[Cite as Williams v. Thomas,
2023-Ohio-2856.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
James H. Williams, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 22AP-426
v. : (C.P.C. No. 19DR-2174)
Patricia A. Thomas, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on August 15, 2023
On brief: Vincent A. Dugan, Jr., for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Patricia A. Thomas, appeals the June 15, 2022
judgment entry and decree of divorce of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations, terminating her marriage to plaintiff-appellee, James H.
Williams, and dividing the parties’ assets. For the following reasons, we reverse and
remand this matter with instructions.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Williams and Thomas were married on September 6, 2013. On June 21, 2019,
Williams filed a pro se complaint for divorce. After Williams filed the complaint, the trial
court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the parties from, among other
actions, withdrawing or spending any assets to which either or both parties might have a
claim. Thomas filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce on August 31, 2019. That same
day, Thomas requested production of documents from Williams. In November 2019, a trial
No. 22AP-426 2
court magistrate issued a temporary order requiring Williams to maintain health insurance
for both parties and pay spousal support of $200 per month. In December 2019, Williams
obtained counsel. Williams then moved to modify the magistrate’s temporary order; the
magistrate denied Williams’s motion and ordered the temporary order to remain in effect.
{¶ 3} Between March and December 2020, the trial court issued four continuances
(two by the court’s own motion and two at the parties’ request), ultimately continuing the
case to March 2021. In December 2020, Williams’s first attorney withdrew from the case
and a second attorney appeared on his behalf. In March 2021, the court granted another
continuance at the request of the parties, continuing the case until June 2021. On June 17,
2021, Thomas moved to compel production of documents from Williams, asserting
Williams had only produced some of the documents requested. Thomas claimed Williams
failed to produce his federal tax returns, paycheck stubs, or records of real estate interests
and only produced incomplete checking account records and mortgage statements.
Thomas also requested attorney fees related to the motion to compel. A magistrate
dismissed the motion to compel because the parties failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing.
{¶ 4} On July 29, 2021, Thomas again moved to compel production of documents
from Williams and sought attorney fees related to the motion to compel. In August 2021,
the trial court permitted Williams’s second attorney to withdraw as counsel; thereafter,
Williams proceeded pro se. Following a hearing on November 10, 2021 at which Williams
failed to appear, a magistrate granted Thomas’s second motion to compel production of
documents, ordering Williams to provide specified documents on or before December 10,
2021. The order reserved judgment on Thomas’s request for attorney fees.
{¶ 5} On March 28, 2022, Thomas moved for an order holding Williams in
contempt for intentional failure to produce documents as required by the court’s order.
Thomas asserted that Williams failed to produce the documents by December 10, 2021, and
that Williams appeared unannounced at the office of Thomas’s counsel on Friday,
January 14, 2022 with the documents to be copied. Thomas’s counsel was not present at
the time and the building owner advised Williams he would need to arrange for an
appointment. Thomas alleged that the following Monday, Williams left a voicemail stating
he would provide the documents when he had time to do so. Thomas asserted Williams
No. 22AP-426 3
made no further attempt to produce the documents. Thomas requested sanctions be
imposed on Williams and requested attorney fees related to the motion for contempt.
{¶ 6} The trial court conducted a hearing on the divorce petition on March 30,
2022. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court noted the pending motion for
sanctions but declared it would address the merits of the case first:
This case is almost four years old …. So we’re going to get
this divorce done today and I will deal with sanctions. And we
can deal with sanctions after the evidence is produced about
the divorce. And it may come out about the lack of cooperation,
the lack of discovery, the lack of interrogatories and answers,
and I think that all of that would help you in your sanctions.
(Tr. at 11.)
{¶ 7} Williams testified that Thomas had misstated his income in her request for
spousal support, arguing that he earned $60,000 to $65,000 per year from employment,
social security, military retirement, and disability benefits. Williams testified he owned real
property on Bide-A-Wee Park (“Bide-A-Wee Park property”) and on Westphal Avenue
(“Westphal Avenue property”). Williams’s daughter lived at the Bide-A-Wee Park property,
and it was not encumbered by a mortgage; Williams testified he did not know the fair
market value of the Bide-A-Wee Park property. The Westphal Avenue property was
Williams’s primary residence and was encumbered by a mortgage. Williams testified the
mortgage balance was approximately $58,000 and the fair market value of the property
was approximately $180,000. On cross-examination, Williams admitted the balance of the
mortgage on the Westphal Avenue property was paid down during the term of the parties’
marriage. Mortgage statements for the Westphal Avenue property for 2018 through 2021
established that the mortgage balance was paid down by more than $27,000 during that
period. Williams also admitted that he removed money from his retirement account and
from a credit union account after the trial court issued the temporary restraining order.
