#29485-a-PJD
2022 S.D. 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
…
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DANIEL JAMES GRASSROPE, Defendant and Appellee.
…
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
…
THE HONORABLE ANDREW ROBERTSON
Judge
…
DANIEL HAGGAR
DREW DEGROOT
NICHOLAUS MICHELS
Minnehaha County Deputy
State’s Attorneys
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellant.
CHRISTOPHER MILES of
Minnehaha County Public
Defender’s Office
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellee.
…
ARGUED
OCTOBER 5, 2021
OPINION FILED 02/09/22
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DEVANEY, Justice
[¶1.] The State appeals the magistrate court’s decision granting Daniel
Grassrope’s motion to suppress, asserting that the magistrate court erred in
determining that the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment did
not apply.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] In the early morning of March 7, 2020, Sioux Falls dispatch received a
call from a six-year-old boy. In the initial call, the child gave the phone to his
mother, and when dispatch asked the mother if there was an emergency, she hung
up the phone. When dispatch called back, the child answered and said that “daddy
was being mean to mom.” The child also informed dispatch that his dad was
leaving to go to his car. Dispatch relayed the information shortly thereafter to
Officer Conley at 2:46 a.m.
[¶3.] Officer Conley, believing a domestic dispute might be occurring,
responded to the apartment building from which the call had been placed. On his
way to the apartment, dispatch further advised that according to the child, “dad
was talking back and mom didn’t like it.” Officer Conley arrived at the apartment
building at 2:48 a.m. and saw a tan Chevy Malibu leaving the parking lot. At this
time, he had not yet received information describing the father’s car. Officer Conley
testified that he decided to follow the Malibu because he had very limited
information and was not sure if the driver was a victim or the suspect, or if someone
had been hurt.
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[¶4.] Shortly thereafter, dispatch provided an update stating that the
father’s automobile was silver. Officer Conley initiated a traffic stop at 2:49 a.m.,
and Daniel Grassrope was the only person in the automobile. Officer Conley
testified that while speaking to Grassrope, he immediately detected a strong odor of
intoxicants. After further investigation, he placed Grassrope under arrest for
driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license.
[¶5.] Before trial, Grassrope filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained
during the stop. Grassrope claimed that Officer Conley violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure by stopping his
automobile without probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion. In
response, the State asserted that Officer Conley had an objectively reasonable
suspicion that Grassrope had engaged in criminal activity, but the State primarily
argued that Officer Conley’s actions were lawful under the community caretaker
doctrine.
[¶6.] The magistrate court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law
granting Grassrope’s motion to suppress. The magistrate court found that Officer
Conley did not observe any traffic violations and that his decision to stop
Grassrope’s vehicle was based solely on the information provided by dispatch
regarding a family dispute. The court further found that the information from
dispatch did not indicate that a crime had been committed, there had been no
request for help, and there was no indication that the mother or child had left the
apartment. Instead, the child reported that the father had left. The magistrate
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court therefore concluded that the community caretaker exception did not apply. 1
The State appeals the magistrate court’s order granting Grassrope’s motion to
suppress, alleging the court erred in determining that the community caretaker
exception did not apply to the circumstances surrounding Officer Conley’s stop.
Standard of Review
[¶7.] “We review the [magistrate] court’s grant or denial of a motion to
suppress involving an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right under
the de novo standard of review.” State v. Short Bull, 2019 S.D. 28, ¶ 10,
928 N.W.2d
473, 476 (quoting State v. Kleven,
2016 S.D. 80, ¶ 7,
887 N.W.2d 740, 742). “The
court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but we
give no deference to the court’s conclusions of law.” State v. Fischer,
2016 S.D. 12, ¶
10,
875 N.W.2d 40, 44 (quoting State v. Fierro,
2014 S.D. 62, ¶ 12,
853 N.W.2d 235,
239). “[O]nce those facts have been determined, ‘the application of a legal standard
to those facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.’” State v. Heney,
2013 S.D. 77,
¶ 8,
839 N.W.2d 558, 561–62 (quoting State v. Hess,
2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 9,
680 N.W.2d
314, 319). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum
1. It appears from the magistrate court’s comments during its oral ruling and
from some of the court’s written factual findings that the court also rejected
the State’s alternative argument that Officer Conley had reasonable
suspicion to believe the driver of the vehicle had engaged in criminal activity.
