[Cite as State v. Stevers,
2023-Ohio-3050.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 22CA11
v. :
IAN STEVERS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Kathleen Evans, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio,
for appellant1.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Timothy Warren, Assistant Athens County Prosecuting Attorney,
Athens, Ohio, for appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:8-22-23
ABELE, J.
{¶1} Ian Stevers, defendant below and appellant herein,
appeals the Athens County Common Pleas Court judgment that revoked
his community control and sentenced him to serve the remainder of
his five-year prison sentence.
{¶2} Appellant assigns one error for review:
“MR. STEVERS WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND
1
Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
2
ATHENS, 22CA11
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY THE TRIAL
COURT’S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE HIS REVOCATION
HEARING. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHIO
CONSTITUTION.”
{¶3} On December 5, 2018, in Case Number 18CR0408, appellant
entered guilty pleas to (1) possession of heroin in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), (2) possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), (3) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), and (4) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), all fifth-degree felonies. The trial court placed
appellant under five years of community control.
{¶4} On February 1, 2021, appellant entered guilty pleas in
two additional cases. In Case Number 20CR0013, appellant entered
guilty pleas to (1) receiving stolen property in violation of R.C.
2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony, and (2) having weapons under
disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree
felony. In Case Number 21CR0003, appellant entered a guilty plea
to vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(b), a fifth-degree
felony. The trial court placed appellant under five years of
community control to be served concurrently.
{¶5} As part of the terms and conditions of appellant’s
community control, the trial court ordered appellant to: (1)remain
a law-abiding citizen during supervision, (2) remain in Ohio, (3)
3
ATHENS, 22CA11
submit to a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all
recommendations, (4) abstain from using or possessing illegal drugs
or alcohol, (5) be subject to random substance abuse monitoring,
(6) successfully complete the community-based correctional program
(CBCF), (7) pay court costs, (8) report to the APA upon his
release, (9) be screened for and, if found acceptable, successfully
complete the Athens County Prosecutor’s Office Vivitrol Program and
all requirements, and (10) follow other conditions appellant’s
supervising officer deems appropriate.
{¶6} On June 22, 2022, appellee filed a Notice of Violation of
Community Control that alleged: (1) on May 19, 2022 appellant
failed to contact his supervising officer, (2) on June 2, 2022
appellant failed to contact his supervising officer, (3) on June
16, 2022 appellant failed to contact his supervising officer, (4)
on June 21, 2022 appellant possessed fentanyl, (5) on June 21, 2022
appellant possessed methamphetamine, and (6) on June 21, 2022
appellant possessed a firearm.
{¶7} At the start of the June 30, 2022 community control
violation hearing, appellant’s counsel orally requested “a brief
continuance” and stated that appellant’s son had been “in and out
of the Children’s Hospital” for weeks and appellant and his
girlfriend expected to hear about a follow-up appointment “any day
4
ATHENS, 22CA11
now.” When the state opposed the continuance, the court stated: “I
appreciate that he has a child in crisis. That doesn’t obviate the
fact that he hasn’t reported for six weeks in a row. Got caught
with Meth and fentanyl and has a firearm.” Counsel then stated:
Additionally your honor. I mean the Prosecutor’s office
did provide us pretty promptly with the uh, notices of
violations and I believe Mr. Warren said this is day eight.
But just about a half hour ago I was given this twentyfive page or so report from the Sheriff’s office concerning
then, I believe the last three violations. This is
something I have not had the opportunity to review or
prepare any kind of meaningful cross examination with
whatsoever.
{¶8} The trial court responded: “What kind of time frame you
looking to continue it? … I’m not going to continue it ad
nauseam like we have, like I got fifteen cases from you people that
are overdue that you haven’t taken care of. So how long of a
continuance are you suggesting?” Counsel stated that he “wouldn’t
need anything more than a week or two.”
{¶9} At this point appellee reasserted its opposition to the
continuance and noted that although the state is not required to
provide discovery for probation violations and defense counsel did
not request the report, the state would have provided copies if
requested. Further, the state reiterated that to continue the case
would inconvenience the two subpoenaed witnesses who appeared for
the hearing.
