[Cite as State v. Williams,
2023-Ohio-1634.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2022CA00123
GEIONTAE WILLIAMS :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022-
CR-0844
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 15, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE STONE BERNARD HUNT
Prosecuting Attorney 2395 McGinty Road N.W.
BY: LISA A NEMES North Canton, OH 44720
Assistant Prosecutor
110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Geiontae Williams [“Williams”] appeals his convictions
and sentences after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On May 25, 2022, Williams was indicted on the charges of Felonious
Assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)(D)(1)(a) and
Aggravated Riot, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2917.02(B)(2). The
events in this case occurred at the Ohio Department of Youth Services [“DYS”], Indian
River Juvenile Correction Facility in Massillon, Stark County, Ohio, on October 17, 2022.
{¶3} The series of events was preceded by a group of youths hanging out in the
gym under the supervision of Lori Paxos, a corrections officer at the facility. Paxos
testified that while the youths were in the gym, she suspected "something was off” due to
youths huddling, rather than playing basketball, and she "got the vibe that something
wasn't right." 1T. at 132-33. One of the youths in the gym at that time was J.C., who was
unfamiliar with the other youths in the group, so he was standing with Paxos. Id. at 137.
Paxos testified, a "group of fellows that are in the same gang'' were huddling around and
staring at J.C., who was not a gang member. She stated she told him to watch his back.
{¶4} Around 5:30 p.m., J.D., approached Paxos and requested to use the
restroom. Just before J.D. asked to use the restroom, A.W., another youth, had a
conversation with him and made a hand motion. 1T. at 159. At first, Paxos told J.D. "no"
because the group just had the opportunity to use the restroom before they came in to
the room. Id. at 145-146. Ms. Paxos relented, however, because J.D. was adamant that
he really needed to use the restroom. Id. at 146. Ms. Paxos contacted another staff
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 3
member to escort J.D. to the restroom. Id. This required Ms. Paxos to partially turn her
back to unlock the door, while still attempting to keep her eyes on the youths in the room.
Id.
{¶5} During this time, Williams and two other youths, A.W. and C.D., were
interacting by looking at each other. 1T. at 156, 158, 186-187. Williams gave a hand
"gang sign. 1T. at 157, 159, 171. De.T. took a swing at J.C. in an attempt to strike him
from behind. Id. at 146, 187. J.R. and Da.T. then jumped into the affray and began
assaulting J.C. Id.
{¶6} Ms. Paxos called a “signal 5” immediately because she needed assistance
to break up the fight. A signal 5 means "assistance is needed" and requires that the
"youths are immediately supposed to be out of their chair, up against the wall, facing
towards the wall to secure them for safety as well." Id. at 158. When Da.T. joined the
attack, Ms. Paxos realized they had lost control. Id. at 160. With three youths attacking
the one, Ms. Paxos escalated her request for help and called "an 88." Id. at 147, 160. A
“signal 88” indicates an emergency requiring assistance from everyone in the building,
including administration, lunch staff, and maintenance staff. Id. at 143. The door to the
room was open for more staff to come in and assist. Id. at 160. Ms. Paxos focused her
efforts on breaking up the three youths attacking J.C.
{¶7} A.W. was not facing the wall, but instead moving toward the door. Williams
also was moving across the room rather than staying in place with his face against the
wall. Id. at 160. Williams and A.W. were looking at each other and moving, and then left
the room. Id. 160-161. After A.W. left the room, he attacked a youth in the next room.
Id. at 188. Upon leaving the room, Williams went straight toward N.G., who was talking
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 4
on the phone with his mother. Williams attacked N.G. and continued to assault him after
picking up a staff chair. Id. at 162. Quiana Good, a corrections officer responded to the
signal and attempted to stop Williams from attacking N.G. Id. at 178. After the incident,
Ms. Paxos observed Williams "laughing in his room," and "doing gang beats on his door."
Id.
{¶8} De.T. testified regarding the attack on J.C. 1T. at 104. He stated the attack
was a personal issue and occurred because J.C. was "talking too much," including while
they were playing basketball. Id. at 104-05, 109-10. De.T. testified Williams did not know
anything about the reason for the attack on J.C. 1T. at 111.