However, the court did not enter a written conclusion stating that the
evidence did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard to justify the stop of
Grassrope’s vehicle to further investigate a crime. In any event, the State is
not pursuing this alternative argument on appeal.
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Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395,
68 S. Ct. 525, 542,
92 L. Ed. 746 (1948) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Analysis and Decision
[¶8.] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
VI, section 11, of the South Dakota Constitution guarantee a person’s right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s textual
reference to the issuance of ‘[w]arrants’ has been interpreted to state a general
principle that police officers ‘must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure[.]’” State v.
Schumacher, 2021 S.D. 16, ¶ 20,
956 N.W.2d 427, 432 (quoting Short Bull,
2019
S.D. 28, ¶ 11,
928 N.W.2d at 476). However, courts have long recognized certain
exceptions to the warrant requirement. “[A] warrant is not required to effect a
temporary seizure of a vehicle by means of a traffic stop.” Short Bull,
2019 S.D. 28,
¶ 12,
928 N.W.2d at 476 (citing State v. Bowers,
2018 S.D. 50, ¶ 10,
915 N.W.2d 161,
164). A police officer need only have “a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.”
Id.
(quoting State v. Chavez,
2003 S.D. 93, ¶ 15,
668 N.W.2d 89, 95). “While the stop
may not be the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, it is enough that the
stop is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’”
Id. (quoting
Chavez,
2003 S.D. 93, ¶ 16,
668 N.W.2d at 95). The State carries the burden to
prove that the search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Edwards,
2014 S.D. 63, ¶ 12,
853 N.W.2d 246, 251 (citing
Hess,
2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 23,
680 N.W.2d at 324).
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[¶9.] We have recognized that the “specific and articulable facts standard
. . . has not been exclusively connected with the detection of criminal activity.”
Short Bull, 2019 S.D. 28, ¶ 13,
928 N.W.2d at 476. We have likewise applied this
standard when police officers act as community caretakers, noting that “[f]rom first
responders to the sick and injured, to interveners in domestic disputes, and myriad
instances too numerous to list, police officers fulfill a vital role where no other
government official can.” Id. ¶ 14,
928 N.W.2d at 477 (quoting State v. Deneui,
2009
S.D. 99, ¶ 49,
775 N.W.2d 221, 242). Our prior cases applying what came to be
known as the “community caretaker exception” stem from the United States
Supreme Court’s recognition that local law enforcement officers often “engage in
what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski,
413
U.S. 433, 441,
93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528,
37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973) (determining that a
warrantless search for a firearm believed to be in a disabled vehicle that had been
towed from a public highway after an accident did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
[¶10.] We first applied the community caretaker exception in State v.
Rinehart and acknowledged that law enforcement officers, under appropriate
circumstances, “may be justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance, without
needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity.”
2000 S.D. 135, ¶ 7,
617
N.W.2d 842, 843 (citation omitted). However, we recognized that the exception
should be applied “cautiously and narrowly” to avoid the risk of abuse or the use of
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the exception “as a pretext for conducting an investigatory search for criminal
evidence.” Id. ¶ 10, 617 N.W.2d at 844 (quoting Commonwealth v. Waters,
456
S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)). Thus far, we have applied the community
caretaker exception in three instances involving the warrantless search or
temporary seizure of an automobile.
[¶11.] In Rinehart, we held that a law enforcement officer, acting in his role
as a community caretaker, was authorized to stop an automobile after he observed
the vehicle traveling at an “excessively slow speed” and believed it was being driven
by someone experiencing either a “medical emergency or automotive malfunction[.]”
