[Cite as State v. Stith,
2023-Ohio-3041.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-230009
TRIAL NO. C-22TRD-15698
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TERESA STITH :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 30, 2023
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffman, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Teresa Stith was convicted
of failure to stop after an accident on private property under R.C. 4549.021(A). She
now appeals that conviction, asserting a single assignment of error in which she
challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. We
find no merit in her assignment of error, and we affirm her conviction.
{¶2} The record shows that on June 12, 2022, Officer Jan Gehlhar of the
Delhi Township Police Department responded to a report of an automobile accident
in the parking lot of a Kroger store. Upon arrival, he observed a vehicle parked in a
handicapped spot with heavy damage to the passenger side. Next to the vehicle, he
saw a piece of a taillight laying on the ground. From witnesses at the scene, he
obtained a description of a vehicle and the driver, as well as a photograph of the license
plate.
{¶3} Officer Gehlhar was able to connect the vehicle with Stith. He went to
her residence on July 2, 2022, where he observed her car in the driveway with a broken
taillight, consistent with the broken taillight he had found at the scene of the accident.
When he asked Stith about the accident, she initially stated that she could not
remember it. After Office Gehlhar confronted her with the evidence he had obtained,
she admitted to remembering the accident. She told him that she panicked and fled
from the scene. When questioned by Officer Gehlhar, she acknowledged that she had
not left the required information at the scene. Additionally, she could not provide
insurance information.
{¶4} In her sole assignment of error, Stith contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction. She argues that the state failed to prove the
elements of the offense because it presented no evidence as to whether the car that was
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
hit was occupied or unoccupied. She also argues that the conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶5} As a preliminary matter, the state argues that Stith did not raise that
argument in the trial court in her Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. But
this court has stated that the failure to make a Crim.R. 29(A) motion during a trial
does not waive an appellate argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. State
v. Glover, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180572, 2019-Ohio-5211, ¶ 26, citing State v.
Jones,
91 Ohio St.3d 335, 346,
744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). An accused’s not-guilty plea
preserves the right to object to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence because the
state must prove each element by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover at ¶ 26.
{¶6} The relevant inquiry, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Watts, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220219, 2023-
Ohio-1394, ¶ 10. In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither
resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Watts at ¶
10; State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561,
2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 45.
{¶7} Stith was convicted of violating R.C. 4549.021(A), which provides:
(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in injury
or damage to persons or property on any public or private property other
than a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle, having
knowledge of the accident or collision, shall stop at the scene of the
accident or collision. Upon request of any person who is injured or
damaged, or any other person, the operator shall give that person the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
operator’s name and address, and, if the operator is not the owner, the
name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together with the
registered number of that motor vehicle, and, if available, exhibit the
operator’s driver’s or commercial driver’s license.
(2) If the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident or
collision does not provide the information specified in division (A)(1) of
this section, the operator shall give that information, within twenty-four
hours after the accident or collision, to the police department of the city
or village in which the accident or collision occurred, or if it occurred
outside the corporate limits of a city or village, to the sheriff of the county
in which the accident or collision occurred.
(3) If the accident or collision is with an unoccupied or unattended motor
vehicle, the operator who collides with the motor vehicle shall securely
attach the information required under division (A)(1) of this section, in
writing, to a conspicuous place in or on the unoccupied or unattended
motor vehicle.
{¶8} Stith relies on State v. Mullins, 2d Dist. Montgomery N0. 10381, 1987
Ohio App. LEXIS 9106 (Oct. 8, 1987). In that case, the court stated that R.C. 4549.021
has three paragraphs, which “in effect describe three separate offenses.” The first
paragraph requires the operator of a vehicle to stop after an accident and upon request
of any person to provide the required information. The second paragraph requires the
operator to report the accident to the appropriate police department within 24 hours
if the operator did not provide the information at the scene. Finally, the third
paragraph requires the operator of a vehicle that collides with an unattended vehicle
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to attach the required information to the unattended vehicle. Id. at 1-2. We find no
cases citing Mullins or containing the same analysis.
{¶9} We do not find Mullins to be dispositive and we decline to follow it. The
plain language of the statute shows that R.C. 4549.021(A)(1) sets forth the elements of
the offense. Sections (A)(2) and (A)(3) provide alternate means of complying with the
provisions of section (A)(1). See In re D.B., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00189, 2017-
Ohio-4174, ¶ 18-21; State v. Love, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100597, 2011-Ohio-2053,
¶ 7-12; State v. Hoy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1197,
2003-Ohio-3117, ¶ 16-18.
{¶10} Further, a driver does not need to hit another car to be subject to the
requirements of R.C. 4549.021(A)(1). It refers to “a motor vehicle accident or collision
resulting in injury or damage to persons or property” on private property. Courts,
including this one, have found that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction
in cases not involving another vehicle. See In re D.B. (defendant hit a fence); State v.
Harris, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23915, 2013-Ohio-716 (defendant hit a pedestrian);
Love (defendant hit a pedestrian). It makes little sense then to require the state to
prove whether the vehicle was occupied or unoccupied.
{¶11} Further, Stith argues that there was no evidence presented of “what
information [she] did not provide.” This argument is without merit because the
evidence shows that she did not provide any information. She left the scene of the
accident without providing the required information and she did not provide it to
police within 24 hours. On the contrary, she only disclosed that she had hit the other
car and left the scene when Officer Gehlhar confronted her with the evidence he had
obtained. Responding to police questioning about the accident does not constitute
reporting it within the meaning of R.C. 4549.021. In re D.B. at ¶ 21-22.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} The evidence against Stith was mostly circumstantial, but
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence possess the same probative value. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492, at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Blount,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180096,
2019-Ohio-3498, ¶ 10 Our review of the record
shows that a rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, could have found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt
all the elements of failure to stop after an accident on private property. Consequently,
the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
{¶13} Stith also argues that her conviction was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trier of fact lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse Stith’s
conviction and order a new trial. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678
N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. Richards, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210656, 2022-Ohio-
4698, ¶ 13. Consequently, we overrule Stith’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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