[Cite as State v. Gloeckner,
2021-Ohio-1193.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 109665
v. :
JAMES A. GLOECKNER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 8, 2021
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-19-639268-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Oscar Albores, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
James A. Gloeckner (“Gloeckner”) appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his oral motion to withdraw guilty plea. After reviewing the facts of the
case and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On September 23, 2019, Gloeckner entered a guilty plea to sexual
battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), a third-degree felony, alleged to have
occurred in 2001. The court held a sentencing hearing on November 14, 2019, at
which defense counsel requested a continuance and a “mental health competency to
stand trial” evaluation of Gloeckner, stating that “it is evident that there are mental
health issues.” Defense counsel also stated that Gloeckner “has a desire today to
withdraw his plea” and that the mental-health evaluation “should be done so that
I’m confident that his decision to … withdraw his plea or not withdraw his plea is
… sound and appropriate ….” The court referred Gloeckner to the psychiatric
clinic in accordance with R.C. 2945.371 for a competency-to-stand-trial
examination.
The court held another hearing on March 9, 2020, at which the
parties stipulated to Gloeckner’s mental-health report, which found him competent.
Gloeckner renewed his oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court
denied. The court sentenced Gloeckner to two years in prison and classified him as
a sexually oriented offender.
II. Standard of Review — Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
“Although a defendant is not vested with an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea, a motion for withdrawal made prior to sentencing is to be
freely allowed and liberally treated.” State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 83350, 2004-Ohio-2012, ¶ 34. See also State v. Peterseim,
68 Ohio App.2d 211,
428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980); Crim.R. 32.1.
Appellate courts review denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521,
584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).
It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea:
(1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2)
where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11,
before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is
filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the
motion, and (4) where the record reveals that the court gave full and
fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request.
Peterseim at paragraph three of the syllabus.
Other factors that an appellate court may consider in determining
whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea are found in State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240,
661 N.E.2d 788 (1st
Dist.1995) and include whether: the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; the
motion was timely; “the motion sets out specific reasons for the withdrawal”; the
defendant “understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties”; and the
defendant “was perhaps not guilty of or had a complete defense to the charge or
charges.”
III. Motion Hearing
At the March 9, 2020 hearing, the court found that, because the
parties stipulated to Gloeckner’s competency, “the basis in the first place for the
request to withdraw his plea has now been rendered moot.” In response,
Gloeckner’s counsel argued that Gloeckner’s “position” was now that “at the time of
the plea he was diabetic and his blood sugar levels were excessive. He was of the
understanding that he would be able to request a bond should he enter a plea of
guilty.” In other words, Gloeckner believed that he would have been better equipped
to control his blood sugar levels outside of the county jail, and he believed that if he
pled guilty he would be out on bond. It is undisputed that Gloeckner did not raise
this issue at his plea hearing or when he first requested to withdraw his plea.
The court asked Gloeckner if he was receiving his diabetes medicine
while in jail. Gloeckner responded that “[t]hey were providing me with it, Your
Honor, but it wasn’t working.” The court stated that “you were not displaying any
signs that you were under any diabetic distress” at the September 23, 2019 plea
hearing. The court continued:
I remember asking you these questions. You were able to answer them
fully. We went over a lot of information, and you were able to respond
to me in a calm, composed manner.
We had a full discussion regarding all of your trial rights, your
requirement to register as a sex offender, the plea, how it was amended,
the potential penalties. So that takes a … good amount of time. And
my recollection is that we talked about all the medication that you were
on, that you were thinking clearly that day.
… I also … have to say that while we were sitting in court here, after
I said that there’s no reason … that was given to withdraw the plea, I
gave you time to have a conversation with your attorney, and that’s
when this new basis appeared … after he explained to you that the
basis originally is no longer applicable.
So I do find that this is a mere change of heart. I find no evidence to
support that you were having a diabetic episode at that time. You were
… medicated the same as you’re being medicated today. You’re able
to answer all of the questions and have a complete dialogue with me.
So I am going to deny your motion to withdraw your plea.
IV. Analysis
We turn to our analysis of the Peterseim and Fish factors. First, there
is nothing in the record that speaks directly to whether Gloeckner’s attorney was
“highly competent.” Defense counsel at the time of the plea hearing was Gloeckner’s
second attorney. On June 10, 2019, the trial court granted his original attorney’s
motion to withdraw as counsel based on the attorney’s medical issues. On June 12,
2019, the court assigned Gloeckner new counsel, and this attorney represented
Gloeckner for the remainder of the proceedings. At the plea hearing, the court asked
Gloeckner if he had “enough time to speak with your attorney regarding this plea”
and if he was “satisfied with the representations that he’s provided to you.”
