FILED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
DECEMBER 15, 2023
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2023 ND 233
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Michael Dean Hamilton, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20230052
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Cynthia M. Feland, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
Julie A. Lawyer, State’s Attorney, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
William Woodworth, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
State v. Hamilton
No. 20230052
Tufte, Justice.
[¶1] Michael Dean Hamilton appeals from a criminal judgment entered after
he pled guilty to a charge of hindering law enforcement in violation of N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-08-03(1)(b). He argues the district court abused its discretion by
rejecting his plea agreement and the court substantially relied on
impermissible sentencing factors. We affirm the judgment.
I
[¶2] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by rejecting his
plea agreement.
[¶3] The State charged Hamilton with hindering law enforcement in violation
of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-03(1)(b), alleging he provided transportation and money
to an individual he knew had engaged in the crime of abduction in Virginia.
[¶4] At a hearing two days before the scheduled trial, the parties presented
the district court with a plea agreement. Hamilton pled guilty, and the court
asked him to provide the factual basis. After hearing from Hamilton and the
State, the court expressed concerns about the factual basis, explaining
Hamilton’s “recitation of the facts basically tells [the court] [Hamilton] did
absolutely nothing wrong.” The court found Hamilton’s guilty plea was not
supported by a sufficient factual basis, explaining, “I’m not taking the guilty
plea. We’re going to trial on Wednesday. There is not enough even remotely
here based on [Hamilton’s] admissions for us—for me to take this.” The parties
then filed a written plea agreement under Rule 43, N.D.R.Crim.P., which
included a factual basis for the guilty plea. The district court also rejected this
written plea agreement.
[¶5] A change of plea hearing was held the next day. The district court
explained, “Given the nature of the proceedings yesterday, the Court indicated
it would not be taking a plea agreement in this case, and then any plea would
need to be an open plea.” After the court reviewed Hamilton’s rights and
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explained the procedure for an open plea, he pled guilty to the charge of
hindering law enforcement. Hamilton acknowledged a jury would be presented
with sufficient evidence to find him guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt, referencing the Alford plea procedure. The State provided a factual
basis. The court found Hamilton’s plea to be knowing, intelligent, voluntary,
and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
[¶6] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by arbitrarily
rejecting the plea agreement for lack of a sufficient factual basis but then
accepting the open plea, because a factual basis is required for both. “Rule 11,
N.D.R.Crim.P., governs pleas and provides the procedural framework for
entering pleas. To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Generally, a defendant who voluntarily pleads
guilty waives the right to challenge non-jurisdictional defects and may only
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea.” State v. Wallace,
2018 ND 225, ¶ 6,
918 N.W.2d 64 (cleaned up).
[¶7] After making an unconditional, open plea, Hamilton may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the plea. See State v. Trevino,
2011 ND
232, ¶ 6,
807 N.W.2d 211. Hamilton’s argument that the district court abused
its discretion by rejecting the previously-presented plea agreement was waived
when he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. He can no longer
challenge such non-jurisdictional defects.
Id.
II
[¶8] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by substantially
relying on impermissible factors. He argues the court impermissibly relied on
facts outside the record, including: a Virginia court order finding the
individuals he aided were “unsafe parents”; Hamilton’s actions aiding removal
of the children from the custody of their aunt; and the procedure for issuing
and general seriousness of Amber alerts. Hamilton argues he was sentenced in
an illegal manner because the main factors the court relied on were based on
information outside the record, or unreasonable inferences from information
in the record.
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[¶9] This Court reviews a district court’s sentencing decision under an abuse
of discretion standard. See State v. Thomas, 2020 ND 30, ¶17,
938 N.W.2d 897.
Our review is generally limited “to whether the court acted within the
statutorily prescribed sentencing limits or substantially relied on an
impermissible factor.”
Id. (quoting State v. Clark,
2012 ND 135, ¶ 18,
818
N.W.2d 739).
[¶10] Hamilton did not object to the district court’s discussion of or reliance on
these factors during his sentencing hearing. When an issue has not been
properly preserved, we review only for obvious error. N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b);
State v. Smith,
2023 ND 6, ¶ 5,
984 N.W.2d 367. “We exercise our power to
consider obvious error cautiously and only in exceptional situations where the
defendant has suffered serious injustice.”
Id. (quoting State v. Landrus,
2022
ND 107, ¶ 6,
974 N.W.2d 676). “To establish an obvious error, the defendant
must show: (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error affects the defendant’s
substantial rights.” Smith,
2023 ND 6, ¶ 5. “There is no obvious error when an
applicable rule of law is not clearly established.” State v. Gardner,
2023 ND
116, ¶ 5,
992 N.W.2d 535 (quoting State v. Lott,
2019 ND 18, ¶ 8,
921 N.W.2d
428. “[T]he determination whether to correct the error lies within the
discretion of the appellate court, and the court should exercise that discretion
only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” State v. Pemberton,
2019 ND 157, ¶ 9,
930 N.W.2d 125
(quoting State v. Patterson,
2014 ND 193, ¶ 4,
855 N.W.2d 113).
[¶11] During a sentencing hearing, a district court is not restrained by the
rules of evidence except for the rules on privilege. N.D.R.Ev. 1101(d)(3)(D).
Further, a district court may draw a reasonable inference from evidence
presented. See State v. Hoverson,
2006 ND 49, ¶¶ 38-39,
710 N.W.2d 890
(rejecting argument that reliance on unproven conduct is an impermissible
factor).
[¶12] We have held the district court relied on an impermissible factor when it
misinterpreted a statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” to the detriment
of the defendant. State v. Christensen,
2019 ND 11, ¶ 10,
921 N.W.2d 436. We
have also held penalizing a defendant for exercising a constitutional right is
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an impermissible factor. State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 463-464 (N.D. 1978)
(holding it is impermissible to penalize a defendant for standing trial or
remaining silent); see also Hoverson,
2006 ND 49, ¶¶ 35-36 (concluding
consideration of either uncounseled guilty pleas without waiver of counsel or
pending criminal charges is impermissible).
[¶13] Hamilton cites no clearly established law prohibiting reliance on
information from outside the record or a court’s use of its personal knowledge
regarding such things as Amber alerts. Hamilton has not demonstrated that
the factors the court considered were a clear deviation from the applicable
statutory provisions, case law, or rules of evidence. The sentencing factors are
outlined in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04. “Although entitled to consideration, the
sentencing factors in § 12.1-32-04 do not control the district court’s discretion
and are not an exclusive list of all a district court may consider in fixing a
criminal sentence.” State v. Lyon,
2020 ND 34, ¶ 7,
938 N.W.2d 908. A district
court need not explicitly reference the factors listed in section 12.1-32-04.
Id.
[¶14] We conclude the district court did not commit obvious error when it
considered facts outside the record and relied on its personal knowledge
regarding Amber alerts when deciding Hamilton’s sentence.
III
[¶15] The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
[¶16] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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