellate counsel was not ineffective for arguing that a material witness warrant was issued in error applicant lacked standing to assert the due process rights of a witness who was the subject of a warrant the applicant did not identify any rights warranting reversal and if the warrant was issued in error, that error was harmless given the testimony of other witnesses.

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings compulsory counterclaim logically related business relationship res judicata transaction or occurrence. Upheld the trial court's decision to grant appellees' Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings when it appeared beyond doubt that the appellant could prove no set of facts warranting the requested relief. Appellant's claims, which were logically related to the claims raised in the prior action pertaining to the parties' business relationship and an ownership interest, were compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised in a prior action, and the action was barred by res judicata. A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted when the determination of res judicata does not depend on documents outside of the pleadings.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure to state a claim contract reasonably certain definite aspirational. Trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' breach of contract claim where the disputed contract language was aspirational in nature and did not create a binding obligation.

Motion to vacate postrelease control void voidable res judicata. Res judicata barred the defendant's challenge to postrelease control because he did not challenge the alleged sentencing error on direct appeal.

Foreclosure Civ.R. 60(B) abuse of discretion fraud default judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion where the motion failed to set forth a meritorious defense or claim to present against the foreclosure claim and failed to establish entitlement to relief. Appellant's unsupported assertion that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a mortgage does not satisfy the requirements of Civ.R. 60(B). Further, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal to collaterally attack a foreclosure judgment.

Nunc pro tunc clerical void jurisdiction conviction sentence direct appeal res judicata indictment defective. The trial court properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction to issue a nunc pro tunc journal entry and defendant is barred by res judicata from challenging the validity of the trial court's corrected journal entry. Whether an indictment was defective was an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal. Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of his indictment at trial or on direct appeal and, therefore, res judicata barred his attempt to raise the issue of a defective indictment many years after his conviction.

Complaint for permanent custody R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) determination that child cannot be placed with parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with parent R.C. 2151.414(E) best interest of the child R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) clear and convincing evidence abuse of discretion. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Although mother showed initiative in completing case plan services, competent, credible, clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's findings that child did not have a relationship or bond with mother, child did not want to return home to mother, child had a lengthy custodial history based on a prior case, child deserved a safe and stable environment where her needs were met and there were no other relatives with whom child could be placed, resulting in its determination that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child.

App.R. (26)(B), application to reopen, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, expert qualification, gang membership, seizure of cell phone, Fourth Amendment, overwhelming evidence, and lack of prejudice. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the seizure of a gang member's cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment, that trial counsel should have sought a limiting instruction on other acts evidence, and that the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine regarding a gang expert. Applicant failed to show prejudice because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Evidence from cell phone was admissible to show gang membership as charged. Appellate counsel did argue the qualifications of the gang expert. Appellate counsel in the exercise of professional judgment could decline to argue the seizure of the phone given the uncertainty of facts of the seizure, the appellant's consent to search, the existence of a search warrant, and existing precedent.

Trial court erred in granting motion to seal records in refiled case that was dismissed, but denying motion to seal the records in the first-filed case. The records in the first-filed case are "official records" of the refiled case and may fairly be characterized as the same case at different stages of the proceedings.

On application for reinstatement.

JURISDICTION – DUE PROCESS – RECEIVERSHIP – COURT COSTS – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT – APPELLATE REVIEW – STANDING: Nonparties have no standing to appeal a trial court's final judgment. The trial court erred in ordering defendants dismissed from the case to pay the fees and costs of the receivership incurred after the entry of dismissal was filed.

AUTOS/CRIMINAL – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - WAIVER: Even though defendant raised the issue of the validity of the traffic stop in his motion to suppress, he waived it at the hearing on the motion and, because he relinquished the right to challenge the stop in open court, he is precluded from raising it now, even under a plain-error analysis. The police officers did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights where they ordered to him to get out of his car after he was stopped for a window-tint violation even without a reasonable concern for officer safety. The plain-view exception to the warrant requirement applied where the police saw a marijuana cigarette through the open door on the floor of the car next to the driver's seat when the door was left open after defendant got out of the car upon a police officer's order and where the police officers were legally in a place where they could view the marijuana cigarette.

State's appeal. The trial court erred in finding that the Reagan Tokes Act violates the separation of powers doctrine and in imposing a definite two-year sentence contrary to the Act. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing.

Under the terms of the parties' final judgment and decree of divorce, appellant was awarded a portion of appellee's retirement account, and appellee had an obligation to notify appellant of his withdrawal of funds from the retirement account. The trial court abused its discretion and erred when it concluded that appellee was not in contempt of court based upon his failure to notify appellant of his withdrawal of funds from the retirement account and his failure to pay appellant her share of the account. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences it made all the required consecutive sentence findings at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry, and the findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Also, appellant's claim that the charging indictment was defective because it did not include all elements of the offense of failure to appear as required by recognizance does not warrant a reversal of appellant's conviction, as appellant failed to object to the indictment in the trial court and failed to establish plain error. Judgment affirmed.

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of guilt for aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs, and these findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State's improper remarks during closing arguments did not rise to the level of plain error, and appellant was not denied his right to a fair trial. Ample evidence of appellant's guilt was adduced by the State, and the statements were not so inflammatory that appellant's convictions were the product of passion and prejudice rather than proof of guilt. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellees' motion to dismiss. However, the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for directed verdict with respect to damages in the form of legal fees associated with the Belmont County litigation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without an evidentiary hearing.

Juvenile court erred by failing to make proper inquiry pursuant to 25 CFR 23.107 in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and therefore it was not possible to determine if tribal notification provisions applied. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying request for continuance. Juvenile court did not plainly err by admitting the testimony and report of the guardian ad litem. Assignment of error asserting juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody to children's services agency was against the manifest weight of the evidence rendered moot as case reversed and remanded to make proper ICWA inquiry. Case reversed and remanded with instructions.

The magistrate did not err in recommending relator's complaint be sua sponte dismissed. It is obvious relator's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Objections overruled case dismissed.

We adopt the magistrate's decision granting respondent's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss relator's request for a writ of mandamus and prohibition.

On relator's petition for writ of mandamus ordering respondent Ohio Adult Parole Authority to reverse its decision that relator violated the conditions of postrelease control release and order that relator serve a sanction of 90 days incarceration. The petition was referred to a magistrate, and upon review of the magistrate's recommendation, the court adopts the magistrate's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation to grant respondent's motion to dismiss relator's petition for writ of mandamus, and dismisses relator's petition.

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea.

Appeal from probate court's temporary order of detention of alleged mentally ill person following a probable cause determination is moot where there was no adjudication that appellant was a mentally ill person.

Trial court's decision to set off amount defendant owed to plaintiff under promissory note was not against manifest weight of the evidence even though set-off was premised on assertion of counterclaim and not as affirmative defense. Trial court did not lose its way in accepting some, but not all, testimony concerning value of custom furniture. Plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees from defendant under unambiguous language of promissory note.

Affirming the judgment of the trial court, we find the record contains sufficient competent, credible evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that renewing a protection order against appellant for an additional year was necessary in order to prevent ongoing mental distress to appellee. Preponderance of the evidence showed that appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused appellee to fear for his safety, and knowingly caused him mental distress, as prohibited by R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

Manifest Weight of the Evidence Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Felonious Assault, R.C. 2903.11

Decendent's estate concealment of assets RC 2109.50 prejudgment interest ex parte communications affirmed in part, reversed in part

CIVIL – breach of contract law of the case punitive damages emotional damages.

CIVIL – mandamus Y.C.O. 163.63 independent investigation R.C. 149.43(B)(1) reasonable period of time statutory damages attorneys' fees.

The trial court did not err denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence because the deputy dog warden's visual observation of an emaciated dog in appellant's backyard did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The subsequent warrantless seizure of the dog was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement because the deputy dog warden had an objectively reasonable basis to believe the dog needed emergency aid to protect its life.

As the state failed to raise in the trial court an argument that the traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle was lawful, even in the absence of probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, due to the officer's reasonable mistake of law, the issue is deemed waived and will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress.

The trial court properly determined that appellant waived its notice of termination of tenancy by accepting rent from appellee after the date appellee's tenancy was to terminate.

Habeas corpus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), void, voidable

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Appellant's request for additional time to file objections to the magistrate's decision. The trial court did not commit plain error: in its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities in ordering the parties to use a parenting coordinator in calculating child support and in allocating the tax dependency exemptions.

The Reagan Tokes Law does not run afoul of the doctrine of the separation of powers. A trial court can order a defendant to pay restitution to a governmental entity if it suffered economic losses as a victim of the defendant's criminal offense. However, a trial court cannot order restitution to a governmental entity for funds expended in a drug buy.

The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The convictions were not allied offenses of similar import and thus did not merge. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - review of felony sentences appellate court not permitted to independently weigh competing factors R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 295308(G)(2) constitutionality of a statute issue waived on appeal.

CRIMINAL LAW: effective assistance of counsel sufficiency of the evidence, magazine in a firearm is a loaded firearm motion to suppress, untimely, considered by trial court, officer did not need probable cause to initiate traffic stop motion to dismiss, untimely, never served in previous case, speedy trial clock never started drug prohibition part of community control is not double jeopardy, trial court broad discretion to fashion sanctions related to offense, rehabilitation, and prevent future crime.

Escape/Manifest weight and sufficiency/Ineffective assistance of counsel/Jury instruction on flight

Denial of petition for relief from firearms disability/Untimely appeal

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not plainly err by keeping a particular juror on the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a cash withdrawal slip, a calendar, or a spreadsheet into evidence, or by excluding the testimony of a defense witness. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the indictment included technical errors, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the trial court's questions to witnesses amounted to plain error. As appellant had served her prison sentence, appellant's contention that the trial court erred by sentencing her to a term of prison was moot.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion because under the facts of this case, it was not filed within a reasonable time.

Objection overruled action dismissed. Respondent's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss petitioner's action seeking a writ of habeas corpus was granted. The magistrate properly determined that petitioner could not demonstrate he had been held beyond his maximum sentence or unlawfully restrained, as this court's decision in State v. Bryant, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-241, 2020-Ohio-363 did not provide petitioner with additional jail-time credit.

Habeas Corpus de novo review R.C. Chapter 2725 Civ.R. 12(B)(6) R.C. 2969.25

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on constitutional speedy-trial grounds: despite the timely-filed motion, there was an absence of some particularized prejudice and a tenuous link between the state's efforts in pursuing defendant and the two-year post-accusation delay.

MUNICIPAL – ZONING: In the administrative appeals filed by neighboring property owners challenging a city's decision to grant a residential zoning application, the trial court did not err as a matter of law in determining that the southernmost lot line of the subject property qualified as the rear lot line under the zoning code, and that the subject property met the minimum required lot frontage under the zoning code.

Post-conviction relief, no hearing, IAC, Proscutorial misconduct, timeliness of response, inevidtable discovery

petition for writ of habeas corpus summary judgment in favor of warden R.C. 2725.04 R.C. 2969.25(A) sentencing error not grounds for habeas relief failure to attach commitment papers

motion for jail-time credit appellant failed to file direct appeal from sentencing judgment appellant not entitled to "double" credit while serving sentence in another case

defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated theft, telecommunications fraud, three counts of forgery, identity fraud, money laundering, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity second postconviction petition petition untimely R.C. 2953.23(A)

aggravated robbery with accompanying firearm specification R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) doctrine of res judicata bars appellant from raising the issue of deficiencies in jury verdict forms when they could have been raised in direct appeal no improprieties with verdict form

Mandamus clear and convincing evidence summary judgment Civ.R. 56 de novo review R.C. 149.43 public record attorney-client privilege waiver disclosure. Appellee did not waive attorney-client privilege by disclosing the investigative report to its employees. The records sought by appellant in his public-records request were excepted from disclosure under Ohio's Public Records Act, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee.

Speedy trial rights R.C. 2945.71 capias. The trial court violated the appellant's speedy trial rights because the appellant was not brought to trial within 90 days of his arrest in accordance with R.C. 2945.71. Additionally, the issuance of the capias does not reset the number of days for appellant's speedy trial rights because the appellant did not delay a trial, but a hearing.

Coronavirus pandemic cruel and unusual punishment maximum sentence. - Defendant's challenge that denying him release from prison due to the coronavirus pandemic constituted cruel and unusual punishment was overruled because he failed to raise this issue with the trial court and relied on information outside of the record. Defendant's maximum sentence was not contrary to law and he failed to demonstrate that it was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.

Ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error. Trial counsel's representation of appellant did not fall below a reasonable standard of performance. None of appellant's arguments were found to be well taken, therefore, the argument of cumulative error is inapplicable.

Visiting judge case transferred must object trial demonstrate prejudice issue waived. An appellant must point to some evidence in the record demonstrating that he objected to having his case transferred and tried in front of a visiting judge, otherwise he fails to preserve any possible error and waives the issue for review. Appellant must also demonstrate prejudice from the transfer as well. Trial court's decision of directed verdict is affirmed.

R.C. 2921.331(E) R.C. 4510.021 R.C. 4510.54 driver's license suspension class two lifetime limited driving privileges suspend three years financial responsibility. The trial court erred by granting the defendant's motion for limited driving privileges pursuant to R.C. 4510.021(A) without considering whether it was authorized to suspend the defendant's class two suspension after three years pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(E) for the purpose of granting the defendant limited driving privileges under R.C. 4510.021(A). The appellate court declined to consider the issue and remanded the matter to the trial court. Further, the trial court failed to fully comply with R.C. 4510.021 in granting limited driving privileges when the defendant did not provide proof of financial responsibility in compliance with R.C. 4510.021(E), and the trial court did not specify the purposes, times, and places of the privileges in compliance with R.C. 4510.021(A).

Endangering children criminal damaging jurisdiction R.C. 2151.23 Confrontation Clause testimonial statement hearsay Evid.R. 803 excited utterance sufficiency Crim.R. 29 R.C. 2919.22 recklessness substantial risk R.C. 2901.01 R.C. 2909.06 manifest weight restitution R.C. 2929.18 plain error Crim.R. 52. Appellant's endangering children conviction was not void for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting nontestimonial statements at trial under the excited utterance hearsay exception, and appellant was not denied his constitutional right to confrontation. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error in ordering appellant to pay restitution for his criminal damaging conviction.

Trial court did not commit reversible error by denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence found in the search of his vehicle during a lawful traffic stop because probable cause to believe appellant's vehicle contained contraband arose when appellant voluntarily surrendered a small amount of marijuana to the officers on exiting the vehicle. Even though the trial court articulated a different rationale for denying the motion, we must affirm a legally correct judgment because there has been no prejudice to the appealing party. Appellant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance during the suppression hearing. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court's issuance of nunc pro tunc entry to correct a nonsubstantive clerical error in 2006 judgment of conviction was not a new final order and related back to the original entry. Defendant's appeal is untimely under App.R. 4 and court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Appeal dismissed

On certification of default.

Community Control violation

Service name change of minor

Summary judgment on medical malpractice no causation

Permanent custody–trial court's decision to award children services agency permanent custody of three children not against the manifest weight of the evidence when mother failed to complete alcohol and drug treatment program and continued to test positive for illegal substances throughout case, no relative placements exist, two older children stated that they did not want to live with mother, youngest child born with illegal substances in her system, and two older children require counseling to address psychological trauma inflicted while living with mother.

TAMPERING WITH RECORDS – PRIVILEGE – SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE : Appellant's conviction for tampering with records was not supported by sufficient evidence where the conviction was based on allegedly false statements in a civil complaint for quiet title that appellant had filed and those statements, which were reasonably related to the judicial proceedings in the civil action, were privileged.

AUTOS/CRIMINAL – DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION – IMPROPER CHANGE OF COURSE – BLURRED WINDSHIELD – CROSS-EXAMINATION – EVID.R. 602 – JUDICIAL BIAS – JURY TRIAL: Defendant's conviction for improper change of course was not supported by sufficient evidence where the evidence showed that when defendant turned left at the intersection, he stayed to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered. The trial court did not err in restricting and then terminating defendant's cross-examination of the police officer where defendant repeatedly asked irrelevant questions and made irrelevant statements. The police officer's testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 602 where he personally observed the events to which he testified. The trial judge did not demonstrate judicial bias in denying defendant's requests for a jury trial the right to a jury trial does not extend to offenses for which the potential penalty does not include the possibility of a prison term or jail term and for which the possible fine does not exceed $1,000.

SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the record showed that the trial court engaged in the requisite analysis and made the proper findings at the resentencing hearing and in the judgment entry and where the record showed that the harm caused by the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term would adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct.

R.C. 2913.03 – AUTOS/CRIMINAL: Defendant's conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was based upon sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant admitted to the victim that he had operated the vehicle after his permission to do so had terminated.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – FINAL ORDER – CIV.R. 54(B): The trial court's judgment entry was not a final appealable order where the entry did not dispose of defendants' counterclaim and did not include the language required by Civ.R. 54(B).

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. Defense counsel's decision to forego a suppression hearing was a tactical decision and therefore not a proper basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel could have reasonably believed that pursuing a motion to suppress would have been futile, and the better course of action was to advise appellant to plead to a lesser offense with a shorter recommended sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's argument that his prison sentence was "excessive" and thus contrary to law, because the offenses to which he pleaded guilty did not trigger a presumption that a prison term was necessary, is without merit. Further, in arriving at its sentencing decision, the trial court did not inappropriately consider unindicted allegations of criminal conduct. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring in judgment only.)

The probate court violated appellant's constitutional right to due process by determining the decedent's heirs for purposes of Ohio's Statute of Descent and Distribution without giving appellant an opportunity to be heard on the issue. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The jury selection process utilized by the court did not constitute error, and certainly not plain error. Appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges before a particular juror, who was a retired police officer, became a member of the jury pool. At that point, appellant was limited to a challenge for cause, for which he acknowledged there was no basis, because the juror affirmed that he could be fair and impartial. However, the trial court's judgment entry erroneously suggests that the jury found appellant guilty of repeat violent offender specifications, when in fact the trial court made those findings thus, the matter is remanded for the court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry reflecting the fact that the court found appellant guilty of the specifications and citing the applicable code section related to the specifications. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. During a jury trial for rape, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complaining witness's admission to a counselor that she had engaged in prostitution in the past. Application of the rape shield law to exclude such evidence would have infringed on appellee's right to present a defense of consensual sex and to confront his accuser with a motive to fabricate the allegation. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.) (Hall, J., dissenting.)

Appellant was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of felonious assault (deadly weapon) and one count of aggravated robbery. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving a jury instruction on complicity. The record does not demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, since we find no error, the assertion of cumulative error fails. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claims for abuse of process, defamation, and civil conspiracy. Appellant argued that appellees' prior lawsuit against him related to non-payment for gas services was meritless and without probable cause. However, the trial court correctly found that an abuse of process claim did not lie. Furthermore, the doctrine of absolute privilege barred appellant's defamation claim. Appellant's civil conspiracy claim was based upon his allegations of abuse of process and defamation, and since he failed to establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact on those claims, his claim for civil conspiracy was also subject to summary judgment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's "motion for resentencing," which he filed two decades after his conviction on numerous felony offenses. To the extent that the motion in substance sought post-conviction relief for constitutional violations, it was governed by R.C. 2953.21. Under that statute, the motion was untimely, and the appellant failed to establish, among other things, that he was "unavoidably prevented" from discovering the facts upon which his arguments relied. In any event, regardless of how the appellant's motion was characterized and regardless of any timeliness problems, res judicata applies. Appellant's arguments all could have been raised on direct appeal because they did not depend on any evidence outside of the trial record. The issues appellant raises also did not render the jury's verdict or his sentence void. Judgment affirmed.

administrative appeal, R.C. 119.12, res judicata

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Appellant's convictions for retaliation for sending threatening letters to a county prosecutor are not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellant's name and inmate number were in the return address on the envelopes, the letters contained information specific to appellant, and the letters were similar in style and substance to an earlier letter to a different prosecutor for which appellant was also convicted.

Appellant demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to file an affidavit of indigency prior to sentencing and the record shows that appellant has a persistent drug problem, is not educated, and does not have a record of work history, and where the trial court indicated a willingness to waive a mandatory fine based on appellant's indigency.

Statements made by the prosecutor during sentencing did not breach the plea agreement.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—A public-records mandamus claim generally becomes moot when a public office provides the requested documents—A public office may establish by affidavit that all existing public records have been provided—Writ denied.

The trial court did not err by denying appellants/third-party plaintiffs' Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment where the trial court found it necessary to dismiss appellants' third-party complaint filed against appellee/third-party defendant pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B) when appellants failed to perfect service of process of their amended complaint on appellees even after being explicitly instructed by the trial court to do so.

