[Cite as State v. Saxer,
2023-Ohio-3548.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WILLIAMS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WM-22-007
Appellee Trial Court No. 22CR000022
v.
Alexander J. Saxer DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 29, 2023
…
Katherine J. Zartman, Williams County
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
…
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Alexander Saxer appeals the judgment of the Williams County
Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of illegal conveyance of drugs onto
the grounds of a detention facility. Saxer asserts that the trial court’s imposition of an 18-
month prison sentence is clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Further,
he contends that the trial court erred in imposing a fine and ordering him to pay the costs
of court-appointed counsel without making a finding of his ability to pay. For the reasons
that follow, the judgment is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On September 26, 2022, Saxer pleaded guilty to the single count of illegal
conveyance of drugs onto the grounds of a detention facility in violation of R.C.
2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2), a felony of the third degree. The trial court accepted Saxer’s
plea, found him guilty, and continued the matter for the preparation of a presentence
investigation report.
{¶ 3} At the start of the sentencing hearing on November 9, 2022, the state
suspected that Saxer was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The trial court recessed
the hearing to allow for a drug screen, which revealed that Saxer had a .172 blood alcohol
content and his urine screen tested positive for THC and cocaine. Saxer admitted to
having smoked marijuana over the weekend and having had a few drinks before his
sentencing hearing, but he was confused by the positive test for cocaine.
{¶ 4} In mitigation, counsel for Saxer noted his significant substance abuse issues.
Counsel argued that Saxer needed treatment and advocated for the imposition of
community control. Counsel stated that Saxer had strong family support, lived with his
mother, and worked for the family painting business.
{¶ 5} Saxer also spoke in mitigation. He explained that he struggles with
addiction and sometimes gets overwhelmed and turns to drugs. He stated that he has
been on probation in another court for almost three years and has not had any problems
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except for the current charge. Saxer noted that he has a full-time job and has paid off all
of his restitution and is paying off his court fines.
{¶ 6} In imposing sentence, the trial court expressly stated that it considered the
principles and purposes of sentencing and the relevant factors contained in R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12. The trial court found that Saxer was not amenable to community control
and ordered him to serve a term of 18 months in prison. The court notified Saxer,
however, that it did not intend for him to serve all 18 months, but that it was inclined to
grant him judicial release. The court remarked that it believed sending Saxer to prison
was necessary to help him see where his life was headed in order to motivate him to do
the hard work of recovery. In addition to the prison term, the trial court ordered Saxer to
pay a fine of $500 and all attorney’s fees and costs. The court did not address the issue of
Saxer’s ability to pay the fine, attorney’s fees, or costs and did not make any finding on
that issue at that time. In its sentencing entry, the trial court found that “the Defendant
has the present and future ability to pay all costs of prosecution, any court-appointed
counsel costs, and any supervision fees permitted.”
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} Saxer timely appealed his judgment of conviction and asserts two
assignments of error for review:
1. The trial court’s imposition of 18 months incarceration is clearly
and convincingly not supported by the record.
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2. The trial court erred in imposing a fine and costs of court-
appointed counsel without a finding of ability to pay.
III. Analysis
{¶ 8} Saxer’s assignments of error challenge the trial court’s imposition of
sentence. Felony sentences are reviewed pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which
provides, in pertinent part,
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and
remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate
court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 9} Here, none of the findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) are applicable; thus,
Saxer must demonstrate that his sentence is “otherwise contrary to law” under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b). “Contrary to law” means “‘in violation of statute or legal regulations
at a given time.’” State v. Goode, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-22-012, 2023-Ohio-863, ¶ 6,
4.
quoting State v. Jones,
163 Ohio St.3d 242,
2020-Ohio-6729,
169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34; see
also State v. Bryant,
168 Ohio St.3d 250,
2022-Ohio-1878,
198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22.
A. Prison Sentence
{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, Saxer argues that his prison sentence is
clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Notably, Saxer acknowledges that
his sentence is within the statutory range. He does not contest the fact that the trial court
considered the principles and purposes of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as
required by R.C. 2929.13(C), nor does he argue that the trial court improperly considered
factors not included in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Instead, Saxer argues that the prison
sentence would impose a far greater burden on state resources than community control
and it does not meet his need for rehabilitation and treatment. In support, Saxer notes his
extensive substance abuse issues, the state’s recommendation that Saxer be placed on
community control, his employment in the family painting business, and his relationship
and visitation with his four-year-old son.
