State v. Belton

[Cite as State v. Belton, 

.]




                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY


State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. L-20-1121

        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. CR0200802934

v.

Anthony Belton                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                Decided: January 30, 2023

                                            …

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Timothy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, Allison Swain,
        Randall L. Porter, and Samantha Koravecic, Assistant
        State Public Defenders, for appellant.

                                            …
        DUHART, P.J.

        {¶ 1} This case is before the court on appeal by appellant, Anthony Belton, from

the June 29, 2020 judgment of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.
                                       Background

       {¶ 2} On the morning of August 13, 2008, a BP gas station at the corner of Dorr

Street and Secor Road in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio was robbed and the clerk, Matthew

Dugan, was shot and killed.

       {¶ 3} On August 25, 2008, appellant was charged by way of indictment with one

count of aggravated murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(B) and (F), one count of

aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, and

one count of aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), also a felony of the

first degree. All three counts had firearm specifications attached pursuant to R.C.

2941.145 and the aggravated murder count included two death penalty specifications

pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (murder to escape detection) and R.C. 2929.04(A)(7)

(felony murder).

       {¶ 4} Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and entered pleas of no contest to

each of the charges and specifications, and on April 2, 2012, the case proceeded to a

hearing before a three-judge panel pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3).

                              Trial and Mitigation Hearing

       {¶ 5} After the presentation of the state’s case in chief, the three-judge panel

unanimously found appellant guilty of all of the charges and the specifications. The state

represented to the court that the two death penalty specifications merged and the state

elected to proceed on the felony murder specification in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).




2.
       {¶ 6} A mitigation hearing was then held. Mark Rooks, a mitigation specialist;

Kim Harold, appellant’s mother; Linda Berry, appellant’s great-aunt; Matthew Martin, a

forensic counselor at the Lucas County Correction Center; and Dr. Robert Stinson, a

forensic psychologist testified on behalf of appellant. Appellant also introduced 22

exhibits, including Kim’s medical records, appellant’s educational, employment, and

Connecting Point records, as well as reports from interviews with appellant; Kim;

appellant’s aunt, Charise Harold; his grandmother, Sheila Googins; his aunt, Francine

Belton; his cousin, Isaiah Everett; his brother, Aaron; and his father, Anthony Belton, Sr.

David Connell, a clinical psychologist, testified for the state.

                                    Mitigation Evidence

       {¶ 7} In State v. Belton, 

, 

, 

, ¶

161 - 186, the Ohio Supreme Court described the evidence presented in mitigation as

follows:

                          i. Background and family history

              [Kim Harold, appellant’s mother,] was born to a teenage mother,

       Sheila Googins, in 1965. As a child, Kim moved frequently, living at times

       with her mother, her grandmother, and foster parents. When she was five or

       six, Kim moved in with her mother and stepfather, George Harold, who

       adopted her. George molested Kim for years, and at some point when Kim

       was a teenager, she told Sheila that George had molested her. Sheila told

       Kim she did not believe her, but then Sheila became depressed over the



3.
     allegation and attempted suicide. Kim moved in with her grandmother after

     Sheila’s suicide attempt. Kim became depressed and began to use

     marijuana and crack, but she did complete high school and then attended a

     semester of a nursing program at the University of Toledo.

            At a young age, Kim entered an 11-year relationship with Anthony

     Belton Sr. They had two sons together when Kim was in her early twenties.

     [Appellant] was born on November 23, 1985, and Aaron followed on

     January 5, 1987. Kim used drugs during both pregnancies-marijuana during

     the first and cocaine during the second. She was also hospitalized for an

     abdominal contusion during her pregnancy with [appellant]. Even so,

     records and family members indicate that [appellant]’s birth was normal

     and that he was a full-term baby.

            As a young child, [appellant] saw his father infrequently. The family

     lived in Toledo, but Belton Sr. was stationed in Japan for four or five years

     as a member of the United States Marine Corps. When [appellant] was

     about four years old, Belton Sr. became frustrated with Kim’s continued

     drug use, and he moved to California. Kim attempted suicide. But soon she

     began dating Belton Sr.’s nephew, Christopher Belton [Sr.], and they had a

     son [(Chris)] together. Christopher Sr. became like a surrogate father to

     [appellant].




4.
            Kim and her sons moved frequently, living in eight or nine homes

     while [appellant] was growing up. [Appellant] attended school regularly,

     but he began to get into trouble at an early age. According to [appellant]’s

     great-aunt, [appellant] knew the difference between right and wrong, but

     had a tendency not to listen. Kim disciplined him by spanking him or

     hitting him with a belt.

            [Appellant] witnessed both domestic abuse and drug use in the

     home. On one occasion, police came to investigate a domestic-violence

     incident and [appellant] was maced by the police. Another time, Kim went

     to the hospital, where she reported that Christopher [Sr.] had assaulted and

     raped her. Kim smoked marijuana in front of her sons, at times used $100

     worth of cocaine in a single day, and left home for days-long crack binges.

     Yet she rejected offers from Belton Sr. and her mother to take the boys.

            When [appellant] was around 11 years old, Kim was incarcerated for

     forgery and petty theft. Kim sent [appellant] and Aaron to live with [their

     father,] Belton Sr. in California. Initially, [appellant] attended school and

     earned good grades. He got along well with his father’s girlfriend, LaTisha.

     But after about a year, Belton Sr. and LaTisha broke up, and the family

     moved.

            When [appellant] was 13 or 14 years old, Belton Sr. began dating a

     woman named Michelle. Michelle and her three daughters moved into the




5.
     house, and she expected [appellant] to help with the kids. She also tried to

     act as a surrogate mother to [appellant], which he resented. According to

     Dr. Stinson, “By this time, [appellant] was an angry child who very much

     resented the abandonments that he had suffered up to this point in life.”

            Belton Sr. employed military-style discipline with the boys and

     frequently grounded [appellant] or took away privileges. He ordered

     [appellant] to do physical exercises such as push-ups as punishment. Belton

     Sr. also sometimes ordered [appellant] to box with him so that Belton Sr.

     could show him that he was stronger and was in charge. At times, he made

     [appellant] sit in a hot car all day while he worked.

            [Appellant] attended Gompers High School in San Diego,

     California, a school that Stinson testified was known for its “crime ridden,

     gang infested environment.” Riots broke out at Gompers several times a

     year, and when fights broke out, teachers would contain the fighting by

     closing gates inside the school until a swat team arrived. [Appellant]’s

     attendance at school was spotty. He got into fights, was beaten up a few

     times, and ultimately joined a gang. [Appellant] began using alcohol and

     marijuana, but he did not try cocaine or crack, because he had seen what

     those drugs did to his family members.




6.
            When [appellant] was 17 or 18 years old, he assaulted a female

     classmate, and her family threatened charges. Belton Sr. decided to send his

     sons back to Toledo on a bus.

            Although [appellant] was glad to return to Toledo, he did not adjust

     well to the move; his great-aunt[, Linda Berry,] testified that he seemed

     depressed and angry. Initially, [appellant] enrolled in high school and got a

     job. But his school attendance was poor, and he was soon kicked out for

     fighting. [Appellant] began pursuing a GED, but he stopped attending

     classes. And he was fired from his job because he did not want to follow

     rules. Around this time, [appellant] began hanging out with his cousins,

     who used and dealt drugs.

            [Appellant] lived with his mother and his great-aunt Sherry, but he

     left after he got into some disagreements with his great-aunt. Finally,

     [appellant] moved into the home of his maternal great-grandmother, Marian

     Do[t]son. Do[t]son ran a “flop house” for anyone who needed a place to

     stay. Do[t]son’s guests tended to spend their days smoking marijuana,

     instead of working or attending school.

            [Appellant]’s mother described him as intelligent, fun-loving, and

     not a bad person. She said that [appellant] loves to help people. And

     [appellant]’s great-aunt stated that she has never seen [appellant] get

     violent.




7.
                         ii. [Appellant]’s mental health

            [Linda Berry, appellant’s great-aunt], is a psychiatric nurse. She saw

     [appellant] frequently as a child and remembers him as being quiet. At

     family events, he sat alone rather than playing with other children.

            According to Berry, [appellant] became severely depressed in 2003

     when his uncle, George Harold, died in a motorcycle accident. George had

     been a father figure and a stabilizing force to [appellant]. After George’s

     death, Berry said, [appellant] “wouldn’t talk to anybody” and “isolated

     himself.” Berry thinks [appellant] may have experienced hallucinations and

     shown other signs of psychosis at the time.

            Berry set up an appointment for [appellant] to be evaluated at

     Connecting Point in November 2005. He was diagnosed with dysthymic

     disorder, which is chronic, low-grade depression. His file was closed in

     March 2006.

            Dr. Bob Stinson … testified that he had met with [appellant],

     administered the Woodcock-Johnson III achievement test, and interviewed

     [appellant]’s mother, brother, cousin, and great-aunt. Stinson also reviewed

     discovery materials, the mitigation specialist’s interview notes, and records

     collected by the mitigation specialist.

            Stinson analyzed [appellant]’s life through the lens of a United

     States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) model that identifies various risk




8.
     factors that make a person more likely to engage in criminal behavior, as

     well as various protective factors that reduce the risk of such behavior.

     According to Stinson, virtually every risk factor identified by the DOJ

     model applies to [appellant], meaning that he was “at high risk for

     developing a psychological disorder or drug dependence and criminal

     activity.” Stinson testified that these risk factors provide “a context in

     which to understand how [appellant] developed morally, how he developed

     in terms of values and what influence[d] his choices that he ultimately

     made.”

