[Cite as State v. Geddes,
2021-Ohio-4115.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
FAYETTE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2021-01-001
Appellee, : OPINION
11/22/2021
:
- vs -
:
CHARLES R. GEDDES, JR., :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CRI 20200013
Jess C. Weade, Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Abbott, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Steven H. Eckstein, Fayette County Public Defender, for appellant.
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Charles R. Geddes, Jr., appeals his conviction in the Fayette
County Court of Common Pleas for having weapons while under disability.
{¶ 2} In January 2020, a parole officer in Fayette County received information that
Geddes was in possession of firearms and other prohibited contraband while released on
postrelease control. On January 8, 2020, a search of Geddes' residence was conducted
Fayette CA2021-01-001
and an operable firearm was discovered in the home. After the search, the Fayette County
Grand Jury indicted Geddes for having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13. The disability stemmed from Fayette County Court of Common Pleas Case No.
CRI20110189, a case in which the court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Geddes was a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order. Geddes pled not
guilty to the charge and the matter proceeded to a jury trial on January 13, 2021.
{¶ 3} During trial, the state presented testimony from a senior parole officer,
Sergeants Andrew Parks and John Fausnaugh with the Fayette County Sheriff's Office, and
the Fayette County Clerk of Court. The parole officer and Sergeant Parks testified regarding
the search of Geddes' residence and the discovery of the firearm, as well as their discovery
of ammunition, BB guns, a sword, and several bows and arrows in the residence. Sergeant
Fausnaugh testified that he examined the firearm and determined that it was operable.
{¶ 4} The Clerk's testimony focused on Case No. CRI20110189, the case in which
Geddes was adjudicated a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order. The
Clerk testified that her office is the record keeper for the Common Pleas Court, and that all
filings and judgment entries go through her office. The Clerk then authenticated the
judgment entry from Case No. CRI20110189 that designated Geddes a mentally ill person
subject to hospitalization by court order. The judgment entry was admitted into evidence
as State's Exhibit 1.
{¶ 5} On cross-examination, Geddes attempted to question the Clerk regarding
other documents in the Case No. CRI20110189 case file. Specifically, Geddes sought to
question the Clerk regarding a judgment entry from 2015, which allegedly "declared that
[Geddes] was no longer a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by the court and that
his commitment had been terminated." Upon objection by the state, the trial court did not
allow Geddes to cross-examine the Clerk regarding the 2015 judgment entry, subject to a
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proffer of the document by the defense and review by the court. After the state's case-in-
chief, and outside the presence of the jury, Geddes' counsel proffered a copy of the 2015
judgment entry into the record, and argued that, in light of the "determination letter," Geddes
believed he was permitted to possess firearms and that he was not on notice that he
remained under disability.
{¶ 6} After a discussion with counsel, the trial court concluded the 2015 judgment
entry was not relevant. The court indicated that simply because Geddes was released from
hospitalization did not automatically relieve him from his disability to possess a firearm. The
court further stated that neither the court nor the jury had received any evidence establishing
the disability had been relieved and that the 2015 judgment entry did not have any effect
on his ability to possess firearms.
{¶ 7} The defense then rested without presenting any witnesses. The trial court
instructed the jury regarding the charge, including an instruction that "[y]ou need not find
that the defendant currently meets the definition of a mentally ill person but only at the time
alleged he had previously been found to be a mentally ill person subject to court order."
{¶ 8} After deliberation, the jury found Geddes guilty of having weapons while under
disability. The trial court then sentenced Geddes to 30 months in prison.
{¶ 9} Geddes now appeals, raising the following assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 10} DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 16 AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶ 11} Geddes argues the trial court abused its discretion and denied him the
constitutional right to present a complete defense in ruling that R.C. 2923.13 requires a
disability be relieved by operation of R.C. 2923.14 and by excluding the 2015 judgment
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entry showing that his status as a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order
had been terminated.
{¶ 12} We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Grindstaff, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2013-09-074, 2014-Ohio-2581,
¶ 21. "A reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse
of discretion that has created material prejudice."
Id., citing State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown
No. CA2012-06-012,
2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion connotes more than
an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Id.
{¶ 13} Generally, relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible. Evid.R. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence "having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evid.R. 401.
{¶ 14} A reviewing court may not override a trial court's determination that certain
evidence is relevant or irrelevant simply because it disagrees with the trial court. State v.
Redwine, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2006-08-011, 2007-Ohio-6413, ¶ 16, citing State v.
Hancock,
108 Ohio St.3d 57,
2006-Ohio-160, ¶ 129. "'The issue of whether testimony or
evidence is relevant or irrelevant, confusing or misleading, is best decided by the trial judge,
who is in a significantly better position to analyze the impact of the evidence on the jury.'"
Id., quoting Renfro v. Black,
52 Ohio St.3d 27, 31 (1990).
{¶ 15} Geddes was charged with having weapons while under disability in violation
of R.C. 2923.13(A)(5). The statute states, in relevant part, that "[u]nless relieved from
disability under operation of law or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have,
carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if … the person … has been found by
a court to be a mentally ill person subject to court order[.]"
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{¶ 16} The statutory procedure for relief from disability is established by R.C.