{¶9} In October 2021, then fifteen-year old N.G. was confined to the Indian River
facility in the Alpha Unit. N.G. testified that he had been talking on the phone with his
mother, and the next thing he recalled was waking up in the hospital about two hours
later. 1T. at 116. When Williams attacked N.G., he knocked him unconscious.
{¶10} N.G. was released back to Indian River that night. Following the incident,
he had to stay on bed rest for "like a day." Id. at 120. He had to get approximately four
stitches in his chin. N.G. had to attend speech therapy for a couple months due to
stuttering, but he was still able to communicate and attend school classes. Id. at 117,
119, 123-24. N.G. was put on recreation restriction, meaning he could not do things such
as playing basketball or going to the gym. A week following the incident, he had a CAT
scan due to frequent headaches. The CAT scan showed he had a concussion. N.G. has
no permanent injuries from the incident. 1T. at 124.
{¶11} Shawn Anders the security threat group coordinator and gang specialist at
the Indian River facility testified regarding the relevant youths and their alleged gang
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 5
affiliations. He testified that he had knowledge and experience related to hand signals,
and the signal Williams displayed was a gang hand signal. 1T. at 185, 187. Anders
further testified he was familiar with “gang beats,” which are a distinct beat that gang
members use to disassociate themselves from other youth. Id. at 188. Anders further
testified that Williams is a gang member. Id. at 185. De.T. was not a gang member at the
time of the incident. Id. at 184. N.G. and J.C. were not associated with any gangs. 1T.
at 182; 187.
{¶12} The jury was shown a video of the events as they transpired on October 17,
2022. State’s Exhibit 1.
{¶13} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Williams guilty of
aggravated riot, and guilty of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, as a lesser
included offense of felonious assault.
{¶14} The trial judge sentenced Williams to thirty-six months incarceration on the
charge of Aggravated Riot, to be served consecutive with Williams’ sentence in Stark
County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 0134, and thirty-days incarceration
on the charge of Assault, to be served concurrently with the sentence for Aggravated Riot.
Assignments of Error
{¶15} Williams raises five Assignments of Error,
{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF
THE DEFENDANT BY PERMITTING IRRELEVANT BUT HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL
TESTIMONY REGARDING GANG AFFILIATION TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL.
{¶17} “II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S REQUEST
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 6
FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON A WITNESS'S TESTIMONY OF GANG EVIDENCE
THAT WAS EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
{¶18} “III. THE TRIAL ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO THE
MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR AGGRAVATED RIOT AND RAN THAT SENTENCE
CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCE HE IS CURRENTLY SERVING.
{¶19} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW, AS HIS CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED RIOT WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶20} “V. APPELLANT' S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED RIOT WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
I.
{¶21} In his First Assignment of Error, Williams contends that evidence that
Williams and other youths were affiliated with gangs was irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶22} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the
rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271,
569 N.E.2d
1056 (1991). “However, we review de novo evidentiary rulings that implicate the
Confrontation Clause. United States v. Henderson,
626 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2010).”
State v. McKelton,
148 Ohio St.3d 261,
2016-Ohio-5735,
70 N.E.3d 508, ¶97.
{¶23} We note that any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect the
accused’s “substantial rights.” Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 7
must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Chapman v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 24,
87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court violated Williams’ right to a
fair trial by allowing the state to present evidence of his gang affiliation, as well as the
gang affiliation of some of the other youths
“Other acts” evidence
{¶24} In State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521,
2012-Ohio-5695,
983 N.E.2d
1278, ¶ 20, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a three-part analysis for determining the
admissibility of other-acts evidence: to be admissible, (1) the evidence must be relevant,
Evid.R. 401, (2) the evidence cannot be presented to prove a person’s character to show
conduct in conformity therewith but must instead be presented for a legitimate other
purpose, Evid.R. 404(B), and (3) the probative value of the evidence cannot be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Evid.R. 403. The admissibility
of other-acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a question of law. State v. Hartman,
161 Ohio St.3d 214,
2020-Ohio-4440,
161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22. The court is precluded from
admitting improper character evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), but it has discretion to allow
other-acts evidence that is admissible for a permissible purpose.
Hartman at ¶ 22, citing
Williams at ¶ 17.
Gang affiliation evidence
{¶25} Trial courts must treat evidence of gang affiliation with care since most
jurors are likely to look unfavorably upon a defendant’s membership in a street gang.
