[Cite as State v. Hayden,
2022-Ohio-3933.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210352
TRIAL NO. B-2003803
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
VS. : O P I N I O N.
LOGAN HAYDEN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 4, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Arenstein & Gallagher, and Elizabeth Conkin, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Logan Hayden appeals his convictions for
multiple offenses including drug trafficking, drug possession, and having weapons
while under disability. He additionally appeals the indefinite sentences the court
imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law for the two most serious offenses. Hayden
argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence, his
convictions were not supported by the evidence, and the Reagan Tokes Law is
unconstitutional. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Procedure
{¶2} In 2020, Hayden was on community control as a sanction for a drug-
trafficking offense. His community-control sanctions involved local incarceration at
the River City Correctional Center and, upon his release from River City, intensive
supervision through Hamilton County’s Adult Probation Department and Electronic
Monitoring Unit (“EMU”), which we refer to as probation.
{¶3} Hayden was successfully discharged from River City and placed on
probation on July 17, 2020. Billy Scott, a supervisor at River City whom Hayden had
met while incarcerated, allowed Hayden to reside in his home and to use his white
2011 Chevy Malibu during his stay.
{¶4} Hayden signed forms when he was placed on probation. These forms
contained his acknowledgement of, and agreement to, certain rules and conditions of
probation, including subjection to certain warrantless searches, wearing an electric
monitoring device (“EMD”) with a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) on his ankle,
obeying all laws, and staying inside his residence except for limited times and for
limited activities.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} After Hayden moved into Scott’s home, Hayden’s probation officers
closely monitored Hayden’s movements by using GPS mapping technology and by
observing him driving the Malibu. The probation officers noticed that Hayden was not
abiding by his restricted schedule and had been present for short periods of time in
multiple parks and gas stations around the city on the same day, often in the early
morning hours, a pattern consistent with drug trafficking. Based on this information,
the probation officers decided to visit Hayden’s residence on July 31, 2020, to ensure
Hayden was complying with the conditions of his probation.
{¶6} Just before the visit, the probation officers noticed that Hayden had
again left his residence at a restricted time. When they arrived at the residence,
however, Hayden was observed on the street outside the home sitting in the driver’s
seat of the Malibu with the engine still running. The probation officers asked Hayden
to turn off the car and accompany them into the home. Inside the home, the probation
officers searched Hayden’s bedroom area but found no contraband.
{¶7} Scott was in the home at the time getting ready to leave for work. The
probation officers saw Hayden give Scott the keys to the Malibu and whisper into
Scott’s ear. One of the probation officers told Scott that he intended to search the
Malibu. Scott handed the probation officer the keys and gave the probation officer
express consent to search the Malibu. Scott also informed the probation officer that
he had not driven the car that day and that no one else ever drove the car.
{¶8} The probation officers discovered contraband in the Malibu.
Specifically, they found a bag placed in the driver’s side door pocket containing 17.587
grams of methamphetamine, a digital scale with heroin, fentanyl, and
methamphetamine residue, two different morphine pills, and a baggie containing
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3.133 grams of a mixture of heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, and xylazine, and a bag in the
trunk of the car containing a loaded semiautomatic pistol. The probation officers also
found in the back seat paperwork such as mail addressed to Hayden. The probation
officers then arrested Hayden.
{¶9} A Cincinnati police officer called to the scene searched Hayden’s person
and found currency in mixed bills totaling $1000. That officer subsequently obtained
a ballistics report demonstrating that the handgun found in the trunk of the Malibu
was operable and was a “positive match” for the weapon used in a shooting on July 29,
2020, around midnight. The police further linked Hayden to the July 29 shooting
because Hayden’s GPS mapping location at the time of the shooting placed him at the
scene, and a surveillance video of the shooting indicated that the shots were fired out
of a car resembling the Malibu.
{¶10} The state indicted Hayden for 11 counts of various drug and firearm-
related offenses. Hayden filed a motion to suppress all the evidence recovered from
his person and from the Malibu.
{¶11} In his motion, Hayden acknowledged that as a condition of his
probation he had consented to a warrantless search of both his residence and the car,
if probation officers had reasonable grounds to believe that he was not abiding by the
law or otherwise was not compliant with the conditions of his probation. Contending
his consent was exceeded because the officers lacked the requisite reasonable grounds,
Hayden argued his Fourth Amendment Rights were violated and all evidence from the
home visit had to be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
{¶12} The state argued that the probation officers’ actions were within the
scope of Hayden’s consent to warrantless searches because they had the requisite
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
reasonable grounds, and the probation officers had obtained separate consent from
Scott that justified the search of the Malibu.
