[Cite as State v. White,
2021-Ohio-3284.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2020-07-039
: OPINION
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:
ROBERT L. WHITE, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 2019 CR 0149
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas Horton, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F. Benintendi, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Robert L. White, appeals from the sentence imposed by the
Clermont County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to six counts of
misrepresentation in the sale of securities. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm
appellant's sentence.
{¶ 2} On February 5, 2019, appellant was indicted on a 25 counts, consisting of six
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counts of securities fraud in violation of R.C. 1707.44(G), six counts of misrepresentation in
the sale of securities in violation of R.C. 707.44(B)(4), one count of engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), ten counts of money laundering in violation
of R.C. 1315.55(A)(4), one count of money laundering in violation of R.C. 1315.55(A)(1),
and one count of money laundering in violation of R.C. 1315.55(A)(3). With the exception
of the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity count, which was a felony of the first degree,
all of the charged offenses were felonies of the third degree. The charges arose following
the actions appellant, an accountant, took after developing the idea of franchising his tax
services. As early as 2011, appellant began soliciting funds, which totaled more than $1.3
million dollars, from more than 80 of his clients and friends as investments in the promised
franchises. Appellant made statements to the investors as to the intended use of investor
funds and created a marketing brochure and paperwork for investors showing the
anticipated revenues for each year. Appellant represented that returns on investor
payments were guaranteed and would be made within a certain time frame. However,
appellant did not use the investors' funds in the manner promised and did not repay the
funds to the investors.
{¶ 3} On January 27, 2020, following plea negotiations, appellant pled guilty to six
counts of misrepresentation in the sale of securities in exchange for the remaining offenses
being dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the restitution
would not be limited to the victims of the six counts to which appellant pled guilty. Rather,
the restitution owed would include the victims of all 25 counts. Appellant also acknowledged
that the state would be seeking a prison sentence.
{¶ 4} After engaging appellant in a Crim.R. 11(C) plea colloquy, the trial court
accepted appellant's guilty plea and found that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered. The court ordered a presentence-investigative report ("PSI") be
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prepared and set sentencing more than five months out in order to give appellant time to
make partial restitution to his victims. Appellant indicated his belief that he would be able
to pay $100,000 to his victims by June 30, 2020 and another $100,000 the following year.
{¶ 5} On July 1, 2020, appellant's sentencing hearing commenced with an
admission by appellant that he had not raised the $100,000 he had expected to be able to
repay his victims. He indicated he had not been able to raise the expected funds due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the extension of the tax deadline for 2019 tax filings, and the publicity
of his criminal case. Appellant indicated if he had more time, he believed he would be able
to raise the funds.
{¶ 6} Defense counsel then informed the court that it had reviewed the prepared
PSI and as to the restitution recommendation, appellant was not in a position to challenge
the amount set forth in the PSI. Defense counsel indicated that "any challenge to the
amount would not be really substantive anyway." Nonetheless, defense counsel stated it
was appellant's position that restitution "at least to some degree, [is] less than [what] has
been shown in the PSI."
{¶ 7} Defense counsel moved to continue sentencing so appellant could have a
medical procedure done, but the court denied his request. Thereafter, defense counsel
spoke in mitigation, noting appellant was 73 years old, had been a practicing accountant in
Clermont and Brown Counties for more than 50 years, and, other than a couple minor traffic
offenses, had no criminal record. Defense counsel noted that appellant had opened three
locations for his tax business, intended to open further franchises, and always intended to
pay back his investors for the money they loaned. However, appellant "began to experience
cash flow and would borrow money from this person and pay it to this person. … [But]
Mr. White, at all times, believed he was acting in good faith … [and] in his mind, he does
not believe that he has committed a crime because he's always intended to pay everybody
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back all the money that was borrowed." Defense counsel asked the court to impose a term
of community control on appellant so that appellant would be able to continue to pay back
his victims.
{¶ 8} Four individuals spoke on appellant's behalf at sentencing. One individual
stated he had done work for appellant's tax businesses "for many years" and was owed
about $20,000 to $30,000 for his work. He asked the court for leniency in sentencing
appellant, in part, so that appellant would be able to work and pay his debts. Another
individual, who had been a tax client of appellant for nearly 30 years, stated his belief that
appellant had "good intentions" and would pay back everything owed to the victims if given
enough time.
