[Cite as State v. Caupp,
2023-Ohio-2889.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29717
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 03379
:
MATTHEW CAUPP : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on August 18, 2023
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
MARY ADELINE R. LEWIS, Attorney for Appellant
.............
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Matthew Caupp appeals from his conviction for
aggravated possession of drugs. Caupp claims his conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence. Because we find no merit in this argument, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
-2-
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On May 5, 2021, City of Clayton Police Officer Cody Cecil was on routine
patrol. At approximately 11:00 p.m., he encountered a Chevy pickup truck near the
intersection of Westbrook Road and Ohio State Route 49. Cecil ran the vehicle’s license
plate and discovered the truck was registered to Caupp, who had an outstanding warrant
for his arrest. Cecil initiated a stop and determined that Caupp, who was driving the
truck, was the vehicle’s only occupant.
{¶ 3} Because Caupp was being arrested on the warrant, officers determined that
the vehicle would be towed, and they conducted an inventory search. Cecil located a
glass pipe on the driver’s seat that was several inches long with white residue. He found
more glass pipes in the center console. A plastic bottle with a “smoker pipe,” which Cecil
described as a bong with white residue, was located behind the front passenger seat.
Cecil testified that he believed, based upon his experience and training, that the white
residue was consistent with the use of methamphetamine. Finally, Cecil located a soda
can located directly behind the center console. When he picked up the can, Cecil noted
that it was not the appropriate weight for an unopened can of soda. He then observed
that the can had a “false lid.” After unscrewing the top of the can, Cecil found what was
later determined to be methamphetamine.
{¶ 4} Caupp was indicted on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. The
trial court sentenced Caupp to a term of community control not to exceed five years.
-3-
{¶ 5} Caupp appeals.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 6} Caupp’s sole assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL UNDER RULE 29 BECAUSE
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT HE WAS KNOWINGLY IN
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
{¶ 7} Caupp asserts the trial court erred by overruling his Crim.R. 29 motion for
acquittal. In support, he argues that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs.
{¶ 8} “A Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial.” State v. Cranford, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23055, 2011-Ohio-384,
¶ 31. “A sufficiency of the evidence argument challenges whether the State has
presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.”
Id., citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio
St.3d 380,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing this issue, we apply the standard set
forth in State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991):
An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence
admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
-4-
doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} Caupp was convicted of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),
which prohibits the knowing possession of drugs. “A person acts knowingly, regardless
of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a
certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C.
2901.22(B).
{¶ 10} “ ‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance,
but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through
ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
R.C. 2925.01(K). Possession of a drug may be either actual physical possession or
constructive possession. State v. Mabry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21569, 2007-Ohio-
1895, ¶ 18; State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 329,
348 N.E.2d 351 (1976). A person
has constructive possession of an object when he is conscious of the presence of the
object and able to exercise dominion and control over it, even if it is not within his
immediate physical possession. State v. Hankerson,
70 Ohio St.2d 87,
434 N.E.2d 1362
(1982), syllabus. Readily usable drugs in close proximity to an accused may constitute
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of constructive possession. State
v. Ruby,
149 Ohio App.3d 541,
2002-Ohio-5381,
778 N.E.2d 101, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.).
-5-
“Establishment of ownership is not required.” State v. Rastbichler, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 25753, 2014-Ohio-628, ¶ 33. In determining whether an individual possessed an
item, it is necessary to consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.
Mabry at ¶ 20.
{¶ 11} The only issue Caupp raises is whether the State proved that he knowingly
possessed the drugs inside the vehicle. While he admits he was the owner of the truck,
he argues there was no evidence that he was the sole user of the truck. He also argues
there was no evidence that either the drug paraphernalia or the can containing
methamphetamine belonged to him. He thus claims that the State relied on “wholly
circumstantial” evidence which “fell short” of establishing ownership of the drugs.
{¶ 12} Caupp correctly notes that the State did not present direct evidence that he
knew there were drugs in his vehicle. However, circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence have the same probative value. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272,
574
N.E.2d 492 (1991).
{¶ 13} Here, the evidence established that Caupp was the owner, operator, and
sole occupant of the vehicle stopped by Cecil. A glass pipe with white residue was found
in Caupp’s seat after he exited the vehicle. A bong with white residue and more glass
pipes were in areas that were within Caupp’s reach from the driver’s seat. Likewise,
Cecil testified that the soda can, which was located directly behind the center console,
was within Caupp’s reach from the driver’s seat. All the items found by the officer were
in open view and within reach of Caupp while seated in the vehicle. Thus, a reasonable
juror could have inferred that Caupp knew these items were in his vehicle. Further,
-6-
because drug paraphernalia was readily apparent in the vehicle, some of which had white
residue identified by Cecil as being indicative of methamphetamine, a reasonable juror
could have inferred that Caupp had also been aware of the methamphetamine inside the
false soda can.
{¶ 14} After viewing the record in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude
that the State presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate constructive possession of
the methamphetamine found in the vehicle. Therefore, the assignment of error is
overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} Caupp’s sole assignment of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
.............
WELBAUM, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
