[Cite as State v. Bridgewater,
2023-Ohio-1211.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 22AP-417
(C.P.C. No. 06CR-8408)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Dominique Bridgewater, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on April 13, 2023
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.
On brief: Dominique Bridgewater, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
JAMISON, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Dominique Bridgewater, appeals from a judgment of
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion seeking a final appealable
order. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On November 8, 2006, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, with an accompanying firearm specification. The
indictment arose out of the shooting death of Jason Bucknor on October 13, 2006.
Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted appellant of the lesser-included offense of
murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, with a firearm specification. The trial court sentenced
appellant to 15 years to life in prison, plus a consecutive 3-year prison term for the
No. 22AP-417 2
specification. Appellant appealed to this court from the June 8, 2007 judgment of
conviction and sentence.
{¶ 3} In appellant’s assignments of error, appellant alleged the verdict was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. He also challenged the trial court’s jury instructions.
Appellant did not raise any issues regarding the prison term or the sentencing entry. In
State v. Bridgewater, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-535, 2008-Ohio-466, this court overruled
appellant’s assignments of error and affirmed the June 8, 2007 judgment.
{¶ 4} On May 4, 2022, appellant filed a pro se “Motion for Trial Court to Provide a
Final Appealable Order of Conviction and Sentence.” Therein, appellant argues the June 8,
2007 judgment entry was not a final appealable order under Crim.R. 32 because it did not
explicitly state that the prison term of 15 years to life was an “indefinite” sentence.
Appellant now claims he is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing from which he may
initiate a new direct appeal to this court. Appellant also argues the trial court erred by
imposing a term of post-release control following a conviction of the unclassified felony of
murder.
{¶ 5} Plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, opposed the motion arguing that the law of
the case doctrine barred appellant’s claim that the June 8, 2007 judgment entry was not a
final appealable order because the judgment had been affirmed by this court on appeal. The
state further maintained that res judicata barred appellant from raising trial court error in
a subsequent proceeding that could have been raised in his direct appeal. The trial court
agreed with the state, and, on June 13, 2022, issued a judgment entry denying appellant’s
motion. Appellant appealed to this court from the June 13, 2022 judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:
[1.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING APPELLANT HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ACTED IN A CARPRICIOUS AND
ARBITRARY MANNER BY DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION FOR TRIAL COURT TO PROVIDE A FINAL,
APPEALABLE ORDER PURSUANT TO CRIM.R.32(C), WITH
DE NOVO SENTENCING HEARING REQUESTED FOR
PURPOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE AN
“NDEFEINITE” TERM AS REQUIRED UNDER R.C. §
No. 22AP-417 3
2929.02(B)(1) OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE TO COMPLY
WITH CRIM.R.32(C)(2) “THE SENTENCE.”
[2.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING APPELLANT HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
LAW UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ACTED IN A CARPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY MANNER BY
NOT ADDRESSING OR RENDERING A RULING ON THE
IMPOSITION OF (PRC) POST RELEASE CONTROL THAT
IS PROHIBITED UNDER MURDER CONVICTION.
(Sic passim.) (Emphasis sic.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 7} The application of res judicata and law of the case are questions of law. See
Lycan v. Cleveland, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4676, ¶ 21; DeAscentis v. Margello,
10th Dist. No. 08AP-522,
2008-Ohio-6821, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review
as to such questions without affording deference to the trial court’s decision. Lycan at ¶ 21,
citing Rossow v. Ravenna, 11th Dist. No. 2001-P-0036 (Mar. 29, 2022), and State v. Hill,
177 Ohio App.3d 171,
2008-Ohio-3509, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.);
DeAscentis at ¶ 12, citing
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Davey Tree Expert Co.,
166 Ohio App.3d 268,
2006-Ohio-2018,
¶ 26 (11th Dist.).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} In appellant’s first assignment of error appellant contends the trial court
erred when it determined that res judicata and the law of the case doctrine barred his
motion for a final appealable order. We disagree.
{¶ 9} A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when
it sets forth: (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the
conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the
journal by the clerk of court. State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197,
2008-Ohio-3330, ¶ 13.
Crim.R. 32(C) provides in relevant part that “[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the
fact of conviction and the sentence. … The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk
shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by
the clerk.”
