Slip opinions decided 2022 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

Evid. R. 801(D)(1)(b) - prior consistent statements - ineffective assistance of counsel - pre-indictment delay - joinder and speedy trial

Habeas corpus action claiming excessive bail—The sole purpose of bail is to ensure an accused person's attendance in court—Under Crim.R. 46, public safety is not a consideration with respect to the financial conditions of bail—Court of appeals' judgment granting writ and ordering reduction of bail affirmed.

CONTRACTS—INSURANCE—DUTY TO DEFEND—ATTORNEY FEES: The trial court did not err in determining that defendant insurer had a duty to defend the underlying action where the claims in the underlying complaint were arguably within the policy coverage. The trial court did not err in declining to award plaintiffs attorney fees where the suit was between the insurer and the insured and no determination had been made that the insurer acted in bad faith in refusing to defend the insured in the underlying action.

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(B)—IMMUNITY: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees where, based on the evidence in the record, reasonable minds could not conclude that the officers' actions in subduing the decedent amounted to recklessness.

POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.23(A) — SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS: The common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain defendant's successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A), because defendant's claims failed to satisfy the statutory exceptions for successive petitions under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), where the claims were based on the charging document and not facts that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering.

CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER — Civ.R. 65.1(G)(1) —PROCEDURE/RULES — OBJECTION — JURISDICTION — APPELLATE REVIEW — WAIVER: The trial court's denial or adoption of the magistrate's decision to issue a civil protection order is a "final, appealable order" under Civ.R. 65.1(G) and R.C. 2505.02 therefore rendering Civ.R. 65.1(G)'s requirement to file written objections is nonjurisdicitonal for purposes of appellate review. Respondent's failure to comply with Civ.R. 65.1(G)'s requirement to file written objections to the trial court's adoption of a domestic violence civil protection order waives any challenge to the trial court's adoption of the domestic violence civil protection order.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 5103.20: The juvenile court did not err in awarding permanent custody of the child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where clear and convincing evidence supported the court's decision. Pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, codified in R.C. 5103.20, where the receiving state does not approve the placement, the child shall not be placed. Where the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services did not approve mother's home for placement, the Ohio juvenile court could not place the child with mother in her Kentucky home.

Forcible entry and detainer/Judicial bias/Lease interpretation/5321.17/Notice to terminate/1923.03/Notice of eviction/5321.02/Retaliatory eviction/5321.03/Holding over

Attorney disqualification Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 necessary witness unobtainable testimony crime-fraud exception attorney-client privilege. Attorney disqualification is a drastic measure that should not be taken unless absolutely necessary. Trial court erred in disqualifying attorney where there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the attorney's testimony was unobtainable by any other source and therefore necessary.

Motion to enforce settlement agreement attorney fees. The trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding to enforce the agreement. The trial court did not base its decision on a misconstruction of law or an erroneous standard.

Prompt Payment Act R.C. 4113.61 interest attorney fees breach of contract mechanic's lien bond. - Trial court's judgment finding that appellant had violated Ohio's Prompt Payment Act set forth in R.C. 4113.61 and awarding interest and attorney fees for the violation reversed because the trial court improperly found that appellant was prepaid for appellee's work and that the statute therefore required appellant to pay the appellee within ten days of receipt of appellee's invoices, rather than ten days after payment from the upper tier contractor trial court's judgment that appellant breached the contract between appellant and appellee reversed because the trial court based its judgment on terms that were not part of the contract trial court's judgment that surety company was liable on a surety bond for any part of the judgment rendered against the subcontractor was affirmed because neither the surety company nor the subcontractor challenged the underlying mechanic's lien at trial, thereby waiving any challenge on appeal.

Mandamus denied respondent demonstrated excusable neglect for its untimely motion to dismiss and therefore the motion could be considered. Relator had adequate remedy at law to contest the denial of his request for the opening and closing arguments from his criminal trial thereby precluding relief in mandamus relator's purported public records request did not comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8).

R.C. 2744.02—POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY—PHYSICAL DEFECT—APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL—APP.R. 16(B)—APP.R. 18(C): The trial court did not err in denying summary judgment on the issue of immunity of a political subdivision from a negligence claim where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a loose rubber mat on a stair constituted a physical defect under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). Where the plaintiff-appellee fails to present any argument in response to arguments raised on appeal by defendant-appellant political subdivision in two assignments of error concerning immunity of a political subdivision from violations of the Landlord-Tenant Act, the appellant's brief reasonably sustains reversal of the trial court's decision on those claims when the Ohio Supreme Court has established that claims for violations of the Landlord-Tenant Act cannot proceed under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's post-conviction "Claim of Actual Innocence" because it was an untimely, successive petition for post-conviction relief that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider, and because the claims raised therein were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant a continuance to appellant or to exclude witnesses when the State inadvertently sent a witness list to another one of appellant's pending cases. All the potential witnesses were listed in discovery completed months earlier, and appellant was not prejudiced. Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not classify a witness as an expert witness. Finally, because there were no errors, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. Judgment affirmed.

small claims court – rules of civil procedure – notice pleading – breach of contract – wedding reception – consumer sales practices act

R.C. 2969.25, Habeas Corpus, verification

Habeas corpus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

transcript, presume regularity, record on appeal, motion to withdraw, hearing

Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order

Residential tenant appeals decision dismissing counterclaims against landlord. Court erred in finding tenant was not entitled to written notice concerning security deposit. Statute mandated notice even though the tenant owed past due rent exceeding the security deposit. Tenant failed to present evidence of unlawful eviction where landlord advanced tenant's agreed move-out date by several days. Landlord undertook no unlawful acts. Tenant voluntarily left.

In sentencing appellant to a community control term which included a residential sanction in jail, the trial court erred by failing to award appellant 46 days of jail-time credit for the time he spent in confinement in lieu of bail. The trial court did not impose a prohibition on appellant seeking transfer of his community control to another jurisdiction prior to the completion of 500 community service hours as the trial court's sentencing entry did not set forth such a prohibition.

Appellant's conviction for cruelty to a companion animal was not erroneous. A presentence investigation is not required for a misdemeanor and was not requested here. Further, a trial court is presumed to have considered the statutory factors when the sentence is within the statutory limits and there is no affirmative showing that the trial court failed to do so. The sentence here was well within the statutory limits and appellant made no such showing. Additionally, appellant failed to demonstrate how her attorney's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced.

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody in favor of her children to a children's services agency.

Juvenile court did not err by denying Father's motion to file untimely objections, as he failed to demonstrate "good cause" and did not suffer any prejudice. In addition, The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of Father's children to a children's services agency where the record reflects that the children have been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 of the last 22 months and the grant of permanent custody is in the children's best interest.

Appellant's motion for attorney fees was barred by the doctrines of res judicata, law of the case, and collateral estoppel where the trial court previously ruled that such fees were improper and not subject to the initial contract between appellant and appellee. The trial court also properly determined that appellant had released appellee from any future obligations after a first jury trial occurred and appellee paid the judgment.

Although appellant's medical records were not properly certified pursuant to R.C. 2317.422(A), their erroneous admission was harmless where there was ample additional evidence to show that appellant knew about his diagnosis and failed to fully disclose to the victim that he was HIV positive, without use of the medical records. R.C. 3701.243(C)(1) and (2) permit a court to issue an order granting a government agency the authority to disclose HIV test records on a showing of compelling need. Neither provision prohibits the introduction of evidence concerning an HIV test of a specific individual in a criminal proceeding. The state demonstrated a compelling need for the records, so the physician-patient privilege did not apply. In finding appellant guilty of felonious assault, the trial court was entitled to discredit appellant's testimony and believe the victim's testimony. In believing that testimony, the trial court could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the state proved the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Felonious assault conviction. Defendant threw victim down staircase. Defense argued accident. State presented sufficient evidence defendant acted knowingly. Defendant angry immediately preceding assault. Defendant continued "wrestling" with the victim after fall. Greater weight of evidence did not support theory of an accidental fall. Defense counsel was not ineffective in not pursuing a self-defense theory, for not requesting instruction for aggravated assault, for not retaining an expert witness, and for not calling the defendant to testify, all decisions within the ambit of trial strategy.

Appealable order/2505.02(B)(4)/In-camera review/Civ.R. 60(B)

Summary judgment duty to mitigate

WAIVER – EVID.R. 403 – EVID.R. 404 – EXPERT WITNESS – MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – INFORMED CONSENT – FRADULENT MISREPRESENTATION – BATTERY – REAL PARTY IN INTEREST – R.C. 2307.28 – R.C. 2305.113(C) : In a medical-malpractice case, the medical defendants waived any error in the trial court's references to defendant-doctor as "Mr." as opposed to "Dr." where they did not object to the court's pretrial order giving the parties notice that it would refer to defendant-doctor as "Mr." or its statement to that effect to potential jurors during voir dire. The trial court did not improperly refer to other lawsuits filed against defendant-doctor by telling jurors that there had been "some publicity" on the case and instructing jurors not to "Google" the n4ames of the parties involved. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs' expert witness to testify repeatedly that defendant-doctor had "lied" and committed "fraud" where defendants objected to some, but not all, of the statements and the expert witness's testimony related to plaintiffs' claim that defendant-doctor had fraudulently misrepresented the nature of her condition and the necessity of surgery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs' radiologist expert witness to testify regarding whether the diagnostic images indicated that surgery was necessary or whether plaintiff gave informed consent the radiologist, although not a surgeon, was qualified to render an opinion as to whether the diagnostic images indicated that surgery was necessary, and obtaining informed consent from a patient for a procedure is a practice that is standard across all types of medical doctors. The trial court did not err in holding that there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of a permanent and substantial physical deformity to the jury where the surgery left plaintiff with restricted movement in her neck and permanent physical changes to her spine. Defendants raised their real-party-in-interest defense in their answer to plaintiffs' complaint, but they took no further affirmative action to prosecute the raised defense, which resulted in waiver of the defense. Defendants are not entitled to a credit ("setoff") under R.C. 2307.28 against the jury verdict in the amount of the settlement reached between plaintiffs and the settling defendants because defendants were found liable for the intentional tort of battery, and the facts of the case make it impractical to distinguish the injuries caused by the battery from the injuries caused by the unintentional torts. Defendants raised their statute-of-repose defense under R.C. 2305.113(C) in their answer to plaintiffs' complaint, but failed to raise the matter again pretrial and apply relevant case law to the facts of the case, and therefore, waived their statute-of-repose defense.

As respondent had already issued a ruling on relator's motion for judicial release, relator's requested writ of procedendo is moot. We agree with the magistrate's decision to grant respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of procedendo.

The trial court did not err in granting the state's motion to dismiss Foy's complaint seeking a declaration that he is wrongfully imprisoned individual.

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio Redistricting Commission did not attempt to meet the standards set forth in Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution in passing the General Assembly–district plan—Plan invalid—The Ohio Redistricting Commission shall be reconstituted, convene, and adopt a plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution.

Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Crim.R. 32.1 did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider the appellant's motion after an appeal and affirmance by the appellate court.

Disorderly conduct R.C. 2917.11(A) noise ordinance free speech First Amendment selective prosecution. Defendant's convictions for disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11(A) and a violation of a local noise control ordinance were impermissibly based on the defendant's speech in violation of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution, and therefore, the convictions are vacated.

Third-degree felony R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 30-month prison term. - Defendant's sentence of 30 months in prison was not contrary to law because it was within the statutory range for third-degree felonies and the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12 when it imposed the sentence. Appellate court could not consider defendant's argument that the record did not support the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 because nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Pro se litigant Crim.R. 32(B) final appealable order judgment of conviction. The trial court's denials of defendant's motions for a final order are affirmed. Defendant's argument that the judgments of conviction in multiple cases be condensed to one document is unsupported by law.

Notice of consequences of violation of community control sanction final judgment. On July 15, 2021, one month after it journalized a community control sanction as sentence for a felony offense, the trial court journalized an entry containing notice of a potential prison sentence it could impose for a violation of the community control sanction. Because the trial court did not have authority to amend the final judgment of sentence, the case is remanded to the trial court to vacate the July 15, 2021 journal entry.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 negligence duty breach hazard notice slip and fall premises liability invitee. The trial court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment in defendants' favor. Appellant did not present any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence demonstrating that a hazard existed and that the hazard caused her to slip and fall. Accordingly, appellant's negligence claim fails as a matter of law.

Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 801 hearsay Evid.R. 803(2) excited utterance Evid.R. 803(3) present sense impression ineffective assistance of counsel jury irregularities R.C. 2945.71 speedy trial. Appellant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reviewed for plain error, the witness's statement to the victim's mother made immediately after the shooting qualified as an excited utterance and present sense impression to the hearsay rule. Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails where the errors complained of were found to lack merit.

Preliminary injunction modification noncompete agreement doctor specialized abuse of discretion likelihood of success on the merits irreparable injury unjustifiable harm to third parties public interest reasonable legitimate business interest undue hardship injury to the public. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between appellant and appellee. Appellant did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its breach-of-contract claim against the appellee with the noncompete agreement as written, however it did have a substantial likelihood of success under the trial court's modified noncompete agreement. As modified by the court, the noncompete agreement protected appellant's legitimate business interests, did not impose and undue burden on the appellee, and did not injure the public. Further, the modified noncompete agreement would not cause the appellant to suffer irreparable injury. Finally, third parties would be harmed, and the public interest would not be served by enforcing the noncompete agreement as written by appellant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between the parties.

Postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 R.C. 2953.23 untimely exception unavoidably prevented from discovering witness testimony de novo. The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief because it was untimely pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. Additionally, appellant did not qualify for an exception to the timeliness requirement pursuant to R.C. 2953.23 because he did not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relies, nor did he establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty but for the alleged constitutional error. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain appellant's petition.

Motion to show cause contempt sanction manifest weight of the evidence abuse of discretion attorney fees. - Trial court's judgment granting motion to show cause and finding defendant in contempt was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor an abuse of discretion where the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the motion was undisputed that defendant had not complied with the agreed judgment entry plaintiff's request for attorney fees was properly submitted with its post-hearing brief trial court's decision granting attorney fees without an evidentiary hearing did not violate defendant's due process rights because defendant offered no evidence challenging plaintiff's entitlement to attorney fees nor the reasonableness of the fees and never requested a hearing.

Summary judgment expert testimony Loc.R. 21.1 Civ.R. 26(B)(7). The trial court did not err in granting the appellees' summary judgment motion because the appellant failed to provide expert testimony in compliance with Loc.R. 21.1 and Civ.R. 26(B)(7).

Petition for postconviction relief recantation successive untimely abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's successive and untimely petition for postconviction relief, based on an alleged recantation of witness testimony, because appellant was unable to show that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the recantation and unable to establish a constitutional error.

Partition Civ.R. 12(C) pleading requirements. In an action for partition of property acquired during cohabitation, judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) was properly granted where plaintiff did not allege any fact other than cohabitation to establish that defendant had an ownership interest in the property because Ohio law precludes an action for partition of personal property acquired solely on account of cohabitation.

Postrelease-control sanctions jail-time credit. The trial court erred by failing to reduce the postrelease-control sanction because the sanction should have been reduced by the prison term that was imposed by the parole board. The trial court did not err by not awarding the appellant jail-time credit because the court's calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the appellant served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced.

The court of common pleas did not abuse its discretion in affirming the SPBR order denying appellant's request for reclassification because SPBR's decision to classify appellant's job duties as HCM Senior Analyst and not as a HCM Manager is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant's appeal of trial court judgment determining she was incompetent to stand trial affirmed. Challenge to determination of incompetency overruled where appellant failed to ensure a transcript was prepared and filed for review and for that reason could demonstrate no irregularity in the trial court proceedings. Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to determine challenges relating to nonfinal judgments and orders, and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to challenge orders from different trial-level courts from which no appeal had been taken.

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XIX, Section 3(A)—Redistricting—General Assembly did not comply with Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) of the Ohio Constitution in passing the congressional-district plan—Plan invalid—General Assembly ordered to pass within 30 days a new congressional-district plan that complies in full with Article XIX of the Ohio Constitution and is not dictated by partisan considerations.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. Based upon the totality of the circumstances following a ShotSpotter alert at an early morning hour, the officers' reasonable articulable suspicion justified the Terry stop of appellant, a solitary pedestrian in the radius area of the alert, whose demeanor caused the officers to fear he might be armed and dangerous and pose a threat to their safety. In the course of the ensuing pat down for weapons, an officer lawfully seized methamphetamine "sticking out" from appellant's shorts. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated in relation to appellant's no contest plea. Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err in finding that appellee's biodigester facility is a public utility pursuant to R.C. 519.211(A) and thus exempt from zoning restrictions. The trial court also did not err in not remanding the case back to the BZA for further proceedings on the public utility issue R.C. 2506.04 permits, but does not require, such an action. Finally, the trial court did not err in ordering the BZA to grant appellee's request for an exemption to expand the facility because the expansion will also be part of the public utility. Judgment affirmed.

The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's dependency adjudication for appellant Mother's three children. The preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's dispositional order awarding appellee Greene County Children Services temporary custody of the children. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress drugs retrieved from her purse in the course of a traffic stop in which she was the vehicle's passenger. The evidence established that appellant freely and voluntarily consented to the search of her purse in the absence of any coercive procedures. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant appeals firearms offenses. During high-speed chase, witnesses observed individual shooting at another vehicle. Hat fell off shooter during DNA from the hat matched defendant. State submitted sufficient evidence to prove identity. Defendant's DNA was major DNA profile recovered from hat. Eyewitness testified that defendant appeared "very similar" to shooter. Defendant not entitled to mistrial where juror revealed he had seen the defendant before at a Wal-Mart. All jurors agreed that comment would not affect ability to fairly decide case. Comment itself was benign.

Tenant appeals a decision dismissing various claims against her landlord. Tenant argued that the court erred in considering certain testimony but failed to object. Tenant could not demonstrate plain error where the testimony had no effect on outcome. Dismissal of claims supported by weight of the evidence. Tenant misunderstood burden of proof.

The trial court failed to address both aspects of waiver when issuing its decision denying appellant's motion to suppress appellant's incriminating statements he made to police wherein he acknowledged raping the alleged victim, thereby requiring appellant's conviction for first-degree felony rape be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Defendant convicted of offenses relating to operation of prostitution business and for assault. Defendant prostituted two women out of three hotels located in Warren and Hamilton counties. Though one count of felonious assault occurred in Hamilton County and the defendant was acquitted of offenses involving that victim in Warren County, venue was appropriate in Warren County based on evidence that the overall offenses were part of a course of criminal conduct occurring in both counties. Trafficking in persons and promoting prostitution are distinct offenses under R.C. 1.51. Trafficking in persons counts and promoting prostitution counts were not required to merge. Counsel not ineffective for striking allegedly biased juror who was rehabilitated. Felonious assault conviction established by evidence that the defendant slapped and rendered victim unconscious.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1), untimely appeals can file untimely criminal appeal via App.R. 5(A).

Trial court decision denying defendant's motion to correct partially void sentence affirmed. Under State v. Henderson, defendant's sentence was voidable rather than void.

MOOTNESS – RES JUDICATA : The trial court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the case as moot where, in a prior appeal in the same case, the appellate court had remanded the case to the civil service commission and the civil service commission complied with the appellate court's mandate upon remand, leaving the parties without an actual controversy capable of judicial redress. Plaintiff-appellant's procedural-due-process rights were not infringed where he was given notice of the grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to respond. Res judicata prevented plaintiff-appellant from relitigating issues decided in a previous appeal in the same case.

COUNSEL – POSTRELEASE CONTROL – SENTENCING: Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where he failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel's failure to raise the issue of misjoinder under Crim.R. 8 there was no reasonable probability that the result of the appeal would have been different but for counsel's errors. [But see DISSENT: The misjoinder of the charges resulted in a trial that was unreliable and fundamentally unfair because of counsel's deficient performance.] Defendant convicted of murder and sentenced to postrelease control as part of his sentence received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where defendant was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to challenge the imposition of postrelease control: the postrelease-control statute does not apply to murder.

waiver of counsel, misdemeanor, petty offense, new trial, sufficiency

permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – cannot or should not be returned to parents – fail to remedy concerns – best interest of the child – mental health – six-month extension of temporary custody – reasonable efforts – plain error – forfeited

ineffective assistance of counsel – prejudice – restrictions on visitation

Reagan-tokes act/Appeal of mandatory fine

summary judgment, scope of employment, vicarious liability

DNA testing outcome determinative res judicata. Trial court properly denied defendant's application for DNA testing where the record shows the results of such testing would not be outcome determinative.

Dormant judgment motion for revivor objection R.C. 2325.15 R.C. 2325.18 App.R. 12 challenge to validity of the judgment collateral attack. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to revive dormant judgment. The collateral attacks on the judgment raised by appellant in her objection were appropriate for a motion for relief from judgment but could not be considered with regard to a motion for revivor.

Felony sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) findings R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I) R.C. 2929.11 contrary to law permissible range. We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if it "clearly and convincingly finds" that the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Under R.C. 2929.11, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be "reasonably calculated" to achieve "three overriding purposes of felony sentencing" — (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, (2) to punish the offender, and (3) to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender — "using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources." Appellant argues his two-year sentence was contrary to law because it failed to comport with the overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. However, the two-year sentence for appellant's conviction, a third-degree felony, was within the permissible range. In addition, the court's judgment of conviction states that "[t]he court considered all required factors of the law" and "finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11." Further, although the trial court was not required to make findings on the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court discussed its reasoning at the sentencing hearing. As such, we refuse to find that appellant's two-year prison sentence is contrary to law.

Jail-time credit medical isolation community-control sanctions maximum jail sentence served R.C. 2929.24 trial court journal entry misdemeanor. The trial court erred when it denied defendant 20 days of jail-time credit for days spent in medical isolation within the county jail. The trial court also erred when it placed defendant on community-control sanctions after he had already served the maximum jail sentence for a misdemeanor.

Mandamus, procedendo, pending motion, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), hybrid representation, duty of trial court to rule on pro se motion. Relator seeks a writ of procedendo/mandamus in order to compel the trial court to issue rulings with regard to pending pro se motions. The relator does not possess the right to representation by counsel and pro se representation, often know as hybrid representation. When a criminal defendant is represented by counsel, a trial court is prohibited from ruling on a pro se motion unless counsel joins in the pro se motion. Herein, the relator filed numerous pro se motions without the assistance or approval of counsel. Because the relator was represented by counsel, the trial court possesses no duty to issue rulings with regard to any pro se motion. The complaint for procedendo/mandamus fails to state a claim and is subject to a sua sponte dismissal.

Civ.R. 56, summary judgment, Civ.R. 12(F), strike pleadings. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. The trial court struck pleadings by appellant that failed to comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and appellant did not resubmit filings that complied with the rules though warned to do so.

Judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12(C) de novo review insurance policy contract interpretation coverage exclusion duty to defend claim for attorney fees statute designed to deter frivolous conduct IDEA 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3). There was no coverage for appellants' claims under the policy because the claims against appellants in the subject suits were brought under IDEA's fee-shifting provision, which is a statute that was designed to deter frivolous conduct by attorneys engaged in litigation. The trial court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings on OBLIC's complaint in favor of OBLIC and denying appellants' corresponding motion. The trial court further did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of OBLIC on appellants' counterclaim for bad faith.

Maximum sentence, findings of fact, R.C. 2929.141, abuse of discretion, psychological evaluation. A trial court is not required to place findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when imposing a maximum sentence where the trial court on the record and in its journal entry notes that it considered the required factors. The mere fact that the trial court emphasized certain facts and did not mention others, does not mean the trial court failed to consider relevant factors. Appellate court may only review the record before it. Where the record is silent as to an issue argued by appellant, the court is unable to review it. Finally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it fails to order a second psychological evaluation when the first psychological evaluation suggests appellant is malingering and appellant's multiple pro se filings and colloquy with the court display appellant's understanding of the proceedings and his ability to assist his attorney.

Center for Disease Control Eviction Moratorium R.C. 3767.12 Crim.R. 48(B) abuse of discretion

R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) grand theft of a motor vehicle sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence circumstantial evidence

The magistrate did not err in the conclusion that the deceased injured worker and/or his estate lacked standing to bring the mandamus action as the workers' compensation claim had abated upon the injured worker's death, and the surviving spouse of the deceased injured worker cannot pursue the mandamus action on the deceased injured worker's behalf but has a remedy in her ongoing R.C. 4123.60 proceedings. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed.

The magistrate's decision recommending this court deny the relator's request for a writ of mandamus seeking an order to vacate the Industrial Commission's grant of permanent total disability compensation to relator's employee is adopted in its entirety. Relator failed to file an objection to the magistrate's decision, and our review, under Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c), reveals no error of law or other evident defect in the decision.

Considering all of the evidence together, the trial court did not clearly lose its way in concluding appellant was required to yield to Hashim's right-of-way when he was attempting to turn left across Hashim's lane of travel, and appellant's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err in in finding appellant guilty of the traffic offense of failure to yield when turning left. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's no contest plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligently entered, and thus must be vacated, where the trial court made no mention of appellant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination at the plea hearing.

SERVICE OF PROCESS — Civ.R. 4.6 — DUE PROCESS — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — REASONABLY CALCULATED: The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment based on an alleged failure of service where the plaintiff complied with Civ.R. 4.6(D) and plaintiff presented circumstantial evidence of receipt the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, following an evidentiary hearing on remand, it concluded defendant's evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service the trial court did not err when it determined that service of process was made in a manner reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action when plaintiff relied on an address provided by the defendant. [But see DISSENT: Defendant sufficiently rebutted the presumption of proper service where documentary evidence showed that defendant did not live at the address listed in the complaint and that defendant was incarcerated in another state when process was served.]

Motion to dismiss on speedy trial basis. COVID-19 pandemic.

State's appeal. The trial court did not err in sustaining defendant-appellee's motion to suppress evidence found in his car. The positioning of a police cruiser at an angle directly in front of appellee's vehicle, which was backed into a parking space at his apartment complex, would have caused a reasonable person in his position to believe he was not free to drive away. Therefore, the trial court correctly found a "show of authority" that resulted in appellee being seized by police without reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. State's assignment of error overruled remanded.

Appellant's claim that his guilty pleas in two cases were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered lacks merit because the trial court's plea colloquy did not fail to inform appellant of his constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and did not fail to properly notify him of the maximum possible prison sentence for his offenses. Appellant's claim that his aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated menacing offenses should have merged as allied offenses lacks merit because those offenses were either committed by separate conduct, committed against separate victims, and/or resulted in a separate, identifiable harm. Judgments affirmed.

In this appeal, which involves three separate criminal cases, the trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to an additional year in prison pursuant to R.C. 2929.141, based on appellant's violation of post-release control. The court told appellant of the additional sentence during the sentencing hearing and then properly included it in two termination entries. However, the court's subsequent nunc pro tunc entry, eliminating the additional sentence from one judgment entry, was a nullity and had no legal effect. Therefore, appellant's original sentence, including the additional year of incarceration, stands. The judgments are affirmed, but with the proviso that the case in which the nunc pro tunc entry was entered is remanded with an instruction to the trial court to vacate that entry.

The record establishes that appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Additionally, appellant's statutory rights to a speedy trial were not violated pursuant to R.C. 2945.71 through R.C. 2945.73. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order an additional evaluation, because appellant's testimony at the competency hearing (along with the prior expert forensic reports) did not create a genuine question of his ability to understand the proceedings or to aid his attorneys. Furthermore, two competency evaluations were performed that found him competent to stand trial. The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 during the plea hearing. Appellant's conviction in no way violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, fundamental fairness, and due process of the law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's arguments are barred by res judicata where he could have raised them in a direct appeal but failed to do so. Appellant forfeited any constitutional challenge to his vehicle's forfeiture where he failed to timely raise the issues with the trial court, despite having several opportunities to do so.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree felony rape where, regardless of which standard applied, i.e., the more liberal pre-sentence standard or the more stringent standard applied to post-sentence motions, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea given appellant's motivation in moving to withdraw his plea was that he received an unexpectedly high eight-year prison sentence rather than a lower prison sentence of three, four, or five years.

The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive prison terms.

CIVIL - postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 stipulated sentence, ineffective assistance of counsel, untimely, newly discovered evidence, unavoidably prevented from discovery of facts.

CIVIL - Summary Judgment Civ.R. 56(C) Civ.R. 6(C) summary judgment reply procedural due process full and fair response meaningful judgment entry.

CRIMINAL LAW - improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, felonious assault, consecutive sentences, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), R.C. 2929.14, allied offenses of similar import, R.C. 2941.25, separate victims.

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus to require respondents to preapprove/transfer deeds for a property merit decision without an opinion is still a merit opinion, subsequent transfers of the property does not change the underlying nucleus of facts same parties raising the same issues over the same property barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

APPELLATE REVIEW: state appeal R.C. 2945.67 App.R. 5(C) judgment of acquittal is not appealable by the state when no legal issue capable of repetition is shown.

CIVIL - small claims condominium association repairs water proofing damages to utilities replacement costs magistrate's decision no objections filed plain error doctrine failed to meet burden no plain error.

CRIMINAL LAW - Reagan Tokes Act constitutionality ripeness separation of powers right to a jury trial fair trial due process not ripe for review.

CRIMINAL - consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) inconsistent findings failure to include finding in sentencing entry community control seriousness of the offender's conduct deferential review clearly and convincingly find the record does not support the court's findings R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 consideration of sentencing factors presume consideration of factors

ORIGINAL ACTION - Mandamus public records request fulfilled legal invoices properly redacted, protected by attorney-client privilege cannot establish claims for statutory damages, attorney fees, and/or costs no claim upon which relief can be granted respondents motions to dismiss granted.

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus publish records request R.C. 149.43 statutory damages court costs bad faith

Civ.R. 60(B) - Substitute for Appeal

APPELLATE REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE — MOOTNESS: The court of common pleas did not err by dismissing on mootness grounds an administrative appeal of the Ohio Department of Aging's ("ODA") decision denying appellant's application to become a provider for an ODA administered program where the record demonstrates that ODA certified the appellant as a provider during the pendency of the administrative appeal and that any decision by the lower court on the merits of the appeal could not afford appellant any additional relief.

The trial court did not err when it held the Schools did not waive their real party in interest defense. However, the trial court erred when it held that ODE was not the real party in interest to ODE's claims to recover federal grant funds. Pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A) a real party in interest includes "a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another", and the Assurances made by the Schools is a contract with ODE which has been made for the benefit of another – i.e., the USDOE. Furthermore, it was error on the part of the trial court to conclude that ODE abandoned the portion of its Trust claim which was premised on state operating funds. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Community control revocation

motion to dismiss – selective prosecution – Summit County Sheriff's Office – Prosecutor's Office – attorney general – OHLEG misuse – similarly situated – invidious motive – criminal investigation – administrative investigation

Motion to suppress mixed standard of review Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution guarantee searches and seizures police-citizen contact consensual encounter Terry stop arrest and sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. As the reviewing court, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact in ruling on a motion to suppress if the findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. With respect to the trial court's conclusion of law, the reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review and decides whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee "the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." However, these guarantees are not implicated with every police-citizen contact. Instead, the individual rights are balanced against the type and extent of the intrusion and the other interests involved, such as crime prevention. In balancing these interests, the United States Supreme Court has developed three categories of police-citizen contact — none intended to be used in a bright-line fashion — namely: (1) the consensual encounter, (2) Terry stop, and (3) arrest. Appellant, state of Ohio, contends that the officer's initial encounter with appellee was consensual up until the first time Jackson attempted to put his key in the ignition. Appellant also contends that the officer "first observed the extremely strong odor of marijuana by 'plain smell' when he initially approached the vehicle, barely entering appellee's property to do so." Upon review, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the police encounter with appellee was consensual. We also find nothing to suggest that the officers possessed sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to perform a Terry or investigative stop and to subsequently detain appellee. As such, the trial court properly granted appellee's motion to suppress.

Crim.R. 11 knowingly intelligently voluntarily maximum penalty prejudice guilty plea felony. Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's inconsistent advisement of the maximum penalties he faced by entering guilty pleas to the felony offenses. Defendant's decision to enter pleas of guilty was predicated on his desire to accept the terms of a favorable plea agreement and not his alleged misunderstanding of the applicable penalties.

Postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) de novo motion to correct sentence void voidable jurisdiction. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's untimely petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). Under the Ohio Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, any sentencing error would be voidable, not void and defendant was limited to challenging his sentence via a direct appeal. Therefore, the trial court did not err by summarily denying defendant's motion to correct sentence.

Summary judgment, workers' compensation, causal connection, arising out of employment. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of employer was in error where a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the causal connection of appellant's injury to the employment.

Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel waiver of the right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily colloquy and conceded error. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that persons brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before they can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment. When a defendant manages his or her own defense, they relinquish, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Therefore, in order to represent themselves, defendants must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing him to proceed to trial pro se without ensuring he had properly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The City filed a notice of conceded error pursuant to Loc.App.R. 16(B). Our review of the record, including the colloquy, reveals that the trial court did not discuss with Davis the consequences of waiving counsel, the charges against him, or possible defenses. As such, the inquiry was insufficient to determine whether Davis was making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel.

Sufficiency of the evidence R.C. 2929.14(C) consecutive sentences. Appellant contended that the state could not produce sufficient evidence to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. However, the court found that the state had produced sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction as a reasonable juror could have inferred that the victim suffered child abuse in the custody of appellant and the conduct that constituted child abuse also proximately caused the victim's death. The court sustained appellant's assignment of error with respect to consecutive sentences. The trial court neither expressly made the disproportionality findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C) nor made any statement showing that the court considered those factors using different language.

Abuse of discretion Civ.R. 6(B) extension of time Loc.R. 8(C) stipulated extension breach of contract de novo Civ.R. 10(D)(1) agreement not attached to complaint Civ.R. 12(E) motion for more definite statement Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss matters outside complaint Civ.R. 56 convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's request for extension of time to respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss after the appellant missed both the initial deadline and the extended deadline. The appellant pleaded facts sufficient to meet elements of breach of contract. The appellant's failure to attach the parties' agreement to the complaint was not fatal. The proper remedy was for appellee to move for a more definite statement. The trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss based on matters outside the complaint without converting the appellee's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

Fourth Amendment seizure search warrantless traffic stop concealed carry violation plain view immediately apparent inadvertent. Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress evidence where traffic stop was constitutionally valid and police observed contraband in plain view.

