[Cite as State v. Wright,
2021-Ohio-4107.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 28368
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-1554
:
DEMARCO WRIGHT : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 19th day of November, 2021.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JAMIE J. RIZZO, Atty. Reg. No. 0099218, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio
45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
SCOTT S. DAVIES, Atty. Reg. No. 0077080, 7416 Waterway Drive, Waynesville, Ohio
45068
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
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DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} Demarco Wright pled guilty in the Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas to aggravated burglary (physical harm), aggravated robbery (deadly weapon),
kidnapping (terrorize), felonious assault (serious physical harm), grand theft (motor
vehicle), theft (R.C. 2913.71 property), and gross sexual imposition (by force). The trial
court sentenced him to 15 years in prison, designated him both a Tier I sex offender and
a violent offender, and ordered him to pay restitution and court costs.
{¶ 2} Wright appeals from his convictions, challenging the trial court’s application
of the Violent Offender Database duties in Sierah’s Law to his case. For the following
reasons, the portion of the trial court’s judgment imposing Wright’s Violent Offender
Database duties in accordance with Sierah’s Law will be reversed, and the matter will be
remanded for the trial court to provide him the notifications under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a),
to provide him an opportunity to file a motion to rebut the statutory presumption, and for
a new ruling on whether he is required to enroll in accordance with R.C. 2903.42. In all
other respects, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} In May 2018, Wright was charged in a 14-count indictment with two counts
of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnapping,
two counts of rape, two counts of felonious assault, and one count each of robbery, grand
theft, and theft. Wright subsequent reached a plea agreement with the State in which he
agreed to plead guilty to seven charges: aggravated burglary (Count 1), aggravated
robbery (Count 3), kidnapping (Count 7), felonious assault (Count 11), grand theft (motor
vehicle (Count 13), theft (R.C. 2913.71 property) (Count 14), and gross sexual imposition
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(by force) (added by bill of information). The prosecutor represented to the court that, in
exchange for Wright’s pleas, “the balance of the indictment would be nollied, and the
defendant would receive an agreed sentence between 9 and 15 years.”
{¶ 4} During the March 27, 2019 plea hearing, the prosecutor informed the trial
court in a sidebar discussion that “[t]here’s been a change in the law,” namely the creation
of a violent offender registry, effective March 20, 2019. The prosecutor indicated that
the requirement to enroll as a violent offender would apply to the kidnapping count. The
parties discussed with the court whether the new enrollment requirement applied to
Wright and what advisements needed to be made at the plea hearing, with the court
commenting that it had not been informed that it “had to do this.” Neither the court, the
prosecutor, nor defense counsel knew the details of Sierah’s Law’s requirements.
{¶ 5} Following the discussion and with defense counsel’s agreement, the court
informed Wright:
THE COURT: Mr. Wright, I need to tell you due to a very recent change,
which may have an effect on you and I’m not sure if it does, but I think I
need to inform you of this, that you may be placed on what we call a violent
offender registry for the charge of kidnapping. It would only apply to that
offense. We would make that determination, and I would so advise you at
the sentencing of this matter, but I do need to tell you now that there’s a
very good likelihood that you would be placed on that registry, and I want to
inform you of that so you can factor that into your decision here today to
enter pleas. Okay, do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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(Plea Tr. at 15.) After additional advisements pursuant to Crim.R. 11, Wright pled guilty
to the seven charges in accordance with the plea agreement.
{¶ 6} After a presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Wright to 15 years
in prison and designated him a Tier I sex offender and a violent offender. The trial court
reviewed with Wright the forms that notified him of his duties as a Tier I sex offender and
his duties to enroll, re-enroll and provide notice of a change of address under the violent
offender statute. The court ordered Wright to pay restitution and court costs, including
extradition costs.
{¶ 7} Wrights appeals from his convictions. His original appellate counsel filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
87 S.Ct. 1396,
18 L.Ed.2d 493
(1967). Upon our Anders review, we found that non-frivolous issues existed as to
whether the trial court provided adequate notice of the violent offender registration
requirements under R.C. 2903.42 and whether the trial court failed to comply with R.C.