Gloeckner responded “Yes” to these questions.
Second, the court held a full hearing before it accepted Gloeckner’s
guilty plea in the instant case, and the parties do not dispute that the court complied
with Crim.R. 11 at this hearing. In fact, the court inquired about whether Gloeckner
was taking his blood pressure and diabetes medication while he has been in jail, and
Gloeckner replied that he was. The trial court asked whether Gloeckner was
“thinking clearly” to which he responded, “Oh, yeah.”
Third, the court held a hearing on Gloeckner’s oral motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and although Gloeckner argues that it was “short at just
seven transcript pages,” the record shows that the court heard argument from
defense counsel and the state. Gloeckner cites no law or facts that would show this
hearing was not “complete and impartial.” He did not produce or attempt to offer
any evidence corroborating the statements he made at the motion hearing.
Fourth, the record reveals that the court gave “full and fair
consideration” to Gloeckner’s plea withdrawal request. Gloeckner argues that “the
trial court stated its own medical opinion that … he displayed no signs of diabetic
distress …” rather than “hear actual evidence.” However, our review of the record
shows that Gloeckner did not offer any evidence to support his claim that he was in
“diabetic distress” at the time of the plea.
The fifth factor concerns whether the withdrawal will prejudice the
prosecution. The offense to which Gloeckner pled guilty was committed 18 years
prior to the plea in this case. The state does not argue, and we do not find, that it
would be prejudiced if he withdrew his plea at this stage of the proceedings. Even
assuming that this factor supports Gloeckner’s request to withdraw his plea, it alone
cannot justify granting his motion.
Sixth, there is no dispute that Gloeckner’s original request to
withdraw his plea was made within a reasonable time, because it was prior to
sentencing and approximately three weeks after he pled guilty. Gloeckner renewed
his request to withdraw his guilty plea at his sentencing hearing on March 9, 2020,
after the parties stipulated to his competency.
Seventh, Gloeckner’s motion was oral, and the only record of his
reasons for requesting to withdraw his guilty plea are found in the transcript. The
record reveals that Gloeckner pled guilty, requested to withdraw his plea with no
reason given, was evaluated for mental-health issues, was found competent, and
renewed his request to withdraw his plea, alleging for the first time that he was in
“diabetic stress” at the time he entered his plea. The court stated on the record that
it did not believe Gloeckner’s argument about “diabetic distress.”
Eighth, our review of the plea hearing transcript shows that the court
fully explained the nature of the sexual battery charge to which Gloeckner pled guilty
as well as the potential sentence he faced. The court also explained that Gloeckner
would be classified as a “sexually oriented offender” under the former Megan’s Law
and reviewed the registration requirements associated with this classification. At
the hearing regarding Gloeckner’s request to withdraw his plea, the trial court
concluded that Gloeckner responded to questions at his plea hearing “fully” and in
a “calm, composed manner.” Nothing in the record suggests the Gloeckner did not
understand the nature of the charges and possible penalty.
Ninth, although Gloeckner argues on appeal that “he is in fact not
guilty,” it does not appear from the record that he maintained his innocence in the
trial court. Gloeckner’s argument that he is innocent is not supported by anything
he or his counsel stated in open court on or prior to March 9, 2020. On appeal, he
offers nothing but the blanket conclusion that he is not guilty.
Upon review, we find that Gloeckner first requested to withdraw his
guilty plea on November 14, 2019, but it was not until March 9, 2020, that he raised
the issue of “diabetic distress” as a reason for the request. Gloeckner’s allegation is
not supported by any evidence, and he made no reports of this medical issue to the
jail. Furthermore, nothing in Gloeckner’s Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy indicates that his
health was an issue or a reason he was pleading guilty.
This court has consistently held that the
defendant’s protestations of innocence are not sufficient, however
frequently repeated, to warrant grounds for vacating a plea knowingly
entered. By inference, all defendants who request a withdrawal of their
guilty plea do so based upon some claim of innocence. A mere change
of heart regarding a guilty plea and the possible sentence is insufficient
justification for the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Abdelhag, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71136, 1997 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3394 (July 31, 1997). See also State v. Minifee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 99202,
2013-Ohio-3146, ¶ 27 (when considering a request to withdraw a guilty
plea, the trial court ‘“must determine whether the claim is anything more than the
defendant’s change of heart about the plea agreement”’) (quoting State v. Kramer,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01-C.A.-107,
2002-Ohio-4176, ¶ 58).
Accordingly, we find that the court acted within its discretion when it
denied Gloeckner’s request to withdraw his guilty plea, and his sole assignment of
error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue of out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