Summary judgment/Foreclosure action

Mandamus—R.C. 319.16—Common pleas court judge sought writ of mandamus ordering county auditor to issue warrants on county treasurer for payment of court-ordered expenditures—Writ granted.

Public records—Writ of mandamus sought to compel police chief and city to produce documents relating to the city's implementation of a traffic-ticket quota—Writ denied statutory damages awarded attorney fees and costs denied.

Anders appeal. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Counsel filed an Anders brief suggesting one potential assignment of error: that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum prison sentence. We find that this is not a potentially meritorious argument, and our independent review of the record pursuant to Anders reveals no other potentially meritorious arguments for review. Judgment affirmed.

Having committed an offense of violence, appellant was not entitled to mandatory community control his 18-month sentence for trespass in a habitation was not contrary to law. The court made the required findings in imposing consecutive 18-month sentences for the trespass offense and receiving stolen property, and the record does not overwhelmingly support a contrary result. Judgment affirmed.

The record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that appellant was apprised of his right to counsel or that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in open court as required by Crim.R. 44(B) and (C). In the absence of a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court was prohibited from sentencing appellant to a period of incarceration. Therefore, the portion of the trial court's judgment imposing a jail sentence is vacated. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

Appellant admitted violating his community control, and he was afforded all of his due process rights when the court revoked his community control and imposed sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—R.C. 319.16—Common pleas court judge sought writ of mandamus ordering county auditor to issue warrants on county treasurer for payment of court-ordered expenditures—Writ granted.

The trial court did not err in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Appellant cannot challenge the trial court's tentative pretrial ruling on a motion in limine, and appellant failed to seek admission of the disputed evidence at trial. The trial court's personal opinion about a jury instruction on reasonable doubt did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. Defense counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on aggravated assault did not constitute ineffective assistance where the evidence did not support the instruction. Three comments made by the prosecutor were not improper and did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant's convictions for murder and felonious assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motions for a new trial and for Civ.R. 60(B) relief or in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The claims, defenses, issues, and arguments presented were or could have been raised in prior proceedings, so they were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's post-conviction motion for an order requiring the State to retry or dismiss aggravated murder and aggravated robbery charges. A finding of guilt on the lesser included offense of murder operated as an acquittal of the greater offense of aggravated murder. The aggravated robbery charge was dismissed. As a result, all charges in the case were resolved when appellant was originally convicted many years ago. Appellant has had many opportunities to be heard and has previously raised this issue. Thus, appellant's motion was barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

CLASS ACTION – CLASS CERTIFICATION – CIV.R. 23 – NUMEROSITY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification where the trial court found that the numerosity requirement was lacking. Because all Civ.R. 23(A) requirements are necessary for class certification, a reviewing court may affirm a denial of class certification upon a finding that the trial court acted within its discretion as to even a single requirement.

Anders, Crim.R. 11, post release control, felony sentencing

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea - Petition for Post-Conviction Relief - Res Judicata

Max. Sentences - Consecutive Sentences

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

No plain error found where the trial court—after imposing a sentence that included prison time—erroneously indicated that the state had recommended prison time. Appellant failed to present any evidence that he would have received a more favorable sentence if the state had corrected the trial court.

Trial court did not err in appellant's community control violation sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Challenge to sentence based on trial court's consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 summarily rejected in affirming judgment.

Trial court's finding that appellant refused to submit to a chemical breath test is supported by competent credible evidence where officer testifies that appellant intentionally did not blow into the machine despite being given several opportunities to do so. Trial court's holding of an ALS hearing does not violate appellant's due process where appellant, through counsel, requested that the court proceed with the hearing.

Affirming the trial court's denial of bail following a hearing held pursuant to R.C.2937.222.

Judgment affirmed where clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1),(2), (4), and (14).

Workers' compensation—Awards under R.C. 4123.57(B) for permanent partial loss of sight—Industrial Commission abused its discretion by basing its award on application of American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA guidelines") when only medical evidence on which commission relied stated that AMA guidelines do not adequately assess percentage of total vision employee lost—Court of appeals' judgment granting writ of mandamus ordering commission to grant award affirmed.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to comply with requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaints affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment.

Defendant-appellant's OVI conviction is based on sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

manifest weight—sufficiency—community control—credibility—Evid.R. 403(A)

The trial court did not err by permitting a witness to provide expert witness testimony in violation of Evid.R. 702 and Crim.R. 16(K) where the witness at issue testified as a lay witness, not an expert witness, given the witness's testimony related to the witness's observations and first-hand account of two dogs haggard appearance and obvious malnourishment upon the witness first having contact with the two dogs at the animal hospital where the witness worked as the hospital's boarding lead. Additionally, appellant's conviction for three counts of second-degree misdemeanor cruelty to a companion animal in violation of R.C. 951.131(D)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence where the state provided evidence that the three dogs at issue were underweight, some severely, while in appellant's custody and care, weight that the three dogs quickly regained to once again become healthy, beautiful dogs once the three dogs were moved to a dog shelter and provided with the necessary sustenance and sufficient quantities of good, wholesome food and water.

Appellant's conviction for violating a protection order is supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury believed the state's witnesses, who testified that appellant yelled at and threatened the victim in violation of the protection order's terms.

Father's convictions for attempted rape and attempted gross sexual imposition were supported by sufficient evidence. In this case, Father had begun expressing an interest in engaging in real incest with his children, an idea that he had long harbored as a fantasy. During a camping trip with his family, Father engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward engaging in sexual conduct and sexual contact with his daughter.

Appellant's convictions for felonious assault and assault of two corrections officers were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant forfeited his constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law by not first raising the issue with the trial court. The trial court's failure to provide appellant with the necessary notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) regarding the indefinite nature of his sentence resulted in reversible error and the matter was remanded on this limited issue.

R.C. 2945.38(C)(2) unambiguously limits the maximum amount of time that a criminal defendant can be ordered to undergo treatment to restore him to competency to a maximum of six months when the defendant is facing a felony offense that is not a first or second-degree offense of violence. The time period for restorative treatment does not begin anew or "restart" when there is a period of competency in between incompetency findings. As there was not a substantial probability that the defendant could be restored to competency with less than six months of treatment, the trial court should have dismissed the indictment and discharged the defendant or, alternatively, filed an affidavit in probate court for civil commitment pursuant to Chapter 5122. or 5123. of the Revised Code. The decision of the court was reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with R.C. 2945.38(H)(4).

CRIMINAL - CONSTITUTIONAL - Motion to suppress Fourth Amendment Ohio Constitution Unreasonable search and seizure warrantless protective search pat down reasonable suspicion Exclusionary Rule Terry pat down requires reasonable suspicion that individual is armed based on totality of the circumstances where no articulable facts indicate officer believed individual was armed, search exceeded scope of Terry.

CIVIL - summary judgment recreational sports negligence trial court failed to consider evidence before it and whether nonmoving party met reciprocal burden certified partial transcripts no objection by opposing party.

CIVIL - Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted defamation judicial immunity judicial act.

CRIMINAL - Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2953.08 does not apply to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 Sentence is not otherwise contrary to law R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

CRIMINAL LAW - revocation of community control consecutive sentences statutory findings R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

CRIMINAL - Obstructing Justice motion to suppress Miranda warnings traffic stop custodial interrogation

CIVIL - seeking enforcement of an arbitration provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement and declaratory relief to determine whether the issue of arbitrability falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of an arbitrator and whether the Union made a timely demand for arbitration SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over Chapter 4117 claims appellant was not an aggrieved party under R.C. 2711.03(A) as he was not a party to the CBA appellant lacked standing to bring his complaint and it was properly dismissed affirmed.

CRIMINAL - Attempted Rape Felonious Assault manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence R.C. 2923.02(A) R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) credibility of witnesses jury in best position to assess credibility jury instructions "false in one, false in all" jury charge ineffective assistance of counsel leading questions cross-examination trial strategy prejudice

APPELLATE REVIEW - Lack of final appealable order default judgment relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) final order R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) determination of damages deferred parties and claims not disposed of in entry on appeal no Civ.R. 54(B) language.

Civ.R. 60(B), excusable neglect, damages determination

Proximate Result - Involuntary Manslaughter

Criminal law—A conviction for rape based on insertion under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) must be supported by evidence that the defendant inserted a body part or object into another—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Mandamus—Inmate's claim not cognizable in mandamus to extent he seeks release from prison—Inmate failed to show existence of a clear legal right or clear legal duty enforceable in mandamus—An agency's internal policy does not create a legal duty enforceable in mandamus—Writ denied.

Mandamus—Inmate's complaint challenging nunc pro tunc sentencing entry failed to state a viable mandamus claim against named respondent—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

A finding of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite under R.C. 2152.12 to transferring a child to adult court for prosecution of an act charged—A juvenile court may transfer a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court's jurisdiction is limited to the acts charged for which probable cause was found.

forcible entry and detainer – land – sale – residential property

summary judgment, foreclosure, face-to-face meeting, 24 C.F.R. 203.604 (c)(2)

operating under the influence, motion to suppress, reasonable suspicion, probable cause to arrest, Crim.R. 29, impair driving ability, ineffective assistance of counsel

Appellant appeals the trial court's issuance of a civil stalking protection order. Because appellant has not caused a transcript of the trial court's proceedings to be filed, we must presume the regularity and correctness of the trial court's judgment. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence was not unlawful. The trial court considered the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. The Reagan Tokes Law, under which appellant was sentenced, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or the right to due process. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress evidence, as the inventory search in question was performed pursuant to Dayton Police Department policy and the search was not a pretext for an investigatory search. Judgment affirmed.

At resentencing pursuant to a remand from this court, the trial court merged appellant's aggravated robbery and felony murder offenses and, based on the State's election, resentenced appellant for felony murder. Contrary to appellant's claim otherwise, the trial court did not resentence appellant for aggravated robbery, nor did the trial court impose a term of post-release control for aggravated robbery during the resentencing hearing. The amended sentencing entry does, however, incorrectly reflect that appellant is required to serve a term of post-release control for aggravated robbery. The amended sentencing entry also incorrectly cites felony murder as being in violation of R.C. 2903.04(B) as opposed to R.C. 2903.02(B). These are clerical errors that can be corrected nunc pro tunc. The matter is therefore remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the clerical errors in the amended sentencing entry. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The trial court reasonably concluded that defense counsel's actions did not constitute excusable neglect and that his actions were properly imputed to appellant. Civ.R. 60(B)(5) did not apply. Judgment affirmed.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress where the investigatory stop of the appellant's vehicle was supported by both reasonable suspicion and probable cause and was constitutionally valid where the officer observed a loud exhaust, a marked lanes violation and a turn signal violation appellant was not in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings where he was temporarily detained as part of an investigatory stop, despite the fact that he was seated in the cruiser while the trooper searched his vehicle pursuant to a consent search also, the constitutionality of sentencing pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act is not yet ripe for review because the appellant has not yet served his minimum prison term.

Knowing, voluntary, Intelligent plea

Appellate law—App.R. 26(B)—Under App.R. 26(B), the determination whether appellate counsel was deficient and prejudiced an applicant is to be made after the appeal has been reopened and the parties are afforded the opportunity to have counsel, transmit the necessary record, and substantively brief the issues—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

Private-citizen affidavits—R.C. 2935.09—Court of appeals' dismissal of affidavit for lack of jurisdiction affirmed.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—Statutory damages—Writ granted in part and denied in part.

Preindictment delay actual prejudice justifiable delay law-of-the-case doctrine ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to establish actual and substantial prejudice based on the period of preindictment delay. Defendant established that he suffered actual prejudice in the form of a deceased witness who was present for a portion of the incident and would have provided testimony that minimized or eliminated the impact of the state's witness. Nevertheless, even though the trial court erred in finding no prejudice, the trial court was correct, given its finding, in deciding not to address the issue of the state's reason for the delay. The case is thus affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the state provided sufficient reason to justify the period of preindictment delay.

Preindictment delay actual prejudice justifiable delay law of the case ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to establish actual and substantial prejudice based on the period of preindictment delay. Defendant established that he suffered actual prejudice in the form of a deceased witness who was present for a portion of the incident and would have provided testimony that minimized or eliminated the impact of the state's witness. Nevertheless, even though the trial court erred in finding no prejudice, the trial court was correct, given its finding, in deciding not to address the issue of the state's reason for the delay. The case is thus affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the state provided sufficient reason to justify the period of preindictment delay.

Manifest weight of the evidence witness credibility sufficiency of the evidence court witnesses cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are primarily for the finder of fact. The finder of fact is in the best position to weigh witness credibility. The defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. The state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant acted alongside the codefendant with the same purpose. A trial court's decision to treat a witness as a court's witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion. It is not an abuse of discretion for a court to call a witness where the record demonstrates that the witness was not going to abide by his or her plea agreement to testify truthfully and consistent with prior statements. The defendant's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. He was sentenced within the statutory range for each of his convictions, the sentences were not ordered to be served consecutively, and he did not receive the maximum sentence on any one particular count.

R.C. 5721.18 foreclosure R.C. 5723.01 forfeiture R.C. 5723.03 redemption Civ.R. 62(B) stay upon appeal supersedeas bond. Appellant's appeal dismissed as moot because appellant did not obtain a stay or post a bond to prevent execution of the court's foreclosure and forfeiture decrees, the property was sold to a third party, and the proceeds were distributed, extinguishing the matter through satisfaction of the judgment.

Speedy trial R.C. 2945.71 toll R.C. 2945.72 COVID-19 Administrative Orders dismiss. - Trial court erred in finding that the state violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial and thus, dismissing the indictment. The Administrative Orders issued by the Administrate Judge of the common pleas court, general division, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, tolled the speedy trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72.

Civ.R. 60(B) relief from judgment excusable neglect procedural outcomes adjudication on the merits. Trial court properly denied a motion for relief from judgment where the moving party failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.

Mandamus DNA testing, discovery Crim.R. 16 Crim.R. 42 R.C. 2969.25(A) R.C. 2969.25(C) violation of due process rights violation of equal protection rights judicial discretion prohibitory injunction declaratory judgment. The relator has filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus and seeks an order from this court that requires the relator-judge to overturn his judgment with regard to a discovery matter and DNA testing. A review of the relator's original complaint for mandamus fails to reveal compliance with R.C. 2969.25. R.C. 2969.25(A) requires the relator to file an affidavit listing each civil action or appeal of a civil action he has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court, as well as information regarding the outcome of each civil action or appeal. Compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) is mandatory and the failure to comply subjects the complaint to dismissal. In addition, the relator has failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which requires that an inmate file a certified statement from his prison cashier setting forth the balance in his private account for each of the preceding six months. The failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) constitutes sufficient reason to deny a writ claim, deny indigency status, and assess costs against the relator. Noncompliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) and 2969.25(C) cannot be cured by amendment of the original complaint. This court possesses original jurisdiction over a complaint for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(1) of the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 2731.01 and 2731.02. The requisites for mandamus are well established: 1) the relator must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief 2) the relator must establish that respondent-judge possesses a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief and 3) the relator possesses no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is to be exercised with great caution and granted only when the right is absolutely clear. Mandamus should not issue in doubtful cases. The relator has failed to establish that his rights under Crim.R. 16 and 42, due process, and equal protection have been violated. The relator has also failed to establish the duty owed by the respondent-judge with regard to Crim.R. 16 and 42, due process, and equal protection. In addition, mandamus cannot be used to control the discretion of the respondent-judge via discovery orders. Finally, the real purpose of the complaint for a writ of mandamus is a prohibitory injunction to prevent the state from conducting addition DNA testing and to declare the rights and duties of the relator and the respondent-judge with regard to discovery and additional DNA testing. A complaint for mandamus that seeks a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Complaint dismissed.

Habeas corpus, failure to state a claim, R.C. 2969.25(C), R.C. 2725.04, and verification. The court dismissed a petition for habeas corpus because the petitioner misinterpreted the court's journal entry and did not state a claim for relief. Petitioner also did not verify the petition as required by R.C. 2725.04 and did not file a proper poverty affidavit as required by R.C. 2969.25.

App.R. 26(B), ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, timeliness, good cause, and delay in obtaining transcripts. The court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen as untimely because counsel's delay in sending the transcripts does not state good cause for untimely filing.

Motion to intervene foreclosure distribution of excess sale proceeds. Appellant, a third party who was assigned the mortgage after Deutsche Bank defaulted on a tax foreclosure complaint and the property was sold in a sheriff's sale pursuant to a decree of foreclosure, cannot claim any interest in the excess sale proceeds to be protected by Civ.R. 24 through a motion to intervene. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to intervene.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

On Requester's objections to a report and recommendation, the Court overruled the objections, adopted the report and recommendation, found that Requester was an aggrieved person under RC. 2743.75(F)(3), and determined that, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(3)(b), Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, but Requester was not entitled to recover attorney fees.

After neither party timely filed written objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation. The Court adopted the report and recommendation, found that that Respondent had failed to produce public records in violation of R.C. 149.43((B)(1), ordered Respondent to forthwith disclose certain redacted employee names, as set forth in the report and recommendation, and determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, but Requester was not entitled to recover attorney fees.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent database. Requester sought lists of MARCS radio ID's, Talkgroup numbers, and Channel Names associated with the City of Columbus. Respondent denied that it possessed the lists and asserted that in any case the information would be exempt as security and infrastructure records. The special master found requester had failed to show that respondent could produce the requested lists from a single database using existing programming and further found that respondent had no duty to create a new record.

After neither party timely filed written objections to a report and recommendation, the Court determined that there was an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation as to the issue of a lack of jurisdiction. The Court adopted, in part, the report and recommendation, granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, and rendered judgment in favor of Respondent.

After neither party timely filed written objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation. The Court adopted the report and recommendation.

Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2), the Court sua sponte dismissed Requester's complaint without prejudice in accordance with a special master's recommendation.

Attorneys—Rules of Professional Conduct—Willfulness and intent of conduct under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)—Cause dismissed.

Original jurisdiction—Mandamus—Takings—Article IV, Section 3(B) of Ohio Constitution does not grant courts of appeals original jurisdiction to decide nuisance claims or empower them to grant declaratory, injunctive, or compensatory relief—Owner of land near construction of power lines failed to allege risks of harm constituting an actionable taking—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Court of appeals correctly dismissed complaint for failure to state a habeas claim—Judgment affirmed.

community control – extension – authority – expiration date – theft – violation

Traf.R. 11, Crim.R. 12, motion to suppress, leave, untimely, abuse of discretion

Anders, speedy trial, R.C. 2945.71, ineffective assistance of counsel

plea colloquy, Crim.R. 11, maximum penalty, App.R. 16, Section 2929.13(D)

APPELLATE REVIEW: R.C. 2929.20 the denial of a motion for judicial release is not a final appealable order cannot affect a substantial right trial court judge has full discretion whether to grant or deny judicial release.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - R.C. Chapter 6117 household septic systems public health nuisance sanitary sewer districts wastewater treatment plant board of commissioners environmental protection agency property owner has no right to appeal necessity of the improvement when declared necessary by the director of environmental protection probate court exceeded its jurisdiction boundaries of the assessment district due process probate court substituted its judgment for the board tentative apportionment of the assessment benefit of improvement to the property property owner did not meet burden of proof.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - R.C. Chapter 6117 household septic systems public health nuisance sanitary sewer districts wastewater treatment plant board of commissioners environmental protection agency property owner has no right to appeal necessity of the improvement when declared necessary by the director of environmental protection probate court exceeded its jurisdiction boundaries of the assessment district due process probate court substituted its judgment for the board tentative apportionment of the assessment benefit of improvement to the property property owner did not meet burden of proof.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

ORIGINAL ACTION - writs of mandamus remand from Supreme Court of Ohio summary judgment solid waste management district Open Meetings Act R.C. 121.22 meeting minutes consent agenda act already performed general compliance with the law Public Records Act statutory damages obligation imposed by R.C. 149.43(B) missing exhibit.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - multiple offenses consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) trial court failed to make findings remand for resentencing.

CIVIL - political subdivision immunity summary judgment R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) negligent failure to keep public roads in repair pothole road under construction constructive notice exercise of judgment or discretion R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).

DAMAGES – DUTY TO MITIGATE – INSURANCE: Plaintiff did not demonstrate that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence in connection with plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where plaintiff did not establish that the trial court deemed the filing untimely or otherwise ignored the contents of the filing. The trial court's finding that plaintiff suffered no damages for breach of a life insurance policy was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant breached the policy by informing plaintiff that the policy had lapsed, but later remedied the situation by reinstating the policy.

MUNICIPAL TAXATION – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL – DUE PROCESS: The trial court did not err in granting the city's motion to dismiss the taxpayer's complaint where the taxpayer alleged that Section 29, 2020 H.B. 197 ("Section 29") was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because it permitted a municipal corporation to tax a nonresident's income for work performed outside of the municipal corporation: the city was required to follow the dictates of the General Assembly in applying Section 29, which required that the plaintiff taxpayer be deemed to have been working from his principal place of business within the city, even though he was not physically present there because of the COVID-19 stay-at-home order, and as an Ohio citizen, plaintiff received all the process that he was due under the law.

R.C. 2953.32 – R.C. 2953.31 – EXPUNGMENT: Under R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.31, the trial court erred in sealing defendant's conviction for misdemeanor assault because defendant had three felony convictions in Hamilton County and that were not of the fourth or fifth degree.

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio Redistricting Commission's revised plan violates Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution—Revised plan is invalid—The Ohio Redistricting Commission shall be reconstituted, convene, and adopt an entirely new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution.

Application for writ of procedendo dismissed as moot. Respondent performed action subject to relator's petition.

Complaint for writ of mandamus dismissed upon evidence that respondents were not the persons or entities responsible for providing records requested by relator but nevertheless provided relator with the records he requested.

Adoption—Parent's right to consent to the adoption of his children not extinguished under R.C. 3107.07(A)—Judgment affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Court of appeals improperly considered an unauthenticated document submitted in support of warden's motion for summary judgment— The reliability of documents purportedly printed from a website is questionable unless verified by a sworn affidavit—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition reversed and cause remanded.

Habeas corpus—Petitioner failed to state a valid claim for relief in habeas—Writ denied.

SPBR administrative order adopting the employer's rescission of the position abolishment did not constitute an "adjudication" as defined in R.C. 119.01(D) because the order did not determine the "rights, duties, privileges, benefits or legal relations" of the parties with respect to the issue that was before it. Nor was the former employee adversely affected by the SPBR order because the rescission restored him to his former position with any backpay due. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the R.C. Chapter 119 appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The interpretation of "records of inmates", as used in R.C. 5120.21(F), from State ex rel. Hogan Lovells U.S., L.L.P. v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-1762, does not extend to the circumstances of this case as the public records sought here (1) relate to the inmate seeking the records himself, and (2) are the basis of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority's (OAPA) denial of the inmate's eligibility for Transitional Control. The court adopts the magistrate's findings of fact, but not the conclusions of law. The court grants a limited writ of mandamus.

BTA erred and violated legal duty by adopting the auditor's original allocation of value without conducting its own independent valuation. We reverse and remand for the BTA to conduct an independent determination of value based on all the evidence set forth in the record.

Respondent's motion to dismiss relator's request for a writ of mandamus was granted because relator failed to fully comply with R.C. 2969.25(A). Further, relator's motion to amend his complaint, motion for summary judgment and motion for leave to file objections were rendered moot.

CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER – CIV.R.65.1 – OBJECTIONS: Respondent-appellant could not challenge on appeal the trial court's decision to adopt the civil stalking protection order without first filing objections pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1.

DISCOVERY – CIV.R. 56(F) – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where defendant failed to appropriately answer discovery requests going to an essential element of the case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Civ.R. 56(F) motion for additional time to respond to defendant's motion for summary judgment.

THEFT — R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) — EVID.R. 701 — EVIDENCE —LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state's lay witness to testify that store merchandise was recovered from defendant where that testimony was based on the observation of the witness. Defendant's conviction for theft was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where store surveillance footage showed defendant gathering merchandise and a store employee testified that merchandise that had not been paid for was recovered from defendant.

sealing, record of conviction, R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) and (7), R.C. 2953.32

post-conviction petition, untimely, res judicata

Death of appellant/App.R 29/Mootness

Evidence-trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence when it was relevant and when probative value did not substantially outweigh any prejudice sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence-defendant's convictions not against the manifest weight of the evidence and sufficient evidence supported convictions evidence showed that defendant rented vehicle in which heroin was discovered and had been in dominion and control of vehicle for about one week reviewing court will not consider defendant's argument that his possessing criminal tools conviction was inconsistent with trafficking in drugs conviction when defendant failed to cite any authority in support ineffective assistance of counsel-trial counsel not ineffective for failing to file various motions that did not have a reasonable probability of success trial counsel not ineffective for failing to object to state's motion to amend indictment when objecting would have been a futile effort defendant did not establish that eight-year prison sentence clearly and convincingly contrary to law-record did not support claim that trial court acted vindictively due to defendant' s decision to reject state's plea offer and to instead proceed to trial

R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 mandatory transfer Crim.R. 11 strict compliance. Appellant's case was transferred from juvenile court to the general division of the common pleas court. Ohio's juvenile mandatory transfer procedures, R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12, have been determined to be constitutional. Further, the trial court properly conducted a colloquy with appellant on the record and determined that her waiver of a probable cause hearing was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Appellant's plea after transfer of the case was invalid because the trial court did not strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C).

Participating in a criminal gang R.C. 2923.42(A) sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of the evidence jury instructions prejudice curative instruction Reagan Tokes Law.- Defendant's conviction for participating in a criminal gang in violation of R.C. 2923.42(A) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence demonstrated (1) the existence of a criminal gang, (2) defendant's active participation in the gang, (3) defendant's knowledge of the gang's pattern of criminal activity, and (4) defendant's purposeful promotion, furtherance, or assistance with the gang's commission of criminal acts. The trial court did not commit plain error by not instructing the jury on aggravated robbery, robbery, or discharge over a roadway where no evidence of these offenses was produced at trial. The defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of improper evidence where defense counsel invited the error, and the remedy requested by defense counsel, a curative instruction given during the general jury charge, was adopted by the trial court in full. Defendant was properly sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law where the conduct for which he was found guilty occurred after the effective date of the law.

Frivolous motion to withdraw appointed appellate court assigned error waiver of jury trial R.C. 2945.05 Crim.R. 23 ineffective assistance of counsel confusion plea agreement Crim.R. 11. The potential assignments of error in the Anders brief have no merit and would have been wholly frivolous because: (1) Phillips executed a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial, (2) defense counsel's actions were not deficient and, therefore, there was no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11's constitutional requirements and substantially complied with the rule's nonconstitutional notifications so that defendant's guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, counsel's motion to withdraw was granted.

Legal malpractice damages, third-party claims malicious conduct. Defendant attorneys did not inform their client and her husband of a settlement offer in their client's case. Client later settled the case for a greater amount than the settlement offer. Client, her husband, and their opponent in the underlying litigation filed suit alleging legal malpractice. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to legal malpractice defendants as client and her husband could not show damages caused by alleged legal malpractice of defendants. Further, the third-party legal malpractice failed as no objective evidence showed defendants acted with malice.

Lesser included jury instruction abuse of discretion rape sexual battery defendant's claim of victim consent complete defense. A trial court's determination of whether to give a requested lesser-included instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The question of whether a particular offense should be submitted to the jury as a lesser-included offense involves a two-tiered analysis. The first tier is a purely legal question under which it is determined whether one offense is generally a lesser-included offense of the charged offense. Under the second tier, the trial court considers the evidence and determines whether a jury could reasonably find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but guilty of the lesser-included offense. Sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(2) is not a lesser-included offense of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) is a lesser-included offense of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Where a defendant claims that the victim consented to the sexual conduct no instruction on the lesser-included offense is warranted. The jury would have to choose between a complete defense, and therefore acquittal, or the commission of the crime of rape.

Leave new trial hearing abuse of discretion newly discovered Crim.R. 33(A)(6) Crim.R. 33(B) unavoidably prevented reasonable time eyewitness testimony recantation actual innocence postconviction relief untimely R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence or in denying the motion for leave without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant did not show that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the purported newly discovered evidence of an eyewitness's statement recantation of his trial testimony or that he requested leave to file his motion for new trial within a reasonable period of time. Appellant's claim of actual innocence was rejected. Appellant's untimely petition for postconviction relief was properly denied.

Sentence community-control sanctions violation sentence served underlying conviction moot. Defendant's appeal of his imposed sentence is moot where the defendant served the sentence in its entirety and he did not appeal the underlying conviction.

Domestic violence self-defense sufficiency manifest weight court costs. Self-defense claims are generally an issue of credibility and whether the state disproves any of the elements of self-defense is left to the trier of fact to decide. Having carefully reviewed the entirety of the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say the trier of fact lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding appellant guilty of domestic violence despite her claim of self-defense.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel good cause untimely application appellate counsel's discretion to decide which issues to raise and argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel motion to suppress letters. - The application to reopen was denied where the application was filed almost five years from the date of the appellate decision without a showing of good cause for the delayed filing. Even if the application was timely, the claimed instances of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel do not establish a colorable claim of ineffective assistance to warrant reopening.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel speedy trial R.C. 2945.71 R.C. 2945.72 2020 Am.Sub. H.B. No. 197 Sections 22(B) and (C) In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed by Rules Promulgated by the Supreme Court and Use of Technology, 03/27/2020 Administrative Actions, 2020-Ohio-1166. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a defendant must be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest. Each day of incarceration while awaiting trial, counts as three days toward the 270-day speedy trial requirement per R.C. 2945.71(E). The running of the days counted toward speedy trial can be tolled by any continuance granted on the defendant's motion or any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the defendant's own motion pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H). Herein, a period of 562 days ran between the defendant's arrest and the commencement of trial. However, only a period of 162 days was chargeable against the 270 days required for speedy trial because the remainder of the days between arrest and the commencement of trial were tolled because of the numerous requests of pretrial continuances, trial continuances, and the tolling of speedy trial from March 9, 2020, through July 30, 2020, as promulgated by the Ohio legislature and the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The objections filed by Respondent OFP are overruled and the objection filed by Relator Fair Housing are overruled. The magistrate properly found that OFP is a public office for purposes of the Public Records Act and therefore must respond to Fair Housing's public records request by providing all records not otherwise exempt from disclosure pursuant to the statute. We modify the magistrate's decision to reflect that on page eight, in the second full paragraph, the phrase "all other documents are public records" should instead be "all other records are public records", and further modify the decision to reflect that both conditions of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b) have been met so as to decline to award statutory damages. As so modified, we otherwise adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Accordingly, we grant relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

The trial court lacked authority to conduct proceedings on an alleged community control violation where the state did not notify Browning of the alleged violation or commence the community control proceedings before the expiration of his term of community control. Additionally, Browning's argument related to the trial court's imposition of a fine and court costs is not properly before this court on appeal.

The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as competent, credible evidence supported appellee's failure to accommodate and disability discrimination claims against appellant. And the trial court did not misapply the law in reviewing appellee's claims. Despite appellee repeatedly seeking an accommodation based on her disability, and the information provided in support being reasonable on its face, unrefuted, and sufficient for its purpose, appellant rejected the request as inadequate. This response reasonably could be viewed as a complete failure to accommodate, with appellee deciding to resign being a foreseeable consequence of appellant's denial of appellee's request. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, a business premises owner, on the negligence claim filed by the plaintiff, a business invitee. Reasonable minds could only conlcude that the elevation difference in the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell was an open and obvious danger that was not hidden, concealed from view, or undiscoverable upon ordinary inspection. Further, there was no evidence of attendant circumstances that enhanced the danger to the plaintiff and contributed to his fall.

Although the trial court correctly declined to use an Affidavit of Merit in assessing summary judgment, deposition testimony of a treating doctor established that a question of fact exists as to whether the alleged negligent delay in discovering cancer proximately caused harm to the plaintiff patient. Testimony reflected an issue of fact as to whether the calculus for treatment options had changed with the delay, and also reflected that the patient's tumor had grown and moved over that time. Summary judgment reversed case remanded.

Relators failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A). Magistrate recommends sua sponte dismissal and this court adopts. Action dismissed.

Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because certificates of judgment filed by the Department of Taxation were not final, appealable orders, and no action had been taken to enforce the certificates of judgment.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment de novo premises liability invitee ordinary care trivial or minor defect doctrine open and obvious defect doctrine

Property law—Conveyance of oil and gas interests—Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56—Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq.—Under common law applicable to quiet-title action, conveyance of real property had to include words of inheritance for grantor to pass on, or to retain part of, a fee-simple absolute interest in the land—If conveyance did not include words of inheritance, then grantee received, or grantor retained, only a life estate in the land—Marketable Title Act and Dormant Mineral Act provide independent, alternative statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral interests with the surface property subject to those interests—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded to the trial court.

Property law—Conveyance of oil and gas interests—Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56—Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq.—Recorded title transactions—Under common law applicable to quiet-title action, conveyance of real property had to include words of inheritance for grantor to pass on, or to retain part of, a fee-simple absolute interest in the land—If conveyance did not include words of inheritance, then grantee received, or grantor retained, only a life estate in the land—Marketable Title Act and Dormant Mineral Act provide independent, alternative statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral interests with the surface property subject to those interests—A will that does not distribute the decedent's oil and gas rights does not affect title and is not a recorded title transaction that prevents those rights from being extinguished by the Marketable Title Act—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

On motion for immediate interim remedial suspension.

Trial court properly recast motion to vacate conviction and sentence as a petition for postconviction relief. Petition was not filed within 365 days of the transcripts being filed in appellant's direct appeal and exceptions under R.C. 2953.23(A) did not apply to excuse his untimeliness, therefore, the trial court lacked authority to consider it. Appellant's arguments are also barred by doctrine of res judicata because they could have been raised on direct appeal.

Community control violation, offense, consecutive sentence.