5
ATHENS, 22CA11
{¶10} The trial court asked about the hearing date, to which
the prosecutor replied, “He was arrested on the 21st. Violations
were filed on the 22nd and then our office coordinated this date on
the 24th.” The trial court responded, “So we had uh, you guys
picked the date. Well the motion will be overruled then. We will
go forward.”
{¶11} Athens County Sheriff’s Deputy D.J. McCollister testified
that on June 21, 2022, he and others visited appellant’s address
because he had not reported to his probation officer. Officers
detained appellant when he answered the door and retrieved
suspected fentanyl, methamphetamine, and LSD. Officers also
retrieved several drug abuse instruments, three phones, and a
firearm. While officers processed the scene, “several vehicles had
showed up.” Officers recognized some individuals as regular drug
users and identified some by name.
{¶12} Before defense counsel began to cross-examine Deputy
McCollister, counsel notified the trial court that one of the
identified “regular drug users” had been a prior client. The court
responded, “What … are the chances that drug offenders
mentioned by the law enforcement officer are gonna have contact
with your office. What are the outside chances? So what are you
saying Mr. Chaves?” Defense counsel then stated, “I question my
6
ATHENS, 22CA11
full ability to actually, ethically do this case considering that
an officer just listed a prior client of mine as relevant to the
violations that are listed here.” The trial court stated, “Well I
don’t know whether it’s relevant. He just mentioned that it’s a
person he came into contact with. Who your office may have
previously represented. So the Court is not fully convinced that
there is a conflict there so. We are going to press forward.” On
cross-examination, Deputy McCollister acknowledged that the lab had
not completed results from the seized substances.
{¶13} Adult Parole Authority Officer Ann Richardson testified
that she supervised appellant in all three cases. Richardson
reviewed with appellant all the probation conditions and he
initialed and signed the form. On May 5, 2022, Richardson ordered
appellant to report bi-weekly, and he failed to report on May 19,
June 2, and June 16. On June 16, 2022, Richardson declared
appellant “whereabouts unknown, violator at large.”
{¶14} After Officer Richardson’s testimony, the state rested.
The trial court stated, “Mr. Chaves I’ll give you uh, I’ll give you
the opportunity, uh, happy to continue the case a week or so to
give you a chance to look at that report more fully and figure out
if you want to call witnesses or not based on that since it was
just handed to you.” Counsel stated, “Your honor. No. At this
7
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point the defense will rest.” The trial court found probable cause
for violations one, two, three, four, five, and six.
{¶15} At the July 6, 2022 hearing, Officer Richardson testified
that appellant came onto her caseload in December 2018 and
continued violation behavior and had been “through the violation
process numerous times.” Appellant also failed to complete the
CBCF program and had numerous opportunities to get into treatment,
but “has chosen not to take advantage of those opportunities.”
Richardson also testified that appellant had cases before her
contact with him and had served prison time.
{¶16} On July 14, 2022, the trial court revoked appellant’s
community control and sentenced him:
For Case 18CR0408, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
six (6) months in the State Penal System for Count One,
six (6) months prison for Count Two, six (6) months prison
for Count Three, and six (6) months prison for Count Four.
All counts of Case 18CR0408 shall run consecutive to each
other for a total sentence of twenty-four (24) months.
For Case 20CR0013, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
twelve (12) months in the State Penal System for Count One
and thirty-six (36) months prison for Count Two, to run
concurrent to each other, for a total sentence of thirty-six (36) months prison for Case 20CR0013.
For Case 21CR0003, the Court sentences Defendant to serve
twelve (12) months in the State Penal System.
The sentences for 21CR0003 and 20CR0013 shall run
consecutive to each other but concurrent to prison term
for Case 18CR0408, for a total aggregate prison term of
8
ATHENS, 22CA11
four (4) years.2
The trial court made consecutive sentence findings, ordered
appellant to pay court costs and restitution, serve up to two years
of optional post-release control and advised him about the
consequences of a post-release control violation. This appeal
followed.
