Slip opinions decided 2023 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

R.C. 3107.07(A) – consent to adoption – failed without justifiable cause – maintenance and support – disjunctive relationship of contact and support provisions – failure to challenge alternative basis

Suggestive pre-trial identification ineffective assistance

Legal custody manifest weight of the evidence abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in overruling mother's objections to the decision of the magistrate or in adopting the magistrate's decision. Mother did not provide a transcript to support her objections, therefore the juvenile court was required to adopt the factual findings of the magistrate and was limited to reviewing the magistrate's conclusions of law. Although mother provided a transcript of proceedings to the court of appeals, the appellate court was precluded from reviewing evidence that was not presented to the juvenile court and limited to determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it overruled mother's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. The juvenile court did not err in adopting the decision of the magistrate that granted legal custody to a family member.

Civil stalking protection order contempt no-contact order. While the terms of the civil stalking protection order prohibited respondent-appellant from any written contact with the petitioner, appellant sent multiple mailings to the petitioner directly in connection with a lawsuit appellant filed against the petitioner, among them a copy of the summons and complaint, even though the petitioner was served with the summons and complaint by the clerk's office upon appellant's request and in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court found appellant in contempt for violating the civil stalking protection order by sending correspondence and documents to the petitioner. Because the record contains competent credible evidence to support the trial court's determination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant in contempt.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the evidence pointed toward a change of heart rather than a legitimate and reasonable basis to withdraw the guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

In the context of a bench trial, appellant failed to establish plain error in the trial judge's decision to allow a witness to testify regarding appellant's state of mind, where defense counsel failed to object to the question asked, the judge did not mention this testimony when explaining the guilty finding, and logical inferences from the other evidence of record established beyond a reasonable doubt all of the necessary elements of the retaliation offense. Judgments affirmed.

In appellant's first appeal, the case was remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing regarding one firearm specification. The trial court addressed the remanded issue at a new sentencing hearing, prompting the current appeal, in which appellant raises a sentencing issue not raised in the first appeal and unrelated to the remanded firearm specification issue. As such, appellant's assignment of error is beyond the scope of the remand and, since the assignment of error could have been raised in the first appeal, its consideration is barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into a final judgment and decree of dissolution, did not contain a provision specifically authorizing the trial court to modify the amount or terms of appellant's spousal support obligation. As such, the trial court correctly concluded, under R.C. 3105.18(E), that it was without jurisdiction to modify or terminate appellant's spousal support obligation. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's lawful sentence for failure to comply, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii), a felony of the third degree, is not rendered unlawful based upon the entry of a voluntary plea, as appellant expressly admitted to the actions of the offense and to the enhancement language. Judgment affirmed.

In divorce action, trial court did not err in declining to accept wife's expert's valuation of marital residence rejecting wife's claim that she did not intend to release dower rights as to property transferred six years earlier finding that real property gifted to husband by his parents was separate property declining to award spousal support allocating $15,000 of debt to wife valuing and dividing other property and accounts. Trial court erred in failing to restore wife to maiden name.

Finding of cohabitation, spousal support terminated

Denial of Jail-time credit

Motion to Vacate properly treated as petition for post-conviction relief - Properly Denied - Untimeliness, Waiver, and Res Judicata - Guilty plea waives right to challenge defects in indictment

Step-parent adoption consent

Civ.R. 12(B)(6)—judicial immunity—quantum meruit

final, appealable order, right to counsel, direct appeal, delayed appeal

gross sexual imposition – R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) – sufficiency – weight – witness credibility – impeachment by extrinsic evidence – Evid.R. 613(B) – plain error – outcome determinative – sentencing – PSI – presume regularity

Petty offense, right to a jury trial, arraignment, explanation of rights, en masse, general announcement, Crim.R 23(A), jury demand, untimely, guilty plea, waiver

Defendant-appellant's assault, falsification, theft, criminal-damaging, and criminal-trespassing convictions are based on sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding police reports, medical records, and text messages as inadmissible hearsay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that no Crim.R. 16 violation occurred.

Juvenile court did not commit plain error in ordering a delinquent juvenile to pay $50,167.49 in restitution to the victim of his felonious assault with a firearm.

Testimonial statements elicited by the state that otherwise may violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution are admissible if the defendant opens the door to the testimony by asking about the subject matter first. Testimony about the contents of a driver's license and a vehicle's registration is not hearsay if the truth of the contents is immaterial and the testimony is offered as circumstantial evidence from which another fact may be inferred. That trial counsel does not object to the admission of testimony does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if an objection would be futile. An appellate court may not consider evidence that supports a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the evidence is outside the record. The requisite criminal intent to prove accomplice liability for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon may be inferred from the evidence. Construing evidence in the light most favorable to the state showing that the defendant tried to cover up the robbery and his complicity in the crime - like the defendant's presence at the crime scene, his companionship with the principal, and his conduct during and after the robbery - permits an inference that the defendant facilitated the robbery knowingly and with the purpose of stealing the victim's money.

Trial court did not err in denying bail to appellant when factual findings that appellant was a danger to the community and no conditions could prevent the risk were supported by the record.

TAXATION – REAL PROPERTY: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed the tax valuation of the board of revision because the taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proof of entitlement to a reduction in valuation and the auditor's valuation was supported by competent, credible evidence.

R.C. 119.12, incomplete record, administrative appeal

Record regularity prosecutorial misconduct objections mistrial

divorce – continuance – abuse of discretion – student loan debt – martial residence – new counsel

On application for reinstatement.

Legal and Permanent Custody Plain Error

Summary judgment constructive notice. The trial court did not err in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment because the appellant did not demonstrate that the appellee had constructive notice of any defects of the PVC pipes.

Motion for mistrial jury instructions peremptory challenge sufficiency of the evidence aggravated murder prior calculation and design aggravated robbery robbery identity manifest weight of the evidence constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act. Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder and associated offenses are affirmed. Eyewitnesses saw defendant shoot the victim and beat him in the face and head with a claw hammer. The defendant was arrested after coming out of the house with the shotgun and claw hammer. Defendant's emotional outburst during opening arguments cannot be the basis for a mistrial.

Divorce allocation of debt and assets child support extracurricular activities and fees mental health retirement account guardian ad litem fees. - In a divorce proceeding, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the parties' marital debt and assets, ordering that Husband pay Wife child support, not considering the children's extracurricular activities and fees when calculating child support where no evidence of any extracurricular activities was offered, not considering the mental health of the parties and children in rendering the divorce decree where their mental health was never placed into issue, ordering the sale of the marital home, telling Husband that he could not take money from his retirement account during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, and allocating payment for the guardian ad litem fees equally between Husband and Wife.

R.C. Chapter 2721 declaratory relief civil service commission disciplinary grievance procedure binding arbitration. The decision of the trial court is reversed. The CPPA cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act to circumvent binding contractual and administrative procedures, and because the relief the CPPA sought is not contemplated under R.C. Chapter 2721, the trial court should have dismissed the action.

Guilty plea Crim.R. 11 knowing, intelligent, voluntary recommended sentence ineffective assistance of counsel presentence investigation. Appellant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary where the record demonstrates that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 and conducted a thorough plea colloquy. The trial court was not required to explicitly ask appellant whether any threats or promises had been made in exchange for his plea. Nothing in the record supports appellant's assertion that he was promised an eight-year sentence. Trial counsel was not ineffective where the terms of the plea agreement were extensively explained to appellant. The use of a presentence investigation from a prior case does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Sentencing Reagan Tokes Law felony second degree indefinite sentence constitutional right to a jury trial separation-of-powers doctrine due process.

Reagan Tokes Law S.B. 201 indefinite sentence. The trial court erred by not imposing an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Foreclosure standing in rem constructive possession holder note summary judgment preponderance of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted the bank summary judgment on its in rem foreclosure claim because no genuine issue of material fact exists. The bank had standing and was the holder of the note, which had a blank endorsement at the time the case was filed. The bank further demonstrated that it was the holder of the note through constructive possession. Moreover, in a typical civil case, the degree of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.

Foreclosure distribution of excess funds mechanics' lien legitimate lien valid lien sufficient evidence final appealable order and foreclosure order. The trial court abused its discretion when it granted a motion for distribution of excess funds from the foreclosure sale to a holder of a mechanics' lien without first holding a hearing or requiring the submission of evidence to prove the legitimacy of the lien. The matter is reversed and remanded and the trial court will conduct a hearing where the parties may introduce evidence and present arguments on the validity of the mechanics' lien.

Reagan Tokes sentence constitutionality R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notification advisement. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Appellant's sentence is not unconstitutional under the Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court did not give appellant all the advisements required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The matter is remanded for resentencing to provide all the advisements required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 manifest weight abuse of discretion best interest of the child. Judgment affirmed. When proceeding on a motion for permanent custody, the juvenile court must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (e) applies, and (2) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. The record in the instant case demonstrates that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time and Mother failed to complete her case plan, failed to consistently submit to drug screen requests, continued to test positive for illicit drugs, and failed to follow through with mental health services. Alleged Father never engaged in any case plan services. Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's judgment granting permanent custody of the children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.

Magistrate's decision transcript shared parenting objections. - Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in approving and adopting the magistrate's decision awarding shared parenting to father. Mother failed to timely file a transcript of the proceedings with the juvenile court thus, the court was in its discretion to adopt the magistrate's findings. As such, this court was also precluded from considering the transcript.

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, self-defense, lesser included offense instruction, right to jury trial, and fair trial. The court denied an application to reopen under App.R. 26(B). Appellate counsel was not ineffective for directly arguing that the trial court erred in not giving a self-defense instruction, instead of framing the issue as a failure to allow the jury to weigh the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a lesser included offense instruction on involuntary manslaughter because the defendant was convicted on involuntary manslaughter. Labeling the defendant as the shooter in a video did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Trial counsel used the video to argue that the defendant could not have killed the victim.

Summary judgment genuine issue of material fact judgment on the pleadings punitive damages attorney fees. The trial court did not err by granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment because the appellants have not demonstrated there are any genuine issues of material fact. The trial court did not err by denying the appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings because Michael engaged in fraud. The award of punitive damages and attorney fees was proper against Michael and Jetmo only, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the claims against Laura and Kleen because Laura was not a party to the contract or engaged in the fraudulent behavior in concert with Michael.

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 manifest weight abuse of discretion best interest of the child. Judgment affirmed. When proceeding on a motion for permanent custody, the juvenile court must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (e) applies, and (2) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. The record in the instant case demonstrates that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time and Mother failed to complete her case plan, failed to consistently submit to drug screen requests, and failed to follow through with mental health services. Alleged Father never engaged in any case plan services. Both children were born premature, both tested positive for marijuana, and both had resultant medical challenges. One child had unimaginable medical challenges and neither Mother nor Father availed themselves to receive training to care for the child's extensive medical needs. Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's judgment granting permanent custody of the children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.

Breach of plea agreement plain error Reagan Tokes as applied to consecutive sentences and constitutionality R.C. 2929.144(B)(2). Where appellant failed to object to alleged breach of plea agreement before the trial court, he waives all but plain error. Further, when plain error is not raised before the court of appeals, the court is not required to address it. Trial court properly added indefinite sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) to each of appellant's cases. Had the legislature intended to include indefinite prison terms in separate cases when calculating consecutive sentences, it could have done so, but did not. Finally, appellant raises a constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law. However, we have found the law constitutional State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, and likewise await the Supreme Court's final determination.

Constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence. The trial court properly imposed an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, and this court overruled appellant's challenges to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law en banc in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.).

Juvenile sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence complicity motion to suppress videotaped statement Miranda rights coercion involuntary ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. The failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Even when there is some evidence in the record to support a motion to suppress, an appellate court presumes that defense counsel was effective if defense counsel could reasonably have decided that the motion to suppress would have been futile. In the instant case, the indicia of involuntariness and coercion are not present. The appellant turned 18 years old a few days before she was arrested. She appeared coherent and stable in the video. She was conscious the entire time and did not slur her speech or appear to be under the influence of any medication or substance. The questioning by the officer lasted approximately 45 minutes. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant's state of mind was altered. The appellant was able to write her statement in a notepad. In addition, the officers did not prevent the appellant from receiving any medical treatment while questioning her. Therefore, we decline to find that the appellant's statement was involuntary or coerced based on the totality of the circumstances and the foregoing case law. We cannot say that a motion to suppress the statement would have been successful. Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain appellant's convictions on a complicity theory and her conviction are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record demonstrates that the appellant was more than just merely present. She was aware of and involved in the theft of the victim. She initiated the marijuana sale and knew that a gun was involved, that cash was taken, and that the victim was assaulted. The appellant did not attempt to stop her boyfriend from entering the victim's car, nor did she try to leave.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent custody of two of appellant's children to a children services agency or in ordering that a third child be placed in a planned permanent living arrangement ("PPLA") with the agency. Appellant's persistent failure to remedy her substance abuse problems and to recognize their negative impact on her children provided clear and convincing evidence that the permanent custody award and the PPLA placement were in the children's best interests. The court's decision was supported by competent, credible evidence. Judgments affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of several drug possession and drug trafficking counts. Additionally, based upon a forfeiture specification included in the indictment and following a hearing, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of monies held in a bank account appellant maintained. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court's forfeiture decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Reasonable suspicion Motion to suppress

Manifest weight/Sufficiency/Reasonable efforts/Best interests

Manifest weight/Sufficiency/Reasonable efforts/Best interests

Option contract intentional interference with contract

App.R. 16 and App.R. 12

Civ.R. 5 filing and responding to multiple motions and entering an appearance at a hearing is sufficient to trigger the requirements of Civ.R. 55(A) damages.

Affirming trial court's sentence, on the grounds that the matter raised by appellant is not ripe for review.

Defendant's statements were admissions, not confession, therefore, corpus delicti rule did not require city to offer independent evidence that crime occurred before offering defendant's statements. Trial counsel's decision to advance self-defense claim, rather than argue that defendant was mischarged, was matter of strategy. City offered sufficient evidence of elements of domestic violence. Trial court misapplied self-defense standard, but error was both invited and harmless.

Trial court's collection judgment in favor of appellee for $6,481.31, following appellants' default on a $78/month, interest free payment plan on the balance owed on health care services received in 2016-2020, was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Where judgment entry incorporates the findings made at the sentencing hearing, imposition of consecutive sentences is affirmed where the record supports the findings necessary pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) (4). Where the sentencing judgment entries make additional findings not made at sentencing hearing, the cases will be remanded back to trial court to excise additional findings not made at the sentencing hearing to comply with State v. Bonnell.

The trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion to suppress is affirmed. The appellant failed to demonstrate that his arrest lacked competent, credible evidence to establish probable cause. Failure to substantially comply with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) guidelines in performing standardized field sobriety tests was harmless error.

Because appellant failed to establish that she was entitled to relief under any of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), the trial court properly denied her motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11.

constitutional right to present a defense – motion in limine – state of mind – sufficiency – pandering obscenity

manifest weight - sufficiency - lesser included offense -burglary - prosecutorial misconduct - other acts - Evid.R. 404(B)

R.C. 2953.25, certificate of qualification for employment, versions of a statute

Moot, completed sentence, voluntarily, sufficiency of the evidence, aggravated menacing, gun, manifest weight of the evidence

Defendant appeals aggravated murder conviction. Gruesome photographs had probative, not outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Demonstrative exhibit, aerial representation of the location of evidence, was relevant and admissible. State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt. Case was supported by the greater weight of the evidence.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of two of appellants' children to a children's services agency as such decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellants failed to remedy the cause for the children's removal and where permanent custody was in the children's best interest.

Appellant's conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide and failure to stop after an accident was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and was not based upon insufficient evidence. The state presented witnesses who observed appellant's noticeable impairment immediately prior to and immediately after the fatal collision with a pedestrian. Furthermore, appellant's own statements indicated that he was impaired at the time as was aware that he had struck something in the road. In addition, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, as he raises only meritless issues. The video evidence introduced in testimony was properly authenticated. Furthermore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law.

Woman appeals probate court decision granting petition for adult protective services and placing woman in nursing facility. Evidence supported probate court's decision that woman was in need of protective services. Due to numerous medical conditions, woman unable to provide for basic needs. Her current caretakers could not provide for needs due to serious alcohol abuse and medical issues.

The jury's verdict finding appellant guilty of complicity by aiding and abetting four co-defendants in a theft at a local electronics store was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record indicated appellant's role in the theft was serving as the driver both to and from the store where the theft occurred.

The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting the defendant-appellant's confessions since corpus delicti was satisfied. Defendant-appellant's argument that trial counsel is ineffective is preempted by our determinations in his first assignment of error. The trial court did not err by merging Count One (rape) and Count Two (sexual battery). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motions to suppress evidence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Extortion Valuable Thing or Benefit. Sufficient evidence was presented to convict appellant of extortion in violation of R.C. 2905.11(A)(5).

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on appellants' claim of defamation and the additional claims derived from the defamation claim as the publications are protected speech in the form of parody or satire.

NEW TRIAL – BRADY V. MARYLAND – COUNSEL – ACTUAL INNOCENCE The common pleas court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, including witnesses' pretrial identification statements that defendant claimed demonstrated a due-process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963): the evidence submitted by defendant, when considered in context with the complete witnesses' pretrial identification statements and the evidence presented at trial of defendant's guilt, including defendant's denim shorts stained with the victim's blood found at the crime scene, did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, and thus did not satisfy the materiality component of a due-process violation under Brady. The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion (1) by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial based on defendant's claim of actual innocence where defendant did not demonstrate substantive grounds for relief or (2) by denying defendant's new-trial motion based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel's performance was not deficient and where defendant failed to demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have been different but for his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.

MOTION IN LIMINE – EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY Where the excluded testimony and video were not included in the record on appeal to allow the appellate court to determine whether the evidence was admissible, the appellate court must presume the regularity of the trial court's rulings and cannot determine whether the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine. [But see DISSENT: The state did not forfeit the issue of whether a federal regulation, rather than prohibiting a federal employee from testifying, merely subjected the employee to possible consequences from the Department of Justice if the employee testified without prior authorization, where defendant put the issue squarely before the trial court upon defendant's argument that the employee would be subject to such sanctions if the employee testified, and the potential for sanctioning of the employee was the only reason the trial court excluded the testimony. The trial court erred by granting defendant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of a former federal prosecutor about the defendant's guilty plea in federal court on related charges because (1) although the burden of proof is on the movant who seeks to exclude the evidence, the court improperly shifted the burden to the nonmovant, the state, to prove, prior to trial, that the evidence should not be excluded and (2) no Ohio Rule of Evidence precluded the witness from testifying. The trial court erred by excluding a compilation video made from raw footage obtained from a bar's surveillance cameras on the ground that the state failed to authenticate it where the bar owner testified from personal knowledge that the raw footage from the bar's multiple cameras was contained on the hard drive collected by police, that she watched the entire compilation video which showed different scenes from different cameras in the bar, and that they were authentic videos of her bar and her recording system from the night of the offense. Pursuant to Evid.R. 103(A)(2), error may be predicated upon a ruling excluding evidence where the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked—therefore, the state's failure to proffer a video did not prevent appellate review where it was clear from the record that the challenged video was a compilation video created by police from raw footage obtained from a bar's surveillance cameras.]

guilty plea, Crim.R. 11, ineffective assistance of counsel

Criminal hearsay best evidence rule

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted, on mootness grounds.

Upon remand, the trial court did not err in resentencing appellant on a merged count where the initial conviction was reversed. Further, the court did not err in failing to retry the sexually violent predator adjudication. Allied offense R.C. 2941.25(A) R.C. 2971.02, 2971.02(H).

Appellant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel where the record belies his claim that trial counsel did not review the state's evidence against him before he entered his guilty plea, and appellant fails to articulate how he was prejudiced by trial counsel's actions.

Imposition of consecutive sentences will not be overturned where the court made the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the record supported those findings. Secondly, absent any indicia that defendant could not assist in his own defense or distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to raise competency or to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity assistance also must fail.

Permanent custody neglect best interest of the child. Court's order granting permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS was supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Furthermore specification mandatory prison term felony, guilty plea ineffective assistance counsel prejudice record waiver presume regularity transcript. By knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, the defendant waived her right to challenge sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant failed to establish that she was prejudicially denied her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

Temporary custody dependency

judgment on the pleadings, immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), tortious interference with business relations, Valentine Act, monopoly, antitrust injury

child support travel expenses abuse of discretion R.C. 3119.03 R.C. 3119.22 R.C. 3119.23

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — SPEEDY TRIAL – SIXTH AMENDMENT – PRESUMPTIVE PREJUDICE The trial court did not err by engaging in a constitutional speedy-trial analysis under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), when it found that the six-and-a-half-month delay between the filing of the first-degree misdemeanor complaint and defendant's arrest resulted in actual, not presumptive, prejudice to defendant. [But see DISSENT: Because the trial court found that the six-and-a-half-month delay in initiating the prosecution was not presumptively prejudicial, the trial court erred in analyzing the remaining Barker factors.]

The length of appellant's sentence was proper, but the trial court did not comply with the notification requirements of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs-appellees on their claim under R.C. 2117.12 (action on rejected claim in probate court) and denying defendants-appellants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs-appellees were not required to address affirmative defenses in their summary judgment motion. Defendants-appellants did not raise their affirmative defenses in their own summary judgment motion, and they did not file a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs-appellee's motion for summary judgment. Defendants-appellants' failure to raise their affirmative defenses in the trial court waived those defenses, and they could not be raised for the first time on appeal when seeking reversal of the judgment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in instructing the jury that self-defense was an affirmative defense on which appellant bore the burden of proof. Under State v. Brooks, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2478, __ N.E.3d __, the State bore the burden to disprove appellant's self-defense claim. The trial court's error in allocating the burden of proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because the evidence at trial did not support a self-defense instruction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct lack merit because appellant failed to establish that the alleged inappropriate conduct by the State prejudiced him at trial. Appellant's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during voir dire by failing to effectively challenge certain jurors lacks merit because whether and how to challenge a juror is a matter of trial strategy, which cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. Appellant's trial counsel was also not ineffective for failing to object to inappropriate comments made by the State during voir dire regarding the reasonable doubt standard of proof the comments at issue did not result in any prejudice to appellant given that the trial court subsequently provided jury instructions that properly explained reasonable doubt. Appellant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying two of his challenges for cause during voir dire lacks merit the record indicates that the challenged jurors indicated that they could remain fair and impartial during trial. Appellant also failed to establish that his conviction for assault was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant waived the ability to challenge the trial court's ruling on her motion to dismiss for a statutory speedy trial violation by entering a guilty plea. Additionally, the trial court did not err in imposing restitution. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in imposing a mandatory fine based on appellant's failure to demonstrate a future inability to pay over time. The record does not portray ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with submitting appellant's affidavit of indigence. The affidavit was timely because it was filed before the trial court's final judgment entry imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Emergency municipal zoning ordinance passed pursuant to a city charter is not invalid for failing to comply with the public notice and hearing requirements where the charter separately allows for the passage of emergency measures. Non-emergency municipal zoning ordinance is invalid where the city failed to substantially comply with its requirement to make the text of the ordinance and the report and recommendation of the planning commission available for 30 days before the hearing.

Permanent custody. Transient. Mental health concerns. Parenting.

Introduction of hearsay testimony from confidential informants is not plain error where the evidence of drug possession includes appellant's occupancy and dominion over the home, the presence of appellant's personal items and mail in the home and torn baggies in the garbage, loaded guns and large amounts of cash unhidden or poorly hidden in the home, and scales, a bowl, spoons, and a bulk amount of cocaine hidden in the dining room.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Trial court erred in failing to incorporate imposition of appellant's indefinite prison term into its final judgment entry.

attempted aggravated arson – harassment with a bodily substance – intent – diesel fuel pump – lit cigarette – sufficiency – manifest weight – other acts – ineffective assistance of counsel

directed verdict - requests for admissions - default admissions - Civ.R. 36 - withdraw admissions

wrongful termination, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, reverse gender discrimination, hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motions to withdraw his no-contest pleas.

Appeals in 8-22-14 and 8-22-15 are dismissed as the assignment of error challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences does not apply to those cases when no consecutive sentences were imposed. The record supports the findings used to impose consecutive sentences in 8-22-16 and 8-22-17.

CIVIL - administrative appeal court of common pleas R.C. 2506.01 failure to exhaust administrative remedies zoning resolution trustees administrative officials board of zoning appeals no right to notice, hearing, and opportunity to introduce evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - robbery force exert any violence physically by any means sufficient evidence lesser-included offense theft evidence not sufficient to support acquittal on robbery no error.

The trial court's decision finding appellant guilty of domestic violence following a bench trial was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court found the victim's testimony credible.

That a children services agency does not liberalize visitation with a child does not mean that it did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family where the evidence shows that the parents could not care for the child properly even during the highly supervised visits. Granting permanent custody of a young child to a children services agency may be in the child's best interest where the child has a strong bond with the foster family, the foster family wants to adopt the child, the child considers the foster family to be her family, and the child has no real bond with her parents.

Reagan Tokes Merger Plain error Ineffective assistance of counsel R.C. 2929.19

Traffic stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged

PERMANENT CUSTODY - Although a judgment rendered without proper service or entry of appearance is a nullity and void, a notice issue may be waived on appeal when a parent's attorney is present for various permanent custody hearings and does not raise the improper notice issue Even assuming counsel's deficient performance by failing to object to the alleged lack of service, father cannot demonstrate that such supposed deficiency prejudiced him and thus, he cannot demonstrate that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors a reviewing court will generally not disturb a trial court's permanent custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the agency presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in its permanent custody would serve the child's best interest, the trial court's decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the agency presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in its permanent custody would serve the child's best interest, the trial court's decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) did not require the agency to show reasonable efforts at the permanent custody hearing unless it had not been established previously and the agency had made multiple reasonable efforts findings at the time of the hearing.

CRIMINAL - The trial court's decision denying defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion the trial court reasonably applied controlling case law to find a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) occurred where the defendant's vehicle crossed over the fog line by a half a tire width and therefore the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appeal dismissed as moot.

Magistrate's finding of facts and conclusions of law are adopted and the petitioner's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus is sua sponte dismissed.

Trial court's order granting preliminary injunction was final appealable order because the requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) were satisfied and Civ.R. 54(B) did not apply.

Tampering with evidence sufficiency weight

FINAL ORDER - DIVORCE DECREE: An order denying relief from a divorce decree that was not final because the domestic relations court left unresolved the disputed ownership of certain real property is not a final appealable order.

same juror rule - plain error - interrogatories - verdict form - Civ.R. 49(B) - App.R. 12(A)(2) - ex parte communication

de novo - summary judgment - ordinary usage

Mandamus, R.C. 149.43, statutory damages, method of delivery, evenly balanced evidence

Fleeing and Eluding - Substantial Risk Harm - Manifest Weight Sufficiency of Evidence

Summary judgment re: zoning amendment on "hedge".

habeas corpus Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss subject-matter jurisdiction jurisdiction over a case sentencing court without jurisdiction to vacate plea on state's motion entitlement to immediate release

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Trial court erred in failing to incorporate imposition of appellant's indefinite prison term into its final judgment entry.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and ordered appellant to return fund to appellee where appellant wrongfully withdrew the funds, which she did not own, from a joint and survivorship account in which she was a co-owner.

Appellant's conviction for assault on a peace officer was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Knowingly physical harm.

Summary judgment was properly granted on appellants' claims for: (1) failure to build in a workmanlike manner (2) negligent design and (3) negligent supervision. The negligent construction claim is found not well-taken on the merits. The remaining claims are blocked by the applicable statute of limitations.

Having weapons while under disability R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) constitutionality New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen remand. The trial court's decision finding R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) constitutional is vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for the parties to develop the relevant record so that the trial court can apply the correct burden of proof and standard of review set forth in Bruen.

Hearsay testimony confrontation clause alibi testimony Batson challenge. The trial court did not err or violate the appellant's right to confrontation in the admission of testimony to explain the conduct of a police officer's investigation of a crime. The trial court did not err in excluding testimony that was deemed irrelevant to the case because it was not being used as alibi testimony. The trial court did not err in determining that the state's rationale for using a peremptory challenge on an African-American juror was race-neutral after the appellant's Batson challenge.

R.C. 2903.214 civil stalking protection order Civ.R. 65.1 objection failure to file. Appeal is affirmed. Under Civ.R. 65.1(G), appellant had to timely file written objections to the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's granting of a civil stalking protection order prior to filing his appeal. Appellant failed to file any objection. Without timely filed objections, appellant may not challenge the trial court's judgment on appeal.

Aggravated assault felonious assault domestic violence allied offenses serious physical harm sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of evidence self-defense. - Trial court properly found defendant guilty of aggravated assault where it first found him guilty of felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt and then found he proved the mitigating factor of provocation to find him guilty of aggravated assault defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and domestic violence were allied offenses that should have merged for sentencing defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was supported by sufficient evidence where the state presented evidence that the victim suffered serious physical harm defendant could not claim that he acted in self-defense where he was at fault in creating the situation that led to the altercation.

Final appealable order R.C. 2505.02(4) provisional remedy privileged matter Civ.R. 12(F) motion to strike uncertified grievance Gov.Bar R. V(8). - Trial court's order denying appellants' Civ.R. 12(F) motion to strike privileged matter from the plaintiff's complaint was a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(4) trial court's order was reversed because plaintiff's quotations in his complaint from a grievance committee's letter dismissing his grievance against defendant attorney and the attachment of the letter to his complaint violated the confidentiality provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(8) regarding public access to attorney disciplinary documents and proceedings involving uncertified grievances.

Crim.R. 11 mandatory indefinite sentence felony knowingly plea advisement maximum penalty good-time credit earned credit statute irreconcilable special provision general provision manifest intent Reagan Tokes Law constitutional due process separation of power right to a jury trial ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice notice sentencing. The trial court did not make an incorrect statement of law by advising the defendant that he was eligible to earn a reduction in his minimum prison term if he demonstrates exceptional conduct while incarcerated or an adjustment to incarceration. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the court's imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to the sentencing structure enacted by the Reagan Tokes Law, which has been deemed constitutional. The trial court failed to fully comply with the notification requirements of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the time of sentencing.

Delinquency sexual imposition R.C. 2907.06(A)(1) force threat of force sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight. The juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile was found delinquent for committing an act at his high school that would constitute sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.06(A)(1). A female student testified that a male student - who was a stranger to her - grabbed her breast in a hallway without consent as she was leaving the school at the end of the school day. A school resource officer testified that a school security employee identified the juvenile as matching the description of the perpetrator recorded on surveillance footage. The juvenile admitted to touching the victim inappropriately when questioned and said he had no reason for touching the victim's breast. The state did not need to prove that the juvenile compelled the sexual contact by force or threat of force. The type, nature and circumstances of the incident supported a reasonable inference that the juvenile's act was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. There was nothing in the record to indicate that anything occurred that would have led the juvenile, who was 17 years old, to conclude that it would not be offensive to grab the breast of a girl he had never met and never spoken to in a school hallway while she was headed home after classes. While the victim could not identify the juvenile as the person who touched her, the other evidence readily supported that the juvenile was the person who touched her. The juvenile pointed to no inconsistencies in the evidence.

Abuse of discretion permanent custody clear and convincing evidence motion for a continuance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence support granting permanent custody of the appellant's children to CCDCFS. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a continuance.

Termination of parental rights child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with parents permanent custody in child's best interest motion to continue. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying father's request for a continuance of the trial. The trial had already been continued to allow father additional time to bond with the child. The juvenile court's judgment granting the agency permanent custody of the child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. All of the court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the court's best interest findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment de novo shared parenting plan contract interpretation intent. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted Mother's motion for summary judgment. Under a plain reading of the shared parenting agreement, the parties agreed to raise J.M.P. in the Catholic religion, with Mother having the option to send J.M.P. to St. Paschal, and if Mother decides to do so, Father will pay one half of J.M.P.'s tuition at St. Paschal. This language clearly demonstrates that the parties intended to raise their child in the Catholic religion and contemplated sending him to Catholic school, and Mother, as the sole residential parent for school purposes, decides where J.M.P. is enrolled in school.

Writ of habeas corpus Civ.R. 10(A) caption sua sponte dismissal defective petition R.C. 2725.04 commitment papers verified petition R.C. 2969.25 affidavit of prior actions affidavit of indigency statement from cashier R.C. 2725.03 territorial jurisdiction. An inmate's petition for writ of habeas corpus was sua sponte dismissed because it was fatally defective in that it failed to include any commitment papers, lacked verification, lacked an affidavit of prior civil actions or appeals of civil actions as required by R.C. 2969.25(A), failed to include affidavits of indigency required by R.C. 2969.25(C), and this court has no jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2725.03.

Reconsideration divorce division of pension QDRO equity. The QDRO issued by the trial court is affirmed. It is within the trial court's discretion to select a date for distribution purposes regarding each marital asset in order to achieve an equitable division of marital property. Furthermore, there is no merit to appellant's claim that the QDRO improperly modified the terms of the judgment entry of divorce.

Enforce subpoena stipulate at trial ineffective assistance of counsel stipulated testimony trial strategy and failure to call a witness. The trial court did not err when it accepted a report stipulated to by both parties rather than requiring the drafter of the report to present live testimony. The appellant was not subject to ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel introduced a stipulated report rather than live witness testimony. Further, defense counsel's failure to call two witnesses at trial was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel's decision not to call the two witnesses amounted to trial strategy, and the record shows the witness testimony would not have reasonably resulted in a different outcome at trial.

Consumer Sales Practices Act

reallocation of parental rights, termination of shared parenting, child support

Appellate counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), having found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. An examination of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues having arguable merit. Judgments affirmed.

Suppression Reagan Tokes

App.R. 32.1, Motion to withdraw plea/App.R. 36/Nunc pro tunc

Possession of Drugs - Motion to W/D as Counsel - Continuance - Removal of Defendant from Courtroom - Identification of Controlled Substance W/O Scientific Testing

Permanent Custody/sufficiency/weight

Guilty plea waives right to appeal denial of motion to suppress - Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance not supported by record before the Court

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss the charges against him on statutory speedy-trial grounds. With the exception of a specification accompanying two vehicular assault charges, appellant's convictions were based on legally sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence. The State did present legally insufficient evidence to prove the vehicular-assault specification, which applied only to driving with a suspended license, not to driving without any license. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant's prior juvenile adjudication for burglary, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to engage in certain cross-examination of a detective, but again the error was harmless. No cumulative error deprived appellant of a fair trial. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on selective prosecution grounds where there was no evidence that she was singled out for prosecution or that the government's charging decision was based upon her race. And, where the only evidence in the record showed that defendant drove her car at the victims because of her dislike for African Americans and not because she had a bona fide belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, she was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction.