Appellant appeals her convictions for failure to stop after an accident and failure to keep an assured clear distance. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant appeals pro se from his convictions for felonious assault, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and having weapons while under disability. The record does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or judicial bias. The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing, the reasons for which were appropriately set forth on the record and in its written decision on the motion. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was not entitled to community control sanctions for her three theft offenses, because the trial court reasonably found that she engaged in organized criminal activity. Her aggregate, consecutive sentence of 30 months was not contrary to law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing restitution. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant has not demonstrated error in the trial court's order awarding attorney fees and costs to appellee. Seven of the appellant's 15 assignments of error are unrelated to the fee award and are not properly part of the present appeal. The other eight assignments of error fail to establish any error. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2909.06(A)(2), sufficiency of the evidence, R.C. 1.51, R.C. 2923.162, ineffective assistance of counsel, motion to suppress, restitution, R.C. 2929.28(A)(1), admission of evidence, Evid.R. 702(B), Evid.R. 801(D)(2)

negligence – property damages – smoking – remand – summary judgment –motion for relief from judgment – notice of appeal – moot

sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance of counsel, Evid.R. 614(A)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff-appellee's leave to amend its complaint. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court's clerical error is not reversible error and should be addressed through the appropriate mechanism under Civ.R. 60(A) in the trial court. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking defendant-appellant's judicial release and reimposing the remainder of his original sentence.

Because the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences and those findings are supported by the record, defendant-appellant's consecutive sentences are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

The defendant-appellant's speedy-trial rights were not violated.

Trial court did not err in revoking community control and imposing a prison term when appellant failed to appear for any of the visits after the initial one and for subsequently testing positive for multiple illegal substances.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

The repeat OVI offender specification did not elevate the underlying OVI charge to a fourth-degree felony the OVI was charged as a fourth-degree felony irrespective of the specification. There is no legal requirement that the indictment identify the underlying felony which elevates the degree of the failure to appear charge the indictment is sufficient if it alleges that the underlying offense is a felony. The record is clear that appellant understood that he was being charged with a fourth-degree felony in both cases. Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion to withdraw appellant's valid guilty plea.

The trial court did not provide the defendant with the necessary notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) regarding the indefinite nature of his sentence, which resulted in reversible error and the matter was remanded for resentencing on this limited issue.

Defendant claims guilty pleas not entered knowingly. Court imposed indefinite sentence that exceeded jointly recommend cap in negotiated plea agreement. Plea compliant with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). Court not bound by recommended cap. Plea knowing and intelligent because court informed defendant it could impose a sentence greater than recommended cap.

Despite the trial court's inclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) language finding no just cause for delay, the trial court's decision overruling appellants' Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was not a final appealable order given the well-settled principle that a trial court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction does not satisfy the requirements for a provisional remedy since a post-judgment appeal from a decision overruling a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will provide an adequate legal remedy.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a church and its pastor a writ of mandamus compelling the city to issue violation notices to an business for non-compliance with the city's flood regulations.

application to reopen appeal App.R. 26(B) judgment of conviction postconviction relief petition

CRIMINAL LAW - rape kidnapping gross sexual imposition sexual conduct sexual contact sexual activity minor victim manifest weight of the evidence legally sufficient evidence juror misconduct motion for new trial mistrial Crim.R. 33 alternate jurors.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 32.1, post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, Crim.R. 11(C), res judicata, manifest injustice, affidavit, transcript.

CIVL - Civ. R. 56(C) summary judgment premises liability business invitee constructive knowledge open and obvious doctrine attendant circumstances mode of operation theory burden shifting.

CRIMINAL - nunc pro tunc Crim.R. 32(C) clerical error judgment of conviction final order harmless error

CIVIL - summary judgment fraud property disclosure form R.C. 5302.30 knowledge intent to deceive reasonable reliance indemnity agency

Attorneys—Misconduct—Attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring an attorney to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the client's matter) and 3.4(d) (requiring an attorney to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party)—Two-year suspension imposed, stayed in its entirety on conditions.

Mandamus—Prohibition—Writs sought to compel a judge to grant full access to documents filed in a lawsuit brought by a police officer and to prevent the judge from continuing to permit the police officer to proceed with the lawsuit under a pseudonym—Writs granted.

Taxation—Use taxes—Tax penalties—R.C. 5739.13(A)—Tax commissioner has discretion whether to impose a penalty for unpaid taxes—Abatement of a penalty is clearly erroneous when there is no basis for finding that the tax commissioner acted arbitrarily or unconscionably—Board of Tax Appeals' decision abating penalty reversed.

The Industrial Commission of Ohio abused its discretion in denying relator's application for permanent total disability compensation based on a physician's report that, while indicating relator can engage in sedentary work, also indicates that relator has physical restrictions that are inconsistent with performing sedentary work. The commission is directed to vacate the order denying the application and enter a new order that adjudicates the application in a manner consistent with this decision. Objections sustained in part and overruled in part writ granted.

SENTENCING — R.C. 2953.08 — PLAIN ERROR — CONTRARY TO LAW: The trial court committed plain error when it accepted defendant's guilty plea for a misdemeanor and sentenced defendant for a felony offense.

42 U.S.C. 1983—judicial proceedings—immunity—privilege—witnesses—service—amendment of pleadings—defamation—intentional infliction of emotional distress

Civ.R. 12(B)(6)—sua sponte—notice—evidence outside pleadings

peer review privilege, R.C. 2305.252, peer review committee, motion to compel, final appealable order

R.C. 2953.21, petition for post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.23, repealed statute, judicial bias

Felonious assault endangering children discretionary bindover probable cause amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system guilty plea subject-matter jurisdiction nonjurisdictional errors

Denial of motion to seal record

Shareholder Action Statute of Limitations Summary Judgment

Domestic violence guilty plea Crim.R. 11 standard of review State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286 mandatory penalty nonconstitutional right substantial compliance sentence R.C. 2953.08(G) R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Judgment affirmed. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) when it advised appellant that "there would be no reduction" in the imposition of his postrelease control. The Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the review standard on appeal regarding compliance with Crim.R. 11. Appellate inquiry no longer focuses on strict, substantial, or partial compliance with the rule. Rather, the questions to be answered are as follows: "(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?" In addition, appellant's 36-month maximum sentence for domestic violence is not contrary to law when the sentence was within the range for the offense and the trial court considered the factors and principles in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Guilty plea Crim.R. 11 nonconstitutional rights knowing, intelligent, and voluntary maximum potential penalty consecutive sentence. Appellant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court fully complied with the nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11(C) by informing appellant of the maximum penalties he faced for each of the counts to which he was pleading guilty.

R.C. 149.43(B)(8), mandamus, public records, witness statements, clerk of courts, judicial approval to obtain records, R.C. 2969.25(A), prior lawsuit affidavit, and inability to cure. The court dismissed an inmate's public-records mandamus because the inmate did not obtain prior judicial approval to seek the records under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and because the inmate submitted an incorrect prior lawsuit affidavit under R.C. 2969.25(A) that could not be cured by a supplemental filing.

Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2901.011 S.B. 201 R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 R.C. 2967.271 due process separation of powers indefinite nonlife sentence qualifying felony offense. The defendants in this en banc proceeding have not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the Reagan Tokes Law, as defined under R.C. 2901.011, is unconstitutional based on the separation-of-powers doctrine violations of due process rights, or the failure of R.C. 2967.271 to provide the full panoply of trial and pretrial rights, and the challenges are therefore overruled.

PROCEDURE/RULES - WITNESSES: The trial court erred in failing to follow proper trial procedure as set forth in R.C. 2315.01, and as applied to bench trials in R.C. 2315.08, because it did not allow the parties to present witnesses, it did not swear in witnesses, and it did not allow the parties to cross-examine any witnesses. The trial court erred in failing to swear in witnesses in violation of Evid.R. 603, R.C. 2317.30, and Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

FORMER R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) – DISPOSITIONAL HEARING – AMENDED COMPLAINT – WAIVER: When the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services filed a fourth amended complaint for permanent custody, the juvenile court erred when it conducted a dispositional hearing after former R.C. 2151.35(B)(1)'s 90-day deadline expired, because the statute's mandatory deadline required the court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when a dispositional hearing was not held within 90 days of the filing of the complaint alleging child abuse, neglect, and/or dependency. The juvenile court erred when it ruled that a complaint containing no changes or alterations to the allegations or facts contained in a previous complaint was an amended complaint. The juvenile court erred when it ruled that the parties entered an express waiver of former R.C. 2151.35(B)(1)'s 90-day deadline, because the juvenile court had no authority to obtain an express waiver following the expiration of the statute's 90-day deadline.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Civ.R. 23(B)(3) predominance criteria was not established by appellant for the proposed class and proposed contract subclass. Having found the predominance criteria was not established, it was not necessary to address the criteria of ascertainability and superiority, rending the assignments of error addressing the same to be moot. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' motion for class certification. Judgment affirmed.

Criminal law—Postrelease control—A collateral attack on the trial court's imposition of postrelease control in the sentence must be brought on direct appeal or it will be barred by res judicata—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and trial-court order vacated in part.

Public-records requests—Court of appeals did not err on remand in applying R.C. 149.43(B)(8)'s requirement that inmate obtain sentencing judge's approval of release of public records relating to a criminal investigation or prosecution—Judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

Mandamus—Petition for writs to compel the trial court to vacate the petitioner's sentence and resentence him and to compel the clerk of the trial court to return funds paid as a fine and court costs—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to vacate and set aside costs.

Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial counsel not ineffective for failing to file motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds, motion to suppress, and motion for separate trial when none of motions had reasonable probability of success amend indictment-trial court did not plainly err by allowing the state to amend the indictment to charge trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) rather than 2925.03(A)(1) when amendment did not change the name of the offenes or the penalty sufficiency of the evidence-state presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant knowingly aided and abetted principal offender in committing trafficking in drugs defendant's convictions was not against the manifest weight of the evidence felony sentencing--appellate court could not review defendant's claim that the record does not support the trial court's decision to impose a six-year prison term.

Because the warden established by clear and convincing evidence that the subject dog was not provoked by the victim prior to biting the victim, the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant dog warden's objections to the magistrate's decision reversing its dangerous dog designation. R.C. 955.11 R.C. 955.222.

Drug trafficking manifest weight/sufficiency sentencing

Property law—Conveyance of oil and gas interests—Ohio Public Works Commission and Clean Ohio conservation fund, R.C. 164.20 et seq.—Deed restrictions on use and transfer—Remedies available at law and in equity—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition for failure to state valid habeas claim affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to act with reasonable diligence, to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly deliver client papers as part of the termination of representation, and to promptly refund an unearned fee—Failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation—Public reprimand.

The trial court did not err in its analysis of the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when it sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term of 30 months. Thus, appellant cannot demonstrate that his sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Additionally, the trial court did not err when it imposed consecutive sentences, because the record supported the trial court's conclusion that appellant's history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. Appellant pled guilty to abduction and gross sexual imposition, and the trial court imposed a jointly-recommended sentence of 18 months in prison. Appellant also was designated a Tier I and Tier II sex offender. There are no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault, along with firearm specifications. None of the convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the attempted murder conviction. The trial court did not err by not merging the attempted murder and felonious assault convictions. The trial court's consecutive sentencing findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. The record indicates that the trial court gave some consideration to appellant's present and future ability to pay a fine thus, the $10,000 fine was not contrary to law. Finally, the trial court erred when it concluded that the three-year consecutive sentence for the firearm specification attached to the felonious assault count was a mandatory sentence. Under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), the trial court had the discretion to impose, or not impose, a three-year consecutive sentence for this firearm specification. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing on the firearm specification attached to the felonious assault count.

Anders appeal. Appellate counsel asserts the absence of any non-frivolous issues for appeal. Our independent review of the record, as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), also reveals no issues with arguable merit to present on appeal. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not commit plain error in adopting a magistrate's decision and granting judgment in appellant's favor of $250, plus interest and court costs, although appellant had sought a greater amount. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Our independent review of the record also reveals no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals' decision that 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. 197, the COVID-19 emergency relief statute, as enacted, did not toll the March 31 deadline for filing a property valuation complaint under R.C. 5717.15(A)(1) was reasonable and lawful. Equitable estoppel did not apply to extend the filing deadline. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of solicitation and loitering to engage in solicitation. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, and they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, on this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment. Judgment affirmed.

Appellate jurisdiction existed over two orders the trial court entered because the court's initial order was not a final appealable order. Specifically, appellant's untimely objections to a magistrate's decision were still pending when the trial court filed its initial order adopting the magistrate's decision. The initial order also did not contain a Civ.R. 54(B) certification. Furthermore, the trial court did not commit plain error in finding that appellant's action was barred, as appellant failed to file suit within the limitations period contained in his insurance policy. In addition, the limitations period in the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act did not apply because the act does not apply to transactions between insurance companies and their customers. Appellant's manifest weight challenge cannot be considered on appeal because appellant failed to file a transcript of the hearing before the magistrate in the trial court proceedings. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider appellant's untimely objections to the magistrate's decision. Judgment affirmed.

Mother appeals decision denying motion for legal custody of children and granting custody of the children to foster parents. Juvenile court did not err in denying mother's motion where mother had given up custody of both children eight years earlier when the children were very young. The mother was also aware the children were being abused at a prior foster placement but, for years, took no steps to protect the children.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee where the independent contractor was driving home, where his vehicle was regularly garaged, from the contractor's facility at the time of the accident all personal detours were minor and completed before he returned to his usual route home from the contractor's facility and the plain language of appellee's insurance policy excludes coverage in such situations.

R.C. 2505.02—substantial right—R.C. 2329.02—judgment lien—certificate of judgment

To establish the crime of participating in a criminal gang in violation of R.C. 2923.42(A), the State must prove that the defendant acitvely participated in a criminal gang, with knowledge that the criminal gang engages in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and purposely promoted, furthered, or assisted any criminal conduct.

As a general matter, the decision to order a presentence investigation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Appellate procedure—App.R. 26(A)(1)(c)—Motion for reconsideration of court-of-appeals decision—Requirement under Article IV, Section 3(A) of the Ohio Constitution that three judges "participate in the hearing and disposition" of each case includes any decision made on an application for reconsideration—When a member of an original appellate panel leaves the bench before a decision on a motion for reconsideration, the departing judge may be replaced by a new judge on the panel that is reconsidering the matter.

Summary judgment political subdivision immunity

Domestic violence/Manifest weight/Whether admission to community control violations knowing intelligent and voluntary

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 2151.414: The juvenile court did not err in determining that the child cannot be placed with appellant father within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with father, where father had history of drug abuse and untreated mental-health issues, would not cooperate with case workers to address underlying issues, and had not visited or communicated with the child.

CRIMINAL-POSTCONVICTION - Appellant's application for postconviction relief arguing his sentence was void due to failure to properly impose parole and instead, impose post-release control, is time-barred where it was filed more than 365 days after the filing of the transcript in the direct appeal.

Postconviction relief petition-appellant failed to establish that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts surrounding trial court judge's alcoholism so as to allow the trial court to consider appellant's second postconvictin petition

Writ of mandamus postconviction-relief petition delay Ohio Rules of Superintendence Sup.R. 39(B)(5) findings of fact and conclusions of law R.C. 2953.21 R.C. 2953.23 moot Civ.R. 56 summary judgment. Relator's request for writ of mandamus was denied as moot where respondent issued a ruling on relator's postconviction-relief petition that was pending before respondent in an underlying action.

Statute-of-limitations, ineffective assistance of counsel, reasonable diligence, motion to dismiss, guilty plea. When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives certain defenses, including challenges to the statute of limitations. However, he may still challenge the convictions if he can establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that counsel's error(s) were such that they rendered his plea infirm. In the instant case, the state filed a John Doe-DNA indictment a week prior to the statute of limitations expiring. Three years later the defendant was identified via DNA match. However, whereas here, the record reflects that the defendant was knowable prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, there is a legitimate question as to whether the state used reasonable diligence in establishing the defendant's identity. Because the state bears the burden of proving that a prosecution was commenced within the statute of limitations, there was a reasonable probability that a motion to dismiss based on the statute-of-limitations would have been granted based on the facts of this case. Therefore, counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss based on the statute-of-limitations. Additionally, because the record reflects that the defendant would have likely withdrawn his plea and demanded his counsel proceed with trying the case, the convictions must be reversed.

Crim.R. 33 motion for leave motion for new trial DNA evidence missing evidence eyewitness identification unavoidably prevented abuse of discretion. The trial court's denial of appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial was unreasonable.

Res judicata R.C. 2947.23(C) court costs successive motions. Trial court's judgment denying motion to vacate court costs is affirmed even though trial courts retain jurisdiction under R.C. 2947.23(C) to modify costs where the defendant filed successive motions requesting the same relief.

Will contest jurisdiction standing parentage action R.C. 3111.04 R.C. 3111.05 statute of limitations. - Probate court properly dismissed appellants' will contest action because appellants lacked standing. Appellants were unable to bring a parentage action pursuant to R.C. 3111.04 because the statute of limitations to bring such action expired. Any argument regarding the constitutionality of R.C. 3111.04 and 3111.05 was waived because it was not argued with the trial court.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss governmental immunity R.C. 2744.01 et seq. wanton or reckless conduct. Trial court properly denied motion to dismiss claims of wanton or reckless conduct against college administrators, who were political-subdivision employees, where the complaint alleged facts that at least one of the administrators knew that a teacher posed a threat of harm to students when they hired the teacher.

Payment Act R.C. 4113.61 interest attorney fees breach of contract mechanic's lien bond. - Trial court's judgment finding that appellant had violated Ohio's Prompt Payment Act set forth in R.C. 4113.61 and awarding interest and attorney fees for the violation reversed because the trial court improperly found that appellant was prepaid for appellee's work and that the statute therefore required appellant to pay the appellee within 10 days of receipt of appellee's invoices, rather than 10 days after payment from the upper tier contractor trial court's judgment that appellant breached the contract between appellant and appellee reversed because the trial court based its judgment on terms that were not part of the contract trial court's judgment that surety company was liable on a surety bond for any part of the judgment rendered against the subcontractor was affirmed because neither the surety company nor the subcontractor challenged the underlying mechanic's lien at trial, thereby waiving any challenge on appeal.

The commission did not abuse its discretion by applying the "special circumstances" exception from R.C. 4123.61 to exclude 46 weeks from the average weekly wage calculation. Objection overruled writ of mandamus denied.

The SHO's mistaken reference to a prior commission order being upheld by this court was harmless error. As relator failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances, the commission properly found relator's third motion for loss of use of the left leg barred by res judicata. Objections overruled magistrate's decision adopted writ of mandamus denied.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to vacate sentence and motion to vacate judgment, interpreted as a postconviction relief petition, without a hearing as they were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate correctly determined Worthington did not show a clear legal right to health insurance coverage during her work as an independent contractor and did not show either that OPERS has a clear legal duty to provide such benefits or that The Ohio State University has a clear legal duty to remedy the gap in healthcare coverage for her. Writ of mandamus denied.

Rape - GSI - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Competency of Child to Testify - Testimony by Closed Circuit TV - Jury Instruction - Consciousness of Guilt

R.C. 2152.13 – SERIOUS YOUTHFUL OFFENDER – INDICTMENT: The juvenile court did not err in dismissing the serious-youthful-offender indictment because the state did not meet the notice or timing requirement under R.C. 2152.13(A)(4) to seek a serious-youthful-offender dispositional sentence when the case was initiated by the filing of a complaint which did not request a serious-youthful-offender dispositional sentence.

NEGLIGENCE PER SE — R.C. 3781.28(A) — EXCAVATOR — R.C. 3781.25(J) — STATUTORY INTERPRETATION — CAUSATION — DAMAGES — DIRECTED VERDICT: The trial court did not err in holding that a construction company was liable for causing damage to underground utility lines, because the construction company was excavating as defined by R.C. 3781.25(I) and the construction company's failure to contact the Ohio Utility Protection Service before excavating a driveway in violation of R.C. 3781.28(A) constituted per se negligence, and the utility company offered proof of causation and damages. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant construction company's motion for a directed verdict after plaintiff utility company produced evidence of the essential elements of its negligence claim.

The trial court did not err by denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict there was more than enough evidence presented at trial to support the appellees' claims. The trial court also did not err in awarding attorney fees to appellees, as they were statutorily authorized to collect such fees under R.C. 1333.64(C). Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err in its analysis of the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 thus, appellant cannot demonstrate that his sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Additionally, there is no indication from the record that appellant's decision to file a motion to withdraw his plea was anything other than a mere "change of heart," which was not a sufficient basis upon which to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements that he made to police and drugs found in a vehicle and on his person. Appellant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he was asked about drugs in the vehicle, and the subsequently-discovered drugs on his person would have been inevitably discovered during a search incident to his arrest. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The Miami County Court of Common Pleas erred by dismissing appellant's foreclosure action for want of subject-matter jurisdiction it incorrectly determined that the Miami County Probate Court was first to acquire jurisdiction over the matter. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant appeals from the revocation of his community control and the imposition of a 13-month prison sentence. Because he has completely served the imposed sentence, the appeal is moot. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to transfer jurisdiction over this child-custody case to a Florida court. The trial court evaluated the evidence in light of the statutory factors governing jurisdictional transfers based on an inconvenient forum. In so doing, it recognized that the parties' child has a growing connection to Florida, where the child has resided for several years. The trial court also found, however, that it was most familiar with the parties and the issues and was ready to proceed expeditiously to a final judgment. The trial court's decision to continue exercising jurisdiction was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's finding in favor of appellee, after a bench trial, on breach of contract claims was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the trial court misidentified the limited liability company of which appellant is an owner, appellant was nevertheless individually liable based on the manner in which she signed the contract. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress multiple search warrants as they were based on probable cause. Further, the trial court did not err when it failed to merge the offenses of tampering with evidence and gross abuse of a corpse because the offenses had separate, identifiable harm. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred in the complete failure to inform appellant of a possible sexual offender classification resulting from appellant's misdemeanor change of plea to no contest. This was in breach of Crim.R. 11(D). Plea and sentence vacated. Judgment reversed.

Trial court's judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's counterclaim affirmed where assignments of error challenged factual findings of the court and no transcript of trial was included in the record for review.

Fourth Amendment-traffic stop-trooper possessed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle to investigate window-tint violation and failure to have proper brake light trooper did not unlawfully expand scope of traffic stop by searching appellant's vehicle instead, trooper detected the odor of marijuana before he had completed routine procedures associated with traffic stop and odor of marijuana gave trooper probable cause to search vehicle.

Defendant noticed appeal of judgment entry of conviction. Defendant then moved for jail-time credit, which motion the court denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court failed to award him jail-time credit. Assignment of error challenged the decision denying jail-time credit, which was postjudgment order not within the scope of appeal under App.R. 3(D) and 4. The matter was dismissed.

The trial court erred in its calculation of jail-time credit appellant was entitled to receive, thereby requiring the matter be reversed and remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that properly reflected the amount of jail-time credit appellant was entitled to receive 230 days of jail-time credit rather than 148 days of jail-time credit, a difference of 82 days.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a fair and just remedy where there was conflicting evidence in the record concerning the use of proceeds from a line of credit. In addition, the trial court did not err in denying cotenant's claim for reasonable rental value. Though an owner out of possession is entitled to testify concerning the reasonable rental value of the property, the trial court was not required to accept it. Finally, the trial court did not err by denying cross-appellant's claim that he should be credited for improvements on the land where neither party benefited solely from the improvements.

Trial court did not err in dismissing inmate's petition for writ of habeas corpus where the petition was not filed in the county where the inmate was currently incarcerated, the petition was lacking commitment papers and a list of previous civil actions the inmate had filed, and the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The trial court's decision awarding appellant with 86-days of jail-time credit was reversed and remanded for further proceedings where the record was insufficient to allow for the appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court's jail-time credit calculation.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that defendant was in violation of community control by testing positive for meth.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The jury's verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Colvin had satisfied the "predominance" and "superiority" requirements for class certification.

Trial court did not err in imposing restitution when the record supported the statement that the trial court had considered Defendant's ability to pay. Trial court did not err in ordering restitution be paid for the benefit of the Ohio Attorney General's Victims of Crime Fund, even if the name was not completely accurate as it was sufficient to notify the Attorney General's Office that the funds were designated for the reparations fund.

To establish a conviction for felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the State must prove that the offender knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordinance. R.C. 2903.11(D)(4 ) indicates that a motor vehicle can be used as a deadly weapon.

The trial court did not err in granting the Agency's motions for permanent custody.

CIVIL - Child custody Purposes of Change of Temporary Custody Hearing right to counsel at custody hearings appointment of counsel court is required to ascertain whether parties know of right to counsel and appointed counsel at child custody hearings R.C. 2152.352 waive right to counsel.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - habeas corpus R.C. 2725.03 territorial jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL - Rape prosecutorial misconduct statutory definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt" substantial prejudice prosecutorial statements in voir dire cured by jury instructions lay witness opinion testimony delayed disclosure hearsay understanding of declarant's statements cumulative testimony Confrontation Clause primary purpose test ineffective assistance of counsel trial strategy

CRIMINAL - dismissal with prejudice probable cause finding Crim.R. 5(B)

Prohibition—Mandamus—Appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants—To the extent that municipal-court judges sought to invalidate an agreement for the appointment of counsel, the wrong parties were named, because the parties to the agreement were not the common-pleas-court judges—Municipal-court judges lacked standing to challenge the appointment of counsel in the common pleas court, because the aggrieved parties were the indigent defendants or the unpaid attorneys—When a local rule is ambiguous, a common pleas court cannot have a clear legal duty to repeal it—Writs denied.

On motion for immediate interim remedial suspension.

The convictions for aggravated burglary and felony murder were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. And the trial court properly imposed sentence on each offense, because the crimes were not of similar import or significance even though the aggravated burglary (committed while in possession or control of a gun) was the predicate offense for the felony murder each offense caused separate, identifiable harm, so they did not emerge. Judgment affirmed.

Motion to suppression, Miranda warnings

Summary judgment political subdivision immunity

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS: Defendant's conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence where credible testimony established that defendant disregarded the officer's instructions and interfered with the investigation of an illegally parked vehicle.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – POLITICAL-SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY – GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION – TREE MAINTENANCE – R.C. 2744.02(A)(1): The trial court erred in denying defendant city's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff's injury was the result of falling into a hole that was left in a tree lawn on public grounds where a fallen tree had been previously removed by the city therefore, tree maintenance on public grounds is a governmental function, and none of the R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) exceptions to general immunity apply in this instance, the city is entitled to general immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).

Petition for post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to file appeal, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, deficient performance, prejudice, relief sought, void, voidable

Anders v. California, meritless, wholly frivolous

jurisdiction, forfeiture, motion to suppress, collective knowledge doctrine

Motion to vacate void judgment, petition for post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21, untimely, successive, R.C. 2953.23, de novo, defective indictment, res judicata, subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, void, voidable

On certification of default.

Res judicata subject matter jurisdiction

Kidnapping - Meanacing by Stalking - IAC - Standby Counsel - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Continuance

Unencumbered fee simple estate appraisal tax appeal. - Board of Tax Appeals did not comply with this court's mandate to weigh and address the appraisal evidence in determining the unencumbered fee simple estate for the relevant tax year. The BTA's summary denial of the appraiser's testimony and appraisal does not represent full consideration as required under the law.

Insurance policy interpretation of terms plain meaning summary judgment. Summary judgment was appropriate to insurer who was not required to provide a defense or coverage for a claim based upon a dog bite where the policy excluded coverage for any bodily injury caused by a dog with a prior history of causing "bodily injury to a person." The language of the policy was not ambiguous and the exclusion would apply where the prior history of causing injury was to the homeowner himself. Further, the plain meaning of the policy did not necessitate a determination as to the extent the homeowner's actions contributed to the prior injury caused by his dog.

Inferences stacking other acts evidence Evid.R. 404(B) motion to suppress custody Miranda circumstantial evidence sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. – Evidence that the defendant was wearing boots ten days before the murder and the police never found the boots allowed the jury to impermissibly stack inferences to conclude the defendant disposed of his bloody boots, but defendant was not prejudiced by the error because there was other overwhelming circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt the trial court did not admit other acts evidence for a purpose not permitted by Evid.R. 404(B) trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police prior to the victim's murder because the defendant was not in custody at the time and he volunteered the statements and, therefore, no Miranda warning was required defendant's conviction for aggravated murder, although based on circumstantial evidence, was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Crim.R. 25(B) subsequent judge presiding over postconviction proceedings Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial newly discovered evidence clear and convincing proof res judicata. As duly-elected successor to the trial judge, the judge presiding over the appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial had authority under Crim.R. 25(B) to rule on the motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because, pursuant to Crim.R. 33(B), the appellant neither presented material evidence outside the record that was unavailable to him at the time of trial or direct appeal nor showed by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence. The evidence is barred by res judicata because the appellant raised the same evidence in his motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial that he raised in prior petitions for postconviction relief.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea abuse of discretion coercion family pressure. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because nothing in the record demonstrated that motion was based on anything more than a change of heart. Defendant's claims that, due to stress over his father's health, he "didn't hear" the trial court during the plea colloquy and did not understand the offenses to which he was pleading guilty were not credible and were contradicted by the record. The record contained nothing to support defendant's assertion that defense counsel coerced him to accept the state's plea offer. Familial pressure to "take the plea" was not sufficient evidence of coercion to warrant withdrawal of defendant's guilty pleas.

Guardianship appointment of guardian best interest abuse of discretion App.R. 12 App.R. 16. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee's guardianship application and denying appellant's guardianship application.

Petition for postconviction relief final order. The trial court's journal entry denying appellant's "Motion to Grant Defendant/Petitioner's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" is not a final order conferring jurisdiction upon this court pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.

Purposes and principles of felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.12 constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act S.B. 201 failure to object to sentence. Trial court properly considered the purposes, principles, and factors of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when sentencing appellant to 7 to 8.5 years in prison. Appellant failed to object to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act in the trial court and therefore waived his constitutional challenge to the indefinite portion of his sentence on appeal. Appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Joinder indictments severance plain error Crim.R. 8 Crim.R. 13 Crim.R. 14 right to be present Confrontation Clause Sixth Amendment Crim.R. 43 waiver disruptive sufficiency of the evidence circumstantial evidence direct evidence manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel cross-examination competency cumulative error consecutive sentences. Appellant failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced when the trial court joined his three separate indictments for one trial and did not sever them once the crimes relating to one of the indictments were dismissed after the close of the state's case. The trial court did not violate the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial when appellant was removed from the courtroom after he continuously disrupted trial proceedings. The state produced sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to sustain convictions for each of the appellant's crimes. Further, the jury did not find the appellant guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's trial counsel's cross-examination, decision not to seek severance, and not renew the issue of competency were all decisions of trial strategy and did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Because we did not find error in any of appellant's assignments of error, appellant was not deprived of a fair trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Finally, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences because the trial court made the requisite statutory findings and those findings were supported by evidence in the record.

Reagan Tokes Act constitutional State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. The en banc majority in Delvallie has determined that the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional. Therefore, appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Arbitration arbitration award arbitrator R.C. 2711.10 vacate award exceed authority essence of the agreement de novo review. The trial court's denial of appellant's application to vacate the arbitration award and confirming the arbitration award in favor of appellee is affirmed. An arbitrator's award shall be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds authority or does not draw its essence from the agreement. Here, the arbitrator discussed the contract language and provided her basis for the award, which meant that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement. The award did not conflict with the express terms of the agreement and was rationally derived from the terms of the agreement.

Petition to compel arbitration R.C. 2711.03(A) and (B) denial of discovery request abuse of discretion. Successor to investor fund filed petition to compel arbitration to resolve fund manager's claim for fees. The trial court properly limited its inquiry to determining the validity of the arbitration agreement in granting the petition to compel arbitration and properly found that it was necessary to apply terms of the contract containing the arbitration provision to resolve the parties' dispute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying fund manager further discovery where there was no showing discovery would assist in determining the validity of the arbitration agreement.

SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court did not err in dismissing the charges against defendant for violation of his right to a speedy trial where the length of delay between the filing of the arrest warrant and the formal indictment was eight-and-a-half months, the state made no effort to execute the arrest warrant during the delay, defendant timely invoked his right to a speedy trial, and the trial court made the factual finding that defendant suffered prejudice because of the delay.

PROBABLE CAUSE — SEARCH & SEIZURE: The trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found in the trunk of his vehicle during a traffic stop where the investigating police officer's testimony that he detected the odor of raw marijuana coming from the trunk, determined by the court to be credible, was sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to support the warrantless search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. [But see DISSENT: Where it is the role of the trial court to make factual findings and weigh the credibility to be given to the officer's testimony, and where the issue of probable cause is one of fact, the trial court's findings must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous: the trial court did not find the officer's testimony credible and, therefore, the court correctly granted defendant's motion to suppress.]

R.C. 2953.21, petition for post-conviction relief R.C. 149.43, Public Records R.C. 2303.09 abuse of discretion res judicata mootness App.R. 9(E)

In accepting appellant's no contest plea to a first-degree misdemeanor domestic violence charge, the trial court completely failed to inform appellant of the effect of the no contest plea as required by Crim.R. 11(E). This complete failure requires that the plea be vacated. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court erred in allowing the State, upon remand, to amend the criminal complaint pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D) and in reaffirming the court's previously-entered judgment of conviction. The trial court's consideration of the Crim.R. 7(D) motion exceeded the scope of our appellate mandate, and Crim.R. 7(D) cannot be used to correct a jurisdictional defect in a criminal complaint. Judgment reversed remanded for the filing of an order dismissing the case.

