[Cite as State v. Acker,
2023-Ohio-2085.]
COURT OF APPEALS
HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 22CA008
:
CORY ACKER :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Holmes County
Municipal Court, Case No. 21CRB00177
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 21, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
ROBERT K. HENDRIX PATRICK BROWN
Assistant Prosecutor 439 North Market St., Suite A
Holmes County Wooster, OH 44691
164 E. Jackson St.
Millersburg, OH 44654
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Cory Acker appeals from the August 12, 2022 judgment entry of
conviction and sentence of the Holmes County Municipal Court, incorporating the trial
court’s July 8, 2022 Judgment Entry. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The following facts are adduced from the record of appellant’s bench trial
on July 8, 2022.
{¶3} On September 29, 2021, Deputy (now Sgt.) Bernhart of the Holmes County
Sheriff’s Department was dispatched to a noise complaint on Township Road 506.
Bernhart testified that upon dispatch, he customarily checks the driving status of an
identified suspect before responding. In this case, appellant was the suspect identified in
the noise complaint, and upon checking his driving status, Bernhart discovered an active
warrant.
{¶4} Defense trial counsel immediately objected to Bernhart’s testimony about
the existence of the warrant, arguing the statement was offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. The prosecutor responded that the statement was offered for its effect on the
listener, and the trial court overruled the objection.
{¶5} Bernhart and another deputy responded to the address. Bernhart is familiar
with appellant and recognized him on sight. The door of the shop was open and appellant
was visible inside, listening to music and spraying undercoating on a semi. The deputies
approached appellant and Bernhart advised him of the noise complaint, which was
remedied.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 3
{¶6} Bernhart further advised appellant of the active warrant and appellant
disagreed that a warrant existed, stating his attorney told him the matter was resolved.
{¶7} Appellee asked Bernhart how deputies confirm the existence of an active
warrant, and Bernhart replied that “during Covid,” the deputy would call dispatch or
corrections to check for active warrants, and were also required to contact a “corrections
sergeant.” Bernhart testified he took those steps in the instant case and defense trial
counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection. Bernhart further testified he
confirmed the existence of an active warrant, and counsel again objected. The trial court
overruled the objection.
{¶8} Bernhart testified his next step would have been to take appellant into
custody. Appellant showed him texts on his phone from his attorney, purporting to
establish there was no warrant. Bernhart testified appellant’s demeanor throughout the
encounter was cooperative and polite, although he became more agitated as the deputies
disagreed with him about the existence of the warrant. When he realized deputies
intended to execute the arrest warrant, appellant said he had an obligation out of state
the next day. Appellant walked around the corner of the semi, momentarily out of
Bernhart’s sight, and ran away.
{¶9} Bernhart told the other deputy to pursue appellant as Bernhart went to his
vehicle. Bernhart yelled at appellant to stop, and warned he would release his K-9 if
appellant didn’t return. Appellant briefly stopped, turned, and looked at Bernhart, then
continued running around the corner of the house. Bernhart heard a loud vehicle exhaust
and saw a silver passenger car speed away.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 4
{¶10} Deputies were ordered to terminate the vehicle pursuit and lost sight of
appellant’s vehicle. Deputies put out a BOLO for appellant in Holmes and adjacent
counties. Appellant was not located that evening. Bernhart testified it would have taken
about 30 minutes to process appellant on the warrant, but because he fled, he spent the
rest of the shift looking for him.
{¶11} Upon cross-examination, Bernhart acknowledged there was no noise
ordinance for appellant’s location and he would not have been cited for the noise
complaint. However, Bernhart pointed out that he customarily responds to noise
complaints and speaks to the parties involved to resolve disputes. Bernhart
acknowledged he did not have a paper copy of an arrest warrant for appellant and did not
show appellant an arrest warrant.