Trial court erred in dismissing claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where the complaint sufficiently alleged or could have alleged civil liability for criminal acts and Corrupt Practices Act violation. Trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend that was based upon facts learned during discovery, was made well before the close of discovery and the deadline for dispositive motions, and where amendment was not futile.

Magistrate's decision, adopt, objections, abuse of discretion, standing, prejudice, visitation, contempt, civil, child's welfare, attorney's fees, discovery, rules of juvenile procedure, Juv.R. 1, rules of civil procedure, Civ.R. 1, parent-child relationship, special statutory proceeding, hearsay, medical records, contemporaneous objection, clearly contrary to the evidence, harmless error, judicial notice

Civ.R. 60(B), catch-all, lex loci contractus, marriage

summary judgment, purchase agreement, forfeiture, fixture, legal duty, property damage, doctrine of merger

trust – fiduciary – successor trustee – issue preclusion – collateral estoppel – final judgment – final, appealable order – interlocutory – discovery order

child support – income averaging – distributions – downward deviation – temporary orders – retroactive modification – spousal support – attorney fees

The trial court did not err by overruling the delinquent child's motion to suppress. The trial court did not err by overruling the delinquent child's motion for mistrial or with respect to its evidentiary determination involving the redaction of State's Exhibit 55 (J.D.'s edited interview). The trial court did not err in its evidentiary determination related to D.J.'s dying declaration. The delinquent child's adjudication is not based upon insufficient evidence nor is it against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by not merging the delinquent child's aggravated murder and aggravated robbery adjudications and convictions for purposes of disposition and sentencing. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees because the defendants-appellees are entitled to political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants-appellees did not negligently fail to procure an insurance policy for the plaintiff-appellant that contained uninsured-motorist coverage.

Defendant-appellant's aggravated-possession-of-drugs conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's aggravated-possession-of-drugs conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

To impose consecutive sentences, a trial court must make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). An appellate court will conclude these findings are supported by the record as long as it can determine that the trial court performed the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains some evidence to support these findings.

Because the defendant-appellant's sentence is within the sentencing range and the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, her sentence is not contrary to law.

Appellant's convictions for murder, felonious assault, and having weapons while under disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented testimony from an eyewitness that appellant fired a gun at the victim multiple times, striking him in the chest and causing his death. Despite appellant stipulating to having a prior conviction for a felony offense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the state to question appellant about the events surrounding his prior conviction as appellant was subject to impeachment with his prior convictions under Evid.R. 609(A)(2) and he opened the door to questions about his prior conviction by suggesting that an individual involved in the prior conviction was responsible for the murder of the victim in the instant case.

The trial court did not err by sentencing appellant to the maximum possible 10-year prison term available after appellant pled guilty to raping an under 13-year-old girl where the sentence was not contrary to law and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a new trial and his third petition for postconviction relief where the appellant failed to demonstrate that the state committed a Brady violation by not providing appellant with medical reports of the victim, and where appellant failed to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the information contained in the medical reports within the time for filing his motion or petition. Further, the trial court did not err in finding that appellant's claims were barred by res judicata as appellant was aware of the information contained in the medical reports at the time of trial and could have raised the issues at either the time of trial, in his direct appeal, or in one of his other appearances before this court.

The trial court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was conflicting testimony concerning the terms of the alleged verbal contract. The record showed that the parties combined or blended the terms of several agreements or understandings resulting in terms that are difficult to ascertain. Moreover, there was evidence that the plaintiff signed a letter indicating her intention to gift a defendant a large sum of money.

CIVIL - Civ.R. 12(B)(6) current agricultural use values real property taxes R.C. 5713.30 tax commissioner annual current agricultural use value tables R.C. 5715.01 Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-31 appeal to board of tax appeals R.C. 5717.02 Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34 cropland woodland minimum values management costs Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-33 R.C. Chapter 2723 illegal levy or assessment of taxes one-year statute of limitations written protest notice of intent to sue invited error.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - prenuptial agreement full disclosure or full knowledge and understanding of prospective spouse's property duration of the marriage valuation of property third party defendants Civ.R. 75(B)(1) marital property active appreciation separate property premarital property passive income and appreciation R.C. 3105.171 equitable division of marital property.

CIVIL - teacher evaluation formal observation R.C. 3319.111 R.C. 3319.11 collective bargaining memorandum of understanding subject matter jurisdiction limited contract pre- and post-conference reinstated

CIVIL - class action res judicata administrative hearing R.C. 4511.099 political subdivision immunity civil conspiracy Ohio constitutional violation equitable restitution legal and equitable remedies declaratory judgment statutory waiver

CRIMINAL - Anders Alford plea discretion to impose prison or community control knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea maximum sentence postrelease control

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02 entry dismissing a criminal charge is not a final appealable order appellant placed in same position as he was in prior to filing of charge.

Delayed application for reopening App.R. 26(B) second application for reopening no right to file successive applications for reopening res judicata application overruled.

timely application to reopen is denied appellant raises twelve additional arguments valid strategy to winnow out appellate argument and focus on a few key issues.

CIVIL – Summary judgment in favor of surface owner affirmed on bad faith trespass claim in the Point Pleasant interval where oil and gas lease reserved minerals in all formations below the base of the Utica Shale. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited introduction of actual sales data at trial which had not been produced in discovery despite continuing discovery dispute. Evidence of present and future damages proven to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty based on testimony of chemical engineer. Jury did not usurp statutory authority of the trial court to award prejudgment interest in applying pv-10 multiplier to actual damages award.

CIVIL - The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to clients of law firm and against law firm and its sole member for intentional interference with expectation of inheritance, undue influence and fraud, where attorney induced clients to transfer property based upon misstatements of Ohio law. The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to clients of law firm and against law firm and its sole member on claim for lack of capacity, where lawyer spent one hour with client, who suffered from dementia, and purported to completely explain then execute trust and other legal documents, while conceding that client did not read the trust in its entirety.

Attorney fees Quantum meruit attorney contingency fee agreement collateral estoppel law of the case doctrine abuse of discretion.

Child custody termination of parental rights R.C. 2151.414 ineffective assistance of counsel right to be present at hearing.

felonious assault – knowingly – separate rooms – sufficiency – manifest weight – ineffective assistance

student loan, accord and satisfaction, federal preemption, summary judgment, Consumer Sales Practices Act, supplier, harassment, fraud, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56

enforceable settlement agreement – oral agreement – res judicata – judicial notice – hearing – statute of frauds – additional terms – jurisdiction – accurately reflect – estate – family – properties

rape, expert testimony, opinion testimony, social worker, abuse of discretion, unsubstantiated, manifest weight of the evidence, child victim, inconsistent testimony

shared parenting plan, R.C. 3109.04, magistrate's decision, Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv)

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas correctly determined that appellant is not entitled to a declaratory judgment, stating he was denied meaningful consideration when he is unable to identify any substantially inaccurate information considered by the parole board. Summary judgment in favor of the parole board was proper.

Magistrate's finding of facts and conclusions of law are adopted and the petitioner's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus is sua sponte dismissed.

Characterization of Property as Marital or Separate - Civ.R. 53(D) - Failure to Object Waives Issue on Appeal - Failure to Award Spousal Support - Not an Abuse of Discretion

Probable cause to arrest for OVI

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find good cause why judgment should not be entered against surety.

Death Penalty Res Judicata Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Postconviction Relief Hearing Postconviction Right to Discovery Postconviction Right to Funding for Experts Cumulative Error

Magistrate ruling that disposes of motion and transfers jurisdiction of child custody dispute to out-of-state court is a decision. Juv.Rs. 40(D)(3). Trial court required to conduct de novo review of the facts and an independent analysis of the issues where objections were filed to magistrate's decision. Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). Judgment reversed.

Crim.R. 5(A), R.C. 2311.14, interpreter

permanent custody – oral motion to continue – abuse of discretion – factors – delay – inconvenience – contrived excuse – alternative request to appear remotely

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Zoning appeals practical difficulty area variance R.C. Chapter 2506. The trial court's decision affirming the Cleveland Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") is affirmed. The appellant did not demonstrate that the BZA's decision was unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.

Speedy trial rights R.C. 2945.71. The trial court violated the appellant's speedy trial rights because the appellant was not brought to trial within 90 days of his arrest in accordance with R.C. 2945.71.

Sufficiency manifest weight Crim.R. 16 discovery violation hearsay excited utterance aggravated murder aggravated burglary felonious assault having weapons while under disability Reagan Tokes Law ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that she saw the defendant shoot and kill the victim while trespassing in her apartment. The state's delayed disclosure of the defendant's incriminating statements to a witness did not constitute a willful discovery violation in violation of Crim.R. 16 where the witnessed disclosed the evidence to the prosecutor during the trial. The indefinite sentence imposed on defendant pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was constitutional. Defendant could not establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object to imposition of the sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law because he could challenge the sentence in a postconviction proceeding if the Reagan Tokes Law is declared unconstitutional and therefore, he was not prejudiced by the failure to object.

Abuse of discretion Evid.R. 404(B) motion for mistrial hearsay confrontational clause. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by permitting the appellee to introduce evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Evid.R. 404(B) because the testimony did not affect the appellant's substantial rights. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for a mistrial because the trial court provided a curative instruction to the jury. The trial court did not err by permitting jurors to hear hearsay evidence because the testimony was not in violation of the appellant's constitutional right to confrontation.

Motion to suppress OVI probable cause to arrest competent and credible evidence totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge traffic violation odor of alcohol glassy, bloodshot eyes. Based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances, including witnessing appellant commit a traffic violation and drive erratically, and the observation of an odor of alcohol on appellant's person, his glassy, bloodshot eyes, and unsteady gait, the officers had sufficient information to cause a prudent person to believe that appellant was driving while intoxicated. The trial court did not err in finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant for OVI.

Consecutive sentences de novo review of findings clearly and convincingly supported by the record postrelease control. The trial court's findings in support of consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly supported by the record. The trial court did not commit plain error by running the consecutive sentence on defendant's felony convictions consecutive to his sentence on the postrelease-control violation.

Murder felonious assault complicity jail calls sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of evidence Evid.R. 801(D)(2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's conviction for murder and felonious assault were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of evidence. The evidence demonstrated that appellant was complicitous in procuring two males to assault the victim. The appellant stayed on the scene while the assault occurred and left with the two men when it was over. The victim died as a result of the injuries he suffered during the assault. Recorded jail calls were properly admitted under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the calls.

Anders Crim.R. 11 psychiatric reports. The trial court granted counsel's motion to withdraw because the record reflected that defendant pleaded guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the court met the Crim.R. 11 requirements prior to accepting his guilty plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a psychiatric report. The court agreed with appointed counsel that any error raised on appeal would be wholly frivolous. Thus, pursuant to Anders v. California, counsel's request to withdraw was granted, and the appeal was dismissed.

Summary judgment negligence dog bite insurance coverage declaratory judgment. Exclusion in an insurance policy did not apply when the dog did not have an "established" history of biting or attacking on the date the dog bit and attacked the plaintiff. A subsequent police report did not "establish" a history of biting or attacking for insurance purposes.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional indefinite sentence nunc pro tunc clerical error. The trial court's imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not a violation of appellant-defendant's constitutional rights. The case is remanded for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing judgment entry that corrects a clerical error.

Robbery, R.C. 2911.01 grand theft R.C. 2913.02 aggravated robbery R.C. 2911.01 bindover discretionary transfer amenability hearing Reagan Tokes Law. Affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding amenability factors favoring the transfer of the case to the general division court outweighed those factors that weighed against the transfer

Reagan Tokes Law S.B. 201 indefinite sentence felony constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine. The trial court properly imposed an indefinite sentence to the Reagan Tokes Law, and this court overruled appellant's challenges to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law en banc in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 356 (8th Dist.).

Disorderly conduct minor misdemeanor App.R. 16 Crim.R. 11(E) no-contest plea R.C. 2937.07 ineffective assistance of counsel trial strategy double jeopardy Crim.R. 32(C) App.R. 12. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in accepting the defendant's no-contest plea. The trial court properly advised the defendant pursuant to Crim.R. 11 and the record reveals that after such advisement, defendant voluntarily entered the no-contest plea. The defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where all of counsel's conduct that defendant took issue with fell into the category of trial strategy that fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. The defendant's double jeopardy protections were not violated where the trial court's initial finding of "not guilty" was not reduced to writing and journalized. Finally, defendant's failure to fully brief a proper substantive due process argument allowed this court to disregard it pursuant to App.R. 12(A).

Termination of parental rights permanent custody manifest weight of the evidence competent, credible evidence R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence child could not or should not be placed with parent failure to substantially remedy the conditions causing removal chronic chemical dependency involuntary termination of other siblings best interest of the child abuse of discretion guardian ad litem recommendation temporary custody. The juvenile court's judgment awarding permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it did not abuse its discretion in declining to award temporary custody rather than permanent custody. Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's findings and determination that permanent custody was in the best interest of M.S.K.

Permanent custody dependent temporary custody case plan counseling parenting education best interests abuse of discretion manifest weight due process. The juvenile court's award of permanent custody to CCDCFS is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court did not violate Mother's due-process rights by considering information that was cumulative to the testimony adduced at the permanent-custody hearing.

Procedendo, moot, jail-time credit. The complaint for a writ of procedendo to compel the trial court judge to render a ruling regarding a motion for jail-time credit is moot. The trial court judge has granted the motion for jail-time credit and specified the amount of jail-time credit to be awarded to the relator. Finally, this court will not issue an extraordinary writ in order to correct any error associated with the calculation of jail-time credit and any error associated with the calculation of jail-time credit must be addressed through a direct appeal.

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's intentional tort claim under R.C. 2745.01. Appellant did not produce any evidence to create a genuine issue of fact from which a reasonable jury might infer that appellee acted with deliberate intent to injure appellant after he fell attempting to sit in a broken office chair.

Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to establish that the state administered an unnecessarily suggestive photo array. As appellant failed to demonstrate noncompliance with R.C. 2933.83, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury pursuant to R.C. 2933.83(C)(3). Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by preventing counsel from reading statements during closing argument which were not in evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of a search warrant or by instructing the jury regarding consciousness of guilt. Appellant failed to establish that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mandamus. Withdrawal of counsel. Res judicata.

GSI - Importuning - Manifest Weight - Credibility of Victim - Sentencing

Following a jury trial during which appellant asserted that he had acted in self-defense, appellant was convicted of murder, felonious assault, and several other offenses. Following this court's precedent before State v. Brooks, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2478, __ N.E.3d __, the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the allocation of the self-defense burden of proof. And, contrary to the State's argument, the incorrect instruction was not harmless error. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded permanent custody of two minor children to Children Services. The children had been in the agency's temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, and awarding the agency permanent custody was in the best interest of the children. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's two judgment entries imposing consecutive eight-month prison terms upon the revocation of appellant's community control were valid final orders under Crim.R. 32(C). The trial court did not improperly elicit appellant's admission to a community-control violation by making a false promise to place him in a residential treatment program. The trial court did not err in failing to construe appellant's remarks at sentencing as an attempt to withdraw his admission to violating community control. Appellant's completion of his prison term rendered moot his challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive eight-month prison terms. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss of the alleged chief executive officer (CEO) of a store chain due to appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the CEO. However, the trial court erred in granting the store's motion to dismiss appellant pled sufficient factual allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss on her defamation claim against the store under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Sentencing. Ineffective assistance of counsel alleged. Lack of prejudice in record.

Preindictment delay. Motion to suppress. Open view, plain view. Joinder. Consecutive sentences. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Removal of appointed counsel.

mandamus Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss jail-time credit motion alleged errors regarding an award of jail-time credit are not cognizable in mandamus adequate remedy at law in the ordinary course of the law by way of an appeal of that entry

In addition to failure to the raise argument challenging service of the fathers below and failure to raise the argument in her objections to the magistrate's decision, Mother lacks standing to challenge alleged defects in service of the fathers of her children. An appellant-mother may challenge an alleged service error regarding a non-appealing party only when she has demonstrated that she herself has been prejudiced by the alleged error. Mother failed to demonstrate that she sustained any prejudice other than conjecture that it may have extended the case to give her more time. The record demonstrated it was unlikely she would have availed herself of additional time and immediate permanency and stability was clearly in the children's best interests.

In addition to failure to the raise argument challenging service of the fathers below and failure to raise the argument in her objections to the magistrate's decision, Mother lacks standing to challenge alleged defects in service of the fathers of her children. An appellant-mother may challenge an alleged service error regarding a non-appealing party only when she has demonstrated that she herself has been prejudiced by the alleged error. Mother failed to demonstrate that she sustained any prejudice other than conjecture that it may have extended the case to give her more time. The record demonstrated it was unlikely she would have availed herself of additional time and immediate permanency and stability was clearly in the children's best interests.

The trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentences resulting in appellant being sentenced to a mandatory minimum 15 years to a maximum 22-and-one-half years in prison where the trial court made the necessary consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and where the trial court's consecutive sentence findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence after appellant pled guilty to 15 felony drug offenses levied against him in four separate cases.

Defendant appeals murder conviction. Gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs' probative value outweighed danger of unfair prejudice. Court did not abuse discretion in refusing self-defense. No evidence supported self-defense. Defendant denied any memory of stabbing the victim to death. No other circumstances suggested self-defense. Court erred by failing to give mandatory advisements concerning the Violent Offender Registry, as required by R.C. 2903.42(A)(1). Sentence vacated and matter remanded for resentencing.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds where the trial court properly placed on the record and journalized its reasons for the sua sponte continuance of nine days due to its crowded docket. Further, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and was thus supported by sufficient evidence, where the jury heard testimony from three witnesses that had ample opportunity to see and identify the appellant as the driver of the vehicle.

Convictions for criminal damaging and tampering with evidence were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant did not demonstrate plain error with respect to merger.

Trial court did not err by finding children neglected pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C).

CRIMINAL - Violating a Protection Order R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) Purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing R.C. 2929.22 Appellant must ensure necessary parts of the record are available on appeal duty to provide transcript.

CIVIL - Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 Open Meetings Act R.C. 121.22 Trial court must thoroughly examine all appropriate materials before ruling on motion for summary judgment Trial court must issue injunction upon proof of a violation of R.C. 121.22 A trial court shall award court costs where injunction is appropriate Summary judgment not proper in favor of nonmoving party unless all relevant evidence is before the trial court.

CRIMINAL - App.R. 5 Delayed appeal Jail time credit nunc pro tunc entry Crim.R. 36.

CRIMINAL - Sexual Battery R.C. 2907.03(A)(7) sentencing R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 school official/student relationship principal status an element of the offense conduct more serious than normally constituting the offense consecutive sentences record does not support consecutive sentence findings great or unusual harm

CIVIL - arbitration motion to compel arbitration scope of arbitration clause de novo nonsignatory to arbitration agreement broad arbitration clause action can be maintained without reference to the contract torts foreseeable hearing record lacks evidence to support applicability of arbitration provision

APPELLATE REVIEW – lack of final appealable order Civ.R. 54(B) R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) and (B) no final appealable order lack of jurisdiction.

APPELLATE REVIEW – lack of final appealable order Civ.R. 54(B) R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) and (B) no final appealable order lack of jurisdiction though service was not perfected as to one defendant, time for service pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A) had not elapsed, and the court had not dismissed the action pursuant to Civ.R. 4(E) thus order was not final and appealable.

CIVIL LAW - jury's verdict will not be disturbed, wrongful death and survivorship claims/damages are separate multiple theories of recovery are permissible so long as only one set of damages is awarded compensatory damages cap does not apply to wrongful death claim motion for prejudgment interest was wrongfully granted because neither party submitted affidavits and/or other evidentiary materials.

CRIMINAL - evidence testimony regarding a witness' veracity hearsay medical diagnosis and treatment Evid.R. 803(4) sufficiency of the evidence Crim.R. 29(A) manifest weight of the evidence Rape force R.C. 2907.02 R.C. 2971.03 Furnishing Beer or Intoxicating Liquor to Underage Person R.C. 4301.69(A) venue R.C. 2901.12

Restitution, R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) Economic Loss, R.C. 2929.01(L) Abuse of Discretion

Sexual battery gross sexual imposition guilty plea nature of the charges substantial compliance pro se pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea hybrid representation Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a) R.C. 2907.03(A)(5)-R.C. 2907.03(B)(3) R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)-R.C.2907.05(C)(2)

In this permanent custody action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the incarcerated father's continuance request. The denial was reasonable and supported by the record. The permanent custody trial already had been repeatedly continued, father was represented at trial by counsel, a full record of the trial was made, and father did not show that he could not have presented any relevant testimony by deposition. Further, father fails to show that a continuance likely would have changed the trial court's decision to award permanent custody of the child to Franklin County Children Services. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting some but not all of the magistrate's findings and conclusions related to appellant's motion to modify shared parenting plan. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ultimately denying appellant's motion to modify shared parenting plan as it could not conclude that modification was in the child's best interest. The trial court did not ignore the prior modification to the original shared parenting plan as it pertained to transportation. Judgment affirmed

REAGAN TOKES LAW – SENTENCING – MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas where the court sufficiently addressed the factors set forth in State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995). The trial court properly imposed an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law as this court held that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional on its face in State v. Guyton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962, appeal accepted, 168 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2022-Ohio-3752, 196 N.E.3d 850.

R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), tampering with evidence, Crim.R. 29(A), sufficiency of the evidence, ankle monitor

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err by refusing to vacate the award under R.C. 2711.10(D). The arbitrators did not exceed their authority by failing to enforce a material notice provision of the parties' agreement because the language appellants point to when so arguing obviously concerns the activities of appellees' attorneys during litigation, not the parties' performance under the agreement. The trial court did not err when awarding post-arbitration attorneys' fees based on the indemnification clause in the parties' agreement because the clause was unambiguous and appellant's decision to challenge the award and file a related lawsuit required appellees' attorneys to continue work after arbitration to defend the award. The trial court did not err when ordering appellant to reimburse appellee for bond premium payments because the indemnification clause entitled appellee to compensation. The costs accrued only because appellant refused to release a mechanic's lien for years after the arbitration panel ordered it to do so.

Respondent's motion filed under Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b) to set aside the magistrate's order of September 20, 2021, compelling discovery responses and ordering him to appear for a deposition is denied.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's request for an unanimity jury instruction on self-defense. The instructions provided the jury with the appropriate law and any other purported deficiencies in the instruction did not rise to the level of plain error. Appellant's conviction for murder was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely filed application good cause delay in mailing by prison mail room. The application for reopening has been filed more than ninety days after journalization of the appellate judgment subject to reopening. The appellant has failed to establish any good cause for the untimely filing of the application. In addition, the appellant possesses no right to file a successive application for reopening.

Mandatory arbitration provision motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration R.C. 2711.02 R.C. 2711.03 hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering appellees' reply brief. The reply brief did not advance allegations rather it rebutted appellant's opposing brief. Appellees did not move to strike the reply brief or seek leave to file a surreply brief. Because appellant is challenging the execution of the arbitration provision itself and there is no evidence in the record that the trial court took this into consideration when granting appellees' motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, the case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing. If, after the trial court conducts its hearing pursuant to our mandate herein and determines that the subject issues are arbitrable, because R.C. 2711.02 calls for a stay, not a dismissal, of an action referable to arbitration, the trial court should stay the case.

R.C. 2907.02(D) rape shield law R.C. 2907.02(E) evidentiary hearing Evid.R. 608 evidence of character and conduct ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error. The trial court properly conducted an in camera proceeding to determine whether the victim's prior allegation of sexual activity involving another individual was prohibited by the rape shield law or was wholly unsubstantiated and admissible under Evid.R. 608. The defense bears the burden of demonstrating the accusations were totally false. Defense counsel's decision not to request a limiting instruction regarding appellant's prior conviction testimony was tactical and not in error where the trial court issued a general instruction on credibility. Appellant's argument that his constitutional rights were violated by the cumulative errors in this case fails where this court has found no errors were committed.

Violation of community-control sanctions driver's license suspension. Under R.C. 2929.15(B), when a defendant violates the conditions of his or her community control, a trial court has the option of imposing a longer period of community control, a more restrictive community-control sanction, or a prison term of any length within the range of that available for the original offense, up to the maximum that the trial court specified at the first sentencing hearing. A driver's license suspension under R.C. 2925.22 is part of a defendant's prison sentence it is not a community-control sanction. Thus, the suspension should have been imposed, if at all, at the original sentencing hearing. The trial court's imposition of a driver's license suspension for a violation of community-control sanctions is contrary to law.

R.C. 2950.06(F) sex offender failure to verify address. Appellant's conviction for failure to verify address under R.C. 2950.06(F) was in error where appellant's Adam Walsh Act classification was unconstitutional and the Ohio Supreme Court had specifically mandated six years before appellant's conviction that appellant was to be properly classified under Megan's Law.

Pro se litigant guilty plea presentence request to withdraw plea abuse of discretion. The trial court admonished the defendant about proceeding pro se, but despite the admonishments, defendant opted to represent himself. Although presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea should be liberally granted, there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea. The record demonstrates that the defendant had a full and fair Crim.R. 11 hearing at which he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties. He was given an opportunity to state his ground for withdrawal of his plea, which demonstrated only that he had a change of heart.

Sex offenses S.B. 201 Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality ineffective assistance of counsel sentence mitigation trial strategy. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant pursuant to S.B. 201, the Reagan Tokes Law because this court's en banc opinion in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.), held that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional. Defendant also did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage. Trial counsel's decisions concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence were matters of trial strategy and within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Motion to withdraw plea Crim.R. 32.1 ineffective assistance of counsel abuse of discretion manifest injustice trial court lacked jurisdiction following affirmance of conviction and sentence. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to withdraw plea because the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider appellant's motion after his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

Personal jurisdiction improper service motion to vacate certified mail regular mail. The trial court erred when it determined that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant when he filed a motion to vacate, supported by an affidavit rebutting the presumption of proper service, by stating that he did not live at the address where service was sent.

Crim.R. 11 Crim.R. 11(E) Crim.R. 11(B) Crim.R. 11(B)(2) no-contest plea effect complete failure inform vacated. Reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Because the trial court failed to provide any explanation of the effect of a no-contest plea as required by Crim.R. 11(E) and in accordance with the language of Crim.R. 11(B)(2), appellant's plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made and was required to be vacated.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. Pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (en banc), the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional. The trial court did not err in imposing an indefinite sentence on appellant's offense of felonious assault.

Reagan Tokes Law. The appellant's sentence in accordance with Reagan Tokes Law has been ruled constitutional.

Motion for sanctions R.C. 2323.51 frivolous conduct wholly unwarranted in law hearing abuse of discretion. Appellant's claims were insufficient to satisfy the frivolous-conduct standard without allegations of egregious misbehavior, harassment, or a demonstration that there was no evidence supporting appellee's claims. The trial court was not required to hold a hearing on appellant's motion for sanctions and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Mandamus moot final appealable order R.C. 2969.25(C). The complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court judge to issue a final appealable order in a criminal case is moot. The trial court judge has vacated the original judgment of conviction and sentence and resentenced the relator. In addition, the relator failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which mandates that the complaint for a writ of mandamus contain a statement certified by the institutional cashier setting forth the balance in the inmate's account for the preceding six months.

Confrontation Clause non-testimonial statements testimonial statements objective witness test primary purpose test ongoing emergency hearsay excited utterance Evid.R. 803(2) Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence allied offenses of similar import R.C. 2941.25 imposition of consecutive sentences indefinite sentence Reagan Tokes Law reopening case App.R. 12(A)(2) App.R. 16(A)(7). Declarant's statements to neighbor, 911 operator, and EMS dispatcher were nontestimonial and admission of such statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause where declarant was in need of medical assistance and the primary purpose of statements was to obtain medical assistance. Declarant's statements to neighbor, 911 operator and EMS dispatcher were admissible as excited utterances under Evid.R. 803(2) where declarant personally observed a startling event, statements related to the startling event, and statements were made while declarant was still under the stress of excitement from the startling event. Declarant's statements to police officers while in the custody of EMS personnel, receiving medical care in the back of an ambulance, at the hospital, and at a nursing facility were testimonial and admission of police officer testimony and body camera footage of such statements violated the Confrontation Clause where the primary purpose of the interrogation was to document past events for a later criminal investigation or prosecution. However, the erroneous admission of such evidence was harmless error where it was duplicative and cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence of declarant's statements to neighbor, 911 operator, and EMS dispatcher. Defendant's convictions for aggravated arson, felonious assault, arson, and domestic violence were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant cited no legal authority and made no argument in support of claim that trial court erred in allowing state to reopen its case to present additional evidence relating to repeat violent specifications after rendering its verdict on matters not tried to the jury. Aggravated arson and felonious assault offenses of which defendant was convicted were allied offenses of similar import and trial court erred in failing to merge the offenses for sentencing case remanded for a new sentencing hearing on those counts. Assignments of error challenging imposition of consecutive sentences and imposition of indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law were moot.

Competent, credible evidence supports the probate court's determination that appellant is a mentally ill person subject to court order under R.C. 5122.01(B)(3).

OVI – PROBABLE CAUSE – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SUFFICIENCY: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence stemming from a warrantless arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol based on defendant's physiological indicia, combative demeanor, colliding with a parked car, and refusal to submit to sobriety testing. Defendant's OVI conviction was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court based its finding of guilt on credible testimony of the arresting officer and body-worn-camera video that supported the conclusion that defendant's driving was appreciably impaired by alcohol.

IMMUNITY – R.C. 2744.03 – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS – JUDICIAL NOTICE – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff pled sufficient facts to overcome defendant's claim of political-subdivision-employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). Judicial notice is inappropriate for facts in dispute, including when the alleged facts are documented in the minutes of a township board of trustees meeting. The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a claim of qualified privilege on interlocutory appeal under R.C. 2744.02(C).

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 2151.414 – BEST INTEREST The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the child had been in the custody of HCJFS for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period with a single foster family, he was bonded with the foster family and the foster family wanted to adopt him, and mother had missed several drug screens, did not engage in mental health-treatment as directed, and failed to secure employment throughout the pendency of the case.

The trial court correctly overruled appellant's motion to suppress a confession he made to a detective and pictures the detective obtained from his cell phone. The protections of Miranda did not apply when appellant made his confession and the detective discovered the pictures, because appellant's interaction with the detective was not a custodial interrogation. Appellant's confession to the detective also was voluntary and not a product of police coercion. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(iv) were not contrary to law. Although the trial court did not quote R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(iv) verbatim, its notification contained the required information. However, the trial court failed to provide the notification required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(v) when it, seemingly inadvertently, told appellant that he must be released at the expiration of his minimum (as opposed to maximum) sentence. Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the child's best interest to grant permanent custody of the child to Children's Services, where the child had bonded with her foster family and the biological mother had not completed significant portions of her case plan, including having stable housing and verified income. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of an owner of premises where appellant slipped and fell on a sidewalk. The owner had no duty to appellant because the defect in the sidewalk was open and obvious, and no attendant circumstances existed that would warrant holding the owner liable. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's appeal from the revocation of his community control is moot. Appeal dismissed.

Civ.R. 75(F)(2), spousal support, R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), child support, R.C .3119.05(B), R.C. 3119.051(A), R.C. 3119.231, R.C. 3119.30(B)

Judgment affirmed where paternal grandmother failed to demonstrate paternity according to the statutory provisions under R.C. 3109.12(A) based on the lack of standing to consider the merits of grandmother's complaint, trial court could not consider the merits and dismiss the complaint, on the merits and with prejudice

Judgment affirmed where Reagan Tokes is constitutional, based on the authority of numerous recent cases, including those issued prior to appellant's appeal, with no ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the constitutionality of the law.

Appellant's challenge of felony sentence as contrary to law is not reviewable by this court. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Probate court determination that petitioner satisfied his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that natural father failed to have de minimis contact with his son and lacked justifiable cause for his failure, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed where evidence was sufficient to support convictions, trial counsel's performance resulted in no prejudice, and any error in the jury instruction did not rise to plain error, requiring a new trial.

Trial court did not err in imposing a one-year term of incarceration when sentencing appellant on two, fourth degree felony convictions. Judgment affirmed.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to a children's services agency as such decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellants failed to remedy the cause for the children's removal and where permanent custody was in the children's best interest.

Habeas corpus—Inmate failed to comply with R.C. 2725.04(D), and he has not served his maximum prison sentence—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Inmate failed to comply with affidavit requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Trial court erred by failing to determine what was separate property and treating all of the property as marital when the evidence showed it was not.

An appellate court is conclusively bound to follow the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jones is applicable to appeals that can be brought under R.C. 2953.08(A)(1)(a).

Defendant-appellant's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by not striking testimony or dismissing the case because there is no indication that the evidence identified by defendant-appellant was even available for preservation.

CRIMINAL - Crim.R. 11 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea failure to inform defendant of sex offender registration at time of plea was part of the maximum penalty involved trial court partially complied with nonconstitutional Crim.R. 11(C) requirements and appellant did not assert prejudice Alford Plea trial court must ascertain that defendant has made a ration calculation the record demonstrated sufficient factual basis on which to find defendant guilty.

CRIMINAL - Ineffective assistance of counsel motion to suppress failure to raise an issue on a motion to suppress constitutes a complete waiver reasonable suspicion.

CRIMINAL - R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 an appellate court is without authority to independently weigh mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.12.

CIVIL - postconviction remedy civil in nature sealing of record of conviction R.C. 2953.32 eligible offender no requirement for court to set forth its reasoning in granting or denying a motion to seal court must weigh applicant's interest in sealing record against the public's interest in being able to review court must consider whether rehabilitation has been attained to satisfaction of the court applicant bears the burden of demonstrating a greater interest in sealing.

CRIMINAL - consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) failure to incorporate findings into the sentencing entry remand to issue nunc pro tunc entry.