Father's abandonment of his minor daughter was not attributable to any lack of effort by the caseworker, any fraud committed by Mother, or any alleged violation of his due process rights. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err when it found that Father had abandoned his daughter pursuant to R.C. 2151.011(C). The juvenile court reasonably concluded that the child required a legally secure placement and that such security could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to child protective services (CPS). The juvenile court's finding that granting permanent custody to CPS was in the child's best interest was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the juvenile court did not err when it granted permanent custody of the child to CPS. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the untimely, successive petition and because the claims asserted in the petition were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Although the trial court erred by denying appellant's petition prematurely, the error was harmless and may be properly disregarded under Crim.R. 52(A). Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's 30-month prison sentence for third-degree felony failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law therefore, the trial court's sentencing judgment may not be disturbed by this court on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Challenge to 30-month prison sentence for conviction under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) failed. Sentence not subject to review under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) because statutes identified in that section inapplicable. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), appellate court may not independently weigh evidence and substitute its judgment as to appropriate sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant failed to demonstrate that R.C. 2929.13(D) is unconstitutional as applied to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Manifest Weight, Other Acts Evidence, Harmless Error

Estate. Settlement. Wrongful death action. Survival action.

Affirming entry of summary judgment based on the doctrine of merger, as well as on unambiguous contract terms.

Trial court validly imposed post release control. Further, trial court did not err in applying the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law to Appellant's case. Appellant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the unconstitutionality of the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law.

Motion for summary judgment Civ.R. 56(B) and (C). Plaintiff, an inmate, filed this claim after he injured himself on a rusty nail in defendant's facility. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment to which plaintiff failed to respond. Defendant submitted affidavits from the warden, unit management chief, and building construction superintendent from the facility where plaintiff was injured which stated that defendant had no notice of the nail, that there was no work order from plaintiff's cell for a rusty nail, and that it is defendant's practice to check each cell for defects before placing an inmate in a cell. Therefore, the court found there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.

Age discrimination disability discrimination. Plaintiff filed an action alleging age discrimination and disability discrimination. Defendant formerly employed plaintiff as a tenured professor. Plaintiff is a 68-year-old-man. During the spring of 2020, plaintiff went on medical leave to undergo cardiac surgery. In the summer of 2020, defendant notified plaintiff that he was one of 96 full-time faculty members whose employment was terminated as part of a reduction in force (RIF). Defendant motioned for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie that the RIF was discriminatory. In the context of an RIF, plaintiffs must proffer direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that establishes age was a factor in their termination. Plaintiff alleged that his supervisors' inquiries into whether he might soon retire and the fact that only 15% of terminated employees were under the age of 40 constituted evidence of defendant's discriminatory intent. The court found that defendant's university-wide RIF was conducted out of economic necessity, which constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose for plaintiff's termination. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and judgment was entered in defendant's favor.

Denial of motion to withdraw plea after sentence

CRIMINAL - Motion to suppress suppression hearing Defendant may not raise constitutional violations to events that occurred prior to a guilty plea.

CIVIL - Civil Stalking Protection Order ("CSPO") Motion to modify or terminate a CSPO Circumstances must have materially changed to modify or terminate a CSPO.

Appellant's assigned errors based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Evid.R. 804(B)(5), and his constitutional confrontation clause rights both lacked merit and did not amount to prejudicial or plain error where the record showed defense counsel deliberately did not object to the admission of an "agreed upon" portion of an interview between a detective and a deceased witness and, amid overwhelming evidence linking the appellant to the crime, used that interview to benefit the appellant's defense. Judgment affirmed.

On objections to magistrate's decision dismissing petition for writ of mandamus for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)(1). Objections sustained, decision vacated and case referred back to magistrate in accordance with the original appointment. Pursuant to a recent decision from the Ohio Supreme Court, the statutory requirement that an inmate's affidavit of prior filings must give a "brief description of the nature of the civil action or appeal" was satisfied when an inmate described his sole prior civil action simply as a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus."

Trial court erred in revoking defendant's probation and imposing the balance of defendant's suspended jail sentence without advising defendant of his right to the assistatnce of counsel and inquiring whether defendant wished to waive such right

The trial court erred in precluding the civil protection order petitioner from seeking to offer evidence. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

JURISDICTION – POSTCONVICTION – POSTRELEASE CONTROL: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postconviction motion seeking relief on the ground that defendant's sentence was not imposed in conformity with the statutes governing postrelease control: the motion was not reviewable under any postconviction proceeding provided by rule or statute and the sentence was not correctable under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, when it was imposed by a court with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.

R.C. 1109.69 — SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A trial court speaks only through its journal entry and is free to change its mind at any time before making such entry. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant bank where the evidence in the record created an inference that the account in question was closed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint and the determination of all the claims in the complaint would thus depend on contents of records that the bank was authorized to destroy pursuant to R.C. 1109.69(F).

CHILDREN – PERMANENT CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in denying counsel for father's request for a continuance at the permanent-custody trial on the basis that father could not be present, and on the basis that the GAL report had been untimely filed: father had notice of the hearing but indicated he could not participate at the hearing in person or virtually because of his emotional state, but father gave no indication of when he might be able to participate, and father's counsel did not indicate that he had not read the GAL report, or that he was not otherwise prepared for trial. The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of father's children to Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services ("HCJFS") where HCJFS used reasonable efforts to maintain the family unit prior to the children's removal by providing father with intensive in-home therapy services and food stamps, however, father continued to struggle financially and with managing the children, and some of the children alleged that father, a former drug user, had been using and selling drugs in the home, and father had failed to comply with the required drug screens.

court costs community service R.C. 2947.23 shall mandatory duty hearing

Writ of Habeas Corpus

summary judgment on claims for violation of corporate constitution, negligence, dilution of ownership rights, breach of duty of care, breach of duty of loyalty, civil conspiracy, declaratory judgment genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment no summary judgment on laches defense R.C. 1101.05(A) R.C. 1105.11(A) affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies not in answer

abduction conviction community control sanctions not specific in judgment entry nunc pro tunc judgment entry to reflect sanction set out at sentencing

Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 58(B) App.R. 4(A) appellant could have timely filed notice of appeal from judgment denying his postconviction petition App.R 4(A)

Sentencing R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2929.11 recidivism and seriousness factors R.C. 2967.271 Reagan Tokes constitutionality Sixth Amendment separation of powers jury trial. A sentence is not contrary to law where it is in the statutory range and the trial court states that it considered all the appropriate statutory factors. Failure of the trial court to specifically cite R.C. 2929.12 is irrelevant where the court notes that it considered all the required statutory factors. Trial court did not fail to consider mitigating factor of the defendant only facilitating the crime when the statute considers such behavior to be more serious rather than mitigating. Based on our decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, defendant's constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled.

Reagan Tokes Act constitutional State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. The en banc majority in Delvallie has determined that the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional. Therefore, appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Maximum sentence State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649 R.C. 2929.12 Reagan Tokes Act constitutional State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. The Ohio Supreme Court in Jones concluded that the language in Marcum regarding appellate courts modifying or vacating defendant's sentence if the record failed to support it under R.C. 2929.12 was dicta. The court also concluded that an appellate court errs if it relies on Marcum and modifies or vacates a sentence "based on the lack of support in the record for the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12." In this case, appellant's sentence is not contrary to law and is supported by the record. The en banc majority in Delvallie has determined that the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional. Therefore, appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act S.B. 201 failure to object to sentence. Appellant failed to object to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act in the trial court and therefore waived his constitutional challenges to the indefinite portion of his sentence on appeal. Appellant's sentence is affirmed.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act non-life indefinite felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Consecutive sentences findings necessary to protect the public punish the offender. The trial court made the required statutory findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Further, the evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings. Appellant did not demonstrate that, despite his age and poor health, the trial court erred in findings consecutive sentences were necessary to punish him.

Guilty plea R.C. 2967.271 Reagan Tokes felony indefinite sentence Due Process Clause separation-of-powers doctrine Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Defendant's sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not unconstitutional.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act non-life indefinite felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Final, appealable order appellate jurisdiction R.C. 2505.02 resolution of all claims. Because appellant's declaratory judgment claim was not resolved in the trial court, a final appealable order does not exist in this matter. This court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss.

Consecutive sentences findings proportionality nunc pro tunc. The trial court made the required statutory findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences despite the fact that the court did not use the exact words from the statute. A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court found that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the danger appellant posed to the public. Further, the evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings. However, while the trial court made the requisite statutory findings, and those findings were supported by evidence in the record, it did not incorporate those findings into its journal entry. That error can be corrected through a nunc pro tunc.

R.C. 2744.01(C)(1) governmental function R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(p) action taken in connection with zoning code R.C. 2744.01(G)(1) proprietary function R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) political subdivision immunity R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) exception for negligent act in performance of proprietary function. Reversing denial of appellant's motion for summary judgment because appellant is immune under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) from appellee's claims in damages. Appellant's review of appellee's development plan for compliance with the zoning code constituted a governmental function under R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(p). The exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) for an allegedly negligent act in the performance of a proprietary function does not apply, and R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) does not recognize an exception for intentional torts.

Reagan Tokes law right to trial by jury separation-of-powers doctrine due process nunc pro tunc judgment entry clerical mistake maximum term. The Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional and, therefore, appellant's sentence imposed under the law does not violate appellant's constitutional rights. Remand was required for the trial court to prepare a judgment entry that correctly sets forth the defendant's sentence as stated on the record at the time of sentencing.

Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2929.144 indefinite sentence sexual battery R.C. 2907.03(A)(5). Appellant's indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo review res judicata interlocutory order/ruling Civ.R. 41 dismissal. The trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for judgment on pleadings on the ground of res judicata. In the original action, when the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of two defendants, that ended the case against those two defendants. Following the dismissal of the remaining claims, the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants became a final, appealable order. The plaintiffs failed to appeal. The plaintiffs' refiled action against the same defendants as in the original action, for the same dispute, was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

Jail-time credit transcript App.R. 9 plea agreement R.C. 2967.191 consecutive sentence unrelated offense. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for jail-time credit. Appellant was not entitled to jail-time credit because he was serving a prison sentence in an unrelated case, and the trial court ordered appellant's sentences to run consecutively.

Mandamus, R.C. 2969.25(A), R.C. 2969.25(C), Civ.R. 10(A), Civ.R. 58(B). - The relator's complaint for a writ of mandamus, to compel the respondent-judgment to comply with Civ.R. 58(B), is defective for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A) and R.C. 2969.25(C). Pursuant to R.C 2969.25(A), the relator must file an affidavit listing each civil action or appeal of a civil action he has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court, as well as information regarding the outcome of each civil action or appeal. Compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) is mandatory and the failure to comply subjects Wells's complaint to dismissal or denial. R.C. 2969.25(C) requires that a relator, who is an inmate, file a certified statement from his prison cashier setting forth the balance in his private account for each of the preceding six months. The failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) constitutes sufficient reason to deny a writ claim, deny indigency status, and assess costs against the relator. The relator has also failed to comply with Civ.R. 10(A), which states that the caption of a complaint must include the names and addresses of all the parties. Despite the procedural defects contained within the complaint for mandamus, it is clear that the respondent judge has failed to comply with the notice requirement of Civ.R. 58(B).

Writ of procedendo Civ.R. 56 summary judgment postconviction-relief petition findings of fact and conclusions of law moot R.C. 2969.25 affidavit of prior civil actions affidavits of waiver and indigency.

Qualifying felony offense Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2967.271. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Purposes and principles of felony sentencing Reagan Tokes Law. Sentence affirmed where record clearly and convincingly demonstrated that the court considered purposes and principles of felony sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 and where the indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act non-life indefinite felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act non-life indefinite felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Qualifying felony offense Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2967.271 violent offender database ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance with respect defendant's enrollment into the violent offender database and the defendant's non-life indefinite felony sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. The trial court erred, however, in calculating the maximum term of imprisonment under R.C. 2929.144(B)(2).

R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 sentence contrary to law Reagan Tokes Act. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines. Appellant's claim that the Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutional is forfeited on appeal because she did not raise the issue in the trial court.

Relator sought a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, School Employees Retirement System of Ohio, ("SERS"), to vacate a decision of the SERS board denying relator's application for disability benefits, and issue a decision granting such benefits. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending this court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and denies the requested writ of mandamus. Writ denied.

Trial court did not err in finding claims made insurance policy did not cover claims for environmental clean-up because the claimant failed to notify the insurer of the claim prior to the expiration of the policy period.

Respondents' motion to dismiss granted procedendo action dismissed.

arbitration, non-recourse civil litigation advance

Denial of motion to correct sentence/Res judicata

Sufficiency/Manifest weight Jury Instruction

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the arresting officer to testify regarding excited utterances made to him by the victim, who did not testify at trial, and appellant's right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated. Appellant's convictions for assault and obstructing official business were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's appeal, which was brought pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), is moot, because it challenges the already-completed 120-day jail sentence that appellant received for violating his community control sanctions and because appellant's community control sanctions have since been terminated by the trial court. Accordingly, there is no remedy available to appellant, and there are no issues with arguable merit for him to advance on appeal. Appeal dismissed as moot.

The record reveals no non-frivolous issues for appellate review. The trial court fully complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11 when accepting the appellant's guilty plea. At sentencing, the trial court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12, and appellant's 36-month prison sentence is not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant triggered an in terrorem clause in a trust by filing a declaratory judgment action directly attacking an amendment to the decedent's trust, thereby divesting appellant of her status as a beneficiary of the trust. Because she was no longer a beneficiary, appellant did not have standing to file a motion to remove the executor of the decedent's estate. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Res judicata precluded consideration of appellant's successive motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was filed 12 years after his initial plea and sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. Appellant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he had been unavoidably prevented from filing a motion in a timely fashion. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant pleaded guilty to an arson offense and, as a result, is subject to arson registration requirements. These requirements are remedial and thus are not part of appellant's maximum sentence, so the trial court's failure to inform appellant of the registration requirements at the plea hearing did not violate Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or otherwise make appellant's plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in determining that deputy did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant performance of field sobriety tests. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment reversed, in part, where trial court improperly ordered no use of all social media for three years as overly broad condition of community control following probation violation.

Taxation—A transaction is taxable only when the consumer's true object is to obtain the work performed by computer systems rather than to obtain personal and professional services that are coupled with the work that is performed by computer systems—Decision affirmed in part and vacated in part, and cause remanded.

Unauthorized practice of law—The general provision of Civ.R. 8(B) that averments in a pleading are admitted when not denied in a responsive pleading has no application in default proceedings involving the unauthorized practice of law—The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law—Charges of unauthorized practice of law dismissed.

On certification of default.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

The juvenile court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, in granting permanent custody of appellant's twin daughters to a children services agency under the two-part test set forth under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) where granting permanent custody was in the children's best interest given that appellant had not been economically stable for the life of the case, appellant was basically homeless for much of the case, and appellant continued to struggle with mental health and substance abuse issues for which appellant did not believe she needed treatment. However, as it relates to appellant's third child, a boy, the juvenile court committed plain error by not applying the appropriate two-pronged test set forth under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) to the children service agency's request for permanent custody, thereby requiring the matter be remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to apply the correct statutory framework to the children services agency's permanent custody request.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE – CRIMINAL DAMAGING – NO-CONTACT ORDER – SENTENCING: Defendant's conviction for criminal damaging was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence where credible testimony established that defendant broke the back window, front windshield and headlights of the victim's vehicle. The trial court erred in imposing a no-contact order when the defendant was not placed on community control.

DELINQUENCY – DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS – SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE – AGGRAVATED ROBBERY – OPERABILITY OF A FIREARM: Where the magistrate did not rely on juvenile's invocation of his right to remain silent as substantive evidence of guilt that he possessed an operable firearm, juvenile was not adjudicated delinquent in violation of his due-process rights. The state presented sufficient evidence that juvenile possessed an operable firearm where juvenile entered a store, pointed a weapon at the victim and demanded money, and the victim testified that he believed the weapon to be real.

CRIM.R. 11 – GUILTY PLEAS – SENTENCING: The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) before accepting defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant entered the pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently: although the record reflects defendant's confusion regarding an outstanding charge, the trial court permitted defendant to consult with his attorneys off the record, and after the off-the-record discussions, defendant then indicated his desire to plead guilty to the remaining charge. The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences where the court engaged in the required analysis under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and its findings were supported by the record: defendant had an outstanding warrant at the time of the underlying offenses and a criminal history of drug trafficking, and defendant shot the victim in the leg during the course of an aggravated robbery.

Trial court improperly granted defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant-appellant raises no error as to his 2015, 2017, and 2018 cases. Consequently, his corresponding appeals in appellate case numbers 05-21-05, 05-21-07, and 05-21-08 are dismissed. The trial court did not err by denying Smith's presentence motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in his 2020 case (appellate case number 05-21-06). Appeals dismissed in part and Judgment affirmed in part.

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "[a]n occupier of premises is under no duty to protect a business invitee against dangers which are known to such invitee or are so obvious and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect himself against them."

Trial court's judgment finding defendant guilty was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appeal of the imposition of maximum consecutive sentences was moot when the sentences were already completed and no judicial remedy was available. The trial court did not err in imposing fines as part of the sentence.

The trial court did not err by denying plaintiff-appellant's application for relief from a firearms disability.

The defendant-appellant is statutorily authorized to assess a rate that it determines to be sufficient to manage, conduct, and control its water and sewer system. The text of the ordinance does not support compounding the cumulative unpaid water and sewer assessment.

Mandamus—Writ sought to compel city to terminate special prosecutor—Court of appeals' dismissal affirmed because the complaint is moot.

R.C. 2505.02(B)—Court of appeals' judgment vacated for lack of final, appealable order, and cause remanded to trial court for further proceedings.

CRIMINAL - Merger R.C. 2941.25(A) sufficiency of the evidence guilty plea is complete admission of guilt ineffective assistance of counsel motion to dismiss in criminal case Crim.R. 12(C) not guilty by reason of insanity Reagan Tokes R.C. 2967.271.

CRIMINAL - Ineffective assistance of counsel leading questions plain error Crim.R. 52(B) Evid.R. 611(C) expert testimony Evid.R. 701 Evid.R. 702 Crim.R. 29 sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - traffic offense speeding citation incomplete amended to include all necessary information speed unreasonable conditions 19 mph over posted limit.

CIVIL - dismissal for failure to state a claim affirmed failure to comply with Loc.R. 16(C)(4) pro se litigants are generally afforded leeway in their filings pro se litigants are held to the same standard as litigants represented by counsel courts do not advocate for pro se litigants.

CIVIL - homeowner-appellant did not file a timely action with insurance company grant of summary judgment was not error appellant did not argue that insurance company acted in bad faith affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - termination of community control shooting home surveillance video hospital appellant shot state must show substantial proof highly deferential analogous to preponderance of the evidence standard sufficient, credible evidence of violations.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea no contest misdemeanor assault found competent motion to withdraw plea pre-sentence freely and liberally granted Peterseim plea entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily hearing held counsel competent full consideration afforded no abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL LAW - denial of motion to access files capital murder conviction motion for new trial previously filed alleged newly discovered evidence prior remand order motions for court to comply with remand order motion to release funds for expert granted motions to access denied arguments not barred by res judicata denying access inconsistent with prior remand order.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - petition for writ of mandamus compliance with previous remand order of superior court access to prosecutor's and sheriff's files direct appeal filed of underlying order denying access adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law petition dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW: App.R. 4(A)(1) thirty-day rule untimely appeal App.R. 5(A).

Criminal law—Sentencing—R.C. 2967.271—Reagan Tokes Law—Ripeness—A criminal defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.271 is ripe for review on the defendant's direct appeal of his or her conviction and prison sentence—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Clean Water Act—33 U.S.C. 1341(A)(1)—State certification—One-year period during which the state must act on a request for certification under 33 U.S.C. 1341(A)(1) begins when application is submitted, not when it is deemed complete—State waives its rights or authority only with respect to activities approved under federal application when it fails to act on 33 U.S.C. 1341(A)(1) application—Trial court's dismissal was improper because it failed to determine whether any of allegations brought by state address issues outside the contours of the federal application.

Habeas corpus and declaratory judgment—Habeas corpus not proper remedy to address allegedly improper revocation of parole—Appellant not entitled to immediate release—Equal-protection claims not cognizable in habeas corpus—Courts of appeals lack original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment—Court of appeals' denial of relief affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law—Two-year suspension with credit for the time served under interim felony suspension.

Appellant's convictions for burglary affirmed. Evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that a person other than an accomplice of the offender was likely to present when the burglaries occurred and convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's convictions for having weapon under disability and for firearms specifications affirmed, as evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant constructively possessed firearm found during a foot chase, and convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Convictions in separate consolidated appeals affirmed as appelllant has assigned no error to those consolidated cases.

Because relator did not bring the mandamus action in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying as required by R.C. 2731.04, and did not seek leave to amend the complaint when respondent raised this issue, dismissal of the complaint was required under Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, ¶ 33-37. Objections overruled Writ dismissed Motion for continuance denied.

Plaintiff-appellant, Tareq Jabr, has not substantially complied with the briefing requirements set forth in the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Local Rules of the Tenth District Court of Appeals so as to provide this court with a reviewable matter. Appeal dismissed. App.R. 18(C) Loc.R. 10(E).

lack of service – standing – actual prejudice – permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the children – alternative motions – legal custody – six-month extension of temporary custody

Crim.R. 32.1—res judicata—postconviction relief—untimely

Civ.R. 60(B)—substitute for appeal

Criminal law—Successive postconviction motion—Suppression of evidence—R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b)—Defendant seeking to assert a claim under Brady v. Maryland is not required to show that he could not have discovered suppressed evidence by exercising reasonable diligence—Defendant must establish that allegedly suppressed evidence is material—Motion for new trial—Until a trial court grants leave to file a motion for a new trial, motion for a new trial is not properly before the court—Crim.R. 33 prescribes the circumstances under which a defendant may seek leave to file a motion for a new trial alleging that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering evidence but does not give a deadline by which leave must be sought—Trial court does not have discretion to deny leave to file a motion for a new trial based on failure to seek leave within a reasonable time after discovering new evidence.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, namely, engaging in sexual activity with a client in the absence of a preexisting consensual sexual relationship, knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary hearing, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation—Two-year suspension with the second year stayed on conditions.

R.C. 2305.113 – MEDICAL CLAIM – STATUTE OF REPOSE – VICARIOUS LIABILITY: In a malpractice action, where the allegedly negligent physician cannot be held liable for medical malpractice because the statute of repose extinguished the claim against him, the physician's employer cannot be held liable on the basis of vicarious liability, and therefore the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the physician's employer because the statute of repose extinguished the claim as to both the physician and the employer.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR — FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY — CONTRACTS — OPERATING AGREEMENT — AUHORITY TO BIND — REAL PROPERTY — MORTGAGE — QUIET TITLE: The trial court correctly concluded that a member of plaintiff foreign limited liability company maintained his member-manager status. The trial court erred in finding that the member lacked the authority to bind the foreign limited liability company in executing a promissory note and mortgage that encumbered real property that was a part of plaintiff foreign limited liability company's Ohio asset portfolio therefore, the trial court erred in finding that defendant's mortgage on the real property was void and by quieting the title of the real property in favor of plaintiff limited liability company.

R.C.1311.06/Mechanic's lien/Quantum meruit/Unjust enrichment/Civ.R. 50/Directed verdict

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio Redistricting Commission's second revised plan violates Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution—Second revised plan is invalid—The Ohio Redistricting Commission shall be reconstituted, convene, and adopt an entirely new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution.

Reagan Tokes Law, constitutionality. Appellant argued that his indefinite sentence imposed pursuant to the Reagan Tokes law was unconstitutional. In State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-XXXX, this court determined en banc that the Reagan Tokes law is constitutional. Judgment of the trial court affirmed.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The state has a right to appeal a sentence that did not impose an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. In State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470 (en banc), this court overruled the reasons that the trial court found the Reagan Tokes Law unconstitutional. The sentence is reversed and cause remanded for resentencing

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel competency report not part of record PSI not part of record. There exists a reasonable probability that had appellate counsel presented argument with regard trial counsel's failure to include a competency report and a PSI for the trial court's consideration before sentencing, the result of the appeal may have been different. The applicant has met the first prong of the test applicable to an application for reopening and his appeal is reopened for further review.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes law is reversed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court erred in finding the Regan Tokes Law unconstitutional. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality future changes in the law forfeiture plain error failure to object. The application to reopen an appeal was denied where the applicant claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law because that challenge was not raised in the trial court and this court has found the law to be constitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The trial court imposed an indefinite prison sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's arguments that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional were overruled in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470 (en banc). Appellant's sentence is affirmed.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act indefinite non-life felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2901.011, constitutionality restitution, plain error. The trial court imposed an indefinite prison sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law defined in R.C. 2901.011 and ordered appellant to pay restitution to multiple victims. Appellant's arguments that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional are not well taken because these arguments were overruled by this court en banc in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. The trial court's order of restitution did not amount to plain error where appellant did not object to the restitution and the restitution was based on the request of the victims and was not extraordinary. Appellant's sentences are affirmed.

Reagan Tokes Law right to jury trial due process separation of powers sentence. - Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law affirmed because the law does not violate defendant's right to a jury trial or constitutional guarantees of due process and separation of powers.

Felony sentence indefinite separation of powers due process trial by jury Reagan Tokes Law. Indefinite sentence imposed under Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. Appellant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act indefinite non-life felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional

Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court erred in finding the Regan Tokes Law unconstitutional. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law.

Guilty plea plea colloquy competency R.C. 2903.41 R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) R.C. 2903.42(C) Sierah's Law violent offender database registration retroactive application constitutional required notice reversible error. It was not plain error for the trial court to accept appellant's guilty plea to attempted felonious assault because the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The application of Sierah's Law does not constitute an unconstitutional retroactive penalty, but the trial court failed to provide the required notice pursuant to R.C. 2903.42(C).

Reagan Tokes plea agreement split sentence community control prison. Appellant's sentence pursuant to Reagan Tokes was not a violation of his constitutional rights. The trial court erred in imposing both a prison term and a community-control sanction.

S.B. 201 Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The trial court's refusal to impose sentence pursuant to S.B. 201 known as the Reagan Tokes Law on the ground that the law is unconstitutional is in error pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Statute of limitations motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) affirmative defense. The trial court erred in dismissing the action based on the plaintiff's failure to plead facts demonstrating the accrual date for the statute of limitations.

Reagan Tokes Law separation of powers due process State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. Appellant contends that the indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law violated the Ohio and United States Constitutions' due process clauses and the principle of separation of powers. However, based on this court's en banc decision in Delvallie, the court overrules those assignments and affirms the judgment of the trial court.

Reagan Tokes law right to trial by jury separation-of-powers doctrine due process. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional and, therefore, appellant's sentence imposed under the law does not violate appellant's constitutional rights.

Guilty plea waived defective indictment effective assistance of counsel self-sabotage diligent sales talk sentence. - By pleading guilty, appellant waived any argument that his indictment was defective or that the state failed to prove an element of the offense. Counsel was not ineffective by preventing appellant from self-sabotaging a plea agreement or by failing to engage in diligent sales talk with the trial court to mitigate the sentence. Appellate court's limited review of felony sentences prevents modification of a sentence where the records supports that the trial court adequately considered the purposes of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12.

Reagan Tokes Act separation-of-powers due process ineffective assistance of counsel. The Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional because it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or appellant's due process rights. Based on the authority established by this district's en banc holding in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, the challenges appellant advanced against the constitutional validity of the Reagan Tokes Law have been overruled. The appellant's trial counsel's performance was not deficient by not raising a constitutional challenge to Reagan Tokes.

Summary judgment breach of contract affidavit personal knowledge Civ.R. 56(E). - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment where the averments in the affidavit were not based on the affiant's personal knowledge, as required by Civ.R. 56(E) trial court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiff on its breach-of-contract claim where there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of a contract, plaintiff's performance, defendant's breach, and plaintiff's damages.

Felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) manifest weight of the evidence hearsay Evid.R. 801(C) present sense impression Evid.R. 803(1) excited utterance Evid.R. 803(2) Reagan Tokes Law.

Arbitration arbitration award arbitrator R.C. 2711.10 vacate award exceed authority essence of the agreement de novo review. The common pleas court erred in granting the appellee's motion to vacate the arbitration award. An arbitration award must be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds his authority or the award does not draw its essence from the parties' agreement. An award draws its essence from the agreement when it is rationally derived from the terms of the agreement. The appellant charged a member of the appellee union with gross insubordination and conduct unbecoming. Under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, gross insubordination is punishable by termination, demotion, or suspension exceeding 72 hours without pay insubordination is punishable by official reprimand and suspension of up to 72 hours without pay and conduct unbecoming is punishable by official reprimand and suspension of up to 24 hours without pay. The questions submitted to the arbitrator were whether the appellant had just cause to suspend the union member for 24 hours and issue him a written reprimand, and if not, to determine the appropriate remedy. The arbitrator found that the union member's conduct was not insubordinate but was unbecoming. The arbitrator awarded compensation for any lost wages and benefits resulting from the union member's 24-hour suspension but retained the written reprimand in his personnel file. The award resolved the questions submitted to arbitration and was rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority in issuing the award, and the award drew its essence from the agreement. Therefore, the common pleas court erred in vacating the award.

Postconviction motion to vacate void sentence. Pursuant to State v. Dowdy, 162 Ohio St.3d 153, 2020-Ohio-4789, 164 N.E.3d 418, the trial court's failure to use the statutorily mandated language does not render appellant's sentence void. Appellant's claim of sentencing error was subject to correction only in the direct appeal.

Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(1) Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standing S.B. 22. A motion to dismiss on the basis of standing is properly considered under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) it is not properly considered under Civ.R. 12(B)(1). A matter is justiciable only if the plaintiff has standing. The trial court properly granted the appellees' motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant failed to establish that he had standing to challenge the constitutionality of S.B. 22 because he failed to demonstrate injury, causation, and redressability.

Reagan Tokes Law, constitutionality. Appellant argued that his indefinite sentences imposed pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law were unconstitutional on the grounds the sentences violated his right to due process, his right to a jury trial, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Because the court overruled these arguments in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470 (en banc), the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Reagan Tokes law right to trial by jury separation-of-powers doctrine due process. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional and, therefore, appellant's sentence imposed under the law does not violate appellant's constitutional rights.

Conceded error postrelease control R.C. 2967.28. The trial court was required to impose up to three years, but not less than one year, of postrelease control for an offender who was convicted of a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and not a felony sex offense.

Motion for stay R.C. 119.12(E) revocation of veterinary license abuse of discretion unusual hardship irreparable harm likelihood of success on the merits. Common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to stay order of the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board revoking his license pending appeal under R.C. 119.12(E). Appellant did not demonstrate that he would suffer an unusual hardship or irreparable harm from the operation of the order during the pendency of the appeal and did not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal. In his motion for stay and conclusory, supporting affidavit, appellant did not provide any specific information in support of his claims of unusual hardship and irreparable harm and did not explain, with any detail or supporting evidence, why he believed he would prevail on appeal.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional challenges indefinite sentence R.C 2967.271 multiple firearm specifications R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) municipal court complaint grand jury indictment Crim.R. 36 clerical mistakes nunc pro tunc entry. Pursuant to the en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, appellant's constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled. Trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences on 54-month firearm specifications on counts for aggravated robbery and having weapons while under disability pursuant R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Where defendant was subsequently indicted by a grand jury, he was not denied due process based on purported defects in municipal court complaint. Trial court incorrectly computed defendant's aggregate sentence, imposing an aggregate prison term of 39 to 41.5 years, instead of an aggregate term of 39 to 40.5 years. Case remanded for trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct clerical errors in sentencing journal entry to reflect sentences actually imposed at sentencing hearing.

Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. Furthermore, his sentence is not contrary to law because the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12 and the sentence falls within the statutory range for his offenses.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional challenges indefinite sentence plain error ineffective assistance of counsel R.C. 2925.03(D)(1) R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) mandatory fine affidavit of indigency mitigating facts and circumstances. Where defendant failed to challenge the constitutionality of Reagan Tokes Law below and failed to present a plain error argument on appeal, appellate court could decline to consider defendant's constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to challenge the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant did not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for, his trial counsel's failure to challenge the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, the result would have been different. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to file an affidavit of indigency, failure to request waiver of mandatory fine, or failure to present mitigating facts and circumstances at sentencing hearing. There was nothing in the record to suggest a reasonable probability existed that trial court would have found defendant indigent if an affidavit of indigency had been filed and trial counsel had requested waiver of the mandatory fine or that trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had had more information about any of the alleged mitigating facts or circumstances.

Felony sentence indefinite separation of powers due process trial by jury Reagan Tokes Law. Indefinite sentence imposed under Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-year suspension, with the final six months stayed on conditions.

Insurance—Commercial umbrella insurance policy—Third party incorporated insured's contaminated product into its glass containers, which then had to be scrapped—Claims against insured by the third party are covered under insured's commercial umbrella insurance policy because they arose out of an accident that resulted in "property damage" under the policy and no policy exclusions apply.

Felonious assault admissibility of videotape Crim.R. 29 manifest weight ineffective counsel - failure to request inferior charge

jurisdiction, R.C. 2505.02, Civ.R. 54(B), no just cause for delay, breach of contract, attorney fees, damages, independent claim

SENTENCING — R.C. 2929.14 — CONSECUTIVE-SENTENCES — FINDINGS: The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was proper under R.C. 2929.14 when the record supported the trial court's finding that defendant's history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by defendant.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — LEASEHOLD MORTGAGE —NONRECOURSE LOAN — PREMATURITY RENTS — PROSPECTIVE LANGUAGE — CONDITIONAL ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT: The trial court erred in granting plaintiff lender's motion for partial summary judgment for prematurity rents where the record reflects that the language of the loan documents provided for a conditional absolute assignment of the leasehold rents and the prospective language of the loan documents conditioned plaintiff's ability to collect rents only upon an event of a default therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to rents collected prior to the maturity date of the leasehold mortgage.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT – PROCEDURE/RULES — RETURN OF PROPERTY: The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for the return of his property because, pursuant to State v. Hammock, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200368, 2021-Ohio-3574, indefinitely confiscating appellant's cell phone and body camera is not reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the direct-criminal-contempt offenses for which he was convicted.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT – PROCEDURE/RULES – RETURN OF PROPERTY: The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for the return of his property because, pursuant to State v. Hammock, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200368, 2021-Ohio-3574, indefinitely confiscating appellant's cell phone and iPad is not reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the direct-criminal-contempt offense for which he was convicted.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS – JUVENILE – MIRANDA – INTERROGATION – SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT: The juvenile court erred by suppressing a statement made by juvenile in police custody because the statement was spontaneous and was not made in response to interrogation the statement was neither triggered by an express question nor its functional equivalent where the juvenile was not subjected to words or actions that the officer should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. [But see DISSENT: Where the issue of whether an interrogation is on-going is a factual matter, and the juvenile court's findings of fact are supported by competent, credible evidence, the juvenile court did not err in granting the motion to suppress.]