{¶ 9} The other two individuals who spoke on appellant's behalf were victims of
appellant's investment scheme. One man, who said appellant had done his taxes for about
30 years, stated that he believed appellant was "close to" opening the promised franchises
when appellant's computers were seized as part of the criminal investigation. He believed
appellant was within six months of closing on a number of deals. He did not believe
appellant had pulled the wool over his eyes in their business dealings but, rather, that
appellant had merely gotten in over his head. The other victim who spoke on appellant's
behalf indicated appellant had done his taxes for 10 to 15 years before approaching him
with an investment opportunity. This individual stated he knew he was taking a chance by
investing his money with appellant. He believed appellant was a good person, although he
was shocked to learn how much money appellant had taken from investors.
{¶ 10} Appellant then spoke, telling his victims he was "immensely sorry" for what he
had put them through. He stated that though he had a "[g]reat plan" for opening his
franchises, he had the "[w]rong execution." Appellant explained different offers and
investments that had fallen through over the years and other obstacles that prevented him
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from achieving his franchising goals. Appellant claimed that for three years in a row he had
his own "small pandemic[s]." The first year, two key employees left at the same time. The
second year, one key employee passed away and the other moved to Florida to take care
of a parent. The third year, his tax business had a ransomware attack. He then faced
another setback when law enforcement sized his server and did not return it for well over a
year.
{¶ 11} Appellant denied that he used investment money to buy "fancy things" for
himself, his family members, his girlfriend, or his girlfriend's children. Appellant claimed the
money was spent on overhead, staff, and keeping some tax locations open longer than they
should have been. He also explained that in the five-month delay between the plea
proceedings and sentencing hearing he had not been able to contribute more to restitution
as the publicity and media attention surrounding his case had stopped some clients and
potential business partners from communicating with him. Appellant asked the court to
impose a sentence that would allow him the opportunity to regrow his business to
demonstrate his commitment to paying back his victims.
{¶ 12} Nine of appellant's victims then spoke about their dealings with appellant and
the economic hardships they have faced as a result of appellant's actions. Consistent
among all their stories was that appellant was a "very smooth talker" who made many
unfulfilled promises about where their investment money would be going and what type of
returns they would see on their investment. One victim stated that she had invested
$12,500 with the promise that she would receive one percent interest on her investment
within six months. However, she never received a penny back from appellant. When she
developed cancer and had to have major surgery in 2018, she approached appellant about
getting back her money. Though appellant promised to send her a check, he never sent
one.
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{¶ 13} Another victim stated that after investing $10,000 with appellant in 2014, his
life "got turned upside down" when his wife died unexpectedly. The investor sought to
retrieve some of the money he had invested in order to pay for his wife's funeral. Appellant
offered the victim $100. Appellant, who was the victim's accountant, stopped responding
to tax matters for the victim. The victim's 2013 tax return, which had been prepared by
appellant, was audited by the IRS. The victim provided a box of records to appellant for
purposes of handling the audit. The victim believed appellant had the matter handled but
later learned that appellant had not shown up to the IRS audit. The victim hired someone
else to handle the audit and asked appellant for a return of his tax records, but was advised
appellant had lost the documents. The victim stated he ended up owing the IRS $100,000
and had to declare personal bankruptcy.
{¶ 14} One victim, who had known appellant since appellant was a teenager,
invested his entire life savings, over $300,000, with appellant. He had not received any of
the funds back from appellant. The victim suffered a stroke, had to sell his house, and is
now renting a room from a friend because of the financial troubles he has faced since
investing with appellant. The victim also received notice that his taxes for years 2013
through 2019 had not been filed, despite claims by appellant that appellant had filed the
taxes. The victim subsequently received a letter stating that appellant did not have a license
to submit taxes.
{¶ 15} Another victim indicated that he invested $12,500 with appellant and was
promised quarterly reports, which he never received. When there was no return on his
investment and he could not get any answers as to where his money had gone, the victim
asked appellant to return the money. Appellant told the victim he could have the money
returned if he gave 90-days' notice. Despite providing this notice, appellant never returned
the funds.