Id. ¶¶ 8–9,
617 N.W.2d at 844. We concluded, based on the circumstances of the
case, that the officer was justified “in stopping Rinehart to make sure everything
was all right.” Id. ¶ 11,
617 N.W.2d at 844.
[¶12.] We have also held a police officer’s actions were justified under the
community caretaker exception when the officer knocked on the driver’s window of
an automobile that had been parked at the same location with the engine running
for an extended period of time during the early morning hours and the driver
appeared to either be sleeping or passed out. Kleven,
2016 S.D. 80, ¶ 12,
887
N.W.2d 740, 743. We determined that the officer had “sufficient reasons to act”
under the circumstances.
Id.
[¶13.] Finally, in Short Bull, we concluded an officer had reasonable facts to
initiate a stop of a vehicle suspected to be occupied by the victim of a possible
domestic disturbance.
2019 S.D. 28, ¶ 21,
928 N.W.2d at 478. While the facts in
Short Bull have some similarities to the facts underlying the stop of Grassrope’s
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vehicle, there are notable distinctions that bear directly upon the dichotomy
between police officers’ caretaking and law enforcement roles. In Short Bull, at
approximately 3:00 a.m., a hotel night clerk called dispatch and reported that she
had received a call from a female patron asking for help. Id. ¶ 2, 928 N.W.2d at
474. Shortly after the initial call, the clerk spoke to dispatch again, reporting that
the female patron was in the lobby. According to the clerk, the female had
confirmed she was involved in a domestic dispute and that the male was still in the
hotel room. The woman then left the hotel.
Id. An officer responded to the call,
and upon arrival at the hotel, dispatch advised that the female was in the parking
lot but did not provide a description of the vehicle or a direction of travel. Id. ¶ 3,
928 N.W.2d at 474. The officer did not see any pedestrians or traffic movement in
front of the hotel, but as he pulled around to the rear parking lot, he saw a black
SUV leaving the lot and activated his lights and siren to stop the vehicle.
Id.
Under the circumstances, the Court concluded that the officer’s actions fell within
the community caretaker exception because he had reasonable and articulable facts
to initiate the stop. 2
2. Although, since Rinehart, we have applied the community caretaker
exception in circumstances involving warrantless entries of both vehicles and
residences, we recently noted in Boggs v. Pearson, 2021 S.D. 44, ¶ 25,
963
N.W.2d 304, 312–13, that the United States Supreme Court has now clarified
that its previous acknowledgement of law enforcement’s caretaking duties did
not create “a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and
seizures in the home.” Caniglia v. Strom, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1598,
209 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2021) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme
Court nevertheless reaffirmed its existing precedent recognizing that law
enforcement may enter private property “when certain exigent circumstances
exist, including the need to ‘render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’” Id. at ___, 141 S.
(continued . . .)
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[¶14.] Here, however, Officer Conley never received information suggesting
that a person in need of aid was leaving the apartment. The only information he
possessed was the child’s report that his father was “being mean” to his mother and
“talking back” to her and that his father had gone to his car. Even if the
information from dispatch would have supported a decision to seek entrance to the
caller’s apartment to ensure that everyone was safe, there was no additional
caretaking concern that justified a stop of the father’s vehicle as it was driving
away. Officer Conley’s claim that he was concerned the driver of the vehicle leaving
the apartment might have been the victim of a domestic assault is not supported by
the reported information. As a result, Officer Conley could not articulate specific
facts to support his contention that he stopped Grassrope’s vehicle in the exercise of
his community caretaking role.
[¶15.] We acknowledge that officers responding to reports of domestic
disturbances must often make on-the-spot, difficult decisions regarding how to
ensure the safety of persons involved. But when relying upon the community
caretaking exception to justify a warrantless search or seizure, they must
nevertheless operate within the bounds of our existing precedent directing that this
exception be applied cautiously and narrowly. Applying this directive here, Officer
________________________
(. . . continued)
Ct. at 1599 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 470,
131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856,
179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011)). Three separate concurring opinions in
Caniglia emphasized that the principles underlying Cady’s recognition of law
enforcement’s community caretaking functions are still sound. Id. ___, 141 S.
Ct. at 1600–04.
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Conley’s actions were beyond the scope of a community caretaker. Therefore, the
magistrate court properly granted Grassrope’s motion to suppress.
[¶16.] Affirmed.
[¶17.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,
concur.
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