No. 22AP-417 4
{¶ 10} Appellant contends the June 8, 2007, judgment of conviction and sentence
was not a final appealable order because it did not explicitly impose an “indefinite”
sentence, as required by statute. The trial court determined that res judicata and the law of
the case doctrine barred appellant from raising this alleged error due to his failure to raise
it in his original appeal from his conviction and sentence. We agree.
{¶ 11} In criminal cases, res judicata generally bars a defendant from litigating
claims in a proceeding subsequent to the direct appeal if those claims were raised or could
have been raised at trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction or on appeal from that
judgment. State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171,
2014-Ohio-3707, ¶ 92. The doctrine of res
judicata “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless
relitigation of an issue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity
to be heard.” State v. Saxon,
109 Ohio St.3d 176,
2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18; State v.
Huddleston, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-512,
2013-Ohio-2561, ¶ 12; State v. Jackson, 10th Dist.
No. 20AP-16,
2020-Ohio-3783, ¶ 7. Similarly, the doctrine of law of the case provides that
the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case, both at the trial and reviewing levels.
DeAscentis at ¶ 12, citing Nolan v. Nolan,
11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984).
{¶ 12} In State v. Hobbs, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-482, 2021-Ohio-4278, a jury found
Hobbs guilty of murder with a firearm specification, carrying a concealed weapon, and
having a weapon under disability. The trial court convicted Hobbs and sentenced him
accordingly. Hobbs appealed to this court alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the direct appeal. Hobbs subsequently moved the trial
court to vacate his sentence alleging that the sentence was void and contrary to law because
the language in his sentencing entry specifies a definite sentence instead of the required
indefinite sentence. The trial court denied the motion and Hobbs appealed to this court.
{¶ 13} On appeal, we determined the alleged sentencing error rendered the
judgment voidable, not void. Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-
Ohio-2913, ¶ 26 (“ ‘[W]hen a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not
void.’ ”). Accordingly, we held that “res judicata bars claims that [Hobbs] failed to timely
raise in his direct appeal of the sentencing entry.” Hobbs at ¶ 11.
No. 22AP-417 5
{¶ 14} Here, appellant was convicted of murder in 2007. He timely appealed to this
court from his conviction and we affirmed the trial court in Bridgewater. Appellant could
have raised the alleged sentencing error of which he now complains in his direct appeal,
but he did not. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err when it ruled that res judicata
barred appellant from challenging the sentencing order.
{¶ 15} In an effort to avoid res judicata, appellant claims the June 8, 2007 judgment
entry of conviction and sentence was not a final appealable order because it did not meet
the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C). Appellant maintains that if the June 8, 2007 judgment
was not a final appealable order, this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and our
prior judgment in Bridgewater is a nullity. This court has previously considered this sort
of claim under similar circumstances and concluded that it is barred by the law of the case
doctrine.
{¶ 16} In State v. Monroe, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-598, 2015-Ohio-844, Monroe was
convicted of eight counts of aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, two
counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. The trial court imposed the
death penalty, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the trial court in Monroe’s direct
appeal.
{¶ 17} Monroe subsequently filed a motion for a final appealable order alleging the
trial court’s judgment did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C). In considering Monroe’s claim,
we noted that “ ‘[t]he purpose of Crim.R. 32(C) is to ensure that a defendant is on notice
concerning when a final judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has
begun to run.’ ” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303,
2011-Ohio-5204,
¶ 10, citing State v. Tripodo,
50 Ohio St.2d 124, 127 (1977). We concluded that because
Monroe had timely filed his direct appeal of the judgment, and because the Supreme Court
considered and ruled on the merits of the appeal, “[Monroe] cannot credibly argue that he
was not on notice regarding when a final judgment was entered.” Id. at ¶ 26. Accordingly,
we held that the law of the case doctrine barred Monroe’s claim to the contrary in any
subsequent proceeding. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 18} Similarly, in State v. I’Juju, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-692, 2016-Ohio-3078, the
trial court convicted I’Juju of two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty
specifications and one count of kidnapping with a firearm specification. This court affirmed
No. 22AP-417 6
I’Juju’s conviction and sentence on appeal. Ten years later, I’Juju filed a motion to correct
the judgment entry alleging that his 1985 sentencing entry contained numerous
deficiencies. The trial court denied the motion on concluding that the judgment entry
complied with Crim.R. 32(C).