2903.42 at sentencing. We therefore rejected the Anders brief and appointed new
counsel for Wright.
{¶ 8} Wright, with new counsel, now raises three assignments of error.
II. Retroactive Application of Sierah’s Law
{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, Wright claims that “[t]he Trial Court’s
application of Ohio’s Violent Offender Registry provisions of ORC 2903.41 is
unconstitutional because the offenses occurred prior to March 20, 2019.”
{¶ 10} In 2018, the 132nd General Assembly enacted S.B. 231, commonly known
as Sierah’s Law. Sierah’s Law established the Violent Offender Database and requires
violent offenders convicted of specified offenses, including kidnapping, to enroll in the
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database. Sierah’s Law creates a presumption that violent offenders enroll in the
database and mandates enrollment for a minimum of ten years. Re-enrollment in the
database is required on an annual basis. See R.C. 2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43; State
v. Hall, 2021-Ohio-1894,
173 N.E.3d 166, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.); State v. Garst, 2d Dist. Clark
No. 2020-CA-51,
2021-Ohio-1516, ¶ 4.
{¶ 11} Wright first argues that the Violent Offender Database duties do not apply
to him, because his offenses occurred prior to March 20, 2019, the effective date of
Sierah’s Law. Of relevance here, R.C. 2903.41(A) defines a “violent offender” to include,
among others, any person who is “convicted of or pleads guilty to” kidnapping in violation
of R.C. 2905.01 on or after the effective date of Sierah’s Law. See R.C.
2903.41(A)(1)(a). Wright pled guilty to kidnapping on March 27, 2019 and was convicted
of the offense on April 22, 2019, when the judgment entry was filed. Accordingly, Wright
was subject to Sierah’s Law under R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 12} Wright asserts that application of Sierah’s Law to him violates the
Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. “The Retroactivity
Clause of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive
laws and protects vested rights from new legislative encroachments.” Garst at ¶ 17,
citing Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 352,
721 N.E.2d 28 (2000). “The retroactivity
clause nullifies those new laws that ‘reach back and create new burdens, new duties, new
obligations, or new liabilities not existing at the time [the statute becomes effective].’ ”
Bielet at 352-353, quoting Miller v. Hixson,
64 Ohio St. 39, 51,
59 N.E. 749 (1901).
However, not all retroactive laws are forbidden. Id. at 353; In re Forfeiture of Property of
Astin,
2018-Ohio-1723,
111 N.E.3d 894, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
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{¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has articulated a two-part test for determining
whether a statute is unconstitutionally retroactive. The first step asks whether the Ohio
legislature had expressly made the statute retroactive. See State v. Jarvis, Ohio Slip
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3712, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 9; Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105,
522 N.E.2d 489 (1988); State v. Irvin,
2020-Ohio-4847,
160
N.E.3d 388, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.); R.C. 1.48 (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its
operation unless expressly made retrospective.”). If the legislature expressly intended
the statute to apply retroactively, the second step is to determine whether the statute is
substantive, as opposed to merely remedial.
Bielat at 353. A statute is substantive if it
impairs vested, substantial rights or imposes new burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities
in regard to a past transaction, “such as a retroactive increase in punishment for a criminal
offense.” Jarvis at ¶ 9. A statute that both applies retroactively and is substantive
violates the Retroactivity Clause.
Bielat at 353.
{¶ 14} We have previously concluded that the Ohio legislature expressly intended
for Sierah’s Law to apply retroactively. State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
28648, 2021-Ohio-1340, ¶ 141; Garst at ¶ 19. Moreover, upon review of the
requirements imposed by Sierah’s Law, we have concluded that those requirements are
remedial in nature and are not unconstitutionally retroactive. Williams at ¶ 144; see also
Garst at ¶ 23.
{¶ 15} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently reached the same conclusions.