Appellant's invoices to appellee were due and payable when presented, and the trial court erred in failing to determine the accrual date of the invoices and the appropriate interest rate for prejudgment interest. Appellant's motion for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses in defending appellee's counterclaims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and Consumer Sales Practices Act violations demonstrated arguable merit, and the court abused its discretion in denying the motion without a hearing. Judgments reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the officers did not unreasonably prolong his detention to search for a box containing a gun and other contraband. Appellant's convictions for tampering with evidence, having weapons while under disability, and illegal conveyance were based on sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, precludes appellant's challenge to his sentence. Judgment affirmed. (Epley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

The trial court did not err in its analysis of the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when it sentenced appellant to a maximum prison term which was within the applicable sentencing guidelines. Thus, appellant cannot demonstrate that his sentence was contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in failing to include the week between the first and second sentencing hearings when calculating jail time credit. The trial court properly calculated appellant's maximum term under the Reagan Tokes Act. However, the judgment entry did not properly indicate that stated minimum term for the three offenses subject to the Act. Appellant did not establish that the trial court failed to consider R.C. 2929.12(E) when imposing sentence. Judgment reversed in part as to jail time credit and remanded for (1) an amended judgment entry reflecting that appellant is entitled to 236 days of jail time credit and for the trial court to notify the appropriate prison officials of the amended judgment entry and (2) the trial court to modify its sentences for the three Reagan Tokes Act offenses to clarify that the eight-year term is the stated minimum term of an indefinite sentence under the Act. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. There was no genuine issue of material fact that the rainwater just inside the door of the Pizza Hut in which appellant slipped and fell constituted an open and obvious danger. As a result, appellee did not owe a duty of care to appellant, and no liability in negligence is possible as a matter of law. Judgment affirmed.

Convictions for petty theft and aggravated robbery with two firearms specifications are supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. No trial court error for sentencing enhancement on one of the two firearms specifications. Judgment affirmed.

Property owner does not breach duty owed to licensee where licensee falls in a hole in the grassy area of the property between the curb and sidewalk, and where there is no evidence to show that the property owner was aware of the licensee's presence, was aware of the hole, or created the hole. Toledo Municipal Code sections 911.02 and 911.34 apply only to sidewalks and not to the grassy areas next to them.

Appellant's conviction for rape is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the child victim testified that he "put his thing inside [her]," and where an examination showed physical injury to her vulva and the presence of appellant's DNA. Appellant's due process rights not violated where trial court provides transcript of one witness's testimony where two jurors indicated that it was difficult to hear.

Elections—Mandamus—Election laws are mandatory and require strict compliance—Substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election provision expressly states that it is—Writ denied.

Property law—Contracts—R.C. 2711.01(B)(1)—An action seeking a determination that an oil and gas lease has expired by its own terms is a controversy involving the title to or the possession of real estate and, under R.C. 2711.01(B)(1), is not subject to arbitration—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failure to safeguard a client's settlement funds and making false statements to his client about the status of those funds, misdemeanor theft conviction for passing bad checks, and dishonest conduct during the ensuing disciplinary proceedings—Indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

Where a trial court enters an order without jurisdiction, its order is void and a nullity, and puts the parties in the same position they would be in if it had not occurred. Following the trial court's void order, appellant's motion was pending before the trial court. However, when a trial court fails to rule on a pending motion, an appellate court considers the motion denied. Appellant's attempt to amend his motion to raise new claims fourteen years later was improper.

Trial court erred in finding homeowners association liable for negligence for the injuries sustained by a homeowner following her slip and fall on natural accumulation of ice in the parking lot. Trial court did not err in granting judgment in favor of the homeowners association on the homeowner's breach-of-contract claim.

R.C. 4517.56(D)—statutory construction—ambiguous—franchise—Ohio Automobile Dealers Act—declaratory judgment

mandatory consecutive sentence, Crim.R. 11, substantial compliance, R.C. 2921.331(D), sentence package theory

In an interpleader action, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of bank while denying consultant's motion for summary judgment. The bank proved its entitlement to the interpleaded funds, whereas the consultant did not.

The failure of a motorist to signal in compliance with R.C. 4511.39(A) provides the police with a legal basis to conduct a traffic stop of that vehicle. A motorist must signal when moving right or left on a highway.

Record established that plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Challenge to Reagan Tokes Law rejected under our prior precedent defendant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel letter to the trial court was not included in the record and, in any event, defendant expressed his desire to proceed with sentencing trial court erred by ordering forfeiture of funds when the State did not include a forfeiture specification in the indictment.

Defendant-appellant's sentences are neither unsupported by the record nor contrary to law. Defendant-appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State's motion to dismiss one of the OVI charges pending against defendant-appellant. The trial court did not commit plain error by issuing a supplemental jury instruction.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion to vacate the trial court's default judgment without a hearing.

CIVIL - foreclosure, R.C. 5721.30, tax certificate, certificate holder, Civ.R. 56, summary judgment, affidavit, personal knowledge, Evid.R. 803, hearsay, attorney's fees.

CRIMINAL LAW - revocation of community control consecutive prison sentences due process Crim.R. 32.3 representation by counsel plain error opportunity to speak to appointed counsel prejudice presumed.

CRIMINAL - Nonsupport of Dependents resentencing more severe sentence actual vindictiveness presumption of vindictiveness findings must affirmatively appear on the record new evidence at sentencing hearing

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02 no final appealable order premature appeal no sentence remedy to appeal after case is concluded.

CRIMINAL LAW – tampering with evidence possession of heroin possession of cocaine guilty plea consecutive sentence seven years in prison pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea following a hearing denied by the trial court abuse of discretion standard of review. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - the record does not reveal that Appellant's initial trial counsel and second trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance pursuant to Strickland, Appellant fails to show that his representatives' performances were deficient and that the deficient performances prejudiced the defense judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL – Appellant failed to demonstrate presumptive prejudice to establish constitutional speedy trial violation due to his incarceration during Ohio's Covid-19 tolling period Appellant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from six-month delay resulting from the state's failure to procure Appellant from federal custody as Appellant was being held by federal authorities.

CRIMINAL LAW – felonious assault grand theft concurrently sentenced to an indefinite term of 3 to 4.5 years in prison the trial court imposed an additional 1,416 days of a "reserved sentence" due to Appellant being on post-release control under a prior case from 2012 at the time the new offenses were committed the trial court ordered that the additional 1,416 days are to be served consecutively for a total of 6.8 to 8.4 years in prison guilty plea Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c) Bishop a criminal defendant on post-release control for a prior felony must be advised, during his plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court's ability under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate his existing post-release control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the post-release control violation the trial court did not fully advise Appellant of the post-release control violation potential at the time of the plea the record supports Appellant's claim of "surprise" and prejudice it appears Appellant's guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel assignment of error is moot App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) the trial court's judgment is reversed, Appellant's plea and sentence are vacated, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

JUVENILE - Juvenile Court abused its discretion under R.C. 2152.12 in refusing to transfer rape charges to the general division allegedly committed by subject child at age seventeen where the subject child's twenty-first birthday was two months after the amenability hearing. In addition to other factors favoring transfer, two months was an insufficient period of time for rehabilitation.

CIVIL – Dismissal of postconviction petition without a hearing affirmed on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and/or outcome-determinative prejudice based on trial counsel's failure: (1) to challenge Crim.R 16(K) violation (2) to cross-examine law enforcement officer's testimony omitting denials of the charges made by Appellant during police interview and (3) to offer testimony of prior sexual assault of one of the victims, which was inadmissible pursuant to rape shield law.

Dormant Mineral Act—Abandonment process and required notice to holders of mineral interests—Dormant Mineral Act establishes a single, comprehensive method for surface owners to unify their land with subterranean mineral interests through abandonment—Surface owners did not exercise reasonable diligence when they failed to search public records beyond the county where the mineral interests were located, despite having knowledge that the mineral-interest holder did not reside in that county when the mineral-interest reservation was made.

Insufficient evidence

The requested writ of mandamus is denied because there was some evidence to support the Commission's decision to grant the workers' compensation claimant a new hearing where for reasons beyond his control he had not received notice of the intial hearing. Magistrate's decision adopted without objection writ denied.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant brought his declaratory judgment action to collaterally attack his judgment of conviction and sentence. But a declaratory judgment action cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence. As such, his claims did not raise the justiciable controversy necessary for a declaratory judgment action. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)-motion to modify prior allocation of parental rights and responsibilities-trial court incorrectly determined date of prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities so as to limit appellant's ability to present evidence trial court incorrectly applied doctrine of res judicata so as to limit appellant's ability to present evidence regarding an issue that the parties had not previously actually litigated

SERVICE OF PROCESS – WAIVER: The trial court did not err in holding that defendant did not waive service of process because defendant did not appear for purposes of the present case defendant's alleged appearances actually pertained to other unrelated cases and/or a collateral matter.

attorney-client privilege—Civ.R. 26(B)—forensic image—cellphone—magistrate's order—Civ.R. 52(D)(2)

R.C. 2323.51 frivolous conduct breach of contract manifestation of mutual assent consideration promissory estoppel reasonable reliance Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e)

R.C. 3319.081 termination of non-teaching employees due process R.C. 2506.03 administrative appeal abuse of discretion stipulation reliable evidence probative evidence preponderance of evidence waiver

ZONING – TOWNSHIP – CIVIL FINES – ATTORNEY FEES: Where the trial court limited its grant of summary judgment to injunctive relief for violations of plaintiff township's zoning resolution at specific locations, and where it is not clear from the record whether the civil fines and penalties assessed by the trial court were limited to those specific violations, the fines and penalties must be reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to assess fines and penalties only for those locations included in the grant of summary judgment.

JURISDICTION/VENUE — Civ.R. 12(B)(6): The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas did not err by dismissing a company's lawsuit against a state of Ohio community college solely seeking the return of electrical equipment installed on the campus under a lease the Court of Claims previously found to be void due to the lack of certification by the college's fiscal officer while the Court of Claims Act did not divest the court of common pleas of subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim for equitable relief, the company could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment because "courts will not lend their aid to enforce such a [void government] contract, directly or indirectly, but will leave the parties where they have placed themselves." See Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell, 60 Ohio St. 406, 420, 54 N.E. 372 (1899).

ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT : Defendant's convictions for assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victims testified that defendant grabbed their genitals during separate altercations, an eyewitness to one of the assaults testified that she witnessed defendant grab the victim's genitals, and surveillance video of the incidents did not contradict the witnesses' testimony as defendant claimed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel prejudicial evidence irrelevant evidence duty of defense counsel to create reasonable doubt.

Personal jurisdiction forum non conveniens R.C. 2307.382 Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) due process.

Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence constitutional challenges due process separation of powers right to jury trial. Pursuant to the en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, appellant's constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled.

Motion to withdraw plea Crim.R. 32.1 manifest injustice R.C. 2953.36(A)(7). Trial court abused its discretion in determining that a manifest injustice existed that permitted appellee to withdraw his guilty plea 15 years after sentencing because the motion relied substantially on subsequent postsentence developments.

Felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) attempted murder 2903.02(A), 2923.02 mistreating animals R.C. 2959.02 competency to stand trial R.C. 2945.38 stipulation Reagan Tokes Law S.B. 201. Appellant is presumed competent, the parties stipulated to appellant's competency report, and the parties agreed that appellant was competent to stand trial. The trial court journalized the stipulation the trial court did not need to also state in its journal entry that appellant was competent. Appellant's sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Reagan Tokes unconstitutional S.B. 201. Appellant contended that the trial court erred in imposing an indefinite sentence under Reagan Tokes. However, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court based on this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

The Reagan Tokes Law S.B. 201 indefinite sentence. An indefinite sentence imposed pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Manifest weight of the evidence inconsistent testimony. The appellant's adjudication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence as the trial court was in the best position to determine the veracity and reliability of the witnesses' inconsistent testimony.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 R.C. 3905.91 bail bond commission build-up fund contract. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on appellant's commission and build-up fund claims. Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that precluded judgment as a matter of law in defendants' favor on either claim. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conceded error R.C. 2967.28 postrelease control R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) contrary to law appeal by state. The defendant-appellee concedes that the trial court's imposition of postrelease control was contrary to law per R.C. 2967.28, as amended effective September 30, 2021.

Conceded error R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) appeal as a matter of right R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sentence contrary to law R.C. 2967.28(C) postrelease control. The trial court erred by imposing a specified term of three years of postrelease control. Under R.C. 2967.28(C), as amended, the trial court was required to impose a discretionary period of postrelease control of up to two years.

Felonious assault guilty plea contrary to law Reagan Tokes. Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law where appellant disagrees with the court's consideration of the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant's sentence pursuant to Reagan Tokes was not a violation of his constitutional rights.

Reagan Tokes Act separation of powers due process. The Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional because it does not violate the separation- of-powers doctrine or appellant's due process rights. Based on the authority established by this district's en banc holding in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, the challenges appellant advanced against the constitutional validity of the Reagan Tokes Law have been overruled.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) mandatory prison sentence clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law simply because appellant speculated that the trial court did not believe the prison sentence was mandatory.

Motion to withdraw plea competency R.C. 2967.271 Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion to withdraw guilty plea where the defendant was 1) represented by competent counsel, 2) advised of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11, 3) given notice and an opportunity to be heard, and 4) the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the motion. Where the motion was filed almost four months after the plea and alleged that the defendant's competency had deteriorated in recent weeks, the motion to withdraw will be found to be a mere change of heart unless there is evidence that the defendant was incompetent at the plea hearing. The record did not support a finding that the defendant was incompetent to enter a plea where he had reviewed the discovery, understood the charges against him and elected to plead guilty anyway. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

S.B. 201 the Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court erred by failing to impose a sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Sentencing maximum sentence R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2929.14 ineffective assistance of counsel mitigation. When a criminal defendant was not convicted of a repeat violent offender specification or ordered to serve consecutive sentences, trial courts are not required to make findings under R.C. 2929.14. Further, trial courts are not required to make any findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Finally, appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice based upon her assertion that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she addressed the court at sentencing and provided it with all of the mitigating circumstances she claims her trial counsel should have raised.

Directed verdict Civ.R. 50 de novo review age discrimination prima facie case direct evidence statements by employer indirect evidence reasonable inference reduction in force business considerations breach of contract renewal of contract assignment meeting of the minds essential terms promissory estoppel damages. The trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on all of appellant's claims. Appellant failed to present direct or indirect evidence of his age-discrimination claim. Further, appellant did not demonstrate a prima facie case of breach of contract because there was no meeting of the minds, and the alleged contract lacked essential terms. Finally, appellant did not present evidence of damages in support of his promissory-estoppel claim.

The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. The plain language of the lease agreement was ambiguous as to what the parties considered a "comparable replacement" under Section 8.03(c) of the lease. The parol evidence informs multiple reasonable interpretations of the contract provision creating a dispute of fact regarding the parties' intentions at the time the contract was formed. As the trial court also failed to rule on certain issues in its decision, this court would not rule on those issues for the first time and remand the case for the trial court to consider the other questions raised in appellee's motion for summary judgment. Because we find that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Rooms for Less constitutes as a "comparable replacement" under Section 8.03(c) of the lease, a review of whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to appellee as the prevailing party is premature.

Appellant, the administrator of the decedent's estate, did not demonstrate the probate court erred in overruling his objections to a magistrate's decision disapproving his fiduciary's account where the assignment of error was premised on newly raised and unsupported assertions and appellant did not otherwise demonstrate cause for reversal. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment of trial court was correct when it granted appellee's motions for judgment on the pleadings to quiet title and for a declaratory action and for summary judgment regarding slander of title and fraud, and jury properly determined punitive damages. Judgment affirmed.

Split sentence (prison term followed by community control) was voidable, not void, and thus subject to res judicata. Trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in revoking defendant's community control and imposing the original jointly recommended sentence rather than conducting a resentencing hearing. Trial court erred in failing to incorporate into judgment entry the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings made on the record at the sentencing hearing.

Insurance - Auto Exclusion - Summary Judgment

The trial court did not err by ordering appellant to sign authorization forms for both physical and mental health records, as both were causally and historically related to her lawsuit. The trial court also did not err by not ordering an in-camera review of such records, because there is nothing in the record before us that demonstrates appellant requested such a review. Judgment affirmed.

The dismissal of appellant's complaint was partly based on incorrect factual conclusions related to the application of judicial estoppel the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, an alleged lack of standing due to appellant's Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing does not provide an alternate reason to affirm the dismissal. Appellant had standing when she filed her complaint alleging that appellees had caused her injury and damages by unlawfully terminating her employment, by failing to pay wages, by failing to pay minimum wages, and by illegally accessing her electronically-stored information. At that point, appellant had not yet filed for bankruptcy, and standing existed. Whether the bankruptcy trustee subsequently became a real party in interest, depriving appellant of standing, or whether appellant had a concurrent interest for purposes of standing due to differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings is for the trial court to decide on remand, along with the issue of judicial estoppel. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court's denial of a motion for a protective order involving the peer-review and medical records privileges was a final, appealable order. The timely notice of appeal allows an appellate court to also consider the previous, interlocutory order granting appellee's motion to compel. The trial court erred in denying appellants' motion for a protective order, because the documents at issue were protected by the peer review and medical record privileges. Judgment reversed and remanded.

After neither party timely filed written objections to a Special Master's report and recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and found that Requester had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated R.C. 149.43(B).

The Court denied Requester's untimely objections to a Special Master's report and recommendation. The Court did not find any error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the report and recommendation.

Core Terms: public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent burden of proof evidence. Overview: Requester sought a record of his settlement of a dispute with the respondent facility. Requester alleged the settlement was reduced to writing but provided no evidence that it was in the respondent facility's possession at the time of the request. Respondent denied that it possessed such a record. The special master found that while respondent had not proven the putative record did not exist somewhere else, it was not required to. The special master found requester had failed to meet his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the record in the keeping of the facility from which he requested it.

Appellant's specific plea agreement that the offenses of endangering children and felonious assault do not merge waives the issue of merger on appeal. Trial court's finding of two or more offenses committed during a single course of conduct supported by the record where appellant admitted and pled guilty to committing two separate offenses. Indictment is not defective where it tracks the language of the statute.

Minor child placed in legal custody of maternal great aunt and uncle following an adjudication that the child was dependent. Trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying mother's motion for unsupervised visitation of minor child where although mother has made great progress in her mental health counseling, the child's young age and unique needs warrant a more cautious approach of expanded supervised visitation.

Competency evaluation, peremptory challenge, Batson challenge, sufficiency of evidence, manifest weight of evidence

Judgment affirmed where negligent assault is not a lesser-included offense for vehicular assault, and sufficient, persuasive evidence supported the verdicts for vehicular assault, notwithstanding the jury's differing findings regarding reckless conduct as to other counts in the indictment.

Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment where questions of material fact exist in breach of contract action.

On application for reinstatement.

Delinquency manifest weight

Manifest weight and sufficiency, attempted aggravated arson

O.V.I., Motion to suppress, Masks during jury trials

T.C. Did Not Err in Ordering the Involuntary Admin. of Psychotropic Medication to Restore Appellant to Competency

Judgment Against Trade Name Enforceable Against Legal Entity Owning Trade Name

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of cross-appellants on plaintiff-appellant's claims for tortious interference with contracts and business relationships and trade-secret violations against cross-appellants, its claims against Orians for conversion and defamation, and its claim against Chiles-Laman for ratification. Moreover, the trial court did not err by determining that plaintiff-appellant's tort claims were not preempted by Ohio's Uniform Trade Secret Act and by granting summary judgment in favor of cross-appellants as to their claim for conversion against plaintiff-appellant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant-appellant's patient-neglect conviction is based on sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The delinquent child did not raise his constitutional argument before the trial court and failed to raise any plain-error argument on appeal. Thus, we decline to fashion one for him. Judgments affirmed.

Defendant-appellant's sentence is not subject to review under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) because was jointly recommended by the parties and imposed by the trial court and authorized by law.

Ineffective assistance - jury instructions merger of offenses in sentencing firearm specifications

Trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's complaint seeking enforcement of terms of a Last Will and Testament.

manifest weight—sufficiency—ineffective assistance

motion to dismiss, R.C. 2919.21(B)

Trial court erred in suppressing evidence where police officers had probable cause to believe that domestic violence had taken place shortly before their arrival and were justified in entering an apartment to investigate if anyone needed medical assistance.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Although the statements made by the defendant criticizing the former Mayor can clearly be characterized as inconsiderate, unkind, or rude, there is no evidence that such statements were made with actual malice. Uninformed opinions like narrow-minded opinions are not per se actionable otherwise society would see its legal system congested with civil litigation. Furthermore, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on appellant's other claims for malicious prosecution, false light, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy.

Defendant appeals decision dismissing his complaint related to separate litigation and receivership in Hamilton County. Court's error in converting Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion into Civ.R. 56 motion without notice was harmless where the defendant offered his own summary judgment evidence in opposition. Receivership is an arm of the court. A party intending to file suit against receiver acting in the scope of duties must seek leave of court. Defendant failed to seek leave and claims properly dismissed. Immunity from suit applied to the receiver's employees and attorneys and for actions taken after the termination of the receivership. Failure to comply with court order resulted in dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B).

CRIMINAL - Suppression Hearing reasonable suspicion judicial view totality of circumstances premature judgment entry trial court collapsed the time for responses opportunity to present case post-hearing briefs trial court's function cannot be replaced by independent review of appellate court.

CRIMINAL LAW - Tampering with Records R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) Petty Theft R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) evidence was sufficient to support conviction Crim.R. 29(A) convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence statements made during closing arguments of prior bad acts was not reversible error as defendant was not prejudiced by the statements, which the jury was instructed not to consider as evidence failure to exclude evidence of prior bad acts was not error as the act in question was particularly relevant to the case as the day the investigation began and the day defendant lied about discrepancies probative value of admission of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice affirmed.

CRIMINAL - postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel prosecutorial misconduct conflicting statements prejudice res judicata overwhelming evidence of guilt

APPELLATE REVIEW - lack of a final appealable order multiple claims or parties Civ.R. 54(B) no just reason for delay

CIVIL - dismissal with prejudice clerical error Civ.R. 60(A)

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to vacate void judgment of conviction subject matter jurisdiction voidable judgment res judicata.

CRIMINAL LAW - jail-time credit abuse of discretion defendant not entitled to jail-time credit for periods of incarceration spent on unrelated matters R.C. 2967.191(A) affirmed.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - writ of mandamus summary judgment solid waste management district Open Meetings Act R.C. 121.22 Public Records Act R.C. 149.43 accurate meeting minutes statutory damages.

CRIMINAL - Writ of habeas corpus Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted other adequate remedy at law precludes the matter from being addressed via habeas corpus relief.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 3(D) and App.R. 4(A) no entry attached to notice of appeal untimely appeal.

Accident bodily injury ecotec rail buggy ATV commercial auto insurance policy breach of contract bad faith bifurcate summary judgment de novo abuse of discretion plain and ordinary meaning of the contract language covered auto medical payment coverage underinsured motorist coverage uninsured motorist coverage intent of the parties Civ. R. 42(B) Civ. R. 56(F) R.C. 2315.21(B)

COMPETENCY – R.C. 2945.37: The trial court erred in finding defendant incompetent because the Court Clinic report relied on by the court was not properly admitted into evidence, and therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of competence.

MUNICIPAL: In a taxpayer action alleging an abuse of municipal corporate powers, the trial court erred by granting injunctive relief that prevents the city from continuing with a civil lawsuit instituted by its solicitor without prior authorization by city council, because the city's charter allows the solicitor to file a civil action on behalf of the city and its officials without such prior authorization. Where the taxpayer failed to demonstrate an abuse of municipal corporate power in his pursuit of injunctive relief, any error by the trial court in concluding the taxpayer lacked standing to obtain declaratory relief was harmless.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL —PRIVITY: Where plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendant based on an automobile accident, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant based on collateral estoppel where no privity existed between plaintiff and the state of Ohio in the prior traffic court case in which defendant was acquitted of a red-light violation.

GUILTY PLEA – CRIM.R. 11 – RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION: The trial court violated Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it failed to orally advise defendant of his right to confront the witnesses against him, even though the right was listed in the signed plea agreement, and therefore, defendant's guilty plea must be vacated.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION – APPEAL – DUE PROCESS – SETOFF – R.C. 2307.28: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a judgment entry reducing the damages award while defendants' notice of appeal was pending before the Ohio Supreme Court because the trial court's action was inconsistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment appealed. The trial court's procedure for determining the proper amount of setoff failed to comport with due process or the adversarial nature of the legal system because the court accepted the amount provided by plaintiffs' counsel and counsel for the settling defendants without independently verifying its accuracy or allowing the nonsettling defendants to test its accuracy.

LAW-OF-THE-CASE DOCTRINE – UNJUST ENRICHMENT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – TRUSTS: The law-of-the-case doctrine did not bar the trial court from reentering summary judgment in favor of defendant trustee on plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment after the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's prior entry of summary judgment on that claim where the record was expanded following remand and where the legal basis for granting summary judgment was not raised in the first motion for summary judgment or in the first appeal before the appellate court. Where plaintiffs conferred no benefit on defendant, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment.

PARENTAL TERMINATION — CHILD CUSTODY — R.C. 2951.414 — BEST INTEREST — STATUTORY FACTORS —R.C. 2951.414(D)(1)(b) — CHILD'S WISHES: The juvenile court erred in determining that the termination of appellant mother's parental rights were in the best interest of the children where it did not consider the wishes of the child under R.C. 2951.414(D)(1)(b). The juvenile court did not err in determining that the termination of appellant father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child where father had a history of perpetrating domestic violence and provided inconsistent testimony to the juvenile court.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – MOTION TO DISMISS – 42 U.S.C. 1983: A private attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights action.

Civ.R. 53, proximate cause. Plaintiff filed objections to the magistrate's decision recommending judgment in favor of defendant. The court overruled plaintiff's objections after holding, among other findings, that defendant was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. As a result, the court adopted the magistrate's decision as its own with modification to reflect the court's additional analysis.

On application for reinstatement.

Plaintiff, an inmate in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's (DRC) custody, filed an action against DRC seeking recovery for injuries he sustained when his cellmate assaulted him. Plaintiff stated that his cellmate pulled him off his bunk by the leg, then pushed him, causing him to hit his head. Plaintiff suffered bumps and scratches to his head, shoulders, and abdomen as a result, causing him temporary pain and discomfort. Plaintiff claimed that DRC acted negligently by failing to protect him from assault by his cellmate. The magistrate found that, as plaintiff's custodian, DRC had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiff from unreasonable risks about which defendant knew or should have known. The magistrate determined that defendant should have known that plaintiff's cellmate was a danger to him. Plaintiff had approached defendant's employees three times regarding previous hostilities between himself and his cellmate and had requested a bed move, which DRC did not grant. Further, plaintiff's cellmate had a reputation for a short temper and being hostile towards other inmates and prison staff. The magistrate found that DRC breached its duty of reasonable care by not taking precautions to protect plaintiff from his cellmate, which caused plaintiff to be injured when his cellmate attacked. Accordingly, the magistrate awarded plaintiff judgment in the amount of $1,000 for his temporary pain and discomfort.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for "regarded as" disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A) and aiding and abetting discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(J), but the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for "actual" disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A), failing to accommodate plaintiff's alleged disability, or failing to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's alleged disability. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dealing with the parties' discovery disputes.

Medical claim statute of repose did not bar wrongful death claim

Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint after the trial court had granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. And the trial court did not err in considering the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for judgment on the pleadings rather than as (an analogous) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Further, mere legal conclusions in a complaint, without alleged facts, will not state a claim. But as read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiffs, the complaint's allegations that city actions regarding a holding tank on city property have caused flooding of plaintiffs' property did not necessarily fall outside the statute of limitations given Supreme Court precedent that limitations periods can be tolled by continuing damage caused by an act carried out on the actor's own land. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part cause remanded.

The court of claims did not err in finding employees of a state center for developmental disabilities were subject to immunity and such finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court of claims did not err in not awarding damages for loss of consortium. The court of claims erred and applied an incorrect standard for assessing damages for pain and suffering and the findings regarding the existence and amount of pain and suffering damages were against the manifest weight of the evidence

Finding no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and the conclusions of law therein, and conclude that Clark failed to demonstrate he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. Respondents' motion to dismiss granted, complaint dismissed, and writ of mandamus is denied.

The magistrate properly determined that the act respondent seeks to compel – that respondent issue a final appealable order in his underlying criminal case – has already been performed, rendering the instant action moot and this court without jurisdiction over the matter. Objections overruled magistrate's decision adopted motion of respondent to dismiss granted and complaint dismissed.

R.C. 2923.14, relief from disability

Crim.R. 33 – new trial – newly discovered evidence – motion for leave

mootness, live controversy

class action – medical bills – medical charges – treatment – investigative fees – law firm – referral network

attorney's fees, R.C. 2335.39(F)(3)(c), R.C. 5101.35, R.C. 119.12, statutory interpretation, unambiguous, de novo

action to quiet title to mineral interest summary judgment in favor of surface owners no standing to appeal default judgment against other parties 2006 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act R.C. 1701.88(F)

guilty plea to aggravated possession of a controlled substance sentence consecutive to sentence in another case court made required R.C. 2929.14(C) findings no evidence of bias of trial court judge

CIVIL – Where a municipality perfects service by publication of a declaration of nuisance and abatement order in accordance with its own ordinances, mandamus does not lie due to the existence of an adequate remedy at law where there exists an administrative appeal of the declaration and abatement order.

R.C. 1901.17 counterclaim exceeding municipal court jurisdiction R.C. 1901.22(E) Civ. R. 13(J) bifurcation of forcible entry and detainer not proper

Rule 12(b)(6) Standing Rule 17(A) Injury fairly traceable to wrongdoing affirmative defenses foreclosure Issues raised for first time in response to motion to dismiss

Summary judgment Deed interpretation clear and unambiguous deed language four corners deed reservation life estate multiple grantor conveyance and reservation latent ambiguity doctrine estoppel by deed

Reagan Tokes Act constitutionality consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Based on the authority established by this district's en banc holding in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, the challenges appellant advanced against the constitutional validity of the Reagan Tokes Law have been overruled. Additionally, the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to serve his sentence consecutively because the trial court made the necessary statutory findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, untimely filed application, good cause, delay in mailing by prison mail room, lack of funds, cannot extend good cause for indefinite period of time. The application for reopening has been filed more than ninety days after journalization of the appellate judgment subject to reopening. The appellant has failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the application through his claims of delay associated with the prison mailing room and lack of funds to mail the application. Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court has established that good cause cannot excuse the lack of timely filing for an indefinite period of time. Application for reopening is denied.

Guilty plea R.C. 2967.271 the Reagan Tokes Law felony indefinite sentence Due Process Clause separation-of-powers doctrine Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial ineffective assistance of counsel incompetency. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to determine defendant's competency when there is no indica in the record of the alleged incompetency. Defendant's medication and mental disorders are not evidence of incompetency. Defendant's indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not unconstitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12. Because the trial court stated that it considered all required factors of law, it satisfied its statutory requirements under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Further, appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Insurance coverage bad faith bifurcate choice of law discovery privileged documents attorney-client privilege. Appellant appealed the trial court's journal entry ordering it to produce documents in a civil action arguing that the court used the wrong state's substantive law in a choice-of-law analysis and that disclosure of the privileged documents was improper. Appellee's bad-faith claim is classified as a tort and, therefore, we apply 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 145, to analyze which state's substantive law applies. After analyzing the four factors of 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 145, Ohio has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Applying Ohio's substantive law, "in an action alleging bad-faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to discover claims file materials containing attorney-client communications related to the issue of coverage." Boone v. Vanliner Ins, 91 Ohio St.3d at 213-214, 744 N.E.2d 154. However, appellant did not identify which documents, reviewed by the trial court in camera, were allegedly improperly ordered to be disclosed or redacted. Appellant failed to make the documents at issue available to this court for review and failed to show how the court allegedly erred by ordering the production of documents under Ohio law.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Declaratory judgment manifest weight equitable estoppel breach of contract unjust enrichment representation Medicaid medical receivables assignment. The trial court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and did not constitute the erroneous application of law.

Summary judgment open and obvious attendant circumstances. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellees where the steps were open and obvious and there were no attendant circumstances to negate the application of the open-and-obvious doctrine. Accordingly, appellees had no duty to protect plaintiff from the danger.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act indefinite non-life felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant has not demonstrated that the indefinite sentences imposed are unconstitutional.

Unemployment compensation just cause. The evidence presented at the agency hearing did not support the agency's finding that the plaintiff knew about the policy for which she was fired.

Robbery sentence maximum R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 contrary to law considered financial sanctions fine ability to pay R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) costs. The maximum sentence imposed on a robbery count was not contrary to law. The prison term imposed was within the statutory range, and the record showed that the court considered the purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. The trial court did not err in imposing a $1,000 total fine or in considering appellant's ability to pay.

Dental malpractice expert. To establish a claim for dental malpractice, the plaintiff must establish, by expert testimony, the requisite standard of skill and care of physicians in the medical community, the negligent failure of the defendant to render treatment in conformity with the standard and the proximate causation of the plaintiff's damages by the defendant. Appellant failed to present evidence necessary to establish a dental malpractice claim. The judgment of the Parma Municipal Court is affirmed.

Postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 untimely R.C. 2953.23 exceptions jurisdiction. The trial court properly dismissed appellant's petition for postconviction relief because the petition was untimely and no exception under R.C. 2953.23(A) applies. The trial court was without jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief.

Ohio Adm.Code 1301:8-7-02(E) Civ.R. 55 default weight of the evidence unjust enrichment fraud. The trier of fact did not lose its way in considering the credibility of the evidence presented in support of the damages.

Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence constitutional challenges due process separation of powers right to jury trial. Pursuant to the en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, appellant's constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled.

Community control sanction R.C. 2929.15 2929.16, 2929.18 contrary to law. Offender was sentenced for the crime of aggravated assault, a felony of the fourth degree. The trial court was required to impose either a prison term or community control sanctions. The trial court sentenced offender to "time served" and ordered the offender to pay the costs of prosecution. The sentence of "time served" is not a community control sanction authorized by R.C. 2929.15 through 2929.19 and is thus contrary to law. Further, imposing costs of prosecution is not a community control sanction under R.C. 2929.19(A). Sentence is reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing.

Reagan Tokes Law separation of powers due process right to jury trial State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. Appellant contends that the indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law violated the Ohio and United States Constitutions due process clauses, the principle of separation of powers, and appellant's right to trial by jury. However, based on this court's en banc decision in Delvallie, the court overrules those assignments and affirms the judgment of the trial court.

Forfeiture forcible entry and detainer land installment contract final appealable order eviction standing de novo review bankruptcy divest of property interests abandonment schedule of assets and liabilities judicial estoppel abuse of discretion standard and inadvertence or mistake. The trial court did not err when it determined the defendants lacked standing to pursue a counterclaim that the defendants failed to list as an asset in their bankruptcy petition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the defendants who failed to include an asset on their bankruptcy petition were judicially estopped from pursuing that asset in a later action.

Civ.R. 55(A), magistrate's decision, abuse of discretion, App.R. 23, attorney fees

libel constitutionally protected opinion publication limited purpose public figure preserving alleged error in jury instruction on appeal, compensatory damages, punitive damages

summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, foreclosure, motion to compel, discovery, affidavit, judicial bias

postconviction petition, untimely, successive

legal fees, no transcript, App.R. 9, presume regularity

minor, force, rape, sufficiency, manifest weight

Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 4301.33(A)—Petitioner seeking placement of a local liquor-sales option on the May 3, 2022 primary-election ballot failed to comply with statutory requirements to include with the liquor-option petition an affidavit certifying that the petitioner gave notice to all liquor-permit holders who would be affected by the proposal, if any, and to provide a list of the permit holders to the petition signers at the time of their signing—Writ denied.

Trial court erred in determining administrator's application for claim against the estate was untimely filed.

Pursuant to State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, a claimant is ineligible for temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation if the claimant's workplace injury did not cause the loss of earnings. Therefore, when a claimant removes herself from employment for reasons unrelated to the work-related injury, she is no longer eligible for TTD compensation.

Mandamus will not lie to enforce a private right against a private person or entity. Nor will mandamus lie where there is an adequate remedy at law.

As the order appealed did not dispose of all claims pending against all parties or contain Civ.R. 54(B) language, the order was not a final appealable order. Appeal dismissed.

JUVENILE - CUSTODY - motion to intervene Juv.R. 2(Y) Civ.R. 24(B) nonparties standing in loco parentis grandparents.

CRIMINAL LAW - traffic offense rolled through stop sign and loud exhaust patrolman prolonged stop unreasonably to await backup before conducting a free-air sniff without additional, reasonable, articulable suspicion Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle R.C. 2923.16(B)(l) motion to suppress reversed and remanded.

CRIMINAL - right to jury trial Crim.R. 23(A) jury demand bench trial petty offense waiver of jury trial R.C. 2945.05 new trial

APPELLATE REVIEW - Motion to dismiss merely adopting magistrate's decision is not a final appealable order trial court needs separate and distinct order.

WRIT OF PROCEDENDO - petition for writ of procedendo granted trial court judge ordered to proceed to final judgment after two and one half years delay a trial court need not enunciate any definitive statement concerning the court's rationale for ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

domestic violence – unlawful restraint – insufficient evidence – primary physical aggressor – self-defense – ineffective assistance – misdemeanor sentencing – R.C. 2929.22

Appellant's appeal and request to stay the lower court's judgment are moot where the fine was voluntarily paid and appellant failed to demonstrate a collateral disability stemming from the conviction.

R.C. 2953.31 — R.C. 2953.32— RECORD SEALING — ELIGIBILITY — REHABILITATION — STATE INTEREST — APPLICANT INTEREST: Where appellant filed applications to seal the records of her convictions, the trial court erred in determining that appellant's conviction for driving under a suspended license in violation of R.C. 4510.16 rendered her conviction for drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11 ineligible for sealing when she was eligible under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(A) because her conviction for drug possession and her conviction for driving under a suspended license could not be counted as one conviction. The trial court abused its discretion in determining that appellant was not rehabilitated under R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(c) when the trial court's finding was contrary to the evidence in the record. The trial court erred in determining that appellant's interest were outweighed by the government's interest in maintaining the records of her convictions under R.C. 2953(C)(1)(e) where the record contained evidence that appellant's financial and social interests outweighed a nonspecific state interest.

OPEN MEETINGS ACT – PUBLIC BODY – EVIDENCE – AUTHENTICATION – HEARSAY – PUBLIC MEETINGS: A land-use planning committee created by a township's board of trustees was a public body within the meaning of the Ohio Open Meetings Act even though it had no formal decision-making power because it was a subcommittee to which the trustees referred business and because it made recommendations and advised other public bodies, which necessitated making decisions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering a draft land-use plan because it was adequately authenticated by a planner working for the township planning department who testified that he created the graphics and took the photographs, as well as attending the committee's meetings and helping to guide the conversation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a draft land-use plan and other documents were not hearsay because Evid.R. 801(D)(2) provides that a statement made by a party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his or her agency or employment is not hearsay. The trial court did not err in finding that a quorum of a majority of the members of the land-use committee existed where the evidence showed that the land-use plan contained a photograph of seven of the committee members, which consisted of seven voting members and two nonvoting members, discussing ideas at a meeting, where an employee of the township planning department testified that the committee discussed issues and reached a consensus, and where the draft land-use plan discussed the nature of the committee's interactions. The trial court did not err in finding that the land-use committee met by email where an employee of the township planning department sent emails to all the committee members and the committee members discussed issues related to the township's land use.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY – R.C. 2744: Where the face of the complaint does not conclusively establish that the activity in question was of a governmental nature, thus entitling the city to immunity, the trial court did not err in denying the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Because the parties' written construction contract contained an obvious typographical error regarding the contractor's damages on termination for convenience, the trial court did not err when it reformed the parties' agreement to express the true intentions of the contracting parties. Because the parties' written agreement clearly and unequivocally set fort the contractor's margin for overhead and profit, the trial court erred when it relied on extrinsic evidence in finding that a different margin applied. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint for lack of service of process under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). Appellant twice requested certified-mail service at a residential address linked to appellee. On both occasions, electronic return receipts indicated that the summons and complaint successfully were "delivered" on a specific date and "left with individual." Both electronic return receipts contained illegible writing in the signature box, demonstrating that someone signed for service of process. This evidence was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of valid service, and the record contains no evidence rebutting the presumption. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding appellants' proposed medical expert, pursuant to Evid.R. 601(B)(5)(c). The trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for a new trial. Judgments affirmed.

The recreational user statute, R.C. 1533.181, precludes appellees' liability for appellant's injuries. Appellant was a recreational user on the premises, riding a bicycle on a multi-use trail which was open to the public and free of charge, at the time he collided with a rope strung across the trail between two stakes in the ground to mark a cross-country course. Since the rope was a condition of the premises, it did not change the essential character of the multi-use trail. In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Judgment affirmed.

Issues raised for the first time on appeal based on evidence outside the record will not be considered. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's successive post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant's motion was precluded by res judicata. Although the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion prematurely, the error was harmless under Crim.R. 52(A). Judgment affirmed.

Cognovit note/Guaranty/Civ.R. 60(B)

Express trust created Letter showed intent, named beneficiary, and property Judicial estoppel forecloses collection under trust because did not inform the bankruptcy court property was being held for his benefit, i.e. the trust, instead stated disinherited.

civil stalking protection order manifest weight of the evidence presumption in favor of judgment menacing by stalking mental distress credibility determination conflicting evidence.

remand to trial court from Supreme Court to determine if contract contains clear intent to abrogate the common law requirements for indemnification such as pre-settlement notice if there is no clear intent to do so, then there is no right to indemnification where settlement notice was not timely provided to indemnitor remand did not permit trial court to reconsider our decision finding notice was not properly provided intervening decision exception to law of the case doctrine did not apply cannot raise contract dispute with other party on remand.

upholding sentence where defendant appealed failure to impose community control when sentencing on felony to run concurrent with misdemeanor.

Mootness—Temporary restraining orders—Civ.R. 65(A)—It is this court's duty to decide only actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts—Because the temporary restraining order at issue was no longer in effect, the appeal of the order was moot—For purposes of the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review, it is not enough for an issue to be capable of repetition between some parties the issue must be capable of repetition between the same parties—Cause dismissed as moot.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a hearing regarding defendant/appellant's competency.

Complaint was not barred due to failing to refile the case within one year of prior voluntary dismissal when the statute of limitations had not yet expired. Testimony of keeper of records is not hearsay pursuant to Evid.R. 803. Trial court properly considered defense of accord and satisfaction.

The October 1, 2021 judgment entry does not constitute a final appealable order. Therefore, we lack subject-matter appellate jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.

An insurance policy is an insurance contract. Accordingly, an insurance policy will be interpreted to give effect to the intentions of the parties.

The trial court did not err by finding that respondent-appellant failed to file an objection to the petition for adoption. Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated murder death sentence vacated resentencing application for reopening S.Ct.Prac.R. 11.06 jurisdiction motion for continuance mitigation testimony unavailability of expert witness prejudice life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02(B) lack of final appealable order denial of summary judgment is not a final order.

The Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision to disallow the applicant's application on the basis that she did not meet the employment requirements of R.C. 4141.01(R) is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record indicates the applicant received remuneration for past service during her entire base period and the weeks she received such compensation constituted qualifying weeks of employment. The issue of whether the employer properly reported the applicant's wages is not within the limits of our review on appeal.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the owner of a local nail salon in a slip and fall case where appellant failed to provide any evidence regarding how long the area inside the nail salon where she fell had been wet, nor any evidence that the nail salon employees knew or should have known that the floor was wet and failed to clean it up, thereby precluding a finding that the nail salon had been negligent.

Trial court did not err in its decision ordering distribution of sale proceeds in an action where the complaining party never appealed the trial court's foreclosure order. In so doing, the trial court did not err by overruling appellant's request for a disbursement of "excess funds" where there were no "excess funds," but rather only "remaining funds" still subject to priority lienholders.

Appellant's convictions for involuntary manslaughter, corrupting another with drugs, trafficking in heroin, and aggravated trafficking in drugs (fentanyl) were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant provided the controlled substances to the victim, the victim ingested the substances, and the victim died after overdosing on the substances.

Appellant's conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence, which included cruiser camera footage taken of the incident, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant operated a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from that police officer to bring her motor vehicle to a stop.

Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for felonious assault and two counts of assault based on an altercation he had with three corrections officers while he was an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution.

Taxation—R.C. 5739.101—Resort-area taxes—A municipal corporation or township is not required to renew its designation as a resort area after each decennial census for it to collect a previously enacted resort-area tax under R.C. 5739.101—Decision affirmed.

Post-Sentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Aggravated Robbery

COMMUNITY CONTROL - A trial court does not abuse its discretion in revoking community control and sentencing an offender to prison where the offender was advised that participation in a particular program is a condition of community control and the offender fails to successfully complete the program.

Trial court did not err in permitting indictment amendment or property forfeiture.

INSURANCE – EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTION – DEFENSE COSTS – INDEMNITY – "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE: The trial court erred by allowing plaintiff Great American Insurance Company to seek contribution from defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company because Philadelphia's policy included an "other insurance" clause that made Philadelphia's policy "excess" when another insurance company had a duty to defend: therefore, Philadelphia was not equally bound with Great American to defend their common insured, and the doctrine of equitable contribution does not apply.

Reagan Tokes Act separation of powers due process constitutionality vagueness. The Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional as it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or appellant's due process rights. The appellant did not raise the issue of the Act being unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, has waived the argument.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act indefinite non-life felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

R.C. 2929.144 R.C. 2929.14 Reagan Tokes Act indefinite non-life felony sentence ripeness due process separation of powers. The defendant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional.

Confrontation Clause Crim.R. 43(A) Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution resentencing harmless error. The United States Supreme Court has held that one of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is a defendant's correlative right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial. In addition, Crim.R. 43(A) and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, mandate a defendant's presence at every stage of the criminal proceedings. Although there is no Confrontation Clause right at sentencing, the broad scope and protection offered by Crim.R. 43 embodies the constitutional guarantee under the Confrontation Clause. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by resentencing him without him being present. However, we find appellant's absence constituted harmless error, in this matter, because appellant suffered no prejudice. To the contrary, the trial court conferred a benefit on appellant by waiving the mandatory drug fine of $7,500.

Substantive due process fundamental fairness requirement equal protection rights R.C. 2152.10 R.C. 2152.12 R.C. 2152.121 juvenile discretionary transfer mandatory transfer adult court reverse bindover amenability hearing rational-basis test legitimate government purpose estoppel Juv.R. 1 R.C. 2152.02 and juvenile court's jurisdiction. Juveniles have no substantive right to an amenability hearing or to have their case returned to the juvenile court system following a discretionary transfer. Absent such rights, appellant's claim of a substantive due process violation lacked merit. After finding appellant met the initial statutory requirements for a discretionary transfer to adult court, the juvenile court completed a full investigation of appellant and held an amenability hearing where appellant and his counsel were present. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated its decision and reasoning to subject appellant to a discretionary transfer. The juvenile court issued a judgment entry that discussed its reasoning for transfer. Based upon these actions, appellant's alleged violation of the fundamental fairness requirement of procedural due process is without merit. The discretionary transfer statute is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose — to protect society from violent offenders and increase punishments for serious juvenile offenders — and, therefore, it does not violate appellant's equal protection rights. The juvenile court acted in accordance with Juv.R. 1, the discretionary transfer statute, and R.C. 2152.02 when it sent, by discretionary transfer, two of appellant's juvenile cases to adult court but retained jurisdiction over appellant's third juvenile case.

Crim.R. 11, guilty plea, knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, R.C. 2929.14, consecutive sentences, Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The record demonstrates that the appellant's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily under Crim.R. 11. The imposition of concurrent sentences was not contrary to law and was an express part of the plea agreement, but the trial court's failure to journalize the findings that were properly made on the record pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a remand to enter a nunc pro tunc entry to conform to the sentencing proceedings. This court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470 (Laster Mays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) determined that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Board of Tax Appeals Board of Revision property valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals erred when it relied on the fiscal officer's property valuation in lieu of the Board of Revision's valuation. When the Board of Revision has reduced the value of the property based on the owner's evidence that value has been held to eclipse the auditor's original valuation.

Oral contract written contract statute of limitations Savings Statute. Trial court erred in finding that plaintiff's claim for breach of contract was barred by the statute of limitations where the court applied the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts even though there was insufficient evidence to determine if the claim for breach of an oral contract had accrued and also because the parties had a written contract.

R.C. 2323.12 2323.13 cognovit note Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment App.R. 12 App.R. 16 jurisdiction R.C. 1343.01 Ohio's usury statute. Trial court did not err in granting cognovit judgment in favor of appellee and in denying appellants' motion for relief from judgment when appellants took out commercial loans and provided no evidence that the loans were consumer loans. Appellants were not entitled to a hearing because the undisputed facts showed that the loans were commercial loans and the trial court expressly found as much. The trial court correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to consolidate an active case with an inactive case. Ohio's usury statute does not apply because the amount of the loans exceeded $100,000 and/or were business loans. Appellants' brief does not comply with appellate rules, but cases are best decided on their merits so the court will use its discretion to address appellants' arguments but will not address arguments appellants make that they do not assign as error.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. Appellant's sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) Civ.R. 60(B)(1) Civ.R. 60(B)(5) mistake Loc.App.R. 23 frivolous filing sanctions. A motion for relief from judgment was denied where no proper grounds for relief were presented, the motion was found to be frivolous, and sanctions imposed.

Writ of mandamus prohibition mandate of superior court failure to follow mandate right to trial by jury Ohio Const. Article I, Section 5 Civ.R. 38 Civ.R. 39 R.C. 2311.04 equity specific performance adequate remedy at law. Relator's complaint for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition was dismissed where he failed to show that respondent was disobeying a mandate from a superior court when respondent struck relator's jury demand in an underlying case because relator's claims sounded in equity and sought specific performance.

Crim.R. 52(B), plain error, Evid.R. 402, Evid.R. 403(A), Evid.R. 403(B), photographs, manifest weight of the evidence, R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), R.C. 2907.01(B), ineffective assistance, unfair prejudice, cumulative evidence

Trial court erred when it dismissed appellant's amended complaint for failure to state a claim for relief because appellant's alleged sufficient facts to put appellees on notice of the claim for a breach of the Broker Agreement or, alternatively, unjust enrichment. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Ohio's notice pleading rules did not require appellant to specifically identify the buyer by name or set forth specific information supporting its belief as to the possible identity of the buyer. Because the subject of appellant's promissory estoppel claims were governed by the Broker Agreement, the trial court did not err when it dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Judgment reversed, in part, and cause remanded.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Appellant failed to establish a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his plea. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. CHAPTER 5122 – EMERGENCY HOSPITALIZATION – AFFIDAVIT OF MENTAL ILLNESS – PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT: The mental-illness affidavit filed by a psychiatrist against respondent after an emergency hospitalization was sufficient to establish probable cause that respondent was a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order under R.C. 5122.01(B)(4) where the affidavit detailed respondent's destroying property, causing problems in the community, and voicing his delusions to police officers.

JURISDICTION – POSTCONVICTION – JURY-VERDICT FORM: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postconviction motion seeking relief on the ground that the jury-verdict forms were not in compliance with R.C. 2945.75: the motion was not reviewable under any postconviction proceeding provided by rule or statute and the sentence was not correctable under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, when it was imposed by a court with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.

The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for a mistrial because of inconsistencies in a State's witness's testimony and potential perjury both the State and defense counsel were able to question the witness regarding the inconsistencies in her testimony before the jury. The witness acknowledged that she initially did not want to identify her son as the individual who had advised her that one of her checks had been stolen. Appellant's 12-month prison sentence for forgery was within the statutory range for that offense and therefore not contrary to law. Furthermore, appellant had prior felony convictions thus, the trial court was not required to sentence him to community control sanctions based upon his conviction for forgery, a fifth-degree felony. The evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of the forgery offense. Judgment affirmed.

The record does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's trial strategy. Appellant's convictions for violating a protection order are valid notwithstanding the fact that the protection order was issued on an outdated form. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's request to discharge his attorney during trial. The trial court was not required to inquire into the reason for appellant's dissatisfaction where his complaint was not sufficiently specific. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in finding that an appeal under R.C. 3319.081(C) was timely filed when the evidence established that the appeal was filed nine days after the Board's decision was received by certified mail. The trial court erred in finding that the Board's decision was unconstitutional where the Board's pre-termination notice provided the discharged employee with sufficient notice of the charges against him. The cause will be remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to review whether the Board's decision was illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in considering previous charges of domestic violence against the defendant, that did not result in conviction, at sentencing. A trial court may consider a defendant's previous acts when they are not the sole basis for the sentence. Here, the charges were but one of many factors considered by the trial court in sentencing the defendant to maximum and consecutive sentences.

The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the city's claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief concerning R.C. 4511.093(B)(1) and (3), 4511.096(C), and R.C. 4511.099(A), where it improperly found that such claims were no longer justiciable since the city temporarily suspended its photo enforcement traffic program.

Core Terms: public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 corporation appearance through counsel pro se Civ.R. 41(B)(1) R.C. 2743.75(D)(2). Overview: Requester media corporation sought a list of officers employed by respondent police department. Respondent failed to provide the records or a written response, and later failed to file its statutory response until ordered twice to do so. Although given permission to file a motion for default judgment and/or a reply, requester did not obtain counsel and failed to include proof of service with documents it submitted. The special master recommended the court dismiss the action without prejudice for requester's failure to obtain counsel as ordered and for failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After neither party timely filed written objections to a Special Master's report and recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court denied Requester's claim for production of records for failure to show that the requested record existed in Respondent's keeping.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(m) R.C. 149.43(A)(5) intellectual property. Requester sought crosstabs and participant responses from certain research polls associated with respondent. Respondent asserted it had provided all existing records that could be characterized as "crosstabs," and that the participant responses were exempt as intellectual property records. Requester provided no evidence that additional crosstab records existed but argued that the intellectual property exemption defined by R.C. 149.43(A)(5) had been waived by publication of academic papers based on the survey results, and through the publication peer review process. The special master found respondent had provided sufficient evidence that the survey results had not been disclosed to the public and that the records otherwise fell squarely within the exemption.

The Court sua sponte dismissed Requester's complaint for being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. 2323.52.

Criminal law—Material-witness warrants—When requesting that a court issue a material-witness warrant, state must establish, by oath or affidavit, probable cause to believe that the witness is material and that the warrant is necessary to procure the witness's attendance at trial—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of Jezerinac v. Dioun.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of Jezerinac v. Dioun.

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's community control after defendant admitted to violating the terms of his sanctions on two separate occasions.

The Confrontation Clause is not violated where an analyst testifies at trial on direct and cross examination, in part, about a forensic report she wrote and produced before trial.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02 final order special proceeding substantial right denial of summary judgment declaratory judgment lack of jurisdiction appeal dismissed.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - habeas corpus summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) R.C. 2725.01 expiration of maximum sentence petitioner not entitled to release when he did not receive new inmate number after first sentence completed but before completing second sentence.

CRIMINAL - Grand Theft R.C. 2913.02 sufficiency of the evidence Crim.R. 29(A) intent to deprive lesser-included offense Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle R.C. 2913.03

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

Maximum/Consecutive Sentencing - Court Costs - Court Appointed Counsel Fees

BREACH OF CONTRACT — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — QUANTUM MERUIT — UNJUST ENRICHMENT: The trial court erred by granting defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim where the court failed to accept all allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true and erred in determining that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that defendant breached the parties' contract. The trial court properly granted defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's quantum meruit/unjust enrichment claim because an equitable claim in quasi-contract will not lie where plaintiff acknowledged the parties' contract covered the same subject matter.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for default judgment. Appellant was served but failed to answer the complaint and did not respond to the motion for default judgment, and it was not an abuse of discretion to grant the motion. The trial court judgment is affirmed.

The trial court did not err in finding that the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision, denying appellant's claim for unemployment compensation benefits, was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence in the record supported the commission's finding that appellant was discharged with just cause from her employment. Judgment affirmed.

Sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence support Craig's conviction of tampering with evidence.

jail-time credit R.C. 2967.191 R.C. 2929.19 competent credible evidence abuse of discretion res judicata

aggravated murder, sentencing, equal protection, due process, ineffective assistance of counsel

legal custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the children – timely permanence

Requirements for voluntary waiver of counsel

Suppression anonymous tip

Reagan Tokes Act constitutional State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. The en banc majority in Delvallie has determined that the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional. Therefore, appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Reagan Tokes Law S.B. 201. Appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law is not unconstitutional. Appellant properly preserved his argument for appeal and was afforded effective assistance of counsel.

Civ.R. 41 sanction abuse of discretion trial order dismissal notice selective enforcement. - Based on the entire record, the court abused its discretion to dispose of the counterclaim for failing to strictly adhere to a trial order when arguably no reasonable notice under the circumstances was given, there was no surprise or undue prejudice to the plaintiff, there was no undue delay to the court or proceeding with trial, and the court exercised arbitrary selection of enforcement of its trial order.

Murder felonious assault accident self-defense lesser included offense reckless homicide bench trial manifest weight. The trial court did not err in failing to consider appellant's alternative theories of the case, including accident, self-defense, and a lesser included offense. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio Redistricting Commission's third revised plan violates Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution—Third revised plan is invalid—The Ohio Redistricting Commission shall be reconstituted, convene, and draft and adopt an entirely new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution.

Administrative appeal mootness property already demolished failure to obtain stay impossible to grant effectual relief due process failure to raise argument before board waiver plain error CHCO 553.03(b) nuisance emergency order failure to conduct hearing R.C. 2506.02 transcript unavailable R.C. 2506.03 failure to move to submit additional evidence. Appellant's first assignment of error was rendered moot by her failure to seek a stay of the lower court's decision, which allowed the property to be razed. Appellant's second and third assignments of error are overruled. The lower court did not err in finding that appellant had waived the issue of the need to bring legislative action or in declining to conduct a hearing in this matter.

Robbery manifest weight sufficiency of the evidence credibility. The appellant's convictions for robbery are not against the weight of the evidence solely because the trier of fact accepted the victims' testimony as credible over the defendant's version of the events.

Domestic violence prior convictions enhancement R.C. 2945.75(B) stipulation prosecutorial misconduct closing argument character evidence passion and prejudice jury fair trial. - Absent a stipulation, proof of prior convictions for enhancement purposes must comply with R.C. 2945.75(B). Even though the state did not receive a stipulation and did not comply with R.C. 2945.75(B) the error was not properly preserved on appeal and was not raised for this court to consider. When the prosecutor's comments during closing argument uses improper character evidence, i.e. prior domestic violence convictions, to incite the passion and prejudice of the jury, a defendant is deprived of a fair trial.

Foreclosure Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment confirmation of sale abuse of discretion meritorious defense excusable neglect hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate the confirmation of the sale of the property without holding a hearing. Appellant failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).

Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court erred in declining to impose a sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law.

Qualifying second-degree felony Reagan Tokes Law constitutional. The Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the separation-of-powers doctrine, or due process rights. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing under the law.

Contempt of court findings of fact. The trial court failed to incorporate any findings of fact for the contempt conviction in its journal entry. Thus, this matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court so that it may enter a written order, setting forth fully, clearly, and specifically the facts out of which the contempt arose.

CIV.R. 12(H) – CIV.R. 60(B) – WAIVER: Defendant waived any defects in service when it did not raise the insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense in its Civ.R. 60(B) motion to set aside the default judgment, where that was defendant's first filing in the case. Defendant could not raise an alleged issue regarding party names and whether there was a contract between those parties for the first time on appeal, where the issue was not raised in support of defendant's arguments below. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion where the parties did not agree to, and the record did not reflect that the parties reached any agreement for, an extension of time as alleged by defendant.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — IMMUNITY — R.C. 2744.02(B)(4): The trial court erred by denying the city's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss where plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the city: taking the allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true, plaintiff failed to allege that her injury occurred within or on the grounds of a building used in connection with a governmental function, sufficient to establish the second requirement of the R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) physical-defect exception, so the exception did not apply to remove the city's general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).

Petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition dismissed. Because the ODRC has already recalculated petitioner's initial parole eligibility date and because he is entitled to no additional relief, his petitions are moot. The requested writs will not lie for an act that is authorized by law and has already been performed.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's administrative appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. R.C. 119.12 did not confer on appellant the ability to appeal appellee's adjudication order concerning appellant's grievance. Judgment affirmed.

Complaint for writ of procedendo dismissed. The magistrate's decision and recommendation that the complaint be dismissed because relator failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of R.C. 2969.25 is adopted.

The magistrate's decision is adopted in full and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under R.C. 2725.03.

Crim.R. 7(D), manifest weight of the evidence, sufficiency of the evidence

Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his first trial for the charged offenses. The trial court did not commit plain error when it admitted a statement made by an individual through the testimony of a State's witness, because the statement was not testimonial in nature, and appellant's right to confront witnesses was therefore not violated. The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion for a mistrial. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant's pro se petition for postconviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's appeal from her criminal trespass conviction is not moot where (1) she was forced to pay court costs after being told they were being waived and (2) the suspension of her remaining sentence and her fine was conditioned on her not taking her dog to the shelter where she occasionally stayed. Appellant's criminal trespass conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence she repeatedly refused to leave the shelter when asked to do so by a police officer and an agent of the shelter's owner. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's misdemeanor conviction for leaving the scene of an accident was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record contains evidence, including eyewitness testimony, to support a finding that appellant backed her mini-van into another vehicle in a parking lot and drove away without informing anyone. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by ordering appellant to pay a $130 appointed-counsel fee as part of her sentence, as such a fee must be imposed as a separate civil assessment. The trial court, however, did not err by sentencing appellant to pay a $250 supervision fee where it could be inferred from the record that the trial court considered appellant's present and future ability to pay the fee. Judgment vacated in part and affirmed in part remanded to the trial court for imposition of the appointed counsel fee as a civil assessment.

Anders appeal. An independent review of the record, including the plea and sentencing transcript, confirms appointed appellate counsel's assessment that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to explain appellant's sentencing options during a community-control violation and revocation hearing. The trial court explained that appellant could continue on community control with a local jail term to be followed by completion of a residential treatment program or he could serve a 12-month prison term. Appellant refused to participate in the treatment program, and the trial court imposed the prison term. Because the trial court fully explained appellant's options, defense counsel did not provide deficient representation by failing to do so. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not exhibit bias in sentencing appellant. Imposition of 180-day sentence was not an abuse of discretion where appellant demonstrated pattern of committing OVI offenses and trial judge was concerned for safety of community.

Statute of repose in R.C. 2305.113(C) does not apply to wrongful-death actions arising from medical malpractice. The Wrongful Death Act contains statute of repose applicable to wrongful-death actions arising from product-liability claims, but contains no similar provision for actions arising from medical claims. And unlike other statutory provisions that impose repose period "notwithstanding R.C 2125.02," R.C. 2305.113(C) contains no such language.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

The trial court did not err by dismissing appellant's civil action for failing to comply with the affidavit requirements of R.C. 2969.25.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to vacate its judgment resentencing appellant to an indefinite term of ten-years-to-life in prison after a jury found appellant guilty of one count of first-degree felony rape and appellant's argument challenge to the decision ordering the trial court to resentence appellant claiming that decision as wrongly decided and based on a "mistaken belief" was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from a judgment granting a complaint for forcible entry and detainer filed by appellee where the record indicated appellant had already vacated the premises, thus rendering the forcible entry and detainer action moot because, having been restored to the premises, there is no further relief that could be granted.

The trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction over appellant, an Arizona company, where appellant consented to jurisdiction in the state courts of Clermont County, Ohio through a forum-selection clause in the parties' contract for freight brokerage services. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to set aside default judgment where appellant failed to demonstrate it was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5).

The juvenile court erred in finding permanent custody to a children's services agency was in the best interests of the children where the juvenile court failed to consider the wishes of the children.

CRIMINAL LAW - rape less than thirteen years of age sexual conduct digital penetration corroboration not necessary victim testimony sufficient manifest weight credibility Evid.R. 702 expert testimony court need not expressly state witness is qualified as expert. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES - jury instruction de novo review gross sexual imposition sexual contact right to remain silent.

CIVIL - Summary judgment age discrimination gender discrimination retaliation McDonnel Douglas test adverse employment action similarly situated individuals Civ.R. 56(C) R.C. 4101.11 R.C. 4101.12.

CIVIL-BREACH OF CONTRACT-CONVERSION - Where language of lease agreement was open-ended and ambiguous regarding Appellant's duty to restore Appellee's farm property after conducting oil and gas operations, trial court properly allowed extrinsic evidence which supported trial court's finding that Appellant had a continuing duty to repair property trial court's finding that Appellant's failure to leave topsoil stockpile intact constituted a breach of contract language, and that Appellant's use of topsoil stockpile in furtherance of its cleanup/reclamation efforts constituted conversion was well-reasoned interpretation of contract language where trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve Appellee's claim for damages, trial court did not abuse its discretion in making damage award where Appellant could have easily added pro rata language to "Additional Rents" clause, trial court properly found clear and ambiguous language of clause supported Appellee's claim for annual lump sum payment.

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension and order to pay restitution.

CRIM.R. 33(B) - The trial court erred to the extent that it denied the defendant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial as being untimely filed, without considering whether the defendant met the exception to the timely filing requirement the trial court further erred by applying a reasonability requirement to deny the defendant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial as untimely, when Crim.R. 33(B) does not contain such a requirement.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to hold funds belonging to clients in a client trust account and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation—Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed.

appropriation summary judgment private property R.C. 1545.11 R.C. 163.04 R.C. 163.041 park district bikeway recreational trail eminent domain

SELF-DEFENSE – EVID.R. 403 – EVIDENCE: Defendant met his burden of production to show that he used deadly force in self-defense so as to require the state to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense where defendant's assertion that the victim pointed a gun in his face, which caused him to act in self-defense, was supported by evidence that the victim had a gun within reach. The trier of fact may reasonably have found that defendant did not act in self-defense when he shot and killed the victim where the state disproved at least one element of defendant's self-defense claim, which are: (1) the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such a danger was in the use of such force and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a chat and videos from defendant's Facebook page where the evidence was probative of defendant's identity, his possession of the weapon used to kill the victim, and his attempt to get rid of the weapon Evid.R. 403(A) did not require exclusion of the evidence where the record contains no indication that the evidence aroused in the trier of fact such passion, sympathy, horror, or instinct to punish so as to be unfairly prejudicial.

NEW TRIAL: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in denying, without a hearing, defendant's Crim.R. 33(A) motion for a new trial, when that motion was not timely filed, and leave under Crim.R. 33(B) to move for a new trial out of time was not sought.

ASSIGNMENT – AUTOMOBILES – DAMAGES: The trial court did not err in finding that an assignment by a customer of any claim that he had and/or proceeds that he might be entitled to receive from the person at fault in an automobile accident to an auto-body-repair shop was invalid because liability for the accident had not yet been established and, at the time of the assignment, the customer did not have a right to any proceeds.

R.C. 2945.05 – JURY TRIAL – WAIVER: The trial court did not have jurisdiction to try defendant's case without a jury because it did not strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05, as there was no written jury waiver signed by the defendant in the record.

Because defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment.