{¶12} Appellee rested at the conclusion of Bernhart’s testimony without
presenting additional witnesses or introducing any exhibits. Defense trial counsel moved
for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), arguing appellee failed to present
any evidence that a warrant existed; thus appellee failed to prove Bernhart was engaged
in an authorized act and appellant could not be guilty of obstructing official business.
Appellee responded that Bernhart testified to his customary procedure in checking for a
warrant and confirmed the presence of a warrant, therefore his testimony established he
was a public official performing an authorized act in his official capacity.
{¶13} The trial court overruled the motion.
{¶14} Appellant testified as the sole defense witness. He stated he was painting
a truck on the evening of September 29 when deputies entered his shop without
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 5
permission. Appellant was surprised to see the deputies and did not believe there was a
warrant for his arrest because his attorney assured him there was no warrant.
{¶15} Appellant confirmed he spoke to the deputies and showed them text
messages on his phone. Bernhart returned to the cruiser and appellant fled. When asked
why he fled, appellant testified he needed to be in Texas that weekend for a truck show,
and he believed the deputies could have printed a copy of the warrant in their vehicles if
one existed. Therefore, in his estimation, the deputies had no lawful reason to arrest him
and he was entitled to flee.
{¶16} Upon cross-examination, appellant acknowledged he was convicted in a
separate case in the same court and sentenced to a jail term. He testified he called the
jail twice on the day he was ordered to report but someone told him he “was not on the
schedule.” T. 19. He “didn’t hear anything back from the courts” and therefore believed
no warrant was issued, although he never served any of the jail sentence. Appellant
reiterated the deputies had no reason to arrest him so he ran and drove off. He did not
go to Texas that weekend but called his attorney the next day.
{¶17} Defense trial counsel renewed the motion for acquittal at the close of all of
the evidence. The trial court asked counsel if appellant’s purpose was to obstruct or delay
the exercise of what he believed to be an improper act, and defense trial counsel agreed
this was a fair characterization of the evidence. Appellant’s purpose was to get away
from the deputies because he didn’t believe their actions were authorized. T. 24.
{¶18} The trial court overruled the motion for acquittal and found appellant guilty
as charged, finding that the “evidence is clear Mr. Acker’s purpose is to clearly delay or
obstruct the officer’s performance of [his] duties,” and even if the officer was mistaken
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 6
about the validity of the warrant, the process of confirming and executing a warrant were
part of the deputies’ official duties.
Misdemeanor charge, bench trial, conviction, and sentence
{¶19} Appellant was charged by criminal complaint with one count of obstructing
official business pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter proceeded to bench trial on July 8,
2022. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and issued a written Judgment
Entry containing findings of fact. On August 12, 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant
to a jail term of 30 days with 20 days suspended and a fine of $250.
{¶20} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entries of his conviction and
sentence.
{¶21} Appellant raises three assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶22} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING HEARSAY TESTIMONY
ABOUT A WARRANT INTO EVIDENCE.”
{¶23} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. ACKER’S CRIMINAL
RULE 29 MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, AS THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.”
{¶24} “III. MR. ACKER’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 7
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶25} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
admitting hearsay evidence of the existence of the warrant. We disagree.
{¶26} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the
rules of procedure and evidence.” Huth v. Kus, 5th Dist. No. 2017 AP 06 0015, 2018-
Ohio-1931, 113 N.E.3d 140, ¶ 30, quoting Rigby v. Lake Cty.,
58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271,
569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment;
it is a “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio
State Med. Bd.
66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621,
614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). When applying an abuse
of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.
Id.
{¶27} “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless it falls within one of
the recognized exceptions. Evid.R. 802; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 119,
509
N.E.2d 383 (1987); MCM Home Builders, LLC v. Sheehan, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18
CAE 09 0074,
2019-Ohio-3899, ¶ 37. To constitute hearsay, two elements are needed:
first, an out-of-court statement; and second, the statement must be offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. State v. Maurer,
15 Ohio St.3d 239, 262,
473 N.E.2d 768
(1984). If either element is not present, the statement is not “hearsay.”
