[Cite as State v. Johnson,
2023-Ohio-2979.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-22-1306
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202101505
v.
Trollis Johnson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 25, 2023
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Brenda J Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Samuel Z. Kaplan, for appellant.
…
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Trollis Johnson, appeals from the judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a
warrantless traffic stop. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
Statement of the Case
{¶ 2} Johnson and his co-defendant, Ronvellchio T. Harris, were charged by
indictment on April 8, 2021, for offenses committed on or about April 18, 2020. Counts
one and two relate to Johnson, and counts three and four relate to Harris. Count one
charged Johnson with trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and
(C)(4)(f), a felony of the first degree; count two charged him with possession of cocaine
in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(e), also a felony of the first degree.
{¶ 3} On October 12, 2021, Johnson filed a motion to suppress evidence. The trial
court held on the matter, and, on April 28, 2022, issued an opinion and judgment entry
denying Johnson’s motion.
{¶ 4} Following a period of negotiation, Johnson entered a plea of no contest to a
lesser included offense of count two, possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.
2925.11(C)(4)(d), a felony of the second degree. Johnson’s sentencing hearing took
place on December 1, 2022.
{¶ 5} At sentencing, Johnson was sentenced to serve a minimum prison term of
two years and a maximum indefinite prison term of three years. A nolle prosequi was
entered as to count 1.
Statement of Facts
{¶ 6} In late March or early April 2020, Detective David Donovan of the Toledo
Police Department began an investigation of possible drug trafficking involving Johnson
2.
and Harris. The investigation was based on information that Donovan had received from
a confidential informant (“CI”). According to the CI, Harris would travel to obtain drugs
from Johnson, who lived out of state.
{¶ 7} Surveillance was conducted, and from that surveillance Donovan was able to
verify certain information that was provided by the CI. Specifically, police observed
Harris traveling throughout the city of Toledo, meeting with various individuals and
engaging in what appeared to be hand-to-hand transactions consistent with drug
trafficking behavior.
{¶ 8} The CI further indicated that Harris used a rental car when traveling out of
town, and that he would be traveling to South Carolina in a matter of days. As Harris
was moving about the city conducting his transactions, police observed him operating a
rented navy blue Toyota.
{¶ 9} Donvovan obtained a search warrant permitting him to affix a GPS tracking
device to Harris’s rental vehicle. Within 24 hours, Toledo Police observed Harris using
the car to travel out of town. Rather than going to South Carolina, however, the vehicle
went to the state of Texas.
{¶ 10} Toledo police contacted Texas law enforcement, who verified that the
rental vehicle was in Texas, at an address associated with Johnson. Later, the GPS
tracking device indicated that the vehicle was headed back to Ohio. Toledo police
contacted the Ohio State Highway Patrol Drug Interdiction Unit (OSHP) for assistance.
3.
Donovan testified that the OSHP is frequently asked to assist in highway drug
interdiction cases, as this is their area of expertise. While Toledo Police kept OSHP
advised as to the vehicle’s location, ultimately it was up to OSHP to decide whether or
not they had probable cause to stop the vehicle.
{¶ 11} On April 18, 2020, Trooper Jason Archer, who was part of the OSHP K9
unit, was dispatched to U.S. Highway 24 to watch for the blue Toyota. Archer was
positioned in the highway median. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Archer observed a navy
blue Toyota Camry drive past him in the right hand lane. The left hand lane was open
and -- as indicated by Archer’s dash camera video -- the Toyota was traveling
immediately behind a commercial semi-trailer. Archer pulled out and deployed his laser
gun and determined that the Toyota was traveling at 68 miles per hour – which was
within the posted speed limit. Archer testified that he observed the Toyota traveling
behind the semi-trailer, on this dry and cloudy day, at a distance of between two and three
car lengths. Based upon his observations of the amount of distance between the trailer
and the Toyota and the Toyota’s speed of travel, Archer initiated a traffic stop for
following too closely in violation of R.C. 4511.34.
{¶ 12} Archer testified at length during the suppression hearing as to how he
would determine whether a vehicle was following another too closely. He stated:
4.
Rule of thumb would be one car length for 10 miles an hour. But to
take it a step further, there is a mathematical calculation that you can
determine the perception/reaction time and the braking/stopping distance.