APPELLATE - notice of appeal tolling findings of fact and conclusions of law App.R. 4(B)(2)(d) final order pending motions

CIVIL - cognovit note relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) meritorious defense demand for payment lack of supporting affidavit calculation of interest

CRIMINAL - motion to vacate void judgment subject-matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction postconviction relief

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus motion to dismiss original jurisdiction Ohio Const. Art. IV, Sec. 3 takings/appropriations failure to exhaust administrative remedies

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal lack of jurisdiction.

Sentencing manifest weight

Unemployment Comp. - Just Cause for Discharge

Public Record R.C. 149.43 R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 5120.21 Admin. Code. 5120:9-49 Public records request made after the filing of an R.C. 2743.75 complaint will not be not considered in connection with that complaint R.C. 149.43 does not require public office to respond to questions seeking narrative answers Res judicata bars claims based on requests for public records litigated in a prior case Public office must clearly assert the non-existence of responsive records Requester must provide clear and convincing evidence of the existence of responsive records after public office has properly asserted that no responsive records exist The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has discretion to release records covered by R.C. 5120.21(F).

After neither party timely objected to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation and the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. In accordance with the Special Master's recommendations and findings, the Court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss, found that Requester's claim for production of records was moot, and found that Respondent failed to produce requested public records within a reasonable period of time. Because Respondent denied Requester access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B), the Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

CIVIL-Appellate Rule 26(B) Application denied where parties' argument constitutes mere disagreement with logic and conclusions in original opinion and judgment entry.

Mandamus—Prohibition—R.C. 2743.03(A)—Court of Claims Act—Claim for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by public employer against Bureau of Workers' Compensation is a legal claim over which common-pleas-court judge lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—Writs of mandamus and prohibition granted against common-pleas-court judge.

Civil law—Civ.R. 60(B)(5)—Alleged errors in court of appeals' reasoning in dismissal of mandamus complaint and order striking subsequent Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion should have been raised in timely appeal of court's decision—Litigant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment as substitute for timely appeal—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Civ.R. 55 default judgment Civ.R. 60(B)(1) excusable neglect meritorious defense abuse of discretion agency

CHILDREN - CUSTODY - R.C. 2151.414 - CONTINUANCE: The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the child had been in the custody of the agency for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, including noncontinuous periods of temporary custody, and permanent custody was in the child's best interest because, though the child was bonded with mother and wished to be returned to her care after removal in 2016, mother was unable or unwilling to meet her own needs and was very unlikely to meet the significant mental-health issues of the child, issues that mother dismissed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to continue the permanent-custody trial after mother failed to appear where mother, who had notice of the trial date from multiple sources and was responsible for prior continuances, never provided a reason for her absence, failed to express the length of the continuance requested, and failed to afford reasonable assurance that if a continuance were granted, she would appear for a new court hearing.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail to appellant because the evidence presented by the State supports a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof is evident or the presumption great that appellant committed the serious felony charges in the indictment, appellant poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or the community, and no release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any person or the community if appellant were freed on bail. Judgment affirmed.

Objection overruled, magistrate's decision adopted as modified, motion to dismiss granted, action dismissed. Magistrate properly recommended granting respondents' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of mandamus, because relator had an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal.

R.C. 2941.25 Merger of offenses for purposes of sentencing

Legal custody Best interest Abuse of discretion Manifest weight Sufficiency

waiver, right to counsel

Aggravated trafficking juvenile in the vicinity

Permanent Custody Reasonable Efforts

Motion for permanent custody R.C. 2151.414(D) best interest of the child App.R. 16(A)(7) continuance "Unger facts" Unger v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841 R.C. 2151.414(D) requires consideration of the best interest factors, not detailed

Confrontation Clause 911 call non-testimonial statements testimonial statements primary purpose test ongoing emergency hearsay excited utterance harmless error. Where there was no ongoing emergency at the time of 911 call, alleged victim's statements to 911 dispatcher, identifying defendant as her assailant and reporting what he had done, were testimonial, and admission of those statements at trial violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Error in admitting 911 call was not harmless error where 911 call was the only evidence presented at trial establishing essential elements of the offenses of which defendant was convicted.

Pro se complaint small claims jury trial request judgment on the pleadings motion to compel magistrate decision fail to file transcript. Judgment affirmed. Defendant-State Farm's motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly granted because pro se plaintiff's complaint failed to allege a claim against State Farm. Plaintiff did not comply with civil rules by failing to serve her discovery requests in an electronic format and not attempting to resolve the alleged dispute prior to filing her motion to compel. Plaintiff waived her right to a jury trial because she conditioned the jury trial request on the Lyndhurst Municipal Court's granting her transfer, which the court granted, and plaintiff did not make another request after that point in the proceedings. Plaintiff failed to file a transcript or affidavit of proceedings with her objections to the magistrate's decision. As a result, we presume that the municipal court considered all the evidence and arguments raised, and the court properly adopted the factual findings of the magistrate and limited its review of plaintiff's objections to the conclusions of law made by the magistrate.

Pro se litigant postconviction-relief petition res judicata. The trial court did not err by denying defendant's postconviction-relief petition the arguments were barred by res judicata because they were reviewed and rejected by this court in the defendant's direct appeal of his convictions and sentence.

Crim.R. 2(D) petty misdemeanor Crim.R. 11(B) Crim.R. 11(E) guilty plea. Appellant's guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made when the trial court failed to inform her that her guilty plea was a complete admission of her guilt. The substantial or partial compliance standard is no longer applicable to violations of Crim.R. 11 and reviewing courts do not consider the totality of the circumstances. Instead, pursuant to Dangler, the proper inquiry is, has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of Crim.R. 11? If the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? If a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? The trial court's failure to inform appellant of the language in Crim.R. 11(B) that her guilty plea was a complete admission of her guilt did not comply with Crim.R. 11(E) and was a complete failure to comply therefore, no showing of prejudice was required.

Aggravated robbery felonious assault involuntary manslaughter consecutive sentences Reagan Tokes sentence. Affirmed. The defendant has not demonstrated that consecutive service of the five-year sentence imposed on one of the convictions arising in this case was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.

Negligence summary judgment no-duty winter rule unnatural accumulation improper accumulation. Summary judgment in favor of defendant business owner was inappropriate where genuine issues of material fact surrounding the applicability of the no-duty winter rule existed.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was filed on the morning of the sentencing hearing, because there was no legitimate basis to withdraw the plea other than a change of heart.

GSI App.R. 21 supplemental authority Evid.R. 611 leading questions Evid.R. 802 hearsay Evid.R. 803 exceptions to hearsay medical treatment or diagnosis. Affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor limited latitude in questioning a young victim through the use of leading questions eliciting the victim's out-of-court statements to another person and by permitting a social worker to testify as to the victim's statements made for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.

Murder R.C. 2903.02(A) and (B) felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) improper discharge into a habitation R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) jury instruction self-defense defense of another sufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury on defense of another. Appellant's convictions for murder, felonious assault, and improper discharge into a habitation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were therefore supported by sufficient evidence. The appellant did not prove his affirmative defense of self-defense when the evidence showed that the appellant arrived on scene after a fight between two families had already ended and the appellant used his shotgun to shoot the victims through a closed second-floor window. The jury did not believe appellant's argument that one of the people in the apartment was armed when several witnesses testified that the allegedly armed person was in the kitchen on the phone with police and the two people standing in the window were not armed. The jury also did not believe that the appellant threw a metal pipe into the second-story window. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional so the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to an indefinite sentence under the law.

Sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of evidence attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor importuning. - Defendant's convictions for attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and importuning were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence established that defendant knew the individual he was texting to arrange for sexual activity was 15 years old or was reckless with regard to that fact.

Rape voir dire prosecutorial misconduct sufficiency manifest weight ineffective assistance of counsel lesser included offense instruction jury instruction Reagan Tokes. Prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire when it asked jurors about their understanding of the phrase "no means no" in a rape trial. Prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct when it used the term "victim" and "survivor" to refer to the complaining witnesses in rape investigations generally and to the complaining witness in this case. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for new counsel on the day of trial. Defendant's rape and domestic violence convictions were supported sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel even though his trial counsel failed to request a lesser-included offense instruction. Indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law was constitutional, but was also contrary to law because the court failed to comply with the notification requirements set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

Sufficient evidence obstructing official business R.C. 2921.31(A) moot misdemeanor offense affirmative act intent to impede law enforcement. - Appellant's appeal was not moot because he did not voluntarily serve his sentence appellant's conviction for obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) was supported by sufficient evidence where the evidence demonstrated he knowingly fled from the police to evade capture, thereby committing an affirmative act with the intent to impede law enforcement.

Final appealable order R.C. 2505.02 Civ.R. 54(B). An appeal will be dismissed when the judgment appealed from is not a final appealable order. Although Civ.R. 54(B) will allow the dismissal of a counterclaim to be immediately appealable, it only does so where the decision is a final order. Here, where the counterclaim involved venue and choice of law, two issues that are appealable after final judgment, the trial court's ruling on the counterclaim was not a final appealable order subject to immediate review. Further, the trial court's other rulings on personal jurisdiction and on motions to strike were not final appealable orders because both are appealable after final judgment and do not preclude appellant's ability to proceed in the action.

Gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) endangering children R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) Crim.R. 29 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) felony sentence R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant's convictions for gross sexual imposition and endangering children are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Child victims often do not remember the exact dates of assault and even though the victim told police and CCDCFS social worker that the abuse began in September or October and testified it began in December, the victim's credibility was for the jury to assess. The trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to 18 months in prison because his sentence is not contrary to law. Our review of his sentence is limited and the appellant does not claim that the trial court made considerations that fall outside the principles and purposes of sentencing.

Community-control sanctions misdemeanor sentencing criminal mischief the Jones test R.C. 2929.27(A) R.C. 2929.22(B). Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. The defendant entered a guilty plea to a single count of criminal mischief, a third-degree misdemeanor stemming from conduct related to tearing down a political sign at a gas station. After weighing the factors posed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990), for setting community-control conditions, we find that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to submit to a substance abuse assessment and counseling and submit to substance abuse testing, but do not find that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to attend anger management and complete a mental health screening.

Search seizure Fourth Amendment motion to suppress plain view automobile exception. Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress where police had probable cause to search vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Arbitration waiver totality of the circumstances nonpayment fees leave implicitly denied. - Parties' requests for leave to file a reply and surreply containing supporting documentation was implicitly denied when the trial court did not rule on the motions prior to denying appellant's motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to compel arbitration where the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that appellant waived its right to arbitrate by not paying their portion of the arbitration fees when the consumer-appellees complied with the contract and initially requested arbitration prior to filing their complaint.

R.C. 2151.413 R.C. 2151.414 termination of parental rights child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with parents permanent custody in child's best interest. The juvenile court's judgment granting the agency permanent custody of the child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. All of the court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the court's best interest findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Writ of mandamus R.C. 149.43 Ohio Public Records Act public records requests moot production of records bad faith promptly produce records reasonable time overbroad vague costs statutory damages attorney fees. Writ of mandamus seeking public records was denied as moot based on the limited arguments before the court and the averment that the city produced all records responsive to the two public records requests. The court also declined to award costs, statutory damages, and attorney fees.

Traffic stop window-tint violation motion to suppress reasonable suspicion trial court judgment issued after appeal. The trial court's judgment, which was issued after this appeal was taken, directly related to and affected the matter assigned as error on appeal and was, therefore, inconsistent with this court's jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the trial court's judgment. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue its judgment while the appeal was pending and that judgment is void. The record demonstrates that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the motorist. The officer testified that he observed the defendant driving a vehicle with window tint on the driver and front passenger windows that was extremely dark. The officer testified that the window tint on those two windows must allow 50 percent light in, and he did not believe they did. Even if the officer was mistaken about the window tint, that mistake would go to the sufficiency of the evidence, not the reasonableness of the stop.

Motion to dismiss failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court did not err by granting the appellee's motion to dismiss because the appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Parental rights motion for continuance of trial permanent custody R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time fail to remedy conditions that resulted in child's removal from custody pending criminal charges R.C. 2151.414(E) factors best interest of the child R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) guardian ad litem (G.A.L.) legal custody motion to extend temporary custody adequacy of guardian ad litem (G.A.L.) report and investigation Sup.R. 48 R.C. 2151.281 Cuyahoga Cty. Juv.Loc.R. 15. Father's motion to continue trial because he sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident and was prescribed medications for those injuries did not demonstrate a continuance was necessary to secure fair treatment for Father. The trial court did not err when it denied Father's motion for continuance. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applied and that it was in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. The trial court's determination that legal custody to Father's friend was not in the child's best interest was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's denial of Father's motion to extend temporary custody was not an abuse of discretion. The record demonstrated that the guardian ad litem's (G.A.L.'s) investigation of Father sufficiently met the requirements of a G.A.L.

Summary judgment workers' compensation claims sexual conduct R.C. 4123.01 R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) and R.C. 4123.01(K) threat of physical harm force legislative intent de novo review. Affirmed the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that granted the motion for summary judgment of Cuyahoga County et al., on Appellant's appeal from the denial of her workers' compensation claims. The record contained no genuine issue of material fact for trial on the issue of whether the inmate's actions were sexual conduct as defined by the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to Appellee.

Objection overruled and relator's request for a writ of mandamus denied. Relator's three life sentences for rape have not been modified to add a ten-year minimum term. Relator's motions are denied.

CUSTODY MODIFICATION – JUVENILE – R.C. 3109.04 – GUARDIAN AD LITEM – EVIDENCE The trial court's failure to recite the legal standard of R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) in modifying a prior custody decree did not rise to the level of plain error where no manifest injustice occurred and nothing in the record suggested that the outcome of the proceedings would have differed.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's motion to discharge the guardian ad litem and strike the guardian ad litem's testimony and report from the record where the guardian ad litem sufficiently discharged her duties.The trial court did not err in finding that mother denied father's parenting time where the court's finding was supported by competent, credible evidence.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE - MANIFEST WEIGHT – WITNESS Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, even though the victim was intoxicated at the time of the incident and gave muddled testimony during trial about when the incident occurred, where the victim was clear about how defendant harmed her and where a reporting officer corroborated the victim's testimony.

Following an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), this court finds no issues with arguable merit to advance on appeal. The record establishes that appellant's guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered and that the sentences imposed by the trial court were jointly recommended by the parties and authorized by law, making them unreviewable. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court ruled that a domestic violence civil protection order prohibiting appellant-father from having contact with his child did not provide justifiable cause for appellant's failure to have contact with the child in the one-year period before appellee-petitioner filed a petition seeking to adopt the child. Based upon this conclusion, the court found that appellant's consent to the adoption was not required. While acknowledging that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in In re Adoption of A.K., 168 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-350, 198 N.E.3d 47, applies to the case at hand, this Court does not adopt the lead opinion of the plurality decision. Rather, we continue to apply the two-step analysis applicable to the de minimis prong of R.C. 3107.07(A), which was supported by four of the Justices in In re Adoption of A.K. Under this analysis, the trial court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by imposing a 7 to 10½ year sentence on appellant, as the disposition was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of appellees as the court lacked personal jurisdiction over appellant. Judgment vacated.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Inmate's complaint challenging trial court's sentencing entry failed to state a viable claim for relief in mandamus or procedendo against named respondent—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Vexatious litigators—R.C. 2323.52—Court of appeals was required to dismiss appellant's mandamus complaint under R.C. 2323.52(D)(3) because appellant had failed to obtain leave to proceed under R.C. 2323.52(F)(2) before filing complaint—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Appellant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel based upon claim that prior counsel did not inform him that appellee could elect to not extend a plea bargain offer, for which there is no compulsory right to receive. Judgment affirmed.

Counsel's decisions regarding which witness to call fall within the realm of trial strategy. Speculation as to what an uncalled witness would have said at trial is not sufficient for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Sufficient evidence supports the judgment of the trial court. Jury did not lose its way and the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court properly denied appellant's motion to compel the state of Ohio to honor the terms of his plea agreement, as appellant's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and, further, the state did not breach the terms of the plea agreement. In addition, appellant's Equal Protection claims are without merit, as is his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession to police where defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Defendant's convictions for participating in a criminal gang and the gang specification attached to eight felonious offenses were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant's conviction for operating a motor vehicle without reasonable control in violation of Hamilton Ohio Codified Ordinance 333.022 is supported by sufficient evidence.

Trial court correctly reimposed the original sentence when defendant violated the terms of his judicial release.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the magistrate's decision denying the defendants-appellants' motion for a protective order under Civ.R. 26(C).

The trial court did not err by its evidentiary determinations. Defendant-appellant's domestic-violence conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment Affirmed.

felony sentencing, fines, financial sanctions, hearing, ability to pay, clearly and convincingly

Relator's writ of procedendo seeking a ruling from a common pleas court judge was properly dismissed for relator's failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A). The court may take judicial notice of other civil cases filed by an inmate to demonstrate noncompliance.

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas properly dismissed appellant's action for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25. An inmate seeking waiver of filing fees is required to provide a certified statement of the inmate's account for the last six months, and failure to do so is grounds for dismissal.

Habeas corpus—Petitioner failed to file affidavit of prior civil actions as required by R.C. 2969.25(A)—Petitioner's complaint was not verified as required by R.C. 2725.04—No rule authorizes an appellant to file a motion for summary judgment in a direct appeal to this court—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed—Motion for summary judgment denied.

Habeas corpus—Inmate failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Prohibition and mandamus—Appellant had an adequate remedy in ordinary course of law in that he could have asserted claim in direct appeal—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Fourth Amendment-probable cause existed to justify search warrant-detective received information regarding potential child pornography from an agent who identified himself as a member of a internet crimes task force and this information contained another agent's name and email address that ended in ice.dhs.gov ten-month-old evidence of alleged child pornography web site activity not too stale to support issuing a search warrant for residence and electronic devices because child-pornography images may exist for an infinite time and offenders tend to keep images for a long period of time.

R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(A) - Blood Draw - Failure to Follow Hospital Protocol

Summary Judgment - Sovereign Immunity - Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether Fire Fighter Operated Fire Truck in a Reckless Manner

Motion to withdraw guilty pleas

Habeas Corpus - Res Judicata - Court Costs

JURISDICTION – POSTCONVICTION – COURT COSTS – CRIMINAL FINES – RES JUDICATA – MOOTNESS – APPELLATE JURISDICTION: The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant's motion to vacate his court costs under R.C. 2947.23(C) because defendant satisfied his court costs in 1992. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant's untimely postconviction motion to vacate a $25,000 criminal fine because the motion was filed after the 365-day deadline established by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) had expired. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's request to vacate his criminal fines because defendant's arguments could have been raised on direct appeal in 1992, and therefore, were barred by res judicata. Defendant's challenge to alleged irregularities in the transfer of his case to a particular trial judge was not properly raised in a direct appeal of an order signed by that judge. Defendant's arguments that the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts violated his constitutional rights by providing allegedly conflicting deadlines for filing his appellate brief and allegedly refusing to file his sentencing transcripts were not properly before the court and were made moot by an order of the court that extended his filing deadlines and confirmed that the transcript pages had been delivered. Defendant's arguments that the trial court violated his constitutional right to an appeal when it failed to order service of its decision was made moot by this court's consideration of defendant's appeal. Defendant's equal-protection claim failed because he failed to establish the elements of an equal-protection claim.

CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS CIV.R. 60(B) Civ.R. 60(B) presumes underlying order is a final appealable order moving party must demonstrate facts to establish assertions motion to disqualify counsel advocate-witness rule Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 full evidentiary hearing on motion to disqualify is not necessary where trial court has sufficient evidence to consider the required factors.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02 When a juvenile court determines custody, but defers a decision on child support to a later date, there is no final appealable order.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - prohibition motion to dismiss frivolous conduct due process R.C. 2323.51 no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction adequate remedy at law.

CIVIL - child support order trial court did not abuse discretion in denying appellant's timely filed motion for extension of time to file objections Juv. 40 contemplates objections will be filed prior to transcript appellant failed to make a showing of good cause.

CRIMINAL LAW - post-sentence motion for a new trial Crim.R. 33 motion to withdraw guilty pleas Crim.R. 32.1 manifest injustice pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Crim.R. 5(B)(4)(a) and (5) bind-over order is precluded by the Ohio Criminal Rules appeals dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW - trial court cannot reconsider a valid final order in a criminal case reconsideration of a final order is a nullity order denying reconsideration is not subject to appeal.

CRIMINAL – Appellant's competency determination is affirmed despite some difficulties understanding her plea colloquy. The trial court complied with the recommendation of the examining physician, who opined that Appellant was capable of understanding the charges against her and the legal process if it was adequately explained. The trial court fulfilled its obligations under the heightened Alford standard, when defense counsel conceded that Appellant has signed a written confession to the charges, and the trial court acknowledged the content of the victims' witness statements. The record did not demonstrate any manifest injustice, insofar as there was no evidence that Appellant had been misinformed or coerced when entering her plea.

PROBATE – Civ.R. 12(H)(3) de novo review transfer versus dismissal venue versus jurisdiction at issue is subject-matter jurisdiction the probate division has no jurisdiction over claims for money damages arising from allegations of fraud the probate court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction judgment affirmed.

PROBATE – Civ.R. 12(H)(3) de novo review transfer versus dismissal venue versus jurisdiction at issue is subject-matter jurisdiction the probate division has no jurisdiction over claims for money damages arising from allegations of fraud the probate court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction judgment affirmed

Crim.R. 43(A) sentencing remand correction of entry days-of-confinement credit. Affirmed. Under Crim.R. 43(A), a defendant's presence is not required at any proceeding solely intended to vacate or delete any portion of a sentence, punishment, penalty, or other criminal sanction upon remand from a direct appeal and because no sentence was imposed de novo, the defendant is not entitled to another days-of-confinement calculation upon remand.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea res judicata consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14. On remand solely for resentencing, a trial court may not entertain a motion to withdraw a plea a trial court's grant of a post-remand motion to withdraw a plea would essentially undo the entire appeal. Res judicata bars the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were based on facts in the record and were raised or could have been raised on a prior appeal. The trial court considered all of the statutory factors in accordance with R.C. 2929.14 in sentencing the appellant to consecutive sentences.

Land installment contract forfeiture fraud foreclosure breach of contract notice voluntary satisfaction statute of frauds part performance promissory estoppel oral modification of contract. The vendor of a land installment contract was entitled to summary judgment against the vendee in a forfeiture action where the vendee stopped making monthly payments on the contract and stopped paying property taxes on the parcel. The vendee did not meet his burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial on his defenses, which included that the vendor had failed to include certain required disclosures in the land installment contract, that the vendor had allegedly agreed orally that the vendee could postpone making payments and that the trial court should have considered issues of setoff and reimbursement before forfeiting the vendee's interest in the contract. The alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute of frauds. The vendees also challenged the trial court's order nullifying a quitclaim deed to the subject property. We found that assignment of error to be moot because the vendor recorded the judgment before the appellants sought a stay of execution of the judgment.

Felony sentence R.C. 2953.28(G)(2) consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) statutory findings clearly and convincingly supported by the record attempted failure to comply R.C. 2921.331(D) necessary for the protection of the public not disproportionate to the danger posed by the offender proportionality finding vacate and remand for resentencing postrelease control R.C. 2967.28(C). The trial court did not make the requisite findings to support consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C) by failing to make the full proportionality finding and failing to consider whether consecutive sentences were necessary for appellant's punishment. The court further erred by ordering that appellant be subject to postrelease control for a greater period than allowed by statute for a fourth-degree felony.

Arson violating a protection order manifest weight fire vehicles eyewitness identification testimony credible. Affirmed. Appellant's convictions for arson and violating a protection order, which arose from an incident where the victim's vehicles were intentionally set on fire while a protection order was in place, were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Credible eyewitness identification testimony from the victim along with other testimony and evidence consistent therewith were enough to withstand the manifest-weight challenge in favor of conviction.

Reagan Tokes Law felony sentence, guilty plea constitutional challenge separation of powers indefinite sentence due process jury. Defendant's constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law is foreclosed by judicial precedent, and thus, defendant's sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law is not a violation of his constitutional rights.

Sufficient evidence manifest weight felonious assault credibility intoxication assault of a police officers incidental contact maximum sentences consecutive sentences Reagan Tokes Law. - Appellant's conviction for felonious assault upheld where the evidence showed that the appellant caused the victim serious physical harm when the victim suffered a laceration to his face. The victim's state of intoxication did not render the appellant's conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence because a defense witness corroborated the victim's testimony that the appellant assaulted the victim. Appellant's conviction for assault of a police officer upheld where evidence showed that the appellant's conduct and contact with the officer was not merely incidental but deliberate when he used two hands to push the officer, causing her to fall. The record supported the trial court's decision to impose maximum and consecutive sentences.

R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) R.C. 2313.17(D) juror challenge for cause. The trial court applied the proper standard to appellant's juror challenge for cause and did not abuse its discretion.

Felony sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) plain error clear and convincing evidence proportionality danger the offender poses to the public rape R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) attempt R.C. 2923.02 failure to verify address R.C. 2950.06 offenses committed on bond offenses committed on postrelease control capias. We affirmed the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate 11.5-year prison sentence. The defendant completed a 13-year prison sentence for a sexual battery and a rape committed in 2004–2005. These assaults targeted two different women, both strangers to the defendant. Upon the defendant's release, he was immediately taken back into custody for a rape committed in 2006 against a third female victim. The charge was based on new forensic tests performed while the defendant was in prison. While on bond in that case, the defendant committed two misdemeanors — attempted drug possession and endangering children — and a felony, attempted felonious assault. He then failed to appear for trial on the rape charge and thereafter attempted to fail to verify his address as required because of the previous rape conviction. The defendant was taken back into custody and pleaded guilty to the 2006 rape, the misdemeanors, the attempted felonious assault and the attempted failure to verify his address. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 10 years on the rape count and a sentence of 18 months on the failure-to-verify count. The trial court ran the sentences consecutively, making the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences because, after a thorough review of the record, we were not left with the firm conviction or belief that the consecutive sentences and an aggregate 11.5-year sentence were disproportionate to the danger the defendant posed to the public. While the defendant completed beneficial programming and classes while incarcerated and secured employment upon his release, his actions since being released from prison — including the attempted felonious assault, another crime of violence against a woman — present significant concerns regarding the danger the defendant poses to the public. The defendant did not contest any of the other R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings.

Contempt of court civil stalking protection order clear and convincing evidence abuse of discretion. Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that respondent violated the civil stalking protection order.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional indefinite sentence. The trial court's imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not a violation of appellant-defendant's constitutional rights.

S.B. 201 Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentencing constitutionality R.C. 2953.08(B)(2). Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing. The trial court's judgment was contrary to law because it failed to sentence the defendant pursuant to S.B. 201, the Reagan Tokes Law, because this court's en banc opinion in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.), held that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional.

Petition for postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) R.C. 2953.23(A) timely filed delayed appeal jurisdictional findings of fact and conclusions of law R.C. 2953.21(D), (H). Where a defendant is granted leave to file a delayed appeal, a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 must be filed within 365 days from the expiration of the time for filing a timely appeal. Because petition for postconviction relief was not timely filed, trial court was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law before denying petition for postconviction relief.

Mandamus, limitation of time for trial, Evid.R. 611(A), adequate remedy at law, abuse of discretion. Pursuant to Evid.R. 611(A), a trial court judge may impose reasonable limits on direct examination and cross-examination based on a variety of concerns, such as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, repetitive testimony, or marginally relevant interrogation. In addition, the imposition of time limits on the examination and cross-examination falls squarely within the sound discretion of the trial court judge and can only be addressed, as an abuse of discretion, through a direct appeal. Finally, the fact that a postjudgment appeal may be time-consuming and expensive to pursue does not render an appeal inadequate so as to justify extraordinary relief through mandamus.

Mandamus, continuance of trial, Sup.R. 41(A), adequate remedy at law, abuse of discretion. We find that relator has failed to establish each prong of the three-part test applicable to a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Initially, relator has failed to establish that she possesses a clear legal right to a continuance of the dates set for trial or that the trial court judge possesses a clear legal duty to grant a continuance. Pursuant to Sup.R. 41(A), the continuance of a scheduled trial or hearing is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court for good cause shown. To require the trial court judge to grant a continuance at this juncture of legal proceedings would trample on her judicial discretion, and as previously stated, mandamus may not be employed to control judicial discretion, even if the exercise of judicial discretion constitutes gross abuse. Finally, the fact that a postjudgment appeal may be time consuming and expensive to pursue does not render an appeal inadequate so as to justify extraordinary relief through mandamus. It must also be noted that following trial, an appeal may be filed that challenges the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance based upon an abuse-of-discretion argument.

Judgment reversed. The trial court's judgment granting the agency's motion for permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the evidence and not supported by clear and convincing evidence, because the court relied on incorrect facts regarding father's criminal convictions in assessing the child's best interests. Case remanded for trial court to properly analyze the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) best interest factors, father's remaining arguments rendered moot.

The Franklin County Municipal Court did not err in adopting its magistrate's decision in favor of appellee on appellee's forcible-entry-and-detainer claim and in entering judgment accordingly. After obtaining a continuance of the magistrate's hearing to allow her to gather additional evidence in support of her defense, appellant failed to appear for the rescheduled hearing. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate's decision, but the objections did not address the substance of the magistrate's decision, and appellant did not support her objections with a transcript or affidavit of the evidence presented. The trial court was therefore required to accept the magistrate's findings of fact, which established the legal requirements for appellee's claim. Judgment affirmed.

COMMUNITY CONTROL REVOCATION – NO CONTEST PLEA – EVIDENCE The trial court properly accepted defendant's no contest plea to a community control violation where the court complied with minimum due process requirements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendant violated the terms of his community control where substantial evidence was presented by the state to establish the violation.

Appellant's conviction for felonious assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's domestic violence conviction was not based on insufficient evidence. Appellant's testimony conflicted with that of the arresting officer, and construing the evidence in the State's favor, any rational finder of fact could have concluded that appellant knowingly attempted to cause physical harm to a family member. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in a child's best interest to grant permanent custody of the child to Children's Services the child had bonded with her foster family and there were significant concerns about placing the child with her mother, father, or maternal grandmother. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to vacate a prior judgment against her where appellant's affidavit, if credited, provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating child support where appellant had failed to object to the child support enforcement agency's determination that the child subject to the support order had turned 18 years of age and was no longer attending full-time an accredited high school. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. After admitting to a violation of his community control, the trial court continued appellant's community control, but ordered him to serve 94 days in jail and to pay court costs. Because appellant has served his jail sentence and his community control has been terminated, any claim related to his violation hearing or the court's jail sentence is moot. No arguably meritorious issue exists concerning the order to pay court costs. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in lessor-appellee's favor because there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether equitable estoppel and waiver applied to the lessor's conduct. Other issues as to interpretation of the lease agreement were not raised in the trial court, and consideration of these issues under the plain error doctrine is unnecessary because the summary judgment is being reversed. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Relator, an inmate incarcerated in Kentucky, did not prove clearly and convincingly that the respondents, a juvenile court judge and magistrate, completely failed to comply with constitutional due process in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over his child support obligation. Juvenile court records demonstrate that relator was an Ohio resident when the obligation was established, and there is no evidence that the respondents lack continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify and enforce the obligation. Writ of prohibition denied.

affirming grant of stay pending arbitration requested by defendants plaintiff's claims requesting return of the down payment, damages, and rescission of a purchase agreement due to allegations of fraud in the inducement of the agreement are not exempt from arbitration under R.C. 2711.01(B)(1), as they do not set forth a controversy "involving title to or possession of real estate" arbitration clause was not unconscionable.

affirming grant of motion to compel arbitration defendant did not waive right to demand arbitration by failing to mention arbitration agreement in a response letter which was limited to telling a different version of the facts of the employment situation.

Consecutive sentences

Appellant's conviction for rape of a person less than 10 years of age and gross sexual imposition of a different person less than 13 years of age was affirmed where the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to sever the two charges for purposes of trial or by permitting the expert witness to testify in the manner that she did, and where the jury's verdict finding appellant guilty of gross sexual imposition of the less than 13-year-old victim was supported by sufficient evidence.

Attorney for an aunt who has custody of her niece appeals the trial court's decision not to award attorney fees in a case involving motions filed by the child's grandparents related to visitation with the child's sister, who is in the custody of the grandparents. Trial court did not err in determining not to grant attorney fees to aunt's attorney where grandparents' motions were not frivolous. The motions were filed only after aunt's attorney sent a letter to grandparents, demanding no contact with the aunt and threatening legal action if grandparents contacted the aunt in any way.

A plea agreement is a contract between the parties. If a party does not object at trial, we review any alleged breach of the plea agreement under the plain error standard.

Defendant-appellant's prison sentences are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

Trial court's statements regarding sentencing appellant immediately if he was conviction were not made to coerce the defendant into accepting a plea. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The sentence was not contrary to law and was not entered before a "biased" official.

The indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe upon defendant-appellant's right to due process.

Defendant-appellant's possession-of-fentanyl and aggravated-possession-of-drugs convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's possession-of-fentanyl and aggravated-possession-of-drugs convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant's sentences are neither unsupported by the record nor contrary to law. Because the trial court did not commit multiple errors at defendant-appellant's trial, the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply.

PERMANENT CUSTODY BEST INTERESTS REASONABLE EFFORTS ANDERS. Trial court's determination to grant agency's motion for permanent custody was supported by the record. Mother-appellant presented no non-frivolous issues for appeal.

Trial court did not err in calculating the time served when the calculation is supported by competent, credible evidence. Trial court did not err in ordering defendant to serve his prison term in a local facility when the county was a voluntary county and R.C. 2929.34(B)(2) required him to serve the sentence in the local facility. Defendant was not denied the benefits of R.C. 2967.193 when ordered to serve his sentence in a local facility because the facility was required by R.C. 5120.161(B) to apply the applicable provisions of R.C. 2967.193.

SENTENCING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE Trial court's sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Appellant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel related to sentencing hearing.

CRIMINAL LAW - sufficient evidence of possessing criminal tools and assault where state introduced testimony of eyewitness, victim, and arresting officers manifest weight, competing version of events supports trial court's findings trial court did not abuse discretion by allowing rebuttal witnesses to testify who were in violation of separation order no evidence state improperly allowed witnesses to remain in courtroom, rebuttal testimony was generally repetitive, and matter was tried to bench counsel was not ineffective for cross-examination of witnesses or failing to object to witness' identification testimony, trial strategy, failure to make Crim.R. 29 motion was not ineffective because there was sufficient evidence cumulative error cannot be established by joining meritless claims together failed to establish any instances of harmless error, thus doctrine of cumulative error does not apply.