Addressing a conflict between the Fifth and Twelfth District Courts of Appeals, the
supreme court considered whether the retroactive application of Sierah’s Law to offenders
who committed their offenses prior to March 20, 2019, the effective date, violated the
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Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. The Court, in a
plurality opinion,1 held that it did not, with the following summarization:
We have recognized that registration schemes such as Sierah’s Law
apply retroactively when the duty to register attaches to conduct committed
prior to the effective date of the statute. See, e.g., Williams at ¶ 8, 21. A
review of our caselaw considering registration schemes imposing duties on
par with the duties established by Sierah’s Law shows that Sierah’s Law
does not impair a vested, substantial right or impose new burdens, duties,
obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction. In fact, a comparison of
the requirements of Sierah’s Law to other registration schemes that we have
upheld against retroactivity challenges demonstrates that it is less
burdensome and less invasive than those other schemes. See, e.g., State
v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404,
700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Williams at ¶ 11; State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio
St.3d 7,
2008-Ohio-4824,
896 N.E.2d 110, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Williams at ¶ 16. And unlike the registration scheme
that this court held to be punitive and therefore unconstitutionally retroactive
in Williams, Sierah’s Law does not retroactively increase the punishment for
an offense committed prior to its enactment.
For these reasons, we determine that the application of Sierah’s Law
to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the
1 Two justices concurred in the court’s opinion, one concurred in judgment only, and three
dissented.
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Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. …
State v. Hubbard, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 4-5. See also
Jarvis. Accordingly, Wright’s claim that the trial court’s application of Sierah’s Law to him
was unconstitutional because his offense occurred prior to March 20, 2019 lacks merit.
{¶ 16} Wright’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Validity of Wright’s Plea
{¶ 17} In his second assignment of error, Wright claims that, “[e]ven if the Ohio
Violent Offender Registry requirements were applicable in the instant matter, [he] did not
have sufficient notice of the requirements of ORC 2903.41 to enter his plea.” He asserts
that the trial court’s advisement regarding Sierah’s Law was inadequate and, as a result,
his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
{¶ 18} “An appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively
demonstrates that a defendant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary[.]” State v.
Russell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25132, 2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7, citing Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 243,
89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). If a defendant’s plea is not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it “has been obtained in violation of due process and
is void.”
Id.
{¶ 19} “In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must
follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos.
24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts
to comply literally with Crim.R. 11. State v. Clark,
119 Ohio St.3d 239,
2008-Ohio-3748,
893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29. However, in reviewing the plea colloquy, the focus should be on
whether “the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the
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defendant understood the consequences of his plea.” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d
1,
2020-Ohio-2765,
164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 12.
{¶ 20} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires a trial court to address the defendant personally
and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding
of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions;
(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of
the plea of guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
judgment and sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he or she
understands that, by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial,
to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses, and to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at
which he or she cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. State v. Brown,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3.
{¶ 21} In general, a defendant is not entitled to have his or her plea vacated unless
the defendant demonstrates he or she was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to
comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero,
56
Ohio St.3d 106, 108,
564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). The test for prejudice is “whether the plea
would have otherwise been made.” Id.; State v. Boucher, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-
16,
2021-Ohio-3751, ¶ 17.
{¶ 22} This general rule is subject to two exceptions. Boucher at ¶ 18. First, the
trial court must comply strictly with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to the waiver of
federal constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ 14; Clark at ¶ 31. “When a trial court fails to explain
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the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we
presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of
prejudice is required.” Dangler at ¶ 14.
{¶ 23} Second, “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R.
11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v.
Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86,
2008-Ohio-509,
881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. See also State v.
Bishop,
156 Ohio St.3d 156,
2018-Ohio-5132,
124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 11 (a defendant must
show prejudice if the trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in regard to a
nonconstitutional right, but no showing of prejudice is required if the trial court completely
failed to comply).
