[Cite as State v. Gomez,
2021-Ohio-1357.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 4-20-12
v.
RODNEY G. GOMEZ, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Defiance Municipal Court
Trial Court No. CRB 9701038
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 19, 2021
APPEARANCES:
Ian A. Weber for Appellant
Harvey D. Hyman for Appellee
Case No. 4-20-12
MILLER, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Rodney G. Gomez, from a
decision of the Defiance Municipal Court denying his application to have the record
of his criminal conviction sealed. The essence of Gomez’s appeal is that the trial
court failed to make appropriate findings denying his application. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On September 28, 1997, Gomez was arrested after a physical altercation
with his wife in the presence of several of their children. Oct. 20, 2020 Tr. at 6-7.
Gomez admitted to the police he had gotten angry and struck his wife. Id. The next
day, a complaint charging a first-degree misdemeanor offense of domestic violence
in violation of then existing Defiance Codified Ordinance 636.17(A)(1) was filed
against Gomez. That same day, Gomez appeared in open court without counsel and
entered a plea of guilty to the charge. The court’s sentencing entry filed on
September 30, 1997, shows Gomez was fined $500 and sentenced to serve 90 days
in jail with one day’s credit. The fine and jail term were stayed on the conditions
that Gomez have no similar violations of law, maintain good behavior, and obtain
an assessment and follow all counseling recommendations.
{¶3} In a journal entry filed on June 25, 1998, the trial court acknowledged
Gomez had successfully completed treatment through Charter Counseling Center of
Defiance. Consequently, the court suspended the fine and jail sentence on the
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condition Gomez have no similar violations and maintain good behavior for one
year.
{¶4} On August 2, 2018, Gomez, through retained counsel, filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and to set aside the conviction pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1.
The basis of the motion was the trial court’s failure during the original plea colloquy
to advise Gomez of the firearm disqualifier attendant to a first-degree misdemeanor
conviction for domestic violence. The court conducted a hearing on the motion on
November 28, 2018. After hearing from both parties, the court granted Gomez’s
motion to withdraw his plea. The conviction was set aside and Gomez immediately
proceeded to enter a negotiated plea to an amended charge of domestic violence, in
violation of Defiance Codified Ordinance 537.14(c), a misdemeanor of the fourth
degree.1 Thereafter, the trial court adopted a jointly-recommended sentence and
ordered Gomez to serve 30 days in jail with all 30 days suspended and to pay a fine
of $250 with the full amount suspended. There were no conditions on the
suspensions. The court journalized its decision in an entry filed that same day.
{¶5} On July 15, 2020, Gomez filed an application to seal the record of his
conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. The City of Defiance filed an objection on
1 This code provision reads: “No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or
household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or
household member.” There is no indication in the record as to why, in amending the offense, the
parties chose to maintain the offense as domestic violence, albeit a misdemeanor of the fourth
degree, but still an offense of violence under R.C. 2901.01(A)(9).
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October 20, 2020, contending there was a legitimate governmental interest in
maintaining the record of the domestic-violence conviction. Additionally, the city
suggested Gomez had already received a benefit by being allowed to plea to a
reduced charge which the city contended eliminated any firearm disability and,
therefore, diminished his need to have the record of the conviction sealed.
{¶6} The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on October 20, 2020.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court noted an investigation was done by the
probation department and was submitted to the court. Oct. 20, 2020 Tr. at 3.
Initially, the trial court reviewed the criteria for the sealing of criminal convictions
and then permitted counsel to each address the court regarding their respective
positions. Gomez did not testify and presented no evidence at the hearing.
{¶7} After hearing from the attorneys, the court found Gomez was an eligible
offender as defined in R.C. 2953.31(A)(1), with his only conviction being the instant
offense which was not listed among the excluded offenses of R.C. 2953.36. Id. at
8-9. Additionally, the court found all sentencing requirements to have been satisfied
and the requisite period of time identified in R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(c) had passed in
order for the application to be filed. Id. at 9. Next, the court considered the criteria
of R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) and found there were no criminal proceedings pending
against Gomez in any other court and that Gomez had been rehabilitated, as no
additional criminal complaints had ever been filed against him. Id. Finally, the
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court considered the objections filed by the prosecutor and weighed the
governmental interest in maintaining the record against Gomez’s reasons to have
the record sealed. Id. at 9-11. After consideration of the statutory criteria, the court
denied Gomez’s application finding the governmental interest in maintaining the
records outweighed Gomez’s interest in having the records sealed. Id. at 11.