Trial court did not err in finding that defendant's failure to report to his probation officer and his lack of contact with the probation department for almost two months was not a technical violation under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i).

Trial court erred in summarily dismissing capital defendant's postconviction relief petition challenging defense counsel's failure to present expert testimony during the penalty phase of the jury trial on adolescent brain development in conjunction with defendant's age and mental health issues, and in denying defendant's motion for discovery regarding those claims.

juvenile protection order—future harm—manifest weight

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(C)

summary judgment, statute of limitations, judicial notice, savings statute, wrongful death

Conviction for Voluntary Manslaughter was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and defendant's sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

The trial court did not err in denying the petition for post-conviction relief when the petition set forth no substantive basis and all the claims were barred by res judicata.

The trial court's judgment entries reflect that Appellant was properly classified under R.C. 2152.83.

Appellant's Due Process rights were not violated and his First Amendment rights were not violated.

The trial court did not err in its sentencing of the defendant-appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant-appellant's community control.

A trial court lacks jurisdiction to resentence a defendant after completion of his or her sentence.

Body camera footage was properly authenticated. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to admission of the body camera footage when it had been properly authenticated. The trial court did not err in permitting the State to present more body camera footage as part of the rebuttal. The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendant-appellant's sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Requester made a public-records request to respondent Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office in which he sought emails from a former assistant county prosecutor. In a report and recommendation, a special master recommended a finding that requester had not shown that respondent violated R.C. 149.43(B). On requester's objections, the court overruled the objections, adopted the report and recommendation, and rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

Requester sought records from respondent Disciplinary Counsel. In a report and recommendation, a special master recommended a finding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over requester's claim and recommended granting a motion to dismiss filed by respondent. Neither party filed timely written objections. The court found no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation. The court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed requester's claim without prejudice.

In a report and recommendation, a special master recommended denying requester's claim for production of withheld portions of requested records. The special master further recommended that court costs be assessed to respondent because respondent did not disclose non-exempt headers, signature blocks, and disclaimers until after litigation had commenced. Neither party filed timely written objections. The court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation. The court adopted report and recommendation and the court rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2953.08 ineffective assistance of counsel

Fourth amendment/Abandoned property/Cell phone/Sufficiency of evidence/Manifest weight/Reagan tokes act

Consecutive sentences after admitted CC violations

R.C. 2941.25 allied offenses R.C. 2907.08(C) R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) separate identifiable harm video camera separate animus sufficiency of the evidence possessing criminal tools R.C. 2923.24(A)

petition for postconviction relief consecutive sentences void voidable R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2953.21 R.C. 2953.23 lack jurisdiction App.R. 12(A)(1)(a)

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(a) mandatory prison terms R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) jail time credit

CRIMINAL LAW - Gross Sexual Imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) Sexual Imposition R.C. 2907.06(A)(1) Trespass in a Habitation When a Person is Present or Likely to be Present R.C. 911.12(B) court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences affirmed.

CIVIL - restitution stay of execution R.C. 1923.14(A) notation of service Civ.R. 58(B) notice of appeal App.R. 4(A) law of the case doctrine

CRIMINAL - revival of a dormant judgment final judgment court costs res judicata similar, successive motions finality

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1 before sentencing entered plea knowingly and willingly satisfied with counsel extensively advised of rights merely a change of heart no abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL - motion to suppress investigatory detention reasonable suspicion inventory search warrantless arrest probable cause Obstructing Official Business felony sentencing indefinite sentence maximum term R.C. 2929.144(B)(4) firearm specification

CRIMINAL LAW - Kidnapping R.C. 2905.01 Theft from a Person in a Protected Class R.C. 2913.02 under review for plain error, references to appellant's recent release from jail was more probative than prejudicial as it provided context and identified appellant as the suspect Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal was properly denied as sufficient evidence of each element was presented, including that the elderly victim was not released in a safe place, unharmed appellant knowingly kidnapped victim when he drove off in a stolen vehicle knowing she was in the backseat and not waiting for her to get out after instructing her to do so owner of vehicle was qualified to estimate the value of the vehicle stolen affirmed.

CIVIL - complaint for money only summary judgment lease relieved owner of any duty to mitigate negligent management precluded by lease did not raise unconscionability waived written waiver valid.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) untimely appeal.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - prohibition motion to dismiss subject matter jurisdiction patent and unambiguous death sentence vacated remand pending application for reopening S.Ct.Prac.R. 11.06.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—A public office has no duty to permit the inspection of a public record when the inspection would endanger the safety of the records or unreasonably interfere with the discharge of the duties of the officer having custody of the same—Writ denied.

On certification of default.

Habeas corpus—Inmate's claims not cognizable in habeas corpus—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Mandamus—Prosecutor has no clear legal duty to perform an action that he has no legal authority to undertake—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

Mandamus—Procedendo—A court need not grant extraordinary relief in mandamus when the relator would receive no benefit from such an order—Judge's failure to direct clerk to serve judgment entry on parties under Civ.R. 58(B) is not a refusal or delay in proceeding to judgment—Court of appeals' judgment of dismissal affirmed.

Mandamus—Ohio Adm.Code 3796:2-1-09 does not prohibit a medical-marijuana cultivator from submitting on its own initiative an application to expand its cultivation area—Department of Commerce had a clear legal duty to either approve or deny cultivator's application—Peremptory writ granted.

Defendant's convictions for rape and kidnapping supported by sufficient and manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court provided defendant notice of Tier III sex offender registration requirements.

Judgment reversed. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the escape charge, as any error in the trial court's imposition of post-release control rendered the post-release control sanction voidable, not void. As the post-release control sanction was never vacated on appeal, it remained enforceable. The post-release control term was res judicata and not subject to correction.

JURISDICTION — POSTRELEASE CONTROL — CRIM.R. 32(C) — POSTCONVICTION: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain postconviction motions seeking relief on the ground that sentences were not imposed in conformity with the statutes governing postrelease control: the motions were not reviewable under any postconviction proceeding provided by statute or rule the sentences were not correctable under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, because they were imposed by a court having personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and postrelease control was not correctable under Crim.R. 36, because postrelease control was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing. The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain postconviction motions seeking relief on the grounds that defendant's judgments of conviction did not satisfy Crim.R. 32(C)'s requirements for final appealable orders: the motions alleged due-process violations and were thus reviewable under the standards provided by the postconviction statutes, R.C. 2953.21 et seq., but did not satisfy the statutes' jurisdictional requirements for entertaining a late postconviction claim the judgments of conviction could not have been vacated under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, because they were not void when they were entered by a court having personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and the motions did not demonstrate grounds for issuing revised judgments of conviction, when the clerk of courts' file-stamp was not required to be exclusively mechanical or state the hour of the day of filing, nothing on the face of the challenged file-stamp suggested that the substantive requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, had not been satisfied, and the file-stamp advanced the purpose of those requirements by putting defendant on notice that the time for appealing his convictions had begun to run.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: The trial court did not commit plain error by dismissing the case against defendant, after the state's witness left the courtroom before cross-examination, because the Con4frontation Clause precluded the court from considering the witness's testimony.

permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – clear and convincing evidence – best interest of the child – alternative disposition – legal custody to a relative

protection order—objections—Civ.R. 65.1

mens rea, endangering children, domestic violence, manifest weight

Review of felony sentences, R.C. 2953.08(G), Ineffective assistance

R.C. Chapter 2744, political subdivision tort liability, R.C. 2744.01, immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B), exceptions to immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), negligent failure to repair public roadways. Summary judgment for the appellee city was properly granted in this case. The parties agreed that R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) applied to the stated facts however, appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to actual or constructive notice of the pothole.

Community control sanctions abuse of discretion Jones three-prong test. Although a trial court is granted broad discretion in imposing community control sanctions, the trial court's discretion "is not limitless." We find the imposed indefinite condition, though seemingly well-intentioned, designed to both rehabilitate and protect society, is not reasonable or appropriate and therefore falls short on the Jones three-prong test. The resultant indefinite separation of father from children also impinges upon the "fundamental liberty interest" parents have in the care, custody, and management of their children. Consequently, we are constrained to find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing, and later denying, the motion to modify the indefinite condition. In so finding, we are cognizant of a trial court's desire, when fashioning community control sanctions, to strike the proper balance in protecting the parties involved. Nonetheless, we find nothing in the record that would support the indefinite no-contact order, which has now separated a once totally involved father from his children for more than two years.

Summary judgment de novo personal injuries trip and fall patio paver landlord tenant negligence open and obvious negligence per se Landlord-Tenant Act 5321.04(A)(1) R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) expert statutory duty Residential Code of Ohio fit and habitable. Trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of landlord-appellees was affirmed on claims arising from a tenant-appellant's trip-and-fall on a patio paver. Open-and-obvious doctrine applied to bar common-law negligence claims when appellant had previously fallen on a patio paver and had knowledge that the patio contained some loose pavers. Summary judgment also was warranted on the negligence per se claims for violations of Ohio's Landlord-Tenant Act because appellants failed to demonstrate that appellees breached a statutory duty imposed under R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) or R.C. 5321.04(A)(2). A court interprets statutory provisions as a matter of law, and the code provisions cited by plaintiffs' expert were not applicable to the brick-and-paver patio on which the appellant allegedly fell. Also, the record demonstrated that appellants continued to routinely use the patio and that the premises remained fit and habitable.

Aggregate prison sentence journal entry void voidable Crim.R. 43. - Defendant's sentence is not void or voidable when the trial court does not state the total aggregate prison sentencing on the record during sentencing but includes it in the sentencing journal entry. There was also no violation of Crim.R. 43 because the trial court's journal entry stating the total aggregate sentence was not substantially different than what occurred at sentencing because adding up the individual sentences imposed on each count totaled the aggregate sentence stated in the journal entry.

Motion to vacate void sentence contrary to law indefinite sentence for murder void sentence voidable sentence direct appeal collateral attack res judicata. Defendant's sentence for murder, which was worded differently than mandated by the sentencing statute, was voidable, rather than void. This was subject to challenge only on direct appeal. Defendant's collateral attack barred by res judicata.

Permanent custody termination of parental rights R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence manifest weight of the evidence best interests of the children abuse of discretion guardian ad litem independent counsel plain error Sup.R. 48. The juvenile court's judgment in granting permanent custody to CCDCFS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court did not err in considering or relying upon the GAL's report and recommendation.

Plain error nunc pro tunc guilty plea sentence. Trial court erred by attempting to modify defendant's plea and prison sentence without holding a new sentencing hearing and outside of defendant's presence.

Divorce ward guardianship R.C. 3105.01(J) Civ.R. 15(B). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting divorce. Husband filed for divorce. Months later, he was declared incompetent in separate proceedings and his daughter was appointed his guardian. The divorce proceedings continued. Both Appellant-wife and the daughter testified at trial. The evidence supported that Husband and Appellant-wife had voluntarily lived separate and apart for more than one year. Although different grounds were pleaded in the divorce complaint, the court did not abuse its discretion in amending the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 15 where the issue of living separate and apart was tried without objection by either party.

Ineeffective assistance/court costs

parental rights and responsibilities, change in circumstances, R.C. 3109.04(E), abuse of discretion guardian ad litem

Civ.R. 60 abuse of discretion res judicata App.R. 9

a plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent Crim.R. 11(C)(2) ineffective assistance of counsel

Appellant's speedy trial rights were not violated because fewer than 270 days of appellant's speedy trial time under R.C. 2945.71 elapsed prior to appellant's imprisonment on another conviction, and appellant subsequently failed to provide the notice required to invoke the 180-day speedy trial time under R.C. 2941.401, which is the specific speedy trial provision applicable to persons imprisoned in a correctional institution of this state. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Judgment affirmed.

On review of the record, the decision granting permanent custody motion was in child's best interest was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although mother made some progress while child was in custody, mother demonstrated continued instability and continued inability to address child's medical and psychological issues. Mother's two assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the trial court granting motion for permanent custody affirmed.

Relator's objections overruled respondent's motion to dismiss granted.

Case at hand is distinguishable from our Chapman decision Search incident to lawful arrest was not limited to a search of his person for more weapons Search of his person for any evidence or contraband was permissible under a search incident to lawful arrest.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

CRIM.R. 11– SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE – AGGRAVATED MURDER – R.C. 2953.08 – BIAS: The trial court failed to substantially comply with the requirement in Crim.R. 11 that it inform defendant of the maximum sentence faced where it conflated the concepts of parole and postrelease control. Defendant failed to establish that he would not have otherwise pled guilty had the trial court correctly explained the concepts of parole and postrelease control where defendant was aware that he potentially faced a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and he elected to plead guilty with that knowledge. R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude a constitutional challenge to a sentence imposed for murder or aggravated murder. The trial court's comments at sentencing comparing defendant's behavior to the behavior of other veterans did not demonstrate bias or that the trial court lacked an open state of mind.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS – FLIGHT – EVIDENCE – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where the trial court determined that a requested jury instruction on flight was not probative towards resolution of the claims in the case and would require speculation as to why defendant fled, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide the instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting plaintiff from cross-examining defendants' expert witnesses on defendant's flight where the trial court did not otherwise limit cross-examination on the absent defendant's medical records and plaintiff suffered no material prejudice.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – STATUTE OF REPOSE – R.C. 2305.113: The trial court did not err in granting defendant-hospital's motions to dismiss the complaints where plaintiffs-patients' medical claims were filed outside the four-year repose period. Pursuant to Young v. Durrani, 2016-Ohio-5526, 61 N.E.3d 34 (1st Dist.), plaintiffs-patients' negligent-credentialing claims were "medical claims" under R.C. 2305.113(E). A "physician" is a "caregiver" within the meaning of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3)(b)(ii). R.C. 2305.113(C) is a true statute of repose not subject to a fraud exception or equitable-estoppel exception. Pursuant to Freeman v. Durrani, 2019-Ohio-3643, 144 N.E.3d 1067 (1st Dist.), plaintiffs-patients' fraud claims were "medical claims" under R.C. 2305.113(E).

The trial court did not err in allowing testimony about "pinging" of appellant's cell phone that occurred before police obtained a warrant. Appellant failed to raise the issue through a pretrial suppression motion, thereby waiving all but plain error. In any event, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless pinging, and police acted in good-faith reliance on then-existing precedent that allowed warrantless pinging. The jury's finding that appellant acted with prior calculation and design when he killed one of his victims was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court erred in merging the offenses of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises and aggravated murder. The doctrine of merger did not apply because the two offenses were of dissimilar import or significance. The trial court erred in merging each of appellant's three-year firearm specifications into one. The trial court was required to impose a sentence on two of the three-year firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for grand theft of a motor vehicle, felonious assault, burglary, having weapons under disability, and multiple firearm specifications were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Because appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, his assignments of error attacking the trial court's failure to rule upon discovery motions or to otherwise address discovery issues have been waived. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the court finds the appeal is frivolous and there are no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The record reflects that appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pled guilty to aggravated possession of drugs, operating a vehicle while under the influence, and two counts of identity fraud, in exchange for dismissal of three more counts of identity fraud, one count of possession of drug instruments, and an agreement that the State would not pursue other drug-related or identity theft charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate 22 months in prison. Appellant's record included multiple prior felonies, multiple misdemeanors, failures at prior supervision, and several prior prison terms. Any claim that the plea was inadequate or that the sentence was contrary to law or clearly and convincingly contrary to the record is frivolous. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the results of his urine test. The State's evidence, which the trial court credited, established that the deputy substantially complied with the labeling requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05(E). Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for rape was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence the State proved all the elements of the crime and the jury found the victim's testimony credible. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a new trial because the COVID-19 precautions taken by the court were reasonable and his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. The court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for a mistrial because he did not suffer prejudice from an inadvertent encounter between a witness, an excused juror, and empaneled jurors. The trial court did not err by admitting physical evidence over appellant's objection. Finally, there was no cumulative error. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's pro se petition for post-conviction relief and granting the State's motion for summary judgment on the petition. Appellant failed to set forth operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief that would have entitled her to a hearing, and her claims were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The record supported the trial court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights and award appellee Montgomery County Children Services permanent custody of three children. Judgment affirmed.

One of appellants' claims remains unresolved and pending in the trial court. Although the court included a Civ.R. 54(B) certification in its summary judgment decision, the record does not contain adequate information to indicate whether the pending claim is intertwined or overlaps with the claim that is being appealed. As a result, the basis for the trial court's mere incantation of the Civ.R. 54(B) certification is impossible to ascertain. The summary judgment decision therefore was interlocutory, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. Appeal dismissed.

12(b)(6)/Damage to property/Statute of limitations

Administrative appeal

Prosecutorial misconduct ineffective assistant of counsel.

Permanent Custody - mother

Jail time credit, R.C. 2967.191

Marketable Title Act—R.C. 5301.47 et seq.—Each title transaction in chain of title recites that conveyance is subject to a specific reservation of mineral rights—Root of title and subsequent conveyances are made subject to a specific, identifiable reservation of mineral rights recited throughout chain of title using the same language as recorded title transaction that created it—The reference to the reservation is therefore not a general reference insufficient to preserve reservation of mineral rights—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

Habeas corpus—R.C. 2969.25—Compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) is mandatory, and failure to comply with the statute warrants dismissal of the complaint—Court of appeals' judgment of dismissal affirmed.

In a divorce action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring appellant from presenting witnesses or exhibits at trial, in its custody and child support determinations, in the unequal award of marital assets in favor of appellee, and in awarding attorney fees to appellee. Further, the court did not err in ordering the posting of a supersedeas bond pending appeal. Bias R.C. 3109.04 impute income Civ.R. 62.

Traffic stop. Motion to suppress. Marijuana. Probable cause. Warrantless search.

Not excessive or contrary to law.

Where letter from zoning administrator regarding the lack of regulations relative to keeping fowl on residential property was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, the court did not err in dismissing the administrative appeal. Civ.R. 12(B) R.C. Chapter 2506.

Sierah's law duty to enroll in violent offender database constitutionality R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a)(i)-(iv) factors abuse of discretion.

Appellant waived a constitutional challenge to R.C. 2967.271, the Reagan Tokes law, where appellant failed to object to his sentence in the trial court and failed to argue plain error on appeal. Regardless, the issue is not ripe for review. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law.

Trial court properly denied appellant's application for a writ of mandamus, where the application sought the trial court to compel itself to act, and where appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court was under a clear legal duty to provide him with a copy of his presentence investigation report.

For purposes of invoking serious youth offender's adult sentence under R.C. 2152.14, admission to unit of Montgomery County center for adolescent services established for female felony delinquents constituted admission "to a department of youth services facility." Sufficient evidence existed to support trial court's conclusions that youth engaged in acts described in R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(a) and (b) and was unlikely to be rehabilitated during remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.

Following a jury trial, the trial court did not err in failing to merge the convictions for rape, felonious assault, and kidnapping at sentencing where separate harm was shown. Ruff allied sexual motivation.

Conviction for complicity to commit abduction affirmed where evidence established that defendant communicated with codefendants before and after the commission of the offense and where surveillance video showed defendant operated his vehicle so as to block victim's escape from gunman, who shot and killed him. Imposition of additional prison term for gun specification was proper notwithstanding that defendant was unarmed.

Trial court's award of permanent custody to children services is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where father continuously and repeatedly tests positive for illicit substances and where the children have been in temporary custody of the agency for 21 months and are doing very well in their foster placement.

Juvenile court properly terminated appellant's parental rights to the minor child and granted permanent custody to appellee. Judgment affirmed. Permanent custody, reasonable efforts, best interests of the child, manifest weight

Trial court's erroneous admission of evidence of appellant's prior convictions was harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt as to the charge of possession of cocaine. Trial court erred in failing to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing, where the appellant was convicted of multiple counts of having weapons while under disability based upon possession of three firearms that were simultaneously possessed and discovered in one location at one time.

APP.R. 26(B) APPLICATION TO REOPEN DIRECT APPEAL—INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL—POSTRELEASE CONTROL—PROCEDURE/CIVIL: App.R. 26(B)(5) mandated reopening the direct appeal, when the timely filed App.R. 26(B) application for reopening established a genuine issue as to a colorable claim of ineffective appellate counsel in failing to assign as error trial counsel's ineffectiveness concerning the imposition of an unauthorized period of postrelease control. The court of appeals will not exercise its discretion under Civ.R. 11 to strike the App.R. 26(B) application to reopen the direct appeal, when Civ.R. 11's signature requirement was effectively satisfied by the application's amendment with a signed affidavit attesting to the truth of the matters set forth in the application. The court of appeals was not precluded from granting the App.R. 26(B) application to reopen the direct appeal by the applicant's failure to provide with the application the sworn statement required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(d), when App.R. 26(B)(5) mandated reopening the appeal upon the court's determination that the record demonstrated a genuine issue as to appellate counsel's ineffectiveness, and the sworn statement was not an evidentiary tool that was necessary to that determination.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to comply with filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and withdrawing from representation of a client despite material adverse effects on the interests of the client—Several mitigating factors, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record and other interim rehabilitation—Conditionally stayed two-year suspension.

