[Cite as State v. Ludwick,
2023-Ohio-1113.]
0
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HIGHLAND COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 22CA9
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Aaron Ludwick, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 3/29/2023
APPEARANCES:
Aaron Ludwick, Chillicothe, Ohio, pro se.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, and Adam J. King, Highland County
Assistant Prosecutor, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
Hess, J.
{¶1} Aaron Ludwick appeals the trial court’s decision denying his petition for
postconviction relief. Ludwick contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
postconviction petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argues that he was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because he had an alibi
his trial attorney did not pursue and his attorney failed to impeach the victim. He also
contends that the state used evidence in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and
there were multiple errors in the trial court’s analysis of his postconviction relief petition
that cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial.
{¶2} We reject Ludwick’s contentions. A petitioner seeking postconviction relief
is not automatically entitled to a hearing. Before granting an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court must determine whether substantive grounds for relief exist. Here, the trial court
Highland App. No. 22CA9 2
properly determined that substantive grounds for relief did not exist. The affidavits
Ludwick contends were “alibis,” were statements from friends or neighbors who claimed
that during the times they visited Ludwick or were around him, they did not witness
abusive behavior by Ludwick towards the victim. The trial court correctly held that such
statements do not constitute “alibis,” nor would they be relevant impeachment evidence.
The trial court also reviewed the record and properly determined that none of the evidence
Ludwick contends was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment was introduced as
evidence at trial and, therefore, could not be the basis for vacating his convictions.
{¶3} Finally, we reject his contention that there were cumulative errors in the trial
court’s consideration of his postconviction relief petition. The “cumulative errors doctrine”
applies to errors that occur in the criminal trial. A postconviction relief petition is a
collateral civil attack. We have reviewed the trial court’s decision for “abuse of discretion”
and found that the trial court’s decision to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing
was not an abuse of discretion. And, to the extent Ludwig asserts the cumulative error
doctrine to his underlying claims of error in the criminal trial, he failed to raise it in his
postconviction relief petition and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
{¶4} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ludwick’s petition
for postconviction relief without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶5} A jury convicted Ludwick on four counts of rape of his daughter, N.L., a
minor being less than 10 years of age, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and one count
of rape of N.L. by force or threat of force, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), all first-degree
felonies. The trial court sentenced him to an 11-year prison term plus 4 consecutive terms
Highland App. No. 22CA9 3
of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole and he was ordered a Tier III registered
sex offender. Ludwick appealed, contending that the prosecution should not have been
permitted to ask him about his sexual history, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance for failing to object to certain testimony he argued was inadmissible and for
failing to request the waiver of court costs, and that multiple errors cumulatively deprived
him of a fair trial. We overruled his assignments of error and affirmed his convictions.
State v. Ludwick, 4th Dist. Highland No. 21CA17, 2022-Ohio-2609.
{¶6} Ludwick filed a timely petition for postconviction relief. In the petition,
Ludwick contended: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to research an alibi defense and impeach the victim’s testimony and (2)
the state used evidence at trial obtained after he had exercised his Fifth Amendment
privilege.
{¶7} To support his first claim, Ludwick submitted his own affidavit in which he
stated that he had given his trial attorney the names of eight people that he was
associated with during the timeframe covered by the indictment. However, the first day of
trial his attorney advised him that he was not going to call any witnesses. Ludwick also
included the following four affidavits:
(1) Jameson Carpenter, who stated that he has known Ludwick since 2003 and he was
Ludwick’s neighbor from 2009 through 2011 and he “never witnessed any abuse nor odd
behavior from Aaron towards his children or girlfriend.”
(2) Nathaniel Peck, who stated that he has known Ludwick since 2009 and was a neighbor
from 2010 until he moved. Peck stated that Aaron would be outside most of the time or
quite often and after Ludwick moved away, Peck would visit him two to five times a week.
All the times that Peck visited Ludwick, Peck saw no signs of Ludwick mistreating or
neglecting his family in any shape or form.
