[Cite as State v. Ahreshien,
2022-Ohio-2809.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-21-1243
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201802692
v.
Hussam A. Ahreshien DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 12, 2022
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas Count Prosecuting Attorney, and
Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Hussam A. Ahreshien, Pro se.
…
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Hussam A. Ahreshien, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On June 20, 2019, a jury found appellant guilty of one count of abduction in
violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a felony of the third degree, one count of domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one
count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree. The trial
court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of seven years.
{¶ 3} The facts of the case have been set forth in our decision in State v.
Ahreshien, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1184, 2021-Ohio-1223, ¶ 4-18, appeal not accepted,
163 Ohio St.3d 1506,
2021-Ohio-2401,
170 N.E.3d 898, as follows:
Appellant is an Iraqi-born citizen who worked for the American
military, in Iraq, as an interpreter. Appellant, his wife “Q.S.,” and their two
children moved from Iraq to Texas in 2014.
Q.S. described a terribly-unhappy marriage in which she lived in
constant fear of appellant. Based upon his mistreatment of her, Q.S.
returned to Iraq in 2016. At the urging of her family and based upon
appellant’s promise that he would treat her better, which included allowing
her to learn to speak English and to drive, Q.S. came back to the United
States in 2017. By that time, appellant had relocated from Austin, Texas, to
an apartment on Holland-Sylvania Road in Sylvania, Ohio.
2.
According to Q.S., life did not improve, and she described how her
day-to-day existence was controlled by appellant. Testifying through an
interpreter, Q.S. explained that she was never allowed to learn to speak
English beyond the rudimentary level. Likewise, appellant did not teach
her to drive, or even allow her to leave the apartment without him,
requiring her, for example, to watch her children from the window when
they walked to the bus stop and to launder the family’s clothes in the
apartment, rather than using the complex’s laundry facilities. Q.S. claimed
not to have a key to their apartment and rarely left, unless accompanied by
appellant, and she denied knowing the name of their apartment complex or
street address. When Q.S. returned from Iraq in 2017, appellant
confiscated her important papers like her passport and social security card.
Appellant even forbade Q.S. from talking to their neighbors or having
anyone inside. Q.S. testified that when she befriended a woman who lived
in the same apartment complex and the woman knocked on the door,
appellant “yell[ed] at her” and said “‘don’t ever come back here again.’”
Appellant told Q.S. that “you’re only but a maid in my life,” and that her
only role was to “serve[ ] him.”
Q.S. testified that she had a cell phone that she used to speak with
her mother in Iraq. According to her, appellant monitored those calls from
3.
his computer, and he forbade her from talking to anyone else on it, even her
own family. On May 1, 2018, appellant came home and accused Q.S. of
having “some women” over to celebrate Q.S.’s birthday and further
claimed that they had given her a cell phone as a gift. The appellant then
“started beating” her by “slam[ming] [her] head against the wall.”
Appellant also “hit [her] on the arm” leaving a “big bruise” and delivered
“one big blow” to her stomach. He also “scratched” Q.S., and the scratches
were still visible at trial, according to Q.S. When the children began to cry,
the appellant left the apartment, and soon, a couple—named Osamah and
Hadia Al-Musawi—arrived. According to Q.S., they encouraged her to
leave with them. Q.S. accepted the offer, but the next day, appellant picked
her up from their home at 7:00 a.m. and said, “it’s time to come home.”
Q.S. feared “a lot more problems” if she refused, so she returned even
though she “didn’t really want to go.” After the beating, Q.S. felt “dizzy,”
and though she asked appellant to take her to the doctor, he refused. After
they separated, Q.S. began treating with a neurologist, and she testified that,
as a result of her head injury, she was “still receiving therapy and
treatment.”
While Q.S. occasionally was allowed to go to the Mosque, she was
“forbidden from interacting with any women there” and was “absolutely
4.
forbidden” from talking to men. Instead, she had to stay “in the daycare
area to take care of … the kids there.”
At the urging of his friend, Osamah, appellant allowed Q.S. to attend
some classes at Water for Ishmael, which is a local organization devoted to
“welcoming … people from other nations … to empower them with
skills to become successful,” by for example, teaching them to speak
English. The executive director there, Janelle Metzger, testified that the
organization has “six levels of [English] instruction.” When Metzger met
Q.S. in the summer of 2017, Q.S. was at the “low” end of that range.