{¶ 24} Wright claims that the trial court failed to adequately notify him regarding
Sierah’s Law. R.C. 2903.42(A)(1), which governs enrollment in the Violent Offender
Database, provides in relevant part:
(A)(1) For each person who is classified a violent offender, it is presumed
that the violent offender shall be required to enroll in the violent offender
database with respect to the offense that so classifies the person and shall
have all violent offender database duties with respect to that offense for ten
years after the offender initially enrolls in the database. The presumption
is a rebuttable presumption that the violent offender may rebut as provided
in division (A)(4) of this section, after filing a motion in accordance with
division (A)(2)(a) or (b) of this section, whichever is applicable. Each
violent offender shall be informed of the presumption established under this
division, of the offender’s right to file a motion to rebut the presumption, of
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the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect of
a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome,
as follows:
(a) If the person is classified a violent offender under division (A)(1) of
section 2903.41 of the Revised Code, 2 the court that is sentencing the
offender for the offense that so classifies the person shall inform the
offender before sentencing of the presumption, the right, and the procedure,
criteria, and possible outcome.
(Emphasis and footnote added.)
{¶ 25} In this case, the trial court told Wright that, due to a “very recent change” in
the law, which “may have an effect on you and I’m not sure if it does,” he “may be placed
on what we call a violent offender registry for the charge of kidnapping.” The court
indicated that it would make a determination regarding the violent offender registry at
sentencing, but “there’s a very good likelihood that you would be placed on that registry.”
{¶ 26} The Violent Offender Database duties are a non-constitutional aspect of
Wright’s guilty plea and a collateral consequence of his actions. In general, a trial court
is not obligated to inform a defendant about collateral consequences before accepting a
plea, and its failure to do so does not render the plea invalid. See, e.g., State v. Stape,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22586, 2009-Ohio-420, ¶ 19 (because the obligations under
2 R.C. 2903.41(A)(1) applies to an offender, like Wright, who on or after the effective date
of the section, is convicted of or pleads guilty to a listed offense. Another provision, R.C.
2903.41(A)(2), addresses a person who, on the effective date of the section, “has been
convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense listed in division (A)(1) of this section and is
confined in a jail, workhouse, state correctional institution, or other institution, serving a
prison term, term of imprisonment, or other term of confinement for the offense.”
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Megan’s Law were collateral consequences and not punitive, the trial court was not
required to inform the defendant of those obligations prior to accepting a guilty plea).
With respect to Sierah’s Law specifically, we have stated that the trial court was not
required to inform a defendant of all of the duties under Sierah’s Law at the plea hearing.
See Hall, 2021-Ohio-1894,
173 N.E.3d 166, at ¶ 33. Nevertheless, we will assume, for
sake of argument, that the trial court was required to comply with R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a)
as part of its plea colloquy.
{¶ 27} Upon review of the plea hearing transcript, the trial court did not
substantially comply with its obligations under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). The court did not
mention (1) that Wright’s obligation to enroll was based on a statutory presumption that
he was a violent offender under Sierah’s Law, (2) that he had the right to file a motion to
rebut the presumption, (3) the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and
(4) the effect of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome.
{¶ 28} Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the trial court completely failed to
comply with its obligations under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1). The court did notify Wright that he
would “very likely” be placed on a violent offender registry for the kidnapping offense, so
that Wright could take that obligation into account when entering his plea. Consequently,
the burden was on Wright to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to
substantially comply with the requirements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 29} The only manner by which Wright could have rebutted the presumption of
having to enroll as a violent offender was to a file a motion with the trial court arguing that
he was not the principal offender. Wright has not argued that he was not the principal
offender, and the record before us indicates that he was the sole perpetrator of the
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kidnapping. In the presentence investigation report, the complainant stated that a man,
later identified as Wright, held him against his will, locked him in a dog crate, strangled
him, burned him, beat him with multiple objects, and raped him. The complainant stated
that Wright later left, returned in the complainant’s car with another individual, and quickly
left again. In his statement to the presentence investigator, Wright admitted to robbery,
but he denied that the kidnapping and other offenses had occurred; he did not claim that
someone else was the principal offender.
{¶ 30} On this record, Wright has not established that he could have rebutted the
statutory presumption even if he had he been informed of the procedures for doing so.
Moreover, he was aware that he was likely to be placed on the violent offender database
and nevertheless pled guilty. Wright has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by
the trial court’s incomplete advisement.
