[Cite as State v. Brown,
2023-Ohio-2885.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-220581
TRIAL NO. 21CRB-725
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
DAQUAN BROWN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 18, 2023
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Amber H. Daniel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Judge.
{¶1} As Lieutenant David Schofield parked to conduct undercover
surveillance at an apartment building in lower Price Hill, defendant-appellant Daquan
Brown and another man took notice and entered the apartment building. Wearing a
mask to cover his face, Mr. Brown exited from the building shortly thereafter and
approached Lieutenant Schofield’s car with his phone in hand to record the
interaction, prompting the officer to summon backup. Mr. Brown eventually removed
his mask, allowing the officers to identify him and to confirm an outstanding arrest
warrant for a traffic offense. Believing that he resisted arrest, the state subsequently
charged Mr. Brown with one count of resisting arrest along with one count of
obstructing official business. After the trial court convicted him of resisting arrest (but
acquitted him of the other charge), Mr. Brown appealed, challenging the sufficiency
and manifest weight of the evidence underpinning his conviction. After reviewing the
evidence and record before the trial court, however, we overrule his assignments of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.
{¶2} In January 2021, Lieutenant Schofield parked at an apartment building
in an undercover vehicle in lower Price Hill as part of ongoing Cincinnati police
surveillance. He soon noticed two men entering the apartment building, one of whom
he would later discover was Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown exited from the apartment
building wearing a mask and a baseball hat, and he walked up to Lieutenant Schofield’s
car. Lieutenant Schofield rolled down his window and identified himself as a police
officer. Mr. Brown, identifying himself as an apartment superintendent, asked
Lieutenant Schofield to leave.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶3} Lieutenant Schofield, concerned about the direction this interaction was
taking, communicated his location and the events that occurred to other officers over
the radio. Officer Robert Pitts and other officers patrolling nearby lower Price Hill
responded to the call and headed to the apartment to assist. One of the officers
surmised that the man in the mask might be Mr. Brown, based on Lieutenant
Schofield’s location. While driving over, Officer Pitts ran Mr. Brown’s name through
his car terminal, finding his photo and learning of an active warrant out for his arrest
for a traffic offense.
{¶4} When Officer Pitts arrived, Lieutenant Schofield and another officer
stood outside the car speaking with Mr. Brown. A crowd had gathered, as other
neighbors migrated out from the apartment building and were conversing or milling
about. None of the officers could identify Mr. Brown at the time due to his mask.
Lieutenant Schofield initially informed Mr. Brown that he was not being detained.
Eventually, however, Mr. Brown pulled down his mask, allowing Officer Pitts to
confirm his identity. Officer Pitts proceeded to detain Mr. Brown, announcing that he
was under arrest.
{¶5} While Officer Pitts attempted to arrest Mr. Brown, he stepped back, and
moved his free hand away, exclaiming: “This is what y’all do for a traffic warrant?” As
Mr. Brown continued to move backward, other officers assisted Officer Pitts to detain
and subsequently handcuff him. After a short period of time, Officer Pitts and another
officer moved him into the backseat of a police cruiser.
{¶6} The state ultimately charged Mr. Brown with resisting arrest under R.C.
2921.33 and obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31. During the bench trial,
much of the argument surrounded whether Mr. Brown used force, intended to resist
arrest, or actually interfered with the arrest. Mr. Brown testified on his own behalf
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and insisted that he did not resist, explaining that he did not know why he was being
arrested since the officers indicated that they would not detain him a few moments
earlier.
{¶7} Ultimately, the court found Mr. Brown guilty of resisting arrest but not
guilty of obstructing official business. He was sentenced to one year of probation, with
90 days suspended contingent on the completion of 30 hours of community service.
Mr. Brown then timely filed this appeal.
II.
{¶8} Because Mr. Brown’s first and second assignments of error intertwine,
we consider them together for ease of analysis. Mr. Brown maintains that none of the
state’s evidence at trial sufficiently demonstrated he used “force,” “resist[ance],” or
“interfere[nce]” under R.C. 2921.33(A). Further, he asserts that his conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶9} In reviewing whether the conviction runs counter to the manifest weight
of the evidence, we sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In other words, we review the evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, and the entire record.
Id. But we will only reverse if the trial court “ ‘clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”
Id., quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175,
485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶10} When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘[t]he relevant inquiry
is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409,
2016-Ohio-8295,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. Additionally, “ ‘[w]here reasonable minds can reach
different conclusions upon conflicting evidence, determination as to what occurred is
a question for the trier of fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute
its judgment for that of the factfinder.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Shabazz,
146 Ohio
St.3d 404,
2016-Ohio-1055,
57 N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 20, quoting
Jenks at 279. Whether the
evidence sufficed to support the conviction presents a legal question that we review de
novo. State v. Ellison,
178 Ohio App.3d 734,
2008-Ohio-5282,
900 N.E.2d 228, ¶ 9
(1st Dist.).
{¶11} Mr. Brown insists the state did not prove that he resisted arrest under
R.C. 2921.33(A), which provides that, “[n]o person, recklessly or by force, shall resist
or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” As part of the state’s burden,
it must introduce evidence that it effectuated a lawful arrest in addition to
demonstrating that the defendant resisted or interfered with the arrest. State v.
Carter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220030, 2022-Ohio-3901, ¶ 14.
{¶12} Here, Mr. Brown acknowledges that the arrest was lawful, but he
maintains that the state failed to establish that he resisted. He claims that he did not
resist the arrest, professing only confusion as to the purpose of the arrest. And he
asserts that the only evidence of him using force came from the officers who testified
against him. We find Mr. Brown’s arguments inconsistent with the record before us.
{¶13} When reviewing the body-worn camera footage, Mr. Brown can be seen
moving away from the officers after they advise him that he is under arrest.
Additionally, they told him to “stop resisting” during the arrest, and Officer Pitts
testified that he had to use more force than normally needed to position Mr. Brown’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
hands for handcuffs. The video footage before the trial court reveals him attempting
to pull his arms away from the officers after they announced his arrest. While Mr.
Brown claims confusion for the reason for the arrest, he protested to the officers: “This
is what y’all do for a traffic warrant?” Such a response strongly suggests that he knew
full well why he was being arrested.
{¶14} Moreover, Mr. Brown required two police officers to walk him to the
police car because he was not moving forward on his own. While the arrest itself
happened rather quickly, within the timespan of a minute, he did not comply with the
officers’ orders and resisted their arrest. See Carter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220030,
2022-Ohio-3901, at ¶ 17 (“[T]he evidence established that [defendant] repeatedly
refused to submit to [officer’s] commands …. Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, [defendant] understood the nature of his conduct, but
nevertheless proceeded with heedless indifference to the consequences.”).
{¶15} And regardless, even if the court relied only on the officers’ testimony,
“it is well settled law that matters as to the credibility of witnesses are for the trier of
fact to resolve.” State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170354, 2019-Ohio-3877,
¶ 52. “Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must defer to
the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of
particular witnesses.”
Id. “When conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a
conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier
of fact believed the prosecution testimony.” State v. Robinson, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2018-08-163,
2019-Ohio-3144, ¶ 29. The trial court, after evaluating all the
evidence and testimony before it, found Lieutenant Schofield and Officer Pitts’
narratives of the arrest credible, and believed the officers’ testimony over Mr. Brown’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
account, which does not erode the integrity of the conviction. We overrule Mr. Brown’s
first and second assignments of error.
…
{¶16} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Brown’s assignments
of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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