According to Archer, the calculation -- learned as part of his training in crash
reconstruction -- takes into account vehicle speed and drag, together with driver reaction
time. Using this calculation, Archer determined that a vehicle traveling 68 miles per hour
moves at a rate of 99.688 feet per second. He further testified that the average reaction
time to a perceived threat is 1.5 seconds, so that by the time someone going 68 miles per
hour is able to react to a threat, they have already traveled 149.53 feet. As for braking
distance -- apart from the matter of reaction time -- Archer calculated that it would take a
vehicle traveling 68 miles per hour 214.074 feet to stop. Adding the reaction-time
distance to the actual braking distance, Archer calculated that 363.604 feet of total
braking distance would have been needed to stop Johnson’s vehicle. Finally, Archer
testified that Harris’s rental vehicle was 16.08 feet in length, and that three times this
length -- which was the approximate distance separating the rental vehicle from the truck
in front of it -- was “nowhere near the amount of distance required to stop effectively to
avoid a potential crash or maneuver to avoid whatever is in the roadway.”
{¶ 13} According to Archer, this calculation is not done while on the road; instead,
when he is on the road, he has to make estimations based on what he sees in front of him
and in registering the vehicle’s speed.
5.
{¶ 14} The trial court, in its April 28, 2022 opinion and judgment entry, expressly
accepted Archer’s calculations and testimony regarding speed and braking distance.
After considering that evidence together with Archer’s dash cam video evidence, the trial
court concluded that “there was probable cause that a violation of R.C. 4511.34 had
occurred.”
Assignment of Error
{¶ 15} Johnson asserts the following assignment of error on appeal:
I. The trial court erred in denying appellant Trollis Johnson’s
motion to suppress in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio
Constitution.
Analysis
{¶ 16} Johnson’s sole assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Appellate review
of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100
Ohio St,3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When the trial court considers a
motion to suppress, it acts as the factfinder and is in the best position to resolve factual
questions and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
Id. Thus, an appellate court must
accept the trial courts findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence.
Id. This court must then determine, without deference to the trial court’s
6.
conclusion, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
Id. The trial court’s
application of law is reviewed de novo. State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-18-024,
2019-Ohio-5144, ¶ 11.
{¶ 17} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406,
2008-Ohio-4539,
894 N.E.2d
1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr,
91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391,
745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001). “‘A
traffic stop for a suspected violation is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and
therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.’” State v.
Martorana, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-22-011,
2023-Ohio-662, ¶ 20, quoting Helen v.
North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54, 60,
135 S.Ct. 530,
190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). “This type of
seizure is justified if an officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ – i.e., ‘a particularized and
objective basis’ to suspect – that the person stopped has broken the law.” Martorana at ¶
20, citing Helen at 60. “In other words, a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a traffic
violation.” Martorana at ¶ 20, citing Mays at ¶ 7-8.
{¶ 18} “When analyzing suppression arguments challenging the propriety of
investigative stops, we view the totality of the circumstances ‘“through the eyes of a
reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.”’ State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-070, 2023-Ohio-30, ¶ 31. In
7.
making this analysis, a reviewing court “need not concern [itself] with the degree of
violation or whether … the statute ‘is honored far more in the breach than in the
keeping.’” State v. Stokes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-960,
2008-Ohio-5222, ¶ 36.
That is, the fact that a violation may be extremely minor and/or commonly committed is
of no consequence in terms of our examination.
{¶ 19} The question of whether a defendant might have a defense to a charge of
committing a traffic violation is likewise irrelevant to our analysis of whether an officer
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 17. Thus,
“[a]n officer is not required to determine whether someone who has been observed
committing a crime might have a legal defense to the charge.” Id. Even if an officer is
mistaken that a defendant violated the law -- that is, where the evidence would be
insufficient to prove the elements of the relevant statute beyond a reasonable doubt -- as
long as the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation occurred,
the traffic stop is justified and proper. State v. McDonald, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
111724, 2023-Ohio-464, ¶ 27-28, citing State v. Spellacy, 2010-Ohio785,
132 N.E.3d
1244, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.) (holding that even if a defendant’s “two momentary flickers of his
high-beam headlights spanning 14 seconds apart were not sufficient to constitute a
violation of [the law],” the traffic stop was still lawful if the officer reasonably, albeit
mistakenly, believed that a violation of the law had occurred).
8.
{¶ 20} In the instant case, Archer stopped the rental vehicle for a violation of R.C.
4511.34, which provides in pertinent part:
(A) The operator of a motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley shall not
follow another vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley more closely than is
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle,
streetcar, or trackless trolley, and the traffic upon and the condition of the
highway.
{¶ 21} This court recognized in State v. Gonzalez, 43 Ohio App.3d 59, 61,
539
N.E.2d 641 (6th Dist.1987), that the purpose of the “reasonable and prudent” standard is
“to prevent rear-end collisions.” “Whether a person could stop in time to avoid a rear-
end collision is thus the important issue.”
Id.