United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 219 n. 4. (6th Cir. 1996). The Ohio Supreme
Court has held that evidence of a defendant's gang affiliation is admissible pursuant to
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 8
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B) to show motive. State v. Bethel,
110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-
Ohio-4853,
854 N.E.2d 150, ¶170. This is particularly the case where “the
interrelationship between people is a central issue.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Gibbs,
182 F.3d 408, 430 (6th Cir. 1999)). Evidence of gang affiliation has also been held
admissible to establish the defendant’s opportunity to commit a crime. United States v.
Jobson,
102 F.3d 214, 221(6th Cir. 1996). The evidence is admissible subject to
balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to
Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. See Jobson, 102 F.3d at 221–23,
854 N.E.2d 150
Williams’ case
{¶26} Williams was convicted of Aggravated Riot. R.C. 2917.02 provides, in
relevant part,
(A) No person shall participate with four or more others in a course
of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code:
…
(2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any
offense of violence;
R.C. 2917.11 Disorderly conduct provides,
(A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm to another by doing any of the following:
(1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property,
or in violent or turbulent behavior;
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 9
(2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance,
gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive
language to any person;
(3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances
in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response;
(4) Hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public
street, road, highway, or right-of-way, or to, from, within, or upon public or
private property, so as to interfere with the rights of others, and by any act
that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender;
(5) Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that
presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that
serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.
{¶27} Importantly, R.C. 2917.031 provides,
For the purposes of prosecuting violations of sections 2917.02 and
2917.03 of the Revised Code, the state is not required to allege or prove
that the offender expressly agreed with four or more others to commit any
act that constitutes a violation of either section prior to or while committing
those acts.
{¶28} Williams maintains that because no express agreement is required, the
state could have proven its case without gang affiliation evidence. While that may be
true, we find nothing in either statute that prohibits the state from introducing evidence
that the individuals did in fact agree to engage in the prohibited conduct in order to
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 10
establish the “participate with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct”
element of aggravated riot.
{¶29} The state introduced the gang evidence for a purpose independent of
Williams’ character or propensity to commit a crime. The gang affiliation evidence was
admissible to show that it was more likely than not Williams’ attack on N.G. was not a
random act; rather it occurred in conjunction with the attack on J.C. and the attack on the
unnamed third party. The affiliations of the individuals involved, timing of the attacks, and
that the individuals who were attacked were not gang affiliated, were central to proving
the interrelationship of the party’s and the motive for the attacks.
{¶30} Nor can it be said that the evidence of gang affiliation was unfairly prejudicial
to Williams. In State v. Crotts, the Ohio Supreme Court explained,
As a legal term, “prejudice” is simply “[d]amage or detriment to one’s
legal rights or claims.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.1999) 1218. Thus, it
is fair to say that all relevant evidence is prejudicial. That is, evidence that
tends to disprove a party’s rendition of the facts necessarily harms that
party’s case. Accordingly, the rules of evidence do not attempt to bar all
prejudicial evidence—to do so would make reaching any result extremely
difficult. Rather, only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial is excludable.
“‘Exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a
balance of mere prejudice. If unfair prejudice simply meant prejudice,
anything adverse to a litigant’s case would be excludable under Rule 403.
Emphasis must be placed on the word “unfair.” Unfair prejudice is that
quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 11
decision. Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional
sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish,
the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. Usually, although not always,
unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than
intellect.’” Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172,
743 N.E.2d 890, quoting Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence (2000) 85–87,
Section 403.3.
104 Ohio St.3d 432,
2004-Ohio-6550,
820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 23-24. In the case at bar, the
context of the evidence was to establish the participation element of the crime of
aggravated riot, not to suggest that Williams was guilty based upon his character.
{¶31} We therefore find that evidence of gang affiliation was relevant and
probative of the issues in the case and the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Williams.
{¶32} Williams’ First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶33} Prior to the start of trial, the trial judge acknowledged there is obviously
some level of prejudice inherent in arguing that Williams is in a gang, but found the least
prejudicial way of presenting the relevant information would be to allow evidence that
the youths are in a gang, but omit any specific reference to the specific gang name.