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{¶ 16} Another victim stated that starting in 2012, she and her husband signed five
promissory notes with appellant and invested around $31,000. Appellant had paid back all
but $5,140. Appellant usually paid the victim in small increments, writing checks for around
$200 or $300 and telling her not to cash them for some time. One night appellant called
the victim drunk and she demanded answers as to where the rest of her money was and
when it would be paid to her. Appellant responded that he had hidden money in a PVC
pipe in a lake and he could not get the funds out until the spring.
{¶ 17} The last victim to speak at the sentencing hearing stated that he and his wife
invested in appellant's business only after appellant visited the couple's home and assured
them that they would at least get their money back if they invested with him. Appellant told
the couple to give him a year to get everything up and running. When the victim called
appellant after a year to check on matters, appellant did not remember that the victim had
invested. Appellant consistently requested more time whenever the victim contacted him.
{¶ 18} Following the victims' statements, the state requested that the court impose a
"significant prison [term]" on appellant as appellant was merely a "con man and … a thief"
who took money from more than 80 people based on promises of franchises and returns
that he never fulfilled. The prosecutor noted that the criminal case against appellant began
on a report to the Union Township Police Department by one of the victims. That victim had
been followed by appellant to the police station, where appellant told the victim her issue
was a civil matter, not a criminal matter, and that nothing would come of her complaint as
his son worked at the police department. The state expressed concern that if a prison
sentence were not imposed, appellant would continue his conduct, as he did not appear
remorseful and continued to suggest that he would have been able to pay everyone back
and open his franchises if only the police had not taken his computers and become involved
in his business dealings.
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{¶ 19} After the state concluded its remarks, appellant was given the opportunity to
again address the court. Appellant indicated that he did have remorse, not only for his
victims but also for his family. He challenged the accuracy of some of the statements made
by his victims and the state, stating he never ran a Ponzi scheme where he took money
from one investor to pay off another investor and that he had not tried to prevent one of the
victims from reporting his conduct to law enforcement by following her to the police station.
He then stated that he wished he had money to hire a forensic accountant as he believed
there were holes in some of the information provided to the prosecutor and the court. He
indicated that he would not stop trying to pay his victims back and that he believed there
was "significant revenue" that was about to come into his tax business. He promised that
a "chunk" of that revenue could be brought to the court to help pay down the amount owed
in restitution.
{¶ 20} After hearing from appellant, the state, the victims, and those who wished to
speak on appellant's behalf, the court indicated it had reviewed the lengthy and detailed
PSI report. The court discussed the amount of restitution owed to the victims, noting that it
was only ordering restitution as to the verified amount of money the court could determine
the victims had invested with appellant; the court would not include any interest payments
or promised interest in its restitution award. Defense counsel interjected and stated that as
to the amount of restitution owed to each victim, appellant would stipulate to the amounts
listed in the PSI as he was not in the position to challenge the figures. The court listed the
name of each victim and the specific amount they were owed. In total, the court ordered
restitution in the amount of $1,307,213.11.
{¶ 21} The court then stated it had considered the principles and purposes of felony
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth
in R.C. 2929.12. The court noted that while appellant had a minimal record and had
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accepted responsibility for his actions, he had not expressed genuine remorse. The court
found appellant had taken advantage of his relationships with the investors, many of whom
he had built relationships with over significant periods of time. Though appellant did not
physically hurt his victims, appellant had "ruined them emotionally" and, to some extent,
took away their "ability to just survive." The court imposed an 18-month prison term on
each of the six counts of misrepresentation in the sale of securities and ran the sentences
consecutively to one another for an aggregate prison term of nine years.
{¶ 22} Appellant appealed his sentence raising three assignments of error for review.
{¶ 23} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 24} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S
PRESENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO PAY.
{¶ 25} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court committed plain
error in declining to consider his present and future ability to pay before ordering restitution,
as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). In response, the state contends the trial court was not
required to consider appellant's ability to pay because Marsy's Law, Article I, Section 10a(A)
of the Ohio Constitution, entitles victims to full and timely restitution, thereby making the
court's consideration of appellant's ability to pay irrelevant.
{¶ 26} This court recently addressed an identical argument in State v. Oliver, 12th
Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-07-041, 2021-Ohio-2543, ¶ 52-73. We concluded that R.C.