{¶ 22} Archer testified that he observed the rental vehicle traveling at 68 miles per
hour, and that the approximately 16-foot rental vehicle was only two to three car lengths,
or less than 50 feet, behind the semi-trailer in front of it. This, despite the fact that the
left lane was wide open and available for use. Using a calculation learned as part of his
crash reconstruction training, the trooper explained that, even on a dry day, there should
have been no less than 363.604 feet between the vehicles. Thus, at appellant’s speed, the
rental vehicle should have been approximately 23 car lengths behind the truck. The
evidence adduced at the hearing supports the conclusion that Archer possessed at least
reasonable suspicion that that the vehicle was driven in violation of R.C. 4511.34.
9.
{¶ 23} Johnson argues against this conclusion, stating that the trial court’s findings
were not supported by competent, credible evidence. First, Johnson cites the
“disingenuous nature” of testimony by Archer. Specifically, Johnson points to testimony
by Archer that Archer decided to clock the speed of Harris’s rental car in response to this
court’s decision in State v. Bui, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1028, 2021-Ohio-362, a case
that had not yet been decided at the time Archer effected the traffic stop in this case. 1
The trial court recognized this discrepancy in its April 28, 2022 opinion and judgment
entry, but stated “there is no dispute between the parties that Trooper Archer did in fact
clock the Defendant’s speed.” We agree that a discrepancy exists as to why Archer
decided to clock the driver’s speed in this case, but such is not sufficient to discredit the
remainder of Archer’s testimony. Importantly, the discrepancy does nothing to put into
doubt: (1) the fact that the rental car was traveling at 68 miles per hour; or (2) the validity
of Archer’s dash cam video evidence, which showed the rental car following closely
behind the semi-trailer; or (3) the validity of Archer’s calculations.
{¶ 24} Johnson also criticizes the fact that Archer drew up the worksheet
containing his calculations immediately before trial, and not on the spot at the scene of
the violation. As noted by the trial court:
1
In Bui, this court criticized the fact that Archer “estimated the [defendant’s] speed at
roughly or approximately 65 m.p.h., but provided no explanation as to how he arrived at
that speed.”
10.
This equation would not have been done at the scene. It was explained that
when making the stop the standard is ingrained in [Archer’s] head and that
he must trust what he sees on the road. He had the video available to him so
he could time how many seconds the car was behind the truck. He used
radar to ascertain the exact speed. Defendant argues that it was not done
until 366 days after the stop. That has no bearing here, because the
calculations would always have to be after the stop. An officer must rely on
his observations that day or never be able to stop anyone for following too
closely.
We agree that evidence of Archer’s after-the-fact calculation merely -- and properly --
supports his earlier, spur-of-the-moment, determination that the rental vehicle was
following the semi-trailer too closely.
{¶ 25} Next, Johnson criticizes the fact that Archer’s reaction time figure was
based on an average reaction time, and average brake and braking conditions, rather than
those specifically at issue in this case. This type of challenge, suggesting the relevancy
of factors outside the norm, would seem to be in the nature of a defense to the charge of
following too closely, unrelated to the question of whether Archer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to make the stop in the first place. As indicated above, whether a
defendant has a defense to a charge of committing a traffic violation is irrelevant to our
11.
analysis of whether Archer had an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation
occurred.
{¶ 26} Johnson also takes issue with the fact that this was clearly a pretextual stop.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that pretextual stops are “not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, so long as a police officer has probable cause to believe a
traffic violation has occurred, even if the officer’s motivation is based on suspicion that
the motorist is engaging in other criminal activity.” Bui at ¶ 17, citing Dayton v.
Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3,
665 N.E.2d 1091 (1966), syllabus. As in this case, “‘[a]n
officer’s direct observation that a vehicle is following another too closely provides
probable cause to initiate a lawful traffic stop.’” State v. Holmes,
2019-Ohio-2485,
139
N.E.3d 574, ¶ 29 (2019), citing State v. Kelly,
188 Ohio App.3d 842,
2010-Ohio-3560,
937 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 27} Next, Johnson argues that the rental vehicle was behind the semi-trailer for
a matter of 55 seconds or less before moving into the left lane and, therefore, the
evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of R.C. 4511.34. Unfortunately for
Johnson, although the violation was, in fact, exceptionally slight, the degree of violation
is irrelevant to our analysis and, therefore, does not alter our conclusion in this case.
{¶ 28} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignment of error is found
not well-taken.
12.
Conclusion
{¶ 29} Because the trial court properly found that the traffic stop did not violate
Johnson’s constitutional rights, and properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress based
upon the validity of the traffic stop, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is to pay the costs of appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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