{¶8} From this decision, Gomez filed the instant appeal asserting two
assignments of error for our consideration.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court erred in denying the appellant’s application to seal
the record of his misdemeanor conviction.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court as a matter of law erred by denying the appellant’s
motion to seal his record.
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Gomez contends the trial court erred by
not making factual findings required by R.C. 2953.32. His second assignment of
error generally claims the court failed to weigh his interests against the
governmental interests in maintaining the records. As outlined above, the trial court
made the requisite findings including the weighing of the party’s interests. Because
of their similarities, we elect to address both assignments of error collectively.
{¶10} “Expungement is a post-conviction relief proceeding which grants a
limited number of convicted persons the privilege of having record of their [ ]
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conviction sealed, should a court in its discretion so decide.” State v. Smith, 3d Dist.
Marion No. 9-04-05, 2004-Ohio-6668, ¶ 9. “Expungement is an act of grace created
by the state” and is therefore a privilege, not a right. Koehler v. State, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 07AP-913,
2008-Ohio-3472, ¶ 14, citing State v. Simon,
87 Ohio St.3d
531, 533 (2000), quoting State v. Hamilton,
75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639 (1996).
{¶11} Ohio’s expungement statutes, R.C. 2953.31 et seq., permit an eligible
offender to apply to the sentencing court for an order to seal the record of his or her
conviction. State v. Bell, 6th Dist. Wood. No. WD-19-065, 2020-Ohio-3750, ¶ 11.
R.C. 2953.31 provides the definitions of an “eligible offender,” stating in relevant
part:
(A)(1) “Eligible offender” means either of the following:
(a) Anyone who has been convicted of one or more offenses, but not
more than five felonies, in this state or any other jurisdiction, if all of
the offenses in this state are felonies of the fourth or fifth degree or
misdemeanors and none of those offenses are an offense of violence
or a felony sex offense and all of the offenses in another jurisdiction,
if committed in this state, would be felonies of the fourth or fifth
degree or misdemeanors and none of those offenses would be an
offense of violence or a felony sex offense;
(b) Anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this state or any
other jurisdiction, to whom division (A)(1)(a) of this section does not
apply, and who has not more than one felony conviction, not more
than two misdemeanor convictions, or not more than one felony
conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other
jurisdiction. …
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R.C. 2953.31 (Oct. 29, 2018) ((current version at R.C. 2953.31(A)(1) (Apr. 12,
2021)).
{¶12} Upon the filing of an application for the sealing of a record of
conviction, R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) directs the court to make certain determinations as
follows:
(a) Determine whether the applicant is an eligible offender or
whether the forfeiture of bail was agreed to by the applicant and the
prosecutor in the case. …
(b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the
applicant;
(c) If the applicant is an eligible offender who applies pursuant to
division (A)(1) of this section, determine whether the applicant has
been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court;
(d) If the prosecutor has filed an objection in accordance with
division (B) of this section, consider the reasons against granting the
application specified by the prosecutor in the objection;
(e) Weigh the interests of the applicant in having the records
pertaining to the applicant’s conviction or bail forfeiture sealed
against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain
those records.
R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) (Apr. 8, 2019) ((current version at R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) (Apr. 12,
2021)).
{¶13} “The statutory requirements are independent of one another and are in
the conjunctive.” State v. Krantz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82439, 2003-Ohio-4568,
¶ 23. Accordingly, if the applicant fails to satisfy any one of these requirements, the
trial court must deny the application.
Id. Additionally, in considering an application
for the sealing of the record of a conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.32, the trial court
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“‘must weigh the interest of the public’s need to know as against the individual’s
interest in having the record sealed, and must liberally construe the statute so as to
promote the legislative purpose of allowing expungements.’” State v. Smith, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91853, 2009-Ohio-2380, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Hilbert,
145 Ohio
App.3d 824, 827 (8th Dist.2001).
{¶14} An appellate court generally reviews a trial court’s disposition of an
application to seal a record of conviction under an abuse of discretion standard.2
State v. D.D.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108291 and 108342, 2019-Ohio-4982, ¶
13. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983).
{¶15} In support of his assignment of error Gomez contends the trial court
did not make any of the necessary findings as required by R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). We
are at a loss to understand this claim as the trial court clearly reviewed the statutory
criteria on the record. As stated above, the court found Gomez to be an eligible
offender who waited the requisite amount of time prior to filing his application. Oct.