{¶13} After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed with the state and
overruled the motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial and Hayden was found
guilty of all offenses. Before sentencing, Hayden requested to be sentenced under the
former, definite sentencing scheme for all his offenses, arguing that the newly enacted
Reagan Tokes Law, which applied to the first- and second-degree-felony offenses, was
unconstitutional. The trial court rejected Hayden’s constitutional challenge and
imposed an indefinite sentence for the most serious offenses and a definite sentence
for the remaining offenses, with an aggregate sentence of nine to 11 years in prison.
Hayden now appeals that judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Motion to Suppress
{¶14} In his first two assignments of error, Hayden argues the trial court erred
by overruling his motion to suppress the drugs, money, handgun, and other
contraband found in the Malibu and on his person at the conclusion of the probation
officers’ home visit. Hayden maintains that the actions of the probation officers were
constitutionally unreasonable and resulted in a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
{¶15} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8, cited in State v. Richardson, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-200187,
2021-Ohio-2751, ¶ 13.
{¶16} The Fourth Amendment secures the right to be free from an
unreasonable search or seizure and requires a warrant to be particular and supported
by probable cause. Evidence derived from a search or seizure that violates the Fourth
Amendment is subject to exclusion at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655,
81 S.Ct.
1684,
6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
{¶17} An exception to the warrant requirement is consent. See Richardson at
¶ 20. Generally, consent is valid if it is given freely and voluntarily, under the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 21, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222,
93 S. Ct. 2041,
36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-061032,
2007-Ohio-3786, ¶ 13.
{¶18} A probationer may validly consent to warrantless searches and seizures,
even random searches and seizures, as a condition of probation. See State v.
Campbell, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3226, ¶ 12.
{¶19} Here, Hayden acknowledged in his motion to suppress that he had
consented to certain warrantless searches and seizures by his probation officer as a
condition of probation. He conceded that based on his consent to the probation
conditions, the challenged actions of the probation officers were constitutionally
reasonable if the probation officers had reasonable grounds to believe that he was
violating the law or the terms of his probation.
{¶20} At the hearing on the motion, Hayden’s probation officers testified that
they were monitoring Hayden electronically as part of a probation condition for his
prior drug trafficking conviction. Further, Hayden’s probation conditions allowed him
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to leave his residence solely at specific times and for specific purposes, such as looking
for a job. The officers testified that GPS location data showed Hayden’s location
outside the home he shared with Scott beyond those restricted times and under
circumstances indicating a disallowed purpose.
{¶21} This evidence established that Hayden was repeatedly outside his
residence in violation of the terms of probation and had engaged in a pattern of making
short stops at gas stations and parks at odd hours, circumstances indicative of drug
trafficking. Thus, before the probation officers began the home visit, they had
reasonable grounds as contemplated by Hayden’s consent-to-search agreement.
{¶22} This evidence also established that when the probation officers were in
the home to search Hayden’s bedroom, the officers observed Hayden whisper
something into Scott’s ear as he gave Scott the keys to the Malibu. Hayden’s
surreptitious actions served to further fuel the probation officers’ reasonable
suspicions. One of the probation officers then obtained consent from Scott to search
the Malibu. The testimony concerning Scott’s consent was uncontroverted at the
suppression hearing.
{¶23} Thus, we hold the trial court properly overruled Hayden’s motion to
suppress, because the record of the proceedings at the hearing on the motion to
suppress contains competent and credible evidence of consent.
{¶24} For the first time, Hayden argues the evidence should be suppressed
because the state failed to demonstrate at the suppression hearing that the sentencing
court in Hayden’s prior case had complied with the notification provision of R.C.
2951.02(A).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶25} Generally, R.C. 2951.02(A) affords probation officers statutory
authority to perform warrantless searches of probationers and their effects so long as
the probation officers have reasonable grounds. The statute also contains a provision
directing the court that sentences a felony offender to a nonresidential community-
control sanction, such as intensive probation supervision or electronic monitoring, to
notify the probationer that he or she will be subjected to the reasonable-grounds
searches authorized by R.C. 2951.02(A).
{¶26} In this case, the state presented as evidence at the suppression hearing
the probation department and electronic monitoring unit forms Hayden signed as a
condition of probation in the prior case, but the state did not present evidence
demonstrating the sentencing court had complied with R.C. 2951.02(A)’s notification
provision. For this reason, Hayden contends the probation officers lacked the
authority to search his residence and the Malibu and that all the evidence must be
suppressed as a result. We are not persuaded.