The trial court did not abuse its disretion in denying without an evidentiary hearing a post-sentence motion, premised on claimed actual innocence, to withdraw a guilty plea where the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea was not at issue and where the trial court's rejection of the complaining witness's recanting affidavit was consistent with the analysis used in State v. Calhoun, 86 OhioSt.3d 279 (1999). Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate's recommendation to dismiss this original action for want of an inmate affidavit describing other civil actions filed by the inmate within the last five years is well taken. Although the earlier case cited by the magistrate may not have been a civil action, the court takes judicial notice of various civil actions filed by the inmate within the relevant timeframe. Magistrate's Decision modified objection overruled writ action dismissed.

JUVENILE - Because juvenile courts have broad discretion in fashioning rehabilitative dispositions and because the juvenile sentencing statutes do not obviously prohibit juvenile courts from committing a child to the legal custody of DYS and also imposing community control, the trial court did not commit plain error by imposing a DYS commitment followed by a period of court-supervised probation after his release from DYS.

preliminary injunction – declaratory judgment – injunction – affirmative defense – exhaustion of administrative remedies – exceptions

bond forfeiture hearing to show cause required order denying remission reversed R.C. 2937.36 R.C. 2937.39

CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER - Appellate court must defer to trial court on credibility determinations and trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct which caused Appellee mental distress and thus did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's request for civil stalking protection order.

Endangering children obstructing official business Anders brief motion to withdraw ineffective assistance of counsel guilty plea coercion Crim.R. 11 prosecutorial misconduct plain error invited error speedy trial waiver restitution R.C. 2929.18 ability to pay sentence due process judicial bias contrary to law R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2929.14. Appointed counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. Appellant's endangering children and obstructing official business convictions and the trial court's sentence are affirmed. Appellant's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered it was not improperly coerced by the prosecution. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The prosecutor's remarks at sentencing did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, and appellant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating plain error. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court's five-year prison sentence is not contrary to law, and the trial court did not commit plain error in ordering appellant to pay restitution. The trial court's sentencing journal entry contains a clerical error with respect to the total amount of restitution. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc journal entry accurately reflecting the amount of restitution agreed upon by the parties.

Nunc pro tunc aggravated murder R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) invited error harmless error Crim.R. 43 Crim.R. 52. The trial court's issuance of a nunc pro tunc entry imposing a sentence for the aggravated murder count of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 30 full years of imprisonment was legally correct and was procured upon the request of the defendant, rendering any error to be invited as a matter of law.

Preindictment delay, guilty plea. Appellant's plea of guilty waived the argument that he was prejudiced by the state's preindictment delay.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment R.C. 5302.30 residential property disclosure form caveat emptor material defects building and housing code violations patent defects latent defects attorney fees punitive damages R.C. 2315.21(C). Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to liability in favor of buyers on their fraud claim based on seller's material misrepresentations in residential property disclosure form. Even assuming that certain of the defects/code violations at issue were patent defects that were observed (or should have been observed) by buyers, that did not preclude seller from liability for, and for buyers from properly recovering damages resulting from, seller's fraudulent concealment of and misrepresentations relating to any material, latent defects/code violations in the residential property disclosure form. Trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in awarding buyers their attorney fees after finding that they were entitled to recover punitive damages. Attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party as an element of compensatory damages when the factfinder finds that punitive damages are warranted. Seller did not challenge trial court's punitive damages award or its determination that buyers were entitled to recover punitive damages on appeal and did not otherwise point to anything in the record that showed that trial court's finding that seller exhibited a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of buyers that had a great probability of causing substantial harm was not supported by competent, credible evidence.

Felonious assault sufficient evidence serious physical harm fractured nose. - Appellant's conviction for felonious assault supported by sufficient evidence where the evidence showed that the victim suffered serious physical harm, i.e., a fractured nose.

Felony sentence third degree trafficking financial sanctions mandatory fine indigency affidavit of indigence ability to pay R.C. 2929.18(A)(3) R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) ineffective assistance prejudice nunc pro tunc fine. In one of the underlying cases, affirmed trial court's imposition of a $5,000 mandatory fine where the record showed the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and considered the defendant's present and future ability to pay the mandatory fine before imposing the financial sanction in accordance with R.C. 2929.18. Ineffective assistance of counsel was not established for counsel's failure to file the defendant's affidavit of indigence when the affidavit was signed at the sentencing hearing and reviewed by the trial court. In the other underlying case, vacated the trial court's nunc pro tunc entry that was improperly used to include a fine never imposed in that case. Remanded the cases with instructions to correct the record.

Not-for-profit religious organization independent contractor political subdivision summary judgment agent/employee contracts. Catholic Charities, a not-for-profit religious organization, is not a political subdivision. Catholic Charities entered into five consecutive yearly contracts to provide services as an independent contractor. It performed its services as an independent contractor, not as an agent or employee of a political subdivision. Therefore, Catholic Charities was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity.

Sexual battery R.C. 2907.03 R.C. 2903.11 withdraw plea Crim.R. 32.1 App.R. 16(A)(7) conflict of interest consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2953.08. The trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor was the guilty plea the product of ineffective assistance of counsel or a conflict of interest between the defendant and his counsel. The defendant has not demonstrated that the consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.

S.B. 201 Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's sentence pursuant to Reagan Tokes was not a violation of his constitutional rights.

Reagan Tokes law S.B. 201 right to trial by jury separation-of-powers doctrine due process en banc indefinite sentencing. The trial court erred when it failed to impose a sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw plea res judicata authority to offer relief. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's fourth postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the motion was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata and, in addition, under State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59, the trial court lacked authority to vacate the guilty pleas that had been affirmed in the defendant's direct appeal.

Plain error community-control sanctions violation hearing due process substantial evidence admission to a community-control violation neutral and detached trial court absence of prosecutor at violation hearing the Reagan Tokes Law right to trial by jury separation-of-powers doctrine nunc pro tunc clerical error. The defendant's due process rights were not violated when the trial court acted as a neutral and detached hearing body and the defendant's admission to his community-control sanctions violation negated the need to introduce substantial evidence in support of the violation. The trial court did not err in failing to require a state representative's presence at the violation hearing. The defendant's indefinite sentence imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law did not violate his constitutional rights. Remand was required for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to correctly set forth the court's statements made in open court and reflected in the court transcript.

Forcible entry and detainer tenant vacated residence dismissal of appeal. A forcible entry and detainer action decides the right to immediate possession only. If the property has been restored to the landowner, the action becomes moot because there is no further relief that can be granted to the landowner. Appellant states that he has vacated the property and therefore there is no remedy this court can grant. The appeal is moot and dismissed.

overruling Gulfport's argument that it should not be required to pay the signing bonus and royalties corresponding to the Gatchell reservation trial court did not err in finding reservation was abandoned under the Dormant Mineral Act as Gulfport's production was not a savings event Gulfport was not the holder at the relevant time parties cited language saying signing bonus was payable per acre the lessor owns and payments can be withheld until any adverse claim of ownership is resolved Gulfport never argued the ownership must exist within 90 days of the execution of the lease cross-appellants are concerned the summary judgment as to Gulfport and the surface owner could be read as conflicting with the prior order enforcing settlement between the surface owner and cross-appellants, but these judgments must be together as there is no indication the court was reconsidering its judgment enforcing settlement (which included order to record the judgment).

R.C. 9.39—Strict liability of public officials for the misappropriation of public money—A public official cannot be held strictly liable for the misappropriation of public money when neither the official nor any of the official's subordinates collects or receives, and therefore does not control, the funds—Judgment affirmed.

Court of appeals' judgment reversed, and cause remanded to trial court to consider appellant's motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial in light of State v. Bethel.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded for resentencing. The evidence was legally sufficient and of manifest weight to support appellant's convictions for grand theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) and Medicaid fraud under R.C. 2913.40(B). However, the trial court committed plain error by failing to merge the convictions as allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — CIV.R. 8(A) — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS — MALICIOUS PROSECUTION — RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: The trial court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was proper where the plaintiff plainly failed to allege facts in support of his claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and racial discrimination.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — FOURTH AMENDMENT — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WARRANT — PROBABLE CAUSE — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — OPEN-FIELDS DOCTRINE: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss where credible, competent evidence supported that, prior to obtaining the search warrant, a detective conducted a "knock and talk" at the residence to find out why the tracking device on stolen equipment would be "pinging" from defendant's property and, after no one responded at the home, walked along the driveway of the property—which led to the three storage buildings on the property—to find someone to speak to about the signal: Because the driveway is open to the public and it is not a part of the curtilage, and the detective had a right to be on the property pursuant to the investigation of the stolen equipment, the detective's observation from the driveway of "fresh track marks that would be made by a track-type vehicle similar to what had been described as stolen" leading to the inside of the building was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Where the record reflected that there was no "no trespassing" sign posted on the property, and neither the property, nor the storage buildings, were enclosed by a fence or some other means intended to shield the property from public view or government surveillance, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for the property. The report of the tracking device pinging from defendant's property—which was confirmed by law enforcement to belong to defendant—and the report of the tracks that were discovered by a detective during the "knock and talk" provided a substantial basis to believe that there was a fair probability that the stolen equipment would be found on defendant's property, which established sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

State's appeal. The trial court erred when it granted appellee's "motion to refrain from reimposition of sentence," as there was a mandate from this court in a prior opinion to remand appellee back to prison. Further, there are no constitutional problems on the basis of due process or cruel and unusual punishment with remanding appellee into the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Donovan, J., concurring.)

The totality of the circumstances establish that appellant understood the nature of the charge to which she pled guilty therefore, the trial court's failure to fully recite the elements of attempted involuntary manslaughter at the plea hearing did not affect the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of appellant's guilty plea to that offense. In addition, the eight-year prison term that appellant received for attempted involuntary manslaughter is not contrary to law. However, the post-release control portion of appellant's sentence is contrary to law due to the trial court's failure to fully inform appellant of the consequences for violating post-release control at the sentencing hearing as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of resentencing appellant to post-release control.

On remand from a prior appeal, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for appellant's three rape convictions was contrary to law. Furthermore, because appellee's first appeal from his convictions only addressed the resentencing for the three rape counts, the trial court exceeded our remand and violated the doctrine of res judicata when it resentenced appellant with respect to his conviction for importuning. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

State's appeal. The trial court erred when it granted appellee's "motion to refrain from reimposition of sentence," as there was a mandate from this court in a prior opinion to remand appellee back to prison. Further, there are no constitutional problems on the basis of due process or cruel and unusual punishment with remanding appellee into the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Donovan, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err in granting employer's motion to dismiss due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in an appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. Although the Commission determined that an intervening injury broke the causal connection between the original industrial injury and the new non-industrial injury, the decision of the Commission expressly stated that claimant was not forever barred from seeking future benefits under the original allowed claim. Therefore, the issue at hand related to the extent of claimant's disability, not his right to participate in the worker's compensation fund, and the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for theft was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence established that, after selecting a hat and necklace while shopping at WalMart and paying for other items at the cash register, appellant wore the necklace and hat past the point of sale without paying for them. Judgment affirmed.

An independent review of the record, including a plea and sentencing transcript, confirms appointed appellate counsel's assessment that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The juvenile court did not err in applying the 12 of 22 provision of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) notwithstanding the COVID-19 pandemic and in finding it was in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the children services agency.

Finding that R.C.2909.15(D)(2)(b), which grants a trial court discretion to impose a reduced arson registry reporting period only if it receives a request from the prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Case remanded for nunc pro tunc entry to reflect that appellant is to register as an arson offender, pursuant to R.C. 2909.14 and 2909.15.

Relator's original action in mandamus is dismissed where the respondent, an email address associated with the city of Sandusky, is not a proper party against whom a writ of mandamus may issue under R.C. 2731.01.

Reagan Tokes Act not violative of constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process of law, and does not violate the constitutional requirement of separation of powers

R.C. 2315.19, Civ.R. 59(A)(6)

minor misdemeanor, continuance, magistrate's order, motion to set aside, Criminal Rule 19(D)

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress his chemical-breath test. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary determinations. The jury's verdicts are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee as to plaintiff-appellant's claims brought under Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code.

Delinquency adjudication for Gross Sexual Imposition was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence.

Under Civ.R. 6(C)(1), a movant may file a reply to a nonmovant's response within seven days after service of the nonmovant's response to the movant's initial motion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by reversing defendant-appellant's decision denying plaintiff-appellee's application for a zoning permit because the trial court did not err by concluding that the language of the township's resolution is mandatory and that plaintiff-appellee is entitled to the permit.

The trial court did not err by allowing the state to amend its original indictment to enlarge the time period in which the crime occurred. In this case, the record plainly reflects that the amendment did not change the name or identity of the crime charged it merely changed the time period in which the crime occurred. Courts have repeatedly held that dates and times in an indictment are not essential elements of an offense and have consistently upheld amendments to dates in indictments. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by denying appellant's request for transcripts from the grand jury proceedings where appellant failed to articulate any specific fact that demonstrates a particular need for grand jury testimony and provides no reasonable basis for suspicion that the indictment was not supported by probable cause.

Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel where he did not allege he would not have accepted the plea and would have insisted on going to trial had trial counsel better communicated and conferred more with him regarding the plea offer.

The discrepancy between the term of community control imposed at the sentencing hearing in defendant's presence (no term specified) and by the subsequent sentencing entry (three years) is reversible error requiring a new sentencing hearing.

The probate court did not abuse its discretion in appointing an attorney as guardian of an 86-year-old's person and estate where the attorney presented clear and convincing evidence through the testimony of two psychologists, a social worker, and a nursing home business manager that the 86-year-old was mentally and physically impaired and was unable to handle her finances, make sound medical decisions, or complete daily living activities independently.

allied offenses of similar import R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) trafficking R.C. 2925.11(A) possession R.C. 2903.04(A) involuntary manslaughter R.C. 2925.02(A)(5) corrupting another with drugs predicate offense unlawful termination of another's pregnancy consecutive prison terms App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) Reagan Tokes Law separation of powers due process

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02(B) discovery issues are generally interlocutory in nature lack of a final appealable order.

CIVIL - vexatious litigator R.C. 2323.52 leave to proceed direct appeal from vexatious litigator determination failure to seek leave dismissed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.8(B) by failing to be patient, dignified, or courteous to litigants or witnesses while acting in an official capacity and failing to require similar conduct of a lawyer subject to the judge's direction and control—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

Suppression prolonged detention

Constitutionality of Reagan Tokes law/Court costs

Denial of motion to remove undifferentiated, identically worded, carbon copy charges

Ineffective assistant of counsel

ATTORNEY FEES — AMERICAN RULE — BAD-FAITH EXCEPTION: The trial court's express finding of no bad faith precluded an award of attorney fees under the bad-faith exception to the "American Rule" that each party is responsible for its own litigation expenses.

COMPLAINT – CIV.R. 15(A): The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint where the motion was not timely filed and plaintiff offered no rationale justifying the delay.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS – EVIDENCE – R.C. 4511.34 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where competent and credible evidence existed upon which the trial court could conclude that no objectively reasonable officer would have believed defendant was following the vehicle in front of him more closely than was reasonable and prudent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered after a traffic stop.

de novo review wrongful death claim medical claim statute of repose statute of limitations R.C. 2305.113(C) Civ.R. 12(C)

Court of claims erred when it determined that an Ohio University student's claims against the University for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence were barred by the statute of limitations, as the undisputed evidence and the University's student disciplinary appeals policy established that the student was dismissed from the University, and his cause of action accrued, when the Dean made a final decision in his disciplinary appeal. Because the student's complaint was filed less than two years after the final decision of the Dean, the student's claims were timely, and it was error to grant summary judgment for the University. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Failure to Comply with the Order of a Police Officer Manifest Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Misdemeanor Sentence Consecutive to Felony Sentence

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely application motion for leave to file a delayed appeal App.R. 5 transcript at state's expense good cause. A motion for leave to file a motion for delayed appeal was denied where appellant already had a direct appeal of his conviction. The motion for transcript at state's expense was therefore denied as moot. To the extent that appellant sought to reopen his appeal, the application was denied as untimely without a showing of good cause required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b).

Civ.R. 5o(B)(1) judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) Civ.R. 38(B) legal malpractice proximate cause case-within-a-case doctrine, disqualification International Trade Commission (ITC) general exclusionary order (GEO). Civ.R. 50(B)(1) allows a party to serve a motion to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the parties' motion. A motion for JNOV is used to determine whether the evidence is totally insufficient to support the verdict. A motion for JNOV raises a question of law because the motion examines the materiality of the evidence, as opposed to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. To establish a cause of action in Ohio for legal malpractice based upon negligent representation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty, (2) a breach of that duty and a failure to conform to the standard required by law, and (3) a causal connection between the conduct complained of and the resulting damages or loss. Because the elements of a legal malpractice claim are stated in the conjunctive, the failure to establish any one element of the claim is fatal. In this matter, at the heart of appellants' contention that the trial court erred by not granting it motion for JNOV, is that appellees failed to present sufficient evidence that it would have succeeded in obtaining the GEO, were it not for Appellants' disqualification and thus failed to satisfy the case-within-a-case doctrine as outlined in Environmental Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209, 2008-Ohio-3833, 893 N.E.2d 173. As enunciated in Environmental, under the case-within-a-case doctrine, the plaintiff must establish that he would have been successful in the underlying matter. However, contrary to appellants' contention, appellee presented evidence that satisfied the case-within-a-case burden by presenting testimony, including appellants' own admissions, going to the very heart of the evidence that would have been presented in the ITC to secure the GEO. Thus, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellee, we find the evidence presented was legally sufficient to satisfy the case-within-a-case burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee would have been successful in obtaining a GEO had appellant not been disqualified.

Municipal competitive bidding, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, R.C. 2721.12(A). The trial court erred by declaring a contract between a municipality and a contractor void when that contractor was not a party to the case.

R.C. 2929.41 multiple sentences presumption concurrent sentences consecutive sentences ambiguity in pronounced sentence. Under R.C. 2929.41(A), the presumption in Ohio is that sentences are to run concurrently, unless where the trial court makes the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings for consecutive sentences. In this matter, at the heart of appellant's challenge to the imposed sentence is the notion that the trial court should have made specific findings relative to Counts 4 and 10. As framed, appellant asserts he is unable to discern whether he is to serve 10 years or 12 and a half years. However, pursuant to R.C. 2929.41(A), defendant's sentences are presumed to run concurrently as a matter of law if the trial court's sentencing entry is silent as to whether the sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently. Further, any sentencing ambiguities are resolved in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole assignment of error.

Sufficiency of the evidence rape substantial impairment spousal element ability to resist or consent intoxication vertigo knowledge of substantial impairment state not required to elect offense the jury will consider manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice to defendant failure to object to jury instructions invited error trial strategy speedy trial R.C. 2945.71 prima facie burden shift R.C. 2945.72 continuances toll closing argument trial tactics prosecutorial misconduct Reagan Tokes Act unconstitutionality. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the state did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct, and appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act was proper and did not violate his constitutional rights.

Ineffective assistance of counsel felonious assault suppress consent warrantless prejudice identity. Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress. Suppression of text messages retrieved from the defendant's cell phone would not have affected the outcome of trial.

Motion for summary judgment unopposed motion collection case Civ.R. 56 trial court's docket abuse of discretion pro se litigant. Where the appellee presented evidence to establish it was entitled to payment for legal services rendered and appellant filed no brief in opposition to the motion, the trial court correctly granted appellee motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment breach of contract unjust enrichment account promissory estoppel Civ.R. 56 consideration donation gratuitous promise material term R.C. 1302.10 additional terms acceptance R.C. 1302.64 battle of the forms quantum meruit equitable claim. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee. Appellant failed to demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant-appellee on appellant's claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and action on an account.

Sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence bench trial. Appellant's conviction for theft was supported by sufficient evidence where the state presented testimony in support of every element of the offense such that if believed the trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's conviction was supported by the greater weight of the evidence where the complaining witness testified as to every element of the offense and her testimony was corroborated by a 911 call and appellant's testimony. Finally, appellant was not prejudiced by the state's reference to her "violent history. During a bench trial, the trial court is presumed to only consider reliable, relevant, and competent evidence.

Financial penalties restitution plea hearing failure to inform defendant prejudice Crim.R. 11 Reagan Tokes Law due process felony sentencing review R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) prison term contrary to law consecutive sentences clear and convincing R.C. 2929.14(C) statutory findings. The trial court did not err in not informing appellant at the plea hearing as to the amount of restitution that would be ordered or in imposing consecutive sentences. Further, appellant's sentence was not contrary to law and was proper under the Reagan Tokes Law.

The Ohio Arbitration Act R.C. 2711.13 application to vacate arbitration award service counsel of record complaint motion Civ.R. 5(B). Trial court properly dismissed complaint to vacate arbitration award and confirmed the arbitration award where plaintiff failed to serve the defendant in accordance with the requirements of R.C. 2711.13.

Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's sentence is constitutional pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Conceded error motion for judicial release R.C. 2929.20 hearing. The trial court erred by not holding a hearing prior to granting defendant-appellee's motion for judicial release because it was required to hold a hearing before granting the motion pursuant to R.C. 2929.20.

Domestic violence violation of community control denial of bail R.C. 2937.222(D) jurisdiction final, appealable order. Appeal dismissed. R.C. 2937.222(D)(1) did not apply to municipal court order denying bail following alleged violation of community control on misdemeanor domestic violence offense. Even if R.C. 2937.222(D)(1) applied, R.C. 2937.222(D)(2) would require dismissal of appeal because order denying bail was set aside and defendant was released on personal bond during pendency of appeal.

Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial counsel did not perform ineffectively by failing to file affidavit of indigency before sentencing and asking court to waive mandatory fine when appellant failed to establish reasonable probability that trial court would have found appellant lacked future ability to pay mandatory fine motion to suppress evidence-trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence discovered inside locked safe located within appellant's vehicle when officer had probable cause to search entire vehicle and its contents for evidence of criminal activity manifest weight of the evidence-second-degree-felony aggravated drug possession conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though appellant testified that he did not possess quantity of drugs needed to establish second-degree-felony state's witness testified that appellant possessed requisite quantity.

Having weapons while under disability guilty plea insufficient evidence Crim.R. 11(C)(2) knowing intelligent voluntary nature of the charges maximum penalty. A victim was shot and killed inside of his vehicle. Following a jury trial, appellant was found not guilty of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and voluntary manslaughter for the death of the victim. A charge for having weapons while under disability was tried to the bench, and the judge found the appellant guilty for that charge. On appeal, we find that the conviction for of having weapons while under disability was supported by insufficient evidence. The testimony relied on by the state is appellant's alleged motive for committing the murder, and cell phone records placing his phone within the vicinity of the crime. No evidence was presented that appellant possessed a firearm on the date of the victim's death. Accordingly, the conviction for having weapons while under disability is vacated. Appellant further argues that his guilty plea in a separate case was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because the court did not properly explain the penalty he faced in violation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Upon review, we find that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) when it explained the nature of the charges against him and the maximum penalty he faced.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee's motion for partial relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5) where the record showed that comments made by the magistrate during trial, caused appellee, an inmate acting pro se, to release all of his subpoenaed medical witnesses and to limit his own testimony to the issue of liability. The unusual and extraordinary circumstances that arose during the bench trial before the magistrate resulted in an award of only $1,000 in damages to appellee for injuries he sustained when he was assaulted by his cell mate due to appellant's negligence. Judgment affirmed.

TRAF.R. 10(D) – PLEA COLLOQUY – CORPUS DELICTI: The trial court violated Traf.R. 10(D) by accepting defendant's guilty plea to driving under suspension without informing him that his plea was a complete admission of guilt. Defendant's confession to a hit-skip violation did not contravene the corpus delicti rule where the state established that a license plate was lodged in the rear bumper of a vehicle that was at the scene of the accident. Defendant's convictions for a hit-skip violation and an assured-distance violation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where testimony established that a license plate was lodged in the rear bumper of a vehicle at the scene, defendant responded to an investigatory letter regarding the accident, and defendant confessed to being in the accident.

Prohibition—Law-of-the-case doctrine—Writ sought to prevent trial judge from exercising jurisdiction over issues allegedly already decided by court of appeals—Court of appeals' mandate did not expressly restrict or specifically limit the proceedings on remand such that trial judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction—Writ denied.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by reversing appellant-board's denial of a zoning certificate. The court found that an illness that prevented a property owner from continuing his non-conforming use of property could not be reasonably interpreted as a voluntarily discontinuation of a nonconforming use. Because the meaning of the term voluntarily is not defined in appellant's zoning resolution or in zoning statutes, the common meaning as an act of will or of one's own choice applied. Based on this definition, the court's conclusion that the owner's illness was involuntary and did not cause discontinuance was reasonable. There was also no affirmative evidence establishing a manifest intention to abandon the nonconforming use. Finally, the trial court did not substitute its judgment for that of appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion in overruling appellant's motion for relief from a default judgment, which was based on appellant's claim that he had not been properly served with the complaint. The trial court incorrectly analyzed the motion by referring to Civ.R. 60(B). However, courts have inherent jurisdiction to vacate a judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction, which renders the judgment void. Movants, therefore, do not have to establish entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B). Furthermore, there were deficiencies and inconsistencies relating to service that warranted a hearing on appellant's motion. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant appeals from a multitude of convictions that led to a cumulative sentence of 55 to 60½ years. The trial court erred when it failed to file appellant's competency and sanity evaluations with the clerk of courts, but the error was harmless. The court did not err by overruling appellant's suppression motion, because he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, was arrested based on a valid warrant, and had no standing to challenge the "pinging" of his co-defendant's phone. Further, the trial court did not err in not merging offenses for sentencing purposes, as the crimes were committed separately. Appellant's sentences were not cruel and unusual because they were within the statutory ranges and because, based on his conduct, the lengthy sentences were not shocking to the sense of justice in the community. Appellant's convictions were based on sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. Judgment affirmed.

In this appeal of a foreclosure judgment, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and by overruling his motion for summary judgment. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred by overruling a motion to intervene as a matter of right filed by an entity that has been found not to lawfully exist. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to appellee and overruling appellant's summary judgment motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the motion to intervene. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. An independent review of the record, including a plea and sentencing transcript, confirms appointed appellate counsel's assessment that no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. State and federal laws that prohibit imposing personal liability on the representative of a nursing home resident as a condition of admission or continued stay at the facility did not apply to the payment agreement executed between appellee and appellant nursing home. Appellee agreed to pay the past due balance of his wife's account in monthly installments in exchange for appellant's forbearance in "pursuing collections activity" on the account. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Motion to strike. Res judicata. Frivolous.

The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive 90-day sentences under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c) for a technical violation of community control.

Presentence Motion to W/D Guilty Plea - IAC Competence

Writ of mandamus denied relator failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he had a clear legal right to be placed as a candidate for the Republican primary election ballot or that the respondent had a clear legal duty to place him on the primary ballot.

Criminal law—Subject-matter jurisdiction—R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) and 2151.23(I)—The general division of a common pleas court does not have jurisdiction over an offender who was arrested at the age of 20 for felonious acts he allegedly committed as a juvenile the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over that person—Court of appeals' judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

R.C. 2152.121(B)-reverse-transfer amenability decisions trial court did not plainly err by considering appellant's age at the time of amenability hearing, rather than at the time of probable cause hearing trial court did not plainly err by failing to apply a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof when evaulating appellant's amenability to treatment within the juvenile sysyem trial court did not plainly err by failing to consider all dispositional options available within the juvenile system when considering reverse-transfer amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.121 (B)(3)(b) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advocate for a new standard of proof that applies to amenability decisions or by failing to ask the court to consider imposing an SYO dispositional sentence.

forcible entry and detainer—manifest weight—notice—tenant

The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the trial court made the consecutive sentencing findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and those findings were supported by the record.

The trial court did not err by sentencing appellant to the maximum 36-month prison term available for third-degree felony illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.51 where the trial court's sentencing decision was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law given the trial court took into consideration all relevant statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 prior to issuing its sentencing decision, properly notified appellant that he would be subject to an optional three-year postrelease control term, and sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory range for a third-degree felony offense.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting, sua sponte, an in camera review before ordering disclosure of information that Appellants claim is privileged. Appellants failed to satisfy their Civ.R. 26(B)(8)(a) burden to show a factual basis for believing in good faith that the information is privileged. And Appellants did not request an in camera review, move for a protective order, or submit the information to the trial court under seal.

Appeal of conviction for tampering with evidence and possession. During search warrant, police found evidence that the defendant flushed narcotics down toilet. Defendant aware of official investigation. Police loudly announced presence. Defendant destroyed evidence with the purpose to impair investigation. Defendant was out of breath, police recovered crack cocaine on bathroom floor, water droplets strewn around the toilet suggested frenetic attempt to flush narcotics. Counsel not ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence where defendant presented no basis for the evidence to be suppressed.

Potential income includes imputed income that a trial court determines the parent would have earned if fully employed. After finding that Father was underemployed, the magistrate was required to determine Father's potential income and use that number in calculating his support obligation. The trial court abused its discretion by adopting the magistrate's order finding Father underemployed without subsequently determining Father's potential income. The decision of whether to establish retroactive support is entrusted to the trial court's discretion. When completing the Child Support Computation Worksheet, the court shall exclude any reimbursed or subsidized childcare cost, including any state or federal tax credit, whether or not claimed. Hence, eligibility for the federal child care tax credit is the determinative factor for the court to consider when calculating a support obligation, not whether the tax credit was actually received.

App.R. 26 remand to correct omission of life tail nunc pro tunc.

App.R. 26(A) mere disagreement with the logic employed by the court is not grounds for an application to reconsideration.

App.R. 26 application to reconsider.

App.R. 26 motion for reconsideration.

Original action procedendo alleged trial court delay in ruling upon application to confirm arbitrator's decision action rendered moot when Respondent ruled upon Relator's pending application following Relator's seeking a writ of procedendo.

Breach of contract fixture ambiguous contract language extrinsic evidence summary judgment conversion fraud.

Criminal law—Venue—Retaliation—R.C. 2921.05(B)—Venue for the crime of retaliation under R.C. 2921.05(B) is proper where the defendant committed the criminal offense or any of its elements, not where the victim previously pursued criminal charges against the defendant—Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL - post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1 abuse of discretion manifest injustice

CRIMINAL - rape gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.02 R.C. 2907.05 sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence lay opinion testimony Evid.R. 701 complete defense impeachment prior inconsistent statements cumulative evidence rebuttal motion for mistrial prosecutorial misconduct closing argument plain error ineffective assistance of counsel date of offense indictment cumulative error consecutive sentences R.C. 2953.08(G) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

TAX FORECLOSURE — R.C. 5721.20 — EXCESS FUNDS —DUE PROCESS: Based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court did not err in ordering the distribution of excess funds in a tax-foreclosure action to the defendant-owner where the trial court found that due process required notice to the owner of the excess funds and found that the owner did not receive such notice.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — DISCOVERY — CIV.R. 8 — CIV.R. 53 — WAIVER — SUP.R. 45: The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant failed to deny the allegations contained within plaintiff's complaint and failed to file an objection to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and, by failing to object to the magistrate's decision to grant summary judgment, defendant waived all issues on appeal.

APP.R. 4(C) – FINAL JUDGMENT – APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Where defendant filed a notice of appeal from an interlocutory order granting summary judgment, which left third party defendant's crossclaim and counterclaim pending, appellate jurisdiction was lacking under App.R. 4(C) because that rule does not apply to appeals from interlocutory orders that are subsequently rendered final.

Appellant failed to demonstrate, both due to the lack of a hearing transcript and on the merits of his argument, that the trial court erred in enforcing the parties' settlement agreement, that his due process rights were violated due to the lack of notice of an evidentiary hearing, and that his due process rights were violated by the trial court judge determining compliance with the settlement agreement as a matter of law and/or without recusing himself. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 4731.22(B)(19), which permits the state medical board to "limit" a doctor's medical license upon a snowing of inability to practice, authorizes the board to restrict a doctor from engaging in certain procedures even while finding the doctor able to practice medicine in other respects. Trial court did not err in upholding a board determination that was based in part on testimony by a neurological expert who lacked a detailed understanding of the invasive cardiac procedures the licensee wished to perform. Antidiscrimination law does not prohibit the board from acting to protect patient safety by restricting impaired doctor from performing invasive procedures. And the trial court did not err in failing to find that the doctor and the board had agreed as to what the limitations to doctor's practice should be, so as to permit purely voluntary constraints. Assignments of error overruled judgment upholding board order affirmed.

Assuming for purposes of appeal that appellant was a proper party to challenge a default judgment, the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to vacate the default judgment without conducting a hearing. The appellant presented sworn statements averring that it did not receive service of foreclosure complaint, which warranted a hearing to determine the validity of those statements.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. Res judicata bars the consideration of appellant's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Appellant has not offered any competent, relevant and material evidence, outside the trial court record, to demonstrate that he could not have made this claim based upon information in the original trial record. Res judicata also bars his claim to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R.32.1. Judgment affirmed.

Post-conviction relief

On certification of default.

summary judgment – alternative basis

Trial court did not err in pretrial disqualification of attorney due to serious potential for conflict in dual representation.

Trial court did not err in pretrial disqualification of attorney due to serious potential for conflict in dual representation.

Reagan Tokes/Aggravated possession/Manifest weight/Ineffective assistance of counsel regarding court costs

Consecutive sentences Reagan Tokes Law. Consecutive sentences affirmed where trial court's findings are supported by the record. Indefinite sentence imposed under Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional consecutive sentences aggregate minimum aggregate maximum plain error ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court properly ran indefinite prison terms imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law consecutively because they were imposed in two separate cases. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to consecutive sentences of indefinite prison terms imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law because they were imposed in two separate cases.

Political subdivision immunity political subdivision employee immunity summary judgment R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) R.C. 2744.02(A). Trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellant/cross-appellee City was proper where appellee/cross-appellant failed to establish an exception under R.C. 2744.02(B) that would breach the City's immunity. Trial court's denial of summary judgment to appellant/cross-appellee City employees was proper where there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their conduct rose to the level of reckless and/or wanton misconduct, thereby breaching immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).

Political subdivision immunity summary judgment R.C. 2744.02(A) 2744.02(B)(2). Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to City for claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and respondeat superior where appellee failed to establish the elements of a negligence claim opening the City to liability. Further, political subdivisions are not liable for the intentional torts of their employees therefore, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to appellant on the reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. However, R.C. 2744.02(A) does not apply to breach-of-contract claims therefore, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment as to that issue.

