[Cite as In re D.B.,
2021-Ohio-4170.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE D.B. :
: Nos. 110506 and 110553
A Minor Child :
:
[Appeal by Mother and Father] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 24, 2021
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. AD-19-915401
Appearances:
Rick L. Ferrara, for appellant Mother.
Judith M. Kowalski, for appellant Father.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
Appellants mother and father appeal from a judgment of the juvenile
court granting permanent custody of their child D.B. to the Cuyahoga County
Division of Children and Family Services (hereafter “CCDCFS” or “agency”). Our
review reflects that the juvenile court properly engaged in the two-prong analysis set
forth in R.C. 2151.414 and that clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s
decision granting permanent custody of D.B. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile
court’s decision.
Substantive History and Procedural Background
On November 6, 2019, the police responded to a domestic violence
incident in the parents’ residence. On December 17, 2019, the police responded to
another domestic violence incident there. On December 23, 2019, D.B. (born in
January 2014) was removed from the home.
On December 24, 2019, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging D.B. was
abused and neglected, and requesting temporary custody. The complaint alleged
that mother had anger management, substance abuse, and mental health issues;
both parents abused marijuana and cocaine; and D.B. was at risk of being
unenrolled from school due to a significant number of unexcused absences for the
2019-2020 school year. On the same day the complaint was filed, the trial court
ordered D.B. to be placed in the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
A. Temporary Custody Hearing
On August 6, 2020, a magistrate held a hearing on the agency’s
complaint for temporary custody of D.B. Officer Nate Wolf of the Cleveland Heights
police department testified that the police had responded to domestic incidents on
several occasions prior to November 6, 2019. On that day, the police arrived to find
mother with a mark and bruises on her face. Mother told the officer that while she
was lying down with D.B., father wanted to cuddle with him and, when the child
refused to lie down with father, father attacked mother, striking her with a closed
fist, and a struggle ensued. Father told the officer, however, that he and mother had
been arguing over other women, mother attacked him with a knife, and they
struggled over the knife. In both accounts, D.B. was present when the two struggled.
Father was arrested that night for domestic violence and booked into jail.
Officer Wolf also observed the parents’ apartment to be “inhabitable”;
it was “filthy,” and there was no real bed in the residence. D.B. appeared to have bug
bites and sores all over him. Officer Wolf reported the parents to a child abuse or
neglect hotline.
Officer Andrew Trhlin, also of the Cleveland Heights police
department, testified that on December 17, 2019, he responded to the parents’
residence for a domestic violence incident. Father told the officer that mother came
home after being out “drinking and drugging,” and they argued about it. When he
was walking away, mother pushed him from behind and he fell into a glass table.
The clash caused a seven-inch abrasion on father’s side. D.B. was in the apartment
when the incident occurred. Father pressed charges against mother for endangering
children, assault, and domestic violence. Mother was arrested.
Brooke Gaines, a service worker from the agency, testified that the
agency received a first referral for the family due to domestic violence and conditions
of the home in November 2019, and a second referral regarding domestic violence
in December 2019. The agency’s investigation of the family identified concerns
relating to mother’s mental health, both parents’ domestic violence and substance
abuse issues, and D.B.’s truancy from school.
Gaines testified that during the agency’s investigation, mother
admitted to smoking marijuana, and father admitted to smoking crack cocaine with
mother “for their bonding purposes.” The parents were invited to attend the
agency’s meetings regarding D.B., but neither attended. Gaines referred the parents
to alcohol and drug testing and assessment, but neither participated. Father was
also referred to a domestic violence program, but he did not follow through.
Regarding D.B.’s school attendance, mother explained that she had difficulties
transporting him between home and school and sometimes she and D.B. would go
to other family members’ homes due to domestic violence.
Social worker Arlethia Levison of CCDCFS testified that a case plan
with the goal of unification was developed for the family. Mother’s behavior was a
concern because she would call the social worker, yelling and screaming. However,
mother was now engaged in mental health services and receiving new medications.
She also completed a domestic violence class and parental education class. Father
did not participate in the services he was referred to. Mother had housing but father
did not.
Levison testified that D.B. was doing well in the foster home, but
received medication to treat his behaviors; there was an incident where he was in
the pool with the foster parents’ biological daughter and he held her head down in
the water.