2929.19(B)(5), which requires a trial court to consider an offender's ability to pay before
ordering restitution, was in conflict with Marsy's Law, which states that a victim is entitled
"to full and timely restitution from the person who committed the criminal offense or
delinquent act against the victim" and the victim's right "shall be protected in a manner no
less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused." Article I, Section 10a(A)(7), Ohio
Constitution. See Oliver at ¶ 67. As we noted in Oliver:
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[t]he use of the word "full" to describe the restitution owed to a
victim does not leave room for any implication that the amount
of restitution could be reduced or limited after consideration of
the offender's ability to pay, or that the restitution order could be
anything less than "complete" restitution. Additionally, because
the legal use of the word "restitution" means to make a victim
whole after injury, the plain language of Marsy's Law
unambiguously provides that a victim is entitled to the complete
amount that will make him whole. Allowing the consideration of
the offender's ability to pay to potentially lessen or eliminate the
amount of restitution owed to a victim would effectively render
the word "full" meaningless.
Id.
{¶ 27} "[T]o the extent R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) allows the trial court to reduce a victim's
restitution amount, or otherwise alter the offender's responsibility to provide full and timely
restitution to the victim, … the statute irreconcilably conflicts with the constitutional
provision." Id. at ¶ 70. It is well settled that "where constitutional provisions and the
legislative enactment are 'so clearly in conflict that they cannot both stand the statutory
provision must fail.'" Id. at ¶ 71, quoting State ex rel. Price v. Huwe, 105 Ohio St.3d 304,
306 (1922). Accordingly, "Marsy's Law supersedes R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) to the extent the
statute allows the trial court to reduce or otherwise modify the restitution amount owed to
the victim."
Id. A trial court does not commit plain error in declining to consider a
defendant's ability to pay prior to ordering restitution given the constitutional requirement in
Marsy's Law to impose "full" restitution. Id. at ¶ 72 ("we cannot say the trial court erred in
failing to consider [the defendant's] ability to pay where the trial court was prohibited from
reducing or modifying that amount, regardless of [the defendant's] ability to pay").
{¶ 28} Therefore, in reliance on State v. Oliver, supra, we find that the trial court was
prohibited from reducing or modifying the amount of restitution owed to appellant's victims,
regardless of appellant's present or future ability to pay said restitution. The trial court did
not err in failing to consider appellant's ability to pay prior to imposing the restitution order.
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Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 30} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT'S SIX TERMS OF
IMPRISONMENT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY.
{¶ 31} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by
sentencing him to consecutive prison terms because the record does not support the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶ 32} This court reviews felony sentences pursuant to the standard of review set
forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) to determine whether the imposition of those sentences is
clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Julious, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-
224, 2016-Ohio-4822, ¶ 8. Pursuant to that statute, an appellate court may modify or vacate
a sentence only if, by clear and convincing evidence, "'the record does not support the trial
court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.'"
State v. Harp, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-12-096,
2016-Ohio-4921, ¶ 7, quoting State
v. Marcum,
146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. A sentence is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of
sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors
listed in R.C. 2929.12, and sentences a defendant within the permissible statutory range.
State v. Brandenburg, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-10-201 and CA2014-10-202, 2016-
Ohio-4918, ¶ 9.
{¶ 33} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step
analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Dillon,
12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-335, ¶ 9. First, the trial court must find
that the consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender.
Id., citing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Second, the trial court must find that
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consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct
and to the danger the offender poses to the public. Id. Third, the trial court must find that
one of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
{¶ 34} "A trial court satisfies the statutory requirement of making the required findings
when the record reflects that the court engaged in the required analysis and selected the
appropriate statutory criteria." State v. Setty, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2013-06-049 and
CA2013-06-050, 2014-Ohio-2340, ¶ 113. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court
is not required to provide a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute or
articulate reasons supporting its findings.
Id. Nevertheless, the record must reflect that the
trial court engaged in the required sentencing analysis and made the requisite findings.
Id.
The court's findings must thereafter be incorporated into its sentencing entry. State v.
Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100,
2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 10.
{¶ 35} Appellant concedes that the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
were made at his sentencing hearing and that the findings were included in his sentencing
entry. However, he argues that the record does not support the imposition of consecutive
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sentences as consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the danger he poses to the
public. We disagree.
