[Cite as Bonifield v. Bonifield,
2021-Ohio-95.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
CHRISTOPHER BONIFIELD, :
Appellee, : CASE NO . CA2020-02-022
: OPINION
- vs - 1/19/2021
:
KRISTEN BONIFIELD, :
Appellant. :
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DR 2018 01 0035
Frank J. Schianove, IV, 9078 Union Centre, Suite 240, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for
appellee
Joseph A. Cesta, 1160 E. Main Street, P.O. Box 36, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for appellee
Hochwalt & Schiff, LLC, Thomas R. Schiff, 500 Lincoln Park Blvd., Suite 216, Kettering,
Ohio 45429, for appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kristen Bonifield ("Mother"), appeals the decision of the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, allocating parenting time and
designating appellee, Christopher Bonifield ("Father"), as their child's residential parent for
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school purposes. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Mother and Father were married on November 6, 2010. There was one child
born issue of the marriage, a boy, born on April 8, 2013. The child has been diagnosed
with high risk Pre-B Cell Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia. This diagnosis requires the child
to have regular blood draws, injections, lumbar puncture intravenous chemotherapy,
several prescription medications, and numerous doctor appointments. Father is employed
at a local retail warehouse working second shift Monday through Thursday, 4:00 p.m. to
2:30 a.m. Mother works as a dog groomer at a pet grooming salon approximately 20 to 30
hours per week. Father resides next door to his parents who help take care of the child
when Father is at work. Mother would like to homeschool the child throughout her workday
by bringing the child with her to work. Father prefers the child be enrolled in public school
within the school district where Father resides.
{¶ 3} On January 19, 2018, Father filed for divorce from Mother. A guardian ad
litem was then appointed for the child. After several other ancillary matters unrelated to this
appeal were resolved, the matter ultimately proceeded to a three-day final contested
divorce hearing. During this hearing, both Mother and Father testified. Following this
hearing, the parties submitted a number of joint stipulations into the record. As part of these
joint stipulations, the parties agreed that shared parenting was in the child's best interest.
This left unresolved only Mother's and Father's parental rights and responsibilities as it
relates to: (1) their allotted parenting time, and (2) who would be designated as the child's
residential parent for school purposes. There is no dispute that these are the only two
issues subject of this appeal.
{¶ 4} On October 17, 2019, the domestic relations court issued a decision allocating
Mother and Father with nearly equal parenting time on an alternating weekly basis. There
is no dispute that the parenting time schedule the domestic relations court put into place is
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the same approximate parenting time schedule that Father requested as part of his
proposed shared parenting plan. There is also no dispute that the guardian ad litem
recommended a parenting time schedule that provided Mother and Father with equal
parenting time similar to what the domestic relations court ultimately put into place.
{¶ 5} The domestic relations court's decision designated Father as the child's
residential parent for school purposes. In so holding, the domestic relations court noted
that Father was concerned by Mother's plan to bring the child with her to work in order to
homeschool the child throughout her workday. The domestic relations court also noted that
Father was concerned about the difficulty that Mother would likely face while at work in
providing the proper care and attention the child required. The domestic relations court
further noted Father's belief that Mother's place of employment – a dog grooming salon –
was not "the most sanitary environment" that could "further compromise" the child's already
fragile health.
{¶ 6} The domestic relations court additionally noted in regard to Mother and her
desire to homeschool the child:
[Mother] has always believed that home schooling for their
minor child would be best. She believed the parties always
agreed [the child] would be home schooled. She maintains that
home schooling is 'better' for children than public school. She
believes strongly that she can provide the necessary skills to
make sure [the child] thrives academically. [Mother] lacks
formal training and education but maintains that neither are
necessary.
The record indicates that these were the same concerns expressed by the child's guardian
ad litem as part of the guardian ad litem's report and recommendation. Mother now appeals
the domestic relations court's decision, raising two assignments of error for review.
{¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 8} THE COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
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THE EVIDENCE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT RELATES TO THE ISSUE OF
PARENTING TIME.
{¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations court
erred in the allocation of the parties' parenting time schedules. We disagree.
{¶ 10} "R.C. 3109.04 governs the award of parental rights and responsibilities."
Whitaker v. Whitaker, 12th Dist. Fayette Nos. CA2019-05-008 and CA2019-05-009, 2020-
Ohio-2774, ¶ 16. This includes the allocation of parenting time. Id. at ¶ 19. The primary
concern is the best interest of the child in making this determination. Albrecht v. Albrecht,
12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-12-240 and CA2014-12-245, 2015-Ohio-4916, ¶ 22. In order
to determine the best interest of a child, the domestic relations court must consider all
relevant factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Bristow v. Bristow, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2009-05-139,
2010-Ohio-3469, ¶ 8. These factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the
wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care, (2) the wishes and concerns of the
child, (3) the child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and
any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest, (4) the mental and
physical health of all persons involved, and (5) the child's adjustment to the child's home,
school, and community. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) thru (e).