Id.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 8
{¶28} Appellant argues the trial court should not have admitted “the dispatcher’s
statement that a warrant existed” because such evidence is inadmissible hearsay. Brief,
5. We are unable to find any such “statement” made by any out-of-court witness. Our
examination of the record reveals the following testimony regarding Bernhart’s inquiry into
the warrant:
….
[Bernhart]: So typically when a call for service comes in
typically before we start to respond we’ll take a second look at our
notes on our MDT or Mobile Data Terminal to see what the calls
about. A lot of times we’ll check the complainant if we know who a
possible suspect would be, a lot of times we’ll check them as well.
What I mean by check them a lot of times; we’ll run their driver’s
license checking for active warrants something like that.
[Prosecutor]: Okay so is it common for you to know what type
of call you’re going to?
[Bernhart]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: What, where that call was located?
[Bernhart]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: And the parties involved?
[Bernhart]: Yes correct.
[Prosecutor]: And specifically with the parties involved do you
often times in advance know whether or not they have a warrant?
[Bernhart]: Yes that is correct.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 9
[Prosecutor]: So in this specific situation how did you start that
call?
[Bernhart]:So prior to responding I had looked at the, the call
notes and the complainant or the complaint for the call for service
was that [appellant] was playing loud music at 9:30 at night. I
checked [appellant’s] driving status, which comes up when I
checked him it came up that he had an active warrant.
[Prosecutor]: And is [appellant] an individual (unintelligible).
[Defense trial counsel]: I would object I, that’s offered for the
truth of the matter asserted Your Honor that he actually had a warrant
anything dispatch told him or anything a computer (unintelligible). I
understand he’s just testifying about the call for service, but I
just object at that facts offered to the fact that he actually had a
warrant (sic).
THE COURT: Response, [prosecutor].
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor I think it’s offered for the effect on
the listener that how the officer was trying to carry out his public
duties at the time (sic). It was his impression that he had a warrant
at the time and he was going to well, the testimony that is going to
be provided is going to show that he acted on that information.
[Defense trial counsel]: I don’t have a problem with that I
would just object that that’s offered for the truth of the fact that he
had a warrant. That’s my only objection. Thank you.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 10
THE COURT: Well I think it falls under the public records
exception on hearsay, but if it’s only being offered for the effect it had
on the officer then objection will be overruled.
….
T. 5-6. (Emphasis added).
{¶29} And the following testimony describes Bernhart’s encounter with appellant:
….
[Prosecutor]: Now so, when you get there your issue is two-
fold essentially. You have a complaint and now you, you have this
information that makes you believe there’s a warrant?
[Bernhart]: Correct yes.
[Prosecutor]: In your process what do you do next with
regards to the warrant?
[Bernhart]: Sure so in, in, in that respect typically we will
confirm the warrant. What I mean by that a lot of times it’s a simple
phone call either to dispatch or to corrections. Typically the
confirmation goes through dispatch. At the time due to Covid 19
restrictions in corrections we also had to seek approval through the
corrections sergeant at the time.
[Prosecutor]: Okay and did you go through that process
in this case?
[Bernhart]: Yes I did.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 11
[Defense trial counsel]: Objection to anything dispatch or
anyone at the sheriff’s office told the sergeant.
[Prosecutor]: I don’t think at this point he’s testified to
anything about (unintelligible).
THE COURT: I haven’t heard any answer about that yet have
I?
[Defense trial counsel]: I thought he testified.
[Prosecutor]: I don’t believe so.
[Defense trial counsel]: Okay I’m sorry I thought he testified
that he had gone through that process in this case and that they told
him there was a warrant. That’s what I heard, but if that’s not what
he said then.
THE COURT: Okay. …. Objection overruled at this point.
[Prosecutor]: Had, were you able to go through that
process and confirm the Defendant’s warrant?