A case plan was developed for mother to work toward unification, and
it included unsupervised visits and overnight stays. At the time of the permanent
custody hearing, the visitation was being held via Zoom due to the Covid-19
pandemic, but supervised visits at mother’s home were planned. Mother
understood she needed to work on substance abuse and mental health issues to
achieve unification.
After the hearing, the magistrate found D.B. abused and neglected,
and determined that it was in D.B.’s best interest to be committed to the temporary
custody of the agency.
B. Permanent Custody Hearing
On October 2, 2020, the agency moved for permanent custody. On
April 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the agency’s motion for permanent
custody. Social worker Arlethia Levison, who was assigned this case since January
2020, provided testimony for the agency. Levison testified the agency sought
permanent custody due to the trauma D.B. had experienced and also due to the lack
of improvement and consistency on the parents’ part addressing the issues that had
caused D.B.’s removal. She did not believe the parents would successfully remedy
the conditions leading to the child’s removal if given more time, because they
remained inconsistent with engaging in the services provided by the agency. The
parents presented no witnesses.
a. Mother’s Case Plan
Levison testified that the components of mother’s case plan were
mental health, substance abuse, parenting, and domestic violence. Regarding
mental health, mother has issues of depression and PTSD. Mother was referred in
2020 to Frontline to address those issues. She was not consistently taking the
prescribed medications, however. Between March and May 2020, mother failed to
participate in the mental health service. Because mother appeared to have problems
with transportation, the service provider offered bus tickets and referred her to a
program for assistance with transportation, but it did not remedy the situation.
Based on her interaction with mother, Levison had concerns regarding mother’s
emotional stability; mother would appear to understand certain matters but would
have outbursts over the same matters later. Levison did not think mother had
successfully addressed the mental health component of her case plan.
Regarding the substance abuse component of the case plan, mother
was originally referred to Recovery Resources but she did not complete the service
there. Levison then referred her to Moore Counseling in March 2020. Mother
completed an assessment through Moore Counseling but did not complete the
recommended Intensive Outpatient Program (“IOP”) following the assessment.
Mother was then referred to the substance abuse service at Murtis Taylor in May
2020. Mother did not complete an assessment there. Mother was then referred to
NORA, and she completed an assessment through that program in October 2020.
She participated in the recommended IOP through NORA but was discharged from
it before completion. Mother reported she was currently attending a program at
Stella Maris.
Regarding drug testing, mother failed to submit to random urine
screens to demonstrate sobriety as requested. Mother submitted to the agency
screening only once — in February 2021 — and she tested negative, but she
subsequently tested positive for cocaine in March 2021 through NORA. The agency
asked mother to submit to a drug test following the positive test but mother did not
comply. Levison was concerned that mother was still abusing substances.
Because D.B. was frequently absent from school, left alone in the home
at times, and in an environment where domestic violence occurred, mother’s case
plan required her to take a parenting class and demonstrate that she had benefited
from the class. Mother completed the class, but while she demonstrated certain
parental skills she had learned from the class, there were occasions when she yelled
at D.B. and hung up on him during virtual or telephone visitations. Mother would
temporarily improve her interactions with D.B. after discussions with Levison but
would repeat the same improper behaviors later. Levison did believe mother
successfully addressed the parental aspect of her case plan.
Regarding domestic violence, mother was referred to West Side
Community House for a domestic violence counseling program, and she completed
the program. The agency remained concerned, however, because mother and father
maintained a volatile, off-and-on relationship.
Regarding housing, mother did not have stable housing; mother had
provided four or five addresses since January 2020, and Levison had not been able
to verify her housing situation due to difficulties communicating with mother.
b. Father’s Case Plan
The components of father’s case plan were parenting, domestic
violence, substance abuse, and housing. Regarding parenting, father was referred
to a parenting program in March 2020 and again in June, but he participated in
neither. He eventually completed a parenting class. Despite the completion of the
class, father continued to interact aggressively with D.B. during the virtual visits
arranged during the pandemic. On one occasion, he stated to D.B., “I am going to
put you in a headlock. I am going to choke you.” Levison testified that the aggressive
manner father interacted with D.B. had an effect on D.B. After visitations with
father, he would show similar aggressive behaviors toward the foster family’s
biological and foster children. Father acknowledged his inappropriate behaviors,
but continued to act in the same manner. Levison did not believe father successfully
addressed the parenting component of his case plan.