CIVIL LAW - domestic violence civil protection order trial court did not err in imposing supervised parenting time and issuing domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO") for statutory maximum of five years tailored to circumstances to keep child safe from harm trial court found father recklessly caused severe bodily injury "best interest" analysis is not required.

CIVIL - motion to vacate order settling fiduciary's account R.C. 2109.35(A) fraud guilty verdict in concealment action R.C. 2109.50 scienter one-year from discovery abuse of discretion sound reasoning process.

CIVIL - child custody best interest factors R.C. 3109.04 abuse of discretion substantial credible and competent evidence.

Juvenile court had jurisdiction over father to conduct permanent custody hearing in a case involving the termination of parental rights, where the father waived notice of the hearing and consented to the award of permanent custody to the children's services agency. Mother's consent to the award was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Juvenile court's denial of grandmother's untimely motion to intervene was not an abuse of discretion.

Although preferred on appellate review, a trial court need not explicitly state in its judgment entry that it considered a defendant's ability to pay a financial sanction. All that is required is that the trial court consider his ability to pay. A sentencing court may consider a broad range of otherwise inadmissible evidence, including charges that were reduced or dismissed under a plea agreement.

Because relator received notification of release violation hearing and then admitted to the parole violations, he was afforded due process and is not entitled to a new revocation hearing.

SENTENCING – ALLIED OFFENSES — MERGER – SEX-OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION – JAIL-TIME CREDIT The trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences and two sex-offender classifications for defendant's convictions of abduction and gross sexual imposition where the appellate court had previously determined that the offenses should have merged for sentencing, State v. Merz, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200152, 2021-Ohio-2093, because imposing concurrent sentences is not the equivalent of merging allied offenses, and sex-offender classification tiers are part of a criminal sentence. In calculating jail-time credit, the trial court must credit defendant for the total number of days he served in the local jail for any reason arising out of the offense, including days served prior to resentencing, but the trial court properly did not include time served in prison because the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction tracks and credits that time.

OVI – CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT The state presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain defendant's convictions for OVI, failure to maintain reasonable control, and refusing an OVI test, where a witness saw defendant in the driver's seat of a wrecked car after hearing a crash mere minutes before, notwithstanding two occupants of the vehicle exiting from the car. Defendant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court found the car's two occupants' testimony to be incredible.

FELONIOUS ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant's conviction for felonious assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that defendant shot him, the court found the victim's testimony credible, and the only witness to give contradictory testimony made multiple inconsistent statements.

AUTOMOBILES/CRIMINAL — COUNSEL — IDENTIFICATION —EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT: Defendant failed to establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for failure to file a motion to suppress identification evidence because it was unlikely that the motion, if filed, would have been granted, notwithstanding the use of an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, because based on the totality of the circumstances, including that the police officer who made the identification had a good look at defendant while pursuing him during an investigation, the officer's prior description was accurate and consistent with the photo he was shown only one day after the incident, and the officer was "[one] hundred percent" certain of his identification, the identification was reliable and trustworthy. Defendant's convictions for driving with expired license plates, driving under suspension, and failing to stop after an accident were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where identification testimony that defendant was the driver of a vehicle involved in the offenses was reliable and credible.

APPELLATE REVIEW — RECORD SEALING — R.C. 2953.32 — R.C. 2953.36(A)(7) — ELIGIBILITY : The trial court did not err in denying defendant's application to seal the record of a conviction for child endangering where the state objected to the sealing on the ground that the victim was under the age of one, rendering defendant statutorily ineligible under R.C. 2953.36(A)(7), and defendant failed to present a record demonstrating error in the proceedings below.

CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – COUNSEL – WAIVER. In a permanent custody case, the juvenile court erred in determining that legal custodian maternal grandmother waived her right to counsel, notwithstanding her firing of three attorneys, where the magistrate failed to communicate to her the dangers of proceeding without counsel. [But see DISSENT: The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying grandmother's day-of-trial request for a continuance under R.C. 2151.352 where the record shows that grandmother obtained and fired three, separate appointed attorneys and subsequently failed to appear at the next three hearings, including the final pretrial hearing, and grandmother arrived late to the permanent-custody trial, which was already in progress, and requested a continuance to obtain private counsel.]

PARENTAL TERMINATION – PERMANENT CUSTODY – INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the child had been in the custody of HCJFS for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, father did not have an approved home study under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, the child did not have a bond with father, the child did not express any interest in being placed with father, and father did not follow the case plan's direction to complete a parenting class for special-needs children.

permanent custody denied, voluntary surrender of parental rights contingent on agency receiving permanent custody

permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), failure to remedy, best interest, court considers only relevant factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)

neglected and dependent – legal custody – best interest of the children – manifest weight of the evidence

rape, felonious assault, serious physical harm, Crim.R. 29, manifest weight, sexually violent predator, R.C. 2971.01

speedy trial, sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, forgery, mistrial

State's appeal, voidable judgment, res judicata

Plea disproportionate sentence

Post-Conviction Speedy trial

D.V. - Threat of Imminent Harm - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency - Prosecutorial Misconduct

Manifest Weight Inferior decree offense

Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause nontestimonial statements testimonial statements primary purpose test ongoing emergency body camera footage manifest weight of the evidence felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) domestic violence R.C. 2919.25(A) indefinite sentence Reagan Tokes Law right to jury trial Crim.R. 23(A) R.C. 2945.05 jury waiver. Declarant's statements to police officer relating to March 2020 incident, made while in the custody of EMS personnel, receiving medical care in the back of an ambulance, were testimonial and admission of police officer testimony and body camera footage of such statements violated the Confrontation Clause where the primary purpose of the interrogation was to document past events for a later criminal investigation or prosecution. Trial court's improper admission of statements was not harmless error and affected defendant's substantial rights where evidence that remained once the improperly admitted evidence was removed from consideration was insufficient to support defendant's convictions relating to March 2020 incident. Convictions for felonious assault and domestic violence relating to December 2020 incident were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Constitutional challenges to indefinite sentencing provisions of Reagan Tokes Law overruled based on State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.). Where jury waivers complied with all applicable statutory and common law requirements, temporary suspension of jury trials or other limits on the scheduling of jury trials due to COVID-19 did not violate Sixth Amendment or invalidate waiver of right to jury trial.

Murder felonious assault sufficiency of the evidence mens rea purposely knowingly manifest weight circumstances surrounding accident. The state presented sufficient evidence of the requisite mens rea for both murder and felonious assault. The jury's verdict of guilty for murder and felonious assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the death investigator said that the victim's gunshot could be consistent with a self-inflicted wound because both suicide and accidental shooting were ruled out as the manner of the victim's death based on the circumstances surrounding the death.

Guilty plea, Crim.R. 11, maximum penalty, charge charges maximum, aggregate sentence, July 1998 amendment to Crim.R. 11 State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988) State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766 State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286. Judgment affirmed. The change from "charge" to "charges" under the 1998 amendment to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) did not disturb Johnson's holding. While the plurality in Bishop distinguished Johnson, it did not overrule Johnson when it had an opportunity to do so. Our continued application of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Johnson is consistent with prior decisions from this court as well as other Ohio appellate courts. As a result, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the maximum, aggregate of all prison terms for all the offenses at the time of the guilty plea for discretionary, consecutive sentences. With regard to the plea, we find that trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) when it advised Berry of the maximum penalties he faced for each charge to which he pled guilty.

Forcible entry and detainer unopposed motion for summary judgment motion not ruled on deemed denied failure to file transcript regularity presumed. A trial court may not automatically grant a motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that it was unopposed. Rather, the trial court is required to find that the movant has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and reasonable minds could conclude that judgment must issue as a matter of law. A motion that is not ruled on is deemed denied. Appellant's failure to file a transcript to support his or her objections to a magistrate's decision, as well as on appeal, requires the trial court and appellate court to presume the regularity of the proceedings.

Arbitration agent principal contract nonsignatory class waiver stay compel demand enforce mandate. The nonsignatory agent does not have the authority to enforce the arbitration provision based on the express and limiting terms of the contract. The trial court did not err in denying the agent's renewed motions to stay, compel binding arbitration, and strike class allegations.

Speedy trial statutory right R.C. 2945.71 guilty plea waiver constitutional right Barker v. Wingo Barker aggravated vehicular assault R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) operating a vehicle while under the influence OVI R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(g) ineffective assistance of counsel motion to suppress blood draw. The defendant waived his statutory speedy-trial right under the Ohio Speedy Trial Act by pleading guilty. After balancing the Barker factors — Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) — there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. While the 20-month delay between the defendant's arrest and his guilty plea was presumptively prejudicial, the vast majority of that delay was attributable to the defendant, the defendant never asserted his right to a speedy trial and there was no actual prejudice to the defense from the delay. The defendant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds and for not filing a motion to suppress blood-draw evidence. The defendant did not challenge the validity of his plea or argue that his plea was less than knowing or voluntary and therefore he presented no basis to reverse his convictions. Moreover, by pleading guilty, the defendant waived an ineffective-assistance claim based on the Ohio Speedy Trial Act. There was no constitutional speedy-trial violation, so a motion to dismiss on that ground would have been meritless. Finally, not filing a motion to suppress is not ineffective assistance per se. We affirm the defendant's convictions.

Law-of-the-case doctrine reviewing court subsequent proceedings. The defendant-appellant's appeal is without merit under the law-of-the-case doctrine where his sole assignment of error was argued and decided in a previous appeal.

Foreclosure motion for reimbursement of advances confirmation decree abuse of discretion. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-bank's untimely motion for reimbursement of advances because the motion was filed after the trial court entered a decree confirming the sale of the foreclosed property, even though such motions must be filed before the decree of confirmation to allow (1) the court to examine the accuracy of the fees prior to confirming the sale and (2) the mortgagor to dispute the fees in the confirmation proceedings and on appeal from the confirmation decree.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment contract. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee was not in error where the contract language was not ambiguous and supported the position of appellee.

Dismissal without prejudice with prejudice abuse of discretion notice final, appealable order. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Lively's complaint. The trial court's dismissal without prejudice, in the instant case, effectively served as a dismissal with prejudice. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record upon which to conclude that Lively received notice of the trial court's intent to dismiss her complaint and that Lively's conduct or her counsel's conduct warranted a dismissal of the complaint.

Allocation for parental rights and responsibilities Civ.R. 12(B)(6) notice opportunity to respond failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court erred when it sua sponte dismissed appellant's complaint for allocation of parental rights and responsibilities without providing notice of the court's intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond.

Default judgment motion to vacate certified mail returned unclaimed service by ordinary mail. A trial court cannot render judgment against a defendant over whom it has no personal jurisdiction. A court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless and until the defendant is properly served with the complaint and summons or the defendant makes an appearance in the case. If service sent through certified mail is returned marked "unclaimed," the civil rules allow a serving party to use ordinary mail service. When ordinary mail is not returned marked "failure of delivery," service is deemed complete. Where the plaintiff follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient evidence of nonservice. To rebut the presumption of proper service, the movant must produce evidentiary-quality information demonstrating that he or she did not receive service. If the movant's motion to vacate contains allegations of operative facts that would warrant relief, the trial court should grant a hearing on the motion. Appellant did not submit evidentiary-quality information to corroborate his contention that he was not served. Although he stated that he was "willing to attest" that he had not received service, he failed to submit to an affidavit averring to that. Further, the documentation appellant did submit was not evidentiary quality. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate without holding a hearing.

Reagan Tokes Law felony sentence constitutional challenge separation of powers jury trial due process indefinite sentence. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate plain error in raising constitutional challenge to Reagan Tokes Law where he failed to raise any new arguments not previously held by this court to be constitutional.

Motion to vacate void judgment Civ.R. 4.1 service certified mail rebuttable presumption. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate void judgment because the evidence in the record demonstrates that the appellee presumptively complied with Civ.R. 4.1 by serving appellant at an address where appellant was reasonably anticipated to be, and the certified mail was signed for by a legal occupant of the premises and returned. Appellant failed to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence that service was not perfected.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment res judicata App.R. 11.1 Loc.App.R. 11.1 accelerated docket App.R. 11.1(E) brief and conclusionary decision. The trial court's grant of summary judgment on the ground of res judicata is affirmed.

Judgment pleadings amend complaint timely moot procedure tortious interference. The trial court erred by granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings because the motion was filed before the complaint was amended pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A).

Permanent custody termination of parental rights motion for continuance abuse of discretion. Trial court abused its discretion in denying mother's motion for continuance of permanent custody hearing.

Public Records R.C. 149.43(B)(1) R.C. 2743.75 A requester may not sue on a public records request withdrawn before the case is filed a revised public records request supersedes the original request The Court of Claims' remedial powers under R.C. 2743.75(F)(3) are limited to ordering the production of records and awarding filing fees/costs.

Public Records R.C. 149.011(G) 149.43(B)(1) R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 3701.17(B) Media use of Public Records Act "Data base rule" under R.C. 149.011(G) Redaction does not require the public office to create a new record R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires release of record containing both public and exempted information if the exempted information can be redacted A public office waives defenses not raised in its initial response to a R.C. 2743.75 complaint Extent of deference to agency's construction of statute Import of agency's change of position on the extent of deference to agency's construction of a statute.

Public Records Infrastructure records Security records Trade Secrets R.C. 149.011(G) R.C. 149.43: R.C. 149.433(A) R.C. 1333.16 Media use of Public Records Act Out of state resident is "person" who may request public records Software specially designed to support specific functions of a public office is a "record" because it document's office's decisions "critical" defined for purposes of R.C. 149.433 "configuration" defined for purposes of R.C. 149.433 absence of evidence from holder of purported trade secret undermines trade secret claim.

On Requester's objections, the Court overruled Requester's objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and, in accordance with the Special Master's recommendation, the Court denied Requester's claim for production of additional records.

Public Records R.C. 149.43 R.C. 2743.75 Statements in unsworn memoranda are not evidence Neither R.C. 149.43 nor R.C. 2743.75 give the Court of Claims authority to address public office's alleged violations of contracts or statutes other than R.C. 149.43(B).

Public Records Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio R.C. 149.43(B) R.C. 2743.75 Supp. R. 44 R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) authorizes dismissal of case beyond the Court of Claims' public records jurisdiction Requests for Court records are beyond the scope of R.C. 149.43(B) Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 2743.75(A) to address complaints for access to court records Audio recording of a criminal trial is a court record An audio recording is a "document."

Public records R.C. 149.43(B)(8) elements for applicability of R.C. 149.43(B)(8) "forensic" defined "any" defined.

Writ of mandamus filed by relator-employer seeking to compel respondent Industrial Commission ("commission") to vacate its order granting the request for temporary total disability compensation filed by respondent-claimant is denied where claimant's approved surgery rendered him unable to work as the direct result of an impairment arising from a workplace injury under the plain language of newly enacted R.C. 4123.56(F). Relator-employer's objections focusing on claimant's termination prior to the surgery and relying on judicial decisions based on the voluntary abandonment doctrine, which were expressly superseded by R.C. 4123.56(F), lacked merit. Objections overruled and writ denied.

Having found no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, we the adopt the magistrate's decision as our own and deny relator's requested writ of procedendo.

Because the trial court, in ruling on objections to a magistrate's decision, failed to enter judgment for appellee and failed to order any relief, the judgment entry appealed from is not a final appealable order and this court is without jurisdiction to review it. Appeal Dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW – MAGISTRATE'S DECISION The trial court's entry was not a final appealable order in a residential foreclosure case where the trial court failed to rule on defendant's objections to the magistrate's decision and where the court simply adopted the magistrate's decision and final decree in foreclosure without setting forth any details of the decree, such that the parties could not determine their rights and obligations without reference to the magistrate's decision.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - COHABITATING - EVIDENCE -SUFFICIENCY - MANIFEST WEIGHT - R.C. 2919.F(1) and (2) : Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was based on sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state established that defendant and his victim had been living together for at least a year, and therefore, cohabitating within five years prior to the incident pursuant to R.C. 2919.F(1) and (2).

BAIL - R.C. 2937.222: Where the record contained sufficient evidence in support of the trial court's findings of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2937.222(B) to satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard, the trial court did not err in granting the state's motion to hold defendant without bail.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to a children's services agency as its decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the children had been in the agency's temporary custody for 24 months and where permanent custody was in the children's best interest.

Appellant's conviction for violation of a protection order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant was not acting as a mandated reporter because she was not reporting in her official or professional capacity, and she was not entitled to immunity. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of robbery (physical harm). The conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress evidence found on his cell phone. The challenged affidavit, despite being based primarily on hearsay evidence, was sufficient to ensure the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Further, the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's no contest plea as it partially complied with Crim.R. 11 and appellant did not demonstrate prejudice. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's interlocutory entry construing the terms of a decedent's will in the context of a will-probate proceeding was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). Appeal dismissed.

After merging multiple offenses and specifications, appellant was convicted of two counts of murder with firearm specifications, aggravated burglary, and having weapons while under disability. Appellant's statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were not violated. His convictions were based on sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in admitting two short surveillance videos from the scene or in denying appellant's subsequent motion for a mistrial. The trial court's judgment entry did not accurately reflect the aggregate sentence orally imposed. Judgment affirmed, but the trial court is ordered to file a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the judgment entry.

The trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellant, who claimed status akin to that of a "sovereign citizen." Such arguments are frivolous. The court also had subject matter jurisdiction over the traffic citation issued to appellant, who was driving on a suspended license. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in overruling the city's motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity where appellees' injuries allegedly were due to the city's negligence in performing its governmental function of maintaining sidewalks and streets. Because appellees failed to allege a viable exception to the city's sovereign immunity, the city was entitled to summary judgment. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Messenger.

OVI - Guilty Plea - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Complicity jury instructions

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Drawing all inferences in favor of state, the state presented sufficient evidence that appellant sold carfentanil to victim, causing victim's death. Jury did not lose its way when it rejected appellant's testimony that the "drug" he sold to victim was really baking soda. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to state calling a witness out of order.

Defendant cannot establish a violation under Brady v. Maryland where he learned of the possible existence of exculpatory evidence at trial and then failed to request it. And, where the state put forth evidence that the victim reasonably feared imminent physical harm by defendant, the domestic violence conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4) and (16), the court's determination that the children could not, or should not, be placed with the father within a reasonable time was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Judgment affirmed where trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress, as record demonstrated police went to front door to investigate report of domestic violence and placed appellant under arrest after witnessing criminal conduct on the front porch.

Trooper had reasonable suspicion to initiate traffic stop where she saw appellant's westbound vehicle veer left of center into eastbound lane. She had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant to administer field sobriety tests based on this violation, plus information from motorist who observed appellant's vehicle unable to maintain its lane, appellant bouncing within her lane and following too closely, appellant's red, bloodshot eyes, and her comment that she did not blame trooper for stopping her.

Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error in adopting the decision of a magistrate, which found that appellant triggered an in terrorem clause in her late husband's last will and testament when she filed a complaint seeking a determination that she was a partial owner in the marital residence.

Summary judgment. Trust. Trustee. Beneficiaries. Undue influence. Evidence.

The trial court erred by ordering appellant's seven, seven, and four year prison sentences he received after a jury found him guilty of committing felonious assault on three peace officer victims as mandatory prison time where the record was silent as to whether any of the three peace officer victims suffered serious physical harm to their persons as a result of appellant's conduct, thereby necessitating the matter be remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The trial court did not err by granting a motion to dismiss in favor of employer where the former employee failed to articulate a clear public policy existed as the exception to the employment at-will doctrine. The former employee's general suggestions about COVID-19 recommendations, along with citation to various federal and state authorities were an insufficient basis to support a clear public policy for purposes of meeting the clarity requirement.

Domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by designating mother the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' children, by failing to credit father for the payments he made during the divorce proceedings pursuant to temporary orders, and by finding father in contempt for denying mother parenting time with the children for four weeks.

The juvenile court did not err by finding that there had been no change of circumstances where the alleged conditions were disputed by the legal custodians or were not significant enough to be considered a change of circumstances.

FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER - A criminal charge for which there is no recorded disposition is a "hanging charge" that prevents the conviction from being a final order if a court's order is not final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction to review the matter and must dismiss the appeal jurisdictional issues must be raised by the court sua sponte even if not raised by the parties.

CRIMINAL - Murder R.C. 2903.02(B) Endangering Children R.C. 2912.22(B)(1) Motion in limine Evid.R. 401 Evid.R. 402 Evid.R. 702 Evid.R. 704 admission of expert testimony as to abusive trauma, nonaccidental trauma, and child abuse was not an abuse of discretion where the experts testified to a likely medical diagnosis where no expert opined on the appellant's culpable mental state or opine that appellant was the perpetrator of said abuse admission of coroner testimony as to the manner and cause of death was not an abuse of discretion where the probative value of the manner and cause of death was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the jury no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) existed as the author of an autopsy report testified during trial and autopsy reports are generally nontestimonial business records conviction supported by sufficient evidence and not against manifest weight of the evidence where appellant admitted to being too rough with infant child and medical professionals concluded that the injuries were nonaccidental no cumulative error where no underlying error found.

JUVENILE - motion for permanent custody termination of parental rights best interest of children reasonable reunification efforts clear and convincing evidence.

CRIMINAL - probation violation community control tolling absconded probation violation proceedings instituted prior to expiration of probation period

CRIMINAL - guilty plea Crim.R. 11 right to jury trial expanded explanation of the law consecutive sentences sentence in futuro Crim.R. 32(C) imposition of sentence R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)evidentiary basis for consecutive sentencing findings cumulative error

CRIMINAL LAW - complaint fatally flawed, trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction essential facts of complaint different from numerical designation of statute, under either level of offense was wrong dogs were erroneously declared vicious and ordered euthanized conviction and sentence void.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - habeas corpus respondent's motion to dismiss is granted petitioner released from prison petition is moot not a claim capable of repetition yet evading review successive petition raising identical claims barred by doctrine of res judicata.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking defendant-appellant's community control. Defendant-appellant's second assignment of error was rendered moot by our determination of defendant-appellant's first assignment of error. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay court-appointed counsel fees without holding a hearing on the issue however, the trial court did err when it taxed court-appointed counsel fees as costs in the criminal case. Because the defendant-appellant's sentence is within the statutory sentencing range and because the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing and the R.C. 2929.12 factors, the sentence is not contrary to law.

Defendant-appellant raises no error as to his 2021 case. Consequently, his corresponding appeal in appellate case numbers 08-22-19 is dismissed. The trial court did not err by ordering defendant-appellant to serve consecutive sentences in appellate case numbers 08-22-20 and 08-22-21. Appeal dismissed in part and Judgments affirmed in part.

An appellate court will not reverse a civil judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence. A finding that a workplace injury substantially aggravated a preexisting condition under R.C. 4123.01(C)(5) must be supported by some objective diagnostic findings, objective clinical findings, or objective test results.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 felony sentences contrary to law

Fourth Amendment search and seizure odor of raw marijuana reasonable suspicion

Sufficiency of evidence Manifest weight Ineffective assistance of counsel Free speech

Prosecutor misconduct Plain error Bench trial

Legal custody due process right to cross examine witness

Arson criminal mischief

Permanent Custody - Trial Court's findings Children could not and should not be returned to Mother was not against the manifest weight of the evidence - Best Interest finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence

Permanent custody-trial court's decision to grant agency permanent custody of child not against the manifest weight of the evidence trial court did not plainly err by considering guardian ad litem's report and recommendation.

Habeas corpus—Habeas corpus will lie only when a petitioner is entitled to immediate release—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Prohibition and mandamus—Appellant has not shown that he is entitled to relief in prohibition or mandamus—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Petitioner had adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—Motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was properly granted—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Withdraw guilty plea after sentencing

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. The juvenile court erred by imposing concurrent periods of commitment on appellee because R.C. 2152.17(E) required them to be imposed consecutively.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file delayed motion for new trial without holding a hearing. Appellant failed to show he was was unavoidably prevented from discovering the allegedly new evidence upon which his motion for new trial would purport to be based. Neither did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion for in camera review of the State's file and sealing for appellate review. Appellant failed to prove a Brady violation that rises to a violation of due process because he made no plausible showing to establish a basis for his claim that the State's file contained material evidence. Judgment affirmed.

JURISDICTION – MOOT – SENTENCING: Defendant's appeal was moot where defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor offense, voluntarily paid the imposed fine and court costs despite obtaining a stay from the trial court and failed to present evidence from which an inference could be drawn that a collateral disability would be suffered.

CONTRACTS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on a breach of contract claim where defendant's defenses of prevention of performance, exceeding a reasonable time to demand performance, and abandonment were without merit.

DENIAL OF BAIL - CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE - R.C. 2937.222: The trial court erred when it denied defendant bail when the state did not present any evidence at the hearing where it was required to produce "clear and convincing evidence" pursuant to R.C. 2937.222

R.C. 2151.353 – continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court – motion to modify a final disposition – motion to dismiss – right to self-representation – permanent custody – first-prong grounds – best interest of the child – manifest weight of the evidence – clear and convincing evidence

permanent custody – six-month extension of temporary custody – clear and convincing evidence – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the child

post-conviction relief, felonious assault, child endangering, res judicata, affidavit, law of the case, abuse of discretion, trial strategy, evidentiary hearing, self-serving affidavit

Field sobriety tests relevance

Parental rights temporary custody R.C. 2151.353(A) preponderance of the evidence manifest weight best interest of the children reasonable efforts R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice due process 90-day waiver. Juvenile court's decision to award temporary custody to CCDCFS was supported by the preponderance of the evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the children's best interest to grant temporary custody to the agency. Although mother had engaged in a number of services, mother had not yet shown that she had sufficiently benefited from those services to resolve the concerns that led to the children being removed from the home. There was nothing in the record to support mother's claim that the juvenile court relied on "perjured" testimony or impermissibly disregarded statements made by the children during in camera interview in granting temporary custody of the children to the agency. Record supported juvenile court's finding that that reasonable efforts were made to eliminate the continued removal of the children from the home or to make it possible for the children to return home. Record did not support mother's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Even assuming there was some deficiency in her counsel's performance, mother did not show that she was prejudiced by any such alleged deficiency given that substantial competent credible evidence was presented supporting the juvenile court's decision to grant temporary custody of the children to the agency. Mother was not denied due process based on timing of temporary custody hearing where written 90-day waiver, signed by mother and her counsel, was filed with the juvenile court and there was nothing in the record to support mother's claim that she executed the 90-day waiver under duress.

Summary judgment race discrimination retaliation jury trial manifest weight of the evidence wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendant on employee's race discrimination and retaliation claims. The employee offered no evidence that he was fired because of his race or that he engaged in a protected activity. The jury verdict in favor of the defendant was supported by the weight of the evidence in the record. The employee offered no evidence that his termination was motivated by conduct related to public policy or that the defendant lacked a legitimate reason for the termination.

R.C. 2903.11 felonious assault sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of evidence sentence contrary to law. Appellant's conviction for felonious assault was legally sufficient and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law.

Receiver stalking horse contract private sale of real property R.C. 2735.04(D)(1)(a) maximize the return from the property to the receivership estate and reasonable sale under the circumstances. The trial court's approval of the receiver's sale of real property that (1) maximized the return from the property to the receivership estate and (2) was reasonable under the circumstances did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

R.C. 2953.08 agreed sentence sentencing range R.C. 2929.19 youth. Appellant's sentence is not subject to appellate review where it was within a jointly recommended sentencing range and authorized by law.

Rape force sufficiency of evidence manifest weight police officer's testimony. The "force" element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) is demonstrated through the evidence that the force was sufficient to overcome the victim's will. A victim need not prove physical resistance to the offender in prosecutions under this statute. In this case the victim's testimony was sufficient to prove that appellant purposely compelled the victim to submit to sexual conduct by force. Furthermore, when a police officer's testimony was based on his training and experience, related to his personal observations during an investigation, and helpful to determine facts in issue, the officer's testimony was properly admitted as lay testimony under Evid.R. 701.

Administrative appeal R.C. 4741.22(A)(1) Ohio Adm.Code 4741-1-10 revocation of license to practice veterinary medicine R.C. 119.12(M) supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in accordance with the law due process R.C. 119.07. Common pleas court did not err or abuse its discretion in affirming Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board's revocation of appellant's license to practice veterinary medicine. Common pleas court did not err in determining that appellant's due process rights were not violated where appellant was properly served with notice of opportunity for hearing, the content of the notice complied with R.C. 119.07 and appellant had a reasonable opportunity to be heard regarding the charges against him. Appellant did not show that any Board members were biased, partial or prejudiced against him. Rules of civil procedure, including discovery provisions, did not apply to administrative proceeding. Board was not required to provide an expert report or to present independent expert testimony establishing appellant's violation of the standard of care. Medical records, expert witness testimony, appellant's testimony and evidence of prior disciplinary action supported the common pleas court's determination that reliable, probative and substantial evidence existed in the record to support the Board's adjudication order.

Reagan Tokes Law. The appellant's sentence according to the Reagan Tokes Law has been ruled constitutional.

Mandamus postconviction relief petitions Civ.R. 58(B), findings of fact and conclusions of law R.C. 2953.21 and judicial discretion. - The court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to issue Civ.R. 58(B) directions for December 2017 judgment that did not have that endorsement. The court denied the writ of mandamus for findings of fact and conclusions of law, because the December 2017 judgment entry resolved the postconviction relief petition.

Appellant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. Given that Appellant, with effective assistance of counsel, entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, Appellant's assignment of error regarding the improper admission of evidence is barred. Judgments affirmed.

Juvenile court's decision to vacate findings supporting application for special immigrant juvenile status lacked a factual basis in the record before the court, and was issued without notice and a hearing in violation of Juv.R.14(C) and procedural due process. Judgment reversed and vacated.

SPEEDY TRIAL – GUILTY PLEA – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE - CUMULATIVE ERROR: Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by entering a guilty plea. Defendant's guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently where the trial court strictly complied with the notification requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and substantially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and defendant's alleged confusion as to the nature of his plea was contradicted by the record. Defendant's guilty plea to a nonexistent charge under Ohio law was valid because a person may enter a plea to a nonexistent offense as part of the plea-bargaining process. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective because counsel's performance was not deficient where counsel recommended a guilty plea to a lesser offense and did not pursue a weak claim of a speedy-trial violation, and where defendant has not shown any prejudice from counsel's performance.

ATTEMPTED ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SUFFICIENCY – PLAIN ERROR: Defendant's attempted-assault conviction was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court based its finding of guilt on uncontroverted testimony of the victim. It was not plain error for the trial court to consider excluded hearsay statements during sentencing where defendant rebutted the accuracy of the statements during allocution and there was no showing of prejudice because defendant received the requested sentence.

Mandamus—R.C. 5705.191—R.C. 5705.25—Writ sought to compel board of elections to include two proposed levies on May 2023 primary-election ballot as renewal levies—Proposed levies ineligible for placement on ballot as renewal levies because they are not being imposed under R.C. 5705.191 for purpose of supplementing general fund for at least one of purposes identified in R.C. 5705.25(A)(2)—Writ denied.

As conceded by the State, the trial court erred by not providing the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) Reagan Tokes notifications during appellant's sentencing hearing. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Anders appeal. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding there are no arguably meritorious issues to present on appeal. Neither appellant nor his counsel raised any potential assignments of error having arguable merit for our review. After conducting an independent review of the proceedings, we agree that there are no issues with arguable merit for appeal. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's petition to adopt a child without appellant-father's consent. Appellant had had no contact with the child and had failed to provide for her support and maintenance without justifiable cause during the year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court granted permanent custody of appellant's two minor children to a children services agency. Specifically, the trial court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that appellant had abandoned the children and that it was in the children's best interest that permanent custody be granted to the agency. These conclusions were supported by the record. Judgments affirmed.

Conceded error appeal. The trial court erred when it failed to notify appellant at sentencing of the consequences of violating post-release control. In addition, the trial court's judgment entry erroneously indicated that the duration of appellant's post-release control could be increased up to a maximum term of eight years. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee OTARMA in this declaratory-judgment action insofar as it found that OTARMA had no duty to defend appellants on an infliction-of-emotional-distress claim asserted against them in an underlying lawsuit in federal district court. The trial court should have entered summary judgment in favor of appellant Miami Township on that issue. In all other respects, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of OTARMA. As a matter of law, OTARMA had no duty to defend or indemnify appellants on any other cause of action in the federal litigation. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to compel discovery filed by appellants prior to its entry of summary judgment. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The trial court did not err by failing to suppress evidence flowing from appellant's warrantless arrest, where the arrest was supported by probable cause, was made in a public place, and was not effectuated by officers constructively entering appellant's residence. Appellant's claim that he was prejudiced by the trial court's certifying four expert witnesses in front of the jury lacks merit the record establishes that the trial court did not expressly declare or designate the witnesses as experts so as to give the appearance of judicial approval of their testimony. In addition, appellant failed to demonstrate plain error where the trial court allowed the admission of other-acts testimony that was elicited by appellant and offered for non-propensity-based purposes. Lastly, appellant's convictions for aggravated murder, involuntary manslaughter, having weapons while under disability, and related firearm specifications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgments affirmed.

Appellant challenges the trial court's acceptance of her guilty plea. The trial court strictly complied with the constitutional requirements and substantially complied with the non-constitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11(C). Thus, she entered her guilty plea in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. Judgment affirmed.

Appellate counsel found no non-frivolous issues for appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our examination of the record also reveals no non-frivolous issues having arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

Offenses committed against different victims during the same course of conduct are committed with a separate animus for each offense and the crimes against each victim are of dissimilar import. Appeal of right under R.C. 2953.08(A)(1)(b) as a result of the imposition of maximum sentence is found not well-taken.

48-month prison sentences for two counts of sexual battery where the offender anally penetrated his minor daughter with his penis do not in any way shock the sense of justice in the community. Because appellant's individual sentences are not grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, the aggregate prison term does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Appellant's counsel's determination that appellant should enter plea on a pretrial date, rather than delaying the plea, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed where Reagan Tokes is constitutional and claim regarding unlawful peonage arising from potential order to perform community service in lieu of court costs not ripe for review.