(3) Travis A. Lowe, who stated that he met Ludwick in 1997 and never witnessed any
signs of abuse towards his family.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 4
(4) Donald R. Davy II, who stated that he was Ludwick’s cousin and knew him his whole
life. Davy stated that Ludwick was always outside with his neighbors when he lived in an
apartment and Ludwick was always down at Davy’s house when Ludwick moved from the
apartment into a house. Davy stated that Ludwick “always had a [sic] open door policy”
and “any family and friends was [sic] welcome in his home.”
{¶8} To support his second claim, Ludwick stated in his affidavit that he had
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege but after he asserted it, he was forced by threats
of criminal charges to turn over passcodes to his cellphone and a secure folder on his
cellphone. Ludwick included excerpts from the trial testimony of Detective Vincent
Antinore concerning photographs discovered on Ludwick’s cellphone. In the excerpt
Detective Antinore testified that he discovered “several photos with uh other women,
various different other women that appeared in the same, I guess stature, then, small,
dark hair, very much so resembled [victim].” Ludwick’s attorney objected and the trial
court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard that testimony.
{¶9} The trial court denied Ludwick’s first claim because it found that the affidavit
testimony did not constitute alibi testimony, “The fact that the four affiants never witnessed
his commission of the crime is not an alibi.” Additionally, the trial court found that none of
the four affidavits contained any allegations of falsity of any testimony of the victim and
therefore did not impeach the victim:
Therefore, the testimony of the four affiants would have been of no support
to an alibi defense or to impeach N.A.L. The fact that none of them
witnessed the crimes or any other conduct described by the girlfriend and
daughter at trial is not impeachment any more than a friend testifying that
he/she had never seen a friend accused of bank robbery commit the crime.
The testimony would likely not been admissible as it was not relevant and
had no probative value.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 5
The trial court found that Ludwick had failed to establish an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because he failed to show any prejudicial error by counsel as to either his
alibi or his impeachment contentions.
{¶10} In addressing his second claim, the trial court found that the photographs
mentioned in Detective Antinore’s testimony were not admitted into evidence and the
testimony Detective Antinore presented concerning the photographs was objected to by
counsel and that objection was sustained by the trial court. The transcript excerpt also
includes the trial court’s corrective instructions given to the jury to disregard it. The trial
court also noted that Ludwick’s counsel had filed a motion to suppress statements he
made when he was interviewed in January 2021, based on the argument that Ludwick
had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege but was questioned by law enforcement after
that. The state conceded that claim and stipulated that it would not seek to introduce
Ludwick’s statements made after he invoked the Fifth Amendment. Finally, even though
Ludwick contended that he was coerced into giving his cellphone codes, there was no
evidence obtained from the cellphone that was offered or admitted into evidence at the
trial. Thus, the trial court found Ludwick’s second claim lacked substantive grounds. The
trial court denied Ludwick’s petition for postconviction relief and ordered him to pay costs.
{¶11} Ludwick filed a timely appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶12} Ludwick assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The Court erred by denying the defendant-appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing based upon
petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. The Court erred in denying the defendant’s petition for post-conviction
relief without an evidentiary hearing. The State’s us [sic] of information at
Highland App. No. 22CA9 6
trial, obtained after the defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment
privilege, violating the Fifth Amendment of the United State Constitution and
Article 1 Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
III. The multiple errors cumulatively deprived the defendant, Mr. Ludwick, of
his constitutional right to a fair trial. If this Court finds multiple errors
occurred in this post-conviction relief petition appeal, but none individually
warrant reversal, then this court should reverse under the cumulative-error
doctrine.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
{¶13} Generally we review decisions granting or denying a postconviction relief
petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006–Ohio–6679,
860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58. In Gondor, the
Court recognized that the differences between a direct appeal and an appeal from a
postconviction relief petition warranted different appellate standards of review.
Id. at ¶ 53-
54. The Court stated, “A postconviction claim is not an ordinary appeal: ‘A postconviction
proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction, but, rather, a collateral civil attack on
the judgment.’ ” Id. at ¶ 48, quoting State v. Steffen,
70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410,
639 N.E.2d
67 (1994). The holding in Gondor broadly applies to all appellate postconviction petition
review: “[A] trial court's decision granting or denying a postconviction petition filed
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion; a reviewing
court should not overrule the trial court's finding on a petition for postconviction relief that
is supported by competent and credible evidence.”
