[Cite as State v. Pappas,
2021-Ohio-2915.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 29839
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ROBERT J. PAPPAS BARBERTON MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. TRD 1907099
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 25, 2021
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Robert Pappas, appeals his conviction for reckless operation by the
Barberton Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Pappas was charged with reckless operation in violation of R.C. 4511.20 after
a traffic stop that occurred on November 27, 2019. On the morning of trial, he moved to dismiss
the charge, arguing that the traffic ticket did not adequately inform him of the nature of the
charge against him. The trial court denied the motion, noting that it had been heard on the record
before a bench trial commenced. The trial court found Mr. Pappas guilty, fined him $150, and
assessed four points on his driver’s license. Mr. Pappas appealed, raising two assignments of
error.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS
INADEQUATE TO PUT THE DEFENDANT ON NOTICE OF THE NATURE
OF THE CHARGE[.]
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Pappas argues that the trial court erred by
failing to dismiss the charge against him when the traffic ticket did not sufficiently inform him of
the basis for the charge. This Court does not agree.
{¶4} The Ohio Traffic Rules are intended to promote “simplicity and uniformity in
procedure[.]” Traf.R. 1(B). “Simplicity in procedure does not mean unfairness in procedure, or
indifference to the rights of the prosecution or the defense. It means that traffic court procedure
is not controlled by the stricter, more elaborate rules that govern procedures in more serious
cases.” Barberton v. O’Connor, 17 Ohio St.3d 218, 221 (1985). Consequently, a complaint
initiated by filing a Uniform Traffic Ticket “simply needs to advise the defendant of the offense
with which he is charged, in a manner that can be readily understood by a person making a
reasonable attempt to understand.”
Id. A Uniform Traffic ticket is sufficient to charge an
offense even if the defendant must make a reasonable inquiry to learn the exact nature of the
offense.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶5} When a Uniform Traffic Ticket “describes the nature of the offense … and
makes reference to the ordinance that gives rise to the offense,” it is sufficient to charge the
defendant. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. See also Bellville v. Kieffaber,
114 Ohio St.3d
124,
2007-Ohio-3763, ¶ 19, citing Cleveland v. Austin,
55 Ohio App.2d 215, 220 (8th Dist.1978)
(“Notice is satisfied when a defendant is apprised of the nature of the charge together with a
citation of the statute or ordinance involved.”). Applying O’Connor, this Court has concluded
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that a traffic ticket that cited the defendant for “failure to control” and referenced a
corresponding local ordinance that described the violation at issue was sufficient to charge the
defendant. State v. Warren, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0004, 2016-Ohio-1355, ¶ 6-9. Similarly,
a Uniform Traffic Ticket that references “reckless operation on street or highway” and the
corresponding local ordinance is sufficient under O’Connor to charge the offense. Parma v.
Block, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92891,
2010-Ohio-2341, ¶ 17-18.
{¶6} The traffic ticket issued to Mr. Pappas was identical in substance to the Uniform
Traffic Ticket. It noted that while operating a passenger vehicle, Mr. Pappas committed
“Reckless Operation” in violation of “[R.C.] 4511.20” and that his conduct “[a]lmost [c]aused” a
traffic crash. R.C. 4511.20(A) prohibits operating “a vehicle … on any street or highway in
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Violations of R.C. 4511.20(A)
are commonly referred to as “reckless operation.” See, e.g., State v. Fairbanks, 117 Ohio St.3d
543,
2008-Ohio-1470, syllabus. As in Block, the citation issued to Mr. Pappas referenced both
reckless operation and the corresponding statute. Compare Warren at ¶ 6-9. This was sufficient
to put Mr. Pappas on notice of the nature of the charge against him even if it required him to
make reasonable inquiry regarding the precise nature of the charged offense. See Kieffaber at ¶
19; O’Connor at paragraph two of the syllabus; Warren at ¶ 6-9.
{¶7} The trial court did not err by denying Mr. Pappas’ motion to dismiss. His first
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RENDERING A GUILTY VERDICT
WHERE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR A
FINDER OF FACT TO RENDER A GUILTY VERDICT[.]
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{¶8} Mr. Pappas’ second assignment of error argues that his conviction for reckless
operation is not supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶9} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009–Ohio–
6955, ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction.
Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency
analysis, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v.
Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the State. State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is
sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
{¶10} This Court has recognized that under App.R. 9(B)(4), “[i]f the appellant intends
to present an assignment of error on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the
evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of proceedings that includes all evidence relevant to the findings or conclusion.” See
Macedonia v. Ewing, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23344, 2007-Ohio-2194, ¶ 6-8. “When portions of
the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the
reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no
choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.” Knapp v.
Edwards Laboratories,
61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). Consequently, when an appellant
challenges the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, but the transcript of proceedings is not part
of the record or is incomplete, “this Court must presume regularity in the trial court’s
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proceedings and accept its judgment.” Ewing at ¶ 6, citing Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App.3d
400, 409 (9th Dist.1993). See also App.R. 9(B)(4).
{¶11} In this case, the proceedings in the trial court were recorded. The trial court
appointed an official court reporter for purposes of the transcript on appeal, see App.R. 9(B)(2),
and a transcript of proceedings was included with the record. That transcript, however, is
incomplete: it commences at some point during the testimony of the law enforcement officer
who initiated the stop, omitting a portion of his testimony and any proceedings that may have
come before. The transcript also omits the law enforcement officer’s oath. See Evid.R. 603. See
also State v. Roberts, 137 Ohio St.3d 230,
2013-Ohio-4580, ¶ 67 (recognizing that unsworn
testimony does not technically constitute evidence). Despite the incompleteness of the transcript,
Mr. Pappas did not avail himself of the alternative available to him under App.R. 9(C).1 See
State v. Knox, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010985,
2018-Ohio-43, ¶ 11.
{¶12} The obligation to provide all portions of the record necessary for appellate review
always falls to the appellant. See Knapp at 199. “This is true even if, through no fault of an
appellant, a verbatim transcript of the proceedings below is not available.” In re Wilson, 9th
Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007128,
1999 WL 195566, *2 (Mar. 31, 1999). This Court does not have
a complete record from which we can determine whether Mr. Pappas’ conviction was based on
sufficient evidence, and for that reason, this Court must presume regularity and overrule his
second assignment of error.
{¶13} Mr. Pappas’ second assignment of error is overruled.
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After this appeal was submitted for consideration, this Court issued an order that put
Mr. Pappas on notice of the incomplete transcript and the alternative available to him under
App.R. 9(C). Mr. Pappas did not move to supplement the record with an App.R. 9(C) statement,
however.
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III.
{¶14} Mr. Pappas’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Barberton
Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Barberton
Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
PATRICK J. WEISS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
MICHELLE L. BANBURY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