Affirming Qualified Domestic Relations Order issued by the trial court. Appellant's claim that a QDRO was not the proper enforcement mechanism for assigning benefits under appellant's alternative retirement plan is barred by res judicata. The issue could have been raised on appeal from the judgment entry of divorce and, in fact, was raised – and was ultimately dismissed -- by the trial court in two subsequent judgment entries, neither of which were appealed.

CRIMINAL - Appellant's convictions for Trafficking in Cocaine and Trafficking in Marihuana and Possession of Cocaine were supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence and circumstances available demonstrated that drugs were in Appellant's immediate physical possession, that she was conscious of the presence of the drugs, and that Appellant supported, assisted, encouraged, and cooperated with her co-defendant in possessing and trafficking the drugs found in co-defendant's vehicle.

Habeas corpus—Inmate has adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by way of direct appeal to challenge validity of indictment—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition for failure to state cognizable habeas claim affirmed.

Other acts evidence, forfeiture, sufficiency, criminal damaging or endangering

"Consideration" of the best interest factors for a legal custody analysis does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best interest factors. Even though the juvenile court did not explicitly enumerate each of the best interest factors, it is clear from the record that it considered the relevant best interest factors. The child's marked improvement during his placement with the relative, coupled with several concerning behaviors which characterized appellant's custody demonstrated the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's third successive petition for postconviction relief where appellant's claims raised in support of his most recent petition were barred by the doctrine of res judicata given that appellant had raised the same or substantially similar arguments previously at trial and through multiple appeals and two prior postconviction relief petitions.

Appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's delinquency adjudication is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendant-appellant's sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Prohibition—Appellant failed to identify any statute in support of claim that trial court lost jurisdiction over her criminal case—Court of appeals' dismissal of action for failure to state a claim within its jurisdiction affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - commission to take depositions R.C. 2945.50 Crim.R. 15(A) reimbursement R.C. 959.99(E)(6)(b) due process restitution competent, credible evidence.

CRIMINAL - Presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea a trial court abuses its discretion when it offers a blanket policy against accepting pleas without regard to the facts or circumstances a guilty plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

CRIMINAL - Pandering Sexually Oriented Matter Involving a Minor R.C. 2907.332(A)(1) and (5) Regan Tokes Law indefinite sentencing is constitutional R.C. 2967.271 as-applied challenge to Reagan Tokes Law not yet ripe ineffective assistance of counsel defective indictment lacking an element of the offense was voidable, not void had defect been raised, the defect was curable through amendment Crim.R. 11(C) Crim.R. 32(B) trial court's failure to inform appellant of right to appeal at sentencing did not prejudice appellant because he timely filed his appeal trial court's incorrect statement that only one multiple second-degree felony counts was a qualifying offense under the Reagan Tokes Law was a non-constitutional requirement of Crim.R. 11(C) and appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice or a complete failure to comply with the rule R.C. 2929.144 court was required to state the minimum term for each of the qualifying offense.

CIVIL - civil stalking protection order R.C. 2903.214 Civ.R. 65.1 objections plain error failure to order transcript factual findings.

CRIMINAL - involuntary manslaughter, state did not violate plea bargain, abided by terms of plea agreement by not recommending term of years.

CRIMINAL - motion for new trial sufficiency of the evidence res judicata

CIVIL - summary judgment trial court erred in applying general premises liability framework appellant sufficiently raised genuine issues of material fact whether appellee voluntarily undertook duty to supervise children in afterschool program reversed and remanded.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely criminal appeal has not sought leave to appeal under App.R. 5(A) appeal dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely criminal appeals has not sought leave to appeal under App.R. 5(A) appeals dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - domestic violence R.C. 2919.25(A) sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence knowingly R.C. 2901.22(B).

CRIMINAL LAW – illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of specified governmental facility guilty plea 30-month prison sentence R.C. 2953.08(G) the record reflects no sentencing error the trial court considered the R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2929.13 factors further, the record indicates the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) regarding Appellant's consecutive sentence judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award attorney's fees pursuant to R.C. 121.22(I)(2), where the school board established that it adopted verbatim a model notice rule formulated by the Ohio School Board Association, and used various notification methods, including internet, newspaper, and robocalls in order to notify members of the school district of special meetings.

habeas corpus Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss invalid-waiver-of-counsel claim adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal

The trial court did not err in admitting the statements of an unavailable witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Additionally, sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence support Dillion's convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and the attendant firearm specifications.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Appellant showed counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in that counsel failed to protect appellant's opportunity for meaningful input, sufficiently undermining the outcome of the permanent custody trial for one child.

Breach of Contract-Summary Judgment-In breach of contract action arising out of a consumer's loan agreement with a bank, trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in the bank's favor. No genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the validity of the agreement or the creditor's failure to make required monthly payment, thus resulting in the breach. Dismissal of creditor's breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims was proper, as neither were sufficiently pled. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus-R.C. 2935.09(D)-Private citizen affidavit charging misdemeanor offense mailed to clerk of court for filing-Mandamus complaint seeking to compel respondents, clerks of court, to file relator's mailed citizen affidavit charging misdemeanor offenses and seeking issuance of warrant properly dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because relator failed to demonstrate clerks had a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief under R.C. 2935.09(D) or 2935.10(B).

Mandamus—Prohibition—R.C. 2945.44(A)—Neither probate-juvenile court's status as a division of a common pleas court nor its status as a probate court vested it with jurisdiction to grant application for immunity in criminal case— Prosecutor has no clear legal duty to file an application for immunity in general division of common pleas court because R.C. 2945.44(A) gives prosecutors discretion whether to pursue immunity—Writ granted to compel probate-juvenile court to vacate order granting immunity to two witnesses, and prosecutor's motion to dismiss complaint granted.

Vexatious litigators—R.C. 2323.52, vexatious-litigator statute, is constitutional in its entirety—Nothing in language of R.C. 2323.52 excludes vexatious-litigator parties represented by counsel from statute's requirements—Even when a vexatious-litigator party is represented by counsel, party must still seek leave to proceed—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

COMPETENCY – TESTIMONY – ADMISSIBILITY – COUNSEL – HEARSAY – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – AGGRAVATED ROBBERY – FELONIOUS ASSAULT – HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER A DISABILITY – ALLIED OFFENSES: The trial court did not err in admitting the competency report prepared three months before the competency hearing when defendant requested that the hearing be continued. Where the excluded testimony was not included in the record on appeal to allow the appellate court to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony, the appellate court must presume the regularity of the trial court's ruling and cannot determine that the trial court erred. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the photo lineup because the lineup was provided by the state in discovery and the administration of the lineup complied with the statute defense counsel was not ineffective for untimely disclosing a witness where defendant did not timely inform counsel of the witness and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the defendant's confession because the interrogation was not coercive. The trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of a witness, but the error was harmless because it did not affect the outcome of the trial. Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and having weapons while under a disability were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established that defendant attempted to rob then shot one victim, provided the gun used to rob and shoot a second victim, and committed an armed robbery against a third victim. The trial court did not commit plain error by imposing multiple sentences for aggravated robbery and felonious assault where the offenses were committed separately.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – R.C. 2919.25 – PHYSICAL HARM – SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE : Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence presented established that defendant knowingly caused physical harm to his wife by hitting, grabbing, and squeezing her arms and by scratching her chest.

EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SENTENCING: Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was not against the weight of the evidence where the factfinder found the victim's testimony to be more credible than defendant's testimony. The trial court erred in imposing a no-contact order when the defendant was not placed on community control.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – EXPERT TESTIMONY – PRIMA FACIE CASE: The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of medical defendants on plaintiff's medial malpractice claim where plaintiff's expert, an ENT doctor, offered testimony concerning the standard of care and breach of that standard by an MRI technician in protecting plaintiff's ears during an MRI procedure: the doctor's expertise in the standard of care for ear protection appropriately overlapped the MRI technician's expertise in properly protecting a patient's ears during an MRI..

permanent custody, prior involuntary termination of parental rights, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), best interest

PERMANENT CUSTODY - A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors the trial court's findings that Appellant failed to substantially remedy the conditions that led to the child's removal and that Appellant demonstrated a lack of commitment to the child were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the record contained ample clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's findings that the child cannot be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Appellant.

Civ.R. 56(C) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion open and obvious condition matter of law when only one conclusion can be drawn from the established facts alleged violation of the Ohio Building Code does not constitute negligence per se.

Application for reopening App.R. 26(B) successive applications motion for leave to file successive application res judicata. A motion for leave to file a successive application for reopening was denied because there is no provision in App.R. 26(B) for successive applications and res judicata bars relitigation of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for claims not raised in the prior application for reopening.

Crim.R. 11 guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary prejudice complete failure State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286 OVI repeat OVI offender specification third-degree felony R.C. 4511.19 R.C. 2929.14 R.C. 2941.1413 R.C. 2929.13. Judgment is vacated and remanded. Defendant's guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was misinformed regarding the possible sentence he faced and the nature of his charges. Here, the court failed to correct the mistake in defendant's sentence and failed to advise defendant of the full nature of his charges. The omissions and the misinformation by the trial court demonstrate a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) and eliminate the defendant's burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court's error. Because defendant's plea is vacated, any error regarding his sentence is moot.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 App.R. 12. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment when issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant was involved in the sale of a stolen vehicle. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff in support of its motion for summary judgment showed questions of material fact. There was no evidence defendant was involved in the sale of the car other than the defendant owner's affidavit and substantial evidence that created questions of material fact.

Felony sentencing contrary to law indefinite Reagan Tokes mandatory judicial release earned credit. The trial court's imposition of an indefinite prison term pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not unconstitutional. The trial court clearly and convincingly failed to comply with the applicable sentencing statutes by imposing a mandatory prison term on the defendant's third-degree felony conviction.

Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial hearing on motion for a new trial res judicata newly discovered evidence Petro factors DNA testing lost evidence abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial. The evidence appellant submitted in support of his motion for new trial did not meet the Petro factors and was not newly discovered evidence. The matter of the missing evidence for which appellant wanted DNA testing completed had previously been litigated. The affidavit of appellant's proposed expert in eyewitness testimony was not newly discovered evidence. The appellant did not show that an expert was not available to him at trial and there was not a strong probability that the results of the trial would have been different if an expert on eyewitness identification had testified at his trial. The multiple affidavits of the person who claimed he committed the crimes for which appellant was convicted do not constitute newly discovered evidence. The other person was known to appellant prior to his trial and defense strategy at trial was that this other person committed the crimes, his affidavits were inconsistent, and four victims identified appellant as the person who committed the crimes.

Victim-impact statement R.C. 2930.14 failure to object plain error consecutive sentencing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) ineffective assistance of counsel. The court complied with R.C. 2930.14 by permitting and considering victim-impact statements. The court made the appropriate consecutive sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and incorporated them into the sentencing journal entry. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the victim-impact statements.

Megan's Law classification sexual predator manifest weight record relevant reliable abuse of discretion pattern of conduct behavior nature of offense future sexually oriented offense. The trial court was within its discretion to consider relevant information gathered during the underlying police investigation when making its sexual predator determination. The trial court's judgment classifying appellant as a sexual predator is supported by competent, credible evidence.

Juvenile offender life imprisonment age as a mitigating factor postconviction-relief petition cruel and unusual punishment. The juvenile offender's postconviction-relief petition was untimely. Even if the motion had been timely, his Eighth Amendment claim would be barred by res judicata. Moreover, the rule announced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Patrick is procedural and may not be applied retroactively.

C.C.O. 433.01 operating a vehicle under the influence C.C.O. 431.34 failure to control ineffective assistance of counsel R.C. 2317.02(B)(2) motion to suppress App.R. 9 inaudible transcript segments. The decision of defense counsel not to seek suppression of medical records secured under R.C. 2317.02(B)(2) does not constitute ineffective assistance. The record does not support a reasonable probability that the motion would have been successful if made and that the decision affected the outcome of the case. It is the duty of the appellant to provide a complete transcript under App.R. 9. The inaudible portions of the record did not prevent a thorough and meaningful review on appeal, and appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentences. The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences because the trial court made the requisite findings and they are supported by the record.

Community-control sanctions grand theft R.C. 2929.19(B) notification requirements Crim.R. 36 consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) nontechnical violation of community-control sanctions R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii). Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in imposing a 36-month consecutive prison sentence where the appellant was properly notified of the sentence prior to its imposition. Additionally, the record supported that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences and that appellant's community-control violation was nontechnical.

Motion to compel arbitration R.C. 2711.03 hearing enforceability unconscionable. The trial court erred when it failed to hold a hearing prior to ruling on appellants' motion to compel arbitration when the issue of enforceability was raised, the appellants specifically requested a hearing, and no evidence was submitted to the trial court on the issue of enforceability.

Manifest weight double jeopardy allied offenses of similar import. Convictions for felonious assault, abduction, and domestic violence were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where a jury is permitted to believe, disbelieve, or accept part of the testimony of a particular witness. A review of the entire record disputes appellant's contention that the victim was a pathological liar who lied throughout her testimony. Furthermore, appellant's convictions for felonious assault, abduction, and domestic violence did not violate double jeopardy and were not allied offenses of similar import requiring one sentence. The record established that the crimes, with the exception of the two Counts of abduction, were committed separately, permitting the trial court to impose sentences for each. However, it was an error for the trial court to sentence appellant on each of two counts of abduction, which the trial court had properly merged. As allied offenses of similar import, the state should have been allowed to choose which count they wished to proceed on and the trial court should have sentenced appellant to only one count of abduction. Accordingly, the sentence is vacated as to Counts 3 and 4 and remanded for the state to elect which count it wishes for sentencing to proceed.

Postconviction relief untimely successive res judicata right to counsel waiver of counsel Crim.R. 44 void voidable Ogle Harper Henderson jurisdiction plain error. - Defendant contended that his waiver of counsel was deficient and thus, he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. As such, the defendant maintained that under Ogle, this deprivation of counsel caused the trial court to lose jurisdiction over the case and thus, Harper and Henderson did not apply, and his conviction is void. This court found that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's emergency motion to vacate void judgment because even if res judicata did not bar his claim, and even if the defendant demonstrated that his constitutional right to counsel was violated, he has not established that this violation rose to the level of plain error requiring correction.

Reagan Tokes constitutionality. The trial court imposed an indefinite prison sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's arguments that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional were overruled in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.). Appellant's sentence is affirmed.

Summary judgment motion for directed verdict Civ.R. 56 Civ.R. 50 de novo negligence proximate cause causal connection common knowledge opening statement. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly denied Pietrangelo's motion for summary judgment because disputed facts, including prior injuries, precluded summary judgment and Pietrangelo failed to support his claim with any expert opinions. The trial court properly granted Hudson's motion for directed verdict. Pietrangelo was unable to sustain his negligence action because his injuries required expert testimony to show proximate cause and he could not present any expert medical testimony with respect to this issue.

State's appeal Reagan Tokes Law, S.B. 201 contrary to law. The trial court's sentence was contrary to law because it failed to sentence appellant in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law, which this court found to be constitutional in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 538 (8th Dist.).

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. Appellant argued that his indefinite sentences imposed pursuant to the Reagan Tokes law were unconstitutional on the grounds the sentences violated his right to a jury trial, his right to due process, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Because the court overruled these arguments in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (en banc), the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Pro se litigant postconviction-relief petition res judicata. The trial court did not err by denying pro se litigant's postconviction-relief petition because it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal

Knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea of guilty

Knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea of guilty

Consecutive sentences

OVI Sufficient indicia of intoxication Chemical test not conducted within three hour window Error in sentencing

Speedy trial, time waiver

Manifest Weight Sufficiency of Evidence

Auto accident App.R. 16

The trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the issue of self-defense. Appellant met his burden of producing sufficient evidence that, if believed, would raise a question in the minds of reasonable jurors as to the existence of self-defense. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

The court of common pleas did not err when it found STRS abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily when it refused to consider whether appellee's connective tissue disease was a disabling condition. Judgment affirmed.

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas did not err in dismissing an administrative appeal from a decision of the Ohio Elections Commission, which denied a motion for a protective order, because the commission's decision was not a "final determination," subject to appeal under R.C. 3517.157(D).

Relator, who filed no objections to the magistrate's decision, can prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of prohibition because the trial court had jurisdiction over the foreclosure action he challenges in this mandamus action. Accordingly, the recommendation and decision of the magistrate are adopted, respondents' motions to dismiss are granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to an attorney on plaintiff's claims. The attorney was immune from liability to the third-party plaintiff arising from his performance as an attorney in good faith on behalf of, and with the knowledge of the attorney's client. There was no showing by plaintiff that the attorney was in privity with the client or acted maliciously.

The magistrate did not err in determining that relator had an adequate remedy at law and therefore is not entitled to either a writ of mandamus or procedendo. Case dismissed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to vacate post-release control. Appellant could have raised this issue in a direct appeal. And any sentencing error committed by the trial court relating to post-release control would have made the challenged judgment voidable, not void. Thus, his motion to vacate was barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL COUNSEL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – FOURTH AMENDMENT– PROTECTIVE SWEEP – INEVITABLE DISCOVERY Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of a consent search and protective sweep of the home. [But see DISSENT: The defendant did not meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel because the record does not show that counsel's alleged deficient performance rendered the result of the proceedings unreliable or fundamentally unfair.] Defendant demonstrated arguable merit to his claim that consent to search the home provided to the officers was a product of coercion, and the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, where officers told a resident of the home they were "doing a search warrant" before receiving consent. Defendant demonstrated arguable merit to his claim that a protective sweep of the home lacked justification, and the seizure of a safe discovered in the course of the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, where there were no specific and articulable facts to support a belief that a person was in the home and the protective sweep was consistent with a routine practice. [But see DISSENT: The police officers had articulable facts, which taken together with reasonable inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing dangers to those at the scene, particularly given the danger involved in investigating drug activity and the danger inherent in the confines of a house or otherwise on an "adversary's turf."] Application of the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule was not proper where the state failed to show that the safe would have been discovered apart from the unconstitutional search where the record contains no indication that the officers were attempting to secure a warrant to search the house. [But see DISSENT: Even if the protective sweep was improper, the discovery of the safe was inevitable given the facts and circumstances known to the police before they entered the residence where the officers had probable cause to obtain a warrant and where they would have been justified in freezing the scene to prevent any destruction of evidence while they waited for a warrant.]

FIFTH AMENDMENT – MIRANDA RIGHTS – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL COUNSEL – PREJUDICE – PLAIN ERROR – AGGRAVATED ROBBERY – R.C. 2911.01 – TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE – R.C. 2921.12(A) – OBSCTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – R.C. 2921.31 – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY - MANIFEST WEIGHT The juvenile failed to establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for failing to raise arguments in a motion to suppress because, although trial counsel's assistance was deficient for failing to argue that the juvenile requested an attorney, the juvenile failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if trial counsel had not been deficient. The juvenile failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court committed plain error because, although the juvenile court contravened Juv.R. 22(D)(3)'s requirement that it hold a hearing on the juvenile's motion to suppress, the juvenile failed to show that the error affected the outcome of the trial. The juvenile's delinquency adjudications for three charges of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(a)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where victim and officer testimony and the juvenile's statements connected the juvenile to all three robberies. Juvenile's delinquency adjudication for tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) was supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where the juvenile court found the officer's testimony credible, and the officer's testimony established that the juvenile was carrying a gun, knew an investigation was pending, and discarded the gun. The juvenile's delinquency adjudication for obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) was supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where the officer's testimony, which was deemed credible by the juvenile court, established that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a Terry stop of the juvenile, and the juvenile ran from officers after the officers identified themselves as police and instructed the juvenile to stop.

JURY WAIVER – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SUFFICIENCY: Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional right to a jury trial where the record reflects that defendant waived his right to a jury trial prior to trial, signed the jury-waiver form, engaged in a colloquy with the court, and reaffirmed, in open court, that he understood his right to a jury trial and voluntarily waived it, and the written waiver was promptly journalized once the court discovered the waiver had not been journalized before the start of the trial. Defendant's convictions for felonious assault and improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the factfinder found the victims' testimony established that defendant fired the gun at the home where they were standing and the factfinder found the victims' testimony to be more credible than defendant's alibi testimony.

BATSON CHALLENGE – EVIDENCE WITNESS TRIAL: The trial court's determination that the striking of an African-American potential juror was not motivated by discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous because the race-neutral reason offered by the prosecution for the use of a peremptory challenge was reasonably related to the response given by the potential juror during voir dire. The witnesses did not vouch for the victim's veracity where the witnesses did not offer an opinion as to the truth of the sexual-abuse allegations.

PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA – SENTENCING: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the presentence motion to withdraw the plea because defendant did not have a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw the plea. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a basis for the appellate court to review a sentence where defendant argues that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.

VIOLATING A PROTECTION ORDER - EVIDENCE -SUFFICIENCY: Defendant's conviction for violating a protection order was based on insufficient evidence because the state did not show that defendant recklessly violated the terms of the protection order where the state did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was served with the protection order.

Respondent Ohio Adult Parole Authority's motion to dismiss relator-inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus is granted because relator did not comply with the filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C).

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property and failure to comply. The verdicts were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State presented the expert testimony of the forensic scientist who concluded that appellant's DNA matched the DNA discovered on a baseball cap and a vehicle's airbag, but the State did not introduce the testimony of the person who prepared the DNA samples for analysis. This failure did not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury that "the unexplained possession by the defendant of the recently stolen property may give rise to a permissive inference from which you may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property." This instruction did not violate appellant's right to remain silent. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by ordering appellant to pay sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. The trial court had no authority to determine whether the appeal was frivolous and whether to impose sanctions on that basis. Pursuant to App.R. 23, those determinations are solely for the appellate court. Judgment vacated.

Appellant was convicted of escape as a second-degree felony because the charges pending against him at the time of the escape included first-degree felonies. Based on the evidence that the charges pending against appellant at the time of the attempted escape included two counts of aggravated robbery, which is a first-degree felony, and defense counsel's admission that the pending charges had included aggravated robberies, there was sufficient evidence to support the escape conviction as a second-degree felony. The escape conviction also was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's competence to stand trial was not raised in this case, but counsel informed the court that appellant's competence had been raised (but not determined) in criminal proceedings pending in two other counties. Before the trial began, the trial court discussed this issue with counsel and appellant at length. Contrary to appellant's assertion, this discussion was not a competency hearing. Moreover, nothing that occurred or was discussed would have reasonably triggered a concern regarding appellant's competency to stand trial. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not violate appellant's plea agreement by imposing an indeterminate prison term of 10 years minimum to 15 years maximum under the Reagan Tokes Act. Judgment affirmed

Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), having found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. An examination of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues having arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in imposing a maximum prison sentence for a fourth-degree felony offense of violence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellant had violated his community control sanctions. Judgment reversed.

Trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed an indictment with prejudice where it did so without a recommendation from the prosecutor of successful completion of the pre-trial diversion program, and without affording the state an opportunity to object or provide an argument in opposition to the dismissal.

Trial court's finding—that defendant did not overcome the presumption of prison time required by R.C. 2907.07(F)(3)—was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, and therefore defendant's six month prison sentence for importuning was not overturned.

In a hostile-work environment, sexual harassment case the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where the school board took timely, corrective action to prevent the harassment, had no constructive knowledge that the individual was a habitual harasser, and where a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign while the investigation was still pending. R.C. Chapter 4112.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied motion for leave to file motion to suppress evidence that was filed two business days before trial. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek continuance of trial date. Decision whether to request continuance is trial strategy, a continuance was implicitly requested, and court's comments indicate unwillingness to continue trial date.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE - Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a statutory speedy trial issue where Appellant was not entitled to utilize triple-count provision of R.C.2945.71(E) because four separate indictments did not arise from one criminal incident and any shared common litigation history likely occurred in the interest of judicial economy.

real property agreement – breach of contract – notice of default – cure period – discovery – deposition – Civ.R. 56(F) – summary judgment

Appellant appeals declaratory judgment concerning ownership of shares in corporation. Court did not err by allegedly failing to determine the rights of the parties concerning control and management. Complaint sought declaration on ownership and effect of a partnership agreement. Court's decision decided those issues. Court did not abuse discretion in denying appellant's motion to disqualify counsel. Appellant failed to establish that any alleged conflict posed significant risk of tainting trial.

The Court of Claims did not err in denying appellant's public records request for the mail and email distribution lists for the township's quarterly newsletters as appellant failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the lists are records as defined by R.C. 149.011(G). The lists do not serve to document the organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the township rather, the mailing addresses and names and email addresses represent contact information used as a matter of convenience in distributing the newsletters.

The common pleas court did not err in vacating the village council's decision, and remanding the matter for further proceedings, where the plain language of R.C. 2506.04, in addition to precedent set by the Ohio Supreme Court, clearly authorizes the common pleas court to vacate and remand decisions of administrative agencies.

Trial court's admission of a bystander's 9-1-1 call and the cruiser cam recording of the victim's statements at the scene of the incident at defendant's jury trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

An appellant must demonstrate that a seated juror was biased. Where a challenged juror was excused and did not participate in the jury's deliberations, and there is no evidence that the juror was biased or in any way affected the jury panel, there is no error. Where a trial court orders the separation of witnesses, an appellant fails establish prejudice from the live streaming of the trial if there is no evidence that any witness actually viewed the live stream. A jury may reject a defendant's testimony in favor of a prosecution witness's testimony. And a jury may base its decision on circumstantial evidence from the prosecution's expert that the defendant was the cause of serious physical injuries.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. Appellant failed to address the second prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring prejudice. Appellant's petition suggesting that he could have received a more favorable plea agreement did not constitute substantive grounds for relief.

COMMUNITY-CONTROL VIOLATION NON-TECHNICAL VIOLATION CONSECUTIVE-SENTENCE-NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RESERVED-PRISON TERM. The trial court did not err by determining that defendant-appellant's community-control violation constituted a non-technical violation. However, the trial court did err by ordering the defendant-appellant to serve a 6-month prison term consecutive to the sentence imposed in another county where the trial court had not previously notified the defendant-appellant, that upon revocation of her community control, she may be sentenced consecutively other sentences being served. Judgment affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded.

FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANTLESS SEARCH EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES PLAIN VIEW The trial court did not err by overruling the defendant-appellant's motions to suppress.

If a significant trial witness recants his or her prior testimony, courts must apply a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine the credibility of the recantation. Second, the trial court must determine whether this testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial. In general, purported recantation testimony is viewed with suspicion.

CRIMINAL LAW - reopened appeal App.R. 26(B) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel consecutive sentence findings joint agreement as to sentence.

CIVIL - membership private organization skydiving refusal to renew membership governance manual breach of contract negligence intentional interference with business interest Sarbanes-Oxley Act Ohio's whistle-blower statute Civ.R. 12(C) no contractual relationship no cognizable cause of action for negligence no Sarbanes-Oxley violation no intentional interference with a business interest no breach of duty of good faith genuine issue of material fact as to Ohio whistle-blower claim dismissal of claim for injunctive relief proper.

APPELLATE REVIEW - failure to comply with local and appellate rules appeal dismissed.

CIVIL LAW - workers' compensation R.C. 4123.512(F) increase in statutory award of attorney fees 2017 amendment applies prospectively to any claim arising on or after date of the amendment.

CRIMINAL LAW - resentencing consecutive sentences statutory findings R.C. 292914(C)(4) made during sentencing hearing court failed to incorporate into judgment entry nunc pro tunc affirm.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - petition for writ of mandamus public records request COVID-19 documents even if relator has a right to the alleged records, respondent has no duty to meet the request no genuine issue of material fact petition dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - felonious assault endangering children trial by jury manifest weight of the evidence the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant guilty. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – failure to object to the admission of exhibits failure to object to hearsay testimony Evid.R. 801(C), 802, and 803(4) no plain error failure to request accomplice testimony instruction R.C. 2923.03(D) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing argument because there is no error in any of Appellant's arguments, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable Appellant fails to show his retained trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense judgment affirmed

CONTEMPT – motions for contempt denied hearing abuse of discretion standard shared parenting plan agreed judgment entry manifest weight of the evidence missed parenting time Appellee relied upon CDC COVID guidelines trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Appellee's explanation, noting the best interest standard and the primary concern for the minor child's health in an apparent attempt to make up for the three missed days, the court awarded Appellant an additional week of compensatory parenting time with the minor child with respect to the phone calls, the record reveals the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellee's actions to be at most, inadvertent, due to the extraordinary circumstances at issue judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL – The state did not err in advising defendant in plea negotiations that the trial court must impose a mandatory maximum sentence for a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(9)(g). The defendant does not suffer prejudice, despite the state's erroneous argument at sentencing that the defendant could be classified as a major drug offender but for the dismissal of other charges, where the trial court clearly predicates the maximum sentence on other factors.

CIVIL – The issuance of a domestic violence civil protection order is a miscarriage of justice where the petitioner fails to establish: (1) she suffered "mental distress," as that term is defined by Ohio law (2) Appellant's behavior significantly impacted her daily life and/or (3) she changed her routine due to the respondent's behavior

Domestic Relations modification of spousal support motion to vacate Civ.R. 60(B) accrual and value of sick and vacation benefits payment of vacation and sick benefits upon retirement marital assets divorce decree disparity in income post-decree concealment.

Civ.R. 11, R.C. 2323.51

Sentencing, Ineffective Assistance

Felonious assault prosecutorial misconduct

Employer's writ of mandamus denied where the decision of the Industrial Commission was based on some evidence to support the award of permanent partial disability and permanent total disability, in spite of conflicting medical reports.

Appellant's convictions of cruelty to a companion animal in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A) and having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13 are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Neither the jury nor the trial court lost its way in finding appellant guilty of the charges based on the evidence presented at trial. Merely because the respective finders of fact chose to find the state's witnesses credible does not render appellant's convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

No final appealable order due to the trial court's failure to enter any judgment or order effecting the jury's verdict. Lacking jurisdiction, this court sua sponte dismisses the appeal.

Common pleas court did not err by concluding relator failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. Under the specific definition of "total service credit" contained in R.C. 145.016(C)(1), relator was required to have five or more years of contributing service to be eligible for retirement benefits. The record was undisputed that relator had less than five years of contributing service credit.

Juvenile delinquency—dispositional hearing—trial counsel not ineffective for failing to present evidence to support appellant's request for probation

On certified entry of felony conviction.

JURY SELECTION — IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS — REBUTTAL TESTIMONY — CUMULATIVE ERROR: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to excuse two jurors for cause, as the decision to remove a juror for cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court which determined that the prospective jurors could adequately fulfill their duties. Where the applicable requirements under the Rules of Evidence were not met because defendant was not questioned about his statement so he never denied making a statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rebuttal witness to impeach defendant's testimony. Where the case lacked numerous errors that deprived plaintiff of a fair trial, the plaintiff failed to establish cumulative error.

R.C. 2907.06 — SEXUAL IMPOSITION — EVIDENCE VIDEO — AUTHENTICATION — SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT : While the trial court abused its discretion by admitting improperly-authenticated video about which the victim had no personal knowledge and could not testify to how the surveillance system runs, the error was harmless because defendant's conviction for sexual imposition was overwhelmingly supported by the remaining evidence.

CIV.R. 60(B) — JURISDICTION: Where appeals in the case were completed, the trial court erred when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's application for a writ of mandamus and dismissing his case where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ because defendant requested that the court issue the writ to a court of the same rank.

jurisdiction, State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94 (1978), withdrawal of guilty plea after affirmance

citizen affidavit, R.C. 2935.09, R.C. 2935.10, service

Gross Sexual Imposition, Manifest Weight

App.R. 26(B)(1) good cause shown for late filing administrative error App.R. 26(B)(5) applicant bears burden of establishing a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

rape application to reopen App.R. 26(B) appellate counsel not ineffective

testimony of surgeon who operated on defendant on the day he stabbed his wife and corresponding medical records did not violate physician-patient privilege surgeon and nurse testified as fact witnesses when stating wrist wounds appeared self-inflicted and expert report was not required self-defense claim is not reviewed on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence as statutory change deals only with state's burden of persuasive jury's rejection of self-defense claim was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 2323.51 frivolous conduct R.C. 2105.06 heirship probate court jurisdiction R.C. 2101.24(A)(1) R.C. 2113.01 R.C. 2123.01

affirming denial of motion for leave to file new trial motion without hearing findings of fact and conclusions of law not required.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Habeas corpus, remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), de novo, res judicata, venue, subject matter jurisdiction

Law-of-the-case doctrine partial remand scope of appellate mandate appellate jurisdiction claims abandoned on appeal commencement of class action final appealable order motion for reconsideration R.C. 2505.02(B) Civ.R. 54(B). The trial court lacked jurisdiction to exceed the scope of the remand of this court from the prior appeal, which only reversed the dismissal of the individual claims. The class claims had been abandoned on appeal. Consequently, the court's consideration and adjudication of the motion for class certification was in error. However, since the court denied the motion for class certification, the parties are in the same positions, and the judgment is affirmed. In addition, despite the trial court's inclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) certification, the judgment entry denying the motions for reconsideration did not constitute a final appealable order and this court lacked jurisdiction to review them.

Community-control sanctions abuse of discretion Jones test persisting in disorderly conduct no-contact victims abstain drugs and alcohol asylum support restitution. The trial court's imposition of no-contact with the appellant's wife and daughter was a proper condition of community control when appellant pled guilty to persisting in disorderly conduct. However, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed drug- and alcohol-related conditions, a requirement that appellant cooperate with his wife and daughter's asylum applications, and "continue to support" his wife and daughter as restitution. These conditions do not meet the Jones test and, are therefore, reversed. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Juvenile adjudication juvenile delinquency rape R.C. 2907.02 gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05 Evid.R. 803(4) social worker testimony SANE nurse testimony sufficiency of the evidence penetration manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court's adjudication that defendant was delinquent of seven counts of rape and two counts of gross sexual imposition is affirmed. The trial court did not err in admitting hearsay testimony from the CCDCFS social worker and the SANE nurses where it fit into the hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(4), statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Furthermore, the adjudications were not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Summary judgment respondeat superior liability scope of employment, commercial general liability coverage policy contract interpretation. Plaintiff, a passenger in a single car accident, sued the driver and driver's employer for injuries sustained in the accident. The driver was convicted of operating a vehicle under impairment and felony vehicular assault. The accident occurred after driver and plaintiff had dinner and socialized with friends. After the lawsuit was filed, the employer's insurance company intervened seeking declaratory judgment that the Commercial General Liability Coverage policy it issued to employer did not cover the accident. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to driver's employer was proper where driver was not acting within the course of employment at the time of the accident. The general business insurance policy would apply if the employee was acting in furtherance of the employer's business. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to employer's insurance company was proper because driver was not acting in furtherance of the employer's business at the time of the accident.