Regarding domestic violence, father was referred to Moore Counseling
and Murtis Taylor in March and May 2020, respectively, but he did not complete
either. He was then referred to a virtual program at the West Side Community
House and East End Neighborhood House in June and September 2020,
respectively. He did not complete any of these referred services, but provided a
certificate for a Beech Brook domestic violence class that he completed in early 2021.
Despite the completion of that class, father did not appear to have successfully
addressed the domestic violence of his case plan. While he was advised against
being on virtual visits together with mother, they would still appear together on
occasions, and on one such occasion, they yelled and screamed at each other, despite
the presence and supervision of a visitation coach.
Regarding substance abuse, father has a history of abusing cocaine
and marijuana. Father was first referred to Recovery Resource following the child’s
removal from the home, but he did not participate. He was then referred to Moore
Counseling in March 2020, Murtis Taylor in June 2020, and East End
Neighborhood in September 2020. He did not participate in any of these referred
services. Furthermore, father has never completed a substance abuse assessment
required by the agency. Despite being asked to submit to random drug testing to
verify his sobriety, he completed only one urine screen — in February 2021 — and
he tested positive for cocaine on that occasion. He did not comply with the agency’s
requests for additional tests.
Regarding housing, the agency provided father with referrals to assist
him with obtaining housing and also gave him a list of housing in December 2020.
During 2020, father reported he was living in a shelter and at one point residing
with his father. Before trial, he reported he was residing with mother, but Levison
was unable to inspect that residence because she was not permitted inside.
c. Visitations
Regarding the visitation schedule, the parents were to meet with D.B.
every Wednesday. The visitations were two-hour sessions with one hour for each
parent. Because of the restrictions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the visiting
schedule rotated between in person and virtual formats. There was a supportive
visitation coach present in the room when the visits were held in person, but the
coach would not be in the same room when the visits were virtual. Levison
acknowledged that the outcome would have been better if the visits were all in
person with the supportive visitation coach in the same room.
Between October and December 2020 and between January and
February 2021, the parents cancelled the visits on several occasions, but the visits
were consistent in March and April 2021. According to Levison, on several occasions
mother falsely claimed she was unable to visit because she was attending the IOP.
d. Child
D.B. was placed in a licensed foster home after he was removed from
the home. The foster parents have four biological children and four other foster
children. The biological children treat him like their own little brother, and he treats
them like siblings; the foster parents treat D.B. like he is one of their own children.
D.B. has an IEP to address his special needs, and he is being treated by a psychiatrist
in individual counselling sessions.
e. GAL’s Recommendation
Thomas Kozel, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for D.B., recommended
permanent custody. D.B. had reported to him that he liked his foster placement and
wished to stay there. In the GAL’s opinion, the parents’ substance abuse was the
primary concern in this case because it impacted all other issues regarding their
ability to parent D.B. D.B. had been in the agency’s custody for 16 months at the
time of the hearing, and the parents had yet to show a commitment to maintain
sobriety; they had not completed the substance abuse services and had not shown
any consistency in submitting to drug testing.
f. Trial Court Judgment Granting Permanent Custody
The trial court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody of
D.B., finding the existence of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a): the child cannot be placed with
either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.
In support of that determination regarding each parent, the trial court found the
presence of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)((1) (failing continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child’s removal),
(E)(2) (having chemical dependency so severe such that the parent was unable to
provide an adequate, permanent home), (E)(4) (demonstrating a lack of
commitment toward the child), and (E)(14) (unwilling to provide shelter or to
prevent the child from suffering emotional or mental neglect).
Regarding the best interest of the child, the trial court found that a
grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child upon its consideration
of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
Appeal
Both mother and father appeal from the trial court’s judgment. This
court sua sponte consolidated the two appeals for oral argument and disposition.
Mother raises the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding permanent
custody because the state did not present sufficient, clear and
convincing evidence necessary for the order.