Attorneys—Character and fitness—Application to register as a candidate for admission to the practice of law—Application disapproved and applicant forever barred from reapplying for the privilege of practicing law in Ohio.

The trial court did not err by concluding that the respondent-appellee's consent to petitioner-appellant's petitions to adopt the minor children is required under R.C. 3107.07(A).

domestic violence civil protection order—manifest weight of the evidence—R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)—R.C. 2903.211—pattern of conduct—mental distress

rape – battery – substantially impaired – manifest weight – ineffective assistance – consensual sex – alcohol – prescription pills

Appellant's indefinite sentence is not unconstitutional as the Reagan Tokes Law, specifically R.C. 2967.271, does not violate an offender's due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution as the statute provides an inmate with notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing where the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction may rebut the presumption that the offender will be released on his or her minimum prison term or presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.

Trial court's judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's tortious interference with a contract claim is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence in the record established the appellee's interference with the appellant's former employee's noncompete agreement was improper pursuant to the Siegel factors.

Appellant was not provided with ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel's decisions of who to sit on the jury, who counsel should have subpoenaed to testify, and what questions to ask during cross-examination are all the product of sound trial strategy that cannot form the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee a protection order where appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knowingly caused him emotional distress by driving past his home on multiple occasions within short periods of times and pulling over to park on the curb while appellant knew appellee was outside.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing indefinite term of imprisonment aggravated burglary attempted murder aggravated arson kidnapping firearm specifications duration of individual sentences consecutive sentence no error necessary to protect the public from future crime or punish appellant no single term reflects the seriousness of the conduct merger dissimilar import committed separately.

CIVIL - declaratory judgment action injunction mandamus Board of Commissioners visitors bureau concerned citizen summary judgment open meetings act R.C. 121.22 county administrator authorized R.C. 305.30(A) not a meeting bureau is not a public body Civ.R. 15(A) deny motion to strike cross appeal improper exhibits should have been stricken no prejudice moot allegation of frivolous conduct.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing rape life without possibility of parole potential, less severe options vindictive R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b) no evidence of vindictiveness purposes and principles of felony sentencing no error.

CRIMINAL LAW - speedy trial, 90 days, misdemeanor, time tolled for mutually agreed upon pretrials sufficient evidence of intoxication, sleeping in car in middle of roadway with open beer bottle, bloodshot and glassy eyes, smell of alcohol, refusal to submit to breath test and field sobriety tests.

CRIMINAL LAW - public indecency laundromat next to dumpsters 24 months imprisonment sentence not contrary to law sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence minor likely would have seen and been affronted evidence supports jury's inferences convictions supported by sufficient, credible evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - hearsay testimony to explain police conduct danger of unfair prejudice harmless error some other indicia overwhelming evidence of guilt juror communication sufficiency of the evidence reckless homicide circumstantial evidence vindictiveness genuine remorse.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing consecutive community control sanctions void and voidable sentences res judicata.

CIVIL - motion to remove guardian Civ.R. 53 adoption of a magistrate's decision failure to file objections plain error void judgment subject-matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction standing due process.

APPELLATE REVIEW - no written judgment entry no final appealable order lack of jurisdiction.

APPELLATE REVIEW - no written judgment entry no final appealable order lack of jurisdiction.

Authentication of Messages - Hearsay - Excited Utterance - Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor - Manifest Weight - Sufficiency of Evidence - Plain Error - Allied Offenses - IAC

Motion to withdraw guilty plea

Denial of motion to suppress/Ineffective assistance of counsel/Appeal of maximum sentence/Manifest weight/OVI

Habeas corpus—Inmate has not yet completed his lawfully imposed sentences—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules for the Government of the Bar—No credit for time served under interim felony suspension—Indefinite suspension.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to advise a client in writing that client may be entitled to refund of fee denominated as "earned upon receipt" if the lawyer does not complete representation—Failure to disclose to client attorney's failure to carry professional-liability insurance—Failure to hold client's property in an interest-bearing client trust account—Failure to hold legal fees paid in advance in a client trust account—Public reprimand.

In a permanent custody case, the trial court did not err in not appointing independent counsel for one child, or in not interviewing the children in chambers. Also, the manifest weight of the evidence supports the grant of permanent custody to the children services agency.

The trial court erred in not giving full faith and credit to the Texas court and in exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff-appellee/cross appellant's breach of contract claims. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant's conversion, fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation claims. The trial court did not err in finding to be moot and declining to address the remaining claims. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that reliable, probative and substantive evidence supported the Ohio Real Estate Commission's adjudication order that appellant violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(6) and (A)(9) and its decision was in accordance with the law. The evidence supported finding that appellant failed to timely respond to the investigation of the Ohio Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing where after sixteen months since the issuance of the complaint and shortly after a subpoena was issued, did appellant provide response to the division's investigation. Further, the evidence supported during the course of the investigation, it became evident that appellant failed to notify the superintendent that his residential address had changed, twice, within a reasonable amount of time. Also, appellant failed to cite to the record to support his defense that an inaccurate charge to the property owner reflected on the owner statement was due to a contract dispute. Finally, the determination of the appropriate sanction for the violations is strictly for the commission to determine as authorized by law and therefore appellant's due process rights were not violated when the commission revoked his license. All assignments of error are overruled. Case affirmed.

Trafficking in drugs, Possession of drugs, Constructive possession, Manifest weight of the evidence, Sufficiency of the evidence, R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), R.C. 2925.01(K), R.C. 2901.22(A), Drugs in vehicle, Driver of vehicle, Plain error, Hearsay – (party-opponent), Evid.R. 801(C), Evid.R. 801(D)(2), Ineffective assistance of counsel, Failure to object

Post release-control sentence enhancement R.C. 2929.141 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

Unemployment compensation unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence employment just cause R.C. 4141.01(B)(1) R.C. 4141.29 R.C. 4141.291

summary judgment Civ.R. 56 de novo genuine issue of material fact affidavit personal knowledge prescriptive easement clear and convincing evidence of open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use for 21 years

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE – CRIM.R. 16 – COUNSEL – EVIDENCE—SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – DRUGS – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – SENTENCING: There was no Brady violation where the potentially exculpatory information was provided to defendant prior to trial and defendant had the opportunity to use the information at trial. The prosecution violated Crim.R. 16 where it disclosed to defendant the police officer's notes from his interview with defendant two hours before trial was set to begin nevertheless, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial where the violation was not willful and defendant was not prejudiced by the late disclosure. Defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where he could not show that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a continuance or file a motion to suppress statements he made during his interview with law enforcement officers. Defendant's convictions were based upon sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where 4he admitted possession of the drugs and firearm, the drugs were discovered near defendant's person at the time of his arrest and were packaged in a manner consistent with trafficking, and $900 in cash, two cell phones, and the firearm were discovered on defendant's person and in his car. The trial court erred where it failed during the sentencing hearing to make one of the three findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences and the cause must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing on that issue.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT – EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: Plaintiff could not substantiate an unjust enrichment claim against defendant because the funds at issue were subject to an express contract and defendant was not a party to that contract. Plaintiff-employer could not show that defendant-employees breached a duty of good faith and loyalty because defendants' errors were inadvertent.

permanent custody, party status under Juv.R. 2(Y), presumption of parenthood of father married to mother, presumption can be rebutted, R.C. 3111.03(A) and (B), parental abandonment, best interest of the child

summary judgment—political subdivision immunity—R.C. 2744.01—R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)—public roads—traffic control device

Aggravated drug trafficking (methamphetamine), Manifest weight and sufficiency

Motion to vacate judgment sentence barred by res judicata

Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel secretary of state, county board of elections, and city to change ballot language of a local issue on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot or to strike issue from the ballot entirely—Secretary of state and city not proper respondents for relief sought—Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in approving ballot language for local issue under R.C. 3505.06—Writ denied.

guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel

Forgery - Theft - Manifest Weight - Sufficiency of Evidence - Allied Offenses - Merger

Elections—Prohibition—Writ of prohibition sought to prevent board of elections from placing mayoral candidate's name on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot—Relator failed to show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law by accepting candidate's nominating petitions with circulator statements that were not in the form of sworn affidavits but did substantially comply with the nominating-petition form prescribed by the city charter—Writ denied.

Because appellant failed to establish any of the exceptions under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of appellant's successive petition for postconviction relief. Judgment affirmed.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW – GUILTY PLEA – SENTENCING – R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) : The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the court heard and considered the substance of defendant's oral motion to the court at the start of defendant's sentencing hearing, and where the only basis for the motion was defendant's mistaken belief that the court would not actually impose the permissible prison sentence. The record supports the trial court's sentence, and the sentence is not otherwise contrary to law, where the record shows the trial court properly exercised its discretion under R.C. 2929.13(B) to impose the maximum permissible prison term for a felony of the fifth degree, and where the record does not show that the trial court failed to consider the statutory sentencing factors of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

SENTENCING – R.C. 2929.13 – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The trial court did not err in imposing a prison term for defendant's failure-to-stop offense, a nonviolent fifth-degree felony R.C. 2929.13(b)(1)(a) did not require the trial court to impose a community-control sanction because the condition in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a)(iii) did not apply to defendant where he had a prior conviction for a misdemeanor offense of violence committed within two years prior to the offense for which sentence was being imposed. The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences where the court engaged in the required analysis under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and its findings were supported by the record.

CHILDREN – PARENTAL TERMINATION – CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of two children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where clear and convincing evidence showed that the children needed a legally secure placement, and permanent custody with the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was in the best interest of both children.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14 R.C. 2953.08. In challenging whether the trial court record supports consecutive sentences on appeal, an appellant must show that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the court's consecutive sentence findings. Where the record otherwise contains evidence to support the court's findings, appellant's speculation as to evidence that is not in the record does not meet the burden on appeal.

Guilty plea motion to withdraw presentence abuse of discretion involuntary manslaughter new evidence self-defense Crim.R. 11 hearing ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Wrongfully imprisoned individual R.C. 2743.48 R.C. 2305.02 judgment on the pleadings community control sanctions void sentences violations of local rules issues not raised below. - Trial court did not err in granting the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's declaratory judgment action pursuant to R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48 that he be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual because although plaintiff was incarcerated on void sentences, he did not meet all the factors of R.C. 2743.48 to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual appellate court did not address plaintiff's arguments regarding alleged violations of the local rules of the common pleas court because plaintiff had not raised those issues in the trial court, and an appellate court will not consider new arguments and issues for the first time on appeal.

Sexual predator Megan's Law H.B. 180. The trial court's judgment classifying the defendant as a sexual predator was affirmed. The state established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was likely to reoffend sexually in the future.

R.C. 2941.401 R.C. 2945.71 et seq. speedy trial notice of availability. The trial court did not err by denying a motion to dismiss alleging a violation of the defendant's statutory speedy trial rights under R.C. 2941.401 because the defendant was released from jail before being brought to trial and the defendant's statutory rights were solely governed by R.C. 2945.71 et seq.

Consecutive sentences Reagan Tokes Act R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 allied offenses. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court failed to address allied offenses at the sentencing hearing. The trial court also failed to properly apply the Reagan Tokes Act to the defendant's qualifying offenses, which were his first- and second-degree felony convictions.

Petition for postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 motion to withdraw plea Crim.R. 32.1 R.C. 2929.14. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's untimely petition for postconviction relief or his separate motion to withdraw his plea filed under Crim.R. 32.1.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 breach of contract genuine issue of material fact motion for leave expert report partial performance material breach damages. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee. Genuine issues of material fact exist that precluded judgment as a matter of law in defendant-appellee's favor.

R.C. 2950.05(F)(1)/sexual offender registration requirement community control sanctions double jeopardy Crim.R. 52(B)/plain error. Review is for plain error because appellant failed to raise the issue of a due-process violation at the trial-court level. Appellant admitted his violation of the community control sanctions during the preliminary hearing and the imposed prison sentence was a result of that violation, not a prison sentence for a new offense. There was no due-process violation of appellant's rights and neither does double jeopardy apply here.

Statute of Limitations

Evidence, manifest weight

Manifest weight hearsay

Sufficiency of evidence/Manifest weight/Operable firearm/Jury instructions/Merger/Allied offenses

Appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's denial of a civil protection order when he failed to file objections to the magistrate's decision in the trial court, as required by Civ.R. 65.1. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a timely notice of appeal from the formal notice of property maintenance and zoning code violations at his property, and therefore the trial court properly dismissed his appeal. Although the property review commission held a "rehearing" on the code official's subsequent request to refer appellant's case for prosecution, the rehearing on that issue did not entitle appellant to perfect an untimely appeal from the formal notice of violations. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no issues with arguable merit for appellant to advance on appeal. Based on the facts and law involved, no responsible contention can be made that any part of appellant's plea or sentence offers a basis for reversal. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's denial of a civil protection order when she failed to file objections to the magistrate's decision in the trial court, as required by Civ.R. 65.1. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's claims are barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in his direct appeal from his convictions. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in giving a jury instruction based on non-compliance with requirements in R.C. 2933.83 that did not apply to the situation presented. The statute's requirements apply to a "photo lineup," which is defined as "an array of photographs" that includes the suspect and others. Here the defendant was identified based on an undercover detective's viewing of a single photograph, not a "photo lineup." In such a case, the potential issue is whether the identification violated due process, not whether it violated R.C. 2933.83. Nevertheless, our decision has no impact on the defendant's final judgment of acquittal, as he cannot be placed in jeopardy twice.

Appellant's conviction for reckless operation of a motor vehicle was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The "physical facts rule" was not applicable to the witnesses' estimates of distance and speed. Judgment affirmedremanded for correction of a typographical error in the judgment entry.

The trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion to seal the record was not an abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed.

Reopened appeal. Appellant's convictions for aggravated robbery and felony murder should have been merged under R.C. 2941.25, and prior appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue in prior proceedings. Judgment reversed in part and remanded for resentencing only.

Constitutionality challenge to "Reagan Tokes Law" not ripe for review. Trial court's imposition of prison sentence following felony conviction was not contrary to law. Trial court considered necessary factors and support for trial court's conclusions is not subject to review.

The trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the victim's first-time, in-court identification of appellant as the shooter issues with the testimony's reliability went to its weight, not its admissibility. Because the victim's identification was admissible, appellant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The record does not support appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mandamus action. Failure to comply with requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C) subjected the action to dismissal.

Trial court's consideration of R.C. 3127.21(B) factors was not an abuse of discretion and was sufficient to support its decision to relinquish jurisdiction of this custody case to Pennsylvania.

Trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). Appellant failed to identify reviewable error in imposition of prison term.

Writ of certiorari, original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25

post-release control, sentence modification, completed sentence

Separate felonious assaults committed against an infant were not subject to merger. Further, appellant did not demonstrate that his maximum, consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

The trial court erred by granting summary judgment as to the plaintiff-appellant's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to all remaining claims. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law where the trial court considered the proper statutory factors, imposed postrelease control, and sentenced appellant within the statutory range for a second-degree felony.

The municipal court did not err by denying appellant's application to seal the record in a case originally charging appellant with a first-degree misdemeanor offense that the municipal court subsequently dismissed where appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to demonstrate the need for sealing the record given his failure to appear at the hearing on his application due to his incarceration out of state.

Appeal of a judgment entry denying a motion to stay pending arbitration and granting a motion for a hearing under R.C. 2711.03 for the purpose of determining whether an arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether it is enforceable, is dismissed for lack of a final appealable order as the judgment entry leaves issues unresolved and contemplates further action.

The evidence was sufficient to convict appellant for violating a protection order. Appellant was informed of the protection order by a law enforcement officer in accordance with R.C. 2919.27(D). The reissuance of the ex parte protection order did not require additional notice to appellant because the reissuance was merely an extension of the order, not a separate order.

Appellants failed to establish prejudicial error on appeal based upon the timing of the trial court's ruling on the parties' competing motions for summary judgment.

Because the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) during the plea colloquy, defendant-appellant's guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

RES JUDICATA - Crim.R. 11(C) voidable sentencing error not raised on direct appeal.

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - Crim.R. 29(A) sufficiency manifest weight passing bad checks purpose to defraud payee's knowledge of insufficient funds Evid.R. 609(B) admissibility of prior convictions more than ten years old impeachment crimes of deceit notice.

ZONING - area variance Duncan factors practical difficulties

JURISDICTION – R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction endangering children R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) conviction vacated. CRIMINAL LAW – Crim.R. 29(A) manifest weight misdemeanor assault knowingly eyewitness testimony.

GARNISHMENT - default judgment personal jurisdiction void service ordinary mail

ORIGINAL ACTION - prohibition municipal court jurisdiction venue

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to suppress, Intoxilyzer 8000, properly certified, working order, state substantial compliance, appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, trial court is no longer required to make maximum sentence findings misdemeanor sentencing, no requirement for trial court to state on record considered statutory sentencing criteria.

CIVIL - parenting time contempt of court inability to comply

CRIMINAL - no-contest OVI denied motion to suppress identified citizen informant was presumed credible police had probable cause, even without field sobriety tests, to effect arrest denial of the motion to suppress was not error odor of alcohol is one factor to be considered when determining probable cause of OVI trial court judge's statement regarding the timing of the dissipation of the odor of alcohol was not improper personal opinion appellant failed to show prejudice in trial court's failure to provide findings of fact when the record provided a sufficient basis for review of the assignment of error affirmed.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal no valid reason for delay of over 13 months.

Civ.R. 60(B), two percent processing charge, child support enforcement agency

Manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel

Obstructing official business, sufficiency, manifest weight Father's appeal-right to counsel ineffective assistance of counsel

Murder, Manifest weight and sufficiency, Self-defense

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.18, if a sentencing court imposes restitution as part of the sentence in a felony case the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount. An order of restitution imposed by the sentencing court on an offender is part of the sentence and as such is a final and appealable when it is imposed. The amount of restitution ordered as part of a sentence of community control cannot be challenged in an appeal from revocation of community control such a challenge is barred as res judicata.

The magistrate properly concluded that there is some evidence in the record to support the board's denial of relator's application for disability benefits and that therefore, relator is not entitled to mandamus relief. Objections overruled magistrate's decision adopted and petition for writ of mandamus denied.

The jury's verdict finding appellant guilty of sexual imposition was supported by sufficient evidence as to the element of sexual contact. The jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence as the jury was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court did not commit plain error in instructing the jury on the element of sexual contact. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to the instruction on the element of sexual contact. Appellant's assignments of error are overruled. Judgment affirmed.

Objection overruled action dismissed. Respondent's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dsmiss relator's complaint seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus granted. Relator's request for a writ of mandamus granted. Relator's request for a writ of mandamus truly sought a writ of habeas corpus which this court lacked jurisdiction to address. The OAPA did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over relator's parole proceedings prior to February 3, 2016.

The court vacates the magistrate's decision dismissing the original action in mandamus pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6) because taking the allegations of the complaint as admitted, it does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. Action remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings.

Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because the trial court's ruling ordering the parties to submit an agreed protective order for its review provided adequate safeguards of appellants' alleged trade secrets, it was not a provisional remedy that qualifies as a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.

Trial court did not err in finding appellant in contempt of a prior entry ordering him to abate a nuisance at his property.

The trial court's order dismissing appellant's cause of action against Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act was not a final, appealable order so as to vest this court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Relator's request for a writ of procedendo to compel respondent, a judge of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, to proceed to final judgment in a civil case he filed to recover bailed property is moot where the judge already issued the judgment sought by relator. Motion to dismiss granted writ of procedendo denied.

The trial court did not err in entering a domestic violence civil protection order consented to by both parties. Nothing in the appellate record supports appellant's contention that the trial court intimidated or fraudulently induced him into agreeing to the consent order. Judgment affirmed.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25

CHILDREN — PERMANENT CUSTODY: Mother could not show that the grant of permanent custody of her four children to Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence where the children had undisputedly been in agency custody for over 12 consecutive months and the court's best-interest finding was supported by clear-and-convincing evidence, including evidence that mother failed to understand the need to treat serious mental-health issues that prevented her from providing a safe and nurturing home for the children, who were in the care of a relative who wished to adopt them.

Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure motion to suppress traffic stop vehicle registration violation reasonable suspicion probable cause odor of marijuana

Denial of motion for summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) genuine issue of material fact motorcycle accident jurisdiction R.C. 2744.02(C) political subdivision immunity R.C. 2744.02 R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) exceptions to immunity R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), (B)(2) R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) negligent operation of bus left turn right of way R.C. 4511.42(A) Cleveland Codified Ordinances 431.17 R.C. 4511.01(UU)(1) preferential status proceeding in a lawful manner forfeit right of way wanton conduct reckless conduct. Trial court properly denied rapid transit authority's motion for summary judgment based on political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A), where plaintiff alleged that bus operator's negligence in turning left at intersection into path of motorcycle caused motorcycle operator's death. Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether bus operator was negligent in operating the bus under exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), (B)(2), including whether motorcycle with ostensible right of way lost its preferential status by proceeding in an unlawful manner through the intersection and whether bus operator otherwise failed to exercise ordinary care. Trial court erred in denying bus operator's motion for summary judgment based on statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). Based on the evidence presented, there was no genuine issue of material fact that bus operator did not act wantonly or recklessly in operating the bus to support exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider cross-appeal of trial court's denial of plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability as to claims against rapid transit authority. R.C. 2744.02(C) grants appellate court jurisdiction only to consider trial court's decision on immunity, not other alleged errors concerning the denial of summary judgment on other grounds.

Rape R.C. 2907.02 sexual conduct R.C. 2907.01 gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05 sexual contact erogenous zone sufficiency Crim.R. 29 manifest weight motion for a mistrial abuse of discretion fair trial emotional outburst curative instruction consecutive sentences R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.14 contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12. Appellant's rape and gross sexual imposition convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial following the emotional outburst of a state's witness. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences, and appellant's sentence is not contrary to law.

Traffic regulation municipal law municipality sovereign citizen sovereign nation meritless assignment of error must state legal basis of appeal. Defendant appealed trial court's judgment affirming magistrate's convictions for various municipal traffic violations. His assignment of error failed to state what legal error occurred and his brief does not detail any legal argument or basis for overturning his conviction. Appellant's various random arguments based on a "sovereign citizen" theory are without merit. Because these arguments are meritless and defendant does not detail any other legal basis to overturn the convictions, the judgment is affirmed.

R.C. 2711.01(A) motion to compel arbitration terms and conditions of sale arbitration provision arbitrability scope. Appellee's claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. The arbitration provision in this matter is narrow in scope and covers solely disputes "arising under these Terms and Conditions of Sale." As appellee's claims can be asserted without any reference to the Terms and Conditions, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion to compel arbitration or, alternatively, motion to dismiss.

Theft telecommunications fraud sufficiency manifest weight allied offenses.

Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor importuning possession of criminal tools mistrial undue influence R.C. 2945.36 ineffective assistance of counsel plain error. The trial court's decision to release a potential juror for cause, rather than declaring a mistrial, was not plain error. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney did not object or request a mistrial following a statement by a prospective juror relating her positive experience with the task force that arrested appellant.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 de novo review medical malpractice proximate cause expert testimony jury issue. The trial court erred in determining that appellant had failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the actions of the nursing home staff proximately caused the death of the decedent.

Breach of contract Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act R.C. 1435.01 et seq. Civ.R. 52 Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(ii) magistrate's decision findings of fact conclusions of law substantially comply manifest weight oral contract enforceable contract meeting of the minds definite and certain. Affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of appellees on claims of breach of contract and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. The magistrate's decision substantially complied with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), and additional findings of fact and conclusions of law were not necessary because the trial court's decision, when considered with the rest of the record, formed an adequate basis for review. The trial court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the trial court did not commit error in its determinations. The additional tree work appellant requested was not included in the scope of the parties' oral contract, and there was never a meeting of the minds or a definite and certain contract for the additional tree work. The record did not show that any violation of the CSPA occurred.

R.C. 2151.414(B), permanent custody, sufficiency of evidence. The trial court's grant of permanent custody of appellant's minor children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") was proper where the court found that the children had been in the custody of CCDCFS for 12 months in a 22-month period, the grant of permanent custody was in the best interests of the children, and the children could not be placed with appellant or their mother within a reasonable time. These findings were properly based on competent, credible evidence that the parents had not completed any of the reunification plans or services.

Mandamus denied (1) relator failed to demonstrate that an "integrity review" provided for in former Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-16-72 was required before the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS") could terminate a daycare provider agreement (2) relator's objection to the magistrate's decision that the investigation conducted by ODJFS did not constitute an integrity review is moot and (3) relator failed to show that ODJFS abused its discretion when it terminated the daycare provider agreement and when it declined to reconsider that decision.

The trial court's decision granting the motion for permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and Civ.R. 23(B)(3) were satisfied therefore, the trial court did not err by certifying the class as requested by plaintiffs-appellees. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed.

In accordance with the magistrate's decision, respondent's motion to dismiss is granted and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Aggravated murder murder felonious assault having a weapon while under a disability Crim.R. 16 prior calculation and design sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence abuse of discretion self-defense, R.C. 2901.05 speedy trial, R.C. 2945.71 Art. I, Section of the Ohio Constitution juror illness, R.C. 2945.29, R.C. 2945.30 Crim.R. 16 consciousness of guilt post-release control, R.C. 2967.28

ALIBI – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Where the trial court weighed the theory of defense against the testimony of the state's witnesses and held the state to its burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not shift the burden of persuasion to defendant to prove his alibi defense. Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant failed to show that the trial court clearly lost its way in believing the testimony of the state's witnesses over the testimony of defendant's alibi witnesses.

EVID.R. 404(B) – ALLIED OFFENSES – R.C. 2941.25 – R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) – ROBBERY – SENTENCING – COUNSEL –INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: Where evidence of other robberies committed by defendant was probative to establishing defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged offenses, which was a material issue in dispute, the trial court did not err in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect and in admitting the evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). Where the evidence established that the restraint of the victim was prolonged and was not merely incidental to the act constituting the offense of felonious assault, the trial court did not err in failing to merge defendant's convictions for kidnapping and felonious assault. The trial court did not err in failing to merge defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated murder where the two offenses were committed separately the aggravated burglary was complete when defendant entered the victim's garage with the intent to steal drugs and money, whereas the aggravated murder was separately committed when defendant later purposely opened the victim's car door and shot the victim. The trial court properly imposed sentences on multiple firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to engage an expert to testify regarding the unreliability of the state's cooperating witnesses.

The trial court did not err by granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant-appellee as to plaintiff-appellant's abuse-of-process and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

Following his guilty plea to failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, the trial court sentenced appellant to the maximum 36-month prison term. A trial court's alleged failure to properly consider appellant's remorse is not a basis upon which an appellate court may modify or vacate a felony sentence. Further, under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), an appellate court cannot modify or vacate a felony sentence because the trial court's findings are not supported by R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Finally, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based upon the conclusion the sentence is contrary to law because it is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err when it granted the city's motion for summary judgment related to the constitutionality of the following provisions of Am.H.B. No. 62 (H.B. 62): R.C. 4511.093(B)(1), R.C. 5747.502(C), R.C. 5747.502(D), R.C. 5747.502(F), R.C. 4511.096(C), and R.C. 4511.099(A). The trial court correctly found that these were not general laws and violated the city's authority under the Home Rule Amendment. The record established that a conflict existed between the city's local ordinances setting forth its photo traffic enforcement program and these provisions of H.B. 62. The trial court erred when it found that the provisions enacted in H.B. 62 at R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) and R.C. 1907.02(C) violated the one-subject rule and in denying the State's motion for summary judgment related to the constitutionality of those provisions. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter where the evidence at trial did not reasonably support the instruction. The trial court did not err in entering a guilty verdict on a firearm specification accompanying count six of the indictment. Contrary to appellant's argument, the record reflects that the jury did return a guilty verdict on the specification, and the verdict form is part of the record. With regard to the State's cross-appeal, the trial court erred in merging appellant's conviction for discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises into his purposeful-murder conviction. The two offenses were not subject to merger because they were of dissimilar import or significance. The trial court also erred in not imposing a separate three-year prison sentence on a firearm specification accompanying appellant's conviction for discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a partial resentencing.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Mother's motion for a change of custody the evidence presented in support of the motion was insufficient to establish that a change of circumstances had occurred requiring modification of the existing custody order. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it did not hold Father in contempt for allegedly interfering with Mother's court-ordered visitation on Thanksgiving weekend 2017 and allegedly limiting her access to their youngest child while the child was attending daycare. The trial court did not err when it declined to add the parties' oldest daughter as a third party to the proceedings and to appoint her counsel, based on her statements that she wanted to live with Mother. Judgment affirmed.

With the trial court's consent, the parties entered a plea agreement, without conditions, that appellant would be sentenced to a five-year prison term. Based on appellant's failure to appear at the originally-scheduled sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a six-year prison term. The trial court erred by imposing the longer prison term without giving appellant the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea, and the State concedes this error. Upon remand, the trial court must either impose the five-year prison sentence or allow appellant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant's conviction for sexual imposition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's question regarding the complainant's mental health condition. Alleged statements by complainant that she suggested attending a swinger's club with appellant, his fiancée, and complainant's boyfriend were not admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(1). The prosecutor should not have elicited testimony from a detective that appellant invoked his right to counsel after his arrest, but that error was harmless. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by asking leading questions or using a visual aid during closing argument. No ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant, the biological father of the two children at issue, did not have more than de minimis contact with the children, without justifiable cause, during the relevant period preceding the filing of petitions for the adoption of the children by their stepfather. As such, the probate court properly concluded that his consent to the adoptions was not required. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of breaking and entering based on his conduct at a former commercial greenhouse. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion, and appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to amend the indictment and bill of particulars to correct the address of the property and in denying defense counsel's motion for continuance based on that amendment. Appellant's requests that we modify the trial court's judgment entry to reflect that he was convicted of a felony of the fifth degree and that he could be ordered to serve 12 months in prison if he violated community control are moot the judgment entry already includes that language. Judgment affirmed.

The notice of appeal herein was filed pro se, and the complaint below identified the plaintiff as "Private Attorney General" and trustee for the Travis Lanier Williams Revocable Living Trust. Because Travis Lanier Williams is not a licensed attorney, he cannot represent the trust (the legal status/existence of which is unclear) in court. Appeal dismissed.

Relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) was barred by res judicata because appellant failed to appeal from the trial court's prior judgment dismissing the case. Furthermore, even if relief were not barred, appellee failed to establish that she had a meritorious claim for relief. The trial court abused its discretion in granting relief from judgment. Judgment reversed and remanded.

On application for reinstatement.

Appellant's counsel was ineffective in failing to instruct him on the impact of the state's inability to prove charged offense prior to entering guilty plea.

Judgment affirmed where appellant sought to withdraw his plea, post-sentence, after the time for appeal had expired, and based on matters within the trial court record.

Trial court denial of appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on counts of theft and fleeing and eluding was not an abuse of discretion. Guilty verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court's imposition of prison sentence following felony conviction was not contrary to law. Alleged errors in trial court's determination of appropriate sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 cannot be sustained per State v. Jones.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming decision of board of trustees of joint fire district, which found battalion chief guilty of misconduct. Evidence presented established a duty on part of chief to report improper conduct by subordinate. Though contested, there was reliable, probative, and substantial evidence to support board's conclusion that chief knew or should have known of the improper conduct but did not report it.

Maximum sentence for child endangering was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, properly applied postrelease control, and imposed sentence within statutorily-permissible range. Trial court was not required to provide reason for imposing maximum sentence, but did so anyway. Trial court properly accepted guilty plea even though appellant stated that he did not contest facts recited by state instead of stating that he admitted them.

Public indecency, prior convictions and enhancement, R.C. 2945.75(B)

Appointed counsel ineffective assistance of counsel

standard field sobriety tests, impaired driving, motion to suppress, OVI, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), probable cause, NHTSA, dashcam, competent credible evidence, indicators of impairment

R.C. 5701.02—R.C. 55717.04—real property—personal property—building—structure—fixture—business fixture

shared parenting – allocation of parental rights and responsibilities – equal parenting time – child support – downward deviation – guardian ad litem – bias – geographic proximity – communication issues

Procedendo, moot, vain act

motion to dismiss – failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted – Civ.R. 12(B)(6) – sua sponte – court's own motion – Civ.R. 12(B)(1) – subject matter jurisdiction – jurisdiction over the particular case – equity jurisdiction – composition agreement – judicial composition agreement – open courts

competency, malingering, expert, abuse of discretion, competent credible evidence, credibility

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent data system database R.C. 3705.23 death certificate R.C. 3701.17 protected health information. Requester sought 2020 death certificate data related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Respondent claimed its databases were not programmed to produce the precise content and grouping sought by the requester, and that releasing the requested content, matching decedents to cause of death, would be disclosure of protected health information prohibited by R.C. 3701.17. The special master found that respondent had produced equivalent content and groupings of death data in the past, and its databases remained capable of producing the requested output at the time of the request. The special master further found that the contents of individual death certificates are required to be disclosed without restriction under R.C. 3705.23, and that the same public data from the same database is not subject to the general public records exception in R.C. 3701.17 when aggregated in a report.

Trial court improperly calculated defendant's jail-time credit.

A Board of County Commissioners appeals from the decisions finding that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act ("OMA") and awarding statutory attorney fees to the relator, a county resident. The court found that the Board violated OMA when it motioned into executive session by listing every statutorily-permissible reason to discuss personnel matters but could produce no evidence of what discussions took place. The public body argued that it met its burden of proof in cases alleging OMA violations when it offered evidence that it motioned into executive session for permissible statutory purposes. However, the public body also had the burden to prove that the discussions that took place during executive session were permissible and consistent with those reasons publicly declared for convening executive session. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting attorney fees for attorney time entries that were "block billed," i.e., listing multiple tasks in a single time entry. While the practice is not

Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the underlying action, appellants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to an arbitration provision but did file a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.02(B). The trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was not a final appealable order.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's daughter to a children services agency where the juvenile court's decision was in the child's best interest given appellant's continued struggles with mental health and substance abuse issues that made it impossible for appellant to care for herself, let alone a young child.

Defendant did not demonstrate that his consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees because plaintiff-appellant cannot maintain a breach-of-contract claim against a political subdivision based on an implied-contract theory and because R.C. 2921.42(A)(1) does not express a clear public policy which would support a wrongful-discharge-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress his confession. The defendant-appellant's argument as to his motion filed under Crim.R. 12(C) is wavied. Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to seal R.C. 2953.52 eligible offender position of trust restitution considered factors gravity of crime may be sufficient no specific negative impacts did not identify privacy interests.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - felony sentences R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 appellate court not permitted to weigh R.C. 2929.12 factors contrary to law juvenile adjudication Crim.R. 11 ineffective assistance guilty plea

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - community control terminated maximum consecutive prison terms sentencing packages review of felony sentences appellate court not permitted to independently weigh R.C. 2929.12 factors R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings.

CIVIL LAW - postconviction relief hearing supporting affidavits credibility.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - review of felony sentences consecutive sentences domestic violence violating a protection order R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

CIVIL - R.C. Chapter 2744 political subdivision tort immunity negligence golf clinic city's golf course general immunity exceptions R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u)(v) governmental function R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) inapplicable R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) defense not independent basis for liability failed to establish exception remaining assignments of error moot.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea of guilty robbery trial court denied request for new counsel pro se representation plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered indigent defendant entitled to competent counsel no showing of a breakdown in attorney-client relationship court adequately addressed appellant no indication of ineffectiveness no error.

CIVIL – magistrate's decision objections no final judgment Civ.R. 53(D)(4) attorney fees award final appealable order R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).

CRIMINAL LAW - application to seal record of convictions R.C. 2953.32 consideration of statutory factors no transcript App.R. 9 offenses exempt from sealing R.C. 2953.36.

CRIMINAL LAW - application to seal record of convictions R.C. 2953.32 consideration of statutory factors no transcript App.R. 9 offenses exempt from sealing R.C. 2953.36.

CIVIL - Domestic relations separation agreement which contained contradictory clauses both ordering certain spousal support payments and stating no spousal support was owed was a clerical error that the trial court retained jurisdiction to correct despite language stating the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to correct substantive errors Civ. R. 60(A).

ADOPTION-RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL - This case is reversed and remanded as indigent mother was entitled to a court appointed attorney per Y.E.F., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6785.

Foreclosure/Conditions precedent/Civ.R. 56/Summary judgment

Post-Conviction Relief Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Denial of motion to dismiss filed under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)

Canine sniff of vehicle during traffic stop

Evidence Sufficiency/Manifest weight

Motion to Modify Spousal Support Divorce Decree

Appellant's convictions for murder and tampering with evidence were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, appellant fails to show he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court abused its discretion when, following a default judgment hearing, it summarily denied appellant's prayer for attorney fees under the CSPA for lack of evidence, without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable attorney's fee. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

The officer's search of the vehicle's passenger compartment prior to allowing Shalash to return to the vehicle was a proper search under Terry and Long and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Shalash's motion to suppress.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial.

In a reverse race discrimination case argued under a modified McDonnel Douglas framework, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Ohio Reformatory for Women ("ORW") where the plaintiff, a former employee of ORW, could not point to evidence that showed ORW treated her disparately from similarly situated minority employees. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's successive motion for jail-time credit based on the doctrice of res judicata.

DELINQUENCY – JUVENILE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – ARREST – EVIDENCE – OBSTRUCTING – RESISTING ARREST – ASSAULT – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – HEARSAY – IMPEACHMENT – RELEVANCE – CUMULATIVE ERROR – PROCEDURE/RULES: The juvenile court did not err in denying the juvenile's motion to suppress evidence where the juvenile argued for a determination of the general issue: Although styled as a motion to suppress, the juvenile was essentially asking the court to dismiss the charges on the ground that the arresting officer used excessive force. The sufficiency of an affirmative defense cannot properly be established through a pretrial motion. The juvenile's delinquency adjudication for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the juvenile's overall pattern of behavior was one of resistance. The juvenile's delinquency adjudication for resisting arrest was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the weight of the evidence: arresting officers had probable cause to believe the juvenile committed assault the officers had engaged in a course of conduct for which an arrest was the obvious and inevitable outcome and the arresting officer did not use excessive force to arrest the juvenile. The juvenile's delinquency adjudications for assault on a peace officer were supported by sufficient evidence and were not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the juvenile knowingly kicked her legs in the officers' direction during her arrest. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of police body-camera footage: directives made by the nontestifying arresting officer were not "testimonial statements" that implicated the Confrontation Clause and were not "statements" for purposes of hearsay. The juvenile court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence where the arresting officer was neither a witness at trial nor a hearsay declarant, and thus, not subject to impeachment. The juvenile court did not err in excluding evidence of the local police department's use-of-force policies where the evidence was not relevant to the determination of excessive force. The doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable where there are not multiple instances of harmless error.

FORECLOSURE – REAL PROPERTY: In a foreclosure action brought by a condominium owners' association against a unit owner, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the association where the evidence showed that the association did not have the authority to assess its unit owners for trash removal, so that the owner did not wrongfully withhold part of her assessment.

NEW TRIAL—JURISDICTION—PROCEDURE/RULES - POSTCONVICTION—RES JUDICATA—COUNSEL: The appeal from the judgment overruling the motion for a new trial is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because the notice of appeal was not filed within App.R. (4)(A)(1)'s 30-day period, App.R. 4(B)(3) did not toll that time, and leave was not sought under App.R. 5 to file a delayed appeal. The common pleas court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to deny the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing: the challenges to trial counsel's effectiveness in assisting defendant in representing himself at trial were not supported by evidence outside the trial record the outside evidence offered to show that trial counsel had been ineffective in presenting the motion to suppress was not cogent in the sense that it could not fairly be said to advance beyond mere hypothesis the claim of an outcome-determinative deficiency in trial counsel's performance and the outside evidence offered to show alleged judicial bias and misconduct, along with alleged deprivations of the rights to counsel and the effective assistance of counsel, concerning defendant's midtrial motion for appointed counsel was merely cumulative of the evidence of record.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION: Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody of the child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, where the record demonstrated that mother failed to prove that she could maintain stable housing and income and provide the structure that the child needs, as required by the case plan for reunification. The appellate court reviews the juvenile court's "best-interest" determination to see whether it is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The record reflects that clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's judgment under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and the best-interest determinations under R.C. 2151.414(D).