[Bernhart]: Yes.
[Defense trial counsel]: Objection hearsay.
THE COURT: I’m going to overrule at this point I believe this
falls under an exception to the hearsay rule.
[Bernhart]: Yes I was.
[Prosecutor]: So after you confirmed the warrant, what is your
next step?
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 12
[Bernhart]: So then he, the next step after the warrant was
confirmed would be to take [appellant] into custody.
[Prosecutor]: Okay and again, is this part of your routine job
as at the time a deputy of the sheriff’s office?
[Bernhart]: Yes it is.
[Prosecutor]: Okay and when, when you’re done confirming
the warrant do you go back and speak with [appellant]?
[Bernhart]: Yes I did.
….
T. 7-8. (Emphasis added).
{¶30} Upon our review of Bernhart’s testimony, we do not find that he testified to
a statement by an out-of-court witness; instead, he testified about his own investigation
of the warrant. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct
intended to be an assertion. Evid.R. 801(A). For hearsay purposes, an “assertion” is “a
statement about an event that happened or a condition that existed.” State v. Wellman,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-386, 2006-Ohio-3808, ¶ 14, citing State v. LaMar,
95 Ohio
St.3d 181,
2002-Ohio-2128,
767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 61; State v. Carter,
72 Ohio St.3d 545,
549,
1995-Ohio-104,
651 N.E.2d 965, quoting 2 McCormick, Evidence, Section 246, at
98 (4th Ed.1992), (“An ‘assertion’ for hearsay purposes ‘simply means to say that
something is so, e.g., that an event happened or that a condition existed.’ ”). There is no
“statement” for hearsay purposes where a witness does not testify about “what someone
else said, wrote, or did.” State v. Maiolo, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-15,
2015-Ohio-4788,
¶ 14, citing Evid.R. 801(A).
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 13
{¶31} Instead, Bernhart’s testimony related to his investigation of the noise
complaint, his discovery of the warrant, and the ensuing conversation with appellant.
Even if we strained to identify a “statement” made to Bernhart regarding the warrant, a
statement is not hearsay when offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. State v. Moore, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 14CA0028, 2016-Ohio-828, ¶
74, citing State v. Davis,
62 Ohio St.3d 326, 343,
581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). Testimony
about finding the warrant and investigating appellant’s claims was necessary to explain
why the deputies took certain actions. State v. Anthony, 5th Dist. Stark No.
2020CA00126,
2021-Ohio-1755, ¶ 35, appeal not allowed,
166 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2022-
Ohio-743,
184 N.E.3d 98; see also, State v. Stephens, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0068,
2022-Ohio-2944, ¶ 43 [extrajudicial statements by out-of-court declarant properly
admissible to explain actions of witness to whom statement directed]. As demonstrated
in the portions of the record cited supra, appellee did not offer Bernhart’s testimony to
establish the existence or validity of the warrant.
{¶32} Finally, because this case was tried to the court, we presume, unless
affirmatively shown otherwise, that the court considered the testimony for proper
purposes. Even if the admission of the testimony was improper, since the case was tried
before a judge, it must affirmatively appear on the record that the judge relied on the
alleged improper testimony. State v. Hurst, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2019 CA 0091, 2020-
Ohio-4899, ¶ 28. We note that the trial court’s Judgment Entry of July 8, 2022, in which
appellant is found guilty, does not reference whether a warrant existed or not. See, State
v. Clifford, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAA 12 0068, 2020-Ohio-5095, ¶ 24, cause
dismissed,
163 Ohio St.3d 1426,
2021-Ohio-1733,
168 N.E.3d 512.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 14
{¶33} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II., III.
{¶34} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are related and will be
considered together. He argues his conviction upon one count of obstructing official
business is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree.
{¶35} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence
are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
1997-Ohio-52,
678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review
for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio
St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio
Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶36} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 15
Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering
a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.” Id.