According to Metzger, Q.S. did not personally choose what courses to take;
rather appellant chose them for her. Metzger saw Q.S. there regularly
through May of 2018 but not after that. She became concerned by her
absence based upon the “pattern of control” she had witnessed appellant
exert over her, and she worried that Q.S.’s “isolation was increasing.”
Q.S. explained that she stopped attending classes because, as she
later learned, her friend, Hadia, had been instructed by appellant not to pick
her up any more. When Q.S. asked appellant if she could return, he “lost
his temper” and said “you’re idiotic, you have no education and you’re just
wasting your time and you have no future.” Q.S. remained “quiet because
anything [she] would say to him, he would beat [her].”
5.
According to Q.S., the rape occurred in the early morning hours of
July 3, 2018. At that time, she and her children were sleeping in the living
room because it was the only room equipped with an air-conditioning unit.
Q.S. slept on a twin mattress, with one child on each side of her. At 6:00
a.m., appellant “came over” and “forced himself upon” Q.S. Q.S. “started
kicking him” and saying “ ‘please … the kids are sleeping,’ and he just
wouldn’t stop, he did what he did.” … Q.S. verified at trial that
appellant had vaginal intercourse with her that morning, by force.
Three weeks later, on July 24, 2018, Metzger “made it a point” to go
to Q.S.’s apartment because “two different members from [Q.S.’s]
community asked [for Metzger’s] help.” Q.S. described herself as “tired”
and “exhausted” at the time, and upon seeing Metzger at her door, she
started crying. Metzger observed that Q.S. had “lost a lot of weight” and
“her overall demeanor was not well.” Q.S. asked Metzger not to call 911
but accepted Metzger’s offer to take her to the hospital.
At the hospital, Q.S. and Metzger were taken to a room “designated
for domestic violence victims.” Q.S. testified that she was treated for
stomach pain that caused her to “scream[ ] from pain.” Q.S. told the
examining physician that the “last time” she had sexual relations with her
husband was in the “beginning of July” and that it “was by force.” She also
6.
reported her husband’s physical abuse. After her examination, the police
asked for her statement, which she provided through a translator.
The examining nurse, Janis Karem, also testified at trial. Karem is a
forensic nurse who is also qualified as a sexual assault nurse examiner
(“SANE”). She testified that, despite the use of an electronic interpreter
service, the language barrier made getting Q.S.’s history “very difficult.”
Karem described Q.S. as “depressed” during the evaluation. During
Karem’s physical exam of Q.S., she noted “some abrasions on her [right]
arm” and “a bump on her head that she said was painful.” Although Karem
examined Q.S.’s “body,” Q.S. refused a SANE exam, which would have
involved looking for injuries in her genital area and inserting a speculum
inside the vagina. But, when asked whether she had been sexually
assaulted, Q.S. told Karem the following: “he tried, approximately 3 weeks
earlier, he had tried, she said no, he stopped. And she was having the
children sleep in her bed with her because she knew he wouldn’t try
anything with them present.”
After her release from the hospital, Q.S. did not return home.
Instead, Metzger offered to take her to a shelter or to the home of an
“acquaintance” from the mosque. Q.S. chose the latter and testified that she
had no communication with appellant from that day forward.
7.
… The defense called two witnesses, appellant and his friend
Osamah Al-Musawi.
Al-Musawi claimed that, during the couple’s disagreement on
May 1, 2018, it was Q.S. who injured appellant, not the other way around.
Al-Musawi testified that he observed appellant with a scratched and
bloodied finger, that appellant told him Q.S. had caused the injury, and that
Q.S. had also thrown appellant’s phone against a wall, causing it to break.
During cross-examination, Al-Musawi denied that he had tried to intimidate
Q.S. into dismissing the criminal charges against appellant.
During appellant’s testimony, he denied most of the allegations
made by Q.S. Specifically, he denied that Q.S. was locked inside the
apartment, that she lacked a set of keys, or that he referred to her as his
“maid.” Appellant claimed that he spent most days at the university library,
studying and therefore, he could not have exerted the type of control over
her as she claimed. Appellant admitted that, although the two had argued
on May 1, 2018—when he found a different phone had been connected to
their apartment network—he maintained that it was Q.S. who attacked him,
resulting in his scratched finger. And, he denied beating Q.S. that day. He
also denied that she was forced to stay in their apartment, and he cited her
frequent trips to the mosque, her classes at Water for Ishmael, and other
8.
outings like Walmart, the mall, and the park. Appellant denied that he
instructed his children to be disrespectful to Q.S. or that they, the children,
had assaulted her, as Q.S. claimed. And, appellant “categorically denied”
that he raped Q.S. on July 3, 2018. In support, appellant claimed that Q.S.
was in the midst of her menstrual cycle on that day, and the couple did “not
engage[ ] in any sexual intercourse when she [was] on her period.”
