[Cite as State v. Shuff,
2022-Ohio-3880.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-22-06
v.
TYLER SHUFF, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRC 2104563A, B, & C
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 31, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Dean Henry for Appellant
Elliott T. Werth for Appellee
Case No. 13-22-06
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyler Shuff (“Shuff”), appeals the judgment of
the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court’s denial of his motion to suppress and request
for an order in limine. We affirm.
{¶2} On December 27, 2021, Shuff was charged with two counts of operating
a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”) in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(h), both first-degree misdemeanors as
well as a turn-signal violation under R.C. 4511.39, a minor misdemeanor. On
December 28, 2021, Shuff entered his written pleas of not guilty.
{¶3} On February 24, 2022, Shuff filed in the trial court a motion to suppress
and request for an order in limine. On February 25, 2022, the trial court scheduled
the matter for a suppression hearing. On March 28, 2022, the trial court held a
suppression hearing and denied Shuff’s motion.
{¶4} On April 18, 2022, Shuff pleaded no contest to all three criminal
charges. After the trial court found Shuff guilty of the three charges against him,
the trial court merged the OVI offenses for the purposes of sentencing. Thereafter,
Shuff was sentenced on the per se OVI offense and the turn-signal violation.
However, that sentence was stayed pending appeal.
{¶5} Shuff filed a timely notice of appeal, and raises a single assignment of
error for our review.
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Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in overruling Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress Evidence and for Order in Limine.
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Shuff argues that the trial court erred by
denying his suppression motion and request for an order in limine. Specifically,
Shuff asserts that State Highway Patrol Trooper, Jason Weaver (“Tpr. Weaver”) had
no reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of his vehicle for a turn-
signal violation and no probable cause to arrest him for OVI.
Standard of Review
{¶7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the
role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions
and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.”
Id.
“Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard.”
Id.
Analysis
{¶8} Significantly, the case at bar involves a traffic stop. Law-enforcement
officers must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that a crime has
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been committed or is being committed in order to initiate a constitutionally
permissible traffic stop. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). See also State
v. Smith, 3d Dist. No. 1-17-50,
2018-Ohio-1444, ¶ 8, citing
id.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “reasonable articulable
suspicion” as “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].” State v.
Shaffer, 2013-Ohio-3581, [] ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bobo,
37
Ohio St.3d 177, 178, [] (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21-
22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, [] (1968). ‘Reasonable suspicion entails some
minimal level of objective justification for making a stop—that is,
something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
“hunch,” but less than the level of suspicion required for probable
cause.’ [State v. ]Kerr, [3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-01], [] ¶ 15, quoting
State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557[] (2d Dist. 1990).
(Bracketed text sic.) Smith at ¶ 9. “A police officer may initiate a traffic stop after
witnessing a traffic violation.” Id. at ¶ 10. Thus, the failure to activate a turn signal
in compliance with R.C. 4511.39(A) is a traffic violation that provides a law
enforcement officer “with a legal justification to initiate a traffic stop.” State v.
Harpel, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-20-03,
2020-Ohio-4513, ¶ 20.
{¶9} In assessing whether a seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion, “the ‘totality of circumstances’ must be considered and ‘viewed through
the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to
events as they unfold.’” State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94,
2019-Ohio-4210, ¶
21, quoting Andrews,
57 Ohio St.3d at 87-88. “This process allows officers to draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
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deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well
elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273,
122 S.Ct.
744 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813,
126
S.Ct. 2266 (2006), and quoting United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418,
101 S.Ct.
690 (1981).
{¶10} Significantly “there are three distinct stages in the typical … [OVI]
scenario: (1) the initial stop; (2) the request that the driver submit to field sobriety
tests; and (3) the arrest.” State v. Dierkes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0085,
2009-Ohio-2530, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Richards, 11th Dist. Portage No. 98-P-0069,
1999 WL 1580980, *2 (Oct. 15, 1999). On appeal, Shuff only challenges whether
Tpr. Weaver had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop for
the turn-signal violation and whether Tpr. Weaver had probable cause to arrest Shuff
for OVI. Thus, we will not address Tpr. Weaver’s decision to detain Shuff and his
subsequent request that Shuff submit to field sobriety tests.