Father raises the following two assignments of error:
I. The Cuyahoga County juvenile court erred and abused its
discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported
granting permanent custody of the subject child to the Cuyahoga
County [Division] of Children and Family Services.
II. The parents’ ability to complete and benefit from case plan services
was hampered by the restrictions imposed by the Covid-19
pandemic.
Mother’s sole assignment of error raises the same claim as father’s first assignment
of error, and father’s second assignment of error is related to his first assignment of
error. For ease of discussion, we address these assignments jointly.
A. Standard of Review
We begin our analysis with the recognition that, while a parent’s right
to raise a child is an essential and basic civil right, In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48,
679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), children have the right to “parenting from either natural or
adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and
motivation.” In re Hitchcock,
120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102,
696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th
Dist.1996).
Under Ohio’s permanent custody statute, R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile
court’s judgment granting permanent custody must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that
measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the
evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable
doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 119
Ohio St.3d 538,
2008-Ohio-4825,
895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469,
120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. We will
not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of parental rights and award of permanent
custody to an agency unless the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390,
2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 48;
In re M.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100071,
2013-Ohio-5440, ¶ 24.
B. Two-Prong Analysis for Permanent Custody
R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by a
juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(B).
Under the statute, the juvenile court is authorized to grant permanent custody of a
child to the agency if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing
evidence, that any of the five factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e) exists and,
furthermore, permanent custody is in the best interest of the child under the factors
enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
Under the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the juvenile
court is to determine if any of the following factors exists: whether the child is
abandoned (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b)); whether the child is orphaned and there are no
relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody
(R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c)); whether the child has been in the temporary custody of
public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more
months of a consecutive 22-month period (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)); whether another
child of the parent has been adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent on three
separate occasions (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e)); or, when none of these factors apply,
whether “the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.” (R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a)).
If any of these five factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) exists, the trial
court proceeds to analyze the second prong — whether, by clear and convincing
evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the
agency. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
a. First Prong: R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)
Here, under the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the
trial court found the presence of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) factor — that D.B. cannot
be placed with either mother or father within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either mother or father.
For this finding, R.C. 2151.414(E) enumerates 15 factors for the court
to consider. In this case, the trial court found the presence of the (E)(1), (E)(2), E(4),
and (E)(14) factors regarding both parents. Pertinent to this appeal,
R.C. 2151.414(E) states, in relevant part:
(E) In determining … whether a child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with
the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court
determines, by clear and convincing evidence … that one or more of
the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter
a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining
whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the
court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric,
psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material
resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of
changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain
parental duties.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual
disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent
that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate
permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
within one year after the court holds the hearing …[.]
…
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[.]
…
(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing,
shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child
from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical,
emotional, or mental neglect.
The trial court’s finding regarding the existence of these factors is
supported by clear and convincing evidence presented by the agency at the hearing.
In its efforts to facilitate unification, the agency prescribed a case plan to address
mother’s issues of mental health, substance abuse, parenting, and domestic
violence, and father’s issues of housing, parenting, domestic violence, and substance
abuse.
Mother completed a parenting class and did demonstrate some of the
parental skills she learned. The social worker testified, however, mother failed to
consistently demonstrate that she benefited from the services; she yelled at D.B. and
hung up on him on some virtual or telephone visitations. Mother was not compliant
regarding her medications, and the social worker remained concerned with mother’s
emotional stability based on her interactions with mother.
While father completed a parenting class, he continued to interact
with D.B. in an aggressive manner, which affected D.B.’s own behaviors with others.
The parents were both arrested for domestic violence incidents that
occurred in the presence of D.B. While both parents completed a domestic violence
program, they did not seem to sufficiently benefit from the program; the parents
continued to maintain a volatile relationship, and on one visitation with the child,
they screamed at each other despite the presence of the visitation coach.
While mother was engaged in a substance abuse program at the time
of the permanent custody hearing, she had not been consistent in utilizing the
services provided to her, nor did she consistently demonstrate sobriety as required.