            Stinson conceded that [appellant] made a choice when he committed

     the crimes. However, he opined that [appellant]’s background may reduce

     his moral culpability for his crimes. And Stinson testified that [appellant]

     has expressed sincere remorse for his actions.

            Stinson diagnosed [appellant] with an untreated bipolar disorder. In

     support, he cited [appellant]’s reports of feeling alternately sad, energized,

     irritable, and suspicious of others. He also noted [appellant]’s personal and

     family history of depression, his difficulty sleeping, and his report of

     hearing voices. The state’s psychologist, Dr. Connell, disagreed with

     Stinson’s diagnosis. Based on his review of the records, Connell opined

     that the better diagnosis is antisocial-personality disorder.




9.
             Stinson also diagnosed [appellant] with drug and alcohol

      dependence. [Appellant] began using alcohol and marijuana at age 15.

      Belton told Stinson that by the time he was 17, he was a “minialcoholic.”

      He told Stinson that he drank pints of liquor at a time and sometimes

      blacked out. At the time of his arrest, [appellant] was using at least one

      ounce of marijuana a day. At other times, he used as much as one and a half

      ounces daily. Stinson explained that individuals with untreated mental

      illness “oftentimes turn to drugs and alcohol” in an effort to self-medicate.

             [Appellant]’s full-scale IQ is 89. However, Stinson noted indications

      of possible brain damage, such as perinatal risk factors, reported head

      injuries, reported migraines, and other behavioral indicators. Stinson

      recommended, but did not insist, that defense counsel secure a

      neuropsychological or neurological evaluation of [appellant]. Because this

      evaluation did not occur, Stinson’s conclusions are based on the assumption

      that [appellant] does not have brain damage.

                              iii. Jailhouse behavior

             Matthew Martin, a forensic counselor on the maximum-security

      floor of the Lucas County Correctional Facility, testified about [appellant]’s

      behavior in jail since his arrest. [Appellant] had been on Martin’s floor for

      three years, after initial placements on suicide watch and then another floor.

      According to Martin, [appellant] is polite and can exercise self-control.




10.
             Martin testified that [appellant] hardly ever had discipline problems

      while on his floor. According to Martin, [appellant] had been selected as a

      trustee, a privilege reserved for well-behaved inmates. Martin explained

      that [appellant] was removed from that position only because a jail captain

      thought his case was too high profile.

             On rebuttal, the state introduced reports from the jail’s disciplinary

      board dated from 2008 to 2011. The reports document [appellant]’s attack

      on a special-needs inmate, physical altercations with other inmates,

      disregard of instructions, and possession of contraband. In July 2009,

      [appellant] challenged a shift commander to a fight, stating, “I’m facing the

      death penalty. I ain’t got nothing to lose.” Personnel suspected [appellant]

      was trying to manipulate his placements in the jail, and one report indicated

      that [appellant] may be “a hard placement.” [Appellant] also made repeated

      requests for painkillers, which Dr. Connell described as suspicious, drug-

      seeking behavior.

             Dr. Stinson testified that [appellant]’s prison record shows his

      potential to adjust to confinement. He explained that although [appellant]’s

      record is imperfect, it shows improvement over time. [Appellant] was cited

      in six disciplinary actions in 2009, three in 2010, and three in 2011.

      According to Stinson, prison is probably the most stable environment

      [appellant] has ever been in and he has responded well to the structure.




11.
       {¶ 8} At the conclusion of the mitigation hearing, the three-judge panel weighed

the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors and unanimously found that

the aggravating circumstance outweighed any and all mitigating factors and therefore

sentenced appellant to death.

                     Direct Appeal and Postconviction Proceedings

       {¶ 9} Appellant filed a direct appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court on June 4,

2012. He then filed a postconviction petition on February 15, 2013, in the trial court. He

amended this petition three times, filing his third-amended postconviction petition on

July 29, 2013.

       {¶ 10} In addition to the postconviction petition, on February 25, 2013, appellant

filed a motion for appropriation of funds to hire an expert in forensic psychiatry, a motion

for funds for a neuropsychologist to perform ADHD testing, and a motion for leave to

conduct discovery.

       {¶ 11} All postconviction litigation was stayed pending the Ohio Supreme Court’s

ruling on the direct appeal. On April 20, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its

decision and affirmed appellant’s convictions and sentence of death. In its independent

sentence evaluation, the court gave significant weight to appellant’s family history and

background, minimal weight to his adaptability to prison life, and “some weight” to the

following: his age (22 at the time of the offense); his lack of significant criminal history;

his mental-health problems; and his remorse and acceptance of responsibility. The court

found that appellant had “presented significant mitigating evidence that has substantial




12.
weight.” However, the court noted that “[a]ppellant shot Dugan at close range, in the

back of the head, even though Dugan had cooperated with [appellant]’s demands for

money and phone cards. [Appellant] then left Dugan to die and went shoe shopping.”

The court concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors

beyond a reasonable doubt.

       {¶ 12} The trial court stayed consideration of appellant’s postconviction relief

petition for additional periods while appellant continued his appeal process.

       {¶ 13} On February 7, 2018, the state filed a motion for summary

judgment/motion to dismiss the amended petition for postconviction relief.

           Evidence Presented in Support of Postconviction Relief Petition

       {¶ 14} In support of his postconviction relief petition, appellant provided the court

with 26 exhibits, including the following.

                     Martha Phillips’s Affidavit and Related Exhibits

       {¶ 15} Martha Phillips, a mitigation investigator with the Ohio Public Defender,

assisted appellant’s postconviction attorneys in investigating potential mitigation

evidence, including family members’ criminal convictions. A detailed list of these

convictions, as well as the records themselves, were included as evidence in support of

the petition. Phillips additionally researched the number of residential moves appellant

experienced as a child, and these were detailed in Appendix A of her affidavit.

       {¶ 16} Phillips also related a conversation she had with a friend of appellant’s

from San Diego who distinguished appellant’s personality from Aaron’s, and described



13.
appellant’s father’s girlfriend’s dislike of the brothers and treatment of appellant. In a

second affidavit, Phillips stated she called Lucas County Children’s Services (LCCS) and

was told that there were records listing appellant as an “alleged child victim.” Copies of

the LCCS records were included as exhibits to the petition.

                                    Appellant’s Affidavit

       {¶ 17} In his affidavit, appellant explained that his behavior at trial1 was due to his

mother’s advice that he keep his head up and not show weakness. He also felt the need to

show he was “tough and strong.” He expressed that he was “extremely sorry” for

shooting Dugan. He wrote a letter to Dugan’s family to be read at sentencing, but his

attorneys did not use the letter or allow him to give an unsworn statement. Had they put

him on the stand, he would have expressed remorse and provided additional information

about his father. He stated that his father made him feel like he didn’t fit in with his

family.

       {¶ 18} He described his time in San Diego, which he hated. He did not get along

with his father’s girlfriend, Michelle. He and Aaron had to clean up after her kids and

she lied to his father to get him in trouble, which resulted in him being forced to sit in a




1
 In his seventeenth claim for relief, appellant argued that trial counsel failed to look into
his “poor demeanor at trial” and to explain that it was not due to a lack of remorse. He
pointed out that, during the mitigation phase, proceedings were delayed because appellant
refused to come out of his cell and be dressed in civilian clothes, and he alleged that he
was seen smiling during trial. He also cited to a Toledo Blade article which stated that,
while being led away from the courtroom after the verdict, “a smiling” appellant stated he
“felt good,” and when asked if he was sorry for his actions, answered “no.”


14.
car for eight hours while his father worked and getting smacked in the face. One time he

ran away from his father’s home and stayed at a home across the street. Although his

father said he was looking for him, appellant did not believe he had. His father also

commented that he “should have aborted [appellant’s] ass.” While in California,

appellant’s best friend was killed by a gang member, which “was the beginning of a

downward spiral for [him].”

       {¶ 19} When appellant returned to Toledo, appellant had no further contact with

his father, although his father returned to Toledo several times. His father did not visit

him in jail, although he attended an early preliminary hearing.

       {¶ 20} Appellant was not offered a plea deal, but would have accepted one if

offered.

                                  Aaron Belton’s Affidavit

       {¶ 21} Aaron, appellant’s brother, commented on appellant’s and his life when

they were young, including the sudden move to California, and their life in San Diego,

where they were exposed to “a lot of gangs and violence” and fighting at school. Aaron

said most of their friends in San Diego were “full-fledged gang members” and that

appellant joined the Bloods at 14 after he “had been jumped by the Crips.” Aaron

discussed their sudden return to Toledo, and recalled the brothers did not have any

contact with their father for four years, despite the fact that the father occasionally was in

Toledo.




15.
       {¶ 22} Upon returning to Toledo, Aaron calmed down, but appellant “kept living

more fast-paced, like he did in California.” Appellant lived at “Big Mama’s house on

Cuthbert Road” (Marian Dotson’s home) when he returned from Toledo, but Aaron did

not. Aaron described the home as in a rough area and there was “not a lot of food …

and nowhere to sleep.” He stated appellant hung out with gang members while living at

Big Mama’s house. He acknowledged that a lot of people in his family have criminal

histories, including three cousins and an uncle who were convicted of murder. Aaron

also believed that the way they were raised affected appellant more because he was older.