Summary judgment negligence duty criminal acts. Trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's negligence claim because defendant had no knowledge about the likelihood of theft in plaintiff's neighborhood and, thus, had no special duty to protect the plaintiff from the criminal acts of third parties.

Crim.R. 33 motion for leave to file motion for new trial newly discovered evidence reasonable time filing clear and convincing evidence res judicata ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant submitted clear and convincing evidence that on its face showed he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence sooner. The assistance of prior postconviction counsel was ineffective and resulted in delays and disciplinary action. Res judicata did not apply. Crim.R. 33(B) does not authorize or support the "creation of a reasonable-time filing requirement" and states only that a defendant must show that he was "unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely." State v. Bethel, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 53, 55.

Civ.R. 12(B)(1) subject-matter jurisdiction Court of Claims common pleas R.C. 2743.03(A) declaratory injunctive relief legal damages fees monetary damages legal relief. Affirmed decision of the common pleas court to grant the bureau of workers' compensation's motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Although the complaint included claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and no matter how the claims were characterized, because plaintiff's class-action suit against the bureau sought legal damages for an alleged loss resulting from fees collected by the bank, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

R.C. 5311.19 condominium declaration fiduciary duty derivative lawsuit summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the condominium association on the plaintiffs' claims that the association failed to remediate damage to common areas that in turn damaged their use and enjoyment of their condominium unit. The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the timeliness and effectiveness of the remediation measures.

Sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence, bench trial. Appellant's conviction for rape was supported by sufficient evidence where the state presented testimony in support of every element of the offense such that if believed it supported the trier of fact's finding of guilt. Appellant's conviction was supported by the greater weight of the evidence, as the trier of fact was permitted to believe all, some, or none of a witness's testimony.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel substitution of counsel Reagan Tokes Act objection constitutionality. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because defendant was represented by competent counsel, advised of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11, given notice and an opportunity to be heard, the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the motion, the motion did not state specific reasons for withdrawal, the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, and defendant failed to demonstrate that perhaps he was not guilty or had a complete defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for new assigned counsel because defendant did not demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication and how defense counsel's failure to file a sentencing memorandum led to an apparently unjust result. In addition, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of a Reagan Tokes sentence because this court recently found the Act to be constitutional. Therefore, defendant cannot show prejudice even if we assume deficient performance.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2) strict compliance explanation of right to remain silent. When accepting a guilty plea to a felony offense, a trial court complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) by informing a defendant in a manner that he understands the rights he is waiving. In order to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2), a trial court is required to determine that a defendant understands that he cannot be compelled to testify against himself but is not required to further advise a defendant that the state cannot comment on his right not to testify during trial

R.C. 5311.19(A) reasonable attorney fees award condominium association unit owner violation declaration abuse of discretion unreasonable shocks the conscience. Trial court's decision to not award reasonable attorney fees authorized by statute, R.C. 5311.19(A), was unreasonable and shocked the conscience of the court where the condominium association had obtained a default judgment against a unit owner who was in violation of the Declaration of Condominium Ownership for causing an annoyance and nuisance and when an affidavit supporting attorney fees and an itemized billing statement were provided. The trial court's decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees to be awarded.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The trial court imposed an indefinite prison sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's arguments that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional were overruled in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470. Appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Res judicata, motion for withdrawal of guilty plea, hearing. The trial court did not err by denying defendant's postsentence, successive motion for withdrawal of guilty plea without a hearing, because defendant failed to show manifest injustice.

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications res judicata. - Appellant's argument on appeal challenging the trial court's failure to give the five notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) is barred by res judicata because he could have raised this issue in his direct appeal.

Mandamus case-management hearing inherent authority to control docket judicial discretion. A trial court possesses the inherent authority and discretion to control its own docket. In addition, mandamus may not be employed to control judicial discretion, even if that judicial discretion is grossly abused. Since the trial court judge is under no clear legal duty to conduct a case-management hearing, relief in mandamus is not available to compel the trial court judge to conduct a case-management hearing.

Revoke community control community-control terminated sentence served and moot

SEXUAL IMPOSITION — R.C. 2907.06(A)(2) — SUFFICIENCY — KNOWLEDGE — SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT: Defendant's conviction for sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(2) was not supported by sufficient evidence because the state failed to produce evidence that defendant knew that the victim's ability to appraise the nature of or control of defendant's conduct was substantially impaired where no witnesses testified that the victim's disability was self-evident, the victim's testimony did not suggest her cognitive disability was discernable, and defendant did not provide medical treatment or have access to the victim's medical records as the residential facility night supervisor. [But see DISSENT: The evidence adduced by the state showed that defendant used his role as a residential-facility supervisor to lure a blind, cognitively-impaired victim into his office under the pretense of his concern for the victim's physical health, and that once he got the victim into a state of undress, he engaged her in sexual contact therefore, sufficient evidence exists to uphold the defendant's conviction for sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.06(A)(2)]

LAW OF THE CASE — CIV.R. 60(B): The law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply to preclude relief on remand after an appeal when the subsequent proceedings involve different factual records. A party may not amend an entry of satisfaction of judgment that in effect modifies the trial court's judgment without satisfying the provisions of Civ.R. 60(B).

EVIDENCE – INEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: Defendant's convictions for domestic violence and menacing were not against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because the trial court believed the prosecution testimony over the defense testimony.

court admitted attempted murder victim's statements under forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception after witness refused to testify while on the stand proof witness's unavailability was caused by Appellant's wrongdoing court need not recall witness during the admissibility hearing to confirm what he told prosecutors about refusal to testify.

no credit for time served in prison on other prior offense as he was not confined for reason arising out of current offense.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the court finds the appeal is frivolous and there are no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The trial court did not err when it sentenced appellant to seven years in prison for aggravated burglary, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed for other offenses. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no issues with arguable merit for appellant to advance on appeal. The pro se claims raised by appellant alleging the violation of his right to a speedy trial and the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on his presentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea lack arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

Because the underlying issue of physician liability required the expert testimony of a physician, surgeon, or ophthalmologist, and appellant failed to file an affidavit of merit by a medical expert pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D)(2) with his complaint for medical malpractice, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee. Judgment affirmed.

The parties waived a presentence investigation (PSI) as part of appellant's plea agreement. The trial court did not err in imposing sentence in the absence of a PSI. Appellant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to request a PSI. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to show he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to convert appellee's counterclaim into a motion for frivolous conduct. The court did not err in concluding that no reasonable attorney would have brought defamation claims against appellee. The court also did not abuse its discretion by finding that appellant had engaged in frivolous conduct as retaliation after appellee filed a bar association complaint, and there was no abuse of discretion in the finding that appellant needlessly increased appellee's litigation costs. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion concerning the amount of fees and costs awarded. Judgment affirmed.

sentencing R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

Trial court properly granted motion to suppress evidence taken while appellee was unconscious in his hotel room bathtub

Officers' testimony was not hearsay or without personal knowledge where the testimony was limited to officers' claims that after speaking with Cherokee Nation they were unable to verify appellant's status as a member. Appellant's conviction for falsification based upon insufficient evidence where the state presented no evidence that appellant's claims were untrue. Appellant's conviction for obstruction of justice based upon insufficient evidence where appellant's conduct did not hamper or impede officer.

In trial of appellant's small-claims complaint, trial court's decision rested entirely on credibility determinations. Because the trial judge was in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, we will not substitute our judgment.

The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress where appellant's Miranda waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligently given. Appellant's motion to dismiss was properly denied where his speedy trial rights were not violated. The trial court properly admitted testimony about out of court statements where such statements were admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e). Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not subject to merger.

Culpable Mental State Transferred Intent

Reagan Tokes - Constitutionality - Waiver of Mandatory Fine - IAC

Tenant appeals decision denying motion for relief from judgment and to stay writ of restitution issued in landlord's forcible entry and detainer action. The tenant moved out of the premises, rendering moot her assignments of error challenging the trial court's decision and writ with respect to the forcible entry and detainer claim.

Defendant challenges constitutionality of Reagan Tokes law. No challenge to constitutionality at trial court level forfeited argument.

The trial court erred by failing to advise appellant at sentencing that he would be subject to an optional three-year postrelease control term upon his release from prison as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e), thereby requiring the matter be reversed and remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of permitting the trial court to employ the postrelease control correction procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. Appellant's conviction in all other respects was affirmed.

Trial court erred in imposing a sentence consecutive to that of a federal case in which no prison term had been imposed at the time of sentencing in this case.

The trial court erred by granting summary judgment for employer on Appellant's claim for workers' compensation benefits for psychiatric condition allegedly caused by physical at-work injuries. A genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether a causal connection between the psychiatric condition and the physical injuries.

CRIMINAL - Self-Defense Jury instruction instruction must be given if a correct statement, applicable to facts of the case, and if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by requested instruction defendant required to meet burden of production for prima facie case of self-defense instruction not required where defendant failed to put forth sufficient evidence to meet burden of production instruction not required when evidence showed defendant was at fault for creating situation giving rise to affray manifest weight of the evidence merger of offenses merger of felonious assault and aggravated robbery not required when separate harms result from offenses merger of felonious assault and aggravated robbery not required when level of violence far in excess of that necessary to commit aggravated robbery.

Criminal law—Application of the plain-error standard of review when the accused failed to object at trial—Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—Parole—Inmate failed to establish violation of due-process rights during parole-revocation hearing—Inmate received effective assistance of counsel at parole-revocation hearing—Hearing officer's finding that inmate violated terms of parole supported by sufficient evidence—Court of appeals' judgment denying request for writ affirmed.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

CONSTITIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - SEARCH & SEIZURE – CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER - TERRY - PAT-DOWN SEARCH: The initial encounter between police and the defendant was a consensual encounter when police officers, responding to a Spot Shotter alert, saw defendant in the vicinity and asked him if he had heard gunshots, because a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. The trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress any evidence resulting from a Terry pat-down search where the record showed that (1) the police officers, responding to a Shot Spotter alert, arrived approximately five minutes after the alert to an area with a lot of apartments and houses, (2) the officers saw defendant putting his children in a car, (3) the officer, although he said he was patrolling in a high-crime area, failed to specify where the "hot spots" were, (4) there were no reports of gunfire from residents of the area, and (5) defendant had no bulge in his clothing indicating that he was armed and made no gestures consistent with having a weapon, and therefore, the record did not show that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. [But see DISSENT: Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant might have been involved in criminal activity and that he was armed and dangerous sufficient to justify the stop and pat-down search where (1) the Shot Spotter alert was narrowed down to a small area, (2) it was dark and raining, (3) it was a high-crime area, and (4) when the officers said that they wanted to conduct a pat-down search, the defendant became agitated and turned his body away.]

POSTCONVICTION: The common pleas court's entry denying defendant's R.C. 2953.21 petition for postconviction relief is reversed, and the cause is remanded, because the court's judgment did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by R.C. 2953.21(H), which effectively precluded meaningful judicial review.

CRIMINAL DAMAGING – VIOLATION OF A PROTECTION ORDER – R.C. 2919.27 – R.C. 2909.06 – EVIDENCE: The trial court did not lose its way in determining that defendant violated the terms of a protection order and was guilty of criminal damaging where the protected person testified that she saw defendant, from one foot away, standing on her back porch removing a security camera from her property.

Permanent custody-trial court's decision to award children services agency permanent custody of not against the manifest weight of the evidence any purported Sup.R. 48.06 inadequacies in GAL's report not reversible error trial counsel not ineffective for failing to call GAL as a witness.

R.C. Chapter 2506—administrative appeals—zoning—variance—constitutional—due process—12(B)(6)

OCSPA, HCSSA, R.C. 1345.02(G), R.C. 4722.02(A), R.C. 4722.04, R.C. 4722.07, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea motion to continue sentencing hearing. While a presentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea is to be treated liberally, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the circumstances justifying such a motion. Our review of the record does not indicate the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial court also acted within its discretion in denying the motion to continue filed on the same day of the sentencing hearing.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. State has right to appeal sentence that did not impose indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. The Reagan Tokes Law has been found en banc in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, to be constitutional. The sentence is reversed and cause remanded.

Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellee when appellee met its initial burden demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and appellant never responded to the motion for summary judgment.

Reagan Tokes Act. Appellant's sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act is affirmed pursuant to this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470.

Subject-matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction void voidable res judicata petition for postconviction relief. Trial court properly dismissed defendant's petition for postconviction relief as barred by res judicata where the judgment was voidable, and the defendant failed to raise his challenge to the judgment in direct appeal.

Accelerated appeal refiled case R.C. 2305.10(A) Sup.R. 36.017 Civ.R. 41 Civ.R. 12 Civ.R. 8 R.C. 2305.19 savings statute. Plaintiff's allegation of refiling a previously dismissed action, especially coupled with the trial court's administrative transfer of the refiled action to the original judge, was sufficient to overcome defendant's motion to dismiss in which the defendant claimed that the refiling violated the one-year period under R.C. 2305.19.

Negligence magistrate Civ.R. 53(C) proximate cause. Plaintiff asserted that defendant was negligent in the placement and maintenance of road lines which caused plaintiff to sustain injuries when another motorist turned and hit her motorcycle. Plaintiff asserted that there should have been a solid yellow line at the place of her accident when there was a yellow skip line and that ODOT was negligent when it placed the skip line there. Plaintiff also asserted that there should not have been a solid white line at the location of her accident. The magistrate determined that plaintiff failed to prove that the presence or absence of any lines was the proximate cause of her injuries. Therefore, the magistrate recommended judgment in favor of the defendant.

Retaliation discrimination Civ.R. 53 objections to magistrate's decision. Plaintiffs, employees of the Ohio State Racing Commission (OSRC), objected to the magistrate's decision recommending judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs alleged OSRC retaliated against them for engaging in the protected activity of filing a discrimination complaint with the Ohio Department of Administrative Services Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO). After a review of the magistrate's decision and the evidence submitted, the court found that the retaliatory actions alleged by plaintiffs were insufficient to dissuade an employee from alleging discrimination. Further, the court found that these actions were supported by legitimate business purposes. Accordingly, the court overruled plaintiffs' objections to the magistrate's decision and rendered judgment for defendant.

Civ.R. 56(C), R.C. 4112. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Guess' claim for retaliation and Plaintiffs' claims for racial discrimination and hostile work environment created by racial harassment. The Court found that Plaintiff Guess' retaliation claim was time-barred. Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendants treated a non-protected, similarly-situated person more favorably. Also, the Court found that Plaintiffs could not establish that any alleged harassment was severe enough to create a hostile work environment or that it was based on race. Because there was no genuine issues of material fact that Plaintiffs could not establish their prima facie cases, the Court found that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' claims.

Excessive force, inmate, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56. Plaintiff sued defendant alleging that corrections officers used excessive force against him. The uncontradicted evidence that defendant submitted with its motion for summary judgment indicated that plaintiff attacked a corrections officer. Corrections officers, acting with justification and privilege, used an appropriate extent of force necessary to defend the attacked officer and control plaintiff. Summary judgment rendered in favor of defendant.

Upon application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B), State v. Leyh, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-292, directs (1) that circumstances may require, on a case-by-case basis, when an applicant's prior appellate counsel failed to effectively argue a particular assignment of error, a more particularized showing that the alleged deficient performance prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal, (2) that intermediate appellate courts not require "at the first procedural stage a showing of virtual, if not certain, success of an [applicant's] App.R. 26(B) claims," Leyh at ¶ 27, and (3) that at the first procedural stage an applicant is only required to show "that there is at least a genuine issue—that is, legitimate grounds to support the claim that the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal." Id. at ¶ 25. Here, appellant alleged that prior appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an argument that the second sentencing court engaged in vindictive sentencing. Given the significant disparity between the first and second sentence, the fact appellate counsel could have raised both issues of merger and vindictiveness on direct appeal, and appellant's counsel's affidavit, the court found appellant has shown both a more particularized showing that the alleged deficient performance prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal and that there is "at least a genuine issue—that is, legitimate grounds—to support the claim that the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal." Id. Therefore, appellant's application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B)(5) and appellant is directed to now establish the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Application granted.

Court of Claims of Ohio erred in interpreting BWC's subrogation interest under R.C. 4123.93 to include administrative costs incurred by BWC when it ordered a review and report of the claimant's medical records in response to the claimant's request for additional allowances.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

The trial court correctly found that appellee-employer had not agreed to pay appellant sales commissions, and therefore the trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and in denying appellant's motion for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. The trial court also did not err in entering summary judgment on appellant's claims for promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, because these claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. There were no genuine issues of material fact concerning appellant's claim under Ohio's Prompt Payment Act, because appellant was not entitled to payment of any commissions. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for aggravated trafficking in drugs was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State's evidence supported the conclusions that appellant acted knowingly when he received a package containing approximately 450 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine in the mail and trafficked those drugs. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the court finds the appeal is frivolous and there are no issues with arguable merit for appeal. The trial court did not err when it sentenced appellant to an indefinite term of five to seven and one-half years in prison for one count of aggravated arson, to five years for another count of aggravated arson, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. Judgment affirmed.

possession of heroin guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered Crim.R. 11(C) waiver of right to appeal motion to suppress probable cause in affidavit for search warrant trial counsel not ineffective

On Respondent's objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court sustained the objections, but for reasons different than those asserted by Respondent. The Court did not adopt the Report and Recommendation.

In accordance with a Special Master's recommendation, and absent objections by the parties, the Court sua sponte dismissed Requester's complaint without prejudice pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2).

After neither party timely filed written objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court denied Requester's claim for disclosure of certain records withheld by Respondent.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent identical non-record metadata. Requester sought all communications from named council employees regarding an identified topic. Respondent advised that it searched for, located, and produced all requested records. Requester's complaint asserted that additional records existed. The special master found that requester failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that any additional, non-identical records existed.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 attorney-client privilege waiver R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) R.C. 149.43(A)(7) R.C. 149.43(A)(8) personal privacy. Requester sought all documents from a meeting of respondent trustees. Respondent redacted portions of the records as alleged confidential attorney-client communications or confidential personal information. The special master found that most of the emails consisted of cover letters, pleasantries, scheduling, and other non-legal information. With few exceptions, the special master found respondent failed to show that redacted email content fell squarely within the common-law attorney-client privilege. The special master further found that one email string had been disclosed to third parties, waiving the attorney-client privilege. The special master further found that redacted information from an employee bio sheet went beyond the four names that were the only items falling squarely within the "designated public service worker residential and familial information" exemption defined in R.C. 149.43(A)(8).

On Requester's objections to a Special Master's Recommendation To Dismiss Requester's complaint without prejudice, the Court overruled Requester's objections. In accordance with the Special Master's recommendation, the Court sua sponte dismissed Requester's Complaint without prejudice pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2).

The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences where the record does not support its finding of great or unusual harm under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). The Reagan Tokes Law does not violate principals of separation of powers because the trial court imposes both the minimum and maximum sentences. The state's cross-appeal is dismissed as moot based on court's erroneous imposition of consecutive sentences.

Trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) written sentencing entry finding, in support of consecutive sentences, is incongruous with the trial court's underlying R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) oral sentencing finding, in support of consecutive sentences. Case is remanded for an accordant nunc pro tunc entry.

Statute of Frauds partial performance

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Mandamus—Public Records Act—Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio—Statutory damages—The Public Records Act, not the Rules of Superintendence, governs a request for the production of documents pertaining to the operations, procedures, and policies of a clerk of courts' office—The Public Records Act does not impose a timeliness requirement for responding to a public-records request made under R.C. 149.43(B)(3)—Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

Appellant did not have any right to a jury trial in the Hamilton Count of Court of Common Pleas because he admitted that he committed the offense as an ongoing and continuous course of criminal conduct in Butler and Hamilton Counties. It is well-established that when an offender commits offenses in different jurisdictions as part of an ongoing and continuing course of criminal conduct, he may be tried and convicted for all the offenses in any one jurisdiction in which the offender committed one of the offenses or any element of one of those offenses. Therefore, the trial court was not required to advise appellant of a claimed right that he did not possess. In addition, the trial court did not err in its imposition of an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. Furthermore, his claims regarding the constitutionality of the Regan Tokes Law are forfeited because he failed to raise them below.

Appellant's 36-month prison sentence for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court took into consideration all relevant statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 prior to issuing its sentencing decision, properly notified appellant he was subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term, and sentenced him within the permissible statutory range for a third-degree felony.

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain party's appeal of the denial of his motion for reconsideration

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's application to seal a criminal record under R.C. 2953.32 because he is not an eligible offender.

CRIMINAL LAW - bench trial conviction formal demand for jury trial no objection to proceeding to bench trial is not waiver silent acquiescence is not a waiver no written waiver prejudicial error.

CRIMINAL - abduction operating a vehicle under the influence sentencing factors clearly and convincingly contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 weighing of factors judicial fact-finding household relationship "any other relevant factors"

CRIMINAL LAW - Jus Necessitatis court did not err in striking appellant's repetitious motion for postconviction relief pursuant to its prior order motion was otherwise barred by res judicata right to counsel attaches only when adversarial proceedings are initiated against an individual for a particular incident Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific affirmed.

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing consecutive sentences proportionality R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

Motion for Relief from Judgment, Civ.R. 60(B), Excusable Neglect Abuse of Discretion

Manifest weight of evidence/Sufficiency of the evidence

Home rule—Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3—R.C. 5747.502—No conflict exists between a municipality's ordinance allowing the use of traffic cameras and state law allowing a reduction of a municipality's share of the state's local-government funds—R.C. 4511.099—No conflict exists between a municipality's ordinance allowing the use of traffic cameras and state law requiring a municipality to pay an advance deposit to cover court costs and fees when litigating a citation for a violation based on the use of traffic cameras—State laws do not intersect with a municipality's exercise of home-rule authority to enforce its ordinances through the use of traffic cameras.

original action habeas corpus R.C. 2969.25 mandatory filing requirements failure to include complete affidavit of prior actions

jail time credit, concurrent sentencing, successive motions, res judicata

jail time credit, concurrent sentencing, successive motions, res judicata

Dismissal of administrative appeal failure to name all appellees

Appellant's convictions for eight counts of felonious assault and attached firearm specifications s were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial. The evidence establishing his guilt of each set of four counts of felonious assault stemming from two separate incidents on two separate days was distinct, simple, and direct, and the trial court did not err by trying all eight counts together. Appellant has not established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, as counsel's challenged decisions were supported .by a sound trial strategy. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence concerning two 911 calls made by the victim the trial court did not plainly err by conducting portions of the trial outside of his presence the trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury that it could consider Ferguson's flight from the scene as consciousness of his own guilt the trial court did not plainly err by instructing the jury that a knife is a deadly weapon the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions for murder, felony murder, tampering with evidence, and domestic violence, and the verdicts for same are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court erred, however, in ordering Ferguson to serve consecutive sentences without making the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing, and further erred when it imposed post-release control on him. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant failed to demonstrate any trial court error relating to the exclusion of evidence at trial because the record on appeal does not contain the trial transcript, or an acceptable alternative. Appellant's attachment of a copy of the trial transcript to his reply brief does not place this document into the record on appeal. And even if we consider that copy, it shows no trial court error. Judgment affirmed.

On application for reinstatement.

speedy trial—reasonable—continuance—plain error—forfeiture

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petition for postconviction relief, untimeliness, COVID-19 restrictions, and dead-bang winner. The court denied the App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. The rule does not apply to denials of postconviction relief petitions. The application was untimely. COVID-19 restrictions did not provide good cause, because the application was due before such restrictions took effect. Allegations of a "dead-bang winner" also do not provide good cause for untimely filing.

R.C. 2967.28(B) postrelease control R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) sentencing hearings nunc pro tunc R.C. 2947.23 fines and costs. The trial court failed to advise appellant of the period of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing and of the ramifications for violating the terms. However, appellant has completed his sentence and the state lacks jurisdiction to resentence. The state concedes that the sentencing judgment entry does not accurately reflect the trial court's resolution at sentencing of the waiver of fines and costs and imposition of extradition costs. The case is remanded for the sole purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry to accurately reflect the trial court's rulings. See also R.C. 2947.23(C).

Disability discrimination summary judgment substantially limited major life activity disabled as a matter of law epilepsy is a physical impairment genuine issue of material fact. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant-employer and determining that the plaintiff-employee did not demonstrate that she is disabled under the law. Under C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), epilepsy is a disability in terms of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. There are genuine issues of material fact remaining, including whether defendant-employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff-employee was merely pretextual.

Juvenile court bindover proceedings right to assistance of counsel due process suspended attorney per se violation of right to counsel totality of the circumstances. A juvenile's constitutional right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings flows to the juvenile through due process. Where a juvenile is represented in juvenile court bindover proceedings by a suspended attorney, due process requires that appellate court consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the juvenile was denied his or her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding suspended counsel's representation of juvenile, including the reason for and duration of counsel's suspension, the context, scope, and duration of counsel's representation of juvenile and other factors relevant to counsel's representation, juvenile was denied her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when represented by suspended counsel during juvenile court bindover proceedings.

Felonious assault discharge of a firearm on or over prohibited premises sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence consecutive sentences firearm specifications Reagan Tokes. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence despite inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional and therefore appellant's sentence pursuant to the law is valid. The court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences for firearm specifications as required by R.C. 2929.14.

Jail-time credit R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(g)(i) R.C. 2949.12 R.C. 2967.191 Crim.R. 11 acceptance of a guilty plea implicit acceptance explicit acceptance Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notice of indefinite sentence. The trial court erred in failing to calculate and apply jail-time credit to appellant's convictions and in failing to provide the notification of indefinite sentence required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The trial court did not err in implicitly accepting appellant's guilty plea and in overruling appellant's constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law.

S.B. 201 Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court erred by failing to impose a sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Medical malpractice statute of repose R.C. 2305.113 motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12 fraud exception due process, right to remedy due course of law equal protection vested claim. The appellants have not demonstrated that application of the statute of repose under RC. 2305.113(C) is unconstitutional as applied in extinguishing their nonvested cause of action for medical malpractice discovered five years following the alleged rendering of medical care.

Aggravated murder murder aggravated burglary felonious assault cruelty to animals sufficiency of the evidence Reagan Tokes. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional and therefore appellant's sentence pursuant to the law is valid.

Mootness voluntary payment supersedeas bond. This court finds that this appeal is moot because appellant failed to obtain a bond to stay the execution of the judgment and appellee obtained full satisfaction of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal.

Motion for summary judgment, workers' compensation, timeliness of appeal, failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not timely appeal the denial of workers' compensation benefits when the Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") received the appeal after the deadline to file. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the BWC for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) factual findings. The trial court did not erroneously impose consecutive sentences when it made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the record supports those findings.

Void judgment postconviction proceedings motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1. Defendant's postconviction motion must be construed as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea however, the trial court lacked authority to vacate the pleas because the defendant's guilty pleas had already been affirmed in a direct appeal from the conviction.

Civ.R. 33 Civ.R. 34 interrogatories discovery dispute motion to compel blanket assertion of privilege Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in compelling appellants' discovery response when appellants failed to properly invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by giving the same blanket response to 116 discovery requests. The onus was not on the trial court to perform a question-by-question inquiry as to the merits of the appellants' assertion of privilege. The appellants first had to assert the privilege in specifics sufficient upon which the trial court determines whether the privilege had been properly asserted as to each discovery request.

Reagan Tokes Law separation of powers due process. - The Reagan Tokes Law, under which defendant was sentenced, does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process and separation of powers.

Manifest weight of the evidence de facto fiduciary duty fiduciary relationship complete dependence by inferior party fraudulent inducement employment contract waiver of claim impracticability performance of contract after learning of fraud ratification civil conspiracy intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine R.C. 1707.41 R.C. 1707.43 election remedy failure to join party waiver of affirmative defense punitive damages abuse of discretion actual malice clear and convincing evidence attorney fees award. The trial court erred in finding that appellant owed a de facto fiduciary duty to appellee when there was no showing that appellee relied solely upon appellant in deciding to invest in the company. The court's judgment in favor of appellee on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court further erred in (1) finding that appellee had not waived his claim for fraudulent inducement with regard to the employment contract by continuing to work for the company and signing a subsequent agreement under the same terms (2) awarding appellee relief under R.C. 1707.43 when he elected to proceed under R.C. 1707.41 and (3) awarding punitive damages and attorney fees when there was no showing of actual malice. The trial court did not err in (1) declining to offset appellee's recovery by the amount he earned from other employers during the remainder of his employment contract (2) allowing appellee to recover on the investment that was jointly owned by himself and his wife when his wife was not joined as a party and (3) declining to apply the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine when there was insufficient evidence presented at trial outlining the relationships between the corporate defendants. In addition, the trial court did make a finding on the issue of fraudulent intent and thus did not err on this issue.

Civ.R. 12(B) (6) motion to dismiss breach-of-contract breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing unjust enrichment unambiguous contract. The parties' contract is unambiguous, and the overdraft fee appellee charged appellant did not breach the terms of the contract.

Judgment affirmed. There was insufficient evidence bad faith in the record to support appellant's assertion of a due process violation based on the alleged destruction of evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence supported his conviction.

The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for the advancement of litigation expenses pursuant to R.C. 1701.13(E)(5)(a).

The trial did not abuse its discretion in granting leave to appellees to file a motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment as the statute of repose for medical malpractice, R.C. 2305.113, does not apply to a statutory wrongful death claim. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Workers' compensation—Independent contractors and employees—Right to control manner or means of work—Some-evidence standard—Some evidence supported determination of Bureau of Workers' Compensation that workers were company's employees rather than independent contractors—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

The decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, which found that appellant quit work without just cause, was not unlawful or unreasonable, nor was it against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Contrary to appellant's claim otherwise, the trial court's history-of-criminal-conduct finding under section (c) of that statute was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. The appellant's prison sentence was also not otherwise contrary to law. Judgment affirmed remanded for the sole purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that accurately reflects the history-of-criminal-conduct findings that the trial court made at the sentencing hearing.

Appellant's conviction for domestic violence was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim had blood on his lip and shirt and told the responding police officer that the blood was the result of being hit by appellant, who was his girlfriend and lived with him. The trial court's decision to allow the State to treat the victim as a hostile witness was not reversible error where appellant failed to show any prejudice resulting therefrom. Appellant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Appellant's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's "Post-Conviction Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21." Appellant is unable to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel. Specifically, appellant has failed to establish that his trial counsel did not investigate his case properly. The record also establishes that appellant's counsel was able to effectively impeach the victim's testimony regarding her mental health issues. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court also did not err in treating appellant's motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and denying it as untimely. Judgment affirmed.

Evidence that appellant refused to produce identification upon request of an officer is insufficient to support a conviction for obstructing official business. Conviction for resisting arrest is not supported by sufficient evidence where officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe that appellant committed the offenses for which they arrested him. Conviction for aggravated menacing is not against the manifest weight where appellant made a specific threat to the officer and told her she should get a TPO.

Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law under R.C. 2929.11.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee because issues of fact remained regarding personal liability of contractor and amount of appellee's damages.

Relief after judgment, court of appeals jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, original jurisdiction

sentencing factors, felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.12, attempted murder, R.C. 2953.08

operating a vehicle while intoxicated – tip – identified citizen information – 911 call – totality of the circumstances – indicia of reliability – reasonable suspicion

Appellant failed to provide independent corroborative evidence for her uninsured motorist claim under either the more liberal statutory requirements or the stricter policy requirements. No evidence was produced beyond her own unsupported and inconsistent testimony which tended to show that she was struck by a motor vehicle, rather than simply falling.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's negligence and negligence per se claims where appellant did not set forth any specific facts owing to the existence of a genuine triable issue beyond the mere allegations set forth in her pleadings as required by Civ.R. 56, thus rendering it proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in appellees' favor on appellant's negligence and negligence per se claims.

The juvenile court did not err by denying appellant's motion to dismiss a children service agency's complaints alleging her two children were abused and dependent children because the juvenile court did not hold its disposition hearings for either child within the 90-day timeframe set forth by the now former R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) as such failure does not divest the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction and appellant's argument was barred by res judicata given her failure to raise such a challenge on appeal from the juvenile court's dispositional decisions granting temporary custody of both children to the children services agency. The juvenile court also did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's two children to a children service agency where the record provided sufficient credible evidence to support the juvenile court's decision finding it was in the children's best interest to grant permanent custody of both children to the children service agency. This included evidence that both chi

Trial court erred in denying defendant's application to seal the record of his convictions.

The trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to serve concurrent sentences of a mandatory minimum 10 years in prison with a maximum possible term of 15 years in prison for the charge of first-degree felony rape and a definite eight years in prison for the charge of second-degree felony pandering obscenity involving a minor where the record established that the trial court considered all relevant statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 prior to issuing its sentencing decision, the trial court properly notified appellant that he would be subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term upon his release from prison, and the trial court sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory ranges for first and second degree felonies.

The discovery rule applies to those libel actions where the publication of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable due to the nature of the publication. In such instances, a cause of action for defamation accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he or she was injured by the wrongful conduct of the defendant. The discovery rule also applies to plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy, where such claims are inextricably premised on the same allegations that support the libel claim. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to defendant on the basis that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(A).

Subject-matter jurisdiction—Appellant cannot establish a meritorious claim or defense under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), because this court previously rejected her challenge to trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and determined that she had waived her argument that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her for lack of service—Court of appeals' judgment denying motion for relief from judgment affirmed.

Speedy Trial, Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution R.C. 2945.71 competent credible evidence de novo

Trial court did not err in dismissing untimely, successive postconviction petition for lack of jurisdiction when requirement of R.C. 2953.23 not established.

CRIMINAL - Cruelty against companion animals R.C. 2951.02(A) random probationary searches R.C. 2929.28(A)(3) reimbursement is the proper financial sanction to a humane society for the care of animals restitution hearing not required for when reimbursement is ordered ability to pay a financial sanction permanent bar from owning or caring for a companion animal.

CRIMINAL - SENTENCING right of allocution Crim.R. 32(A)(1).

On certified entry of felony conviction.