{¶ 11} The domestic relations court's "determination regarding its best interest
finding will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Leach v. Leach, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2019-06-092, 2020-Ohio-1181, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial
court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "[T]he vast majority of cases in which an abuse of discretion
is asserted involve claims that the decision is unreasonable." Effective Shareholder
Solutions v. Natl. City Bank, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-080451 and C-090117, 2009-Ohio-
6200, ¶ 9. A decision is unreasonable where it is not supported by a sound reasoning
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process. In re B.B., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-07-057, 2020-Ohio-4007, ¶ 22.
{¶ 12} Relying heavily on her own testimony as to what she believes would be in the
child's best interest, Mother argues the domestic relations court erred in how it allocated
the parties' respective parenting time schedules. This includes, for instance, Mother's
testimony that she was the child's primary caregiver and was more knowledgeable of the
child's medical treatment and specialized needs than Father. However, after a thorough
review of the record, it is clear that Mother's argument is nothing more than a challenge to
the weight that the domestic relations court gave to each of the best interest factors set forth
in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). But, as this court has stated previously, it is the role of the domestic
relations court, not this court, to determine the relative weight to assign to each factor when
determining the child's best interest. See Mack v. Mack, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-09-
179, 2019-Ohio-2379, ¶ 33.
{¶ 13} This court should not, and will not, second-guess the domestic relations
court's decision as to the appropriate weight to be given to any one of those best interest
factors. In re A.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-10-257, 2010-Ohio-2823, ¶ 35. The same
is true as it relates to the domestic relations court's decision regarding Mother's credibility.
See, e.g., Albert v. Albert, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24000,
2010-Ohio-6112, ¶ 32 ("[w]e
defer to the trial court's determinations of the parties' credibility and of the appropriate
weight to be given to the statutory factors"). This is because "it is well-established that a
trial court, particularly a domestic relations court, is in the best position to resolve disputes
of fact, and assess the 'credibility of witnesses' and the weight to be given to their
testimony." Bates v. Bates, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-137, 2005-Ohio-3374, ¶ 38.
{¶ 14} The domestic relations court, after hearing testimony from both Mother and
Father, and upon reviewing the guardian ad litem's report and recommendation, determined
that granting Mother and Father a nearly equal parenting time schedule was in the child's
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best interest. Despite Mother's claims, we find nothing about the domestic relation court's
decision to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable so as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. The domestic relations court's decision was also not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. This holds true no matter how stringently Mother opposes the domestic
relations court's decision, nor how strongly Mother believes she should be given more
parenting time with the child than Father. It is the child's best interest and not the parent's
wishes that is controlling. See Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44,
2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 44
("a parent's wishes should [not] be placed before a child's best interest"). Therefore, finding
no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Mother herein, Mother's first assignment of
error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 16} THE DESIGNATION OF FATHER AS THE RESIDENTIAL PARENT FOR
SCHOOL PURPOSES WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
{¶ 17} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations court
erred by designating Father as the child's residential parent for school purposes. We
disagree.
{¶ 18} The domestic relations court's primary concern is the best interest of the child
when determining which parent should be designated as that child's residential parent for
school purposes. Payson v. Hennessey, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2017-03-030 and
CA2017-03-036, 2018-Ohio-2437, ¶ 23. In making this determination, the domestic
relations court must consider the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
Beucler v. Beucler, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2014-05-009,
2015-Ohio-1084, ¶ 19. As noted
above, these factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the wishes of the child's parents
regarding the child's care, (2) the wishes and concerns of the child, (3) the child's interaction
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and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest, (4) the mental and physical health of all persons
involved, and (5) the child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community. R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(a) thru (e).
{¶ 19} The domestic relations court's decision to designate one parent as the child's
residential parent for school purposes over the other will not be reversed absent an abuse
of discretion. Leach, 2020-Ohio-1181 at ¶ 10; Allen v. Allen, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-
11-107,
2011-Ohio-1478, ¶ 11 ("we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
designating Father as the residential parent for school enrollment purposes"). As stated
previously, this requires the domestic relations court's decision to be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Fee v. Fee, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-11-274, 2003-Ohio-
6781, ¶ 22. A decision is unreasonable where it is not supported by a sound reasoning
process. In re B.B., 2020-Ohio-4007 at ¶ 22.
{¶ 20} As noted above, Mother believes it is in the child's best interest for her to
homeschool the child. Father disagrees and believes it is in the child's best interest to
attend public school in the school district where he resides. The domestic relations court
agreed with Father. The domestic relations court's decision was not an abuse of discretion
nor was it against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 21} As the record indicates, the domestic relations court's decision to designate
Father as the child's residential parent for school purposes will allow the child to attend
public school in a school district that provides a safe and quiet environment for the child to
learn and grow. We find no error in the domestic relations court's decision when considering
the alternative was for Mother to homeschool the child at Mother's workplace – a dog
grooming salon – during Mother's workday. This is particularly true here when considering
the child's already fragile health, as well as the concerns expressed by the guardian ad
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litem in regard to Mother's ability to effectively homeschool the child given her lack of formal
training. The domestic relations court, just as this court on appeal, must act in a way that
places the child's best interest above all else. Mack, 2019-Ohio-2379 at ¶ 36. Based on
the record properly before this court, the domestic relations court's decision does just that.
Therefore, finding no merit to any of the arguments raised herein, Mother's second
assignment of error also lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
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