                                  Chris Belton’s Affidavit

       {¶ 23} Chris, appellant’s brother, averred that when he was a child, Kim and his

father, Christopher Sr., would argue, and Kim told him that his father would get drunk

and hit her. Chris never saw the abuse, but appellant did. Chris stated Kim did drugs

when they were young, and he described staying the night at his Aunt Emily’s house who

also did drugs and was “mean.” He recalled at one point his family lived with his Aunt

Sherrie, who also used drugs.

       {¶ 24} When appellant and Aaron moved to California, Chris lived with his dad.

Chris’s father made him go to school and stay in the house and he believes these things

helped him. He thinks things were harder for appellant who, as oldest, felt he had to

show how tough he was as the “big brother” and “saw the worst part of his dad and the

worst part of [their] mother’s drug use.” Chris also described appellant’s life in




16.
California and Big Mama’s house as “basically a flop house” that was in a rough area.

He stated that his mother’s side of the family, the Dotsons, “killed and raped people.”

                                  Kim Harold’s Affidavit

       {¶ 25} Kim, appellant’s mother, averred her mother gave birth to her when she

was 15; she lived with her grandparents until she was five and then was in foster care

until her mother could take care of her. Kim gave a history of her mother’s family (the

Dotsons), including her mother’s 13 siblings and their children. Numerous members of

the Dotson family have drug problems and criminal records, including two convicted of

murder, one convicted of rape, and another in prison for molesting his stepgrandson.

Kim described “a lot of incest” in the family, including her grandfather molesting her

aunt, and her uncles raping her mother. She stated that her stepfather was abusive and

once her biological father threatened to whip her.

       {¶ 26} Kim recalled Anthony Sr. was “never really there” for appellant and Aaron.

When the brothers returned from California alone, by bus, they “hardly heard from their

father.” She thinks appellant was hyperactive as a child, as he talked too much whereas

Chris and Aaron were “younger and quieter.” She blames “the bad crowd” appellant was

hanging out with for him shooting Dugan, as appellant is a follower. She also explained

that she told appellant to “keep his head up and smile during the trial”

                                 Tiesha Vassar’s Affidavit

       {¶ 27} Tiesha, appellant’s second cousin, stated she and appellant were close as

children and she knew him well, which she believes is due to the fact that they were very




17.
similar - impulsive and not able to control their behavior. She stated that “[t]he Dotson

family has a reputation and we’re all trying to live it down.” After returning from

California, appellant and Tiesha saw each other “almost every day.” He babysat for her

daughter and she thought he was “great” with her daughter and responsible. Although

appellant was friends with drug dealers, he respected her rules and did not bring them

around her house. One time she saw Kevin Washington, a friend of appellant’s and a

drug dealer, punch appellant, but appellant did not hit him back. Tiesha recalled that,

when the story got around, “people were telling [appellant] he got punked” and he was

embarrassed.

       {¶ 28} Tiesha also detailed the Dotson family’s history of legal problems and said

the family, including the women, has a “reputation for fighting and violence.” She thinks

that appellant’s brothers avoided getting into trouble because they were calmer and not

impulsive like appellant.

                               Lamonte Hopings’s Affidavit

       {¶ 29} Lamonte, appellant’s cousin, also discussed appellant’s “chaotic”

household growing up, including Kim’s drug abuse, frequent moves, and minimal

furniture in the home. Lamonte said he and his mother would go pick appellant and his

brothers up because Kim would leave them alone when they were “quite young” to go

out and use drugs. He also described his family as “a family of fighters” who are told

they should “never be a coward or back down from confrontation.” He listed numerous




18.
examples, including seeing Kim, his mother, and his Aunt Karen all fighting on different

occasions. Additionally, he stated that he had seen Kim and Christopher Sr. fight “a lot.”

       {¶ 30} Lamonte detailed the family “legacy” of getting into trouble, and he

himself is (when he signed the affidavit in 2013) incarcerated for murder and both of his

brothers have been to prison. His one brother was imprisoned for a murder he committed

as a juvenile, which also involved two of his other cousins. Lamonte described appellant

as “loud and eager and want[ing] to be noticed and seen” when he returned from

California, and he thinks appellant’s gang affiliation in San Diego had “a major

influence” on him. Appellant sold weed for Lamonte, although he wasn’t good at selling

it because he either smoked it or gave too much away.

                                David Johnson’s Affidavit

       {¶ 31} David Johnson was appellant’s fifth grade teacher. He described appellant

as talkative and active in his class, and he thinks appellant might “have suffered from

some kind of hyperactive disorder, but he was never placed in any special education

classes.” Appellant told him he played a lot of video games at home, including violent

ones, and once he went to appellant’s home to speak with Kim and it seemed that she and

her boyfriend had been smoking weed. The neighbors told him Kim also smoked crack.

       {¶ 32} Johnson thinks appellant was “affected by his father’s absence”; when

Johnson pulled appellant aside to talk about his behavior, appellant would “sometimes

cry about his situation at home – that his dad wasn’t there and that another guy was.” He




19.
noted appellant’s behavior improved with the added structure in his classroom and

described Aaron and Chris as “much more reserved and easy-going” than appellant.

                               Symphonee Cannon’s Affidavit

       {¶ 33} Symphonee was appellant’s girlfriend. Her grandmother lived next door to

Marian Dotson on Cuthbert Road. Symphonee was afraid of most of the Dotsons and her

grandmother never let her go to the Dotson house, which she described as “dark and

messy and looked like a condemned house.” She said there were a lot of people in and

out of the house and there was loud music, partying, “frequent altercations” and often the

police were there. She thought the Cuthbert neighborhood was bad for appellant because

there were a lot of gangs and street people. When she met appellant, Symphonee “was

surprised to learn how nice he was. He did things for [her] … and was great with [her]

son.” She described appellant as hyper, restless, impulsive, with a bad temper, although

“he wasn’t an angry person.” Appellant sometimes broke down crying around her, and

said he didn’t have anyone. Symphonee believed appellant got into more trouble than his

brothers because he “hung out with a bad crowd and was more of a follower.”

       {¶ 34} Once he was arrested, appellant called Symphonee crying, and told her “he

didn’t mean to kill the victim and that he was having nightmares about it.” When she

asked him why he laughed in court and told the cameras he wasn’t remorseful, he told her

“he said it out of anger because he knew things were against him.” She said that

“arrogant attitude is not [appellant.]”




20.
                                Elizabeth Cannon’s Affidavit

       {¶ 35} Elizabeth, Symphonee’s mother, described the Dotson family as

“notorious,” and the Dotson name as associated with dysfunction and crime. She did not

believe appellant stood a chance with his parents, the family history of dysfunction, and

no stable influences. Initially, she was upset when Symphonee started dating appellant,

but once she met him, she liked him. She described him as pleasant, although she also

said he was hyperactive, restless, impulsive, talkative, animated and “seemed to want to

be noticed.”

                                   Mark Rooks’s Affidavit

       {¶ 36} Rooks, a mitigation specialist, testified that, during trial, the attorneys did

not obtain a court order for Children Services records, nor did he request these records.

He also never told the attorneys that there were no records from Children Services or Job

and Family Services.2

                                     Expert Witness Testimony

       {¶ 37} Appellant provided the court with the affidavits of three experts: Dr.

Stinson, Dr. Rahn Minagawa, and Dr. Peggy Giordano.




2
 Appellant’s thirteenth claim for relief alleged trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
request or receive Kim’s Lucas County Department of Job and Family Services
(LCDJFS) records and his twenty-first claim for relief alleged trial counsel did not obtain
and present LCCS records.


21.
                                   Dr. Stinson’s First Affidavit

       {¶ 38} Dr. Stinson was asked to review transcripts from his and Dr. Connell’s

mitigation phase testimony as well as “transcripts from the presentation of exhibits and

closing argument following Dr. Connell’s testimony.” In addition, he reviewed records

given to him by Phillips, the postconviction mitigation investigator, including write-ups

of interviews done with, inter alia, the above-referenced lay-witnesses and a document

detailing appellant’s family’s criminal history.

       {¶ 39} After reviewing these items, in his first postconviction affidavit, Dr.

Stinson discussed what information from Dr. Connell’s testimony he could have

corrected or clarified if he had been called in rebuttal, and how the new information

provided by Phillips would have assisted in his evaluation and mitigation testimony.

       {¶ 40} Dr. Stinson related numerous ways in which it would have been beneficial

to call him in rebuttal. He could have clarified that he had been informed by Kim herself,

not medical records, that she had used marijuana during her pregnancy. Additionally, he

could have explained, or “explained in greater detail”:

              - that Kim’s and Googin’s depression and suicide attempts placed

       appellant at greater risk of developing depression or another mood disorder

       including dysthymic disorder and bipolar disorder;

              - the differences between perinatal problems and a “difficult

       childbirth” and the risks associated with perinatal problems;




22.
              - that “the literature shows that children exposed to certain events

       are at an increased risk for negative outcomes by virtue of being exposed

       to the event - regardless of their subjective experience at the time or

       following the event”;

              - that the standard is best interest of the child and therefore, Dr.