CHILDREN — PERMANENT CUSTODY: Mother could not show that the grant of permanent custody of her four children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence where the children had undisputedly been in agency custody for over 12 consecutive months and the court's best-interest finding was supported by clear-and-convincing evidence, including evidence that mother failed to gain the necessary insight to provide a permanent and safe home for her children, who wished to remain in the care of a nurturing caregiver who wished to adopt them.

foreclosure, Civ.R. 56 evidence

Murder, knowing, intelligent, voluntary, guilty plea, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), nonconstitutional rights, maximum penalty, mandatory prison, fine, substantial compliance, post-release control, consecutive sentences, failure to object, plain error, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), findings, allied offenses of similar import, State v. Johnson, State v. Ruff, presentence investigation report

personal jurisdiction – void – submit to jurisdiction – trial – object – supplemental indictment

murder – felony murder – abuse of a corpse – autopsy report – medical examiner – cause of death – confrontation clause – plain error – ineffective assistance – prejudice – strategical decision – fire – mattress – stolen vehicle

tampering with evidence, self-defense, murder, manifest weight, R.C. 2903.02(B), R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), bill of particulars, indictment, Crim.R. 12

self-defense, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1), sufficiency, manifest weight, reasonable belief

failure to comply – aggravated possession – substantial risk of serious physical harm – motion to suppress – rear license plate light – coercion – manifest weight – vehicle chase – residential area – children – car seat

sufficiency, manifest weight, self-defense, hearing impairment, juror misconduct, jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct, cumulative error

child support—civil contempt—due process

R.C. 2113.05—executor—reasonably disinterested

JUVENILE – permanent custody termination parental rights magistrate's decision objections transcript best interest factors R.C. 2151.414.

CIVIL - App.R. 16(A)(7), assignments of error must cite to case law and/or statutes abuse of discretion, standard of review, finding of contempt ex-husband failed to submit any evidence that ex-wife interfered with parenting plan or his ability pay mortgage trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding ex-husband in contempt, failed to give personal items to ex-wife per divorce decree, abide by the QDRO order, and pay the mortgage on the marital residential property.

CRIMINAL LAW - restitution R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) standard of review failure to object, plain error trial court considered presentence investigation and ability to pay.

CRIMINAL LAW - trafficking in cocaine possession of cocaine felony sentencing sentence was not contrary to law consecutive sentences were not contrary to law affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - competency to stand trial, rational and factual understanding of proceedings, supported by competent, credible evidence allied offenses of similar import, separate, identifiable harm, offenses committed separately, separate animus and motivation.

CRIMINAL LAW - sufficiency of the evidence, shooting with a gun, a deadly weapon, in close range, attempted murder manifest weight of the evidence supports convictions decline to address constitutionality of Reagan Tokes Act, failed to challenge in trial court and/or raise plain error on appeal consecutive sentences, supported by record, not contrary to law.

CIVIL - summary judgment breach of contract liquor permit condition precedent frustration of purpose impracticibility due to government action.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated robbery R.C. 291.01(A)(1)&(C) kidnapping R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)&(C)(1) plea agreement was beneficial to appellant by merging firearm specifications and recommending a less than maximum prison term aggravated robbery and kidnapping did not merge because restraint of victims was not merely incidental to aggravated robbery but was prolonged trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to secure a better plea agreement, failing to respond to state's discovery demand, or failing to object to tolled speedy trial time waiver due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) 12 years untimely no entry attached to notice of appeal.

Permanent custody. Best interest. Registered sex offender.

Appellant's motion to suppress was properly denied by the trial court, where the warrantless search of appellant's automobile was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Appellant's possession and trafficking convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant is not entitled to credit against his underlying felony sentences for the time that he was released on postrelease control, despite the trial court's invalid imposition of postrelease control, because days on postrelease control when appellant was not physically held in a "public or private facility intended for penal confinement" are not considered "confinement" for purposes of R.C. 2967.191(A).

Competent, credible evidence supported trial court judgment, terminating mother's parental rights and granting permanent custody to children's services agency. Mother failed to engage in services to treat previously-diagnosed mental health issues. Mother provided inaccurate information in assessment ordered as part of delinquency case—not as part of custody matter—calling into question assessor's conclusion that no mental health services were needed.

Appellant was not prejudiced by the court's failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), because the trial court did not proceed directly to sentencing.

Judgment affirmed where trial court did not err in denying mistrial and providing curative instruction, lesser-included offense instruction not warranted by the evidence, and appellant demonstrated no coercion in his decision not to testify at trial.

Judgment affirmed where expert provided no testimony or evidence to support finding that appellant/employee had sustained a "closed head injury," and trial court correctly granted motion for directed verdict.

Trial court's imposition of prison sentence following felony conviction was not contrary to law. Trial court considered necessary factors and support for trial court's conclusions not subject to review.

Judgment entry of conviction reversed and matter remanded for resentencing where the trial court incorrectly states in its sentencing entry that a prison term is presumed pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B).

Trial court's imposition of maximum, consecutive sentences for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual conduct with a minor are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record where the victims are 14 and 13 years old, where appellant brandished a gun in one of the incidents, where appellant's criminal activity is increasing, and where appellant has a history of failing to comply with the terms of probation or community control.

Judgment affirmed. As the record demonstrated that mother was able to comprehend and communicate in English, mother failed to establish that she was denied due process due to the lack of a case plan written in Somali or a Somali language interpreter. Mother failed to establish that her trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

Relator's objections were untimely and we decline to address them. We find the magistrate has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law and conclude the magistrate correctly determined that relator's claims are barred by res judicata.

In accordance with the magistrate's decision, respondent's motion to dismiss is granted and the writ of procedendo is dismissed.

Jail-time credit misdemeanor sentence. This case centers around the trial court's failure to calculate jail-time credit for a misdemeanor case. Because the court did not calculate jail-time credit, appellant's assignment of error is sustained and the case is remanded.

Abuse of discretion motion for an extension of time expert report summary judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for an extension of time to file an expert report or her opposition brief, because the appellant did not demonstrate a good cause showing for the late filing. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees' motions for summary judgment because the trial court correctly ruled that there remained no material issues of fact.

R.C. 2953.21-23, postconviction relief, timeliness, voidable sentence, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), rape by force, R.C. 2907.04(B)(3), unlawful sexual conduct. The sentencing court had jurisdiction over appellant and over the case. Appellant's sentence was voidable and challengeable only via direct appeal. The motion to vacate sentence is successive and untimely.

Zoning code violation community control violation notice. The housing court's decision finding appellant in violation of its community control is reversed because the record shows appellant, who operates a dirt processing site without a certificate of occupancy and was found guilty of violating the zoning code, was never on notice that the terms of its community control required it to remove the dirt from the site on a certain schedule or by a certain deadline. As such, there is no proof, substantial or otherwise, that appellant violated the terms of its community control.

Burglary sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of the evidence force trespass occupied structure purpose to commit a criminal offense. - Appellant's burglary conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state's evidence demonstrated that appellant trespassed in his ex-girlfriend's home with a purpose to vandalize it.

Civ.R. 12(C) judgment on the pleadings, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted res judicata statute of limitations discovery sua sponte dismissal of claims waiver fraud. The trial court did not err in dismissing all of appellant's claims. His claims were either invalid, barred by res judicata, and/or were time barred. Appellant failed to allege fraud with particularity. The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claims before discovery or in dismissing his claims against a defendant who failed to respond to the complaint. Appellant waived his argument about abuse of process because he raised it for the first time on appeal.

R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 maximum sentence. - Because the record demonstrated that the trial judge considered the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the record clearly and convincingly did not support his maximum sentence, or that the sentence was contrary to law, the sentence was affirmed.

Trial conviction sentence direct appeal res judicata indictment defective Whether an indictment was defective was an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal. Parker did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment at trial or on direct appeal and, therefore, res judicata barred his attempt to raise the issue of a defective indictment many years after his convictions.

Parental rights R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e)/clear and convincing evidence R.C. 2151.414(D)/best interest of the child findings abuse of discretion. The trial court made specific findings as to the issue of a safe and stable home for each child and there was credible, competent evidence to support the trial court's best-interest findings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion where it granted the agency's motion for permanent custody.

Motion for relief from judgment surety bond jurisdiction final appealable order. Defendant's notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to release surety from obligation divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider his motion for relief from judgment.

assaulting a peace officer, R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(5) manifest weight of the evidence

STANDING-JUV.R. 2(Y)-SHELTER CARE-INTERLOCUTORY ORDER-DEPENDENCY ADJUDICATION-TIMELINESS OF APPEAL - Because step-mother was not a party to the juvenile court action according to Juv.R. 2(Y) and because she had not attempted to intervene as a party, she lacked standing to appeal. Appeal musst be dismissed where the dependency adjudication was not timely appealed. Because shelter care decisions are interlocutory orders that merge into dependency adjudications, and because the dependency adjudication was not timely appealed, we lack jurisdiction to review the trial court's shelter care orders.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SPEEDY TRIAL –AUTHENTICATION – EVID.R. 404(B) – OTHER ACTS: The trial court did not deprive defendant of a fair trial when it compelled him to wear the same clothes for four consecutive days of trial. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on speedy-trial grounds: the state's inaction was not enough to outweigh the absence of particularized trial prejudice. Sufficient testimony from the victim was presented to authenticate the duplicate recordings of phone calls between the victim and defendant. The trial court did not err in permitting the victim to testify about d4efendant's threats and other acts of domestic violence where the evidence was not premised on improper character inferences and was probative of the victim's credibility.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SPEEDY TRIAL –AUTHENTICATION – EVID.R. 404(B) – OTHER ACTS: The trial court did not deprive defendant of a fair trial when it compelled him to wear the same clothes for four consecutive days of trial. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on speedy-trial grounds: the state's inaction was not enough to outweigh the absence of particularized trial prejudice. Sufficient testimony from the victim was presented to authenticate the duplicate recordings of phone calls between the victim and defendant. The trial court did not err in permitting the victim to testify about defendant's threats and other acts of domestic violence where the evidence was not premised on improper character inferences and was probative of the victim's credibility.

SENTENCING – R.C. 2941.25 – ALLIED OFFENSES: The trial court's imposition of a 13-year aggregate prison term for two offenses was not contrary to law where the record demonstrated that the charges and the accompanying specifications did not arise from the same transaction or animus, and thus should not be merged as allied offenses. Defendant's 13-year aggregate sentence on two robbery charges did not constitute plain error where Defendant failed to raise the issue of allied offenses before the trial court and where Defendant the State jointly requested that the trial court impose the sentenced.

CHILDREN - CUSTODY - MAGISTRATES: The juvenile court did not err in denying mother's motion for custody of her children and in granting the children service agency's motion to award custody to a family friend where, despite mother's compliance with the case plan, she still exhibited problems with mental illness and uncontrolled anger. The juvenile court did not ignore the magistrate's findings of fact the trial court is the ultimate trier of fact and the court simply gave different weight to various witnesses' testimony and disagreed with the magistrate's best-interest findings. [But see CONCURRENCE: The magistrate, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence, and if the juvenile court chooses to disregard the magistrate's credibility determinations, it should explain its reasoning.]

The jury instruction given for resisting arrest did not provide the wrong burden of proof for the affirmative defense of excessive force. Appellant's convictions for failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, resisting arrest, and obstruction of official business were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court's appointment of an acting judge was proper under R.C. 1901.121(C). Appellant's allegations of prosecutorial conduct lack merit because the State's conduct was not improper and did not result in any prejudice. Appellant failed to establish multiple errors warranting a reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. Judgment affirmed.

In a contempt proceeding, the trial court improperly altered the parties' final decree of divorce by means of a modification to the property division by awarding $25,000 to appellee for appellant's failure to sell or refinance the marital residence within 120 days from the parties' divorce. Pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(I), the trial court lacked authority to do so. Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's requested jury instructions on aggravated assault and self-defense. A mistrial was not warranted as the prosecutor's statements during closing argument were neither inappropriate nor prejudicial. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not erroneously fail to hold an evidentiary hearing before finding appellant competent to stand trial. Under R.C. 2945.37(E), a competency report may be submitted as evidence by stipulation in lieu of requiring in-person testimony. Appellant waived his right to a fuller competency hearing by stipulating to the contents of two competency reports, each of which contained an opinion that appellant was competent, and by stipulating that the examiners would have testified consistent with their reports if they had been called as witnesses at a hearing. Appellant's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to pursue the competency issue further or by failing to pursue a not guilty by reason of insanity defense after receiving expert reports finding appellant competent to stand trial and legally sane at the time of his offenses. Appellant's firearm-related convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record contains evidence from which the jury could have found that appellant fired an operable nine-millimeter handgun at police officers from inside his house before hiding the weapon and later disposing of it. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his blood sample. Although appellant's blood sample was obtained beyond the three-hour time frame set out in the search warrant and in R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b), the blood-sample evidence was nevertheless admissible the State established that appellant's blood sample was collected and analyzed in substantial compliance with the administrative requirements of R.C. 4511.19(D), and expert testimony was offered on the matter. In addition, a reasonable reading of the search warrant simply required appellant's blood to be drawn "as soon as possible" after the automobile accident in question. Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the search warrant was executed in such a manner, as law enforcement officers obtained appellant's blood sample without any undue delay or dilatory tactics. Because the search warrant was lawfully executed, appellant's blood draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, the trial court was not required to suppress the evidence obtained from appellant's blood sample. Judgment affirmed.

The jury's finding that appellant "caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property" while fleeing from police in his car was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not enter a formal dismissal of this case also, multiple parties remain at the trial court level, and the court failed to include a Civ.R. 54(B) certification in its decision enforcing a settlement agreement. The decision therefore was interlocutory, there was no final appealable order, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by overruling two suppression motions without conducting evidentiary hearings or obtaining factual stipulations. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's objections and adopted a magistrate's decision which denied her petition for a domestic violence civil protection order (CPO) and vacated an ex parte CPO. The trial court also did not err when it found that the magistrate had properly denied appellant's motion to amend her original petition to include allegations related to appellee's repeated violations of the ex parte CPO, because neither appellee nor his counsel was served with a copy of the amended petition. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The agreement between the parties was not a land installment contract because it did not meet the definition of a land installment contract provided by R.C. 5313.01(A) or contain the elements mandated by R.C. 5313.02(A). Because the agreement was not a land installment contract under R.C. Chapter 5313, appellant did not need to pursue a foreclosure action pursuant to R.C. 5313.07 and the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress as the officer had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop where appellant was in violation of city ordinances requiring appellant to have a mounted light on the bicycle he was operating on the city's streets at nighttime. Moreover, even if there had not been probable cause to initiate the traffic stop, the attention doctrine applied to prevent the methamphetamine found on appellant's person from being suppressed as the discovery of the drugs was sufficiently attenuated by the officer's discovery of a pre-existing warrant for appellant's arrest.

Relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, a county prosecutor, a "formal and/or systematic investigation" into the purported "criminal behavior" engaged in by the Governor of Ohio, Mike DeWine, for his handling of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic where the respondent's actions in reviewing the private citizen affidavit filed by relator under R.C. 2935.09(D), as well as the applicable criminal statutes referenced therein, satisfied the prosecutor's statutory duty to conduct an "investigation" into the allegations contained within relator's private citizen affidavit pursuant to R.C. 2935.10(A).

Defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily entered where the trial court's incorrect postrelease control statement during the plea colloquy did not constitute a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and where defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the trial court's postrelease control misstatement and that he would not have entered a guilty plea if he had been properly advised of the duration and mandatory nature of the postrelease control.

The juvenile court did not err adjudicating appellant's two children dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C).

The trial court did not err in determining that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion and in overruling the motion to suppress.

Convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, burglary and breaking and entering related to separate buildings were not allied offenses of similar import.

To establish a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the State must prove that the defendant caused the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing a felony. To prove a conviction for aggravated trafficking in drugs, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly sold or offered to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.

Trial court's determination that granting legal custody of the children to a maternal aunt was in the best interest of the children was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - habeas corpus summary judgment Bureau of Sentence Computation R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) firearm specification statute requiring sentences be served consecutively controls when sentencing entry is silent not entitled to immediate release.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Lack of final appealable order attorney fees claim not disposed of in entry on appeal no Civ.R. 54(B) language.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Sex offenses committed prior to becoming attorney—Tier III sex offender—Permanent disbarment.

Mandamus—Jurisdiction—Court of appeals' judgment was a final, appealable order—Appellant had adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to seek correction of alleged errors in award of jail-time credit—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

illegal cultivation of marihuana Crim.R. 32.1 presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea undue delay change of heart R.C. 2925.04(F) affirmative defense personal use

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Civ.R. 12(C) failure to state a claim judgment on the pleadings R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) tampering with records identity fraud 42 U.S.C. 1983 vicarious liability R.C. 1347.10(B) R.C. 2913.49(J)

Petition for Relief from Disability

Post-Release Control - Res Judicata - Appointment of Counsel

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent data system database R.C. 3705.23 death certificate R.C. 3701.17 protected health information. Requester sought 1) the number of COVID-19 deaths of residents of a named long-term care facility with public information of decedents, and 2) the number of COVID-19 deaths of residents of facilities identified only as located in four counties. Respondent claimed its databases were not programmed to produce the precise content and groupings sought by requester, and that releasing the requested content would be disclosure of protected health information prohibited by R.C. 3701.17. The special master found that respondent's electronic death registration system (EDRS) was capable of producing the requested output as to the first request. The special master further found that the contents of individual death certificates printed from the EDRS are required to be disclosed without restriction under R.C. 3705.23, and that the same public data from the same database is likewise not subject to the exception in R.C. 3701.17 when aggregated in a report. The special master further found that the requested dataset in the second request would require combining data from multiple databases, and that respondent's data systems were not capable of producing the response using existing programming. The special master concluded that the requested compilation was thus not an "existing" record. The special master found that respondent had failed to provide the required opportunity for requester to revise the second request through an explanation of records maintenance and access and encouraged the parties to cooperate fully in any future revision.

counsel of choice, Reagan Tokes Act, ineffective assistance of counsel, waiver of mandatory fine

CRIMINAL LAW – engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity participating in a criminal gang aggravated trafficking in drugs trafficking in heroin trafficking in cocaine aggravated possession of drugs tampering with evidence guilty plea pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea denied all nine factors weigh in favor of the State no abuse of discretion merger participating in a criminal gang and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity are not allied offenses of similar import aggravated possession of drugs and aggravated trafficking in drugs are not allied offenses of similar import aggravated trafficking in drugs and tampering with evidence are not allied offenses of similar import no plain error agreed-upon nine-year sentence is authorized by law R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).

CRIMINAL – R.C. 2907.332(A)(6) R.C. 2907.321(A)(5) circumstantial evidence minor knowledge storage device bring or cause to be brought into the state of Ohio.

CIVIL – magistrate's decision objection overruled by trial court no abuse of discretion in adopting the decision determining no claim for breach of contract small claims complaint computer sale on eBay PayPal Account User Agreement dispute resolution process PayPal determined computer was refurbished and not new as advertised PayPal permitted to make a final decision in its sole discretion refurbished computer returned to seller no demonstration of damages PayPal enforced the agreement as written.

CIVIL – magistrate's decision objection overruled by trial court no abuse of discretion in adopting the decision determining no claim for breach of contract sale on eBay eBay User Agreement default judgment well-settled proposition in Ohio that cases should be decided on their merits whenever possible local rules are subservient to the general rules of civil procedure and the Ohio Revised Code Steubenville Municipal Court Loc.R. 3.2(l) "will" language regarding default judgments R.C. 1925.05(A) "may" language regarding default judgments trial court held a hearing and made a finding on the merits eBay's absence at the hearing did not mandate that default judgment be entered Appellant suffered no prejudice trial court did not abuse its discretion.

CIVIL – juvenile child custody Mother diagnosed with delusional disorder abuse of discretion standard no change in circumstances R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) and (F)(1) testimony collectively establishes the minor child is doing well in Father's home modification of parental rights and responsibilities not warranted trial court's decision not against the manifest weight of the evidence GAL's limited investigation and oral report no cross-examination GAL did not testify under oath failure to object no plain error no appointment of psychiatric expert not raised below waived use of adjective, "delusional," to describe Mother's allegations against Father no reversible error committed.

CIVIL – Evid.R 401 Evid.R. 403 evidence abuse of discretion material prejudice credibility.

CIVIL – civil stalking protection order Civ.R. 65.1 subject matter jurisdiction R.C. 2903.211 use of backyard.

defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated theft, telecommunications fraud, three counts of fogery, identity fraud, money laundering, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity third postconviction petition petition untimely R.C.2953.23(A) res judicata

CIVIL –Marketable Title Act oil and gas repetition reference specific general ambiguous

CIVIL - Civil Rule 52 motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law timely Civil Rule 4 final appealable order.