{¶ 19} On appeal, we concluded the trial court did not err when it denied the motion
because the law of the case doctrine barred I’Juju’s Crim.R. 32(C) arguments. Id. at ¶ 8.
Relying on Monroe, we held that I’Juju could not credibly argue that he was not on notice
of the date when the trial court entered judgment. I'Juju at ¶ 9.
{¶ 20} Similarly, in State v. Bates, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-869, 2019-Ohio-1172, the
trial court sentenced Bates to 15 years to life on the murder count with an additional 3 and
5 consecutive years on the firearm specifications. The judgment entry filed with the clerk of
courts, however, did not bear the judge’s signature. Bates appealed from his conviction and
sentence arguing that the trial court erred by failing to merge the two specifications. This
court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.
{¶ 21} Following several motions and appeals, Bates moved the trial court for a new
sentencing hearing arguing that the original sentencing entry was not a final appealable
order due to the absence of a judge’s signature. The trial court denied the motion and Bates
appealed. On appeal, we recognized that even though the original sentencing entry did not
comply with Crim.R. 32(C), the law of the case doctrine precluded Bates from making that
claim in a subsequent proceeding. Id. at ¶ 15, citing I’Juju and Monroe. In so holding, we
found “no reason to revisit our prior implicit conclusion on direct appeal that the
sentencing entry in this case was a final, appealable order notwithstanding its facial
noncompliance with Crim.R. 32(C). The law of the case doctrine, therefore, mandates a
finding that the original sentencing entry was a final, appealable order.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶ 22} In Bates, we went on to recognize “an exception to the law of the case doctrine
applies allowing an appellate court to ‘ “ ‘re-examine the law of the case it has itself
previously created, if that is the only means to avoid injustice.’ ” ’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Bates
at ¶ 15, quoting Monroe at ¶ 30, quoting Koss v. Kroger Co., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-450,
2008-Ohio-2696, ¶ 19, quoting Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc.,
112 Ohio App.3d 609, 615
(5th Dist.1996). Applying the exception, we concluded that because the original judgment
entry of conviction and sentence did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C), on its face, Bates was
No. 22AP-417 7
entitled to a sentencing entry that complied with Crim.R. 32(C). Accordingly, we reversed
the trial court judgment and remanded the matter for the trial court to issue a new
sentencing entry signed by the trial judge, but we did not order a new sentencing hearing.
{¶ 23} Here, appellant filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and we
affirmed the trial court. Thus, the law of the case bars appellant from claiming the original
judgment entry of conviction and sentence was not a final appealable order in this
subsequent appeal. Moreover, the Crim.R. 32(C) argument appellant makes in this case
was rejected by this court in State v. Albert, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-780, 2020-Ohio-3154.
{¶ 24} In Albert, Albert appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his motion
to vacate an allegedly void sentence imposed in 2015. Albert argued that the sentence was
not authorized by law because he received a sentence of “15-life” for a murder conviction
even though the statute required an indefinite term of 15 years to life. Id. at ¶ 3. In affirming
the trial court, this court concluded that “[a] prison sentence of fifteen years to life is
inherently indefinite, and the law does not require that the sentencing entry add a
redundant adjective to that effect.” Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶ 25} Here, the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction and sentence complied
with Crim.R. 32(C), the omission of the word “indefinite” notwithstanding. Accordingly, we
overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
B. Second Assignment of error
{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court was
precluded from imposing a term of post-release control because the offense of murder is an
unclassified felony, to which post-release control does not apply. We acknowledge
appellant’s legal argument is meritorious in that post-release control may not be imposed
as a sanction for murder. See State v. Richardson, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-310, 2019-Ohio-
3490, ¶ 15. However, the Supreme Court in Harper held that “[a]ny error in imposing the
postrelease-control sanction … was an error in the exercise of the trial court’s jurisdiction
that could have been objected to at trial and that may have been reversible error on direct
appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Harper at ¶ 41.