       Connell’s statement that “there is something to be said for a mother who

       wants to keep custody of her children” was “misguided”;

              - that dysfunction in a family for purposes of death penalty

       mitigation should not be measured by involvement from children’s

       services;

              - that appellant’s transitions and disruptions were critical risk

       factors;

              - why his previous testimony regarding precursors to violent crime

       was correct, as was his diagnoses;

              - that the record did not support a claim that appellant was drug-

       seeking;

              - that appellant’s report of hallucinations was consistent with

       genuine hallucinations;3


3
  In his trial testimony, Dr. Stinson testified that appellant was having auditory
hallucinations, which were described as mumbling and whispering. Dr. Connell later
testified that auditory hallucinations are not vague or mumbling. And Dr. Connell
commented that auditory hallucinations are easy to fabricate, but difficult to report in a
way that is consistent with actual mental illness.


23.
              - that Dr. Connell’s testimony regarding certain tests was

       inaccurate;

              - why appellant might have been remorseful and yet it not be

       reflected in the records;

              - that appellant’s rate of recidivism for a violent crime differs

       depending on whether he is in prison, or unsupervised in the community.

       {¶ 41} He believed he could have corrected misstatements about, and further

elaborated on: bipolar disorder; whether there was evidence of clinical depression in the

record; and, Dr. Connell’s “misunderstanding” about trauma and how it effects the brain

function of children, regardless of whether the diagnostic criteria for PTSD are met. He

also could have established that “the functioning of [appellant’s] parents was poor” and

that Dr. Connell was incorrect in stating that there was “stability of the family.”

       {¶ 42} Dr. Stinson affirmed the additional records Phillips provided to him would

have been important in furthering his evaluation and testimony during the mitigation

phase. Specifically, he points out that the records reveal “a more extensive family

criminal history,” “more residential transitions,” “additional abuses,” and “identities of

other family members, friends, and an ex-girlfriend who would have been willing to talk

to [him] and/or members of [appellant’s] defense team.” He alleges that he was not given

accurate information about appellant and his father’s relationship, and he should have

been given details regarding appellant’s prescription of Depakote. He regrets not more

strongly recommending a neurological or neuropsychological evaluation be completed



24.
since “there are a number of indications of neurological or neuropsychological

impairment.”

                              Dr. Stinson’s Second Affidavit

       {¶ 43} In a second affidavit, made after Dr. Stinson received records from LCCS,

he references information in those records that would have been important, including: (1)

complaints that Kim was neglectful; (2) that when Aaron was born with “intensive

medical needs,” Kim was thought to be suffering from post-partum depression and was

overwhelmed and isolated; (3) that their home sometimes did not have gas, electricity, or

hot water; (4) that Kim was, at times, uncooperative with social service agencies trying to

help her; (5) that at one point, Kim expressed a desire to surrender both appellant and

Aaron for adoption; (6) information regarding Anthony Sr.’s lack of interest in the

children; (7) Kim did not have a good support system; (8) there were allegations of drug

abuse and leaving the children home alone; (9) Kim’s boyfriend “may have been selling

drugs”; (10) Kim was sexually molested as a child and never received counseling; (11)

Kim’s discipline included “whoopings” with a belt, her hand, or a shoe; (12) appellant’s

grandfather once picked him up and threw him in a corner; (13) the children were

exposed to physical confrontations, domestic violence, guns, and extremely intoxicated

adults; and (14) Kim threatened to kill herself and her children.

                                 Dr. Minagawa’s Affidavit

       {¶ 44} Dr. Minagawa identified, inter alia, the following “issues and concerns”

involving appellant’s mitigation defense: (1) witnesses were not called to testify about




25.
appellant’s “childhood and adolescent history of exposure to acts of violence, traumatic

experiences and losses, and problems with impulse control and hyperactivity were not

fully explored”; (2) “evidence of [ADHD] observed by family members, friends, his

teacher, and an evaluating therapist was not presented during his trial, nor was it assessed

prior to the onset of his trial”; (3) appellant was likely misdiagnosed at Connecting Point

and was not “referred for a medication consultation to address his depression or impulse

control disorders”; (4) the “lack of clinical or academic interventions” was not presented;

(5) Dr. Connell’s testimony was not rebutted; (6) the issue of choice was addressed in a

misleading fashion and appellant’s lack of choice “was not explored in terms of being

exposed to numerous risk factors, and his lack of protective factors,” which were not his

choice; (7) Berry’s testimony was misleading in that it painted a picture of familial

support and normative behaviors, as well as non-problematic home and school

experiences; and (8) it would have been more beneficial to conduct a developmental

assessment of appellant to explain “how the presence of risk factors, and the lack of

protective factors, can cause significant deviations from normal child and adolescent

development.”

                                       Dr. Giordano

       {¶ 45} Dr. Giordano is a criminologist specializing in risk factors associated with

juvenile delinquency, adult crime, and violent behavior. She discussed the various risk

factors which impacted appellant, including: maternal drug use; maternal criminality and

incarceration; numerous residential moves; housing instability; family dysfunction




26.
(including drug use, crime, violence, abuse, antisocial behavior) throughout the extended

family; neighborhood and school environment; witnessing domestic violence; suffering

neglect; his lack of a relationship with his father; and his position as oldest child. She

also noted appellant’s lack of a significant criminal history should be considered in

mitigation.

                                      Other Evidence

       {¶ 46} In addition to the foregoing, appellant provided the trial court with the

following: LCDJFS records, which appellant argues are relevant to demonstrate Kim’s

financial hardships while raising him, to confirm their frequent residential moves, and to

highlight Kim’s self-destructive behavior; LCCS records which included evidence

regarding Kim’s drug use and that appellant was neglected throughout his childhood; an

academic article entitled The Adolescent Brain, that appellant cites in support of his

argument that his trial counsel did not effectively present youth as a mitigating factor; a

1991 Los Angeles Times article and a San Diego Reader article about Gompers High

School, both of which appear relevant to the issue of the atmosphere of the schools

attended by appellant in San Diego; a Toledo Blade article which appellant cites for

references to his demeanor at trial; a list of persons incarcerated in Lucas County for

aggravated murder involving an aggravated robbery; and a death penalty clemency report

for John Eley.




27.
                            Trial Court’s Decision and Appeal

       {¶ 47} The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment and denied

appellant’s postconviction petition without a hearing. The opinion did not address

appellant’s motion requesting discovery or his motions requesting funding for experts.

       {¶ 48} Appellant appealed this decision on July 29, 2020. He then requested we

stay the decision pending a decision from the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Blanton,

Supreme Court case No. 2021-0172. We granted this request. On November 10, 2022,

the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Blanton, Slip Opinion No. 

 and

the parties supplemented their briefs to discuss Blanton.

                                   Assignments of Error

       [1.] The trial court erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata to bar

       [appellant]’s [claims] for relief.

       [2.] The trial court abused its discretion and denied [appellant] due process,

       when it summarily dismissed [appellant]’s claims that his trial counsel

       rendered [a] constitutionally deficient performance during the mitigation

       phase of his capital trial, and in failing to grant relief on the meritorious

       ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

       [3.] The trial court erred by denying [appellant]’s postconviction petition

       without allowing him to conduct discovery.

       [4.] The trial court erred in denying [appellant]’s motions for appropriation

       of funding for mental health experts.




28.
       [5.] The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing [appellant]’s

       postconviction petition when he presented sufficient operative facts to merit

       relief, or, at minimum, an evidentiary hearing.

       [6.] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied [appellant]’s

       nineteenth [claim] for relief.4

       [7.] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied [appellant] factual

       development and relief on the twenty-second and twenty-fifth claims for

       relief.5

                                         Applicable Law

                                           Generally

       {¶ 49} Postconviction relief is governed by R.C. 2953.21 and “is not an

appeal of a criminal conviction but, rather, is a collateral, civil attack on the

judgment.” State v. Calhoun, 

, 

 (1999).

       {¶ 50} “Initial petitions for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 may

be resolved in one of three ways. The trial court may (1) summarily dismiss the

petition without holding an evidentiary hearing …, (2) grant summary judgment

on the petition to either party who moved for summary judgment …, or (3) hold




4
  Appellant’s nineteenth claim for relief alleged that his death sentence was
disproportionate to similarly situated defendants in Lucas County.
5
  These claims for relief alleged that the cumulative effects of the trial court’s errors
deprived him of a right to a fair trial.


29.
an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised by the petition ….” State v. Harris,

12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-07-121, 

.

          Bases for Denying Postconviction Relief Without a Hearing

                          No Substantive Grounds for Relief

       {¶ 51} A trial court properly denies a postconviction relief petition without

a hearing if the supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, the files, and the

records of the case do not demonstrate that the petitioner set forth sufficient

operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. A criminal defendant

challenging his or her conviction through a petition for postconviction relief is not

automatically entitled to a hearing. 

. Before granting a hearing on

a petition, a trial court “must evaluate the petition in the context of the entire

record in the case to determine whether the petition alleges ‘substantive grounds

for relief.’” Blanton, Slip Opinion No. 

, quoting R.C.

2953.21(D). “A petition presents substantive grounds for relief when it contains

allegations that are sufficient to state a constitutional claim and the files and

records of the case do not affirmatively disprove the claim.” 

 citing State v.

Milanovich, 

, 

 (1975); R.C. 2953.21(F).

                                     Res Judicata

       {¶ 52} Another basis for denying a postconviction petition without a

hearing is that the claims are barred by res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata

bars someone from raising a claim that could have been raised and litigated in a




30.
prior proceeding. … So a court reviewing a postconviction-relief petition

generally may not decide a claim that could have been presented at trial and raised

on direct appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Blanton at ¶ 2, quoting State v. Perry, 

, 

 (1967).