2923.14(D), which provides that,
the court may grant the applicant relief pursuant to this section,
if all of the following apply:
(1)(b) If the disability is based upon a factor other than an
indictment, a conviction, or an adjudication, that factor no longer
is applicable to the applicant[;]
(2) The applicant has led a law-abiding life since discharge or
release, and appears likely to continue to do so[;]
(3) The applicant is not otherwise prohibited by law from
acquiring, having, or using firearms.
{¶ 17} Here, there is no dispute that Geddes was adjudicated a mentally ill person
subject to hospitalization by court order in 2012 and was subject to a weapons disability
pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(5) based upon that finding. The issue in this appeal is whether
that weapons disability was relieved in 2015 when the trial court determined Geddes was
no longer a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order and terminated his
commitment. Geddes argues that due to his release in 2015, he was relieved from disability
"under operation of law or legal process" pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A). Specifically, Geddes
claims that the statute's use of the phrase "has been found" indicates that a person's status
can be changed by subsequent legal action. Thus, Geddes argues the 2015 determination
that he is not a mentally ill person subject to court order supersedes the 2012 entry
adjudicating him as such and relieved him of any existing disability attached to that finding.
{¶ 18} After a review, we disagree with Geddes' interpretation of R.C. 2923.13.
When interpreting a statute, "[i]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply
it as written, giving effect to its plain meaning." State v. Bryant, 160 Ohio St.3d 113, 2020-
Ohio-1041, ¶ 12, citing In re Estate of Centorbi,
129 Ohio St.3d 78,
2011-Ohio-2267, ¶ 14.
By the plain reading of the statute, the weapons disability within R.C. 2923.13(A)(5) arises
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from a trial court's determination that a person is a mentally ill person subject to court order.
The statute does not, as Geddes claims, limit the disability to the continuation of that status
or lift the disability if that status terminates. Rather, the statute requires an individual, like
Geddes, who has been found to be mentally ill subject to court order, to obtain relief via
operation of law or legal process.
{¶ 19} Although Geddes claims the 2015 judgment entry eliminated his disability "by
operation of law or legal process," the judgment entry does not state he was relieved from
disability or that his prior adjudication was improper or unlawful in any way. Geddes has
not directed this court to any authority to suggest that the termination of his status as a
mentally ill person subject to court order constitutes relief from the weapons disability "under
operation of law or legal process," nor has this court located any such authority after a
review. Consequently, simply because Geddes was later determined not to be a mentally
ill person subject to court order does not negate the fact that he previously "has been"
adjudicated as such in accordance with R.C. 2923.13(A)(5).
{¶ 20} Accordingly, while we agree with Geddes that the plain meaning of R.C.
2923.13 permits relief from a weapons disability by means other than the procedure set
forth in R.C. 2923.14, we decline to find that such means exist in the instant case. See
State v. T.J.D., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28592, 2020-Ohio-3745, ¶ 32-33 (indicating the
act of sealing the record of a felony drug conviction or a pardon could be considered an
"operation of law or legal process" that relieves a weapons disability imposed under R.C.
2923.13).
{¶ 21} The record also reflects that Geddes failed to avail himself of any potential
relief pursuant to R.C. 2923.14. As noted above, R.C. 2923.14 provides a statutory scheme
for requesting relief in instances where, such as here, the weapons disability is based upon
a factor that is no longer applicable to the applicant. R.C. 2923.14(D)(1)(b). However, even
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if the 2015 judgment entry was admissible, and Geddes could show that he is no longer a
mentally ill person subject to court order, non-applicability is only one of the three elements
Geddes was required to establish in order to be entitled to relief. Id. Specifically, Geddes
was also required to demonstrate that he has led a law-abiding life since discharge or
release and appears likely to continue to do so, and that he is not otherwise prohibited by
law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.
Id. As a result, we find that the termination
of Geddes' status as a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, as
reflected in the 2015 judgment entry, is not legally sufficient pursuant to R.C. 2923.13 or
2923.14 to relieve him from the weapons disability.
{¶ 22} Lastly, to the extent Geddes claims his due process rights were violated
because he was not on notice of his disability to possess a firearm, and believed his
disability was resolved in light of the 2015 judgment entry, the Ohio Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that knowledge of a disability is a required element under R.C.
2923.13. State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107,
2010-Ohio-6301, ¶ 43 ("the offense of
having weapons while under disability as defined by R.C. 2923.13" requires the state "to
prove knowing possession but" need not "prove a culpable mental state").
{¶ 23} Considering our analysis above, we further find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the 2015 judgment entry was not relevant. As discussed
above, the 2015 judgment entry merely establishes that Geddes' status as a mentally ill
person subject to hospitalization by court order was terminated in 2015. Such evidence
has no relevance to whether Geddes was adjudicated a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order in 2012 and was prohibited from possessing a firearm on that
basis. Additionally, because the subsequent termination of that status is not legally
sufficient to relieve Geddes from the weapons disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13 or
2923.14, the entry is also not relevant toward proving he was relieved from the weapons
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disability. Therefore, because the evidence would not prove or disprove any fact of
consequence in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the
judgment entry was not relevant.
{¶ 24} As such, we find the trial court did not err and Geddes was not deprived of
due process when the court excluded the 2015 judgment entry and prohibited Geddes from
questioning the Clerk regarding that entry. Finding no merit to Geddes' arguments, we
overrule his assignment of error.
{¶ 25} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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