[Cite as State v. Weemhoff,
2022-Ohio-4263.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 22CA26
:
CODY WEEMHOFF :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No.
2021CR236R
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 29, 2022
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
GARY BISHOP JONATHON W. SPAULDING
RICHLAND CO. PROSECUTOR SPAULDING & KITZLER, LLC
38 South Park St., 2nd Floor 3 North Main St.
Mansfield, OH 44902 Mansfield, OH 44902
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Cody Weemhoff appeals from the April 7, 2022 Sentencing Entry
of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of appellant’s
suppression hearing.
{¶3} This case arose on March 22, 2021, around 10:15 p.m., when Jane Doe left
her workplace and traveled south on Lexington-Springmill Road in Mansfield, Ohio.1
Doe’s vehicle was behind a truck at a red light at Park Avenue. When the light turned
green, the driver of the truck hesitated a moment and did not proceed, leading Doe to
speculate that the driver might be on the phone or impaired. As Doe continued to follow
the truck, however, it began to swerve within its lane and changed speed, slowing down
and speeding up.
{¶4} It was dark and traffic was light. At one point, a vehicle approached from
the opposite direction. Doe was alarmed to watch the truck swerve out of its lane and
almost hit the approaching vehicle head-on. Doe testified the truck “was literally in the
left lane.” T. 14. Doe called 911 as the truck continued to swerve in its lane. As Doe
spoke with 911, the truck sped up and Doe attempted to keep up. Doe did not exceed
the speed limit, however, and the truck outdistanced her.
1
Jane Doe provided her name and identifying details when she made the 911 call, and
her identity is in the record.
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 3
{¶5} Upon cross-examination, Doe said she wrote a statement for police but did
not generally want to get involved. She was adamant that the truck almost caused a
head-on collision, and frightened her enough that she felt compelled to call 911.
{¶6} Ptl. Ryan Riggleman is an officer with the Lexington Police Department and
worked third shift on March 22, 2021. Dispatch advised that a light-colored truck was
southbound on Lexington-Springmill Road approaching the Village of Lexington.
Dispatch noted the truck had a toolbox in the back and almost struck another vehicle
head-on. Riggleman sat stationary at Heartland Church and waited for a vehicle matching
the truck’s description. Heartland Church is approximately a mile and a half outside the
Village limits.
{¶7} Riggleman testified he was concerned that the truck almost caused a
collision, endangering the well-being of other motorists. Riggleman did not know who
was driving the truck and what his or her condition might be. He maintained contact with
dispatch, which was still on the line with Jane Doe, for updates about the truck’s location
and description. Riggleman was aware of the identity of the 911 caller and her location
relative to the truck. He intended to find the truck and perform a traffic stop.
{¶8} Riggleman soon observed a large heavy-duty Ford truck pass Heartland
Church. He pulled out behind the truck and followed it toward the Village of Lexington.
Just outside the Village limits, he observed the truck travel left of center. Riggleman
turned on his lights and initiated a traffic stop. It took the truck a few moments to stop;
between the initiation of the stop and the truck pulling over onto Sherwood Drive, the stop
was within Village limits. Riggleman and his sergeant approached the truck and found
appellant driving with one male passenger.
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 4
{¶9} On cross-examination, Riggleman acknowledged that upon learning of the
911 call, he waited at the church for appellant to drive by, despite the fact that the church
was out of his jurisdiction. Riggleman explained that based upon appellant’s position
when the 911 call came in, appellant could have gone in any of three directions: he could
have turned on Hanley Road and Riggleman could have observed him and alerted
another jurisdiction; he could have turned right on Cockley Road, which would have
brought him into Lexington; or he could have continued on Lexington-Springmill Road,
which turns into Plymouth Street in the Village of Lexington. Appellant took the third route.
Riggleman also sought to observe the vehicle himself before determining whether a traffic
stop was appropriate.
{¶10} When the truck passed the church, Riggleman followed him, and initiated
a traffic stop when he witnessed the left-of-center violation. He did not wait for appellant
to enter the Village of Lexington. Riggleman testified he didn’t know what appellant might
do next; appellant could have easily run off the road and he was not driving “as a normal
person would.”
{¶11} At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court took the matter
under advisement and later overruled the motion to suppress via judgment entry.
{¶12} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of OVI pursuant to R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a) and 4511.19(G)(1)(d) [Count I]; one count of OVI pursuant to R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(f) and 4511.19(G)(1)(d) [Count II]; and OVI pursuant to R.C.
4511.19(A)(2)(a), 4511.19(A)(2)(b), and 4511.19(G)(1)(d) [Count III]. Each charged
offense is a felony of the fourth degree and the indictment states appellant was convicted
of or pleaded guilty to three OVI violations within ten years of the charged offenses.
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 5
{¶13} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and filed the motion to suppress,
asserting that police made an illegal extraterritorial seizure and arrest. Appellee
responded with a memorandum contra. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing
and the trial court overruled the motion to suppress by judgment entry dated February 15,
2022.
{¶14} On March 7, 2022, appellant entered pleas of no contest upon Counts I and
III. Count II was dismissed. Appellant was sentenced to a 30-month term of community
control including, e.g., 60 days in a lockdown treatment facility.
{¶15} Appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction and
sentence, incorporating the judgment entry overruling his motion to suppress.
{¶16} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶17} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
ANALYSIS
{¶18} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
overruling his motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked authority to execute
an extraterritorial traffic stop. We disagree.
{¶19} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332,
713
N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks,
75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154,
661 N.E.2d 1030
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 6
(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf,
111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145,
675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
v. Williams,
86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42,
619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other
grounds.