Summary judgment respondeat superior liability scope of employment, commercial general liability coverage policy contract interpretation. Plaintiff, a passenger in a single car accident, sued the driver and driver's employer for injuries sustained in the accident. The driver was convicted of operating a vehicle under impairment and felony vehicular assault. The accident occurred after driver and plaintiff had dinner and socialized with friends. After the lawsuit was filed, the employer's insurance company intervened seeking declaratory judgment that the Commercial General Liability Coverage policy it issued to employer did not cover the accident. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to driver's employer was proper where driver was not acting within the course of employment at the time of the accident. The general business insurance policy would apply if the employee was acting in furtherance of the employer's business. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to employer's insurance company was proper because driver was not acting in furtherance of the employer's business at the time of the accident.

Admission of evidence Evid.R. 404(B) other-acts evidence abuse of discretion failure to object ineffective assistance of counsel trial strategy closing argument prosecutorial misconduct mistrial curative instruction sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence hearsay testimony vouch for credibility of another witness failure to file motion to suppress probable cause traffic stop window tint other indicia of criminal activity Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did not err in its admission of testimony or giving a curative instruction. Finally, appellant's sentence was properly imposed under the Reagan Tokes Law.

Petition to seal record R.C. 2953.32 abuse of discretion eligible offender hearing. Because appellant was an eligible offender, the trial court erred by not holding a hearing in order to make the determinations required by R.C. 2953.32(C)(1) before ruling upon his petition to seal record.

Permanent custody termination of parental rights best interest of the children denial of continuance. The juvenile court's termination of mother's parental rights is affirmed. Mother abandoned the children, who were in agency custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Permanent custody to the agency is in the children's best interest. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother's attorney's request for a continuance when mother abandoned the children and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for permanent custody.

Sentence contrary to law Reagan Tokes Law constitutional. Reversed and remanded. The trial court's sentence was contrary to law because it failed to sentence codefendants with the Tokes Law, which this court found constitutional. Codefendants' sentences are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to sentence each codefendant in accordance with the Tokes Law.

Breach of personal guarantee summary judgment untimely appeal App.R. 4 bootstrapping. In 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on its claim for breach of personal guarantee. The defendant did not appeal that judgment he instead filed several miscellaneous motions over the next three years asking the trial court for a hearing and arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to the judgment the trial court awarded. He now appeals the summary denial of his most recent motion, the substance of which is again that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment against him in 2019. This is an example of impermissible "bootstrapping," whereby an appellant assigns error from a final order that was not the subject of a timely appeal in an otherwise timely appeal. The appeal is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. Appeal dismissed.

Best interest of the child manifest weight sufficiency of the evidence abuse of discretion R.C. 2151.414(D) R.C. 2151.414(E). Juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody of the child to the agency was supported by the sufficiency and greater weight of the evidence, where the record established that the Mother's three older children had previously been committed to the permanent custody of the agency Mother gave birth to a fourth child did not obtain prenatal care and over the course of six months did not successfully complete case plan goals. Further, the record established that the child should not be returned to Mother's care, and Mother did not rebut that presumption as required by R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Further, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by including in its journal entry all of the best interest factors, even those that were not directly relevant to the case. The court was required to demonstrate that it considered all the factors when deciding the best interest of the child. Even so, the juvenile court in this case did include findings of fact that illustrated its consideration of the factors and what factors in this specific case supported its decision.

Parental rights permanent custody manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence best interests of the child abuse of discretion. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the children were in the agency's custody for 12 months or longer for a consecutive 22-month period and that it was in the best interests of the children to grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody of the child to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence nor was its finding that the parents posed an ongoing threat to the children an abuse of discretion.

Judgement reversed. Because there was no indication that appellant had vacated the premises, there was no basis on which to find the appeal moot. The trial court plainly erred by granting restitution of the premises to appellee based on testimony from an unidentified witness who provided no statement indicating that he had personal knowledge of the case against appellant.

Appeal dismissed. Victim's appeal from trial court's decision denying victim's motion to be present at trial was moot, because victim filed the appeal after trial concluded and the court acquitted defendant of the charged offense. Victim failed to establish any applicable exceptions to mootness.

The juvenile court's judgments granting permanent court commitment of appellant's three minor children to children services agency is supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence relevant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors established, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent court commitment is in the best interest of the children. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the October 16, 2019 order of the Board finding that, pursuant to R.C. 4731.22(B)(26), appellant is impaired in his ability to practice, and pursuant to R.C. 4731.251, appellant is not eligible for the one-bite program thus, the Board's determination was in accordance with the law. During the time-frame relevant to appellant's application for licensure, the version of R.C. 4731.251 then in effect clearly and unambiguously applied only to practitioners, not applicants such as appellant. Judgment affirmed.

"Court of Claims did not err when it dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to name a proper defendant under R.C. 2743.13(A). Judgment affirmed."

rejecting arguments seeking to suppress statement before Mirandize, meth from his pocket after he acknowledged having drugs, and his post-Mirandize statements sufficiency and weight of the evidence as operability of gun gun met definition of firearm.

ALLIED OFFENSES — R.C. 2941.25 — NO-CONTACT ORDER — SENTENCING: The trial court did not err by convicting defendant of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after defendant entered guilty pleas because the offenses were not allied of similar import where each offense generated its own separate and identifiable harm, where the aggravated robbery, committed when the defendant struck the victim in the head with a rock in the garage, caused a serious head injury that was life altering and bore a significance apart from the injuries inflicted when defendant punched and kicked the victim in the kitchen during the aggravated burglary.

CONSTITTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – TRAFFIC VIOLATION: The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to suppress a gun found in his glove compartment where the police officer observed defendant change lanes without using his turn signal and this observation justified the stop of defendant's vehicle.

R.C. 2151.356 – JUVENILE – RECORD SEALING – EXPUNGEMENT: The juvenile court erred when it did not seal and expunge applicant's juvenile adjudication as an unruly child. The juvenile court did not err when it denied appellant's applications to seal and expunge juvenile records based on a finding of insufficient rehabilitation where the juvenile court found that appellant had a lengthy adult criminal record.

Identity 911 call hearsay

Permanent Custody - Father Incarcerated - RC 2151.414(E)(10) - No Communication with Children for Greater than 90 days

Presentence Investigation Report - Post-Sentence Request to Review

Consecutive Sentencing - Rebuttable Presumption of Community Control

Workers' compensation—Premium audit—Employment relationship—Factors for determining whether a person is an independent contractor or employee for workers' compensation purposes—Right-to-control test—Court of appeals' judgment reversed—Limited writ granted ordering Bureau of Workers' Compensation to issue an amended order that accounts for the factors being considered by furnishing reasons that are briefly explained and statements that are fact-specific.

In a termination of parental rights case, the court did not err in awarding permanent custody to the children services agency where the children were in agency custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Further, mother had failed to remedy the conditions causing the removal. R.C. 2151.414 best interest.

Anders appeal. Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. There are no issues of arguable merit to consider on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in reversing Troy Board of Zoning Appeals' decision approving appellant's application for a certificate of appropriateness to demolish a building in the city's historic district. The trial court correctly held that the BZA could not overlook appellant's failure to satisfy prerequisites to the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness and allow appellant to satisfy them later. The BZA's decision was not a valid exercise of its authority to "modify" appellant's application. In effect, the BZA's decision impermissibly modified the requirements of Troy Zoning Code governing the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness. Judgment affirmed.

Upon remand for resentencing, the trial court made the consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and we cannot find that the court's finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) was not supported by the record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The trial court's failure to reduce the amount of jail-time credit to a number of days, as required by R.C. 2949.08(B), along with the absence of any opportunity for appellant to be heard on the issue of jail-time credit, requires reversing in part and remanding for the court to properly address jail-time credit. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, having weapons while under disability, and carrying a concealed weapon were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's request to supplement the record with additional evidence, where the evidence could have been produced with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing before the magistrate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mother's objections to the magistrate's decision and granting legal custody of Mother's three minor children to maternal great-grandmother. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err in upholding appellee-city's denial of appellant's application to erect a digital-billboard on property that is part of a commercial planned-unit development. The proposed sign was not allowed under the terms of a governing sign-program document, which explicitly identified "the total signage" for the completed planned-unit-development project. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant appeals from trial court's judgments, in two separate cases, finding him incompetent to stand trial and ordering treatment to restore his competency. The trial court's orders that appellant undergo a competency evaluation and scheduling a hearing were encompassed within the final order on appeal. The trial court did not err in ordering the competency hearing and did not abuse its discretion in requiring a competency evaluation. Appellant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself was outside the scope of the appeal. Judgments affirmed.

jurisdiction, final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02, Civ.R. 54(B), due process, notice, opportunity to be heard, civil contempt

Crim.R. 33(B) motion for new trial evidentiary hearing motion for leave

Where the state presented evidence that defendant stood over the victim, preventing victim's escape, and said she would "beat" and "whoop" the victim and that victim believed defendant was going to harm her, conviction for menacing was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court had jurisdiction to modify divorce decree with consent of both parties. Modification order was not void or voidable. Trial court did not err in granting Civ.R. 60(B) motion alleging mistake.

The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is affirmed. The totality of the circumstances and competent credible evidence supports the trial court's findings and conclusions that appellant was not in custody while being detained after a traffic stop.

Habeas corpus—Unless a trial court's judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, a writ of habeas corpus will not issue when petitioner has or had adequate remedy in ordinary course of the law—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in how it allocated jail time credit by applying the jail time credit to the community control sentence and terminating it before applying the remainder to the new cases.

REAGAN TOKES LAW INDEFINITE SENTENCE The indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe upon defendant-appellant's right of due process.

CONSENT SEARCH MOTION TO SUPPRESS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence because he freely and voluntarily consented to the taking of his blood and urine samples. However, defendant-appellant's conviction for driving under a 12-point suspension is not supported by sufficient evidence because defendant-appellant's 12-point suspension had expired by operation of law by the time of the incident. Defendant-appellant's remaining convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.

Issue of constitutionality of statutes as applied cannot be addressed on appeal as it was not raised in the trial court below.

Divorcee who received inheritance during marriage appeals decision finding financial accounts marital property. Divorcee failed to meet burden tracing separate property. Inheritance no longer traceable after being extensively commingled with marital funds over four years. Also, evidence that the divorcee had intended to gift former spouse the portion of the inheritance used for the mutual fund.

Defendant's burglary conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Likely to be present element of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) satisfied where occupant was a retiree with no fixed schedule, who had lived in his home for 30 years, who had temporarily left his home to help a neighbor with an errand, and who was away from his home for two hours.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's medical malpractice claims as appellant could not use the saving statute set forth in R.C. 2305.19(A) to refile a medical claim after the statute of limitations had expired and the claim was brought outside the four-year statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C). The trial court also did not err in dismissing appellant's wrongful death claims as wrongful death claims related to the medical care, diagnosis, or treatment of the decedent are subject to the medical-claim statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C).

gross sexual imposition, presentence investigation, sentencing factors, maximum sentence, R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

CRIMINAL - Post-Conviction Relief R.C. 2953.02 abuse of discretion dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing res judicata does not bar petitioner when from raising an issue when petitioner was represented pro se on direct appeal.

CRIMINAL - Anders wholly frivolous guilty plea voluntary Crim.R. 11 competence felony sentencing indefinite sentence restitution

CRIMINAL - Reagan Tokes indefinite sentence separation of powers right to fair hearing due process constitutional

CIVIL - sexually hostile work environment summary judgment Civ.R. 56 political subdivision employee immunity individual capacity R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) R.C. 2744.02(C) manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities malicious purpose bad faith wanton reckless.

motion to suppress, plain smell, marijuana

Manifest weight & sufficiency, rape, Reagan Tokes

Miranda - Suppression - Credibility of Witnesses

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

murder attempted murder Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 171290 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenge Evid.R. 401 Evid.R 402 Evid.R. 404(B) witness refused to testify Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal circumstantial evidence sufficient to support conviction

In reopened appeal, court concludes that appellant's statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were not violated because less than 270 days elapsed between arrest and trial, and the length of the delay was not presumptively prejudicial. Appellant's prior appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to assert this meritless claim on direct appeal.

Because the defendant failed to prove actual prejudice, the trial court erred in granting his motion to dismiss based on preindictment delay.

The issue of whether appellees breached the duty to perform a reasonable inspection of the fitness equipment upon which appellant allegedly was injured was presented in appellees' motion for summary judgment. However, the trial court failed to address that issue in its decision and exclusively relied on its determination that appellees did not cause the fitness equipment to malfunction. Because the trial court failed to rule on the inspection issue, it is not properly before this court. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for appellees is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court.

On certification of default.

The juvenile court did not err in dismissing a custody complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction once the child at issue turned 18 years old.

Because none of the claims raised in appellant's amended complaint are actionable in the Court of Claims, the Court of Claims properly dismissed appellant's amended complaint.

COUNSEL – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – SELF-DEFENSE: Where defendant did not demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on self-defense where the instructions were drawn from the Ohio Jury Instructions and were correct statements of the law.

CONSTITUIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEARCH AND SEIZURE In a criminal prosecution for drug trafficking and possession, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress items police recovered from defendant's vehicle after a drug dog alerted on defendant's vehicle where police stopped defendant's vehicle because it matched a description of a vehicle that had been involved in a recent shooting the drug dog arrived on the scene contemporaneously with the initial stop police used the drug dog to sniff a grassy area near the vehicle based on an officer's belief that defendant had thrown an object out of the vehicle window and once the drug dog completed searching the hill, and after officers spoke with detectives regarding the shooting investigation, police immediately used the drug dog to sniff defendant's vehicle.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL – FIRST AMENDMENT – FREE SPEECH – COMMERCIAL SPEECH – SIGN/ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS – LEAST-RESTRICTIVE MEANS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for leave to amend and supplement its answer and counterclaims after the parties had filed competing motions for summary judgment and defendant could not justify its one-year delay in seeking leave. Defendant's free-speech rights were not violated by plaintiff city's zoning code that restricted off-site signs in plaintiff's downtown development district because the zoning-code restrictions targeted commercial speech, the restrictions directly advanced plaintiff's substantial interests in aesthetics and safety, and the restrictions were no more extensive than necessary.

INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY – ATKINS HEARING – APPELLATE REVIEW: We affirm the trial court's judgment determining that defendant suffers from an intellectual disability and is thus ineligible for the death penalty where the state failed to raise an argument on appeal and the trial court's findings were supported by competent, credible evidence.

Postrelease control cannot be imposed where trial court lacks jurisdiction res judicata bars argument that consecutive sentences improper where issue not raised on direct appeal.

Child endangering contributing to the delinquency of a minor lack of representation at sentencing sentencing is a critical stage of the proceeding at which counsel must be present presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea bias of municipal judge due to irregularities at sentencing, including the fact that counsel was not present, sentence is reversed and the plea is withdrawn upon remand, Appellant may file an affidavit of bias under R.C. 2701.031.

School coach accused of sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03 no contest plea denial of pretrial Civ.R. 12(C) motion trial court could not rule on the ultimate issue of trial in a pretrial motion to dismiss interpretation of coaching contract was not a matter of law when extrinsic evidence was presented to resolve ambiguity in the contract R.C. 2929.12 sentencing factors were properly considered affirmed.

habeas corpus filing requirements not satisfied commitment papers bail

Felony sentencing sentence recommendation misstatement of recommendation corrected.

Child endangering, R.C. 2919.22(B) guilty plea issue of defense medical expert report arose at sentencing but report was not proffered into evidence since the medical report is not part of the record it cannot be used to prove ineffective assistance of counsel failure to offer the report into evidence could have been tactical choice of counsel judgment affirmed.

proposed divorce decree, proposed separation agreement, Local Rule 28.01 of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, abuse of discretion, due process

retirement—change in circumstances—spousal support—R.C. 3105.18

domestic violence, sufficient evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel

speedy trial, R.C. 2945.71, R.C. 2945.72(E), tolling, 90 days, first-degree misdemeanor, dismissal without prejudice

Lack of Final Appealable Order

motion to suppress mixed question of law and fact probable cause to arrest de novo findings of fact are supported by competent, credible evidence speedy trial prima facie case for discharge ineffective assistance of counsel stipulation to doctor's competency report manifest weight of the evidence.

residential parent's out of state relocation change in circumstances "material and adverse effect upon a child" other factors unilateral decision breakdown in communication R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) credibility for trier of fact abuse of discretion Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).

Joinder severance Crim.R. 8(A) Crim.R. 14, abuse of discretion. Defendant was prejudiced by single indictment leading to only one trial involving two alleged rape victims for two reasons: the jury could have improperly accumulated evidence from first victim's case to evidence from second victim's case and the evidence from either case would be inadmissible in the other case under Evid.R. 404(B). Rape convictions reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded.

Civ.R. 52 motion findings of fact and conclusions of law inappropriate final appealable order motion to modify child support App.R. 4 time to appeal bootstrapping. Appellant's Civ.R. 52 motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law was inappropriate because the trial court had issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in its January 5, 2022 journal entry. Therefore, the inappropriate Civ.R. 52 motion did not toll the time to appeal under App.R. 4. Because Appellant appealed a January 5, 2022 decision of the trial court on February 18, 2022, it was not within 30 days and thus his appeal was untimely. Judgment affirmed.

App.R. 3 App.R. 16 negligence manifest weight jury verdict Civ.R. 59 motion for a new trial judicial admissions credibility. The jury did not lose its way in returning a verdict in favor of defendant-appellee where the plaintiff-appellant did not sustain his burden of persuasion in establishing that defendant-appellee was negligent, that plaintiff-appellant was injured as a result of such negligence, and that plaintiff-appellant was entitled to damages. The jury verdict was appropriate where plaintiff's entire case rested on his own credibility and he provided inconsistent versions of each relevant accident and his symptoms that allegedly resulted from those accidents. Appellate court is without jurisdiction to consider the trial court's denial of plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial where that judgment was not properly appealed from.

Felony convictions prison sentence nunc pro tunc entry consecutive sentence protection order violation of a protection order community-control supervision probation presentence investigation ("PSI"), sentencing appellate review clear-and-convincing standard de novo review R.C. 2929.14 2929.11, 2929.12 and 2953.08 consecutive sentences public protection criminal history multiple offenses courses of conduct harm caused evidentiary support sentencing entry aggregate prison sentence mitigating circumstances statutory range purposes and principles of sentencing recidivism seriousness factors community control. Judgment affirmed and remanded. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) prescribes when a reviewing court may alter a felony sentence. A sentence is not contrary to law when it fell within the statutory range for the degree of felony and where the trial court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. A trial court's statement in its sentencing journal entry that it considered the required statutory factors is enough to fulfill a sentencing court's obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. A consecutive sentence will remain undisturbed by a reviewing court when the trial court makes the requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the record does not fail to clearly and convincingly support those findings.

Crim.R. 11(C) plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made de novo review substantial compliance maximum penalty mandatory postrelease control R.C. 2929.141 Reagan Tokes Law required advisements R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 and appellant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. However, because the trial court failed to fully notify appellant of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) advisements, the case is remanded for resentencing solely to provide the proper advisements.

Unjust enrichment fraud political subdivision immunity real estate taxes illegal taxation claim adequate remedy at law equitable claim. Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of county on taxpayer's fraud and unjust-enrichment claims where the county was immune from liability for the fraud claim and the taxpayer had an adequate remedy at law that precluded the equitable claim of unjust enrichment.

Legal custody best interest of a child abuse of discretion manifest weight of evidence. The juvenile court's award of legal custody of the parents' three children to relatives was based on competent credible evidence in the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion where the Agency substantiated allegations of sexual abuse by father and where mother did not show she fully complied with or benefitted from services provided.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 11(C) knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently dismissed. - Motion to withdraw of appellant's counsel granted and the appeal dismissed where, after an independent review of the record pursuant to the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, the appellate court determined that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) when accepting appellant's guilty plea, appellant's plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and there were no meritorious grounds for appeal.

Presumption of community-control sanctions R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(vii) position of trust financial investments plain error. Defendant did not show that trial court committed plain error in sentencing him to a prison sentence rather than community-control sanctions. Record was sufficient to conclude that defendant held a position of trust that facilitated theft offenses. Defendant's crimes related directly to his position as a purported financial investor, broker or advisor and were facilitated by that position. Because the application of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(vii) was supported by the record, trial court had discretion to impose a term of imprisonment rather than community-control sanctions.

Landlord tenant deposit rent R.C. 5321.07 escrow distribution magistrate's decision objections untimely Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) Civ.R. 53(D)(5) Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c) pro se plain error civil exceptional circumstances. Affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a landlord-tenant dispute involving rent deposited with the court pursuant to R.C. 5321.07. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as litigants represented by counsel. Because the pro se defendant did not timely object to a magistrate's decision on the distribution of the escrowed funds, he waived any challenge except for a claim of plain error. In a civil case, plain-error review is disfavored. The defendant failed to raise plain error, and the case did not present exceptional circumstances warranting application of the plain-error doctrine.

Felonious assault improperly discharging a firearm at or into habitation discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises drive-by shooting firearm specification peace-officer specification sufficiency of evidence manifest weight Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the trial court erred in imposing a five-year drive-by shooting specification on the underlying offense of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises in contravention of R.C. 2941.146(A). The case is remanded for resentencing for the sole purpose of providing appellant with the statutory notifications regarding his indefinite sentence imposed pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence constitutionality. - Appellant's constitutional challenges to the indefinite sentencing scheme under the Reagan Tokes Law are overruled.

Felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) firearm specification R.C. 2941.141(A) jail-time credit mandatory prison term R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) judicial discretion COVID coronavirus indigency equal protection judicial release App.R. 5(C) R.C. 2945.67 ripeness justiciability jurisdiction. Where the defendant pleaded guilty to felonious assault with a one-year firearm specification, the trial court's application of jail-time credit to the mandatory term imposed on the specification was contrary to law under the plain language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) and following State v. Moore, 154 Ohio St.3d 94, 2018-Ohio-3237, 111 N.E.3d 1146. However well-intentioned a trial court may be in crafting a criminal sentence, it has no discretion to impose a sentence that is contrary to law. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Moore rejected the defendant's equal-protection argument, which was essentially that he, because of his indigency, would lose jail-time credit if he were granted judicial release at the earliest opportunity where a nonindigent defendant would not. We found the state's appeal to be ripe and determined that we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The defendant had argued that the appeal would only be ripe if he were granted judicial release, but the state's appeal is constitutionally and prudentially justiciable now. Finally, the fact that the trial court phrased its application of jail-time credit as a "request" does not prevent our court from having jurisdiction. The trial court made a "request" as to something that is not within the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's discretion, since the request went to the imposition of sentence itself. Sentence reversed in part, modified to delete the trial court's application of jail-time credit to the mandatory prison term imposed on the specification.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. State appealed sentence that did not impose indefinite sentence under Reagan Tokes Law. The trial found the Reagan Tokes Law to be unconstitutional. Pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 538 (en banc), the sentence imposed by the trial court is vacated and cause remanded for resentencing.

Amplification voir dire plain error harmless error Crim.R. 52 hearsay and manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court's amplification of the reasonable doubt standard during voir dire did not amount to plain error where the court later charged the jury with the statutory definition of the standard. The trial court's introduction of improper opinion testimony to identify the defendant amounted to harmless error. The rules of hearsay did not apply to a witness's testimony about a citation book maintained by his employer because the book was not introduced for the truth of the matter. A review of the record demonstrated that the trier of fact did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice when it convicted defendant.

Mootness sexual offender classification juvenile abuse of discretion. Where appellant voluntarily completed inpatient treatment and that condition of his community control was subsequently terminated, his appeal of that condition is moot. The juvenile court abused its discretion in classifying appellant as a Tier I sexual offender.

Motion to vacate a void judgment R.C. 2953.21(A) R.C. 2953.23(A) petition for postconviction relief successive petition res judicata motion for transcript Civ.R. 58(B) vexatious litigator Loc.App.R. 23(A). Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to vacate a void judgment, construed as a successive petition for postconviction relief. Because appellant did not make the requisite showing under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief. Furthermore, because appellant raised or could have raised the claims in his petition on direct appeal or in his prior petitions for postconviction relief, his claims were barred by res judicata. Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for trial transcript where official trial transcripts were prepared on appellant's behalf, at the state's expense, and filed in his direct appeal appellant was not entitled to another copy of official transcripts at the state's expense for use in his successive postconviction proceedings. Appellant was not deprived of an opportunity to appeal the trial court's denial of his 2014 petition for postconviction relief due to the trial court's failure to comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Appellant's repeated, continued attempts to litigate the same issues constitutes frivolous conduct pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23(A) appellant designated a vexatious litigator under Loc.App.R. 23.

Appellate jurisdiction subject-matter jurisdiction exclusive jurisdiction Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. - The appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal even though the trial court's dismissal entry did not specifically dismiss appellant's claims against the John/Jane Doe defendants because although appellant's complaint named the Doe defendants, it did not state any claims against them, the trial court's entry implicitly dismissed the claims against them, and the entry contained the requisite Civ.R. 54(B) language the trial court properly dismissed appellant's claims against the defendants — a public utility, a natural gas supplier, and its owner — for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's service- and rate-related claims.

Contempt direct criminal attorney abuse of discretion trial court appellate court oral argument precedence late extenuating circumstances sensibilities administration of justice R.C. 2705.01. Judgment of contempt reversed. The trial court abused its discretion in finding attorney in direct contempt when the attorney presented extenuating circumstances for appearing late and then leaving a trial court proceeding to attend an oral argument in the court of appeals, which took precedence. Although the conduct was contemptuous to the trial court's sensibilities, it did not constitute punishable, criminal contempt.

Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 3513.06—Change of name of candidate—Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to place relator's name on May 2, 2023 primary-election ballot as mayoral candidate—Relator failed to show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law by refusing to certify his name to the ballot because relator had failed to include his former name on his declaration of candidacy and petition—Writ denied.

MISTRIAL – VIOLATION OF A PROTECTION ORDER – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's motion for a mistrial where the interpreters were not given the oath to make a true interpretation of the proceedings until the evidentiary portion of the trial was concluded where defendant did not establish that the translators were not qualified or that the interpreters did not properly translate the proceedings. Defendant's conviction for violating a protection order was not against the weight of the evidence where the factfinder found the victim's identification of defendant to be credible.

FAILING TO COMPLY – R.C. 2921.331(B) – WILLFULL – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE Defendant's conviction for failing to comply with a police officer's order in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) was supported by sufficient evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence where dash-cam footage showing defendant's abrupt lane change on a congested highway after the officer activated his lights and siren was proof that defendant willfully eluded the officer.

Reasonable Articulable Suspicion - Officer's Search of Handbag

Domestic Violence - Sufficient Evidence Appellant and Victim were "Household or Family Members"

No duty to defend on misappropriation of trade secrets complaint.

Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 519.12—Writ granted.

Mandamus—Enforcement of tax liens on real property—R.C. Chapter 323—County land-reutilization corporations (i.e., county land banks)—Mortgage holder that did not acquire mortgage for abandoned property until one year after adjudication of foreclosure to enforce tax lien on that property lacks standing to challenge foreclosure proceedings—Mortgage holder and owner of abandoned properties had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by way of exercising its rights under R.C. Chapter 323 to challenge foreclosure proceedings to enforce tax liens against properties—Courts of appeals' judgments denying writs affirmed.

App.R. 26(A), App.R 30(A), App.R. 14, untimely filing, extraordinary circumstances

statute of frauds oral agreement to transfer real estate family caretaker decedent manifest weight of the evidence credibility for the trier of fact fraud in the inducement unjust enrichment damages personal property benefit conferred.

separation agreement adopted no showing of elements of duress Appellant did not waive 14-day objection period to magistrate's decision

Appellant did not timely file objections to the magistrate's decision granting a civil stalking protection order before filing his appeal. The magistrate's decision and trial court's order adopting it were supported by competent, credible evidence. Judgment affirmed.

In this bad faith action based on an uninsured motorists' claim, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in appellee-insurer's favor. The court incorrectly established a blanket rule that insured claimants are required, as a matter of law, to provide expert testimony in bad faith cases. There is no basis for imposing such a standard as a matter of law, and the circumstances of each case should be considered. Furthermore, even if an expert were needed, the deposition of appellee's claims adjuster provided sufficient evidence of standards and what conduct would be required to avoid a bad faith claim. Finally, while appellee contends that the judgment should be affirmed on alternate grounds, the record clearly indicates that the trial court failed to consider evidentiary materials that were submitted. Under these circumstances, we decline to conduct a de novo review of an alternate argument. Judgment reversed and remanded.

final appealable order, subject matter jurisdiction, R.C. 2505.02

finality, parenting time, contempt, R.C. 3109.04

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by administratively issuing an order terminating appellee's spousal support obligation before ruling on appellant's previously-filed motion to modify spousal support the time frame of the spousal support obligation set forth in the final judgment and decree of divorce had expired, and the trial court did not have authority to modify the duration of that obligation. The issue of whether the order terminating spousal support divested the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on appellant's motion to modify spousal support is not ripe for this court's review, because the trial court never rendered a judgment on that issue. Judgment affirmed.

driving under suspension, jury trial, insufficient evidence

The 30-month prison term imposed by the trial court for appellant's fourth-degree-felony offense of operating a vehicle under the influence was contrary to law because the trial court failed to indicate that 60-days of the 30-month term was mandatory per R.C. 2929.13(G). The trial court also erred at sentencing by failing to specify the number of days of jail-time credit that appellant would receive against his prison sentence. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

R.C. 2919.25, domestic violence, manifest weight, ineffective assistance of counsel

criminal mischief, identity, case-in-chief, Criminal Rule 29, ineffective assistance, sufficiency

due process, jail time credit, waiver

post-judgment, lodestar, enhancement

Appellant's conviction for aggravated burglary (menacing/abduction) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence the victim described appellant's forcible entry into her home while brandishing a loaded firearm. Appellant's sentence to a minimum of five years and a maximum of seven and a half years, plus a consecutive three years for the firearm specification, was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by not merging appellant's convictions as they were not allied offenses. Similarly, it was not an error for the court to accept his guilty plea, as there was partial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) and appellant could not demonstrate prejudice. However, the trial court did err by classifying appellant as a Tier I sex offender R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(a) plainly reads that a person who violates R.C. 2907.322 must be classified as a Tier II sex offender. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

R.C. 2929.22, misdemeanor sentencing, R.C. 2929.24(A)(1)

R.C. 2111.47, Res Judicata, Collateral Attack, letters of appointment improperly issued, Termination of Guardianship, de novo

CRIMINAL - Motion to continue denying a motion to continue standby counsel hybrid representation prohibited right to counsel waiver of the right to counsel must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently Crim.R. 44(C) R.C. 2945.37(B) competency evaluation Crim.R. 32.2 a pre-sentence investigation is required only before granting probation or community control sanctions.

CIVIL - Civ.R. 56(C) summary judgment negligence premises liability open and obvious doctrine under the open and obvious doctrine, the nature of the hazard itself is sufficient warning and no duty is imposed on the homeowner social guest invitee.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02 no final order issues not fully resolved lack of jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL LAW - Reagan Tokes Act, constitutional, does not violate doctrine of separation of powers, or rights to trial by jury and due process.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial evidentiary hearing Crim.R. 33 unavoidably prevented clear and convincing proof eyewitness evidence expert testimony new scientific theories new legal authority.

CRIMINAL LAW - postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea advisement trial court not eligible for judicial release during mandatory incarceration did not misinform R.C. 2929.20(C)(4) not eligible until five years after mandatory term served in pari materia trial court not required to inform defendant regarding judicial release during plea colloquy res judicata.

CRIMINAL LAW - indefinite sentences Reagan Tokes Act constitutionality facial challenges as-applied challenges not ripe individual prison terms Jones not contrary to law.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellees. Company directing and controlling appellant's work was entitled to workers' compensation immunity from appellant's negligence claims because someone paid the required workers' compensation premiums. Failure to erect guardrails around a hole was not deliberate removal of equipment safety guard, and appellant failed to present any evidence of company's injurious intent, so employer intentional tort claim failed as a matter of law. Mayle

Court, per Mayle, J., held that state presented sufficient evidence of "trespass" element of aggravated burglary where defendant entered victim's home through bedroom window while she was sleeping. Jury did not lose its way in rejecting defendant's claim of privilege. Reasonable juror could find that defendant's apologies and talk of suicide related to his assault of victim. This evidence can show consciousness of guilt, therefore, consciousness-of-guilt jury instruction was appropriate.

Court, per Mayle, J., held that counsel's decision not to cross-examine deputy coroner or consult an expert about procedure for sectioning brain for microscopic examination constituted trial strategy and did not support claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Conviction was not against weight of evidence where autopsy results showed that baby's fatal injuries were inflicted minutes before her death and defendant was only adult with baby during that time.

Judgment affirmed where lack of understanding of collateral, civil consequences of the plea did not render that plea involuntary, and motion to dismiss based on legal impossibility was properly denied as lacking legal support. Zmuda

Appellant failed to introduce evidence to support his claims for negligent supervision and spoliation of the evidence, and thus the trial court's judgment dismissing those claims on summary judgment was not erroneous. Zmuda

Affirming trial court's dismissal of the case on the grounds that the trial court stated on the record sufficient findings of fact and reasons for the dismissal, as required by Crim.R. 48(B).

The imposition of discretionary costs was contrary to law where the trial court failed to impose such costs during the sentencing hearing and did not consider the defendant's present and future ability to pay. Although the final judgment included an ability-to-pay determination, the record clearly and convincingly did not support that determination. Defendant had only a ninth-grade education, suffered a mental impairment, and had no verifiable employment.