{¶ 36} While appellant, who was 73 years old at the time of sentencing, did not have
prior criminal convictions, the record nonetheless supports the court's imposition of
consecutive sentences. Although appellant did not get caught in his fraudulent investment
scheme for years, his actions spanned nearly a decade and created economic hardships
and destroyed the lives of more than 80 people. Appellant used his position as an
accountant and friend to gain his victims' trust and steal their hard-earned money. Some
victims lost their entire life savings. Other victims who appellant failed to repay struggled
to pay unexpected expenses. Appellant appeared unconcerned with their struggle, offering
one victim only $100 of the $10,000 the victim invested when the victim's wife died and the
victim had to pay for his wife's funeral. Another victim who was diagnosed with cancer did
not receive a refund of any of her investment, despite appellant's promises to send her a
check.
{¶ 37} Appellant kept his criminal investment scheme going for so many years by
taking money from one person and using it to repay others. Appellant ignored his victims'
efforts to get their money back, often times stringing the victims along with promises to
repay their investments in the near future – a future that never came to fruition. Appellant
always told investors he was just a few months away from making a deal that would allow
him to make all of his victims whole. Even at sentencing appellant suggested that he was
about to come into "significant revenue" and that he would be able to turn a "chunk" of it
over to the court to repay part of what was owed to the victims.
{¶ 38} The nature of appellant's crimes carry significant weight in determining the
risk he poses to the community. Appellant has demonstrated a prolonged and continued
ability to deceive and manipulate his tax clients and members of the community, many of
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whom he had developed longstanding personal relationships with over many years.
Appellant's failure to express genuine remorse for the hardships he has caused and his
failure to understand the criminal nature of his actions demonstrate the continued danger
he poses to the public. Accordingly, given the circumstances of the present offenses, we
find that the imposition of consecutive sentences is not disproportionate to the danger
appellant poses to the public and that the trial court's finding is not clearly and convincingly
unsupported by the record.
{¶ 39} As the record supports the findings made by the trial court under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive
sentences. Appellant's sentence is supported by the record and is not contrary to law, and
his second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 40} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 41} APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE.
{¶ 42} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
representation due to counsel's failure to object to the trial court's decision not to consider
his ability to pay before ordering restitution and counsel's decision to stipulate to the
restitution figures listed in the PSI, as determined by the probation department.
{¶ 43} "In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant
must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced
by counsel's deficient performance." State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31,
2020-Ohio-309, ¶
10, citing State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142 (1989), and Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). "Thus, the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Id., citing Bradley at paragraphs two and three of
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the syllabus. "'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.'" Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694. The failure to satisfy either the
deficiency prong or the prejudice prong of the test is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. Madrigal,
87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000).
{¶ 44} As to appellant's claim of ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to object
to the court's decision not to consider appellant's present and future ability to pay restitution,
we find that appellant cannot demonstrate any prejudice. As we explained in our resolution
of appellant's first assignment of error, Marsy's Law supersedes R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and
prohibits the court from reducing or modifying the "full" amount of restitution owed to a
victim, regardless of a defendant's ability to pay said restitution. Oliver, 2021-Ohio-2543, ¶
71-72. Any objection to the court's failure to consider appellant's ability to pay would,
therefore, have been futile and would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
Oliver at ¶ 94.
{¶ 45} As for appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the
restitution figures set forth in the PSI, we find no merit to his argument. Appellant cannot
show he was prejudiced by counsel's stipulation as the record supports the restitution
ordered by the court. The amount of restitution the court awarded for each victim was
limited to those amounts that could be verified based on promissory notes and letters of
intent signed by appellant, as well as images of checks written by the victims to appellant.
When certain amounts could not be verified, the trial court did not order restitution as to
those amounts.
{¶ 46} Additionally, trial counsel's decision to stipulate to the restitution figures was
a strategic decision. Defense counsel did not dispute the amount of restitution owed,
seeking to use appellant's need to pay restitution to encourage the court to impose a
community control term or a minimum prison sentence on appellant. See State v. Floyd,
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10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-449, 2020-Ohio-4655, ¶ 39 (finding defense counsel's decision
to defer to the court on restitution did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as it
was a trial strategy); State v. Betliskey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101330,
2015-Ohio-1821,
¶ 52-53 (finding that defense counsel's decision not to object "to the trial court's imposition
of the restitution order, fines, and court costs" constituted "matters of trial strategy").
Appellant's third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 47} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
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