{¶20} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19,
437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein,
73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed
to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See,
Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,
620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶21} In the instant case, appellant argues Riggleman had no authority to
effectuate the traffic stop outside his jurisdiction. He points to State v. Brown, 143 Ohio
St.3d 444,
2015-Ohio-2438,
39 N.E.3d 496, in which a township officer stopped the
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 7
defendant for a marked-lane violation on an interstate highway that was outside of her
authority in violation of R.C. 4513.39. The Ohio Supreme Court held that suppression of
evidence obtained from the stop was proper stating, “A traffic stop for a minor
misdemeanor made outside a police officer's statutory jurisdiction or authority violates the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures established by Article I, Section
14 of the Ohio Constitution.”
{¶22} In the instant case, we first note a factual distinction: Riggleman observed
the left-of-center violation outside his jurisdiction, followed appellant toward his
jurisdiction, turned on his lights just outside his jurisdiction, but effectuated the traffic stop
inside his jurisdiction. For purposes of the following analysis this is a distinction without
a difference, but we are aware that the stop was within the Village of Lexington.
Riggleman first observed the truck from the parking lot of Heartland Church, which the
trial court found to be adjacent to the Village of Lexington. Appellant does not dispute
this finding of fact.
{¶23} The instant case is distinguishable from Brown. Riggleman was aware of
erratic driving and a near-collision from the 911 caller; he personally observed additional
erratic driving. He was not merely investigating a potential minor misdemeanor traffic
violation; instead, this was potentially an impaired or distracted driver. See, State v.
Dawley, 5th Dist. No. 15-CA-66, 2016-Ohio-2904,
65 N.E.3d 79, ¶ 17.
{¶24} R.C. 2935.03 provides in relevant part,
(E) In addition to the authority granted under division (A)
or (B) of this section:
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 8
(1) A sheriff or deputy sheriff may arrest and detain, until
a warrant can be obtained, any person found violating section
4503.11, 4503.21, or 4549.01, sections 4549.08 to 4549.12,
section 4549.62, or Chapter 4511. or 4513. of the Revised
Code on the portion of any street or highway that is located
immediately adjacent to the boundaries of the county in which
the sheriff or deputy sheriff is elected or appointed.
…
(3) A police officer or village marshal appointed, elected,
or employed by a municipal corporation may arrest and detain,
until a warrant can be obtained, any person found violating any
section or chapter of the Revised Code listed in division (E)(1)
of this section on the portion of any street or highway that is
located immediately adjacent to the boundaries of the
municipal corporation in which the police officer or village
marshal is appointed, elected, or employed.
(Emphasis added).
{¶25} The trial court found Heartland Church is adjacent to Riggleman’s
jurisdiction, and appellant does not challenge that finding of fact; moreover, the traffic stop
did occur within Riggleman’s jurisdiction.
{¶26} When Riggleman spotted the truck, he was aware that Jane Doe reported
erratic driving including a near-collision; he observed a truck matching her description, a
heavy-duty vehicle which potentially posed a threat to anyone inside or outside the
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 9
vehicle. Riggleman observed the same type of erratic driving Doe described, including
failure to maintain the lane of travel. From the point at which he first observed the truck
at the church, it could have traveled in any of three directions, including into the Village
of Lexington.
{¶27} We reject appellant’s implication that Riggleman was not authorized to
initiate the traffic stop outside the Village of Lexington, based upon the information
available to him and his own observations. In Dawley, supra, we acknowledged the
community-caretaking exception to extraterritorial jurisdictional problems. In Ohio, the
Supreme Court has held:
The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement
officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent
serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop.
State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325,
2012-Ohio-1008,
964
N.E.2d 1037, syllabus.
{¶28} In Dunn, the Ohio Supreme Court cited ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
1–2.2 for the proposition that “police officers are duty-bound to provide emergency
services to those who are in danger of physical harm.” Dunn, ¶ 20. We examine
Riggleman’s actions in light of what actions were objectively reasonable for a law
enforcement officer in the role of a community caretaker to take under the circumstances.
Dawley, supra,
2016-Ohio-2904 at ¶ 19, citing Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403,
405–406,
126 S.Ct. 1943,
164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 10
{¶29} We find Riggleman’s actions to be reasonable under the circumstances.
Dawley, supra,
2016-Ohio-2904 at ¶ 20. “He personally observed erratic and dangerous
driving, and received a report from a concerned motorist that mirrored the officer's own
concerns. In these circumstances, the officer had an objectively reasonable basis for
believing both that the driver might need help and that the public was in danger if she
continued to drive while he waited for an officer within the jurisdiction to stop her.”
Id.
“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Brigham City,
547 U.S. at 403,
126 S.Ct. 1943,
164 L.Ed.2d 650, quoting Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392,
98 S.Ct.
2408,
57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). Accord State v. Dunn,
131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-
1008,
964 N.E.2d 1037, syllabus. We find such an emergency or exigency existed in the
instant case.
{¶30} The potential emergency facing Riggleman was the need to stop a motorist
who was driving erratically and endangering the public. Id. The officer personally
observed the left-of-center violation and his conclusions are objectively reasonable from
the perspective of Jane Doe, who was concerned enough to call 911 and report the
danger appellant posed to other innocent citizens traveling the roadways.
Id.
{¶31} The trial court properly overruled appellant’s motion to suppress and his
sole assignment of error is overruled.
Richland County, Case No. 22CA26 11
CONCLUSION
{¶32} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Wise, Earle, P.J. and
Gwin, J., concur.