       {¶ 53} However, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Blanton,

postconviction petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel “pose unique

challenges.” Id. at ¶ 29. In these cases, res judicata does not bar claims for

postconviction relief, inter alia, when a petitioner “must rely on evidence outside

the trial record to establish his claim for relief.” Id. at ¶ 2, citing State v. Cole, 

, 

 (1982). Under this rule, the

introduction of evidence dehors the record in a petition for postconviction relief

under R.C. 2953.21 is generally sufficient enough to avoid dismissal on the basis

of res judicata. Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 54} Yet, overcoming the res judicata bar is not sufficient enough to

entitle a petitioner to a hearing. Id. at ¶ 31. To be entitled to a hearing, a party

“must proffer evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that his trial

counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney’s essential

duties to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to the [petitioner].”

Id. at ¶ 31, quoting 

.

       {¶ 55} Pursuant to Blanton, to determine whether appellant is entitled to a

hearing, we must conduct a two-prong inquiry. In the first prong, we must




31.
determine whether appellant “introduced competent evidence of ineffective

assistance that was not included in the trial record?” Id. at ¶ 33. If so, the second

prong is whether “that evidence present[s] substantive grounds for relief; that is, if

believed, would the newly presented evidence—together with any evidence in the

trial record—establish that counsel was ineffective?” Id. The Ohio Supreme

Court observed that courts often conflate these two inquiries and that “[t]he better

practice is to treat these two inquiries as analytically distinct.” Id. at ¶ 34.

                                     Standard of Review

       {¶ 56} Generally, we review the denial of an application for postconviction

relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gondor, 

, 2006-Ohio-

6679, 

. To find an abuse of discretion, we must conclude the

trial court’s judgment is “so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason

that ‘it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of

judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or

bias.’” State v. Weaver, Slip Opinion No. 

, quoting State v.

Jenkins, 

, 

 (1984). However, an exception

to this general rule applies when the trial court summarily denies a petition on

purely legal grounds, such as res judicata. State v. Boaston, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-

17-1278, 

, ¶ 44. In such cases, our review is de novo. Id.




32.
                                 First Assignment of Error

       {¶ 57} Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in denying the tenth, eleventh

and nineteenth claims for relief on the basis of res judicata.6

                                  Tenth Claim for Relief

       {¶ 58} Appellant alleged in his tenth claim for relief that his trial attorneys failed

to adequately investigate his history and direct Dr. Stinson, who testified at trial. In

support, appellant cites to Dr. Minagawa’s affidavit.

       {¶ 59} The trial court found appellant’s tenth claim for relief barred by res

judicata. Reviewing the claim de novo, under the first prong in Blanton, we find that the

application of res judicata to this claim was error as appellant relies on competent

evidence outside of the record. However, this finding does not necessarily require

reversal, as under the second prong, we must also determine whether this evidence, if

believed, sets forth substantive evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. We discuss

the substantive merits of appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in

appellant’s second assignment of error. We will analyze the substantive merits of

appellant’s tenth claim for relief then.7


6
 Appellant argued that the trial court effectively denied nearly all of his claims through
res judicata when it found, in considering other claims for relief, that evidence was
cumulative to, or alterative to evidence presented at trial. We disagree. This finding is
also relevant to whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, we limit our
analysis to those claims in which the trial court specifically applied res judicata.
7
 Appellant argues that we should remand this issue to the trial court to first address this
issue in light of Blanton. He cites to State v. Rickard, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD-19-030,
WD-19-031, 

, where after reversing a trial court’s decision that a


33.
                                Eleventh Claim for Relief

       {¶ 60} In his eleventh claim for relief, appellant argued that trial counsel did not

adequately present his youth as a mitigating factor. He maintained that the defense failed

to argue that the court should “consider the individual characteristics of [appellant’s]

maturity, understanding, and mental capabilities in assessing the weight to assign to his

youth” and did not “properly cite to specific instances in [appellant’s] background and

history that would have favored the assignment of more weight.”

       {¶ 61} In support, appellant relied on an academic article, Casey, Jones, and Hare,

The Adolescent Brain, 1124 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 111 (March 2008), which he argued

shows that “careful discrimination between young offenders of the same age is vital

because adolescence is a period of ‘changes in physical, psychological, and social

development’ and these changes are extremely individualized, dependent upon one’s own

exposure to harms such as injury, depression, anxiety, drug use and addictions.”




postconviction petition was untimely we found that we could not consider the merits of
the petition because “[d]ue to our role as a reviewing court, we cannot make a
determination regarding the merits of an argument in the first instance.” Id. at ¶ 16,
quoting Cohen v. Dulay, 

, 

 (9th Dist.). We note that
the trial court did make a determination regarding the merits of this claim. Specifically,
the trial court stated that “[a] different conclusion by a new expert which is based on
essentially the same evidence presented at trial is insufficient to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel.” The court then went on to state that “the basic information on
which [Dr.] Minagawa relies … was presented to the court. Dr. Stinson testified about
[appellant’s] symptoms being consistent with [ADHD] as well as a possible diagnosis of
bipolar disorder.” The court ultimately concluded that the claim was barred by res
judicata and “does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” Therefore, we can
consider the merits of the claim.


34.
       {¶ 62} We agree with the trial court that this claim was barred by res judicata,

although not for the reasons relied upon by the trial court. The trial court, in part, found

that appellant’s eleventh claim for relief was barred by res judicata because this article

was available at the time of trial and the evidence did not demonstrate that appellant

could not assert this claim through his new counsel on direct appeal. In Blanton, the

court stated that, in the context of ineffective-assistance claims raised in a postconviction

petition, “[t]here is no requirement that to overcome a res judicata bar, the evidence on

which such a claim is based must have been unknown or unavailable to the defense at

trial.” Blanton, Slip Opinion No. 

.

       {¶ 63} Although the fact that the article existed at the time of trial is not a basis for

finding res judicata, we find that appellant has not presented competent evidence, and

thus, res judicata applies. Youth was presented as a mitigation factor at trial. As the trial

court pointed out, “the Ohio Supreme Court accorded ‘some’ weight to [appellant’s]

youth during its independent weighing of the evidence.” Although appellant attempted to

avoid res judicata by attaching an academic article, this is not competent evidence.

Outside materials submitted in support of a postconviction relief petition must adhere to

the rules of evidence; unreliable documents are not sufficient. State v. Harris, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 89156, 

.

       {¶ 64} In Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 

, 

,

, the court stated that “[b]ecause works of professional literature

contain statements that if introduced as evidence would fall within the definition of




35.
hearsay, and because the Ohio Rules of Evidence … do not contain a learned-treatise

exception to the hearsay rule, … such works ‘are inadmissible as independent evidence

of the theories and opinions therein expressed.’” While Ohio now has a learned-treatise

exception in Evid.R. 803(18), this rule only provides an exception to the hearsay rule

when the learned treatise is “called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-

examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination.” As provided in

the comments to Evid.R. 803, “statements in learned treatises come to the trier of fact

only through the testimony of qualified experts who are on the stand to explain and apply

the material in the treatise.” Here, the article at issue is not relied upon by any expert.

Therefore, we find it is hearsay and we do not find the article to be competent evidence

sufficient to overcome res judicata.

       {¶ 65} Since appellant has not presented competent evidence outside of the record,

and as his youth was raised at trial, we find the trial court did not err in finding the

eleventh claim for relief to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

                               Nineteenth Ground for Relief

       {¶ 66} The trial court additionally found appellant’s nineteenth claim for relief

was barred by res judicata. In this claim, appellant argued his death sentence was

disproportionate to other similarly situated capital defendants in Lucas County. In

support, he provided the court with his Exhibit V, entitled “Current Lucas County

Incarcerations for Aggravated Murder involving an Aggravated Robbery.” The trial

court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court already concluded that the imposition of the




36.
death penalty in this case was proportionate to other similar cases in its review of

appellant’s direct appeal. See Belton, 

, 

, 

. The trial court dismissed this ground both on the merits and as barred by

the doctrine of res judicata.

       {¶ 67} This claim is not based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus, the

general rule barring claims in postconviction relief petitions that were or could have been

raised on appeal applies. This claim was raised on direct appeal and thus, the trial court

did not err in finding it barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

       {¶ 68} For these reasons, we find appellant’s first assignment of error well-taken

with respect to his tenth claim for relief, and not well-taken with respect to the eleventh

and nineteenth claims for relief.

                         Second and Fifth Assignments of Error

       {¶ 69} As they are related, we will consider appellant’s second and fifth

assignments of error together.

                                         Arguments

       {¶ 70} In his second assignment, appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion, and denied him due process, by summarily dismissing his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. In his appellate brief, he argues that his trial counsel were

deficient during the mitigation phase, both by failing to “investigate, prepare, and present

relevant expert testimony on important mitigation issues concerning his mental health,”

and by failing “to fully and effectively present, or to present at all, the testimony of




37.
numerous family members, friends, and teachers, who were all available and could have

provided important mitigation evidence.”8 He contends that, “at the very least, there are

genuine issues of material fact, which preclude judgment for the state, and [appellant] is

entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing.”

       {¶ 71} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court abused

its discretion when it failed to grant relief, or, at minimum, an evidentiary hearing despite

the fact that he presented sufficient evidence to support a claim of constitutional error.

             Applicable Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 72} “To establish ineffective assistance, appellant must (1) show that counsel’s

performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ as determined by

‘prevailing professional norms’ and (2) demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”

State v. Wilks, 

, 

, 

, quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 

, 

, 

(1984).