{¶ 31} Wright’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Sentencing under Sierah’s Law
{¶ 32} Wright’s third assignment of error states that the trial court “failed to comply
with the procedural requirements of ORC 2903.42 at sentencing.” Wright again points
to the trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements in R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). For
its part, the State agrees that the trial court erred in failing to properly advise Wright as
required by R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) at sentencing and asserts that the proper remedy is a
limited remand for the trial court to provide those advisements.
{¶ 33} At the outset, we disagree that the trial court should have provided
notifications under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) at the sentencing hearing. See State v.
Walker, 2021-Ohio-580,
168 N.E.3d 628, ¶ 33, ¶ 37 (the trial court was required to provide
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the advisements set forth in R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) before the sentencing hearing). But
see State v. Williams, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2021CA0003, 2021-Ohio-3579, ¶ 40
(vacating defendant’s placement on Violent Offender Database when the trial court failed
to inform him at sentencing of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption
and possible outcome). As stated above, R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) requires the trial court
to inform the offender “before sentencing” of the presumption, the right to file a motion to
rebut the presumption, the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and the
effect of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome.
(Emphasis added.) By its express language, R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) does not address
the trial court’s obligations at sentencing.
{¶ 34} When an offender, such as Wright, has not filed a motion to rebut the
presumption, the trial court must provide to the offender, at sentencing, notice of his or
her duties under Sierah’s Law. R.C. 2903.42(A)(3). Specifically, the trial court must
require the violent offender to read and sign a form stating that the violent
offender has received and understands the notice. If the violent offender
is unable to read, the judge … shall inform the violent offender of the
violent offender’s duties as set forth in the notice and shall certify on the
form that the judge … informed the violent offender of the violent offender’s
duties and that the violent offender indicated an understanding of those
duties.
R.C. 2903.42(C). This division further provides, in relevant part:
The attorney general shall prescribe the notice and the form provided under
this division. The notice shall inform the offender that, to satisfy the duty
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to enroll, the violent offender must enroll personally with the sheriff of the
county in which the offender resides or that sheriff's designee and include
notice of the offender’s duties to re-enroll annually and when the offender
has a change of address.
The person providing the notice under this division shall provide a copy of
the notice and signed form to the violent offender. The person providing
the notice also shall determine the county in which the violent offender
intends to reside and shall provide a copy of the signed form to the sheriff
of that county … and to the bureau of criminal identification and
investigation.
{¶ 35} In this case, Wright appeared for sentencing on April 17, 2019. After
stating that “[w]e are here for sentencing” and reiterating the charges to which Wright had
pled guilty, the court stated that it was going to begin with the sex offender designation
and his duties to enroll as a violent offender. The transcript of the sentencing hearing
reflects that the trial court read to Wright, verbatim, from a “Notice of Duties to Enroll as
a Violent Offender (R.C. 2903.41, et seq.)” form, which conformed with the requirements
of R.C. 2903.42(C). Wright signed three copies of the form. We conclude that the trial
court complied with its notification obligations under Sierah’s Law at sentencing.
{¶ 36} Nevertheless, the record reflects, and the parties agree, that the trial court
never provided the notifications required by R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) prior to sentencing
Wright. As a result, Wright was never informed by the trial court of the statutory
presumption that he was required to enroll in the Violent Offender Database and of his
ability to file a written motion to rebut the presumption. Furthermore, Wright was not
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made aware of the effect of the rebuttal or the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and
possible outcomes. Consequently, we agree with the parties that the portion of the trial
court’s judgment addressing Wright’s duty to enroll in the Violent Offender Database must
be reversed, and the trial court must provide Wright the notifications under R.C.
2903.42(A)(1)(a) and an opportunity to file a motion to rebut the statutory presumption
that he must enroll in the Violent Offender Database.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 37} Wright’s Violent Offender Database duties in accordance with Sierah’s Law
will be reversed, and the matter will be remanded for the trial court to provide him the
notifications under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a), to provide him an opportunity to file a motion
to rebut the statutory presumption, and for a new ruling on whether Wright is required to
enroll in accordance with R.C. 2903.42. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment
will be affirmed.
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TUCKER, P. J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Jamie J. Rizzo
Scott S. Davies
Hon. Dennis J. Adkins