1 T . a t 99-100. However, during the testimony of Shawn Anders, in response to a
question by the prosecutor the following exchange occurred:
Q: Okay. And how about this fellow next to him?
A: [J.D.].
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 12
Q: Okay. Does he have any sort of gang affiliation?
A: At this time the -- of this incident, he was a passive member of the
Heartless Felons.
1T. at 183. Defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial was overruled by the trial judge;
however, the judge did order the answer stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it.
1T. at 184.
{¶34} In his Second Assignment of Error, Williams contends the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a mistrial.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW – MISTRIAL
{¶35} “Mistrials need to be declared only when the ends of justice so require and
a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127,
580 N.E.2d 1
(1991). The standard of review for evaluating a trial court's decision to grant or deny a
mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Maurer,
15 Ohio St.3d 239,
473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).
In reviewing a claim that a mistrial should have been granted, the Ohio Supreme Court
has noted “[t]his court has instead adopted an approach which grants great deference to
the trial court's discretion in this area, in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the
best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration
of a mistrial.” State v. Shaffer, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2003-CA-0108,
2004-Ohio-3717,
¶18 quoting State v. Widner [
68 Ohio St.2d 188,
429 N.E.2d 1065(1981). See, also,
Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 687,
69 S.Ct. 834, 836,
93 L.Ed. 974(1949).
{¶36} An abuse of discretion can be found where the reasons given by the court
for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice, or
where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 13
Tennant v. Gallick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26827, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35; In re Guardianship
of S.H., 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066–M, 2013–Ohio–4380, ¶ 9; State v. Firouzmandi,
5th Dist. Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823, ¶54.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Williams’ motion for a mistrial
{¶37} In the case at bar, the improper answer was inadvertent and only occurred
on one occasion during the trial. The trial judge admonished the jury to disregard it.
“Juries are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. United States 506 U.S. 534,
540,
113 S.Ct. 933,
122 L.Ed.2d 317(1993). “A presumption always exists that the jury
has followed the instructions given to it by the trial court,” Pang v. Minch,
53 Ohio St.3d
186, 187,
559 N.E.2d 1313(1990), at paragraph four of the syllabus, rehearing denied,
54
Ohio St.3d 716,
562 N.E.2d 163.
{¶38} Looking at the answer in the larger context of the entire trial, we find it did
not prejudicially affect Williams’ substantial due process rights. The mention of the gang
name was isolated, and not intentional. The state did not highlight the improper
information in further questioning of any witness or in its argument to the jury. The trial
court’s admonishment to the jury was swift and unequivocal.
{¶39} We find Williams was not denied his right to due process and fair trial under
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Further, we find beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the inadvertent mention of the gang name did not contribute to Williams’
conviction. See, State v. Aeschilmann, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00192, 2014-Ohio-
4462, ¶95-96. Therefore, error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 14
{¶40} Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by overruling
Williams’ motion for a mistrial.
{¶41} Williams’ Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶42} In his Third Assignment of Error, Williams contends the trial court erred
when it imposed the maximum, consecutive sentences. Williams maintains his sentences
are contrary to law because the trial court did not consider his age when determining the
length of his sentence.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶43} In accordance with R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Williams is entitled to appeal as of
right the maximum sentence imposed on his conviction.
{¶44} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08(F) to
review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written statements and
presentence-investigation reports. R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4). We review felony
sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146
Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002,
59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22; State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark
No. 2015CA00004,
2015-Ohio-4049, ¶31. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either
increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we
clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the
sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell,
140 Ohio St.3d 209,
2014-Ohio-3177,
16 N.E.2d 659, ¶28.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 15
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether Williams’ sentence was imposed based
on impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are
contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and Maximum Sentences
{¶45} A trial court’s imposition of a maximum prison term for a felony conviction is
not contrary to law as long as the sentence is within the statutory range for the offense,
and the court considers both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in
R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. State
v. Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016-Ohio-5234, ¶ 10, 16; State
v. Taylor, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29,
2017-Ohio-8996, ¶16. “[N]either R.C. 2929.11
nor 2929.12 requires [the] court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” State
v. Jones,
163 Ohio St.3d 242,
2020-Ohio-6729,
169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20, citing State v.
Wilson,
129 Ohio St.3d 214,
2011-Ohio-2669,
951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett,
88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215,
724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).