The magistrate properly concluded that there is some evidence in the record to support the board's denial of relator's application for permanent total disability ("PTD") benefits. Because there is some evidence in the record supporting the board's decision, the board did not abuse its discretion in denying realtor's application, and therefore, relator is not entitled to mandamus relief. Objections overruled magistrate's decision adopted and petition for writ of mandamus denied.

On application for reinstatement.

On certification of default.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Workers' compensation—Violation of specific safety requirement—Industrial commission did not abuse its discretion in granting additional award—Record contained evidence supporting commission's findings that specific safety requirement applied, that employer violated it, and that violation was proximate cause of injury—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

Public records—R.C. 149.43—Mandamus—Statutory damages and court costs—Under the "quasi-agency" test, a public-records requester is entitled to documents from a public office relating to duties of the office when the office has delegated the duties to a private entity—Court of appeals' judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part and statutory damages and court costs awarded to relator.

post-conviction relief – ineffective assistance of counsel – guilty plea – knowing and voluntary – speedy trial – waived

forcible entry and detainer—jury trial—waiver

The juvenile court did not err by granting a children services agency permanent custody of the children where a grant of permanent custody was in the children's best interests and the children had been in the custody of the agency for approximately 18 months at the time the agency moved for permanent custody of the children.

The juvenile court did not err by granting a children services agency permanent custody of the child where a grant of permanent custody was in the child's best interest and the child had been in the custody of the agency for 20 months at the time the agency moved for permanent custody of the child.

Aggravated murder prior calculation and design sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence self-defense. Sufficient evidence of prior calculation and design in the murdering of the victim was presented at trial and the trial court sitting as the trier of fact did not lose its way in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the state disproved self-defense.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14 contrary to law R.C. 2953.08. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court made the requisite findings in imposing consecutive sentences, incorporated the findings into the sentencing journal entry, and the trial court's findings are clearly and convincingly supported by the record.

Void vs. voidable sentence res judicata postconviction motion. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct Ratliff's sentencing error because the error rendered Ratliff's sentence voidable, not void, and he could not challenge it through a postconviction motion.

Civ.R.12(B)(6) motion to dismiss immunity of political subdivision employee R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). The trial court's judgment denying the police chief's motion to dismiss based on his claim of immunity as a political subdivision employee is affirmed. Presuming all the factual allegations to be true and making all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, we cannot conclude that plaintiff could prove no set of facts to show the police chief acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

Motion for new trial Civ.R. 59 subrogation expert report Loc.R. 21.1 weight of the evidence breach of contract negligence. The jury's damages award was not against the weight of the evidence and in light of the fact that the jury found the defendant liable, there can be no error with the trial court's decision to preclude the plaintiffs from supplementing their experts' reports two weeks before trial to include an additional basis for liability.

Motion to stay motion to compel arbitration arbitration agreement motion to dismiss jurisdiction venue forum selection clause res judicata final appealable order R.C. 2711.02 hearing R.C. 2711.03 unconscionability procedural unconscionability substantive unconscionability. The trial court did not err denying appellant's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, or alternatively to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and improper venue. The arbitration agreement in this case is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Enforcement of the forum selection provision would be unreasonable and unjust, and effectively deny appellee its day in court. Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to stay and compel arbitration was not reversible error. Res judicata did not bar appellee from challenging the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in the second civil action.

Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor R.C. 2907.04 motion to dismiss preindictment delay actual prejudice guilty plea waiver. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss for preindictment delay. Appellant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating actual prejudice resulting from the delay in prosecution.

Crim.R. 11 voluntary, knowing, and intelligent guilty plea Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) maximum penalty involved R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) consecutive prison terms for firearm specifications calculation of aggregate prison sentence. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11. The trial court correctly informed Gooden that the firearm specifications must run consecutively, and it had no obligation to inform Gooden of the maximum aggregate sentence he faced. Gooden also failed to demonstrate that the trial court's alleged mistakes prejudiced him.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Restitution R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) Crim.R. 52(B) plain error insurance proceeds. Trial court did not commit plain error in ordering defendant to pay restitution arising out of ATM "smash and grabs." Defense counsel did not object to restitution amount at sentencing hearing and stated that defendant agreed to restitution amount at the conclusion of sentencing hearing. Amount of restitution ordered was supported by documentation that included invoices, repair estimates, portions of police reports, correspondence from the victims and photographs detailing the damages and losses sustained by each of the victims. Trial court's failure to consider potential insurance proceeds received by the victims was not plain error where nothing in the record affirmatively demonstrated that restitution was imposed for any amount already recovered through insurance proceeds.

Mandamus—Prohibition—Civ.R. 13(J)—Civil rule requires transfer of a case to the court of common pleas when a party's counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim excess a municipal court's jurisdictional limit—Municipal court did not have authority to transfer a case on ground that plaintiff's claim exceeded the court's jurisdictional limits—Common pleas court had no basis on which to assume jurisdiction over transfer of case from municipal court—Writs of mandamus and prohibition granted against common pleas court judge.

ADMINISTRATIVE MISCELLANEOUS – ZONING: The trial court did not err by adopting a magistrate's decision ordering the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness to a property owner to demolish a structure designated as historic where the court's determination that the owner would suffer economic hardship if the certificate was not approved was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence the record contained evidence which, if believed, supported the trial court's determination that, without approval of a certificate of appropriateness, the property would be deprived of all economically viable use and the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations would not be maintained and that the economic hardship was neither created nor exacerbated by the property owner.

Mandamus—Relator had adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge unanimity of jury verdict—Relator had adequate remedy at law by way of App.R. 26(B) application for reopening to raise claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

The trial court did not err by entering judgment against appellant on her complaint in foreclosure. The record contained competent, credible evidence to support the court's findings that appellant failed to prove appellee's default. Regarding the trial court's finding that appellant failed to prove the amount due under the promissory note, given the absence of proof of default, proof of the amount due was unnecessary. The judgment is modified to exclude conclusions about the insufficiency of evidence of the amount due. Judgment affirmed as modified.

The trial court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it did not err in its application of the law by finding that appellants had misrepresented material facts and concealed material information from appellees in connection with appellees' acquisition of appellants' business. Although certain misrepresentations consisted partly of forecasts and projections regarding the future performance of appellants' business, the misrepresentations also consisted partly of statements regarding past and present facts. The record additionally supported the trial court's findings that appellees justifiably relied on appellants' misrepresentations and that appellants breached their purchase contract with appellees. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by awarding damages in reliance on the testimony of appellees' expert witness, who calculated appellees' damages based upon accepted references and methods. Finally, the trial court did not err by including attorney's fees and prejudgment interest in the award. Judgment affirmed.

The State filed a motion in the juvenile court seeking the discretionary bindover of the 17-year-old appellee so that he could be prosecuted as an adult, because he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of reckless homicide. Following the required probable cause hearing, the juvenile court found that the State had not established probable cause that appellee's conduct, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of reckless homicide. The trial court erred, because the State introduced sufficient evidence on each element of reckless homicide to establish probable cause that appellee committed the offense of reckless homicide. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

Appellant, a juvenile, was in detention on an alleged probation violation while awaiting adjudication on new charges. The juvenile court ultimately committed appellant to the Department of Youth Services on the new charges, without imposing additional time in detention on the probation violation. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not err by not granting appellant jail-time credit on the new charges. But the juvenile court did err by not including in the commitment order the fact that appellant was not granted any jail-time credit. Judgment affirmed remanded to the trial court for entry of a nunc pro tunc order correcting the clerical error.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of appellant's encounter with two police officers and a search of his person. Under the circumstances, the officers' interaction with appellant was a consensual encounter, and irrespective of the fact that the search occurred while appellant lay on a bed in a corridor in a hospital's emergency department, appellant's consent to the search was voluntary. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. The record reflects that appellant was thoroughly advised of his Miranda rights before any questioning occurred, and he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. The sentence imposed was not contrary to law, and the trial court did not err in imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's foreclosure complaint and on appellee's counterclaims to quiet title and for slander of title. Because appellant failed to prove the existence of an underlying debt secured by his mortgage, he cannot prove a default and, therefore, cannot foreclose on the mortgage. The trial court correctly found that appellee was entitled to a decree of quiet title where appellant's mortgage and mechanic's lien were unenforceable. The invalid mortgage and mechanic's lien also supported the trial court's slander-of-title determination. Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys at law—Reciprocal discipline from the Supreme Court of Arizona—90 day suspension from the practice of law with reinstatement conditioned on reinstatement by the Supreme Court of Arizona—Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4).

Adoption petition by step-mother. No-visitation order by juvenile court. Mother's consent to adoption not required.

Trial court determinations to overrule objections to the magistrate decisions on child custody and to grant parenting time were not abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Shared parenting plan, shared parenting decree, allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, parenting time, abuse of discretion

Convictions for rape, domestic violence and abduction were affirmed where the state put forth credible evidence that defendant raped and physically abused his wife and that he restrained her liberties by restricting her to their apartment. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel failed, either because they were inappropriate for a direct appeal or because they were premised upon defendant's disagreement with counsel's strategy and trial tactics.

Motion to seal and expunge criminal record.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), plea colloquy, State v. Dangler, and prejudice.

improper backing, sufficiency of evidence, manifest weight of the evidence

legal custody, R.C. 2151.42, legal custody is intended to be permanent in nature, change in circumstances of custodian or child is threshold requirement to modify or terminate, best interest of child also required

domestic violence, felonious assault, self-defense, ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency, Crim.R. 29(A), manifest weight

motion for judgment on pleadings, Civ.R. 12(C), release, breach of contract

The trial court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment where the tenants failed to show their failure to answer the complaint constituted excusable neglect.

The trial court erred by denying appellants' motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where the appellees' claims brought against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failed given one of the appellants, the director of a township zoning department, was entitled to qualified immunity, whereas the other appellant, the township, was not alleged to have violated any custom or policy for which it could be held liable given that a township cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

The defendant-appellant's assault and failure-to-comply-with-an-order-or-signal-of-police-officer convictions are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by imposing a maximum sentence

If a litigant fails to respond to requests for admissions within the relevant timeframe, those matters are automatically deemed admitted.

The trial court did not err on remand by dismissing the defendant-appellant's motion to correct a void judgment because the trial court complied with our remand order in the first instance and the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913 is not in conflict with our remand order. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable to the case at bar. Moreover, the trial court did not err by dismissing the defendant-appellant's motion to correct a void judgment on the basis it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata under the Harper decision, notwithstanding that it is in deviation from a statutory mandate. Judgment Affirmed.

Trial court did not err by finding that the children were dependent trial court did not err ordering case plans into effect, trial court did not err finding that the Agency engaged in reasonable efforts appellant was not denied a fair adjudicatory hearing trial court did not err in ordering children to be immunized based on the evidence presented.

The defendant-appellant's contributing-to-unruliness-or-delinquency conviction is based on sufficient evidence. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint because it was not plain error to amend the complaint.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal—Failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter—Failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation—Two-year suspension, with conditions.

Mandamus—R.C. 2935.09—Citizen affidavits—Appellant lacks clear legal right to prosecution of felonious-assault charges—Court of appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of prosecutor affirmed.

affirming the grant of bank's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from default judgment

plea upheld defendant complains transcript merely says he nodded his head, without verbally answering, when the court asked if he understood a guilty plea is a complete admission to the charges.

manifest weight of the evidence gross sexual imposition disseminating matter harmful to juveniles R.C. 2907.05(B) R.C. 2907.31(A)(1)

Manifest weight sufficiency

Rape Prior acts evidence

Possession of Cocaine

Arson consecutive sentences

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - review of felony sentences consecutive sentences abduction attempted felonious assault R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

CRIMINAL LAW - manifest weight rape sexual battery in loco parentis substantially impaired prison attire invited error.

CRIMINAL - Robbery Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (A)(3) constructive possession of firearm dominion and control lesser included offense complicity prejudice ineffective assistance of counsel trial strategy

CIVIL - application for relief from weapons disability R.C. 2923.14 form of required hearing.

CIVIL - immunity political subdivision R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions to immunity negligence scope of employment R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) routine decisions policy making, planning, or enforcement water department summary judgment de novo

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus prohibition adequate remedy municipal court jurisdiction.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law—Engaging in an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.

Attorney misconduct—Failure to adequately communicate basis or rate of hourly fees—Public reprimand.

The magistrate did not err in concluding that there was some evidence to support the administrative designee's order that the installers and inspector of relator were employees and not independent contractors. We also find there are both factual and legal distinctions between this court's decision in Barcus v. Buehrer, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-942, 2015-Ohio-3122 and the instant case. Objections overruled. Writ denied.

The trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellee was not a final, appealable order so as to vest this court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not err in denying Elkins' motion for nunc pro tunc judgment as the changes Elkins' sought were substantive legal changes not appropriate for correction by nunc pro tunc entry.

The trial court did not err when it adopted the magistrate's decision terminating the parental rights of appellee. No party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law under Juv.R. 40 and appellee, who never established paternity, did not object to the magistrate's decision to grant the motion for permanent custody. The agency made the reasonable efforts at reunification required by R.C. 2151.419, as evidenced by repeated attempts to assist appellee with establishing paternity. The trial court did not err when it overruled the objection to exclude appellee's mother as a witness at the permanent custody hearing, who never intervened as a party, as the purported subject matter of her testimony was not relevant to the best interests of the child under R.C. 2151.414. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2950.06 – SEX OFFENSES – REGISTRATION – CLERICAL ERROR – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – COUNSEL: A conviction under R.C. 2950.06 for failure to ve4rify an address was not unconstitutional and did not violate defendant's right to a jury trial when the duty to register was mandatory and was based on a delinquency adjudication. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to dismiss defendant's indictment for a violation of R.C. 2950.06 where the charge, which was based on a duty to register stemming from a juvenile adjudication, was not unconstitutional and did not violate defendant's right to a jury trial. Where the trial court informed defendant during the sentencing hearing that defendant faced 18 months in prison for a community-control violation, the statement in the trial court's sentencing entry that defendant faced 36 months in prison for a community-control violation was a clerical error.

MANDAMUS – WRITS: The trial court erred by awarding mandamus relief—ordering the city to promote relator to captain with back pay—because relator could not identify any clear legal right and duty requiring the promotion.

gas line – gas cap – installation – above grade – App.R. 9(C) – statement of the evidence – recording of trial – objections to the magistrate's decision – small claims

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), R.C. 2929.18(A), R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), financial sanction, fine, present and future ability to pay, R.C. 2947.23(C), R.C. 2303.23, waiver or cancellation of costs of prosecution

Imposition of prison term for fifth degree felony R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii) State v. Benson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 18 MA 0042, 2019-Ohio-4635 felony sentencing maximum sentence remedy for improper imposition of postrelease control is limited resentencing hearing.

Plea agreement state does not violate promise to stand silent where it does not advocate for a prison term plain error felony sentence review, State v. Jones, -- Ohio St.3d --, 2020-Ohio-6729, -- N.E.3d --.

Felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)(D) firearm specification flight jury instruction manifest weight non-deadly force self-defense cumulative error.

Postconviction petition untimely petition claims barred by res judicata.

Preliminary injunction permanent injunction breach of contract, franchise agreement misappropriation of trade secrets unfair competition Civ.R. 65(B).

Firearm specifications sentencing agreed sentence agreed sentencing range reviewable mandatory sentencing provisions. Trial court erred in failing to impose mandatory consecutive sentences on firearm specifications attendant to appellees' felony convictions.

Reckless homicide lesser-included-offense instruction negligent homicide murder expert report ballistics match consistent with prosecutorial misconduct Crim.R. 16(K) expert report motion to suppress Franks challenge search-warrant affidavit cumulative error. Trial court properly instructed the jury on lesser included offense of reckless homicide where evidence supported a finding that the defendant was not guilty of murder but was guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on negligent homicide because negligent homicide was not a lesser included offense of either murder or reckless homicide. Allowing the state's ballistics expert to describe a bullet and shell casing found at the crime scene as a "match" instead of describing it as "consistent with" a bullet and shell casing from a test-fired gun in the defendant's possession did not amount to plain error, where there was no legal authority to support the claimed error and the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct in opening statement. Although prosecutor's question that implied the defendant's guilt was inappropriate, it was an isolated comment and did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. Although ballistics expert testified about guns not described in the expert report, the defense was not prejudiced because the expert's notes on the guns were produced in discovery and the defense previously cross-examined the expert in a prior proceeding. Trial court properly overruled a motion to suppress based on a Franks challenge without a hearing where probable cause still would have been found even if the allegedly false statement were removed from the search warrant affidavit. There was no cumulative error.

Aggravated murder sufficiency of evidence manifest weight prosecutorial misconduct ineffective assistance of counsel other-weapons evidence. Appellant's convictions of aggravated murder and related offenses are affirmed because the state presented sufficient evidence to support his guilt and his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The prosecutorial allusion at the opening argument to another shooting linked to appellant by ballistic evidence did not prejudice appellant's substantial rights because the state presented overwhelming, well-corroborated testimonial evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Appellant's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to other-weapons evidence lacks merit because, even if assuming several witnesses' testimony constituted improper other-weapons evidence, appellant fails to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if counsel were to object to the evidence.

Self-defense, R.C. 2901.05, jury instructions, verdict forms, ineffective assistance of counsel, manifest weight of the evidence. The order of the presentation of instructions was logical and proper where the trial court instructed the jury first on the underlying offenses, then on the law of self-defense. The trial court further provided proper verdict forms because there is no requirement that the verdict form contain a special finding as to self-defense. As there was no error in the jury instructions or the verdict forms, appellant did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel did not object to either. Finally, the convictions in this case are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea postsentence Crim.R. 11 ineffective assistance of counsel manifest injustice evidentiary hearing abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea without holding an evidentiary hearing where the motion and supporting documents did not demonstrate a manifest injustice.

Second-degree burglary third-degree burglary "likely to be present." The state failed to present evidence to prove all the essential elements of a second-degree felony burglary offense as defined in R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), but the evidence presented supported a conviction of a lesser-included third-degree felony burglary offense as defined in R.C. 2911.12(A)(3). The matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to modify the judgment of conviction for a third-degree felony burglary offense and to resentence appellant.

Motion to appoint new counsel untimely, presumption of bad faith Crim.R. 11(C) guilty plea knowingly intelligently and voluntarily. Appellate courts review a trial court's decision whether to remove court-appointed counsel for an abuse of discretion. Although Nicholson suggests the trial court summarily denied his motion without consideration, the trial court noted that the motion was being made on the day of trial. There is a presumption of bad faith that must be overcome if the request for new counsel is made on the day of trial. The record reveals the trial court considered the request with the proper safeguard for Nicholson's constitutional rights. We find no abuse of discretion, because the request was not timely and not supported by good cause. Due process requires that a defendant's plea be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily otherwise, the defendant's plea is invalid. The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to provide the defendant with relevant information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty. A trial court must strictly comply with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requirements that relate to the waiver of constitutional rights. Our review indicates the trial court strictly complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C). As such, we find that Nicholson's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Crim.R. 8(A)/joinder Crim.R. 14/relief from joinder Evid.R. 803(2)/excited utterance/hearsay exception admission of evidence abuse of discretion Crim.R. 16/discovery. The indicted offenses against appellant were of the same or similar character where appellant fired the same weapon at multiple victims - one victim being involved in two of the three shootings. Appellee presented simple and direct evidence of the multiple offenses and there was no evidence that the jury was confused. There was no prejudicial joinder against appellant, and there was no error where the trial court denied appellant's motion for relief from prejudicial joinder. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Statements made by victims and witnesses given to the officer and recorded on the officer's body camera, and determined not to be testimonial, met the standard for an excited-utterance-hearsay exception. It was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed the body-camera statements to be admitted as evidence. Appellant's claim, that evidence turned over to appellant five days into trial prejudiced appellant, is without merit. The offenses, to which the evidence pertained, were dismissed. Thus, appellant cannot show that he was prejudiced where the evidence was allowed. At most, the admission of the evidence was harmless error.

Negligence small claims manifest weight competent and credible evidence comparative negligence damages abuse of discretion App.R. 16. The trial court's determination that plaintiff was comparatively at fault for damages to his vehicle while driving through a construction zone was supported by competent and credible evidence. The trial court's damages award was not an abuse of discretion.

Conceded error void voidable R.C. 2929.13 R.C. 2921.331 mandatory sentence. The parties agree that the trial court erred in designating sentences imposed under R.C. 2921.331(D) as mandatory sentences.