{¶17} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the trial court’s refusal to continue his revocation hearing denied
him due process and effective assistance of counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,
Section 16, Ohio Constitution.
{¶18} In general, “[t]he grant or denial of a continuance is a
matter which is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the
trial judge. An appellate court must not reverse the denial of a
continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” State
v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67,
423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), citing
Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 575, 589,
84 S.Ct. 841,
11 L.Ed.2d 921
2
At the revocation sentencing hearing, appellee notified the court
that the July 14, 2022 sentencing entry incorrectly identified the
sentence as four years instead of five years and appellee noted that the
court should issue a nunc pro tunc entry to accurately reflect the
sentence. The trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry on August 24,
2022, but only corrected case numbers in the July 14, 2022 entry. Thus,
the August 24, 2022 entry again repeated the cumulative sentence as four
years. Consequently, the trial court may again consider this issue and
enter a nunc pro tunc entry to correctly set forth appellant’s sentence.
9
ATHENS, 22CA11
(1964), State v. Conway, 108 St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791,
842 N.E.2d
996, ¶ 147, State v. Jones,
91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342,
744 N.E.2d 1163
(2001).
{¶19} “ ‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or … a view or
action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ ”
State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73,
2014-Ohio-1966,
15 N.E.3d
818, ¶ 67, quoting State v. Brady,
119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-
4493,
894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.
{¶20} A trial court that considers a motion to continue should
“[w]eigh [] against any potential prejudice to the defendant …
concerns such as a court’s right to control its own docket and the
public’s interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.”
Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d at 67,
423 N.E.2d 1078. Therefore, when
evaluating a request for a continuance, a court should also
consider, inter alia:
the length of the delay requested; whether other
continuances have been requested and received; the
inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel
and the court; whether the requested delay is for
legitimate reasons to whether it is dilatory, purposeful,
or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a
continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the
unique facts of each case.
Id. at 67-68.
10
ATHENS, 22CA11
{¶21} Appellant argues that the trial court did not apply a
balancing test before it denied the request for a continuance.
While it is a “basic due process right and indeed essential to a
fair trial that a defense counsel be afforded the reasonable
opportunity to prepare his case,” State v. Sowders, 4 Ohio St.3d
143, 144,
447 N.E.2d 118 (1983), not every denial of a continuance
violates due process.
Ungar, supra,
376 U.S. at 589. This court
has held, however, that “nothing requires trial courts to
specifically articulate an analysis of each Unger factor.” State
v. Dickens, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3272,
2009-Ohio-4541, ¶ 13;
Fultz v. Fultz, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 13CA9,
2014-Ohio-3344, ¶ 20.
Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the
trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors]
correctly.” State v. Combs,
18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125,
480 N.E.2d 414
(1985); Hartt v. Munobe,
67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7,
615 N.E.2d 617 (1993).
{¶22} Although appellant argues that the Unger factors favor
the grant of his continuance request, based on our analysis of the
Unger factors we disagree.
{¶23} The first Unger factor is the length of the delay
requested. Appellant’s counsel indicated that he “wouldn’t need
anything more than a week or two.” Although a week or two does not
necessarily equate to a long delay, the state argued that appellant
11
ATHENS, 22CA11
had been arrested on June 21, 2022, the state filed violations on
June 22, and the parties coordinated the date on June 24. The
trial court responded, “So we had uh, you guys picked the date.
Well the motion will be overruled then.” Although the delay
requested was reasonably short, this factor is neutral.
{¶24} The second Unger factor is whether other continuances had
been requested and received. The state concedes that this factor
weighs in appellant’s favor because it was appellant’s first
continuance request.
{¶25} The third Unger factor involves the inconvenience to
litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court that results
from a continuance. The trial court noted the presence of two
subpoenaed witnesses in the courtroom, prepared to testify.
Appellant argues that any inconvenience to the witnesses would have
been “slight” because both witnesses, a deputy and a parole
officer, “were present as a requirement of their employment.”