Gondor at ¶ 58; State v. Black, 4th
Dist. Ross No. 15CA3509,
2016-Ohio-3104, ¶ 7. “A trial court abuses its discretion when
its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Knauff, 4th Dist.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 7
Adams No. 13CA976, 2014–Ohio–308, ¶ 19, citing Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co.,
137 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013–Ohio–4733,
999 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 19.
{¶14} The postconviction relief process is a collateral civil attack on a criminal
judgment rather than an appeal of the judgment. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,
281,
1999-Ohio-102,
714 N.E.2d 905. The postconviction relief proceeding is designed
to determine whether “there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as
to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of
the United States.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a). Postconviction review is not a constitutional
right; instead, it is a narrow remedy that gives the petitioner no more rights than those
granted by statute.
Id. It is a means to resolve constitutional claims that cannot be
addressed on direct appeal because the evidence supporting the claims is not contained
in the record. State v. Teets, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 17CA21,
2018-Ohio-5019, ¶ 14. “This
means that any right to postconviction relief must arise from the statutory scheme enacted
by the General Assembly.” State v. Apanovitch,
155 Ohio St.3d 358,
2018-Ohio-4744,
121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 35.
{¶15} A criminal defendant seeking to challenge a conviction through a petition
for postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Calhoun at
282, citing State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112,
443 N.E.2d 169 (1982). Before granting an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court must determine whether substantive grounds for relief
exist. R.C. 2953.21(D). In making such a determination, the court shall consider the
petition, supporting affidavits, documentary evidence, and all the files and records from
the case. Calhoun at 284 (noting that R.C. 2953.21 “clearly calls for discretion in
determining whether to grant a hearing” on a petition for postconviction relief).
Highland App. No. 22CA9 8
{¶16} “Substantive grounds for relief exist and a hearing is warranted if the
petitioner produces sufficient credible evidence that demonstrates the petitioner suffered
a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights.” In re B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington No.
07CA60, 2008-Ohio-5771, ¶ 11. Moreover, before a hearing is warranted, the petitioner
must demonstrate that the claimed “errors resulted in prejudice.” Calhoun at 283. A court
may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing when the petitioner fails
to submit evidentiary material “demonstrat[ing] that petitioner set forth sufficient operative
facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. See
also State v. Lewis, 4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3181,
2011-Ohio-5224, ¶ 11; State v.
Slagle, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA22,
2012-Ohio-1936, ¶ 14.
A petitioner is not entitled to a hearing if his claim for relief is belied by the
record and is unsupported by any operative facts other than Defendant's
own self-serving affidavit or statements in his petition, which alone are
legally insufficient to rebut the record on review. In reviewing petitions for
post-conviction relief, a trial court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, weigh the credibility of affidavits submitted in support of the
petition in determining whether to accept the affidavit as true statements of
fact. (Citations and internal quotations omitted.)
State v. Quinn, 2017-Ohio-8107,
98 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Smith,
4th Dist. Highland No. 19CA16,
2020-Ohio-116, ¶16-19.
B. Trial Court’s Decision Not To Hold An Evidentiary Hearing
{¶17} Under R.C. 2953.21(D), the trial court must determine whether substantive
grounds for relief exist before granting a hearing on a postconviction relief petition:
Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii),
(iii), or (iv) of this section, the court shall determine whether there are
substantive grounds for relief. In making such a determination, the court
shall consider, in addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the
documentary evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the
proceedings against the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the
Highland App. No. 22CA9 9
indictment, the court's journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of
the court, and the court reporter's transcript.
{¶18} The trial court reviewed Ludwick’s argument, affidavit, and “alibi” affidavits
and determined that none of them constituted “alibis” and none of them contained
information that could be used for impeachment purposes. Therefore, the trial court
concluded, Ludwick failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call
these witnesses to testify or to use their testimony as impeachment evidence in the case.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show: “(1)
deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an
objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result
would have been different.” State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-
3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113, citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S.