{¶ 11} In essence, Saxer argues that the trial court did not properly weigh the
considerations and factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in crafting its sentence. R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), however, “does not permit an appellate court to conduct an independent
review of a trial court’s sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its adherence to the
purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11” State v. Reynolds, 6th Dist. Sandusky
Nos. S-22-022, S-22-023, 2023-Ohio-2624, ¶ 10, quoting
Bryant at ¶ 21; see also
Jones
at ¶ 41-42. Thus, this court cannot review the trial court’s finding and weighing of those
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factors, and his assignment of error on this issue may be summarily denied. State v.
Bowles,
2021-Ohio-4401,
181 N.E.3d 1226, ¶ 8, 10 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Toles,
166
Ohio St.3d 397,
2021-Ohio-3531,
186 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 1.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, Saxer’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
B. Fine and Costs of Court-Appointed Counsel
{¶ 13} In his second assignment of error, Saxer argues that the trial court erred
when it imposed a fine and the costs of court-appointed counsel without first making a
finding of his ability to pay.
1. Fine under R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(c)
{¶ 14} Addressing the $500 fine first, R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(c) authorizes the trial
court to impose a fine of “not more than ten thousand dollars” for a felony of the third
degree. Prior to imposing such a fine, R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) requires that the trial court
“consider the offender’s present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or
fine.” However, “[a] hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay is not required. Nor is a
court required to make findings. All that is required is that the trial court consider a
defendant’s ability to pay … [A] trial court is not required to expressly state that it
considered [a defendant’s] ability to pay a fine …[A] reviewing court may infer that a
trial court considered the issue.” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-20-037,
2021-Ohio-3380, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Davenport,
2017-Ohio-688,
85 N.E.3d 443, ¶ 31
(2d Dist.); State v. Lieb, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-22-025,
2023-Ohio-574, ¶ 9-11. “And,
although preferred on appellate review, a trial court need not explicitly state in its
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judgment entry that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay a financial sanction.” Lieb
at ¶ 10, citing State v. Dahms, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-11-028,
2012-Ohio-3181, ¶ 29.
“An appellate court will look to the totality of the record to determine whether the
requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶ 15} In its sentencing entry, the trial court ordered Saxer to pay a fine of
$500.00. In the next paragraph, the trial court then found that Saxer “has the present and
future ability to pay all costs of prosecution, any court-appointed counsel costs, and any
supervision fees permitted ….” Relevant to his ability to pay, Saxer informed the court
at the sentencing hearing that he is dyslexic and that in school he was in special education
and had an individualized education plan. But, Saxer also reported that he paid off his
restitution, was paying his prior court fines, and had a full-time job. In addition, the trial
court noted that it considered the presentence investigation report, which indicated that
Saxer was a healthy 28-year-old, that he reported graduating from Swanton High School,
that he earns approximately $1,200 per month but has monthly expenses of $2,095, and
that he lives with his parents who also provide financial assistance.
{¶ 16} Looking at the totality of the record, it is fair to infer that the trial court
considered Saxer’s present and future ability to pay the amount of the fine, thereby
satisfying the requirement of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). It was well-apprised of Saxer’s
financial circumstances and made a similar conclusion that he was able to pay the costs
of prosecution, court-appointed counsel costs, and any supervision fees. This court,
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therefore, does not clearly and convincingly find that the imposition of a $500.00 fine
was contrary to law.
2. Costs of Appointed Counsel under R.C. 2941.51(D)
{¶ 17} Turning to the imposition of the costs of court-appointed counsel, those
costs are authorized by R.C. 2941.51(D), which provides, in relevant part, “[I]f the
person represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some
part of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the person shall pay the county an
amount that the person reasonably can be expected to pay.” This court has held that “a
trial court may not impose [costs of appointed counsel] in its sentencing entry if it does
not first make a finding of appellant’s ability to pay and impose those costs at the
sentencing hearing.” State v. Potter, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-21-002, 2021-Ohio-3502, ¶
34, citing State v. Lewis, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1069,
2019-Ohio-3929, ¶ 54.
Similarly, in State v. Connin, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-20-005,
2020-Ohio-6867, this court
noted that it “has repeatedly held that where a court imposes the discretionary costs of …
* assigned counsel, ‘it must affirmatively find that the defendant has, or reasonably may
be expected to have, the ability to pay.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Brown, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-18-1140,
2020-Ohio-1650, ¶ 37. Consistent with this precedent, Saxer
argues that because the trial court did not affirmatively find an ability to pay the costs of
appointed counsel at the sentencing hearing, the order to pay must be vacated.