{¶11} In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Shuff was making a turn
from a left-turn only lane at the intersection of Water Street and Washington Street
in Tiffin, Seneca County, Ohio. Further, it is undisputed that Shuff failed to activate
his turn signal at any point while approaching that intersection, when moving into
the left-turn only lane, after stopping at the intersection’s flashing red lights, and
during the execution of his left-hand turn. (See Joint Ex. 1, Tpr. Weaver’s dash cam
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video). Consequently, it is undisputed that Shuff did not continuously signal his
intent to turn for at least 100 feet before turning. Based upon these facts, the State
contends that Tpr. Weaver had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Shuff
violated R.C. 4511.39(A). Nevertheless, Shuff argues that since this was a turn-
only lane he was alleviated of his statutory requirement to activate his turn signal.
{¶12} To address Tpr. Weaver’s initiation of the traffic stop, we look to the
Revised Code. R.C. 4511.39(A) provides in pertinent part “[w]hen required, a
signal of intention to turn or move right or left shall be given continuously during
not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle … before turning,
….” Importantly, the Revised Code does not define “[w]hen required”. However,
“[t]he plain language of R.C. 4511.39(A) supports [] that a driver who is turning
must use a turn signal no less than 100 feet prior to turning, and there is no exclusion
for a vehicle stopped at a traffic light prior to a turn.” State v. Snell, 4th Dist. Licking
No. 20CA0064, 2021-Ohio-482, ¶ 20. Moreover, in Snell, the Fourth District noted
[t]he comment to R.C. 4511.39(A) provides, ‘the section requires a
signal to be given not only before making a right or left turn, but also
before changing lanes, passing another vehicle, or pulling into or out
of a parking place.’ Further, that the ‘section modifies the requirement
that a signal be given in sufficient time to amply warn other traffic, by
requiring that a signal be given continuously for at least 100 feet
before turning.’ 1975 Legislative Service Comment to R.C.
4511.39(A). The Digest of Ohio Motor Vehicle Laws, a product of
the Ohio Department of Public Safety, provides, ‘turn signals must be
used to show intention to turn right or left, to change course of
direction, or to change lanes on a multi-lane road. They should be
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turned on well in advance of the planned change of direction (at least
100 feet).’
Id. See also State v. Powell, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-21-20,
2022-Ohio-882, ¶ 13,
citing
id.
{¶13} Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Shuff
violated R.C. 4511.39(A), which provided Tpr. Weaver with reasonable, articulable
suspicion to constitutionally initiate the traffic stop of Shuff’s motor vehicle for a
turn-signal violation. Snell at ¶ 20. Hence, this portion of Shuff’s assignment of
error is without merit.
{¶14} Next, we address whether Tpr. Weaver’s had probable cause to arrest
Shuff for OVI. “A warrantless arrest in a public place based on probable cause does
not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” State v.
Davis, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-62, 2009-Ohio-2527, ¶ 6. “In determining whether
a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for OVI, a court considers
whether, at the moment of arrest, the officer had information within the officer’s
knowledge, or derived from a reasonably trustworthy source, of facts and
circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe the suspect was driving
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both.” State v. Montelauro, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 11AP-413,
2011-Ohio-6568, ¶ 20. “‘Whether probable cause exists
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the
arresting officer at the time of the arrest.’” Columbus v. Weber, 10th Dist. Franklin
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Case No. 13-22-06
No. 06AP-845, 2007-Ohio-5446, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Cabell, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-06-1026,
2006-Ohio-4914, ¶ 27. “In determining whether probable cause for an
arrest existed, we must examine the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding
the arrest.”
Davis at ¶ 6.
{¶15} The record reveals that probable cause to arrest Shuff for OVI was
supported by Weaver’s observations of Shuff’s red, bloodshot, and glassy eyes;
Shuff’s flushed face; the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from Shuff’s
person; his slurred speech; his fumbling for his license; his failure to follow
instructions; six out of six clues for the horizontal gaze nystagmus test; a vertical
nystagmus indicating a high level of alcohol content; and a turn-signal violation.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Tpr. Weaver had
probable cause to arrest Shuff for the offense of OVI.
{¶16} Upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court
did not err by denying Shuff’s motion to suppress and his request for an order in
limine.
{¶17} Accordingly, for all these reasons, Shuff’s assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶18} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
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