{¶37} Appellant was found guilty upon one count of obstructing official business
pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), which states: “No person, without privilege to do so and with
purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any
authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or
impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.” Appellant
argues that absent evidence of the existence of the warrant, he cannot be convicted of
obstructing official business because he did not impede the deputies’ “lawful duties.”
{¶38} The offense of obstruction of official business has the following elements:
“(1) an act by the defendant; (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a
public official; (3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official; (4) while the official
is acting in the performance of a lawful duty; and (5) the defendant does so act without a
privilege to do so.” State v. Henry, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-846, 2018-Ohio-1128,
110 N.E.3d
103, ¶ 55, citing State v. Dice, 3d Dist. No. 9-04-41,
2005-Ohio-2505,
2005 WL 1205336,
¶ 19; R.C. 2921.31(A). Thus, under Ohio law, “[a] conviction under R.C. 2921.31(A)
requires proof of an affirmative act that hampered or impeded the performance of the
lawful duties of a public official.”
Id., citing State v. Overholt, 9th Dist. No. 2905–M,
1999
WL 635717 (Aug. 18, 1999). In the instant case, appellant argues the deputies were not
acting in the performance of a lawful duty.
{¶39} “The proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on the
defendant's conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official's ability to
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 16
perform the official's lawful duties.” Id., citing State v. Wellman,
173 Ohio App.3d 494,
2007-Ohio-2953,
879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Appellant’s argument shifts the focus
of the issue from his conduct, fleeing, to that of the deputies, investigating whether a
warrant existed for appellant’s arrest.
{¶40} The parties agree the issue posed by this case is whether the deputies were
acting in the performance of a lawful duty. Appellant’s Brief, 5; Appellee’s Brief, 4. On
the record, appellant agreed with the trial court’s characterization of the encounter
between appellant and the deputies: appellant drove away to stop the exercise of what
he believed to be an improper act. T. 24-25. In closing, appellant reiterated he was
justified in fleeing because he did not believe the actions of the deputies were authorized.
{¶41} We find there is no question the deputies were acting in performance of a
lawful duty in their encounter with appellant, including investigating the warrant, and
appellant’s act of fleeing the scene hampered them in performing that duty.
{¶42} In State v. Dice, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505, the Third
District Court of Appeals examined a case in which police attempted to stop and talk to
the appellant about allegations by his ex-wife as the appellant walked home from a store.
The appellant ran from police and was eventually charged with obstructing official
business. Id., ¶ 9-10. The appellant argued he didn’t act purposefully because he had
no knowledge police intended to arrest him, and he therefore did not “hamper or impede
the officers in the performance of their duties.” Id., ¶ 18.
{¶43} The Third District found that the question whether appellant would or could
be arrested when police wanted to speak to him was irrelevant; appellant fled and
therefore impeded official police business:
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 17
It is unclear from the record in this case whether the officers
were attempting to arrest Dice before he ran from them. Officer Cox
testified that at the time Simona identified Dice to the police they had
probable cause to arrest. However, none of the officers indicated to
Dice that he was under arrest, and no officer testified that they were
attempting to place Dice under arrest at that point in time. In fact, the
prosecution submitted no evidence that the officers were placing
Dice under arrest at this time.
However, it is clear that the officers were in the midst of
conducting official police business. Dice testified that he saw
numerous police cruisers with their lights on at Mom's Used Car Lot.
He testified that he saw that Mason was in custody, that he saw
Simona point him out to the police officers, and that the officers were
coming towards him and ordering him to stop. It is irrelevant whether
or not Dice was being placed under arrest—it was clear from the
facts of the case that the officers wanted Dice in connection with their
arrest of Mason, which is, of course, official police business.
Thus, it is clear from the facts of the case that Dice acted with
the specific intent to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers from what
was obviously an ongoing investigation, part of their official duties.
This fulfills the statutory element of purposefulness. Therefore,
viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 18
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Dice acted with
the requisite mental state.