{¶ 8} Thomas testified that her income was just under $25,000 in 2020 and fell to
just over $15,000 in 2021 due to medical issues, but that she expected her income to return
to around $25,000 in 2022. Thomas testified she owned property on Bowman Meadow
(“Bowman Meadow property”) that she purchased prior to the marriage. The Bowman
Meadow property was encumbered by a mortgage and Thomas testified she paid down the
mortgage balance by nearly $18,000 while married to Williams. Thomas testified that
No. 22AP-426 4
based on the partial information provided by Williams, she estimated he paid down the
mortgage balance on the Westphal Avenue property by more than $65,000 during the
course of the marriage. Thomas further testified she incurred $4,500 in attorney fees in
pursuing discovery remedies due to Williams’s failure to fully produce documents
requested.
{¶ 9} After the evidence was presented, the trial court permitted the parties to
address Thomas’s motion for sanctions. Following the hearing, the parties submitted
written closing arguments.
{¶ 10} On June 15, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry and decree of
divorce granting the parties a divorce, with a marriage termination date of March 30, 2022.
The court awarded Williams the Westphal Avenue and Bide-A-Wee Park properties and
awarded Thomas the Bowman Meadow property. The court also awarded each party 50
percent of the marital portion of the other party’s retirement account, and awarded Thomas
50 percent of the marital portion of Williams’s investment account. The court ordered that
any joint bank accounts be closed and the balances equally divided between the parties.
The court ordered Williams to pay $200 per month in spousal support for four years and
$1,000 to Thomas for attorney fees. Regarding Thomas’s motion for contempt, the court
found Williams in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s orders and imposed a fine
of $250.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 11} Thomas appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our
review:
[I.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in not finding the
Plaintiff-Appellant [sic] in contempt of the prior orders of this
Court, finding sanctions against him and compelling him to
produce the documents requested of him prior to the trial of
this cause.
[II.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in failing to include
the parties paydown of the non-marital mortgage balance as an
asset in its property division.
[III.] The Trial Court abused its discretion and erred as a
matter of law in failing to include the economic misconduct of
the Plaintiff-Appellee in determining its division of property.
No. 22AP-426 5
[IV.] The Trial Court abused its discretion and erred as a matter
of law in failing to award the Defendant-Appellant any attorney
fees due to Plaintiff-Appellant’s [sic] conduct which
dramatically increased her attorney fees.
III. Analysis
{¶ 12} Thomas argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court erred by
not holding Williams in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders,
and by not imposing sanctions and compelling Williams to produce documents requested
in discovery prior to trial. Thomas asserts Williams’s failure to produce the requested
documents prevented her from being fully prepared for trial.
{¶ 13} In the judgment entry, the trial court held Williams in contempt for failure to
comply with the court’s previous orders and imposed a $250 fine. The court further found
Williams was unable to purge the contempt because the trial had concluded, and Thomas
no longer needed complete production of documents. Because the trial court ultimately
granted Thomas’s motion and held Williams in contempt, the gravamen of Thomas’s claim
is that the trial court erred in the timing of addressing the motion for contempt—i.e., that
the trial court erred by waiting to resolve the motion for contempt until after holding the
merits hearing. Thomas asserts this deferral allowed Williams to control the flow of
information and conduct a trial by ambush.
{¶ 14} A trial court has broad discretion to regulate discovery and we generally
review a trial court’s decision on a motion to compel for abuse of discretion. Childs v.
Kroger Co., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-524, 2023-Ohio-2034, ¶ 40. An abuse of discretion occurs
when a trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). A trial court’s discretion is not without limits,
however, and “ ‘an appellate court will reverse the decision of a trial court that extinguishes
a party’s right to discovery if the trial court’s decision is improvident and affects the
discovering party’s substantial rights.’ ” Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc.,
75 Ohio St.3d 578, 592
(1996), quoting Rossman v. Rossman,
47 Ohio App.2d 103, 110 (8th Dist.1975). See Roty
v. Battelle Mem. Inst., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-266,
2017-Ohio-9125, ¶ 17 (citing Mauzy).