20, 2020 Tr. at 8-9. The court noted the amended domestic violence offense, while
expungable under the statute, was still classified as an offense of violence. Id. at 4.
2
Whether an applicant satisfies the definition of an “eligible offender” entitled to have records
sealed is an issue of law for a reviewing court to decide de novo. State v. Helfrich, 3d Dist. Seneca
Nos. 13-17-30, 13-17-31 and 13-17-32, 2018-Ohio-638 ¶ 13, citing State v. Weiss, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 14AP-957,
2015-Ohio-3015, ¶ 5.
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Further, the court found Gomez “has no other proceedings pending at this time, he’s
not under the jurisdiction of any other Court at this time.” Id. at 9. Next, the court
considered the issue of rehabilitation and stated, “He does certainly indicate that
there’s been progress in his life, rehabilitation I think is certainly there based on the
fact that he has continued to be a good citizen over these years and we haven’t had
any further complaints from this victim or any other victims since that time.” Id.
{¶16} Finally, the court considered the objection filed by the prosecutor and
weighed Gomez’s interest in having the record sealed against those stated by the
prosecutor. In support of the application, Gomez’s attorney simply stated that
Gomez and his wife raised five children, this conviction was the only blemish on
Gomez’s record and he would like to have the record sealed as he would soon be
retiring from his job at the General Motors plant in Defiance. Oct. 20, 2020 Tr. at
4-5. In reply, the prosecutor recounted the details surrounding the original incident
that led to the domestic violence charge, the fact Gomez admitted to the police he
hit his wife and twice pled guilty to domestic violence charges related to that
conduct. Id. at 6-7. The prosecutor further indicated his opinion Gomez already
received a benefit because the amended charge reduced the severity of the
conviction to a misdemeanor of the fourth degree and eliminated any firearm
prohibition. Id. Having considered and balanced the respective interests, the court
determined Gomez’s interest did not outweigh the governmental interests in
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maintaining the record of the incident and corresponding conviction. Id. at 11. The
trial court stated, in part:
… As I weigh these interests, I’ve got the Defendant saying, you
know, I’d really like to have it sealed without any really good reason
versus the State’s interest saying well look, the activity clearly was a
first-degree [domestic] violence that was amended down, we have an
ongoing interest or need to then review that in case something like
that would happen again. So, under these circumstances in this case,
I find that actually the State’s interests outweigh the Defendant’s
interests in keeping this and sealing the record. Not that I think he’s
a bad guy or has a, [sic] I think he’s made some very positive progress
and changed, but I do think the State has an overwhelming interest to
keep these issues relating to domestic violence like this as a record
because again, this is something that the State emphasizes that we
want to know the folks that have been involved in that type of activity.
And again, the Defendant was involved in that activity by his own,
and again I give him credit, by his own admission and by his prior
conviction. So, unfortunately, … for you Mr. Gomez, I am going
to deny your application because again, in this case I just find that the
State’s interests outweigh yours. …
Id.
{¶17} Because the trial court did review the statutory criteria and made the
requisite determinations on the record, we find no merit in Gomez’s complaint that
the trial court failed to make findings as required by R.C. 2953.32(C)(1).
{¶18} Although not specifically raised in his argument, it may be inferred
that Gomez takes exception to the brevity of the trial court’s journal entry denying
his application which simply states, “WHEREUPON, it is hereby ORDERED that
the Defendant’s motion to seal this case is hereby denied.” The trial court must
place its findings on the record for review, either at the hearing on the application
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or, in its journal entry. Beachwood v. D.Z., 8th Dist. No. 94024, 2010-Ohio-3320,
¶ 7. Because the trial court’s reasoning was clearly explained in the transcript of
the proceedings, our review is not hampered by the simple entry denying Gomez’s
application. See Smith,
2009-Ohio-2380, at ¶ 12 (the trial court detailed its reasons
for denying an application for expungement on the record, but not in its journal
entry).
{¶19} The trial court was in the best position to consider Gomez’s
application to seal the record of his conviction. Gomez has failed to demonstrate
that the trial court’s review of the statutory criteria, including weighing of the
respective interests, was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Therefore, we
find no abuse of discretion by the court below.
{¶20} For all these reasons the assignments of error are overruled.
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Defiance Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, J., concurs.
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only.
/jlr
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