Moreover, it is evident that by running from the police, Dice
did hinder the officers' performance of their lawful duty and that Dice
was not privileged to do so. ….
State v. Dice, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505,
¶ 20-23.
{¶44} Talking to suspects and serving warrants is a routine lawful duty of police;
part of that duty is determining whether a valid warrant exists. In In re E.C., 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2012-0048, 2013-Ohio-2584, ¶ 2, police awakened the appellant from
sleep, told him he was under arrest, and he immediately fled. We found sufficient
evidence to find the appellant guilty of obstructing official business because “[w]hen
Appellant ran, he prevented the officers from arresting him, effectively ‘hamper[ing] or
imped[ing] a public official in the performance of the public official's [duty.]’”
Id., citing R.C.
2921.31(A).
{¶45} In State v. Willey, 5th Dist. No. 2014CA00222, 2015-Ohio-4572,
46 N.E.3d
1121, ¶ 4, we reviewed a case in which police were dispatched to investigate an alleged
fight at a party and encountered the appellant on a front porch; as police attempted to
investigate, the appellant refused to answer questions and yelled at other witnesses on
the scene, instructing them not to answer questions.
Id. We found that the “official
business” impeded by the appellant was the officers’ investigation:
The officers' “official business” was to investigate the
allegations … . When appellant refused to provide information and
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 19
prevented [another witness] from providing any, the focus shifted to
appellant. Her obstreperous behavior constituted an “act” within the
meaning of the statute. “[Her] persistence in disregarding [the
officers'] orders was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of
fact could conclude that [she] acted with the specific intent to prevent,
obstruct, or delay [the officers] in [their] lawful duties.” State v.
Shepherd, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14CA63, 2015-Ohio-4330,
2015
WL 5917918, at ¶ 30; see also, State v. Friedman, 5th Dist. Stark
No. 2013CA00150, 2013-Ohio-4669,
2013 WL 5753770, ¶ 24; State
v. Brooks, 5th Dist. Knox No. 06CA000024, 2007-Ohio-4025,
2007
WL 2269414, ¶ 13.
State v. Willey, 5th Dist. No. 2014CA00222, 2015-Ohio-4572,
46 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 22
{¶46} In the instant case, therefore, the “lawful duty” of the deputies was the
investigation; whether a warrant existed, and appellant’s “belief” regarding its existence,
are irrelevant. In fleeing, appellant hampered or impeded the deputies in their
investigation.
{¶47} It is well-established that running from deputies “[does] hinder the officers'
performance of their lawful duty ….” State v. Friedman, 5th Dist. Stark No.
2013CA00150, 2013-Ohio-4669, ¶ 22, citing
Dice, supra, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9–04–41,
2005–Ohio–2505, ¶ 23; State v. Davis,
140 Ohio App.3d 751, 753,
749 N.E.2d 322 (1st
Dist.2000) [appellant realized officers sought to detain him and he continued to walk
away]; State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 05AP–27, 2005–Ohio–4553, at ¶ 16 (‘[W]e hold that
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 20
fleeing from a police officer who is lawfully attempting to detain the suspect under the
authority of Terry, is an affirmative act that hinders or impedes the officer in the
performance of the officer's duties as a public official and is a violation of R.C. 2921.31,
obstructing official business.’).
{¶48} We find appellant’s conviction is not against the sufficiency or the manifest
weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the judge appears to have fairly and impartially
decided the matters before him. The judge as a trier of fact can reach different conclusions
concerning the credibility of the testimony of appellee’s witnesses and appellant’s
arguments. This court will not disturb the trier of fact's finding so long as competent
evidence was present to support it. State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208,
378 N.E.2d 1049
(1978). The judge heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of
appellant's guilt.
{¶49} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that
there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the
crime of obstructing official business for which appellant was convicted.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008 21
CONCLUSION
{¶50} Appellant’s three assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of
the Holmes County Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J., concur.
