[Cite as State v. Shannon,
2021-Ohio-1396.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs- :
:
WILLIAM D. SHANNON : Case No. 2020 CA 51
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2019CR0657
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 19, 2021
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOSEPH SNYDER STEVEN P. BILLING
38 South Park Street P.O. Box 1671
Mansfield, OH 44902 Columbus, OH 43215
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 2
Wise, Earle, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William D. Shannon appeals the June 24, 2020
judgment of conviction and sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.
Plaintiff-Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On July 16, 2019, Armon Huguely and his brother Emir Hemphill were
looking to buy $20 worth of marijuana. They contacted Kayne Perry, a former schoolmate
of Huguely's via Snapchat. Perry agreed to sell Huguely and Hemphill marijuana and
directed them to come to his house.
{¶ 3} Since Huguely did not have a car, Hemphill called his friend Keyara for a
ride and told her he and his brother were going to buy marijuana. Keyara arrived 20
minutes later in a gold SUV, but was not driving. A middle-aged woman unknown to
Huguely and Hemphill but later identified as Susan Singleton was driving. Shannon was
seated in the front passenger seat and Keyara was in the back seat. Neither Huguely nor
Hemphill had ever met Shannon. The brothers got in the back seat with Keyara, and
Singleton drove to Perry's home.
{¶ 4} Upon arrival at Perry's apartment, Perry's roommate came out and told
Singleton where to park. Huguely got out of the SUV and entered the apartment. The
other's stayed in the SUV.
{¶ 5} Huguely spoke with Perry in his living room. He noticed an assault-style rifle
propped in a corner. At some point, Shannon entered the apartment, used the bathroom,
then silently sat in the living room with Huguely and Perry. Shortly thereafter Shannon
stood, drew a pistol and pointed it at Perry's face. As that happened Perry reached for
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 3
the rifle. Shannon yelled at Huguely to grab the rifle. As Huguely and Perry struggled over
the gun, Shannon fired multiple shots, hitting Perry in his left hip. When Perry fell to the
ground, Huguely grabbed Perry's rifle and ran out of the house. Huguely threw the gun
into the back of the gold SUV, stated he had a bag with "a lot of weed in it" and then got
back into the vehicle. Transcript of trial (T.) 430. Once there he heard additional shots.
{¶ 6} Meanwhile, inside the house, Shannon began to chase Perry's roommate
who eventually escaped by jumping out a window. On his way out of the apartment,
Shannon shot Perry's dog. Shannon then jumped back into the front seat of the SUV and
continued to fire shots at the apartment as Singleton drove away at a high rate of speed.
Singleton drove to her home where Shannon began washing his gun in an attempt to
remove his fingerprints.
{¶ 7} The shots fired by Shannon at Perry broke both of Perry's hips and fractured
his lower back. Perry's dog survived her injuries.
{¶ 8} As a result of these events, on August 9, 2019, the Richland County Grand
Jury returned an indictment charging Shannon with one count of aiding and abetting
aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, one count of aiding and abetting felonious
assault, a felony of the second degree, and one count of aiding and abetting prohibitions
concerning companion animals, a felony of the fifth degree. Each count contained a
firearm specification.
{¶ 9} Shannon entered pleas of not guilty to the charges and opted to proceed to
a jury trial which began on June 18, 2020. The jury found Shannon guilty as charged.
Shannon was subsequently sentenced to ten years for aiding and abetting aggravated
robbery, seven years for aiding and abetting felonious assault, and twelve months for
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 4
aiding and abetting prohibitions concerning companion animals. Shannon was
additionally sentenced to three years for each firearm specification. He was ordered to
serve these sentences consecutively.
{¶ 10} Shannon filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises two assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS, IN ENTERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON COUNT ONE
AIDING AND ABETTING ROBBERY AND COUNT TWO AIDING AND ABBETIN
AGGRAVATED FELONIOUS ASSAULT, AS THOSE ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF
SIMILAR IMPORT, AND BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO CONSECUTIVE
SENTNECES ON ALLED OFFENSES, THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY."
II
{¶ 12} "APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND OHIO CONSTITUTION, WHER TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO
MITIGATE AND ARGUE FOR MERGER DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE."
I
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 5
{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, Shannon argues the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to merge his convictions for aiding and abetting aggravated robbery
and aiding and abetting felonious assault as allied offenses. We disagree.
{¶ 14} R.C. 2941.25 governs multiple counts and states the following:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment
or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the
defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may
contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be
convicted of all of them.
{¶ 15} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114,
2015-Ohio-995,
34 N.E.3d 892,
syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the following:
1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar
import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate
three separate factors—the conduct, the animus, and the import.
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 6
2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning
of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes
offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from
each offense is separate and identifiable.
3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports
multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of
the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar
import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed
separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were
committed with separate animus.
{¶ 16} The Ruff court explained at ¶ 26:
At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts
of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant's conduct.
The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal
whether the offenses have similar import. When a defendant's
conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm for each person
is separate and distinct, and therefore, the defendant can be
convicted of multiple counts. Also, a defendant's conduct that
constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can support
multiple convictions if the harm that results from each offense is
separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense. We
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 7
therefore hold that two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct
constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that
results from each offense is separate and identifiable.
{¶ 17} Shannon was charged with one count of aiding and abetting aggravated
robbery pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). To prove the charge the state was required to
produce evidence to show Shannon aided another in committing a theft offense, and
displayed, brandished, or used a deadly weapon to do so. Shannon was also charged
with aiding or abetting felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). This charge
required the state to prove Shannon, while aiding and abetting another knowingly caused
or attempted to cause serious physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon.
{¶ 18} Shannon argues because there was only one victim and the offenses
occurred over the span of a few seconds they must merge for sentencing. But we have
previously found aggravated robbery and felonious assault are not allied offenses. See
State v. Napier, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2015-0044, 2016-Ohio-2967, ¶ 32; State v.
McLaughlin, 5th Dist. No. CT2017-0104,
2018-Ohio-2333, ¶¶ 29-30 citing Napier. We find
the same here.
{¶ 19} The charge of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery was complete when
Shannon drew his gun, pointed it at Perry's face allowing Huguely to flee with "a bag that
had a lot of weed in it." T. 233, 329, 430, McLaughlin ¶ 30. Shannon then caused a
separate and identifiable harm when he chose to fire his weapon, striking Perry in the hip.
T. 239, 335. Because we find separate harm resulted from each offense, the trial court
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 8
did not error in convicting and sentencing Shannon on both the offense of aiding and
abetting felonious assault and the offense of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery.
{¶ 20} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 21} In his second assignment of error, Shannon argues his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make a stronger argument for merger of the
charges of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting felonious
assault. We disagree.
{¶ 22} The standard this issue must be measured against is set out in State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136,
538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the
syllabus. Appellant must establish the following:
2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and
until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an
objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition,
prejudice arises from counsel's performance. (State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio
St.2d 391,
2 O.O.3d 495,
358 N.E.2d 623 [1976]; Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, [1984]
followed.)
3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a
reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result
of the trial would have been different.
Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 0051 9
{¶ 23} Based upon our resolution of Shannon's first assignment of error, we
conclude trial counsel was not ineffective. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Wise, Earle, J.
Hoffman, J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
EEW/rw