DV - person living as a spouse

Service of pleadings, Ohio Civ.R. 75, Ohio Civ.R. 5

unduly suggestive photo lineup, ineffective assistance of counsel, affirmative defense of duress

Permanent custody, manifest weight

Personal jurisdiction/R.C. 2307.382(A)(3) and (6)/Minimum contacts/Due process/Civ.R. 12(B)(2)

The magistrate did not err in determining facts and law and in recommending denial of relator's request for writ of mandamus to order the Ohio Adult Parole Revocation Hearing Committee of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to reinstate his parole or grant him a new revocation hearing. Relator's objections overruled. Magistrate's Decision adopted. Request for writ of mandamus/habeas corpus denied.

On the facts of the case, trial court erred in requiring appellant to present expert testimony in order to establish breach in attorney malpractice action where appellee missed a discovery deadline resulting in admissions being deemed admitted. Trial court erred in failing to apply "some evidence of the merits of the underlying claim" standard in determining whether the causation element was met.

The trial court erred by ruling on appellee's motion to reinstate and motion for default judgment filed after a final judgment was entered that extinguished appellee's claims for relief. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court to vacate the judgment entry filed on November 22, 2019 which was a nullity.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion of the Ohio State Highway Patrol for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), and thus did not err in dismissing appellant's action. When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, reasonable minds could only conclude that the force used by Trooper Doebrich in arresting appellant under the facts and circumstances of this case was reasonable and not excessive. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed.

VOYEURISM – ATTEMPT – SUFFICIENCY – SEX OFFENSES – REGISTRATION – SENTENCING ENTRY – R.C. 2929.23(B): Defendant's conviction for attempted voyeurism in violation of R.C. 2907.08(D) was based upon sufficient evidence where defendant took a substantial step toward completing the offense of voyeurism by surreptitiously placing his cell phone under the dress and between the legs of the victim, and defendant's concurrent statements indicated that he intended to photograph or videotape the victim's body or undergarments. [But see DISSENT: The evidence was insufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took a substantial step toward violation of R.C. 2907.08(D) where the evidence showed the cell phone placed under the victim's dress was inactive and had a black screen, and there was no evidence of the type of cell phone used by defendant and its capabilities or whether there were any shortcut buttons on the phone to place it in camera mode or any secret applications installed to take hidden photographs.] The trial court did not err by failing to include a summary of defendant's sex offender registration duties and their duration in the sentencing entry the registration duties and their duration are set by statute, and by including the tier classification in the entry, properly informing defendant of his registration duties and their duration at the sentencing hearing, and ensuring that defendant received, understood, and signed a form detailing his registration duties and their duration, the court complied with the requirements of R.C. 2929.23(B).

SENTENCING: The trial court erred by sentencing defendant to 18-month prison terms for community-control violations where the court failed comply with statutory notification requirements.

ASSAULT – EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant's assault conviction was supported by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence where the trial court reasonably resolved credibility disputes against defendant.

HEARSAY – EXPERT TESTIMONY – LEADING QUESTIONS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an expert witness to reference unnamed studies where: (1) the expert did not provide any precise statement from the studies (2) the expert merely referenced the studies to explain the basis for his opinion and (3) the expert clarified that his opinion was based upon his own education, training, and experience. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defense counsel to ask leading questions of the defense expert on direct examination because the evidence had already been well-established and the questions were not prejudicial.

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE – UNFAIR COMPETITION –CONTRACT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Where the parties are unable to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact with respect to a necessary element of their respective claims, the trial court was correct to grant cross-motions for summary judgment. The existence of a notice provision does not prevent a contract from being terminable at will. The court correctly granted summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim for unfair competition by sham litigation where defendant could not show that plaintiff had the subjective intent to injure defendant's ability to be competitive.

Attempted murder/Sufficiency and manifest weight/Whether offenses of attempted murder and aggravated burglary merged

Self defense, ineffective assistance, manifest weight and sufficiency

The jury's findings that appellant was guilty of attempted murder and that he threatened the use of force during the commission of three robberies were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence. Even if the trial court's decision overruling appellant's motion to sever two robbery counts from the other counts in the indictment were erroneous, such error was harmless because these counts were tried separately to the court at appellant's request. The trial court did not err by allowing the admission of other-acts evidence. Finally, the trial court did not violate appellant's Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses by addressing potential Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues with a defense witness who, after this discussion, asserted her right against self-incrimination. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant entered guilty pleas to three offenses and was sentenced to concurrent terms. Counsel filed an Anders brief. Upon review, we find no arguably meritorious assignments of error. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to correct jail-time credit. The record does not show that appellant was entitled to additional credit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motions to dismiss. The appellees were immune from civil liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, and the appellants' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive prison sentences. Although appellant argued that the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences contradicted the overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11, it is well established that consecutive sentences must be reviewed for compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), not R.C. 2929.11. The record in this case establishes that the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court made all the required consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing and incorporated those findings into the sentencing entry. The trial court's consecutive-sentence findings also were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

The common pleas court erred in dismissing appellant's quiet title claim. Although the municipal court entered a prior judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action involving the same parties and property, the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a quiet title claim, and therefore that claim was not barred by res judicata. Judgment reversed and remanded as to quiet title, and affirmed in all other respects.

The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody to appellee, a children services agency. As a preliminary matter, appellant failed to file specific objections to the magistrate's decision, so review is for plain error only. The juvenile court did not commit plain error or any error in rejecting the motion for custody filed by appellant, who was the child's paternal great-grandmother. The court was not statutorily required to consider appellant as a potential placement, and ample evidence supported the court's finding that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's motion for relief from judgment and to correct jail-time credit and his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting a hearing. Appellant's delay of approximately 20 years between the time of his sentencing and the filing of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was unreasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, appellant's self-serving statements in his affidavit attached to the motion to withdraw, which alleged sexual misconduct on the part of his former counsel with appellant's then-fiancée, standing alone, were insufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice or to support the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

After a full hearing on appellant's pre-sentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea to one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion. Appellant failed to establish a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of her plea beyond the conclusory statements in her motion regarding the alleged effect of pre-existing medical conditions. Judgment affirmed.

unjust enrichment, duty of dominant easement holder to pay for costs to repair and maintain roadways

Appellant not entitled to jail-time credit in Wood County case for time held in pretrial confinement in Lucas County on a separate offense.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for allowing defendant to plead guilty. Trial court's sentence for the fourth-degree misdemeanor charge of domestic violence was well-within statutory guidelines and was not an abuse of discretion.

Judgment affirmed where statements directing police were not impermissible hearsay, additional statements not prejudicial, and there was no evidence of record to support an inference of gang activity permitting mention in closing argument by defense counsel.

On application for reinstatement.

On application for reinstatement.

Defendant moved court to add jail-time credit to prison sentence, which court denied. Defendant then moved court to reconsider decision, also denied. Defendant appealed denial of the motion to reconsider. Decision denying request for jail-time credit was final appealable order, which defendant failed to timely appeal. Motion to reconsider was nullity did not extend deadline to appeal original order. Decision denying motion to reconsideration was not final appealable order. Appeal dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.

The search warrant authorized on appellant's residential was not improper, as the inferences contained therein were either permissible inferences made by the detective or were not made intentionally or with conscious indifference.

The trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress where the officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop (writing a traffic ticket) without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, as the officer's legal right to detain the defendant had expired and the totality of the circumstances indicate that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's request to search the trailer, the consent for the search was not freely and voluntarily given.

Trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) in imposing an indefinite prison term where court did not provide the required statutory notifications at defendant's sentencing hearing.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing.

Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court's imposition of the maximum prison term is contrary to law.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's application to seal his criminal conviction.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in part and erred by granting summary judgment in part.

Trial court's verdict finding defendant guilty of OVI was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post-conviction Ineffective Assistance

8th Amendment - Juvenile Offender - Life Sentence - Failure to Consider Youth of Offender in Mitigation

Settlement agreement/Enforcement/Essential terms

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - review of felony sentences R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) appellate court not permitted to independently weigh competing factors.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - original action prohibition petition dismissed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) nunc pro tunc entry pending appeal jurisdiction adequate remedy at law.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denial of unemployment benefits discharged for just cause Department of Transportation substance abuse test refusal to submit upon request insubordination Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations urine specimen outside acceptable temperature range failure to provide sufficient specimen evaluation from licensed physician.

CRIMINAL LAW - ALLIED OFFENSES - aggravated burglary kidnapping restraint of liberty in order to use as a shield or hostage substantial increase in harm committed separately separate animus. SENTENCING - consecutive service not disproportionate to offender's conduct consecutive imposition of sentences for multiple offenses is not cruel and unusual punishment.

CRIMINAL - Anders v. California revocation of probation/community control Crim.R. 32.3 sentencing hearing R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) prison term for violating community control R.C. 2929.15(B) consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sentencing entry nunc pro tunc

CIVIL - Open Meetings Act R.C. 121.22 trial court's injunction issued on remand from this court was insufficient to address both ways the Board violated the OMA the determination of whether the violations were technical, substantial, egregious, or made in bad faith was properly left to the discretion of the trial court and the trial court did not err in determining they were not technical, and not substantial, egregious, or made in bad faith a trial court does not err in issuing a single injunction when the violations were tehnical in nature and do not involve an intent to conceal the overall purpose of the meeting or create distinct formal actions when multiple technical violations are of the same nature, the remedy is one injunction and one civil forfeiture the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing attorney's fees when the errors were technical, not substantial, egregious, or made in bad faith and the Board's belief was reasonable based on the ordinary application of statutory and case law as it existed at the time of the violation, and the Board reasonably believed that the conduct would serve the public policy of the OMA affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CRIMINAL - OVI motion to suppress reasonable suspicion field sobriety tests

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - original action mandamus petition dismissed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) postconviction relief petition findings of fact and conclusions of law final appealable order adequate remedy at law.

CRIMINAL-R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)-TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE-INFERENCE STACKING - The elements of the crime of tampering with evidence were satisfied where 1) the defendant knew he was going into jail 2) he was warned about bringing contraband into the jail 3) he knew he would be searched prior to being booked into the jail and 4) he took action to destroy evidence of a crime by putting an item into his mouth after he was commanded to hand it over, and then swallowed the item after he was commanded to spit it out the jury did not have to engage in impermissible inference stacking in order to reach a guilty verdict.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to provide competent representation to clients, failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing clients, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Six-month suspension stayed on conditions.

Taxation—Use tax—R.C. 5739.02(B)(32), "highway transportation for hire" exemption—For purposes of R.C. 5739.02(B)(32), waste is "personal property belonging to" the person or entity that generated it when that person or entity has an agreement with the hauler that specifies where it is to be taken for disposal—Decision of Board of Tax Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.

violation of local tall-weed ordinance nunc pro tunc entry specified name and degree of the offense of which appellant was convicted appellant's duty to provide court with transcript substitute when transcript is unavailable App.R. 9 no right to appointed counsel when there is no possibility of incarceration no abuse of discretion in denying his pretrial motions

R.C. 2951.041 (B) Intervention in Liew of Treatment preliminary determination of eligibility victim 65 or over

Rule 36 Rule 56, deed reservation language minerals pil and gas adverse possession shallow rights deep rights.

Respondent State Teachers Retirement System board did not abuse its discretion in denying retirement credit to claimant pursuant to R.C. 2207.53, where some evidence supported the board's determination that the claimant was of service on a full-time basis during the years for which claimant sought such credit. Petition of writ of mandamus denied.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion in limine and admitting Facebook evidence. Defendant's convictions for felonious assault were supported by both sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in replacing juror with alternate juror during deliberations or in denying defendant's motion for mistrial based on juror replacement. Trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel. Trial court did not err in imposing sentence.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's age discrimination claim.

Appellant failed to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient or that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that his conviction on the burglary count, in violation of R.C. § 2911.12, a second-degree felony, must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court properly construed appellant's motion to amend or vacate the 1993 sentencing entry as a successive petition for postconviction relief and denied it on grounds that appellant failed to establish the applicability of one of the exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A) and that his claims were otherwise barred by res judicata, although technically, the trial court should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant has not provided a copy of the hearing transcript for the court's review. Regularity of those proceedings is presumed. Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL-EVIDENCE-INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE-SENTENCE - Trial court did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to present a complete defense where court did not allow Appellant to introduce prior alleged instances of the victim's conduct which were remote in time and which were directed towards another person, not Appellant trial court's comments at sentencing regarding Appellant's "controlling nature" were well-documented by the evidence at trial and did not arise from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on the aiuthority of State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512, the trial court erred in imposing both a prison term and a community-control sanction of no-contact order with victim.

post-decree, spousal support, contempt, attorney fees

Prohibition, dismissal sua sponte

DNA TESTING: The trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain why it denied defendant's application for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 et seq.

CONTRACTS – IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS – FRAUD – EVIDENCE – PROCEDURE/RULES: The trial properly determined that defendant automobile dealer sold a vehicle to plaintiff with prior knowledge of the vehicle's faulty transmission and failed to disclose the defect. The Ohio Rules of Evidence are not applicable to small claims proceedings. The magistrate was in the best position to determine the credibility and authenticity of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting plaintiff/buyer's exhibits and finding in favor of buyer where the record shows that defendant knew of the vehicle's defect and failed to disclose that defect to plaintiff.

EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT – TELECOMUNICATIONS HARRASSMENT: Defendant's telecommunications harassment conviction, under R.C. 2917.21(B)(1), was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant communicated using the same Facebook account that sent the threatening message.

Dismissal of 2506 Appeal, No Jurisdiction for Legislative Action

Civ. R. 41(B)(1) dismissal abuse of discretion

speedy trial, petition for post conviction relief, judicial release

Workers' compensation right to participate motion for new trial untimely objection to verdict motion for new trial. Reversed trial court's granting of new trial where defendant objected to allegedly inconsistent verdicts after the jury was discharged, where the only question for review was whether the plaintiff was entitled to workers' compensation benefits and the jury clearly found he was so entitled.

Drug possession R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) mandatory fine affidavit unable to pay abuse of discretion ineffective assistance R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a)(i). Reversed and vacated trial court's imposition of a mandatory fine under R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). The trial court abused its discretion by imposing the mandatory fine when a poverty affidavit was filed and the defendant demonstrated he was indigent and unable to pay the mandatory fine. Appellant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel where he timely filed a poverty affidavit and the trial court was advised of its filing and had reviewed the PSI report.

U nonimmigrant visa U visa privilege 8 U.S.C. 1367(a)(2) 8 C.F.R. 214.14 subpoena duces tecum nonparty standing in terrorem effect aliens. Trial court's denial of a motion to quash a subpoena is affirmed where the plaintiffs' interest in keeping the privileged information was outweighed by the defendants' interest in obtaining the information and any chilling effect caused by the disclosure of privileged information was minimal since the plaintiffs had obtained permanent resident status and the trial court's order limited the attorney's use of the information.

Sufficient evidence retaliation. The evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant of retaliation, because his statements were made during a bipolar episode. Additionally, the state did not demonstrate that the appellant purposely made threats to the judge or the police officers.

Ineffective assistance of counsel no contest plea guilty plea preserve appellate review motion in limine. A trial court's decision on a motion in limine is not preserved for appellate review until the proponent of the evidence attempts to proffer it at trial. Accordingly, the type of plea entered by an appellant has no bearing on that analysis because by entering a plea, they did not go to trial.

Asbestos voluntarily dissolved corporation wind-up extend statutory time R.C. 1701.88 R.C. 1701.89 jurisdiction receiver. - The specialized asbestos trial court lacked authority to extend the statutory time to wind-up the affairs of a voluntarily dissolved corporation because the court was not located in the county where the dissolved corporation's principal office is located, and the court's jurisdiction was not invoked upon a complaint as required by R.C. 1701.89. Even if the jurisdictional requirements were satisfied, the trial court misapplied R.C. 1701.88 because the extension of the five-year period only applies to winding-up of corporate affairs, not extending the time to bring actions against the dissolved corporation. The trial court erred in appointing a receiver for the dissolved corporation because the movants failed to establish that the appointment was necessary.

Permanent custody continuance due process quarantine Covid-19. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's request for continuance of permanent custody trial on the day of trial where mother failed to communicate and cooperate with her lawyer and with the court and failed to demonstrate good cause.

Technical violation community control violation contact probation officer R.C. 2929.15 sentencing cap. Failing to contact probation officer over the course of five weeks is not a technical violation of community control and, therefore, not subject to R.C. 2929.15's sentencing cap.

Final appealable order R.C. 2109.33 probate court estate denial of exception to final accounting standing pecuniary interest. An order denying an exception to an account or inventory does not affect a substantial right and is therefore not a final appealable order. Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution grants jurisdiction to courts of appeals "to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district." Consequently, because this court does not have jurisdiction over nonfinal orders, we dismiss the appeal. Further, if the present appeal was a final appealable order, Brady would not prevail, if reviewed. Two of the three assignments of error that Brady raised in her last appeal are identical to the two assignment of errors she now raises in this appeal. In Brady's last appeal, pursuant to R.C. 2109.33, we found that she lacked standing because there was no showing that she had any direct pecuniary interest in the estate, was not a beneficiary of the estate, and was not a creditor of the estate. As such, the probate court properly denied her exception to the final accounting.

Wrongful imprisonment R.C. 2743.48 statute of limitations R.C. 2305.07 summary judgment Civ.R. 56 findings of fact. Plaintiff-appellant's wrongful imprisonment action was time-barred where he filed it more than six years after his cause of action accrued. The fact that the statute of limitations for plaintiff-appellant's original offense had not expired did not bar him from filing a wrongful imprisonment action or otherwise operate to toll the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.07. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the court was not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellants cannot meet all three requirements for a writ of mandamus to issue because they did not pursue an adequate remedy at law. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2151.35, Juv.R. 34 Juv.R. 16 Juv.R. 29 Loc.Juv.R. 22 R.C. 2151.23 R.C. 2151.353 abused child, R.C. 2951.031, R.C. 2919.22(A) clear and convincing evidence relevant evidence abuse of discretion de novo.

abuse of discretion motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, Crim.R.33(B) res judicata petition for post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21, R.C. 2953.23 materially exculpatory evidence, due process

Probable cause to arrest

Res judicata, negotiated plea agreement

Public records—R.C. 149.43—Mandamus—A public-records custodian has a clear legal duty to identify the records that are responsive to a public-records request and to offer to provide them to the requester at cost—Writ granted.

OVI — DUE PROCESS — COUNSEL — EVIDENCE —SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant's due-process rights were not violated by the law enforcement officer's failure to administer the field-sobriety tests within view of his cruiser camera because law enforcement has no duty to record field-sobriety tests during OVI investigations. Defendant failed to demonstrate that she received ineffective assistance of counsel where she could not show that she was prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise her due-process claim at trial or to play portions of the cruiser cameras videos that showed that the officer administered the field-sobriety tests in a location different than what he testified to at trial. Defendant's conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was based upon sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the officer testified that defendant smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot and glassy eyes, and defendant's performance on the field-sobriety tests indicated impairment.

JURISDICTION—POSTCONVICTION—SENTENCING: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postconviction motion seeking an order vacating the prison term imposed for defendant's postrelease-control violation: the motion was not reviewable under any postconviction proceeding provided by statute or rule and the sentence was not correctable under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, when it was imposed by a court with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The appeal from the judgment overruling the postconviction motion to vacate the prison term imposed for defendant's postrelease-control violation was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction: the judgment overruling the motion was not reviewable under the jurisdiction conferred by R.C. 2953.02 or 2953.08 to review a judgment of conviction entered in a criminal case, by R.C. 2953.23(B) to review an order denying postconviction relief, or by R.C. 2505.03(A) to review, affirm, modify, or reverse a "final order, judgment or decree."