668, 687-688, 694,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Failure to satisfy
either part of the test is fatal to the claim. See Strickland at 697. The
defendant “has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed
attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377,
2006-Ohio-6679,
860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62.
State v. Ludwick, 4th Dist. Highland No. 21CA17,
2022-Ohio-2609, ¶ 49.
{¶19} We have reviewed Ludwick’s argument and affidavits and agree with the
trial court’s conclusions. The affidavits do not provide an alibi for Ludwick, they simply
state that the individuals did not witness the crimes. They also do not constitute
impeachment evidence. “Impeachment” means “to call in question the veracity of a
witness, by means of evidence adduced for such purpose, or the adducing of proof that
a witness is unworthy of belief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 678 (5th Ed. 1979). Evid.R. 607,
608, 609, 610, 613, and 616 all govern matters related to witness impeachment, which is
when “the credibility of a witness may be attacked.” The affidavit testimony Ludwick
submitted with his postconviction relief petition is not impeachment evidence because the
affidavits do not contain facts that contradict the victim’s testimony, nor do they fall within
Highland App. No. 22CA9 10
the other categories of admissible impeachment evidence outlined in the Ohio Rules of
Evidence. Because the affidavits provide neither an alibi, nor an impeachment, Ludwick
has failed to submit substantive grounds for relief on this claim.
{¶20} We have also reviewed Ludwick’s argument concerning his Fifth
Amendment privilege and his contention that the state used information obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. There is no evidence in the record that the state
introduced photographs or testimony in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. In the
trial excerpt he submitted with his petition, his defense counsel objected to the detective’s
description of photographs on his cellphone, and the trial court sustained that objection
and gave corrective instructions to the jury. “A jury is presumed to follow the instructions,
including curative instructions, given it by a trial judge.” State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49,
59,
656 N.E.2d 623 (1995); State v. Meddock,
2017-Ohio-4414,
93 N.E.3d 43, ¶ 48 (4th
Dist.). In absence of any indication to the contrary, the trial court rightly presumed that the
jury followed the court’s instructions. We find no merit to Ludwick’s second claim.
{¶21} Based on a review of the petition, supporting documents, affidavits, and files
and records from the case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Ludwick’s postconviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing.
C. Cumulative Errors
{¶22} For his third assignment of error, Ludwick contends that he was deprived of
his constitutional right to a fair trial under the cumulative-error doctrine. He argues that
the cumulative-error doctrine applies to the errors he alleges were committed by the trial
court in its review of this postconviction relief petition and should merit a reversal of the
trial court’s decision denying his petition and an evidentiary hearing on it. Specifically, he
Highland App. No. 22CA9 11
argues, “If the cumulative error doctrine can merit reversal of a conviction, it can most
certainly merit reversal and an evidentiary hearing in this case.” Ludwick cites no legal
authority to support his assertion that the cumulative-error doctrine applies to a trial
court’s denial of a postconviction relief petition, which is a collateral civil attack on a
judgment.
{¶23} Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed where
the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to
a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually
constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64,
656 N.E.2d 623
(1995), citing State v. DeMarco,
31 Ohio St.3d 191,
509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987), paragraph
two of the syllabus; State v. Ruble,
2017-Ohio-7259,
96 N.E.3d 792, ¶ 75 (4th Dist.).
“Before we consider whether ‘cumulative errors’ are present, we must first find that the
trial court committed multiple errors.” State v. Smith,
2016-Ohio-5062,
70 N.E.3d 150, ¶
106 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Harrington, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 05CA3038, 2006-Ohio-
4388, ¶ 57.
{¶24} The cumulative-error doctrine does not apply where the defendant “cannot
point to ‘multiple instances of harmless error.’ ” See State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d
467,
2014-Ohio-1942,
13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 148 (“And to the extent that Mammone more
broadly invokes the doctrine of cumulative error, that doctrine does not apply because he
cannot point to ‘multiple instances of harmless error.’ ”); State v. Fannon, 2018-Ohio-
5242,
117 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 124-125 (4th Dist.); State v. Thacker, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.