Although the witnesses’ presence may have been a requirement of
employment, that does not diminish the inconvenience if the trial
court continued the hearing. See State v. Colley, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 09CA3323, 2010-Ohio-4834, ¶ 20 (continuance would have
inconvenienced court, state, and various witnesses when request
12
ATHENS, 22CA11
made one business day before trial date); State v. Jones, 3d Dist.
Defiance No. 4-5-11, 2015-Ohio-5443, ¶ 51 (fact witnesses
“relatively local” did not diminish inherent inconvenience to the
court, state, witnesses, and jury venire). Therefore, we conclude
that this factor weighs in favor of appellee.
{¶26} The fourth Unger factor is whether the requested delay is
for legitimate reasons or is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived.
Appellant argues that he requested the continuance due to his
child’s health and ability to review discovery obtained just prior
to the revocation hearing. Appellee, however, contends that
appellant did not provide any documentation to the court about his
alleged need to tend to his child, and “Ohio courts often conclude
a party’s uncorroborated allegation of medical issues, standing
alone, is not enough to render a decision denying a continuance an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Thacker, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.
18CA21, 2020-Ohio-4620, ¶ 57, citing Jacobs v. Jones, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 10AP-930,
2011-Ohio-3319, ¶ 19. See, e.g., Calvary
SPV I, L.L.C. v. Furtado, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-361,
2005-Ohio-6884,
¶ 8, 12 (determining the trial court did not abuse its discretion
or commit plain error in not granting continuance when defendant
left a telephone message for the court day before trial advising
she would not be able to attend as a result of health issues, but
13
ATHENS, 22CA11
did not provide “affidavits in support” or any “medical evidence”
that “would have been helpful … in persuading the trial court
of the merits of defendant's contentions”); State v. Naypaver, 11th
Dist. No.2008-T-0102, 2009-Ohio-4620, ¶ 28-31 (trial court did not
abuse discretion in denying motions for continuance when the
defendants, three members of a family, moved for a continuance on
the uncorroborated statement that none of the family members could
attend hearing due to the father's medical condition); Hudson v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-562, 2004-Ohio-
7203 (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for a
continuance, based on “medical problems,” when medical records did
not support contention that she could not have sought a continuance
prior to the morning of the trial at which the defendant's
witnesses were present and ready to testify). Thacker at ¶ 57,
citing
Jacobs at ¶ 19. Thus, we do not believe appellant
sufficiently documented his child’s medical issues.
{¶27} In addition, appellant contends that defense counsel
needed time to review the police report given to counsel 30 minutes
before the revocation hearing. Appellee, however, argues that
because a community control revocation proceeding is not a criminal
proceeding, Crim.R. 16 discovery procedures do not apply to the
revocation process.
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]
{¶28} “Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the
requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding.”
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782,
93 S.Ct. 1756,
36 L.Ed.2d
656 (1973). Therefore, not all protections afforded in a criminal
trial apply to revocation proceedings. For example, the Ohio Rules
of Evidence do not apply, Evid.R. 101(C)(3), there is no right to a
jury trial, and the privilege against self-incrimination is not
available to a probationer. State v. Ferguson,
72 Ohio App.3d 714,
716-717,
595 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist.1991), citing Minnesota v.
Murphy,
465 U.S. 420, 435,
104 S.Ct. 1136,
79 L.Ed.2d 409, fn. 7
(1984). Further, the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to
revocation proceedings. State v. Stafford, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas
No. 2000 AP 12 0095,
2001 WL 950692 (Aug. 16, 2001); State v.
Parsons, 2d Dist. Greene No. 96CA20,
1996 WL 665004 (Nov. 15,
1995); State v. Payne, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2001-09-081,
2002 WL
649403 (Apr. 22, 2002) * 2.
{¶29} Instead, a trial court must comply with the following
minimum due process requirements: (1) deliver written notice of
claimed probation violations, (2) disclose the evidence against the
probationer, (3) provide probationer with the opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses, as well as documentary
evidence, (4) provide probationer the right to confront and cross-
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]
examine witnesses, (5) provide probationer with a neutral and
detached hearing body, and (6) issue a written statement as to the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.