{¶46} In State v. Bryant, the Court clarified,
The narrow holding in Jones [163 Ohio St.3d 242,
2020-Ohio-6729,
169 N.E.3d 649] is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate
court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is
not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See Jones
at ¶ 31, 39. Nothing about that holding should be construed as prohibiting
appellate review of a sentence when the claim is that the sentence was
improperly imposed based on impermissible considerations—i.e.,
considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 16
2929.12. Indeed, in Jones, this court made clear that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)
permits appellate courts to reverse or modify sentencing decisions that are
“‘otherwise contrary to law.’” Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).
This court also recognized that “otherwise contrary to law” means “‘in
violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’” Id. at ¶ 34 quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed. 1990). Accordingly, when a trial court
imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous
to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is
contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of issues are therefore
reviewable.
168 Ohio St.3d 250,
2022-Ohio-1878,
198 N.E.3d 68, ¶22.
{¶47} In the case at bar, the trial court considered the pre-sentence investigation
report and the statements from Williams’ attorney and the state’s attorney. The trial judge
was informed that Williams has been incarcerated since he was 15 years old. Sent. T. at
4. At the time of sentencing Williams was 18 years old. Id. The trial judge further noted
that he had sentenced Williams in Case Number 2022 CR 0134 to an indefinite term of 3
to 4.5 years. Sent. T. at 7. The trial judge noted the previous case involved Williams in
an unrelated incident attacking a corrections officer while in the Indian River facility. Id.
at 7-8. The judge further reviewed the violent and repeated attack Williams made on his
victim, hitting him several times with a chair. Id. at 8. The attack continued even after the
victim had collapsed to the floor. Id. at 8-9.
{¶48} It is clear from the record that the trial judge was aware of and considered
Williams’ youth when deciding his sentence. The trial court considered that even while
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 17
incarcerated by the Department of Youth Services, Williams committed two violent attacks
on not only other prisoners, but also the correction officer.
{¶49} We conclude that the trial court did not commit error when it sentenced
Williams. Upon review, we find that the trial court’s sentencing on the charges complies
with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. While Williams may disagree with the
weight given to these factors by the trial judge, Williams’ sentence was within the
applicable statutory range and therefore, we have no basis for concluding that it is
contrary to law. Williams has not demonstrated that the trial court imposed the sentence
based on impermissible considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that
are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶50} R.C. 2929.14(C)(2) provides that consecutive sentences are mandatory in
this case,
(2) If an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential
detention facility violates section 2917.02, 2917.03 [Aggravated Riot], or
2921.35 of the Revised Code or division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2921.34 of
the Revised Code, if an offender who is under detention at a detention
facility commits a felony violation of section 2923.131 of the Revised Code,
or if an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential
detention facility or is under detention at a detention facility commits another
felony while the offender is an escapee in violation of division (A)(1) or (2)
of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code, any prison term imposed upon the
offender for one of those violations shall be served by the offender
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 18
consecutively to the prison term or term of imprisonment the offender was
serving when the offender committed that offense and to any other prison
term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.
Emphasis added.
{¶51} Upon review, we find that the trial court’s sentencing on the charges
complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. Because the record contains
clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s findings we have no basis for
concluding that it is contrary to law.
{¶52} Williams’ Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
IV.
{¶53} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Williams argues that there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for aggravated riot.
Standard of Appellate Review– Sufficiency of the Evidence.
{¶54} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in
conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of
a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. 99,
133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156,
186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. 92,
136 S.Ct. 616, 621,
193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence
involves a question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker,
150 Ohio
St.3d 409,
2016-Ohio-8295,
82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30. “This naturally entails a review of the
elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v.