{¶27} First, this argument is contrary to Hayden’s position in the trial court
and cannot be raised now. See State v. Curry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210274, 2022-
Ohio-627, ¶ 15. Hayden conceded that the only issue with respect to his motion was
the constitutionality of the search, and that inquiry was limited to whether the
probation officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Hayden was violating the
law or the terms of his probation.
{¶28} Further, Hayden does not cite any authority supporting his argument
that the exclusionary rule applies to statutory violations. The Ohio Supreme Court
recently reviewed this issue with respect to R.C. 2951.02(A) in Campbell. That case
involved a random search of a probationer that was constitutionally reasonable due to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the probationer’s consent to random searches, but that exceeded the scope of the
probation officer’s authority conferred by R.C. 2051.02(A) because it was not based on
“reasonable grounds.” See Campbell, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3626.
{¶29} When rejecting a claim that the fruits of that unauthorized random
search should be suppressed, the Campbell court explained that the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply when there has been no constitutional
violation, and R.C. 2951.02(A) did not contain a legislative mandate to impose an
exclusionary remedy for a violation of the statute’s reasonable-grounds requirement.
Id. at ¶ 21-23.
{¶30} Here, Hayden makes no argument that R.C. 2951.02(A) contains an
exclusionary remedy for a violation of the notice provision in the statute, and the
statute plainly reveals no mandate. Thus, to the extent that Hayden preserved this
issue for purposes of appeal, he has not demonstrated meritorious grounds for
suppression of the evidence.
{¶31} Consequently, we conclude that the trial court properly overruled
Hayden’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule the first and second
assignments of error.
B. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence
{¶32} We next address Hayden’s fourth and fifth assignments of error. He
argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶33} The contested issue at trial involved whether the state could sufficiently
tie Hayden to the drugs and handgun recovered in the Malibu. The state presented
the testimony of the probation officers who recovered the contraband from the Malibu
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and testimony of the police officer who recovered the large sum of cash on Hayden’s
person. The state additionally presented GPS evidence of Hayden’s locations and
video surveillance evidence of a nearby shooting and ballistics evidence from the
shooting that tied the handgun to Hayden.
{¶34} Scott also testified for the state. Scott said that he had no connection to
the drugs and handgun found in his Malibu. He explained that he had worked as a
supervisor at River City and sometimes allowed those incarcerated there to stay with
him upon release. He met Hayden this way and allowed Hayden to stay with him and
to drive his car because Hayden told him he was out of options. Scott further testified
that Hayden had driven the Malibu almost exclusively during the short time he lived
with him and that he was unaware of another car that Hayden had access to. Finally,
Scott testified that when the probation officers searched his home on July 31, 2020,
Hayden had whispered in his ear, “Don’t let them search the car.”
{¶35} Scott’s testimony was consistent with the other evidence at trial
implicating Hayden. The probation officers recalled that Hayden had whispered
something in Scott’s ear when he gave Scott the keys to the Malibu. Further, the GPS
data demonstrated that Hayden had engaged in a pattern of activity consistent with
drug trafficking prior to the home visit, and that Hayden was at the scene of the
shooting tied to a white sedan like the Malibu and the handgun recovered in the
Malibu.
{¶36} As part of the investigation, law enforcement did not find contraband in
Hayden’s bedroom, nor did the officers search the rest of the home occupied by Scott
and Hayden. But the police located inside the Malibu all the contraband needed for
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
drug trafficking except for the money. Importantly, that money was found on
Hayden’s person.
{¶37} Considering this evidence, we conclude that Hayden’s convictions were
supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. See State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two
of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-319,
99 S.Ct. 2781,
61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.2d 541
(1997). The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of fact. See State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230,
227 N.E.2d 212
(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, we overrule the fourth and fifth
assignments of error.
C. Constitutionality of Reagan Tokes Law
{¶38} In his third assignment of error, Hayden presents several arguments as
to why the Reagan Tokes Law on its face violates the United States and Ohio
Constitutions. Specifically, he maintains that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine and due-process provisions. Hayden’s challenge is ripe
for review in his direct appeal of his indefinite sentence. See State v. Maddox, Slip
Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-764, ¶ 11 and 21.
{¶39} This court addressed a similar challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law in
State v. Guyton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962. In Guyton, we
determined that the Reagan Tokes Law was constitutional on its face, rejecting a claim
that the indefinite sentencing scheme violates the separation-of-powers doctrine,
substantive- and procedural-due-process provisions, and the Equal Protection Clauses
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
of the federal and state constitutions. Based on our holding in Guyton, we overrule
Hayden’s third assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶40} Considering the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Judgment affirmed.
MYERS, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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