The trial court did not err in allowing lay opinion testimony, under Evid.R. 701, as to whether appellant's act of striking a bicyclist with his vehicle was intentional. Appellant's felonious assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Sulek

Imposition of sentence following alleged violation of community control

Ineffective assistance manifest weight

CRIMINAL RULE 11 SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE Trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11, informing defendant of the effect of his plea.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT MODIFICATION. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying defendant-appellant's spousal support obligation by an amount less than that requested by defendant-appellant.

A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply becuase conflicting testimony was presented at trial. The trial court, as the finder of fact, is free to believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony that is presented at trial.

Defendant appeals murder conviction. Direct and circumstantial evidence implicated defendant. Credibility issues were matters for the jury to determine. Conviction supported by greater weight of the evidence.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to a children's services agency as such decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where father failed to remedy the cause for the children's removal and where permanent custody was in the children's best interest. Father failed to show that his counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective representation at the permanent custody hearing, as counsel's decisions not to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, not to introduce one of father's adult children as a witness, and not to give a closing argument amounted to trial strategy and father could not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from those decisions.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of the children to a children's services agency as such decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where father failed to remedy the cause for the children's removal and where permanent custody was in the children's best interest. Father failed to show that his counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective representation at the permanent custody hearing, as counsel's decisions not to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, not to introduce one of father's adult children as a witness, and not to give a closing argument amounted to trial strategy and father could not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from those decisions.

R.C. 2953.21 postconviction relief abuse of discretion cumulative error doctrine hearing

motion to suppress waiver plain error inventory search impoundment ineffective assistance of counsel manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2925.11(A) knowingly possess

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

Fourth Amendment search warrant probable cause controlled buy confidential informant search of containers scope of search warrant State v. Cutlip, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 21 BE 0032, 2022-Ohio-3524 manifest weight of the evidence recorded jail call complicity consecutive sentences.

Joinder Crim.R. 8(A) manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel consecutive sentences State v. Gwynne, -- Ohio St. 3d --, 2022-Ohio-4607, -- N.E.3d --.

More extensive in camera voir dire of murder victim's minor son who testified at trial pursuant to R.C. 2317.01 warranted, error not reversible error initial admonishment of jury to not discuss the case, R.C. 2945.34, was sufficient ineffective assistance of counsel not shown authentication of Facebook posts was adequate due to stipulation "silent witness" authentication of video evidence cumulative error not shown affirmed.

TAMPERING WITH RECORDS – R.C. 2913.42 – R.C. 2945.75 – VERDICT FORM – SENTENCING – RESTITUTION – R.C. 2929.18: Because the verdict form for the offense of tampering with records did not specify the degree of the offense or the element that elevated the offense from a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony, defendant could only have been convicted of the least degree of the offense, and the trial court erred in entering a conviction against defendant for tampering with records as a third-degree felony. The trial court erred by failing to impose a specific amount of restitution in open court at the sentencing hearing.

LEGAL CUSTODY – BEST INTEREST – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The juvenile court's determination that placing appellant father's minor child in the legal custody of the child's maternal grandmother was in the best interest of the child was supported by competent and credible evidence, which established that maternal grandmother provided a safe and stable living environment where the child had lived for the majority of his life, the child was bonded to his maternal grandmother, father's felony firearm charges remained unresolved, and father failed to request a home study of his residence.

Civ.R. 60(A), clerical error, mistaken filing

adjudication of dependency, R.C. 2151.04(A) and (C), homelessness

Tenants in common cotenants exclusive use partition claim breach of contract oral contract express contract unjust enrichment reasonable rental value justice and equity meeting of the minds manifest weight clear and convincing evidence preponderance of the evidence assault protection order wrongdoers R.C. 5307.21

Rape, Gross Sexual Imposition, prejudicial joinder

Sentencing - Reagan Tokes - IAC - Disproportionality

Fourth-degree felony prison sentence R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) finding R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b) firearm R.C. 2953.08(A)(2). Appellant's appeal is dismissed because the trial court adopted a finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(i), that appellant had a firearm when he committed the offense of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and within its discretion imposed a prison term. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(2), appellant was therefore required to seek leave to appeal his prison sentence. Having failed to seek leave, we cannot review his sentence and his appeal is dismissed.

Crim.R. 32.1 withdrawal of guilty plea manifest injustice abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's postsentence motion to vacate guilty pleas to correct a manifest injustice. The trial court judge, who presided over the criminal case from its onset, was in the best position to balance the credibility of the evidence, parties, and motions with the legal issues raised and determine whether a manifest injustice had occurred.

Attempt R.C. 2923.02 having weapons while under disability R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) firearm specification R.C. 2941.141(A) mandatory prison term R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) community control R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) underlying felony split sentence plain error. The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted having weapons while under disability with a one-year firearm specification. The trial court sentenced her to one year in prison on the firearm specification and two years of community control on the underlying felony. The state appealed, arguing that the trial court was required to impose a mandatory prison term on the underlying felony as a result of the specification, that community control was not an authorized sentence and that the sentence violated the split-sentence doctrine. The plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires that a trial court, when crafting a sentence for a felony (other than a violation of R.C. 2923.12) that is enhanced with a firearm specification, impose the definite prison term prescribed by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) as a mandatory prison term. The statute does not require the imposition of a mandatory prison term with respect to the felony underlying the firearm specification. Where a trial court is not required to impose a prison sentence on an underlying felony, as here, a trial court may impose community-control sanctions on the underlying felony even where prison is mandatory for the accompanying specification. This does not constitute an unlawful "split sentence" because a specification is not part of the underlying offense but merely a sentencing enhancement to that offense. As the trial court was not required to impose a prison term, mandatory prison term or term of life imprisonment on the defendant on the underlying felony here, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) authorized the court to impose community-control sanctions on that offense. Sentence affirmed.

Law firm Civ.R. 11 R.C. 2323.51 sanctions frivolous harassing abuse of discretion out-of-state decision precedent. - Trial court's decision finding law firm engaged in frivolous and harassing conduct to warrant imposition of sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11 was unreasonable. The trial court's exclusive reliance on an out-of-state decision as precedent to support its findings was improper.

Felonious assault aggravated assault inferior offense serious provocation self-defense manifest weight of the evidence bench trial. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that he knowingly caused serious physical harm to the victim during an ongoing argument in which both men were intoxicated, and the evidence does not support any of the elements of self-defense.

Rape R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) cunnilingus fellatio sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. The adjudication of delinquency was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that the appellant engaged in cunnilingus and fellatio with her.

Summary judgment genuine issues of material fact breach of contract meeting of the minds oral contract clear and convincing evidence question of fact statute of frauds agreement capable of being performed in one year failure to pay commissions R.C. 1335.11 enforceable contract unjust enrichment alternative theory of recovery restitution. The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment with regard to AMD on the Estate's claims for unjust enrichment. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of AMD on the Estate's claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and failure to pay commissions under R.C. 1335.11, and did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Coll.

Final, appealable order motion to vacate timely appeal R.C. 3105.171(J)(2) pretrial order for sale of marital real property abuse of discretion. A pretrial order for sale of marital real property is a final, appealable order. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for perfecting a valid appeal. It is within the discretion of an appellate court to allow or disallow an appeal that contains defects in a notice of appeal. Although the appellant has a defect in his notice of appeal, in our discretion, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. R.C. 3105.171(J)(2) allows for a pretrial sale of marital real property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee's pretrial motion to sell the marital residence.

Child endangering sufficient evidence manifest weight gross sexual imposition joinder simple and direct other-acts evidence plain error ineffective assistance of counsel felony sentencing allied offenses contrary to law. The defendant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by permitting the state to join the offenses for trial. The trial court did not commit plain error by permitting the state to explore the defendant's unindicted disciplinary practices. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court imposed a prison term on a felony of the third degree that is contrary to law.

Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence constitutional qualifying offenses. Trial court erred in failing to reserve an indefinite sentence on a qualifying second-degree felony as required by the Reagan Tokes Law.

Manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence Reagan Tokes Law. The appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the appellant failed to demonstrate that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. There was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of disruption of public services because appellant purposely kept the victim from calling emergency services by taking her cell phone. The appellant's sentence in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law has been ruled constitutional.

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) objections to magistrate's decision plain error absence of transcript and regularity of proceedings. Where the appellant failed to object to the magistrate's decision and argue plain error pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) and appellant failed to file a transcript of the lower court's proceedings, the appellant's assignment of error is overruled.

Motion to disclose confidential informant's identity abuse of discretion.

R.C. 2951.022 concurrent supervision longest possible term of incarceration. Offender was sentenced to a term of community-control sanctions with a possible term of incarceration of 180 days in a municipal court. While under supervision with the municipal court, offender was convicted of felony offenses in a court of common pleas and sentenced to a term of community control with a possible term of incarceration of 42 months. When sentenced on the felony offenses and placed on community-control supervision with the court of common pleas, offender was a "concurrent supervision offender" pursuant to R.C. 2951.022(A)(1)(c). As such, offender was subject to supervision by only the court in which he faced the longest possible term of incarceration. R.C. 2951.022(B)(1). Because offender faced a longer term of incarceration in the court of common pleas, offender's motion in the municipal court to terminate his probation should have been granted.

Procedendo, mandamus recall election East Cleveland Charter R.C. 705.92 County Board of Elections Clerk of Council. This court denied an extraordinary writ to compel the Board of Elections to schedule recall elections. The city of East Cleveland Charter required the Clerk of Council to process the recall petitions, but there was no Clerk of Council. Under the East Cleveland Charter a single council member could not appoint the Law Director the Clerk of Council. The attempts to do so was ineffective, and the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion by not abandoning the Charter provisions.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stewart's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence without a hearing as the alleged newly discovered evidence did not disclose a strong probability of a different outcome at trial.

CRIM.R. 6 – GRAND JURY TESTIMONY – EVIDENCE – SENTENCING – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SUFFICIENCY – HOMICIDE – FELONIOUS ASSAULT – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY: The trial court did not err in refusing to order the prosecution to disclose certain witnesses' grand jury testimonies where the testimonies were governed by Crim.R. 6 and the defense failed to establish a "particularized need" for them. The trial court did not err in denying trial counsel's request to admit grand jury testimonies of certain witnesses under seal as a court exhibit for purposes of appeal where these testimonies would not aid this court in its review on appeal. Defendant's convictions for murder, felonious assault, and having weapons under disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where three witnesses connected defendant to the crime scene and shell casings from two guns were found at the scene. The trial court erred in sentencing defendant where it did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a),(b), and (g).

ADOPTION – R.C. 3107.161 – BEST INTEREST – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – COMPETANT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE – LEAST-DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE: The probate court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that granting the adoption petition was in the best interest of the minor under R.C. 3107.161 where petitioner produced competent and credible evidence showing that petitioner had cared for the minor child for years, the child considered petitioner and her daughters his family, petitioner had provided the child with a safe and stable environment, the child was adjusted to life with the petitioner, the child wanted to be adopted, and the child's birth parents had a history of being uninvolved in the child's life.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the payment of a fine as part of his sentence because the court did not assess his present and future ability to pay. The fines were suspended by the trial court and may never become due. There was evidence that the trial court considered appellant's present and future ability to pay the fines, and appellant never raised an issue in the trial court that he lacked a present or future ability to pay. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements he made in the back of a police cruiser, because he did not unequivocally invoke of his right to remain silent and voluntarily answered questions posed to him. Appellant did not show ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's not requesting a mistrial when it became apparent before the jury was impaneled that five of the prospective jurors had read some information about the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State's DNA expert to testify where the State identified the dates when it disclosed the expert's report to defendant's trial counsel and the record provided support for the State's dates. No plain error was shown in the trial court's decision to allow the testimony of appellant's girlfriend as to statements appellant made to her shortly after a murder. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements made following a warrantless arrest. Judgment affirmed.

The record contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court's revocation of appellant's community control. The State presented uncontroverted evidence that appellant violated the conditions of community control by driving a vehicle with knowledge of a firearm and loaded magazine in the center console and by committing felony theft from a retail store. The trial court adequately advised appellant about the mandatory nature of post-release control upon his release from prison. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by failing to suppress drug evidence discovered in appellant's vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. Regardless of whether the initial protective search of appellant's vehicle was appropriate, the drugs would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search that was subsequently conducted of the vehicle. The inventory search was lawful because it was conducted in accordance with the police department's standardized, routine tow policy. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked appellant's community control after appellant admitted to violating her community control sanctions. Further, appellant did not show ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Sisters' settlement of their mother's estate's claim against one of the sisters was not supported by consideration and therefore was not enforceable. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Relator's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Montgomery County Child Support Enforcement Agency to return Economic Impact Payments seized through its federal income tax refund offset program fails because the Internal Revenue Service has disallowed his claim to the funds. Writ denied.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. There was no evidence of police coercion or abuse. Furthermore, while appellant claimed she was intoxicated at the time of the interview, the taped interview revealed that she was coherent and was able to understand the detective's questions. There was no evidence that appellant's ability to reason was sufficiently impaired to render her waiver of Miranda rights invalid. Judgment affirmed.

Attorney fees—Relator failed to show that secretary of state acted in bad faith in rejecting its recommendation to make reappointment to county board of elections—Relator's motion for attorney fees denied.

Final Appeal Appealable Order

Sexual harassment hostile work environment and ministerial exception

After neither party timely objected to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to provide certain documents to Requester, as identified in the Report and Recommendation. The Court found that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

After neither party timely objected to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court determined that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court denied Respondent's Motion To Dismiss, ordered Respondent to produce certain documents upon Requester's payment of copying costs, and found that the balance of Requester's claims failed on the merits for want of proof. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Public Records R.C. 149.43(A) 149.43(B)(1) R.C. 149.43(B)(1) does not authorize requests seeking information separate from records containing the information a public office asserting an exception from the duty to disclose records has the burden of proving facts establishing the applicability of the exception with competent, admissible, evidence.

Public Records R.C. 149.43(B)(1) A public records requester has the burden of proving that the materials requested are "records" within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(G).

Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D)(2), upon a Special Master's recommendation for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court sua sponte dismissed Requester's complaint without prejudice and denied as moot Respondent's motion to dismiss.

Final Appealable Order, Civ.R. 54(B), R.C. 2505.02 Civ.R. 8(A) Negligence Per Se Assured Clear Distance Ahead, R.C. 4511.21(A)

Mandamus—Public records—R.C. 149.43—Writ granted in part and denied in part.

CRIM.R. 11 SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE EFFECT OF PLEA WAIVER OF RIGHTS UPON GUILTY PLEA Appellant did not demonstrate that his plea was anything other than knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Guilty plea waived any argument to defects at arraignment hearing.

Rape-trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's motion to sever rape charges involving three different incidents and involving three different victims when evidence presented was simple and direct any error in admitting out-of-court statements as excited utterances harmless error when statements were cumulative to declarant's direct testimony defendant failed to preserve objection to nurses' testimony recounting victims' narrative during sexual-assault examination when he did not object to specific statements contained in narrative but instead only raised a general objection to the testimony, and any error was harmless error any error admitting other-acts evidence harmless error when no danger that jury convicted defendant based on other-acts evidence and when other evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant's rape convicctions trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting BCI forensic testimony and reports defendant's conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction defendant's assertion that trial court failed to properly consider sentencing factors listed in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 not reviewable on appeal.

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Case caption

Appellant's conviction for one count of second-degree misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter was improper where appellant's no contest plea, if one was in fact made, was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered given the confusion and contradictory evidence in the record indicating neither appellant nor the trial court knew what charge appellant was, or should have been, pleading to: first-degree misdemeanor vehicular homicide or second-degree misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of a child to a children's services agency as such decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the child had been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 months of a consecutive 22 month period and permanent custody was in the child's best interest.

Defendant appeals denial of motion to vacate and set aside sentence under Civ.R. 60(B). Trial court denied motion, found civil rules inapplicable in criminal proceedings. Crim.R. 57(B). Civil rules apply in criminal proceedings where no applicable rule of criminal procedure exists. Recasting motion as untimely petition for postconviction relief, defendant failed to establish grounds. Arguments also barred by res judicata.

aggravated murder – murder – manifest weight – forfeiture by wrongdoing – harmless error – transcripts – pandemic delay – ineffective assistance – complicity – cell phone records – burner phone – cellular footprint – firearm specification – R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) – allied offenses – plain error

OVI – drug of abuse – stimulant – sufficiency – beyond a reasonable doubt

CRIMINAL - Cruelty to Animals R.C. 959.13 right to allocute Crim.R. 32(A)(1) new information introduced by judge at sentencing prejudice manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence credibility of witnesses harm to animal unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering prosecutorial misconduct fair trial prior bad acts bias disqualification

Sufficiency/Manifest weight/R.C. 2953.08 (D)(3)/Prior acts/Evid. R. 404/Merger/R.C. 2941.25/Firearm specifications/R.C. 2929.14

Standing v. Jurisdiction - Failure to Appeal Board of Building Appeals Decision Waives Right to Challenge Sufficiency of Order

Sentence re-imposed by acting judge after case on appeal

Relator can prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of prohibition because the trial court had jurisdiction to impose the sentence relator challenges in this writ, and relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of appeal. Relator's three objections to the magistrate's decision are without merit. Accordingly, the recommendation and decision of the magistrate are adopted, relator's objections are overruled, respondent's motion to dismiss is granted, and the requested writ of prohibition is denied.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's request for approval of his contingent fee relating to the waiver of the state's Medicaid estate recovery claim against decedent's estate. Judgment affirmed.

Appellants' failure to set forth error in their notice of appeal in compliance with R.C. 5717.04 deprives the court of appeals of subject-matter jurisdiction over appellants' appeal of a decision and order of the Board of Tax Appeals.

Underinsured motorist coverage, automobile insurance, contract interpretation

Resentencing/res judicata

CIV.R. 60(B)(4) AND (5) – FRAUD UPON THE COURT – CIV.R. 52: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside a default judgment where defendant failed to establish entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) or (5) because there was no change in conditions that would make the judgment no longer equitable, and defendant did not show fraud upon the court by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not err by adopting plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where there were no errors prejudicial to the defendant.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—City's efforts to locate requested computer-generated images were reasonable—Writ and requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees denied.

On application for reinstatement.

adjudication, voluntary safety plan, R.C. 2151.04(B) and (C), dependency

As the original sentencing entry had been affirmed on appeal, res judicata and the law of the case doctrine barred appellant's claim that the original sentencing entry was not a final appealable order due to the trial court's omission of the word "indefinite" from a stated prison term of "fifteen year to life." Even though res judicata and the law of the case doctrine also barred appellant's otherwise meritorious claim that the trial court erred by imposing postrelease control on an unclassified felony, a new sentencing hearing is not necessary to correct the error. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded for a nunc pro tunc entry removing post release control.

In appeal of trial court decision overruling objections to magistrate decision recommending dismissal of administrative appeal of racing commission decision for failure to comply with R.C. 119.12(D), trial court judgment affirmed where appellant failed to provide trial court with a transcript of hearing before magistrate. Because lack of transcript required trial court to accept magistrate's findings of fact, Appellant's single assignment of error overruled and trial court judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment negligence recreational user immunity defense political subdivision immunity breach of fiduciary duty open-and-obvious doctrine R.C. 1533.18 R.C. 1533.181 park district bicycle recreational activity

Plain error ineffective assistance of counsel comparable sentencing cumulative error abuse of discretion. Trial court did not commit plain error at sentencing where the record reflects that it reviewed all sentencing factors appropriately and made a record where required pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Further, appellant failed to establish he was prejudiced when the trial court considered a videotape of the crime and testimony of the victim at a codefendant's trial where the record established that there was independent evidence presented supporting the trial court's ultimate findings. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the competency evaluation was not a part of the appellate record during appellant's first appeal, it was in the record before the trial court. Further, the parties stipulated to its contents. Counsel's decision to summarize the evaluation rather than submit it into the record was strategic, because the contents contained multiple factors unfavorable to appellant. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to or request a continuance of the sentencing hearing. There was adequate support for the trial court's decision in the record accordingly counsel was able to discuss the change with appellant and the likely effects. Although appellant alleges there was a witness that was unavailable at the hearing, appellant failed to raise that issue before the trial court and both appellant and trial counsel agreed on the record to proceed with the advanced date. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's reliance on evidence outside the record. Prosecutor summarized criminal conduct and content of video. Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's consideration of the victim's testimony. Trial court did not err in sentencing appellant more harshly than a codefendant. Codefendant pleaded guilty to less serious charges and appellant was identified as the primary aggressor. Although engaged in the same incident, appellant and his codefendant were not similarly situated. Finally, appellant failed to establish that there were multiple cumulative errors that deprived him of a fair sentence.

Waiver of jury trial firearm specifications ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err when it accepted the appellant's jury trial waiver because the waiver was executed in open court, signed, and the appellant was represented by counsel. The trial court did not err when it sentenced the appellant on firearm specifications because the trial court has the authority to sentence and made the necessary findings. The appellant was not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to the trial court's imposition of a prison sentence on the firearm specifications, because the trial court has the authority to sentence the appellant on firearm specifications.

Crim.R. 29 sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel outrageous government conduct. Appellant's convictions for attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and importuning were supported by sufficient evidence. Although there was insufficient evidence to establish that appellant knew or believed that the alleged victim, an undercover police officer, was over the age of thirteen but under the age of sixteen, sufficient evidence was presented to establish that he was reckless with respect to the alleged victim's age. Further, there was sufficient evidence to establish that the appellant committed the crime of possession of criminal tools when he was arrested after driving to a predetermined location to meet with an undercover officer with tools to assist in the crime on his person. Appellant's convictions were supported by the greater weight of the evidence, where, although the evidence did not establish knowledge or belief as to the age of the alleged victim, the evidence established that appellant was reckless with regard to age when the alleged victim told appellant that he was doing homework, lived with his mother, was sexually inexperienced, and responded "that 15 yo lyfe" during his chat with appellant. Further, the possession of criminal tools conviction was supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Finally, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, where trial counsel did not raise the outrageous government conduct defense. The record failed to establish that appellant would have prevailed had the motion been filed. Accordingly, he could not establish that counsel was ineffective for choosing not to raise the issue.

Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law were overruled in this court's en banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.). The state of Ohio's assignment of error is sustained. Reversed and remanded.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2) knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas merger of allied offenses 2953.08(D)(1) agreed sentencing range authorized by law R.C. 2941.25(A) waiver. Trial court did not err in accepting defendant's guilty pleas. Record reflected that trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and that guilty pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. There is no requirement that a trial court advise a defendant regarding the possible merger of offenses for sentencing or ensure that a defendant understands the merger of offenses before accepting the defendant's guilty pleas. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), sentences were not subject to appellate review where trial court imposed sentences in accordance with the parties' agreed aggregate sentencing range. Defendant waived allied offenses issue where transcript demonstrated that the state and defense counsel agreed, as part of the plea agreement, that offenses did not merge for sentencing.

Motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tortious interference with a business relationship. Affirmed. The amended complaint lacks allegations of fact supporting each element of a tortious interference claim, and as a result, those allegations are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – SENTENCING: Defendant's convictions for assault were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence where the evidence established defendant approached the victim and her infant daughter and sprayed mace in their faces, and the factfinder found the victim's testimony to be credible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving defendant the opportunity to avoid a jail sentence by apologizing to the victim.

EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – MAKING FALSE ALARMS: Defendant's conviction for making a false alarm was not supported by sufficient where the trial court found that the state did not establish that defendant made the false report.

COVID-19 – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – MOTION TO DISMISS – STANDING – R.C. 2721.03 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT – R.C. 3709.212 – R.C. 2905.12 – R.C. 3792.04 – VACCINATION – QUARANTINE: Where plaintiffs students failed to establish standing under both the common law and the Declaratory Judgment Act, the trial court did not err in granting a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint that sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and challenged four separate policies that the University defendant had issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The amended complaint failed to establish that plaintiffs suffered either an injury-in-fact or faced the significant possibility of future harm where it lacked any allegations that plaintiffs were injured in any articulable, particularized way by the University's vaccination, masking, and testing policies. Where three of the plaintiffs had been granted exemptions to the University's vaccination requirement, they were not denied the right to refuse medical treatment in the form of a vaccine and they suffered no injury. Plaintiffs lacked standing to asset a claim for coercion in violation of R.C. 2905.12 where they were either granted vaccination exemptions or voluntarily received a vaccination without seeking an exemption and where the complaint contained no allegation that any of the plaintiffs were ever knowingly exposed to COVID-19 or required to quarantine against their will. Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a claim for a violation of R.C. 3792.04 where the University's policy did not require them to receive a vaccine and where the complaint contained no allegations that plaintiffs were forced to undergo COVID-19 testing or required to quarantine after being knowingly exposed to COVID-19.

Habeas corpus—Excessive bail—Following conviction, any error concerning the issue of pretrial bail is moot—Appellant has not shown that mootness exception applies—Appeal dismissed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of felonious assault. The trial court did not err by refusing to give a jury instruction on the inferior offense of aggravated assault. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of a surveillance video tape. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to dismiss a female juror for sleeping but not to dismiss a male juror for sleeping the court's investigation supported the different conclusions. The record does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. As conceded by the State, the trial court did not provide the Reagan Tokes notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), and appellant must be resentenced. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 15(A) motion for leave to amend her complaint after the complaint had already been dismissed. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss all claims against the Board of Education due to appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court erred by denying victim's restitution request outright instead of conducting a hearing to determine the appropriate amount. Judgment reversed as to restitution and remanded for further proceedings. Judgment affirmed in all other respects.

Prior to accepting appellant's guilty plea, the trial court complied with the maximum penalty notification requirement under Crim.R. 11(C). Sulek.

The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that appellant complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with any recommended treatment as part of appellant's terms of community control for a domestic violence offense. Under the facts of this case, this condition of community control was not related to the domestic violence offense of which appellant was convicted. The trial court's judgment as to this condition of community control is vacated. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

When accepting appellant's guilty plea, the trial court adequately advised him that it was not bound by the State's sentencing recommendation despite not explicitly stating that fact. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court made the necessary consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) in imposing sentences for vehicular assault and possession of cocaine, and those findings were supported by the record. The trial court erred in concluding that appellant's six-month jail sentence for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI), a misdemeanor, was required to be served consecutively to the prison sentence for vehicular assault imposing the misdemeanor sentence consecutively was discretionary. The trial court also erred in ordering appellant to serve his jail term prior to his prison terms and in failing to properly impose jail-time credit. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in using the date of the final hearing as the termination date for the marriage. Husband did not file a shared parenting plan, and the designation of Wife as the residential parent and legal custodian was in the children's best interest. The trial court correctly and conservatively determined Husband's income for purposes of spousal support, child support, and allocation of marital debt, and an abuse of discretion is not demonstrated. There was no testimony regarding the tax exemptions for the children other than Wife's asking for them, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the exemptions to Wife. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda. Judgment affirmed where certified nurse practitioner's subsequent employment involved a different medical specialty, and terms of the non-compete provision of former employer prohibited employment, by its express terms, for three years and 30 miles in the former employer's specialty. Therefore, the subsequent employment did not violate the non-compete provision, rendering a reasonableness analysis of the restrictive covenant merely advisory.

Visiting Judge Candace Crouse. Municipal ordinance regulating width of taxicabs is not in conflict with state statute imposing a width limitation on all vehicles on the roadway because the state statute does not impliedly create a right to operate as a taxi any vehicle meeting the statewide width limitation. Municipal ordinance does not violate equal protection where it is rationally related to the government interest of protecting the safety of residents and tourists.

The trial court erred in denying the university's motion to vacate an arbitrator's award. The union's demand for arbitration was made outside of the 30-day period allowed by the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and the arbitrator accordingly lacked jurisdiction to proceed with arbitration. Even if the Chapter had established jurisdiction, the arbitrator improperly substituted his judgment for that of the university where the university's judgment and actions did not violate the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Judgment reversed arbitration award vacated.

On application for reinstatement.

COMMUNITY-CONTROL VIOLATION NONTECHNICAL VIOLATION. The trial court did not err by determining that defendant-appellant's community-control violation constituted a nontechnical violation.

APPROPRIATION OF EASEMENT RIGHTS AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT EVID.R. 408, 702. The petitioner-appellant/cross-appellee is not entitled to the irrebuttable presumption under R.C. 163.09(B)(1)(c) or the rebuttable presumption under 163.09(B)(1)(b). The trial court should have applied the prior public use doctrine to determine whether the specific easement rights sought by the petitioner-appellant/cross-appellee are authorized as a result of the agricultural easement.

NEW TRIAL CUMULATIVE ERROR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE JURY POLL. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a new trial that is not timely filed. The decision to call an expert witness to testify on behalf of the Defense is a matter of trial strategy. The crime of tampering with evidence contains three elements. A defendant must know that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress or likely to be instituted must alter, destroy, conceal, or remove a record, document, or thing and must do so with the purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation.

CIVIL - Open Meetings Act frivolous conduct R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(b) appeal divested of subject matter jurisdiction collateral issue magistrate's decision objections plain error.

CRIMINAL LAW - indefinite sentences Reagan Tokes Act constitutionality facial challenges as-applied challenges not ripe individual prison terms Jones not contrary to law.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing.

fair trial, judicial misconduct, acute alcohol intoxication, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence

The trial court did not err in denying the Union's petition for a writ of mandamus when it determined SERB did not abuse its discretion in finding no probable cause to support the Union's claim of an unfair labor practice.

PROCEDURE/RULES — MOTION TO DISMISS — R.C. 3701.74 — FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL RECORDS: The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint because Ohio does not recognize a cause of action for negligent failure to produce medical records, and defendant hospital did not owe a duty to produce medical records where plaintiff was not the patient or an authorized representative to obtain such records under R.C. 3701.74.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 3109.051: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision that determined that a suspension of mother's parenting time was in the children's best interest where the trial court's decision was not unreasonable or arbitrary and where its findings under R.C. 3109.051(D) regarding the children's best interests were supported by the record.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE: In a domestic-violence bench trial, the trial court's refusal to admit defendant's proposed exhibit showing a text message the victim allegedly sent to defendant after an altercation was harmless error: defendant's testimony that he received the text message was sufficient under Evid.R. 901 to authenticate the text message however, even if the text message had been admitted, it would not have conclusively shown that the victim sent the message because the victim denied texting defendant, and the victim testified that her cell phone went missing contemporaneously with the argument that she had with defendant, and she had to get a new cell phone. The admission of evidence pertaining to defendant's alleged prior infidelities was harmless error in a domestic-violence bench trial where the trial court stated that the evidence would be considered to explain why the victim had been looking through messages on defendant's Apple watch defendant admitted in his testimony that he had been unfaithful to the victim and the evidence had no bearing on whether defendant committed domestic violence.

Waiver of Mandatory Fine - IAC - Reagan Tokes

Speedy trial resentencing

Juror challenge for cause Evid.R. 803(4)

Premises Liability - Busniess Invitee - Constructive Knowledge - Two-Issue Rule

Permanent custody/Legal custody/Best interest/2151.414

post-conviction relief, untimely, successive, prior appeal, res judicata, relief from judgment, R.C. 2953.21

permanent custody, best interest, scope of remand

Admissibility of forensic interview of child rape victimweight/sufficiency/mistrial

Termination of guardianship

Manifest Weight - GSI

Agg. Robbery - Assault - Obstructing Official Business - Receiving Stolen Property - Manifest Weight/Sufficiency - Mistrial - Suppression - Probable Cause to Arrest

Summary judgment Criminal Acts Insurance Exclusion

jurisdiction hanging charges final appealable order

Dismissed assigned errors do not address the judgment entry appealed

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.

The Franklin County Municipal Court erred in granting defendant-appellee Alaura's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss beause the Ohio Neighborhood Preservation Association pled facts sufficient to state a claim for public nuisance pursuant to R.C. 3767.41. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of US Bank Trust, Natl. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty.

Reagan Tokes Act, Constitutional Court Costs, R.C. 2957.23(A)(1(a) and (C) Waiver Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Presumption of Reasonable Professional Assistance

Procedendo moot. The complaint for a writ of procedendo, to compel the trial court judge to render rulings regarding motions to vacate sentence, is moot. The trial court judge has denied the motions to vacate sentence.

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 best interest abuse manifest weight of the evidence hearsay. The juvenile court's decision to grant the agency's motion for permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court made appropriate findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 and those findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony from the children's godmother and counselor relating to the children's behavioral and emotional issues because, even if the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, Mother failed to establish that the court relied on this evidence in making its decision.

Legal custody R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) preponderance of the evidence best interest of the child R.C. 2151.414(D) abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody to Father.

Termination of parental rights motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 motion for legal custody R.C. 2151.353(A) abuse of discretion best interest of the child R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). The juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted legal custody of the child to his father and denied the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services' ("CCDCFS") motion for permanent custody. Father failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that legal custody to him was in the child's best interest. The agency clearly and convincingly established that permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest.

Postconviction relief recast irregular motion jurisdiction. Affirmed. Without establishing that the trial court maintained continuing jurisdiction to review the motion filed 35 years after the final entry of conviction, which must be construed as a belated or successive petition for postconviction relief, based on the arguments presented, the trial court had no authority to do anything but deny the motion for the want of jurisdiction.

Permanent custody mental health substance abuse stable housing basic needs income domestic violence factors visitation best interests of the child clear and convincing evidence manifest weight abuse of discretion. The judgment granting permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414, was in the children's best interests because the mother failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children's removal despite the agency's assistance.

Attempted murder aggravated robbery juvenile offender sufficiency of evidence manifest weight. The state presented sufficient evidence to establish that appellant acted in complicity with two other individuals in committing the multiples offenses related to an armed robbery. Furthermore, having reviewed the entire record, weighed the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considered the credibility of witnesses, we are unable to conclude that the juvenile court clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts in evidence in the state's favor.

R.C. 955.28(B) strict liability statutory claim dog owner landlord duplex home harborer out of possession common area shared areas outside yard possession and control sidewalk personal injuries. Affirmed granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant owner of a duplex property on a strict-liability statutory claim under R.C. 955.28(B) for personal injuries allegedly caused by a tenant's dog while plaintiff was walking along a public sidewalk. The out-of-possession landlord/owner could not be found to be a harborer of the dog under R.C. 955.28(B) when the tenants had shared possession and control of the yard and there was no evidence that the landlord had retained possession and control of the premises or any common areas or shared areas outside of the house.