{¶ 4} Appellant timely appealed his convictions, asserting that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court violated his right to due process when
it held a hearing outside of his presence, and that his convictions were based on
insufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. On April 9,
2021, this court affirmed appellant’s convictions.
{¶ 5} Relevant here, appellant argued on direct appeal that his trial counsel was
ineffective for “(1) [failing] to call multiple witnesses who would have refuted Q.S.’s
testimony that appellant abducted her or restricted her movement; (2) [failing] to
introduce pictures and text messages from Q.S.’s cell phone; and (3) [failing] to introduce
Q.S.’s medical records that would have impeached her testimony that she did not allow a
SANE examination based upon her religious beliefs.” Id. at ¶ 54. Appellant argued that
this testimony and evidence would have “support[ed] Appellant’s theory of the case [that]
Q.S. was having an affair outside of her marriage to Appellant and [that she] fabricated
allegations to have Appellant arrested so that she could maintain her illicit relationship
9.
without interference from Appellant.” Id. However, appellant conceded that his
arguments relied upon evidence that was not admitted and was outside of the record.
Therefore, appellant concluded that his claims would be best addressed by a petition for
postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21. We agreed with appellant “that his claims
should be raised, not on direct appeal, but rather a postconviction relief petition.” Id. at ¶
55, citing State v. Heiney, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1115, 2020-Ohio-2761, ¶ 23 (“[A
petition for postconviction relief], rather than a direct appeal, is the proper vehicle to raise
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the claim is premised on evidence outside
the record.”).
{¶ 6} Following this court’s decision in his direct appeal, appellant for the first
time filed his postconviction petition on May 24, 2021. Appellant later filed several
motions and amendments to supplement the record. As grounds for his postconviction
petition, appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for “(1.)
counsel’s failure to call ‘multiple witnesses’ who would have refuted Q.S.’s testimony
that Petitioner abducted her or restricted her movement;” “(2.) counsel’s failure to proffer
pictures, videos and text messages from Q.S.’s cell phone, failure to proffer the contents
of the computer ‘thumb drive’ containing exculpatory evidence and motive for the
alleged victim’s accusations of rape and abuse;” and “(3.) counsel’s failure to introduce
Q.S.’s medical records from the Flower Hospital across the street of the alleged victim’s
residence that would have impeached her testimony that she did not allow a SANE
10.
examination based upon her religious beliefs and would have shown what kind of
examination she had and what kind of medication she was taking.” As with his direct
appeal, appellant argued that the above testimony and evidence would have “supported
Appellant’s theory of the case that Q.S. was having an affair outside of her marriage to
Appellant and that she fabricated allegations to have Appellant arrested so that she could
maintain her illicit relationship without interference from Appellant.”
{¶ 7} On November 3, 2021, the trial court denied appellant’s postconviction
petition, finding that it was untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a), which provides that a
postconviction petition “shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the
date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the
judgment of conviction or adjudication.” The court found that the transcript was filed in
the court of appeals on November 27, 2019, but appellant did not file his postconviction
petition until May 24, 2021. Further, the court found that appellant did not meet the
exception from the timeliness requirement for where “the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the
claim for relief.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 8} In its decision, the trial court methodically addressed each of appellant’s
claims. Starting with appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call
multiple witnesses, the court found that appellant’s own exhibits showed that subpoenas
were issued in May and June 2019, and that the witnesses were on appellant’s witness list
11.
filed with the court on June 7, 2019. Thus, the court concluded that appellant was aware
of the existence of the witnesses prior to the deadline for filing his postconviction
petition. In addition, the court found that the claim could have been raised on direct
appeal, and was consequently barred by res judicata.
{¶ 9} The court next addressed appellant’s claim that counsel failed to proffer
pictures, videos, and text messages from Q.S.’s cell phone and a “thumb drive.” The
court again found that the issue of these files was discussed at a hearing on April 16,
2019, and were again addressed by appellant during multiple hearings prior to his trial.