                               Whether Hearing is Required

       {¶ 73} The above standard applies when we determine the merits of a

postconviction petition. However, when the issue is whether to grant a hearing on a



8
  We note that rather than individually discussing his claims for relief in which he alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel (including the tenth claim), appellant now argues these
claims for relief collectively. We will do the same. We also observe he has not raised
any argument regarding his eighteenth claim for relief.


38.
postconviction petition, rather than as to the merits of the postconviction petition, the

Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Bunch, Slip Opinion No. 

, has stated that

the postconviction petition does not need to definitively establish that trial counsel was

deficient, or that appellant was prejudiced. Id. at ¶ 27. “Instead, the petition must be

sufficient on its face to raise an issue whether [appellant] was deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel, and [appellant]’s claim depends on factual allegations that cannot

be determined by examining the record from his trial.” Id.

       {¶ 74} Appellant has argued that the court erred in not providing a hearing, in

addition to arguing the merits of his claims. To be entitled to a hearing, he must raise in

his petition a triable issue of fact, supported by evidence outside the record, that his trial

counsel were deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. See id. at ¶ 37.

       {¶ 75} The United States Supreme Court has also counseled that “[a] court need

not first determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that

course should be followed.” 

. See also State v. Madrigal, 

, 

 (2000) (“A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the

Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.”).

       {¶ 76} Because we believe appellant’s petition is not sufficient on its face to raise

an issue as to whether he was prejudiced by the alleged trial counsel deficiencies, it is not

necessary to consider the first prong of the Strickland test in determining whether trial




39.
counsel’s performance was deficient. We will begin our analysis with the second prong,

whether the petition raises an issue that he has been prejudiced by the alleged errors.

                                   Presumed Prejudice

       {¶ 77} Appellant first suggests that prejudice should be presumed, citing United

States v. Cronic, 

, 

, 

 (1984). In Cronic, the

United States Supreme Court found that there are circumstances so likely to prejudice the

accused that prejudice should be presumed. 

 at 658 - 659. One such circumstance is

“if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial

testing.” 

. The United States Supreme Court later emphasized that this failure

must be complete. Bell v. Cone, 

, 

, 

(2002).

       {¶ 78} Appellant contends that “[t]he level of the deficient performance by [his]

trial counsel in the mitigation phase was to such a degree that counsel was effectively

absent during mitigation, thereby entitling [appellant] to presumed prejudice under

Cronic.” We disagree. Appellant’s counsel hired Rooks to conduct an investigation

(which included interviewing appellant and multiple family members and obtaining

school, employment, and medical records) and Dr. Stinson to complete a mitigation

evaluation. And, as stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, appellant’s trial counsel

“presented significant mitigating evidence that has substantial weight.” Belton, 

, 

, 

. We do not find this presumption

applies here. Therefore, appellant must establish prejudice.




40.
                                     Test for Prejudice

       {¶ 79} To establish prejudice, a “defendant must prove that there is a ‘reasonable

probability’ that counsel’s deficiency affected the outcome of the defendant’s

proceedings.” Bunch, Slip Opinion No. 

, quoting Strickland,

. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” 

 As the issue here is whether appellant was appropriately

sentenced to death, “the question of prejudice turns on ‘whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer-including an appellate court, to the extent

it independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded that the balance of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’” Hill v. Mitchell, 

 (6th Cir.2005), citing 

. Because a hearing was not had

below, the question before us is whether appellant’s petition was sufficient on its face to

raise the issue as to prejudice. See Bunch at ¶ 27.

       {¶ 80} To establish prejudice “the new evidence … must differ in a substantial

way—in strength and subject matter—from the evidence actually presented at

sentencing.” State v. Herring, 

, 

, 

, quoting 

. New evidence in mitigation that is “merely cumulative” of

evidence already presented is not sufficient to establish prejudice. 

.




41.
                        Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

       {¶ 81} On appeal, appellant claims his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to

(1) adequately investigate, prepare, and present expert testimony, and (2) fully and

effectively present, or to present at all, the testimony of lay witnesses.

       {¶ 82} The trial court concluded, inter alia, that the evidence in support of

appellant’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, was cumulative and did not differ

in strength and subject matter from the evidence presented at trial.9 We agree.

       {¶ 83} As discussed in detail above, appellant’s counsel presented a

comprehensive range of evidence outlining several mitigating factors including his

history and background, his youth, his lack of significant criminal history, his mental-

health problems, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and his adaptability to prison.

       {¶ 84} For the reasons we will discuss below, we do not find that appellant’s new

evidence differs in a substantial way from the evidence presented at mitigation.

Additionally, we do not find significant strength in the evidence as to raise an issue as to

whether a trier of fact would have reached a different outcome.

       Failure to Investigate, Prepare, and Present Relevant Expert Testimony

       {¶ 85} Appellant argues that his expert affidavits offer evidence substantially

different in strength and subject matter from that presented to the three-judge panel and



9
  Appellant has argued that the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law were
insufficient in that they did not specifically state the reasons for the dismissal of certain
claims. We find the trial court’s opinion sufficient to provide us a meaningful basis for
review.


42.
establish that trial counsel failed to investigate, prepare, and present expert testimony.

We disagree.

                                   Dr. Stinson’s Affidavit

       {¶ 86} Appellant argues that Dr. Stinson’s affidavit goes far beyond his trial

testimony and establishes that had he been aware of the evidence presented to him in

postconviction and been called back as a rebuttal witness, he would have been able to

“refute Dr. Connell’s inaccurate testimony.”

       {¶ 87} When reviewing Dr. Stinson’s list of proposed corrections and

clarifications to Dr. Connell’s testimony, we find many merely provide additional

explanation and further support to his trial testimony, and that in some cases, Dr. Stinson

was asked questions in cross-examination on the potential issue. For example, he now

wants to testify that whispering is a characteristic of a genuine hallucination and that

appellant’s report of hallucinations is consistent with bona fide hallucinations, but on

cross-examination, he was asked whether “auditory hallucinations are usually clear and

not vague or inaudible.” With others, there was evidence in the record on the topic he

wished to explain. For example, Dr. Stinson declared that he would have explained why

“the function of Anthony’s parents was poor” and that Dr. Connell’s claim that there was

“stability in the family” was incorrect. With yet others, the intended rebuttal testimony

was handled on cross-examination. For example, Dr. Stinson indicated he wanted to

produce copies of email correspondence with Dr. Connell, but on cross-examination, Dr.

Connell admitted to these exchanges. Further, Dr. Connell admitted on cross that Dr.




43.
Stinson’s opinions were based on different sources of information, and Dr. Stinson had

access to more information than Dr. Connell. Through this line of questioning, trial

counsel established that Dr. Connell’s opinions were limited, as they were based only on

a review of the records, not on any personal interviews, or tests conducted by Dr.

Connell, and that, the professional standards “frown upon” making a diagnosis without a

personal examination.

       {¶ 88} Counsel also questioned Dr. Connell regarding the (supposed) absence of

LCCS reports, his statements concerning the correlation between an impoverished family

and violent crime, PTSD, his statements regarding Dr. Stinson’s use of the Woodcock-

Johnson test, his statements regarding whether appellant had an alcohol abuse problem,

and whether he was aware that Kim was the source of Dr. Stinson’s knowledge that she

used marijuana during her pregnancy with appellant.

       {¶ 89} There was also a line of questioning regarding whether psychologists

would ask different questions than a nonpsychologist, and whether the MMPI-1 is a self-

reporting test. Additionally, on cross-examination, Dr. Connell was questioned regarding

other explanations for appellant requesting Flexeril in jail, rather than drug-seeking. Dr.

Stinson himself was also asked about appellant being prescribed Flexeril and whether

appellant “engaged in manipulation to obtain drugs” while in jail, to which he responded

he didn’t think he did. For these reasons, we do not find that recalling Dr. Stinson in




44.
rebuttal would have added anything new in strength or subject matter from evidence

already before the trial court.10

       {¶ 90} Dr. Stinson also alleged that the additional records provided by Phillips

“would have been important in furthering [his] evaluation and testimony during the

mitigation phase” of trial because the records “revealed a more extensive family criminal

history than [he] was aware of; more residential transitions than [he] knew about;

additional abuses about which [he] did not know; and the identities of other family

members, friends, and an ex-girlfriend who would have been willing to talk to [him]

and/or members of [appellant’s] defense team.” This information is cumulative to

testimony at trial. He then specifically stated that the additional records reveal more

information about Anthony Sr. and his relationship to appellant and give a more complete

understanding of the “pervasiveness and seriousness of the family criminal history”;

however, at trial there was much information presented regarding both of these issues.

       {¶ 91} Dr. Stinson pointed to his testimony on cross-examination where he was

asked about appellant’s prescription for Depakote, and he did not have certain details. He

contended that he should have known specifics regarding the prescription, “[e]specially

since Depakote is a medication used to treat Bipolar Disorder.” Testimony regarding


10
   As we have found it unnecessary to determine whether appellant’s counsels’
performance was deficient, we do not render an opinion on whether counsels’ decision
not to recall Dr. Stinson is reasonable. However, we note that there is evidence in the
record supporting the trial court’s conclusion that the failure to recall Dr. Stinson was
trial strategy. Dr. Stinson was in the courtroom for Dr. Connell’s testimony and
appellant’s attorney specifically asked the judge if Dr. Stinson would be able to stay in
the courtroom “should [they] want to call him in rebuttal.” Transcript, p. 747.