Reagan Tokes - IAC - Maximum Sentence - Court Costs

Fraud by Nondisclosure - Burden of Proof Fraud - Effect of Disclaimer on Fraud Claim

Appellant's conviction for failure to register was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State complied with the notification requirements under R.C. 2950.06 by sending a written warning letter to appellant at his last known residence on the day following the date his registration was required and by affording the statutory seven-day "grace period." There is no requirement that an offender actually receive the warning letter prior to arrest. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by ordering appellant to pay court-appointed-counsel fees and expenses without making an explicit finding as to her ability to pay. Such a finding was not required. The trial court did not err by imposing a prison term rather than community control, by imposing the maximum term, or by imposing consecutive sentences. The record supported the trial court's sentencing findings, and appellant's sentence was not otherwise contrary to law. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit deposition testimony offered by a physician related to the standard of care applicable to the treatment provided to appellant by appellees. Although the physician was qualified to offer certain expert opinions, the record did not establish his qualification for purposes of Evid.R. 601(E) to testify about the standard of care. Furthermore, even if the trial court erred by refusing to admit the testimony, any such error was harmless because the standard of care was not at issue. In addition, the trial court did not err by informing the jury that one of the appellees would be absent from trial as the result of a medical necessity. The trial court instructed the jury that it should not allow sympathy to influence its deliberations, and the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in dismissing most of the claims against appellees for failure to state a claim. In this action, which concerned transfer of a property and subsequent encumbrance of the property, appellants stated a claim against the purchaser and other appellees on various claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, for imposition of a constructive trust, and tortious interference. One claim, against a party for breach of trust, failed to state a claim because R.C. Chap. 5801 only applies to express trusts. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court did not err by holding appellant in contempt and sanctioning him for violating an injunction that it had issued. The record plainly establishes appellant's multiple violations of the court's prior order. The trial court also did not err by ordering that record title to certain real property be corrected, because the transfer of the property violated the court's injunction. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court's judgment denying appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion where the decision was based, in part, on the trial court's incorrect factual finding that appellant was advised of the maximum possible penalty for his offense before entering his guilty plea. Because the record establishes that the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by not advising appellant of the maximum possible penalty during the plea colloquy, appellant's guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The trial court's judgment denying appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court properly overruled appellant's suppression motion, because he consented to a vehicle search that resulted in the discovery of a loaded handgun. With regard to the State's cross-appeal, the trial court technically erred in imposing a sentence of "time served" on appellant's fourth-degree felony conviction for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. The trial court apparently intended to and should have ordered the jail time served as a community control sanction, which ended upon completion of the jail sanction. We so modify the judgment. Therefore, a remand for resentencing is unnecessary. Judgment affirmed as modified.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's petitions for post-conviction relief without conducting a hearing. Appellant's speedy-trial argument was barred by res judicata because he did not raise the argument on direct appeal. Appellant waived his additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel -- claiming that he was promised a sentence of less than ten years but received an aggregate sentence of 20 years -- because he did not raise this issue in the petition filed in the trial court. Appellant's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his request for the release of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings is moot that request related to his speedy trial argument, which is barred by res judicata. Finally, claims alleging the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are not cognizable in post-conviction proceedings. Judgments affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no issues with arguable merit for appellant to advance on appeal. Appellant's claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to accurately advise him of the terms of the State's plea offer and by refusing to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on his behalf lack arguable merit. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for appellee on appellant's bailment claim. Appellant was not the owner of the property, so he had no claim against appellee. Judgment affirmed.

Final appealable order jurisdiction Civ.R. 54(B) motion to strike Civ.R. 56(G) Evid.R. 1002 Evid.R. 1004 summary judgment de novo review easement by estoppel trespass tortious interference with contract tortious interference with business relationship civil conspiracy champerty and maintenance statute of fraud receivership

On application for reinstatement.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to seal his criminal record. R.C. 2953.32 nature of the offense prosecutorial misconduct.

There is no statutory or case law requirement that the court inform a convicted felon of his inability to possess firearms. A trial court is not required to go beyond the Crim.R. 11 notification requirements and a plea will not be rendered involuntary based upon such a claim. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Trial court did not err in failing to order a competency exam for appellant. Trial court did not err in accepting appellant's no contest plea the state's recitation of the facts did not negate essential elements of the offense.

(1) Appellant waived his right to contest procedural defects when he pleaded guilty (2) Appellant waived his right to be physically present at sentencing.

Reasonable, articulable suspicion did not arise sufficient to warrant administration of field sobriety and breath tests. During appellant's consensual encounter with trooper, trooper observed the odor of alcohol, but of an unspecified strength, her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, but it was the middle of the night, and she admitted to consuming one alcoholic beverage many hours earlier. The trooper observed no other signs of impairment.

Judgment vacated where parties agree that neither service nor constructive notice provided to respondent regarding issuance of a CPO as required by R.C. 3113.31(F)(1) and 2919.27(D).

community control—record—violation

motion to correct void sentence, post-release control, petition for post-conviction relief, untimely, successive, res judicata

reasonable doubt, burden of proof, sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance, expert, aggravated murder, circumstantial evidence

Obstructing official business, R.C. 2921.31(A), sufficiency of the evidence, affirmative act, purpose

Trial court did not err in denying petition for postconviction relief where defendant failed to establish that the trial judge who sentenced him was biased or prejudiced against him or other defendants who committed similar crimes.

The domestic relations court erred in dismissing father's motion to register a New York child support order and his motion to modify or terminate the order based on a lack of jurisdiction, as the court had jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 3115.611(A)(1) since neither the children, father, nor mother resided in New York, father was a resident of Florida, and mother resided in Butler County, Ohio. Further, the New York child-support order is subject to modification or termination in the event that one or more of the children reach 21 years of age or otherwise become economically independent, as contemplated by New York law.

Appellant's appeal challenging the trial court's decision to sentence him to serve two consecutive 9-month prison terms after he was found guilty of violating the terms of his community control in two separate cases was dismissed as moot where no relief could be granted to appellant since appellant had already completed his prison sentence and had since been released on postrelease control.

The trial court did not err in granting legal custody of the child to a paternal aunt when after a year, the mother was still not maintaining employment or housing for longer than a couple of months. Trial court did not err in finding that legal custody of the child was in the child's best interests.

The trial court did not err: in overruling Appellant's oral pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas at sentencing in sentencing Appellant to an indefinite prison term on a qualifying second-degree felony in sentencing Appellant to maximum and consecutive sentences and in ordering Appellant to pay restitution.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST - R.C. 1343.03(C) good faith effort to settle abuse of discretion failure to meet burden of proof.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - Reagan Tokes Act, ripeness, constitutional challenge CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated assault, inferior offense of felonious assault, jury instruction, sudden passion or fit of rage CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - sufficiency manifest weight felonious assault.

CRIMINAL – purposes of felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.12 appellate review of felony sentence 2053.08(G)(2) class two license suspension R.C. 4510.02(A)(2)

CIVIL - motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) complaint alleged operative facts alleging verbal agreement with township cannot conclusively determine whether R.C. 2744.09(A) precludes statutory immunity if not, whether R.C. 2744.02 immunity applies.

To prove retaliation in violation of R.C. 2921.05(A), the State does not have to establish that the defendant communicated a threat of harm directly to the victim. Where the defendant is charged with retaliation in response to issuing unlawful threats, the State must only prove that the defendant was aware that the threats would be communicated to the victim or that the defendant could reasonably have expected the threats to have been communicated to the victim. Other acts evidence may be admitted under Evid.R. 404(B) for the legitimate purposes of establishing motive and identity.

Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel secretary of state to appoint county political party's recommended qualified elector to the county board of elections—R.C. 3501.07—Secretary of state abused his discretion in rejecting party's recommendation—Writ granted.

UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT — ASSAULT — EVIDENCE — PROSECUTOR — SENTENCING — ALLOCUTION — CRIM.R. 32(A): Defendant's convictions for unlawful restraint and assault were supported by sufficient evidence and not were not against the weight of the evidence where the victim credibly testified that defendant barricaded her in his house preventing her from leaving and separately injured her hand. The prosecuting attorney's unobjected-to use of "I believe" and "I think" to preface credibility arguments during closing argument, while improper, was not outcome determinative in a bench trial. The trial court erred by sentencing defendant without affording him the right of allocution as required by Crim.R. 32(A).

R.C. 2305.113 – STATUTE OF REPOSE – MEDICAL CLAIM: The trial court did not err in granting defendant hospital's motion to dismiss the complaint in each respective case where: (1) each plaintiff's negligent-credentialing and fraud claims were medical claims under R.C. 2305.113 and filed outside the four-year window of the statute of repose (2) the doctrines of fraud and equitable estoppel have no application against R.C. 2305.113(C) and (3) proper dismissal of the time-barred claims established beyond doubt that plaintiffs would be unable to recover on spoliation-of-evidence claims.

R.C. 2305.113 – STATUTE OF REPOSE – MEDICAL CLAIM: The trial court did not err in granting defendant hospital's motion to dismiss the complaint in each respective case where: (1) each plaintiff's negligent-credentialing and fraud claims were medical claims under R.C. 2305.113 and filed outside the four-year window of the statute of repose (2) the doctrines of fraud and equitable estoppel have no application against R.C. 2305.113(C) and (3) proper dismissal of the time-barred claims established beyond doubt that plaintiffs would be unable to recover on spoliation-of-evidence claims.

CONTRACTS – CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT: The trial court did not err in determining that defendant automobile dealer breached its agreement to repair plaintiff's vehicle: plaintiff testified that the repairs had not been made, and plaintiff returned the vehicle to defendant two separate times before ultimately taking the vehicle to another mechanic for repair. The trial court erred in determining that defendant automobile dealer violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act where defendant had not been put on notice of any claimed violations under the Act, and even though plaintiff filed her action in the small-claims division, plaintiff must still set forth the nature of her claim and a request for damages in accordance with Civ.R. 8(A).

Voidable sentences, Res judicata

Manifest weight on CPO possession of dog

Denial of motion for ineffective assistance of counsel

void sentence, allied offenses, merger, counsel of choice

Summary judgment appropriately granted Phrase "Intake Well House" is not ambiguous Bad Faith claims fail Denial of Civ.R. 56(F) motion did not amount to an abuse of discretion Grant of summary judgment on reformation, equitable estoppel, negligence, and misrepresentation claims were supported by the record.

Procedendo common pleas court judge's undue delay in ruling on objections to magistrate's decision peremptory writ granted.

CIVIL – permanent custody legal custody R.C. 2151.414 failure to appear at hearing motion to continue abuse of discretion best interest of the child.

Suppression - Blood Testing - Compliance with DOH Regulations - Franks Hearing - Probable Cause for Search Warrant - Good Faith Exception

Permanent Custody - Abandonment

Replevin Default judgment

motion to seal abuse of discretion R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(e) interests of the applicant legitimate governmental needs

R.C. 2923.03(D), codefendant testimony, ineffective assistance of counsel, Evid.R. 807, statements of minor children, impermissible comments during opening statements, manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A thorough review of the record does not indicate that the jury clearly lost its way. Reviewed for plain error, the record does not support that defense counsel's performance deprived appellant of a fair trial and that, but for, the alleged deficiencies, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Evid.R. 807(C) regarding out-of-court statements by children was not violated in this case. Relevant objections were sustained. Plain error analysis of the remaining statements does not support that but for the admission of the testimony, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. The state's comments during opening arguments summarized the state's theory of the case and admissible evidence during trial supported the cited statements.

Motion to dismiss preindictment delay Evid.R. 404(A)(1)/cross-examination of previous conviction R.C. 2945.71(C)(2)/speedy trial R.C. 2945.72/tolling sufficiency manifest weight. Appellant failed in appellant's burden to show that he suffered actual prejudice due to a preindictment delay. Appellee's delay to indict was for investigative purposes, and additionally, appellant was unable to establish what unavailable witnesses might have testified to that would have bolstered appellant's case. There was no error where the trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss for preindictment delay. On direct, appellant gave testimony that he was nonviolent thereby opening the door for appellee to cross-examine appellant on his previous violent offense. The trial court did not err by allowing the cross-examination to go forth. Where the delays for speedy trial purposes were at appellant's request, there was no violation of appellant's speedy-trial rights. Witness testimony and scientific evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction the jury was in the best position to determine credibility. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Aggravated murder aggravated burglary prosecutorial misconduct mistrial substantial rights fair trial sufficiency manifest weight identification physical evidence credibility discrepancies eyewitness DNA evidence. Appellant's convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated burglary were affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial claiming prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when the state is permitted to comment upon a defendant's failure to offer evidence in support of its case, the prosecutor is permitted to respond to defense counsel's attacks on a witness's credibility, isolated comments are not to be viewed in isolation, and in the context of the entire trial, the comments did not prejudicially affect appellant's substantial rights or deprive him of a fair trial. There was credible, eyewitness testimony identifying appellant as the offender, and circumstantial evidence was introduced that implicated appellant in the crimes. The lack of physical evidence linking appellant to the scene of the crime and inconsistencies in witnesses' testimony did not render the convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence, and there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.

Self-defense jury instruction sufficient tends to show creating the situation marital punch.

Contrary to law sentence maximum fine housing violation conceded error. The city concedes error in the trial court's imposition of a fine for $13,000 for a minor misdemeanor housing violation. Statutorily, the maximum fine for a minor misdemeanor is $1,000. Because the fine exceeded the statutory maximum, the trial court's sentence is contrary to law and appellant's assignments of error are sustained.

Summary judgment credit card account assignment discovery Civ.R. 56(F) continuance. Affirmed the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee in an action to recover an outstanding balance due on a credit card account. Because defendant-appellant did not request a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance to conduct further discovery and additional discovery was unnecessary to resolve the pertinent issues raised in the motion for summary judgment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the motion. Plaintiff-appellee presented sufficient evidence in support of its motion, including evidence of the outstanding balance owed and a valid assignment of the account.

Postconviction relief petition motion to withdraw plea untimely postsentence ineffective assistance of counsel void voidable coercion jurisdiction hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's untimely petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without an evidentiary hearing.

R.C. 2953.21 R.C. 2953.23 postconviction relief timeliness. A trial court does not abuse its discretion denying an untimely petition for postconviction relief where the petitioner fails to satisfy the statutory criteria that gives the trial court jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Timely appeal App.R. 3 App.R. 4 no jurisdiction of untimely appeal judgment of conviction. The court does not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal when defendant failed to timely appeal his judgment of conviction, which occurred in 2015. As such he cannot timely appeal a different judgment entry to appeal his judgment of conviction five years later.

Termination of shared parenting plan interim, temporary orders adoption of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law failure to file transcript App.R. 9 presumption of regularity R.C. 3109.04 allocation of parental rights and responsibilities best interest of the child child support R.C. 3119.02 R.C. 3119.021 R.C. 3119.04 needs and the standard of living of the children and the parents Civ.R. 54(D) court costs. Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review interim, temporary child custody and child support orders. Because trial court's temporary orders merged into the final judgment, any possible error contained in the temporary orders was moot. Fact that trial court adopted mother's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was not, in and of itself, error where there was nothing in the record to suggest that trial court failed to consider the evidence presented and reach its own independent determinations. Without a transcript of the proceedings, appellate court must presume regularity and had no basis upon which to review father's assignments of error to the extent they concerned factual disputes. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating shared parenting plan and designating mother residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' minor children. The findings of fact set forth in the judgment entry supported trial court's decision that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the shared parenting plan and designate mother residential parent and legal custodian. Where combined annual income of both parents was greater than the maximum annual income listed on the basic child support schedule, trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the needs and the standard of living of the children and the parents when determining the amount of father's child support obligation. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay court costs.

Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's convictions for murder and related offenses, and those convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where three eye witnesses identified the appellant as the perpetrator. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for mistrial, which alleged certain identification testimony was improperly admitted, since the appellant failed to show such an error prejudiced him or prevented him from having a fair trial. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, kidnapping, domestic violence, and violation of a protection order affirmed. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence as to all elements of the offenses, and the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Jury did not lose its way it choosing to find the victim's testimony credible, and its judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Industrial commission's determination to deny relator PTD compensation due to relator's capability of sustained remunerative employment is supported by a physician's opinion addressing relator's psychological conditions. Because "some evidence" supports the commission's decision, relief in mandamus is inappropriate on the facts of the case. Writ of mandamus denied.

Trial court's decision finding the appellant's former attorney had the apparent and actual authority to settle the claims between appellant and appellee, and that the authority was not revoked, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for sanctions without a hearing.

Appellants' failed to provide competent and probative evidence to support their requests for a reduction in the assessed value of the land portion of the property and for allocation of all improvements to be included as tax exempt under a community reinvestment area. Therefore, the decision by the court of common pleas to affirm the Board of Revision's denial of appellant's requests was not an abuse of discretion.

The trial court did not err in sua sponte dismissing appellant's amended complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Judgment affirmed.

Crim.R. 16 – EVIDENCE/WITNESS/TRIAL – JUROR MISCONDUCT – JUDICIAL NOTICE: Although the state's witness nondisclosure certification under Crim.R. 16(D) was not sufficiently case-specific, defendant could not show that he was materially prejudiced. Testimony by a detective that purported to interpret video evidence did not warrant a mistrial because the trial court took immediate steps to blunt potential prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its direction in denying a mistrial for juror misconduct because the court dismissed the offending juror and appropriately investigated the misconduct. The trial court did not commit plain error by taking judicial notice of the date of a Facebook post because the primary value of the evidence was the post itself.

R.C. 2907.06(B) – CORRABORATION – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: The state presented sufficient corroborative evidence of victim's testimony to support a conviction for sexual imposition. The manifest weight of the evidence did not support defendant-appellant's assertion that the victim's testimony lacked credibility.

Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel Columbus City Council to submit to city electors a proposed municipal ordinance on the May 4, 2021 primary-election ballot—Council abused its discretion in finding relators' initiative petition insufficient—Although relators are not entitled to writ ordering council to place proposed ordinance on the May 4 ballot, relators are entitled to limited writ ordering council to find initiative petition sufficient and to proceed with process for an initiated ordinance under Columbus City Charter—Limited writ granted.

Whether defendant-appellant should have been sentenced to prison/Appeal of consecutive sentences

The law under which appellant was sentenced—the Reagan Tokes Act (S.B. 201)—does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or the right to due process therefore, appellant's indefinite prison sentence was constitutional. Judgment affirmed.

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.22(D)(1) and Crim.R. 32.1, the trial court erred when it deprived appellant of his right to allocution prior to imposing sentence. Judgment reversed remanded for resentencing.

Appellant's agreed prison sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act was neither unconstitutional nor otherwise contrary to law. The trial court did not cause appellant's no-contest plea in two consolidated cases to be involuntary by rendering an incorrect legal opinion or inserting itself into plea negotiations. No cumulative error existed depriving appellant of due process or a "fair sentence." The trial court's two judgment entries contain a clerical error, stating that the appellant was convicted on a guilty plea in fact, appellant pled no contest and was found guilty. This matter is remanded for the trial court to file nunc pro tunc entries reflecting the appellant's no-contest pleas. In all other respects, judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea to murder. Retroactive application of Sierah's Law did not violate the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution or constitute a breach of appellant's plea agreement. No manifest injustice shown. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court overruled appellant's motion for satisfaction of judgment, in which he challenged the Bureau of Sentence Computation's calculation that his sentence will not expire until August 2024. The Ohio Supreme Court has twice ruled that the BSC's determination is correct. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted after a plea hearing of attempted leaving the scene of an accident, a misdemeanor of the second degree. The City concedes that there were defects in the plea hearing – specifically, that appellant never stated that she wished to enter a no contest plea. More importantly, trial counsel acted deficiently by failing to move for dismissal of the case on speedy trial grounds. On this record, the trial court's lengthy sua sponte continuance while appellant attended the STOP program was not reasonable, and the speedy trial time had expired prior to appellant's entering her plea. Judgment of conviction vacated. (Welbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.)

After pleading guilty to 14 counts of sexual battery involving his daughter, appellant was sentenced to consecutive sentences totaling 14 years in prison. The record establishes that the trial court properly considered the applicable sentencing factors and did not err in imposing the sentences for the individual offenses further, the court made the relevant findings supporting consecutive sentences, and those findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court correctly overruled appellant's untimely motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. The evidence upon which appellant relied – the blood and alcohol results from the victim's sexual assault kit, which appellant claimed to show that the victim was not substantially impaired at the time of the rape offense -- was not new evidence. Appellant did not establish a Brady violation, and his motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). As conceded by the State, appellant's sentence on each rape count was required to be a minimum term of ten years to a maximum term of life imprisonment. Thus, the trial court erred by sentencing appellant to a life sentence on each count of rape. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing the petition was untimely and barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

sufficiency—manifest weight—identity

defamation per se – damages – theft – employment – default judgment – continuance – service – discovery – motion for relief from judgment – judgment notwithstanding the verdict – new trial

Procedendo, jurisdiction, municipal court, common pleas court

Defendant appeals murder conviction. Juror reported vehicle vandalized and concerns that it may have been related to jury service. Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to strike the juror. Juror stated he was nervous but was "okay" after speaking with a detective. Juror affirmed he could decide the case impartially. Defense counsel indicated he was satisfied that juror could perform duties and had a strategic purpose for retaining juror. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to instruct jury on voluntary manslaughter. No evidence that victim ever provoked defendant. In each encounter between defendant and victim, the defendant was aggressor.