Thus, the court concluded that appellant was aware of the evidence, and was aware of
counsel’s decision not to proffer or pursue the evidence, prior to the deadline for filing
his postconviction petition. The court also found that the issues relating to pictures,
videos, texts, and the thumb drive were part of the record and could have been raised on
direct appeal, and as such they were barred by res judicata.
{¶ 10} Finally, as to appellant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to introduce Q.S.’s medical records, the trial court noted that appellant had failed
to offer any evidence that the records would have impeached Q.S.’s testimony as to why
she would not allow a SANE examination. Moreover, the court found that this issue was
part of a pretrial hearing held on December 11, 2018, at which defense counsel stated that
the defense was satisfied that the records did not exist, and there was additional
discussion that the defense could seek to subpoena records if it believed that the records
12.
did exist. Thus, the trial court concluded that appellant was aware of counsel’s failure to
introduce Q.S.’s medical records, and that he could have raised that issue on direct
appeal, thus the issue was barred by res judicata.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 11} Appellant has timely appealed the judgment denying his postconviction
petition, and now raises five assignments of error for our review:
1. Trial court abused its discretion when it violated this court’s law-
of-the-case doctrine.
2. The state’s inconsistent positions regarding the evidence violated
judicial estoppel.
3. The trial court abused its discretion when it held that appellant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
4. Trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s post
conviction relief petition without a hearing.
5. Trial court erred when it found that appellant’s petition does not
meet the untimeliness exception that he was unavoidably prevented from
discovering the evidence he relied upon.
13.
II. Analysis
{¶ 12} “[A] trial court’s decision granting or denying a postconviction petition
filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion; a
reviewing court should not overrule the trial court’s finding on a petition for
postconviction relief that is supported by competent and credible evidence.” State v.
Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377,
2006-Ohio-6679,
860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58. An abuse of
discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Id. at ¶ 60.
{¶ 13} In his first, second, and third assignments of error, appellant raises
arguments pertaining to the trial court’s findings that his claims were barred by res
judicata. In particular, appellant’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court
violated the “law of the case” doctrine when it held that his claims were barred by res
judicata, despite our determination on direct appeal that his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel were better pursued via a postconviction petition. Likewise,
appellant’s second assignment of error argues that the state’s position on direct appeal—
that appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be rejected because
they relied on evidence outside of the record—judicially estopped the state from arguing
in the postconviction proceedings that appellant’s claims were barred by res judicata
because he could have brought them on direct appeal. Finally, appellant’s third
assignment of error argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
14.
appellant’s postconviction petition on the grounds of res judicata. Appellant’s third
assignment of error engages in a lengthy argument regarding the merits of his
postconviction petition and why he believes his trial counsel was ineffective.
{¶ 14} Upon review, we find appellant’s arguments within his first, second, and
third assignments of error to be inapposite. Initially, we note that the trial court did not
solely rely upon the doctrine of res judicata, but rather concluded:
The Court finds that defendant’s Petition to Vacate or Set Aside
Judgment of Conviction was filed beyond the time limitations of the Ohio
Revised Code. The Court further finds that the petitioner was not
unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the facts he seeks to rely upon
in presenting his claims for relief. All allegations could have been raised as
part of petitioner’s direct appeal. The Court concludes as a matter of law
that because this petition was not timely filed that it is without jurisdiction
to address petitioner’s claims. Therefore defendant’s petitions are
DENIED.
In this case, we recognize that there is ambiguity throughout the trial court’s decision
regarding whether it relied on res judicata or untimeliness as the reason for denying
appellant’s postconviction petition. We also recognize that “[g]enerally, the introduction
in an R.C. 2953.21 petition of evidence dehors the record of ineffective assistance of
counsel is sufficient, if not to mandate a hearing, at least to avoid dismissal on the basis
15.
of res judicata.” State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114,
443 N.E.2d 169 (1982).
Nevertheless, even assuming that the trial court relied exclusively upon res judicata, and
assuming that it was improper to do so, we find that the trial court’s judgment must be
affirmed because “[a]n appellate court cannot … reverse a lower court decision that is
legally correct even if it is a result of erroneous reasoning.” State ex rel. Sommers v.