Richardson,
150 Ohio St.3d 554,
2016-Ohio-8448,
84 N.E.3d 993, ¶13.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 19
{¶55} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not
ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574
N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney,
153 Ohio St.3d 474,
2018-Ohio-22,
97 N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do
not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if believed,
[the evidence] would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Murphy,
91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543,
747 N.E.2d 765 (2001),
quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus; Walker 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶31. We will
not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could
not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer,
111 Ohio St.3d
70,
2006-Ohio-5283,
855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis,
79 Ohio St.3d 421,
430,
683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. Montgomery,
148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-
5487,
71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
that Williams was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated riot
{¶56} Williams was convicted of Aggravated Riot. R.C. 2917.02 provides, in
relevant part,
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 20
(A) No person shall participate with four or more others in a course
of disorderly conduct in violation of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code:
…
(2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any
offense of violence;
{¶57} R.C. 2917.11 Disorderly conduct provides,
(A) No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm to another by doing any of the following:
(1) Engaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property,
or in violent or turbulent behavior;
(2) Making unreasonable noise or an offensively coarse utterance,
gesture, or display or communicating unwarranted and grossly abusive
language to any person;
(3) Insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances
in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response;
(4) Hindering or preventing the movement of persons on a public
street, road, highway, or right-of-way, or to, from, within, or upon public or
private property, so as to interfere with the rights of others, and by any act
that serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender;
(5) Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that
presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that
serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.
{¶58} Importantly, R.C. 2917.031 provides,
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 21
For the purposes of prosecuting violations of sections 2917.02 and
2917.03 of the Revised Code, the state is not required to allege or prove
that the offender expressly agreed with four or more others to commit any
act that constitutes a violation of either section prior to or while committing
those acts.
{¶59} The state presented evidence that this was a coordinated gang attack.
Signals were exchanged, the victims were non-gang members and the disruption caused
was massive. Williams does not deny assaulting N.G.
{¶60} A.W., J.R., C.D., Da.T. and J.P. were fellow gang members in the room
with Williams. De.T. and J.D. were either passive or aspiring members. 1T. at 183-
185. A.W. spoke to J.D. and made a gesture just before J.D. distracted Ms. Paxos
with the request to use the restroom. Id. at 159. Williams interacted with A.W. and
C.D. and then gave the gang signal. 1T. at 156-158, 186-187. De.T. began
assaulting the youth in the day room, and J.R. and Da.T. joined in the attack. Id. at
146, 187. A.W. and Williams disregarded the procedures for youths to follow when
a signal is called, and they slipped out the door to carry out their respective attacks
on other victims. Id. at 160-161. Williams beat his victim unconscious. Id.at 188.
Williams acknowledged his actions as a member of the gang with gang beats from
his room. Id. at 178. The jury viewed the video evidence that shows those who were
"participating" from those who instead chose to back away from the fighting and
comply with the signals from the corrections officer.
{¶61} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 22
Williams participated with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct in violation
of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code with purpose to commit or facilitate the
commission of any offense of violence. We hold, therefore, that the state met its burden
of production regarding each element of the crime and, accordingly, there was enough
evidence to support Williams conviction for aggravated riot.
{¶62} Williams’ Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.
V.
{¶63} In his Fifth Assignment of Error, Williams maintains that his conviction for
aggravated riot is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight.
{¶64} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a
manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the
evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as
stated by State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89,
684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v.
Issa,
93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67,
752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).
{¶65} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, supra,78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387,
678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v.
Williams,
99 Ohio St.3d 493,
2003-Ohio-4396,
794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of
appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.
Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, citing Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42,
102 S.Ct. 2211,
72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982)
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 23
(quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson,
113 Ohio St.3d 382,
2007-Ohio-2202,
865
N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins.
{¶66} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may
not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,
485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.
1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”
Id.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
{¶67} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
678
N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d at 175,
485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon
the entire record in this matter we find Williams’ conviction is not against the sufficiency
or the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears to have fairly
and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated
the evidence, and was convinced of Williams’ guilt.
{¶68} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we
cannot reach the conclusion that the trier of facts lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. We do not find the jury erred when it found Williams guilty. Taken
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 24
as a whole, the testimony and record contain ample evidence of Williams participation in
and responsibility for all the alleged crimes. The fact that the jury chose to believe the
testimony of the state’s witnesses does not, in and of itself, render his convictions against
the manifest weight of the evidence. On a full review of the record we cannot say that
the jury clearly lost its way or created a manifest injustice by choosing to believe the
testimony of the state’s witnesses. The jury saw the video showing the events in real-
time as they unfolded. The state presented testimony and evidence from which the jury
could have found all the essential elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
{¶69} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that
there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the
crimes for which Williams was convicted.
{¶70} Williams’’ Fifth Assignments of Error is overruled.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00123 25
{¶71} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Baldwin, J., and
King, J., concur