Dismissal Crim.R. 48(B). Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in dismissing the proceedings with prejudice based on the victim's failure to appear for trial because that decision was not based on any statutory or constitutional right, and a victim's failure to appear at trial does not in and of itself justify the dismissal of a criminal action with prejudice.

Manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) menacing by stalking R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) conditions of community control. The trial court's imposition of community control conditions was proper where the record supports that the conditions: "(1) were reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) have some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relate to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation." State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 53, 550 N.E.2d 469. Appellant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Self-defense manifest weight sufficiency evidence State v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562 ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly charged the jury regarding self-defense and provided the requisite verdict forms. The fashion of the jury instructions and absence of a separate self-defense verdict form did not prejudice the defendant or rise to the level of plain error. Because the jury instructions and verdict forms were not erroneous, Smith's trial counsel was not ineffective. The defendant's murder and felonious assault convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the State was not required to present sufficient evidence to disprove Smith's, self-defense claim.

Anders appeal. Appellate counsel found no issues with arguable merit to advance on appeal. Pursuant to our independent review, we also find no potentially meritorious issues. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in accepting appellant's guilty pleas to two counts of rape, and the agreed consecutive sentence is not reviewable on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Judge Duhart. Divorce. Marital property or separate property. Donor intent. Burden.

Judge Duhart. Real Party in Interest. Immunity of Political Subdivision Employee.

Judge Duhart. Consecutive sentences. Motion to vacate sentence. Res judicata.

The trial court erred by granting judgment against appellant as to a replevin claim and in granting appellant personal items as a matter of equity. The trial court did not err in ruling against appellant on a conversion claim the trial court's finding that the disputed joint property belonged to the parties' business was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment reversed and remanded with respect to the replevin claim, and judgment affirmed with respect to the conversion claim.

Appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a complaint for an injunction. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the matter of appellant's complaint for injunction, as appellant's failure to file an administrative appeal was fatal to his claim. Appellant argued that the right to effective assistance of counsel applied in a civil action related to an administrative determination, and thus the summary judgment granted by the trial court must be reversed. However, the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has not been extended beyond criminal and permanent custody proceedings and, thus, did not attach to appellant's civil action. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to challenge the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in the trial court and forfeited her argument on appeal for all but plain error. The trial court's imposition of sentence did not rise to the level of plain error as the relevant statute is constitutional. Furthermore, the sentence imposed by the trial court was not contrary to law. Judgments affirmed.

Court, per Mayle J., held that trial court did not abuse discretion when it refused to instruct jury on self-defense where defendant kicked and stomped victim's head and body after he was unconscious. No jury instruction on inferior offense of aggravated assault was warranted where victim merely pushed defendant and defendant testified only that he acted in fear, not a sudden fit of passion or rage. Court is presumed to have considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding Appellant failed to establish prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnel Douglas. TPS had a legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reason in terminating appellant's employment after TPS discovered that appellant had falsified his employment application. Appellant was not an employee of TFT.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress where the warrantless seizure of appellant's person was based on probable cause. Although the officer who detained appellant did not have personal knowledge of the facts on which the probable cause was based, those facts were imputed to the officer via the collective knowledge doctrine. State v. Armstead, 2015-Ohio-5010, 50 N.E.3d 1073 (2d Dist.), overruled. Judgment affirmed.

Forfeiture of appellant's vehicle pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(c)(v) was not an unconstitutionally excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. Neither was it unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to appellant, under either the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. Duhart

Conceded error. The trial court failed to properly provide the notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee on his claim that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual under R.C. 2743.48. Appellee did not establish, as a matter of law, that there was an error in procedure. Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether he was actually innocent of the offenses. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not commit plain error in denying appellant's motion to intervene in a foreclosure action or in finding that appellant was not entitled to excess proceeds resulting from a sale of the premises. Appellant failed to object to the magistrate's decision and also failed to file a transcript of the magistrate's hearing in the trial court. Review, therefore, is limited to plain error, and there was no plain error. Judgment affirmed.

Identification manifest weight and sufficiency

sentencing, PSI, presume regularity, gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)

4th Amendment – warrantless requirement – emergency aid exception

record—transcript—App.R. 9(B)—regularity

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's four children to a county's department of job and family services where the manifest weight of the evidence established that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in the children's best interest and where appellant failed to alleviate the issues that caused the children's removal despite the agency making reasonable towards reunification of the children with appellant.

Defendant appeals consecutive sentences. Record supported trial court's consecutive sentence findings. Judgment entry failed to incorporate all consecutive sentence findings made at sentencing. Case remanded for nunc pro tunc entry.

The trial court did not err in revoking appellant's community control and imposing a prison sentence following his admission to violating the terms of his community control as the court fully complied with Crim.R. 32.3 and afforded appellant with due process in the revocation proceedings. Appellant was not entitled to a Crim.R. 11(C) dialogue at the revocation proceedings.

The trial court erred by finding that a tender of money damages rendered plaintiff's claims moot and non-justiciable. In this case, the plaintiff entered a stipulation stating that its claims were less than $75,000 for purposes of avoiding federal jurisdiction. The defendants then tendered $75,000 to plaintiff arguing that the claim was rendered moot. However, contrary to claims otherwise, the case was not rendered moot as the plaintiff's stipulation did not require that plaintiff receive money damages in lieu of injunctive relief. There was still an actual, genuine controversy and therefore the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

The trial court erred in imposing sanctions for frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 when the parties had not moved for sanctions under the statute and the trial court failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements before awarding frivolous conduct sanctions. Although the trial court found appellant had committed discovery violations under Civ.R. 37(C), the court failed to issue a final appealable order imposing sanctions under Civ.R. 37, thereby preventing appellate review.

CRIMINAL - Endangering Children R.C. 2919.22(A) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) provides for limited review of whether the record supports a trial court's sentencing findings under specific statutes R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides that court of appeals may review whether a sentence is contrary to law 24 month sentence for a third-degree felony conviction was not contrary to law nunc pro tunc Crim.R. 36 allows trial court to correct clerical mistakes.

CIVIL - Tort action motor vehicle accident enforcement of oral settlement agreement requires clear and convincing evidence of the terms of agreement and that parties entered into the agreement mediation proceedings resulting in a purported settlement agreement are subject to privilege R.C. 2710.04 factual dispute existed about whether appellants evidence proof of acceptance of oral settlement agreement.

CRIMINAL LAW - burglary force opening of a closed but unlocked door jury instruction for lesser included offense of criminal trespass sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight.

RELEVANT EVIDENCE. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that certain evidence proferred by defendant-appellant was not relevant.

WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. The trial court erred by conducting a bench trial without ensuring that defendant-appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her right to a jury trial.

APPLICATION TO RESIGN LAW LICENSE PRACTICE LAW. While the attorney in this case submitted an application to resign his license to practice law in October 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court did not accept his application to resign until January of 2023. Thus, the attorney still had a license to practice law through the end of the case presently before this Court.

No contest plea Positive contradiction negating an element

Divorce - division of marital debt child support calculation

Imposition of prison sentence after revocation of community control

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed.

The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals did not err by affirming the Franklin County Board of Revision's decision dismissing a CAUV recoupment charge complaint as untimely filed. Emergency legislation enacted in March 2020 tolled "time limitations" but the statutory requirement that a CAUV recoupment charge complaint be filed by March 31 was a deadline rather than a time limitation and therefore was not tolled by the legislation.

There is no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, in accordance with the magistrate's decision, the motion of OAPA to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is granted, and relator's complaint in which he seeks an order for a writ of mandamus ordering respondent the Ohio Adult Parole Authority ("OAPA") to cease employing discretionary powers with regard to relator's parole is dismissed.

Motion for leave to file a delayed appeal is denied for not setting forth a sufficient reason for the failure to file a timely notice of appeal.

mandamus R.C. 2969.25 procedural inmate-filing requirements R.C. 2969.25(C) affidavit-of-waiver and affidavit-of-indigency requirements inmate account statement statement of inmate's cash and things of value.

CIVIL – No abuse of discretion where juvenile court awards legal custody to grandparents pursuant to R.C. 2151.353 because Mother has not complied with case plan. No violation of R.C. 2151.419 occurs where the reasonableness of the children's services agency's efforts could be gleaned from the record.

PRESUIT-DISCOVERY – CIV.R. 34(D) – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS – R.C. 2317.48 – INTERROGATORIES – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – MOTION TO DISMISS – PLEADINGS – CIV.R. 26(C) – PROTECTIVE ORDER – REASONABLE EFFORTS – CIV.R. 37(A)(5)(a) – REASONABLE EXPENSES – SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION: The trial court properly denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's presuit discovery action because the pleadings in the filing alleged sufficient facts to find that plaintiff's request for the production of documents under Civ.R. 34(D) was necessary to ascertain the identity of additional adverse parties involved in the misappropriation of plaintiff's data, and plaintiff's interrogatories under R.C. 2317.48 were necessary to discover how defendants were using plaintiff's data in order to file a subsequent complaint. The trial court abused its discretion when it granted plaintiff's motion to compel because the trial court failed to determine whether plaintiff's discovery requests exceeded the scope of Civ.R. 34(D) and R.C. 2317.48 and failed to determine whether another defendant's discovery responses rendered plaintiff's remaining requests cumulative or unnecessary.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 2151.414 – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of mother's children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the court determined that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in the children's best interest where mother was incarcerated at the time of disposition, had previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated, and had a history of aggressive behavior and unaddressed mental health challenges, and where the children were thriving in the current placements, and had never been in mother's custody.

CHILDREN — PARENTAL TERMINATION — PERMANENT CUSTODY — BEST INTEREST: The evidence before the trial court was sufficient to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was in the child's best interest where the evidence showed that mother could not provide proof of stable housing or income, had ongoing, significant mental-health concerns, and had not progressed with her case plan.

BREACH OF CONTRACT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – ASSIGNMENT: The parties' lease was not ambiguous where it was only subject to one reasonable interpretation, specifically that the parties intended to require the tenant, and not the landlord, to obtain written consent from the other party prior to assigning or subletting the premises. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the landlord on a claim for breach of lease where no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the lease existed, whether it was breached by the tenant, and whether the landlord suffered resulting damages.

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25

legal custody – manifest weight of the evidence – preponderance of the evidence – best interest of the child – visitation – abuse of discretion – vague – oversight

Consent Judgment, Res Judicata

obstructing official business, traffic stop, sufficiency, manifest weight

reopening – App.R. 26(B) – ineffective assistance of appellate counsel – two-stage analysis – confirm prior judgment

post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a), R.C. 2953.21, R.C. 2953.23, R.C. 2953.21(2)(A), R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), successive petition, R.C. 2953.23(A), res judicata

Court costs ineffective assistance of counsel

Sentencing R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12

rape motion for resentencing life sentence R.C. 2967.13(A)(5) not eligible for post-release control R.C. 2967.28(B) eligible for parole

Standard appellate of review for felony sentences R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b) R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(iii) R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(x) R.C. 2953.08(G)

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) 90-day period to file timely application, untimely filed, failure to establish good cause for untimely filing of application, good cause not applied for an indefinite period of time, effect of guilty plea. The applicant has filed an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application per App.R. 26(B)(2)(b). The applicant has failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the application for reopening. In addition, by entering a plea of guilty, the applicant waived all appealable errors that might have occurred at trial unless the errors prevented a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.

Aggravated murder R.C. 2903.02(B) aggravated burglary sufficiency of evidence felonious assault trespass self-defense duty to retreat allied offenses of similar import. Defendant was tried on charges that he killed the victim in the victim's home with a hammer. Defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), murder, aggravated burglary, and felonious assault after trial. The trial court determined that the charges of aggravated murder and murder were allied offenses of similar import and sentenced defendant on the charges of aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and felonious assault. Defendant claimed on appeal that because he was a tenant in the victim's home, argued there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find the element of trespass necessary to support the charges of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder predicated on the commission of an aggravated burglary. Defendant stated his tenancy was created because he was allowed to stay in the victim's home in exchange for being a "butler." Defendant did not have a rental agreement, pay rent, or have keys to the victim's home. The law of trespass protects those in control of the premises, and there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed a trespass when he committed a violent offense against the homeowner. The trial court properly instructed the jury on trespass and did not err by refusing defendant's request that the jury be instructed on the law of tenancy. Further, the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat. Defendant claimed that the trial court erred by sentencing him to allied offenses of similar import. The evidence supporting the element of trespass in the aggravated burglary charge was the commission of a violent offense against the homeowner. The offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder should have been determined to be allied offenses of similar import. However, there was evidence to support a finding that defendant committed felonious assault with a separate animus and/or caused separate harm and the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant on the charge of felonious assault.

Failure to comply with appellate rules, Loc.App.R. 3, App.R. 12, App.R. 16 petition for adoption R.C. 3107.07(A) consent to adopt, failure to communicate with minor clear and convincing evidence manifest weight abuse of discretion. Trial court's decision that stepfather failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that father's failure to have contact with the child in the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition was without justifiable-cause was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Father failed to have more than de minimis contact with his child for several years preceding the filing of the adoption petition and the lack of communication and contact was not justifiable. The trial court's findings were not supported by the weight of the evidence.

Shared parenting residential parent for school purposes guardian ad litem report change in circumstances best interest of the child manifest weight of the evidence abuse of discretion modification of parenting time. The juvenile court acted within its discretion when it found that it was in the best interest of the child to modify the designation of the residential parent for school purposes and the parenting time.

Voluntary manslaughter R.C. 2903.03(A) involuntary manslaughter R.C. 2903.04(A) reckless homicide R.C. 2903.041(A) aggravated assault R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) firearm specifications R.C. 2941.141(A) R.C. 2941.145(A) motion for acquittal Crim.R. 29 sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence child witness minor competency Evid.R. 601 plain error ineffective assistance of counsel Sixth Amendment allied offenses conceded error Reagan Tokes Law mootness. We vacated the defendant's sentence for voluntary manslaughter based on a conceded error. The state conceded that the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant on the voluntary-manslaughter count because the state had elected to proceed to sentencing on a different allied offense — involuntary manslaughter. The trial court was required to accept that choice, merge the offenses into a single conviction for involuntary manslaughter and then impose a sentence for that conviction. We remanded the case for resentencing on the correct count. The defendant's substantive challenge to the length of her sentence in light of the purposes of felony sentencing, and her constitutional challenge to the imposition of an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law, are moot until she is resentenced. We affirmed the conviction in all other respects. The finding of guilt on the involuntary-manslaughter count was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where — among other things — the defendant had admitted that she pulled the trigger of the gun, forensic tests showed that the gun was less than nine inches from the victim's chest when it discharged and a neighbor testified that he heard the gunshot in the midst of an argument loud enough to be heard from his nearby apartment. There was no plain error in the trial court's finding that the defendant's daughter — who was six years old at the time of trial — was competent to testify as a witness, because any error (if there was any) did not affect the outcome of the trial. The defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective when counsel did not object to the child's testimony because that decision was a strategy call parts of the testimony supported the state's theory and other parts supported the defense theory. In light of these holdings, the guilty verdicts underlying the defendant's sentence remain the law of the case and are not subject to review on remand.

Workers' compensation claim jury verdict for claimant unreliable expert medical testimony inadmissible expert medical testimony inadequate review of medical records insufficient medical history Evid.R. 703 Evid.R. 705 hypothetical questions Evid.R. 611 leading questions Evid.R. 702 weight of the evidence versus admissibility of the evidence credibility and weight of expert's testimony are jury questions Civ.R. 50 directed verdict judgment notwithstanding the verdict flow-through injury proximate cause competing medical expert opinions Civ.R. 59 and motion for new trial. The trial court did not err in admitting expert witness testimony where the issues raised by defense counsel related to the credibility of the doctor's opinion rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Where claimant introduced sufficient testimony to demonstrate proximate cause of his flow-through injury, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant-appellant's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied RTA's motion for new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(6), and the trial court did not err when it denied RTA's motion for new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(7) and (9).

Rape force gross sexual imposition Evid.R. 801 Reagan Tokes.

Summary judgment de novo breach of contract specific performance injunctive relief right of first offer right of first refusal contract matter of law existence meeting of the minds material terms material breach notice negotiations good faith damages reasonable certainty speculative. Affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants/appellees on the claims in the complaint for breach of contract, specific performance, and injunctive relief. The plaintiff/appellant had a right of first offer, not a right of first refusal, which is decidedly different. Upon applying ordinary contract principles, appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the parties entered a right of first offer agreement, they did not have a binding and enforceable contract for the sale of the property. Even if there was a breach of the right of first offer agreement, which required the parties to negotiate in good faith, summary judgment was warranted because damages were speculative and the claims otherwise failed.

Law-of-the-case doctrine law of the case dicta obiter dictum. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss because this court's prior statements regarding defendant's Megan's Law classification and registration duties were not law of the case they were dicta by which the trial court was not bound.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutional indefinite sentence. The trial court's imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law was not a violation of defendant-appellant's constitutional rights. No plain error existed where defendant-appellant objected to the Reagan Tokes Law before the trial court.

Clear and convincing evidence, best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(B), R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 2151.414(E), abandonment, R.C. 2151.011(C).

Parental rights permanent custody standing due process notice continue best interest legal custody. - Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody of the children to the agency. Legal custody was not proper because Mother withdrew her motion prior to the permanent custody trial. Mother lacked standing to raise whether Father's due process rights were violated. Motion to continue was properly denied because the motion for permanent custody was pending for approximately 18 months.

Accelerated appeal breach of contract settlement agreement consent judgment motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) default judgment Civ.R. 55 Civ.R. 12(A). In this accelerated appeal, we affirmed the denial of the defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss and reversed the default judgment that had been rendered in favor of the plaintiff. A settlement agreement is a binding contract, which may be enforced through a separate action for breach of contract notwithstanding that a trial court dismissed the underlying litigation with prejudice based on the settlement without retaining jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a default judgment where it expressly gave the defendant a deadline to appear in the matter to avoid default and the defendant filed its Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion before that deadline. Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(A)(2), the defendant should have been allowed 14 days to file its answer after the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Permanent custody motion for legal custody clear and convincing evidence abuse of discretion. The trial court's decision terminating appellant's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The child could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant. The appellant failed to remedy the conditions that led to the child's removal. The appellant was not successful in her case plan goals for substance abuse, mental health, or parenting. The record does not demonstrate that the appellant's self-medication with marijuana helped her with her mental health issues. The trial court's determination that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child was not an abuse of discretion. The child was bonded and doing well with the foster family, the only family the child has known. The GAL was of the opinion that removing the child from the foster family would be "catastrophic." The trial court's denial of appellant's motion for legal custody to grandmother was not an abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates that grandmother did not demonstrate full commitment to the child's needs. Further, her plans to keep the child safe were undeveloped and unrealistic. Because the juvenile court did not explicitly or solely base its decision to terminate appellant's parental rights on her mental health, there was no error in rendering its decision without the aid of expert testimony. Implied in the juvenile court's dependency adjudication was an implicit finding of parent unsuitability, and therefore, there was no requirement of the juvenile court to make a separate unsuitability finding.

Permanent custody reasonable-efforts findings best interests of the child manifest weight clear and convincing evidence abuse of discretion. Juvenile court was not required to make a reasonable-efforts finding when granting permanent custody of children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services where court previously made reasonable-efforts findings prior to granting permanent custody. The judgment granting permanent custody of children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414, was in the children's best interests because the mother failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children's removal.

Procedendo, postconviction-relief petition, and mootness. This court denied a procedendo action as moot, when the trial court issued a ruling on the subject postconviction-relief petition.

Writ of quo warranto writ of mandamus standing R.C. 2733.04 R.C. 2733.05 R.C. 2733.06 R.C. 2733.08 taxpayer action R.C. 733.58 resident declaratory judgment and injunction jurisdiction. Relator's complaint and amended complaint for writs of quo warranto and mandamus were sua sponte dismissed where relator lacked standing to bring an action in quo warranto and this court lacked jurisdiction over the mandamus claim because relator actually sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

Use of force inmate battery negligence damages intentional infliction of emotional distress. This case arose out of an incident where defendant's employee struck plaintiff, an inmate, in the mouth with his fist while plaintiff was getting ice from an ice machine. Defendant admitted liability. Plaintiff testified that he experienced swelling of his lip at the time of the incident which continued at the time of trial, emotional distress, nerve damage, and long-term harm. The magistrate found that plaintiff proved damages for temporary pain and suffering through his testimony but was unable to prove long-term or severe emotional or physical harm because he did not provide expert testimony. Further, the magistrate concluded that plaintiff did not prove the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the conduct was instinctual rather than outrageous. Therefore, the magistrate recommended that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $3,500.

Civ.R. 56, R.C. 4981.14(B)(4), jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed claims for trespass and adverse possession to quiet title against Defendant. The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after it found that all actions against the Ohio Rail Development Commission had to be filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in accordance with R.C. 4981.14(B)(4).

Relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, to vacate its final order effecting the transfer of the outstanding workman's compensation liability of a prior entity to relator under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C). Respondent concluded that relator and the prior entity were essentially the same employer: under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(D). The arguments relator offers in support of its objection do not demonstrate that the magistrate erred when recommending the writ be denied and they fail to address the quantum of evidence supporting respondent's final determination. Relator's objection is overruled, the decision and recommendation of the magistrate is adopted, and the writ of mandamus is denied.

The trial court did not plainly err by admitting the Guardian ad Litem's testimony. Further, the trial court did not err by granting the motion of Franklin County Children Services for permanent custody. Competent, credible evidence supported the trial court's finding that granting the motion was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

Because the trial court imposed a community control sentence in lieu of jail time for a violation of C.C.C. 223.13(A)(1)(f), which requires a minimum sentence of 180 days in jail, the sentence is contrary to law. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

The trial court erred in approving appellee's submitted shared parenting plan when appellant received no notice of the hearing on the issue. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

The trial court erred when it refused to consider the merits of the City's Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of political subdivision immunity.

Anders manifest weight

Permanent and legal custody, grandmother's appeal

Anders, gross sexual imposition, change of plea, sentencing

COMPLICITY – ROBBERY – EVIDENCE – SENTENCING: The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery as an aider and abettor and the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where two passengers were riding in his car and one was openly carrying a rifle, defendant's car followed the victim from a gas station to a relative's house and then to the victim's house, one perpetrator hit the victim in the head with a gun, both began to hit him while he on the ground, one took the victim's wife's phone, and both men fled the scene in defendant's car. The trial court erred in sentencing defendant on both a one-year firearm specification and a three-year firearm specification where both specifications were attached to the same underlying count. The trial court erred in including as part of the sentence an order requiring defendant to stay away from the victim because a no-contact order is a community-control sanction and the court imposed a prison term, and therefore, it was not authorized to impose a community-control sanction.

ABDUCTION – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE : In a domestic-violence and abduction bench trial where the victim accused defendant of holding her at gunpoint in a vehicle traveling on the interstate, the trial court's refusal to admit statements the victim allegedly made to defendant the day of the incident, which would demonstrate her reason to fabricate the allegations against defendant, and the trial court's admission of other-acts evidence was harmless error: the trial court admitted defendant's testimony that, on the day of the incident, he had told the victim he was marrying another woman, which caused her to become angry the victim's version of events was corroborated by testimony from a passing motorist who saw the victim running down the interstate and stopped to help the victim, and by testimony from the investigating officer, who documented the victim's injuries and confirmed the 200 texts or calls defendant made to the victim in the days prior to the incident defendant's defense that he drove to the victim's apartment to tell her that he was marrying another woman was not credible considering his actions leading up to the incident and defendant's reason for leaving the scene before police arrived and driving to Columbus was also not credible under the circumstances.

CHILDREN — TEMPORARY CUSTODY — DEPENDENCY— INVITED ERROR — EVIDENCE — REASONABLE EFFORTS — MOOTNESS — JURISDICTION: Mother invited any error in the juvenile court's adjudication of mother's child as dependent where mother's other child was charged as delinquent for committing a sex offense, mother stipulated to the granting of temporary custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services ("JFS"), the parents agreed that the juvenile court's intervention was in the child's best interest, mother later requested that the juvenile court remand custody of the child to the parents with protective orders, mother subsequently agreed to the juvenile court's termination of temporary custody and protective orders, and the case was eventually closed. [But see DISSENT: The juvenile court erred in adjudicating mother's child dependent where mother did not invite the error because she did not invite the dependency finding as she sought only temporary orders under Juv.R. 13, which are not predicated on a finding of dependency, and where JFS did not provide clear and convincing evidence of any specific harm to the child or that the parents' support of their other child against sexual-offense allegations adversely affected the child.] Mother's appeal of the juvenile court's finding that JFS made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of her child from the home and to effectuate his return to his parents was made moot where the child had been returned to the parents' home, there were no collateral consequences to a reasonable-efforts finding, and there was no relief that the appellate court could afford mother.

Appellant's claims of deficiencies in his resentencing hearing were barred by res judicata. Further, appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel to raise these barred claims. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. Appellate counsel found no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and our examination of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues having arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the BZA's denial of appellant's application for a conditional-use permit to be supported by a preponderance of the substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. The trial court did not err in failing to take additional evidence where the BZA did not refuse to permit cross-examination during an administrative hearing. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in sustaining appellee-bank's motion for summary judgment on its complaint for foreclosure. The bank filed its complaint for foreclosure following the death of the decedent-borrower, after which payments on the note ceased, and it did not seek personal judgment on the note but sought foreclosure of the mortgage to enforce its security interest. Appellant, an heir to the decedent-borrower, was a necessary party to this action following the decedent-borrower's death and did not oppose the bank's motion for summary judgment. Judgment affirmed.

rape, gross sexual imposition, sexual battery, force or threat of force, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) R.C. 2907.03(A)(3) mistake of fact jury instruction insufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence

speedy trial violation, R.C. 2941.401, substantial compliance

2929.11, 2929.12, 2929.14, Consecutive Sentences

Appellant's assault conviction was not against the weight of the evidence. Duhart.

Where a hole in a bathroom floor was an open and obvious hazard, plumber's premises liability claim failed. Although the homeowner created the hazard by removing a trap door, homeowner had no duty to warn the plumber where the hole was not concealed and was observable, had the plumber been looking. (OSOWIK).

Duhart - Forcible entry and detainer. Jurisdiction. Nonpayment of consideration.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state's interests in maintaining Hair's records outweighed Hair's interests in having the records sealed. Duhart.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court did not abuse its discretion by naming father the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' minor children. The trial court considered all statutory factors and implicitly considered mother's role as the children's primary caregiver. The trial court's factual findings were supported by some competent, credible evidence in the record, so they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Judge Charles Sulek. Decision of hearing officer that the claimant quit his job without just cause and therefore was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence where the claimant quits his employment without inquiring into any of his concerns regarding pay, travel, hours, or working conditions.

Reasonable, articulable suspicion of impairment supported an officer's request that appellant perform field sobriety testing. The breath test results were presumptively admissible where the dry gas control used was traceable to standards required by the Ohio Department of Health. Sulek.

The trial court's decision sentencing appellant to an indefinite four-to-six year prison term and ordering appellant to pay postrelease control supervision costs following appellant's guilty plea to one count of second-degree felony possession of cocaine was affirmed as the sentence was not contrary to law, but the cause was nevertheless reversed and remanded to the trial court so that the court could issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a clerical error in its sentencing entry.

A prosecutor's comment during opening statements on a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the face of questioning by law enforcement does not violate the Fifth Amendment where the defendant did not expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and no exception applies. A social worker's testimony about an assessment based on a forensic interview of the victim and a Traumatic Symptoms Checklist for Young Children completed by the victim's mother may be admissible as lay testimony.

Appellant's conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence where the state presented testimony and evidence from which the jury could have found all the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to his arguments otherwise, appellant's actions demonstrated he acted with purpose to obstruct or delay law enforcement from the performance of official duties.

sentencing, PSI, presume regularity

postconviction—untimely—jurisdiction

allocation of parental rights and responsibilities – factual findings – manifest weight – best interest of the children – sexsomnia diagnosis – mental health

Habeas corpus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), res judicata

R.C. 2935.09 – R.C. 2935.10 – private citizen affidavit – felony prosecution – warrantless arrest – power to arrest – reviewing official

R.C. 2935.09 – R.C. 2935.10 – private citizen affidavit – felony prosecution – reviewing official good faith – meritorious

SUPPRESSION K9 SNIFF trial court did not err by denying suppression motion where officer worked diligently on purposes of the stop.

JUDICIAL RELEASE ALLOCUTION Revocation of judicial release was supported by the record.

Intimidation, Predicate Offense - Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of violating R.C. 2921.03, intimidation, despite the fact that no conviction for a predicate offense occurred. The evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to determine that a predicate offense occurred.

SUPPRESSION MANIFEST WEIGHT JOINDER PLEA AGREEMENTS Trial court did not err by denying suppression motions OVI convictions were not against the weight of the evidence trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining cases for trial.

OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS RESISTING ARREST GENERAL VERSUS SPECIFIC STATUTES IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICTS. Defendant-appellant could properly be convicted of fifth-degree felony obstructing official business as there is no irreconcilable conflict between the offenses of obstructing official business and resisting arrest.

RIGHT OF REVIEW PLEA OF NO CONTEST CRIM.R. 12. Judgment of conviction and sentence must be affirmed where the defendant-appellant pled no contest and failed to preserve issues for appeal that were raised by motions outside the scope of Crim.R. 12(C).

LEGAL CUSTODY LEGAL CUSTODY HEARING CUSTODIAN'S PRESENCE PLAIN ERROR VISITATION. The trial court did not commit plain error by awarding legal custody to the custodian notwithstanding her absence from the legal custody hearing. The trial court did not err by not addressing father's visitation in its legal custody order.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Inmate failed to carry his burden to rebut by clear and convincing evidence showing of sheriff's office that it had provided all public records responsive to inmate's request—Writ and requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees denied.

JUVENILE - motion for permanent custody termination of parental rights best interest of children legally secure permanent placement manifest weight of the evidence clear and convincing evidence.

mandamus Ohio Public Records Act R.C. 149.43 statutory damages

There was sufficient evidence to support Guevara's convictions of aggravated robbery, robbery, and felonious assault, and the trial court did not err in refusing to merge Guevara's felonious assault conviction with his aggravated robbery conviction.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant was not able to show appellee was negligent and therefore could not breach governmental civil liability based on speculation.

Judgment awarding damages pursuant to prior default judgment entry was not a final, appealable order because the case involved multiple claims against multiple parties and the judgment appealed from lacked an express determination that there was no just reason for delay. Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Application for reopening denied.

Motion to suppress Miranda warnings public safety exception to Miranda warnings competent, credible evidence

Criminal law—Sufficiency of the evidence—Burglary—R.C. 2911.12(A)—To prove that a defendant trespassed by stealth or deception in a burglary case, the state must prove that the defendant actively avoided discovery or used deceptive conduct to gain entry into the structure—Court of appeals' judgment reversed, burglary conviction and judicial sanction associated with it vacated, and cause remanded to trial court to enter judgment of conviction for lesser included offense of criminal trespass and sentencing.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS – DIVORCE – CUSTODY – PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES – CHILD SUPPORT – SPOUSAL SUPPORT: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother sole residential and legal custody of the parties' child where the trial court properly considered the required best-interest factors and the trial court's findings were supported by the record. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order mother to pay child support where mother was designated the residential parent, and the trial court granted father a downward deviation in the amount of monthly child support because mother has a higher income-producing ability. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award monthly spousal-support payments to father where the record shows that the spousal-support award was not appropriate and reasonable where mother assumed all of the debt from the marriage, mother retained child-care responsibilities, and father received both marital homes and the equity in the homes.

VIOLATION OF PROTECTION ORDER — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — COUNSEL: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for violating a protection order where the messages were sent from defendant's Instagram account to the victim's account, defendant initially denied sending messages to the victim and then claimed that the messages were meant for someone else or were sent before the protection order was in place, and finally asserted that the victim "catfished" him to lure him into violating the protection order.

COMMUNITY CONTROL – R.C. 2929.15 – R.C. 2929.19 – GUILTY PLEA: Where defendant pled guilty to a community-control violation, defendant was precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the violation. Where defendant was found guilty of nontechnical community-control violations for failing to comply with court-ordered treatment and failing to pay restitution, the trial court was not required to comply with the requirement in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) that it impose a sentence of not more than 180 days. Where the trial court informed defendant of the range from which a prison term could be imposed for a violation of community control, and where defendant failed to appeal both the trial court's initial imposition of community control and the trial court's reinstatement of community control following a violation, defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial court's failure to comply with the requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) to inform him that, if he were to violate his community control, commit a violation of any law, or leave the state without permission from the court or his probation officer, the court could impose a longer time under the same community-control sanction, impose a more restrictive community-control sanction, or impose a prison term.

RECORD SEALING – R.C. 2953.32: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's applications to seal the records of his convictions where the trial court determined that defendant was not rehabilitated under R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(c), and defendant did not challenge that determination on appeal.

CHILD ENDANGERMENT – SENTENCING – DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION: The trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a three-year driver's license suspension for a child-endangerment conviction where the statute authorizes a suspension for a period not to exceed one year.

summary judgment, holder in due course, standing to bring foreclosure action, issue preclusion, R.C. 1303.21/22

restitution, plain error, Reagan Tokes

suppress, reasonable suspicion, totality of the circumstances, initiate, traffic stop

felonious assault, firearm specifications, sufficiency, manifest weight, plain error, ineffective assistance, consecutive sentences

RECONSIDERATION – App.R. 26(A) pro se application delayed application permitted if the moving party can establish "extraordinary circumstances" App.R. 14(B) Appellant filed his application slightly beyond the 10-day timeframe under App.R. 26(A)(1)(a) Appellant fails to establish "extraordinary circumstances" in addition, we addressed in our decision Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel and constitutional claims as well as his claim that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and found no merit in any of his claims upon consideration of the App.R. 26(A) application, Appellant has not demonstrated any obvious errors or raised any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion this court is not persuaded that we erred as a matter of law application denied.

PERMANENT CUSTODY - Because the agency presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in the permanent custody of the agency would serve the child's best interests, the judgment of the trial court is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because Appellant perfected his appeal within 30 days of the trial court's judgment and no other remedy exists, the issue of whether or not the trial court properly notified him of his right to appeal is moot.

Judge Duhart. Writ of Habeas Corpus. Writ of Prohibition.