{¶ 15} The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision in Rossman, which the
Supreme Court of Ohio cited in Mauzy, involved a divorce case where the defendant
“persistently declined” to respond to interrogatories concerning his earing capacity.
No. 22AP-426 6
Rossman at 103. Pursuant to a motion from the plaintiff, the court ordered the defendant
to answer the interrogatories. The defendant provided answers, but the trial court later
concluded that many of his answers were “perfunctory or inaccurate.”
Id. In depositions
both the defendant and his father refused to answer questions about the defendant’s
earning capacity on instruction of counsel.
Id. at 104. Pursuant to a motion from the
plaintiff, the trial court ordered both depositions to be reconvened with instructions to
answer the questions; however, before the depositions were reconvened, the trial court sua
sponte consolidated all pretrial discovery proceedings into trial.
Id. at 105. Over the
plaintiff’s objection, the trial court conducted the trial before the reconvened depositions
could occur and took evidence regarding the defendant’s earning capacity.
{¶ 16} On appeal, the Eighth District concluded that the defendant’s willful failure
to comply with the rules of discovery and the trial court’s refusal to enforce its order
compelling discovery “denied the plaintiff the pretrial opportunity to fully prepare her
arguments on the fundamental issue” in the case. Id. at 108. The defendant’s earning
capacity was a fundamental issue in accurately assessing alimony and child support, and in
dividing marital property.
Id. The appellate court noted the court’s only justification for
terminating discovery was to expedite the conclusion of the case. The court concluded that
was an insufficient justification to sua sponte terminate discovery regarding a complex
fundamental issue.
Id. at 109. The court acknowledged the trial court’s broad discretion
over discovery but reasoned that “[a] sua sponte exercise of judicial discretion that rewards
a party’s willful obstruction of his opponent’s good faith discovery efforts is suspect.”
Id. at
110. The court found the plaintiff’s trial presentation regarding the fundamental issue of
the defendant’s earning capacity was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to enforce its
discovery order. Because the trial court’s discovery order “improvidently extinguished [the
plaintiff’s] substantial rights,” the Eighth District found it to be an abuse of discretion.
Id.
at 112.
{¶ 17} In Roty, this court applied the same analysis in reversing a trial court’s denial
of a motion to compel production of certain statistical data related to a company-wide
reduction in force in an age discrimination lawsuit. Roty at ¶ 9, 17-18. The trial court
limited production to requiring the employer to produce age data for a limited number of
employees that were affected by the reduction in force. Id. at ¶ 12. On appeal, this court
No. 22AP-426 7
concluded the trial court “predetermin[ed] that the statistics could not be relevant despite
evidence and law indicating that they were relevant for purposes of discovery,” which was
an improvident judgment. Id. at ¶ 17. We further concluded that the discovery decision
affected the plaintiffs’ substantial rights because the trial court then granted summary
judgment because the plaintiffs failed to present direct, circumstantial, or statistical
evidence to establish that age was a factor in their terminations. Id. at ¶ 6, 17. Because
denying the motion to compel was improvident and affected the discovering parties’
substantial rights, this court reversed the decision as an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 17-18.
{¶ 18} In this case, Thomas’s attorney advised the trial court at the beginning of the
hearing that Williams had not complied with the court’s order to produce documents.
Thomas’s attorney further explained that he was unable to prepare a complete trial
notebook because of Williams’s incomplete production. The trial court acknowledged
Williams’s failure to cooperate in discovery but asserted “this divorce is going to get done
today” because of the length of time the case had been pending. (Tr. at 11.) The trial court
stated Williams’s non-compliance with discovery would go toward Thomas’s argument for
sanctions.