19CA18,
2021-Ohio-2726, ¶ 69-71.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 12
{¶25} To the extent that Ludwick is invoking the cumulative-error doctrine for his
claims of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) a Fifth Amendment violation, we
find that he failed to raise this claim in his postconviction relief petition and cannot raise it
on appeal for the first time. State v. Barner, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 19CA11, 2021-Ohio-654,
¶ 11 (“Barner's second assignment of error challenging the community control sanction
was not raised in his petition for postconviction relief and is being raised for the first time
on appeal. It is well settled that appellate courts will not consider errors raised for the first
time on appeal.”).
{¶26} To the extent Ludwick seeks to apply the cumulative-error doctrine to his
petition for postconviction relief – a collateral civil attack – by arguing that the trial judge
made multiple harmless errors in denying him an evidentiary hearing, we find that the
question of whether the cumulative-error doctrine is applicable in the civil context appears
to be a question of first impression in our district.
{¶27} The Supreme Court of Ohio has only applied the cumulative-error doctrine
in the criminal context, but the Eight District Court of Appeals has applied the cumulative-
error doctrine to civil appeals. See Daniels v. Northcoast Anesthesia Providers, Inc. 2018-
Ohio-3562, 120 N.E.3d 52, ¶ 4-5 (“While the Ohio Supreme Court has only applied the
cumulative error doctrine in the criminal context, this court has applied the cumulative
error doctrine in an unbroken, 30-year line of civil appeals.”) A number of other district
have held that the cumulative-error doctrine is not employed in civil cases.
[S]ome appellate districts do not apply the cumulative error doctrine to civil
cases. See, e.g., Wolf v. Rothstein, 2016-Ohio-5441,
61 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 96 (2d
Dist.); J.P. v. T.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010715, 2016-Ohio-243,
2016
WL 363247, ¶ 35; Stanley v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 12AP-999, 2013-Ohio-5140,
2013 WL 6157232, ¶ 124; Lambert v.
Wilkinson, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0032, 2008-Ohio-2915, 2008
Highland App. No. 22CA9
13
WL 2404736, ¶ 110. These appellate districts are not, however, emphatic
in rejecting the cumulative error doctrine in the civil context because they
note that the doctrine is not “typically” or “generally” applicable. See, e.g.,
Stanley, supra, at ¶ 124 (“the cumulative error doctrine is not typically
employed in civil cases”); Lambert, supra (“the cumulative error doctrine is
generally not applicable in civil cases.”). In addition, two other appellate
districts have not explicitly endorsed the application of the cumulative error
doctrine in civil cases, but have rejected assignments of error on the
assumption that it applied without actually deciding so. See, e.g., State,
Dept. of Natural Resources v. Mark L. Knapke Revocable Living Trust,
2015-Ohio-470,
28 N.E.3d 667, ¶ 57 (3d Dist.) (assuming without finding
that cumulative error applies in civil cases); McQueen v. Goldey, 20 Ohio
App.3d 41, 50,
484 N.E.2d 712 (12th Dist.1984) (“Without addressing the
relative merits of the cumulative error concept, we conclude that even if we
were to accept and apply the concept to a civil case, the accumulation of
harmless errors in the case at bar did not constitute prejudicial error.”).
Daniels at ¶ 5; see also Painter and Pollis, Ohio Appellate Practice, Section 7:20 (Nov.
2022) (“Courts are divided on the question whether the cumulative-error doctrine applies
in civil cases; the First, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Districts have applied the doctrine in
civil appeals, while the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Districts have rejected it.”).
We note that in all of the cases cited by the Eight District, the parties had appealed a
judgment rendered following a civil trial. None of the cases involved postconviction relief
petitions in which the cumulative-error doctrine was applied to the trial court’s decision
not to grant an evidentiary hearing.
{¶28} We need not answer the broader question of whether the cumulative-error
doctrine is applicable to civil appeals generally. This is an appeal from a denial of a
postconviction relief petition, which we review for “abuse of discretion.” We have found
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding not to grant an evidentiary hearing
before it denied Ludwick’s petition. Thus, the cumulative-error doctrine has no relevance
or application. We overrule Ludwick’s third assignment of error.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 14
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶29} We overrule Ludwick’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Highland App. No. 22CA9 15
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the HIGHLAND
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