45.
both the Depakote and bipolar disorder are in the record. We do not find any basis for

finding this information would have added any weight to the mitigation evidence.

       {¶ 92} Dr. Stinson also wished he had “more strongly recommended that a

neurological or neuropsychological evaluation” be completed because there are “a

number of indications of neurological or neuropsychological impairment in appellant.”

He did not detail these indicators in his affidavit, however, these indicators were

discussed at trial, where Dr. Stinson stated that “there are a number of risk factors and a

number of behavioral indicators that [appellant] is experiencing neurological or

neuropsychological impairment” and then he listed numerous indicators. Moreover, in its

independent weighing of the evidence, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted that appellant

had dysthymia, noted that Dr. Stinson diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, and drug and

alcohol dependence, and, observed that although Dr. Connell disagreed with the bipolar

diagnosis, Dr. Connell opined that appellant suffered from antisocial-personality disorder.

The Ohio Supreme Court then gave appellant’s mental-health problems “some weight.”

       {¶ 93} Dr. Stinson also claimed if he been aware of the LCCS records, he would

have testified to the facts found in those records and explained how those “factors lead to

disturbances in emotional development, conduct problems, and later negative outcomes,

including drug and alcohol abuse, psychological problems, and violence.”

       {¶ 94} We observe that information in the LCCS records, as well as Dr. Stinson’s

proposed testimony, is not sufficiently different, in either strength or subject matter, to

Dr. Stinson’s testimony at trial.




46.
                                Dr. Minagawa’s Affidavit

       {¶ 95} Dr. Minagawa identified certain issues and concerns he had with

appellant’s mitigation defense. He concluded that witnesses were not called to testify

regarding appellant’s “childhood and adolescent history of exposure to acts of domestic

violence, traumatic experiences and losses.” We find these topics were addressed in

mitigation; thus, any additional evidence would merely be cumulative to evidence already

presented.

       {¶ 96} The doctor also alleged that “problems with impulse control and

hyperactivity were not fully explored.” He noted evidence of ADHD was observed by

family members, friends, and a teacher, but was not presented during trial, or assessed

prior to trial. He stated undiagnosed and untreated ADHD can have a devastating impact.

That “[c]hildren with this condition are at risk to develop substance abuse problems,

gravitate to a negative peer group, and fail in school” and that 60% will continue to have

problems with impulse control, attention, and hyperactivity into adulthood.

       {¶ 97} Although ADHD was not assessed prior to trial, at trial, Dr. Stinson

testified that the Connecting Point records contain evidence of symptoms that would be

consistent with ADHD. Moreover, appellant’s other mental health issues were discussed

and given “some weight” by Ohio Supreme Court. Further, there was testimony in the

record that appellant exhibited many of the possible negative consequences discussed by

Dr. Minagawa and that other factors in appellant’s life, not within his control, could lead

to the same negative consequences.




47.
       {¶ 98} Dr. Minagawa took issue with the testimony of Linda Berry, who he

claimed “painted a picture of familial and support and normative behaviors” and “implied

that appellant’s home and school experiences were nonproblematic.” Yet, we find

extensive evidence in the record countering those suggested implications. He also

referred to a statement by Berry that appellant failed to keep an appointment with a

doctor at Connecting Point when he was to be assessed for medication, which he argued

indicates appellant “rejected” opportunities for help. The doctor then referenced a

Connecting Point assessment performed on appellant which indicated he was not referred

for a physician or psychiatrist appointment. We note the Connecting Point records,

including the document referred to by Dr. Minagawa to show the absence of a referral,

were before the trial court.

       {¶ 99} Dr. Minagawa further alleged that trial counsel erred in not recalling Dr.

Stinson to clarify misleading statements made by Dr. Connell regarding bipolar disorder.

As discussed above, we do not find recalling Dr. Stinson would have added any evidence

significantly different from that presented at trial in support of mitigation.

       {¶ 100} Dr. Minagawa also suggested the trial court should have retained a

psychiatrist to confirm the diagnosis of bipolar disorder and identify the clinical

interventions indicated. Dr. Stinson diagnosed appellant with bipolar disorder and

explained the disorder to the court at trial. We find the additional suggested testimony

would not differ in strength and subject matter from Dr. Stinson’s testimony.




48.
       {¶ 101} Dr. Minagawa also objected to the manner in which Dr. Stinson addressed

the issue of choice, by saying appellant always had a choice. He stated the negative

experiences inflicted upon appellant were not his choice and these experiences impaired

his ability to make choices. He cites to a risk and protective factors model published by

the Surgeon General for the proposition that the presence of certain risk factors

(including parent criminality, violent neighborhoods, psychological conditions, child

maltreatment) have a “devastating impact” on normal development and increase the

likelihood that a child or adolescent will engage in violent behaviors. He believes there

should have been a greater emphasis on the potential damage to appellant’s normal

development. We do not find Dr. Stinson’s trial testimony regarding appellant’s choice

differs significantly from that proposed by Dr. Minagawa. As discussed by the Ohio

Supreme Court, Dr. Stinson “analyzed Belton’s life through the lens of a [DOJ] model

that identifies various risk factors that make a person more likely to engage in criminal

behavior, as well as various protective factors that reduce the risk of such behavior.”

Belton, 

, 

, 

. While he

conceded that appellant made a choice when he committed the crimes, Dr. Stinson’s

testimony explained that appellant’s negative experiences shaped those choices and he

“opined that [appellant’s] background may reduce his moral culpability for his crimes.”

Id. at ¶ 179.

       {¶ 102} Dr. Minagawa also argues that appellant’s “course of development was

further derailed by the presence and influence of numerous family members with criminal




49.
histories.” There was evidence at trial presented regarding serious crimes committed by

appellant’s extended family and Dr. Stinson testified regarding “the family history of

criminal behavior and substance abuse.” Transcript, p. 824.

       {¶ 103} Therefore, we do not find that Dr. Minawaga’s affidavit has raised any

issues different in strength or subject matter from that presented at trial so as to create a

substantial issue that could affect the outcome of the trial.

                                        Dr. Giordano

       {¶ 104} Dr. Giordano discussed the various risk factors which impacted appellant,

including maternal drug use, maternal criminality and incarceration, numerous residential

moves, housing instability, family dysfunction (such as drug use, crime, violence, abuse,

antisocial behavior) throughout his extended family, neighborhood and school

environment, witnessing domestic violence, suffering neglect, his lack of a relationship

with his father and his position as oldest child. She also pointed out that appellant’s lack

of a significant prior criminal history should be considered in mitigation.

       {¶ 105} Appellant relied on this affidavit to argue that trial counsel were

ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a forensic sociologist.

       {¶ 106} However, we find Dr. Giordano’s report does not include anything

significant that was not presented to the trial court, and is a variation of Dr. Stinson’s trial

testimony.




50.
      Failure to Investigate, Prepare, and Present the Testimony of Lay Witnesses

        {¶ 107} Appellant also argues trial counsel failed to “investigate, prepare, and

present the testimony of mitigation witnesses who were available and would have

testified at trial concerning facts and circumstances of [appellant]’s background, family

history, upbringing, mental health, and/or education.” Upon review, we do not find the

lay witness affidavits presented in support of appellant’s postconviction petition offer

evidence substantially different in strength and subject matter from that presented in the

mitigation hearing. Although these affidavits go into more depth on certain subjects and

provide new accounts, these exhibits do not discuss any new subject matter or avenue of

mitigation. 11

        {¶ 108} Appellant has argued these witnesses “all had important pieces to add to *

… [the] mitigation case,” and that some “addressed the family dysfunction and criminal

history, some addressed [appellant’s] educational challenges, some addressed his mental

illnesses, some addressed the trauma he sustained by the family breakup, some addressed

the failures of his parents, some addressed his youth and susceptibility to peer pressure,

[and] some addressed his demeanor at trial.” With the exception of his demeanor at trial,

there was evidence presented at trial on these issues.




11
    We additionally note that some of the testimony presented in the lay affidavits is
hearsay which cannot be considered in mitigation. See State v. Grate, 

,

, 

 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay
rules, still apply to mitigation-phase hearings.”).



51.
       {¶ 109} Appellant also relies upon this evidence to differentiate himself from his

brothers and explain what “led them down a different path than [him].” However, there

was evidence presented at trial regarding how appellant’s life differed from his brothers,

and Dr. Stinson testified regarding the differences, and why it is inappropriate to compare

one sibling to the other.

       {¶ 110} With respect to appellant’s demeanor at trial, there is no evidence that this

affected the court’s judgment, and it certainly did not affect the Ohio Supreme Court,

who did not witness it, and who, upon independently weighing the evidence, found the

aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Appellant also relies upon

these factual affidavits to present evidence that he exhibited symptoms of ADHD. For

the reasons discussed above, we do not find this evidence was sufficiently different from

evidence presented at trial.

       {¶ 111} We also note that, in his affidavit, appellant takes issue with the fact he

was not put on the stand to give an unsworn statement. He states that had he been put on

the stand he would have expressed remorse, and he would have provided additional

information about his father. With respect to remorse, there was evidence of remorse in

the record. As the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged, Dr. Stinson and Linda Berry both

testified that he had expressed remorse to them. Belton, 

, 2016-Ohio-

1581, 

. Additionally, there was much evidence presented

regarding his relationship with his father.