{¶ 19} It is undisputed that Williams failed to produce all the documents Thomas
requested in discovery; the trial court recognized this by granting Thomas’s motion to
compel. Williams also failed to bring those documents to the hearing. Although the
magistrate’s order expressly required Williams to produce “tax returns and accompanying
documents and schedules (not just the tax transcripts),” Williams admitted that he only
brought his tax transcripts to court, asserting he thought that would be sufficient. (Nov. 15,
2021 Mag. Order at 1.) The hearing transcript demonstrates that Williams’s failure to
comply with the court’s discovery order impeded Thomas and the trial court from
determining certain basic facts about Williams’s assets. For example, although Williams
claimed his annual income was approximately $60,000 to $65,000, during the hearing the
trial court and Thomas’s attorney reviewed documents suggesting Williams received almost
$80,000 in income during 2021. Similarly, Williams admitted he paid down the mortgage
balance on the Westphal Avenue property during the course of the marriage but failed to
provide any mortgage statements prior to 2018. As a result, Thomas could only attempt to
No. 22AP-426 8
estimate how much the mortgage was paid down from 2014 through 2017, approximately
half the time the parties were married.
{¶ 20} Either spouse in a divorce case may request that the court determine what
constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property, and the court must
divide the marital and separate property equitably between the parties. R.C. 3105.171(B).
Similar to Rossman, the trial court’s failure to enforce discovery in this case substantially
prejudiced Thomas’s trial presentation of an issue that was fundamental to the case—i.e.,
the proper determination and allocation of marital and separate property. Rossman at 111.
Also similar to Rossman, the trial court’s primary reason for terminating discovery was
expediency, with the court stating at the hearing that the case was “so delinquent it needs
to be done or I am going to dismiss it.” (Tr. at 12.) Under these circumstances, the trial
court’s decision to defer the discovery issue until after hearing the merits of the case was
improvident and extinguished Thomas’s substantial rights; therefore, it was an abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, we sustain Thomas’s first assignment of error. On remand, the
trial court should require Williams to comply with its prior discovery order and permit
Thomas to address the equitable division of property based on any additional discovery
provided.
{¶ 21} In her second assignment of error, Thomas asserts the trial court erred when
determining the equitable division of property by failing to include as marital assets the
amounts by which the parties paid down the mortgages of their separate properties during
the term of the marriage. This court has held “it is generally true that any reduction in the
amount of a mortgage during the marriage by payment with marital funds contributes to
the equity in the property and becomes marital property.” Smith v. Smith, 10th Dist. No.
07AP-717, 2008-Ohio-799, ¶ 10. We have also held that a trial court’s “failure to divide all
marital property ‘amounts to an abuse of discretion.’ ” Smoyer v. Smoyer, 10th Dist. No.
18AP-365,
2019-Ohio-3461, ¶ 30, quoting Hackman v. Hackman, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-516,
2009-Ohio-820, ¶ 23. However, as explained above, the trial court’s failure to enforce its
discovery order hindered Thomas’s ability to present evidence regarding the proper
division of marital assets, including any mortgage reductions. Once the trial court has
compelled Williams to comply with discovery, Thomas will be able to argue this issue to the
No. 22AP-426 9
trial court on remand. Accordingly, our resolution of the first assignment of error renders
moot Thomas’s second assignment of error.
{¶ 22} In her third assignment of error, Thomas assets the trial court erred when
determining the equitable division of property by failing to consider her argument that
Williams committed economic misconduct. Similar to the second assignment of error,
Williams’s failure to comply with discovery hindered Thomas’s ability to present evidence
regarding alleged economic misconduct. When Williams has complied with the discovery
requests, Thomas will be able to argue this issue to the trial court on remand. Accordingly,
our resolution of the first assignment of error renders moot Thomas’s third assignment of
error.
{¶ 23} Finally, in her fourth assignment of error, Thomas asserts the trial court erred
by failing to award her attorney fees related to her attempts to obtain discovery from
Williams. We note the trial court awarded $1,000 in attorney fees to Thomas, which was
less than the $4,500 in attorney fees that Thomas testified she accrued in pursuing
discovery remedies. Because we are remanding this matter for the trial court to compel
Williams to comply with its discovery order, Thomas may raise her arguments related to
attorney fees on remand. Accordingly, our resolution of the first assignment of error
renders moot Thomas’s fourth assignment of error. See Beagle v. Beagle, 10th Dist. No.
07AP-494, 2008-Ohio-764, ¶ 59 (finding issues of attorney fees and spousal support moot
because decision was remanded on issue of division of marital property).
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Thomas’s first assignment of error,
which renders moot her second, third, and fourth assignments of error. We reverse the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with law and this
decision.
Judgment reversed;
cause remanded with instructions.
BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and BOGGS, J., concur.