Father failed to participate in any substance abuse program referred to him by the
agency and similarly failed to demonstrate sobriety. In recommending permanent
custody, the GAL was most concerned with the parents’ substance abuse as it
impacted all the components necessary for the parents’ ability to provide and care
for D.B. Indeed, the parents’ lack of commitment is most evident in their
unwillingness to address their substance abuse and work toward sobriety; both
father and mother tested positive for drugs within months of the permanent custody
hearing.
Father argues that his efforts to comply with the case plan were
hampered by the Covid-19 pandemic. He argues specifically that the virtual
visitation lacks the quality of face-to-face interactions, and his ability to find housing
was hindered by the pandemic. Undoubtedly, the pandemic presented a great
challenge to the parents and may have affected their ability to complete their case
plan. However, our review of the transcript reflects that the trial court was cognizant
of the impact of the pandemic and took it into consideration when granting
permanent custody. Notably, neither parent presented evidence to show that the
pandemic impeded their efforts to complete the substance abuse component of their
case plan. As the GAL opined, the parents’ continued drug use and failure in
addressing their substance use underlies all the issues regarding their inability to
adequately provide and care for D.B. That failure, which well demonstrated the
parents’ lack of commitment, was not attributable to the pandemic.
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), if the court determines, by clear and
convincing evidence, that one or more of the (E)(1)-(15) factors exist, the court shall
enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable
time or should not be placed with either parent. See, e.g., In re I.R., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 110410, 2021-Ohio-3103, ¶ 69 (based on its findings under R.C.
2151.414(E), the juvenile court was required to find that the child could not be placed
with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
either parent), citing In re C.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 82258 and 82852, 2003-
Ohio-6854, ¶ 58. Because our review reflects clear and convincing evidence relating
to the (E)(1), (E)(2), (E)(4), and (E)(14) factors, the trial court properly found D.B.
cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with either parent.
b. Second Prong: Best Interest of the Child
Once the juvenile court determines that one of the five factors listed
in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) is present, the court proceeds to an analysis of the child’s best
interest. The court undertakes this analysis with the recognition that although
parents have a constitutionally protected interest in raising their children, that
interest is not absolute and is always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child. In
re B.L., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1108, 2005-Ohio-1151, ¶ 7; and In re N.M., 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106131,
2018-Ohio-1100.
In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D)
mandates that the juvenile court consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two-month period …;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
When analyzing the best interest of the child, “[t]here is not one
element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re
Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498,
2006-Ohio-5513,
857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.
Here, the trial court stated it found permanent custody to be in the
child’s best interest after its consideration of (1) the child’s interaction and
relationship with his parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents, (2) the wishes
of the child, (3) the child’s custodial history, (4) the child’s need for a legally secure
permanent placement, and (5) the report of the GAL, who recommend permanent
custody to the agency.
Our review reflects the trial court’s decision is supported by clear and
convincing evidence contained in the record. The child was removed from the home
in December 2019 due to domestic violence incidents that occurred in his presence
and his truancy issues. He had been in the agency’s custody for 16 months at the
time of the permanent custody hearing. Mother and father asked for additional time
to work on their case plans, yet failed to demonstrate that they would achieve the
goals set forth in the case plan if they were given more time. D.B. has been with his
current foster family since his removal from the home in December 2019. The social
worker reported he is doing well in the foster family; he treats them as family, and
they treat him as one of their own. The social worker’s testimony also reflects
mother and father had difficulties interacting with D.B.: father was aggressive
toward D.B. during some visitations and mother would terminate the visitations
abruptly when she became upset with D.B. The GAL reported that the child liked
his placement and wished to stay in the foster family.
In affirming the trial court’s judgment granting permanent custody,
we are mindful that “[i]n proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children
the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The
knowledge obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and
through independent investigation cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by
printed record.” In re V.M., 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA15, 2018-Ohio-4974, ¶ 62,
citing Trickey v. Trickey,
158 Ohio St. 9,
106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). “‘The discretion
that the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent
custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given
the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on
the lives of the parties concerned.’” In re Ch. O., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84943,
2005-Ohio-1013, ¶ 29, quoting In re Awkal,
95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316,
642 N.E.2d
424 (8th Dist.1994).
For all the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to mother’s first
assignment of error and father’s first and second assignments of error. The trial
court’s judgment granting permanent custody to CCDCFS is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