Perkins Local Schools Bd. of Edn.,
2017-Ohio-7991,
98 N.E.3d 1117, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.),
citing Toledo v. Schmiedebusch,
192 Ohio App.3d 402,
2011-Ohio-284,
949 N.E.2d 504,
¶ 37 (6th Dist.). As will be demonstrated in our discussion of appellant’s fourth and fifth
assignments of error, which we will address in reverse order, appellant’s postconviction
petition was properly denied as untimely.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, appellant’s first, second, and third assignments of error are
not well-taken.
{¶ 16} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
when it found that he did not meet the untimeliness exception for where a petitioner is
unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence upon which he must rely.
{¶ 17} Relevant here, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) provides,
A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the
court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and
asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant
other appropriate relief:
16.
(i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or
adjudicated a delinquent child who claims that there was such a denial or
infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or
voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States.
R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) sets forth the time constraints in which a petition under R.C.
2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) must be filed: “Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of
the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall
be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial
transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction
or adjudication.”
{¶ 18} Here, the docket in appellant’s direct appeal reveals that the record was
filed on October 8, 2019, and then a supplement to the record was filed on November 27,
2019. Using the latter date, appellant’s postconviction petition must have been filed no
later than November 26, 2020. Because appellant did not file his postconviction petition
until May 24, 2021, his petition was untimely unless he met one of the exceptions in R.C.
2953.23.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2953.23 provides, in relevant part,
(A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to
section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition
17.
filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that
section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on
behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies:
(1) Both of the following apply:
(a) … [T]he petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely
to present the claim for relief ….
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but
for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted …
*.
Notably, “[b]y providing that a court ‘may not entertain’ an untimely or successive
postconviction petition except in limited circumstances, R.C. 2953.23(A) plainly
prohibits a court from hearing and deciding on the merits a petition that does not meet
one of the exceptions.” State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358,
2018-Ohio-4744,
121
N.E.3d 351, ¶ 38.
{¶ 20} In his appellate brief, appellant eschews the language of R.C.
2953.23(A)(1)(a), and instead incorrectly applies the standard to avoid his postconviction
petition being barred by res judicata:
18.
A petitioner can overcome the res judicata bar to post-conviction relief only
if the petitioner presents competent, relevant, and material evidence dehors,
or outside, the record. … However, the evidence relied upon must not be
evidence that was in existence or available for use at the time of trial and
should have been submitted at trial if the petitioner wished to make use of
it. (Internal citations omitted). State v. Braden, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
02AP-954, 2003-Ohio-2949, ¶ 27.
Appellant argues that the text messages, videos, and pictures were not available to him to
file a timely postconviction petition because they were on a “thumb drive” and he could
not receive or possess any electronically stored information due to his incarceration.
Appellant further argues that the evidence was not available to him because trial counsel
did not send the contents of his case file until the summer of 2020, after appellant
initiated disciplinary proceedings against counsel. Appellant argues the wrong standard.
{¶ 21} For a postconviction petition, the relevant standard is not whether the
evidence was in existence or available for use at the time of trial, but instead it is whether
appellant was “unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which [he] must
rely to present the claim for relief.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). In determining whether
appellant was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts, Ohio courts hold that “a
defendant ordinarily must show that he was unaware of the evidence he is relying on and
19.
that he could not have discovered the evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” State
v. Bethel, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 21.
{¶ 22} Here, as identified by the trial court, the evidence relied upon in appellant’s
postconviction petition was known to appellant and discussed in court prior to his trial.
Specifically, the “multiple witnesses” appellant references were subpoenaed in May and
June 2019, the text messages, photos, videos, and the “thumb drive” were discussed in
court in April 2019, and the issue of Q.S.’s medical records was discussed in December
2018. Therefore, we hold that appellant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering
the facts relied upon in his postconviction petition, and thus the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied appellant’s petition as untimely.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 24} Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial
court erred when it denied his postconviction petition without a hearing. “This court has
recognized that where a petition for postconviction relief ‘is untimely and the petitioner
does not show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he
now relies, the petition should be denied without a hearing.’” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-17-1014, 2017-Ohio-7102, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Alvarado, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-16-1077,
2017-Ohio-2810, ¶ 26. Thus, because appellant’s petition was untimely,
and he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he now
20.
relies, we hold that the trial court did not err when it denied his postconviction petition
without a hearing.
{¶ 25} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has been done the
party complaining, and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
____________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
21.