Columbus v. Bickel,
77 Ohio App.3d 26, 34,
601 N.E.2d 61 (10th
Dist.1991), citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 489,
92 S.Ct.
2593,
33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); State v. Ohly,
166 Ohio App.3d 808,
2006-Ohio-2353,
853 N.E.2d 675, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.); State v. Miller,
42 Ohio St.2d 102,
326 N.E.2d 259 (1975).
{¶30} Appellee claims that this case is similar to State v.
Graham, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0031, 2022-Ohio-1770, where the
court held that Crim.R. 16 discovery rules did not apply to a
community control revocation proceeding, but observed that
defendants in community control revocation hearings are entitled to
some minimum due process rights as stated in Gagnon, including the
disclosure of evidence. Appellee also claims this case is similar
to the Graham court’s conclusion that no due process violation
occurred because appellant received notice of community control
violations, had the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and had the opportunity to present her own witnesses and
documentary evidence at the revocation hearing.
Graham, supra, ¶
41, citing State v. Shuman, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2009CA00271, 2010-
Ohio-3957, ¶ 23.
[Cite as State v. Stevers,
2023-Ohio-3050.]
{¶31} In the case at bar, our review reveals that appellee
provided defense counsel a community control violation notice eight
days before the hearing, appellant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the state’s witnesses, and the trial court offered
appellant a brief continuance in order to call additional
witnesses. See also State v. Harden, 5th Dist. Fairfield No.
02CA27, 2002-Ohio-4673 (trial court does not abuse its discretion
in refusing to continue revocation hearing, especially when
revocation is not premised upon information unknown to appellant).
See also Ohly,
166 Ohio App.3d 808,
2006-Ohio-2353,
853 N.E.2d 675,
¶23 (defendant failed to establish a violation of due process right
to have disclosure of evidence against him when state provided
probable-cause letter identifying alleged violations). Thus, we
conclude that this factor weighs in favor of appellee.
{¶32} The fifth Unger factor is whether the defendant
contributed to the circumstances that gave rise to the continuance
request. The state concedes that this factor weighs in appellant’s
favor.
{¶33} Finally, the sixth Unger factor incorporates any other
relevant factors depending upon the case’s unique facts. Appellee
contends this factor weighs heavily in their favor. First, the
allegations are serious because appellant did not report to his
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]
supervising officer for six weeks, and when officers checked on
appellant, they found methamphetamine, fentanyl, LSD and a firearm.
Second, appellee argues that if appellant could not maintain
contact with his supervising officer, the court could not be
assured that he would return if it continued the hearing. Third,
appellee points out that at the end of the first stage of the
hearing, the trial court offered a continuance of “a week or two”
for counsel to digest the police report and to call additional
witnesses if needed before the second stage of the hearing.
However, counsel indicated he did not need additional time.
{¶34} Appellant also contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because the trial court denied a continuance
for arbitrary reasons that prevented counsel from providing
effective assistance and denied appellant his right to due process.
In particular, appellant argues that counsel could not properly
prepare for the hearing because he could not thoroughly review the
police report that related to three of the six alleged community
control violations.
{¶35} To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must
satisfy a two-prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that
trial counsel acted incompetently. See, Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In assessing
[Cite as State v. Stevers,
2023-Ohio-3050.]
such claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689, citing
Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101,
76 S.Ct. 158,
100 L.Ed. 83
(1955). However, even if a defendant shows that counsel did not
provide competent representation, the defendant must then satisfy
the second prong of the Strickland test. Under the “actual
prejudice” prong, the defendant must establish “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694.
{¶36} After our review of the record, we do not believe that
appellant demonstrated prejudice from the trial court’s denial of
his motion to continue, or any possibility that the outcome of the
revocation hearing would have been different.
{¶37} Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s continuance request
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we
overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
[Cite as State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050.]
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
ATHENS, 22CA11
20
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellee
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