{¶ 18} However, as pointed out by the state, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the costs of court-appointed counsel in State v. Taylor, 163 Ohio St.3d 508,
8.
2020-Ohio-6786,
171 N.E.3d 290. In Taylor, the court held that R.C. 2941.51(D)
unambiguously does not “support requiring a trial court to make explicit findings on the
record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay before assessing court-appointed-counsel
fees.” Id. at ¶ 27. The court continued,
Nonetheless, although R.C. 2941.51 does not require the trial court to make
any explicit findings prior to assessing court-appointed-counsel fees against
a defendant, making such findings explicitly on the record is the best
practice. Indeed, doing so would give the parties a better understanding of
the trial court’s determination and would enable the appellate court to
conduct a more meaningful review of the imposition of fees.
Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 19} Thus, to the extent that Saxer argues that the costs of appointed counsel
must be vacated because the trial court did not explicitly find on the record that he had
the ability to pay, Saxer’s argument is without merit.
{¶ 20} Furthermore, in this case, the trial court expressly imposed the costs of
appointed counsel at the sentencing hearing, but it did not make a finding at that time that
Saxer had the ability to pay those costs. Such a finding was affirmatively made in the
subsequent judgment entry. That finding is supported by the totality of the record, which
includes information about Saxer’s age, educational history, employment, past wages,
and other financial considerations. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that
Saxer could pay the costs of appointed counsel.
9.
{¶ 21} Notwithstanding that, the trial court erred in ordering Saxer to pay the costs
of appointed counsel as part of his criminal sentence. In Taylor, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that “because there is no statutory authority allowing a trial court to ‘sentence’ a
defendant to pay court-appointed-counsel fees, such an order cannot be included as part
of the defendant’s sentence.” Taylor at ¶ 35. Recognizing that the sentencing hearing is
“the time during which the trial court likely has the most information about a defendant’s
finances and other circumstances,” the court noted that “such fees may be assessed at the
sentencing hearing.” Id. at 33, 37. But, the Ohio Supreme Court instructed, “[I]f the
assessment of the fees is included in the sentencing entry, the court must note that the
assessment of the court-appointed-counsel fees is a civil assessment and is not part of the
defendant’s sentence. To avoid confusion, the best practice would be to include the order
in a separate entry, apart from the sentence.” Id. at 37.
{¶ 22} Here, the state concedes that the sentencing entry does not denominate the
court-appointed-counsel fees as a civil assessment. Thus, the state agrees that the portion
of Saxer’s sentence assessing the costs of appointed counsel should be vacated.
{¶ 23} In State v. Connin, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-21-001, 2021-Ohio-4445, this
court addressed a similar situation where Connin claimed that the trial court failed to
affirmatively find that he had or reasonably may expect to have the ability to pay
appointed-counsel fees. Id. at ¶ 38. Connin argued that the appointed-counsel fees
should be vacated “without the necessity of remanding for a ‘do over.’” Id. at ¶ 27.
Although the state conceded error in that case, this court reviewed the record and
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concluded that it supported the trial court’s determination of the appellant’s present and
future ability to pay appointed-counsel fees. Id. at ¶ 42. Faced with the narrow
assignment of error that “[t]he imposition of attorney fees is contrary to law,” this court
vacated “[Connin’s] criminal sentence only to the extent of the trial court’s order for
[Connin] to pay appointed-counsel fees.” Id. This court then remanded the matter to the
trial court “to include the civil assessment of the court-appointed counsel fees in a
separate entry, apart from the sentence, as the best practice suggested in State v. Taylor.”
Id.; see also State v. Phillips, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29087,
2022-Ohio-1262, ¶ 20, 28
(vacating imposition of order to pay $130 to the assigned-counsel-budget fund because
the order does not indicate that it is a civil assessment and not part of the criminal
sentence, but remanding to the trial court “for purposes of issuing a separate entry
ordering Phillips to pay the $130 fee as a civil assessment”).
{¶ 24} Likewise, here, although supported by the record, the trial court’s
imposition of the costs of appointed counsel as part of Saxer’s sentence is contrary to law
and must be vacated.
{¶ 25} Accordingly, Saxer’s second assignment of error is well-taken, in part.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Williams County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. The portion of the judgment
imposing the costs of appointed counsel as part of Saxer’s sentence is reversed and
vacated. The remaining portions of the judgment are affirmed. Consistent with Connin,
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this matter is remanded to the trial court to include the civil assessment of the costs of
appointed counsel in a separate judgment entry. Costs of this appeal are to be divided
evenly between the parties pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed, in part,
reversed, in part, and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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