52.
                Conclusion regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 112} As appellant’s petition was denied without a hearing, we must determine

if the petition is sufficient on its face to raise an issue as to whether he was denied

effective assistance of counsel. See Bunch, Slip Opinion No. 

.

We have considered the entirety of the trial court record as well as the new evidence filed

by appellant in support of his postconviction petition. 12 For the reasons discussed above,

we do not believe that appellant’s petition is sufficient on its face to raise the issue that he

was prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies.

                     Constitutionality of Postconviction Procedures

       {¶ 113} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant asserts his “convictions and

death sentence are void or voidable because Ohio’s postconviction procedures do not

provide an adequate corrective process, in violation of the [U.S. and Ohio]

constitution[s].” He submits, inter alia, the application of res judicata and the failure to

hold evidentiary hearings and provide discovery resulted in a denial of any meaningful

review.

       {¶ 114} We have previously rejected the argument that “R.C. 2953.21 fails to

afford [an appellant] an adequate collateral attack on his conviction and, therefore,

violates his constitutional rights under the United States Constitution and the Constitution

of the State of Ohio,” and found Ohio’s postconviction procedures constitutional. State v.



12
     For purposes of appellant’s petition, we have assumed the new evidence to be
truthful.


53.
Zich, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1263, 

, ¶ 29. Also see State v. Maxwell,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107758, 

. We agree that Ohio’s

postconviction procedures are constitutional and further find that the trial court did not

err in denying appellant’s application without a hearing.

         {¶ 115} Thus, we find appellant’s second and fifth assignments of error not well-

taken.

                                 Third Assignment of Error

         {¶ 116} Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for

postconviction relief without permitting him to first conduct discovery. He requested

leave to conduct depositions of: his trial counsel; each judge who served on his three-

judge panel; Dr. Connell; and all employees of the Lucas County prosecutor’s office who

worked on his case and “all members of the panel that determine whether a case should

be indicted with death specifications.”

         {¶ 117} He also sought all files and documents in the possession of the

prosecutor’s office and the Toledo Police Department or Lucas County Sheriff’s Office

relating to his prosecution as well as subpoenas duces tecum for any of Dr. Connell’s

files regarding his testimony in appellant’s case and “any and all materials, protocols,

training manuals, or guidelines, maintained in any form, that sets out the policy for Lucas

County Prosecutors in seeking the [d]eath [p]enalty.”

         {¶ 118} Appellant also requested leave to conduct discovery in his postconviction

petition.




54.
       {¶ 119} Appellant maintains that discovery was required by both the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

       {¶ 120} A review of the record shows the trial court did not specifically address

appellant’s motion for discovery. Therefore, the motion is considered denied. Treasurer

of Lucas County v. Sheehan, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1176, 

.

                                            Law

       {¶ 121} Prior to April 6, 2017, a postconviction petitioner was not entitled to

discovery. It was held that postconviction review is not a constitutional right, but rather a

collateral civil attack on a judgment governed by the postconviction relief statutes. State

v. Jordan, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1130, 

, ¶ 29. A petitioner only had

those rights granted by the statute, which did not include discovery. 

 While a court

could allow discovery, “the decision to grant or deny a request for discovery rest[ed] with

a trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Broom, 

, 

, 

. As the statute applied equally to all petitioners, we previously found

the absence of the ability to conduct discovery did not result in a denial of either due

process or equal protection. Jordan at ¶ 30. At least one court has also declined to

recognize a postconviction right to discovery under the Eighth Amendment. State v.

Conway, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-504, 

.

       {¶ 122} We note that, effective April 6, 2017, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(d) permits

discovery in death penalty cases when good cause is shown. Appellant has not argued

that he is entitled to discovery under this provision, however, by its terms it applies “in




55.
conjunction with the filing of a petition for postconviction relief under [R.C. 2953.21(A)]

by a person who has been sentenced to death, or with the litigation of a petition so filed.”

(Emphasis added.) Regardless, we find that appellant has not shown good cause for his

discovery requests and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s

requests for discovery. We further observe that appellant’s petition for postconviction

relief was supported by 26 exhibits comprised of over 900 pages of evidence. Hence, it

does not appear that appellant’s petition was hindered by a lack of discovery. See e.g.,

Maxwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107758, 

; State v. Sowell, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No.108018, 

.

       {¶ 123} We therefore find appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.

                               Fourth Assignment of Error

       {¶ 124} Appellant filed two motions seeking funds for experts. One motion

requests a neuropsychologist to perform testing to determine if appellant had ADHD, and

the second requests an expert in forensic psychiatry to evaluate appellant “for issues

regarding his Bipolar Disorder.” As with the motion for discovery, these motions were

not specifically addressed by the trial court and therefore are considered denied.

Treasurer of Lucas County at ¶ 12.

       {¶ 125} Appellant first asserts that the trial court did not comply with its

obligations under Crim.R. 42(E), which requires that all decisions pertaining to the

appointment of experts be made on the record, and that the trial court “make written

findings as to the basis of any denial.” While we agree that the trial court did not make




56.
written findings explaining the basis of its denial of these motions, we find appellant has

not demonstrated he was prejudiced as the record before us is sufficient for us to fully

consider whether the court erred in denying appellant’s motions. See State v. McDonald,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1181, 

, ¶ 20.

       {¶ 126} Next, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying these

motions. “Under Crim.R. 42(E), the trial court has the discretion to appoint experts for

indigent defendants in postconviction reviews of capital cases.” State v. Powell, 2019-

Ohio-4286, 

, ¶ 48 (6th Dist.). We review a trial court’s order denying a

request to appoint experts for indigent defendants in postconviction reviews of capital

cases for abuse of discretion. 

       {¶ 127} Here, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant had

access to experts in support of his petition for postconviction relief. Therefore, it is not

clear that he was prejudiced by any failure to get funding for additional experts.

Moreover, appellant’s bipolar disorder and possible ADHD were discussed at trial.

Therefore, we cannot conclude that any additional funding would have resulted in any

new evidence different in strength or subject matter from that already presented in

mitigation. See Sowell at ¶ 123 (“Given the cumulative nature of the requested testing,

we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant

Sowell’s request for additional funding.”).

       {¶ 128} We also note that appellant cites to Appt.Coun.R. 5.10(A), which states

that “a court shall provide attorneys appointed as counsel for indigent defendants in




57.
capital cases … with … mental health professional[s] … reasonably necessary or

appropriate for the attorneys to prepare for and present an adequate defense at every stage

of the proceedings[, including] … disposition following conviction, and preparation for

and presentation of mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial.” To the

extent this applies, as we discussed above, we do not find the requested experts were

necessary and we further find that appellant had access to experts on postconviction.

         {¶ 129} Accordingly, we find appellant’s fourth assignment of error not well-

taken.

                                 Sixth Assignment of Error

         {¶ 130} Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

his nineteenth claim for relief, in which he argued that his death sentence was

disproportionate to other similarly situated capital defendants in Lucas County.13

         {¶ 131} As we discussed above, appellant’s nineteenth claim for relief is barred by

the doctrine of res judicata. In its consideration of appellant’s direct appeal, the Ohio

Supreme Court found that “[t]he death penalty is appropriate and proportionate in this

case, when compared to death sentences approved in similar cases.” Belton, 

, 

, 

.

         {¶ 132} On appeal, appellant also argues that R.C. 2929.021 and R.C. 2929.05 are

unconstitutional on their face and as applied to appellant as they do not provide


13
   We note that appellant has not objected to the court’s denial of his twentieth claim for
relief, which similarly argued that his sentence was disproportionate to similarly situated
defendants. We have therefore not discussed this claim for relief.


58.
meaningful proportionality review. He maintains that there are “substantial doubts as to

the adequacy of the information received after guilty pleas to lesser offenses or after

charge reductions at trial”; that the statutes’ “failure to require the jury or three-judge

panel recommending life imprisonment to identify the mitigating factors undercuts

adequate appellate review”; the comparison method is flawed as “[t]here is no

meaningful way to distinguish capital defendants who deserve the death penalty from

those who do not”; and the Ohio Supreme Court’s appropriateness review is

constitutionally infirm as it “is very cursory.” Such constitutional challenges have

consistently been rejected. See e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 

 (6th Cir.2009);

Stojetz v. Ishee, S.D.Ohio No. 2:04-CV-263, 

, *105 (Sept. 24, 2014).

We similarly do not find that R.C. 2929.021 and R.C. 2929.05 are unconstitutional on

their face, nor do we find that they are unconstitutional as applied to appellant.

       {¶ 133} We therefore find appellant’s sixth assignment of error not well-taken.

                               Seventh Assignment of Error

       {¶ 134} In both his twenty-second and twenty-fifth claims for relief, appellant

asserted that if the individual claims for relief did not warrant the granting of relief, the

cumulative impact of those errors prejudiced him and required he be granted relief. In

support he cites to State v. DeMarco, 

, 

 (1987).

       {¶ 135} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that before a court may find a

defendant was prejudiced by “cumulative error,” it must first conclude that multiple

errors were committed. Blanton, Slip Opinion No. 

. As




59.
appellant has not established any constitutional violations, he cannot establish cumulative

error.

         {¶ 136} Accordingly, appellant’s seventh assignment of error is found not well-

taken.

                                        Conclusion

         {¶ 137} The judgment of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

Pursuant to App.R. 24, appellant is hereby ordered to pay the costs incurred on appeal.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.


Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                        ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
                                                ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE


        This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
   Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
        version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                 http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.




60.