{¶ 27} Here, as was the case in Harper, appellant could have raised the erroneous
imposition of post-release control in his direct appeal. Because he did not, res judicata bars
appellant from raising the issue in this appeal.
No. 22AP-417 8
{¶ 28} In order to avoid the application of res judicata and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Harper, appellant persists in claiming that res judicata does not bar this appeal
because the original judgment of conviction and sentence was not a final appealable order.
However, as we have stated in connection with appellant’s first assignment of error, the law
of the case bars appellant’s claim. See Bates, I’Juju, and Monroe. Appellant’s contention
that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing from which a new appeal may be perfected
is without merit.
{¶ 29} Nevertheless, as we have recognized in Bates, an exception to the law of the
case doctrine allows this court to reexamine the law of a case we previously created, if that
is the only means to avoid injustice. We believe that an exception applies in this case that
would permit appellant to receive a corrected sentencing entry but not a new sentencing
hearing.
{¶ 30} In State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh, 156 Ohio St.3d 440,
2019-Ohio-1569,
Roberts was convicted of murder but the sentencing entry included reference to a term of
post-release control. This court affirmed the conviction on appeal. In 2015, Roberts filed a
motion in the trial court seeking to “ ‘Correct [a] Judgment Entry Pursuant to Criminal Rule
36.’ ” Id. at ¶ 3, quoting State v. Roberts, 1st Dist. No. C-150528,
2017-Ohio-1060, ¶ 1. The
trial court granted the motion and issued a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry, pursuant to
Crim.R. 36, removing post-release control.1
{¶ 31} Roberts subsequently filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court
requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to vacate its original sentencing
entry and conduct a resentencing hearing. In denying the writ, the Supreme Court
distinguished the line of cases in which trial courts have sought to add post-release control
to a sentence through a nunc pro tunc entry. The court noted that in those instances, “a
nunc pro tunc entry cannot be used to add information that was omitted from the
sentencing entry.” Roberts, 2019-Ohio-1569, at ¶ 9. However, under circumstances where
the court mistakenly imposes post-release control on an unclassified felony, “no
resentencing hearing [is] required.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing State v. Ortiz, 7th Dist. No. 15 MA
0023,
2016-Ohio-4813, ¶ 13. (Trial court has the authority to issue a nunc pro tunc entry,
1Crim.R. 36 provides that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in
the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time.”
No. 22AP-417 9
pursuant to Crim.R. 36, deleting post-release control when it is mistakenly added to the
sentencing entry.) Ortiz at ¶ 13. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded there was no
error because “the trial court simply deleted a postrelease-control provision that should not
have been included in the initial sentencing entry.” Roberts,
2019-Ohio-1569, at ¶ 11.
{¶ 32} This court subsequently followed Roberts, 2019-Ohio-1569, in Richardson
wherein we held that, under Roberts, the trial court did not err when it issued a nunc pro
tunc judgment entry removing all references to post-release control imposed on a murder
conviction. Richardson at ¶ 18.
{¶ 33} Even though Roberts, 2019-Ohio-1569, and Richardson, are pre-Harper
cases, the distinction recognized in those cases remains valid in post-Harper
jurisprudence. See State v. Callaghan, 9th Dist. No. 29431,
2021-Ohio-1047, ¶ 16; State v.
Mitchell, 11th Dist. No. 2019-P-0105,
2020-Ohio-3417, ¶ 48. Therefore, in order to avoid
injustice in this case, we shall reverse the judgment of the trial court, in part, and remand
the case for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry, pursuant to Crim.R.
36, removing the erroneously imposed term of post-release control. See Bates at ¶ 15,
Roberts,
2019-Ohio-1569, at ¶ 11, and Richardson at ¶ 18. As earlier stated, however,
appellant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. See Bates, I’Juju, and Monroe.
{¶ 34} For the foregoing reason, we sustain appellant’s second assignment of error,
in part, and we shall remand the matter for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment
entry, pursuant to Crim.R. 36, deleting post-release control.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} Having overruled appellant’s first assignment of error and having sustained
appellant’s second assignment of error in part, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. This case is remanded to that
court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry removing post-release control.
Judgment affirmed in part;
reversed in part; and cause remanded.
DORRIAN and BOGGS, JJ., concur.
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