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2023 Ohio 487

State v. Davis

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided February 17, 2023

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2023-02-17

Counsel's decisions regarding which witness to call fall within the realm of trial strategy. Speculation as to what an uncalled witness would have said at trial is not sufficient for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Sufficient evidence supports the judgment of the trial court. Jury did not lose its way and the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · State v. Thompkins · State v. Jenks

Decided 2023-02-17

[Cite as State v. Davis, 
2023-Ohio-487
.]




                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY


State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. L-22-1028

        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. CR0202001261

v.

Robert Davis                                     DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                Decided: February 17, 2023

                                           

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Brad F. Hubbell, for appellant.

                                           

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant Robert Davis appeals the January 13, 2022 judgment of the Lucas

County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to life without parole for an aggravated

murder conviction, with additional prison sentences of 11 years for the burglary
conviction, 11 years for the kidnapping conviction and 36 months for the tampering

conviction, all to be served consecutively.

       {¶ 2} For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       {¶ 3} Appellant raises two assignments of error for our review. His first

assignment of error, presented in his brief as an “Issue Presented for Review” asks “Did

Mr. Davis receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to secure a

witness, central to defendant’s defense, for trial?”

                                    Procedural History

       {¶ 4} On February 12, 2020, the Lucas County grand jury issued an indictment

charging Robert Davis with aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and (F)

(Count 1); murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(8) and 2929.02 (Count 2); felonious

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D) (Count 3); aggravated robbery in

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) and (C) (Count 4); aggravated burglary in violation of

R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) and (B) (Count 5); kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)

and (C) (Count 6); and tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and

(B) (Count 7). The first six counts carried a repeat violent offender specification pursuant

to R.C. 2941.149.

       {¶ 5} A jury found Davis guilty of all the charges. The record reflects that at the

conclusion of the trial and before sentencing, the violent offender specifications were

dismissed by the prosecution.




2.
                                        Facts

      {¶ 6} On March 6, 2019, victim’s wife was on her way home and texted her

husband, victim, asking him to help her unload her photography equipment from her

car when she arrived home. Victim didn’t respond before she arrived at the house at

about 5:00 p.m., and she thought he might have fallen asleep.

      {¶ 7} Victim’s wife was bringing her equipment into the house from her car

when she noticed an empty shelf where the couple normally kept DVD’s. She went

upstairs and saw the doors to a linen closet had been left open. She looked into the

bedroom, where she saw victim’s legs were sticking out from beside the bed next to

the window. She ran to him and saw that he was nude, lying on his back, with his

arms bound together and his ankles bound together. Green cloth cords were wrapped

around his neck, and his face was purple.

      {¶ 8} Victim’s wife called 911 at 5:12:53 p.m. As she spoke to the 911

operator, she used fingernail clippers to cut material wrapped around victim’s neck.

Victim’s hands were tied in front of his chest and she had to untie them in order to

attempt a few repetitions of CPR.

      {¶ 9} When victim’s wife let in the first officer responding to the call, she

realized that the front door to the house wasn’t locked. A laptop, some DVD’s,

costume jewelry, a DVD player, a small boom box, cufflinks, and a watch were

missing. The DVD’s had the couple’s last name written on the boxes. Victim’s wife




3.
didn’t notice that her husband’s wedding ring was missing, but later police showed

her a photo of a ring which she identified as belonging to her husband. She

confirmed that the open drawers in the bedroom and scattered contents were not the

way she’d left the house.

                                          Analysis

       {¶ 10} In counsel’s opening statement, he patently argues to the jury that an ex-

girlfriend “framed” appellant and that Davis had nothing to do with these crimes.

       {¶ 11} In his closing argument, defense counsel unambiguously focused on the

person who did not appear at the trial. Specifically, the ex-girlfriend. With respect to the

evidence provided by this person to the police, counsel encouraged the jurors to consider

that she “gave those items to a new male acquaintance as he prepared to set off on a

cross-country crime spree” although there was no evidence introduced whatsoever to

even suggest that such an imagined theory could be based on facts.

       {¶ 12} This ex-girlfriend was never called as a witness for either the prosecution

or the defense.

       {¶ 13} Appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate,

locate and compel his ex-girlfriend to testify at trial. He further argues that his sole

defense was that the ex-girlfriend played a material role in the case and that without her

testimony the jury could not find for the state.




4.
       {¶ 14} To establish his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Davis must

show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective

standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that

but for counsel’s errors, the proceedings result would have been different. State v. Perez,

124 Ohio St.3d 122
, 
2009-Ohio-6179
, 
920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 200
, citing Strickland v.

Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687
, 
104 S.Ct. 2052
, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674
 (1984) and State v.

Bradley, 
42 Ohio St.3d 136
, 
538 N.E.2d 373
 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 15} A reviewing court must determine whether trial counsel’s assistance fell

below an objective standard of reasonable advocacy. Bradley at 141-142. Moreover, the

deficient performance must have been so serious that, “were it not for counsel’s errors,

the result of the trial would have been different.” 
Id. at 141-142
.

       {¶ 16} Trial strategy must be accorded deference and cannot be examined through

the distorting effect of hindsight. State v. Conway, 
109 Ohio St.3d 412
, 
2006-Ohio-2815
,

848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 115
. An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect

on the judgment. 
Strickland at 691
.

       {¶ 17} Because “effective assistance” may involve different approaches or

strategies, our scrutiny of trial counsel’s performance must be highly deferential with a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. State v. Alliman, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-21-024, 2023-Ohio-




5.
206, ¶ 35-38, citing State v. Bradley, 
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142
, 
538 N.E.2d 373
 (1989),

quoting 
Strickland at 689
.

         {¶ 18} In State v. Rodgers, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1089, 
2004-Ohio-3795, ¶ 19
,

this court noted that Ohio courts have generally held that counsel's decisions regarding

which witnesses to call fall within the realm of trial strategy and will not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.

         {¶ 19} Davis claims that since his trial counsel argued to the jury that his ex-

girlfriend was somehow materially involved and maybe even responsible for the murder,

he was ineffective in failing to investigate, locate and compelling her testimony.

         {¶ 20} The record establishes that the ex-girlfriend contacted police in Cheyenne,

Wyoming and identified Davis as the murderer. When further interviewed by authorities

in Wyoming as well as Toledo police, she provided information corroborating the

murder. She also supplied the police with her laptop which contained some of the

victim’s identification information. She further indicated to Toledo police that she feared

Davis.

         {¶ 21} Neither the prosecution nor defense called this ex-girlfriend as a witness.

The decision of counsel to call or not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of

professional judgment which experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact

that there was a witness that could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not

in itself proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness, absent a showing of prejudice. State v.




6.
Scruggs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107860, 
2019-Ohio-3043, ¶ 39
. See also Arnold v.

State, 
2022 Ark. 191, 196
, 
653 S.W.3d 781
 (2022), citing Johnson v. State, 325 Ark., 44,

49, 
924 S.W.2d 236
 (1996).

       {¶ 22} Davis only hypothesizes about the ex-girlfriend’s actions and what she

would have testified to at trial. Speculation as to what an uncalled witness would have

said at trial is not sufficient for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.

Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-06-144, 
2005-Ohio-3887, ¶ 15
.

       {¶ 23} In this instance, it was this very witness that alerted police in Wyoming

about appellant’s involvement in the murder. She provided significant corroborating

information that was incriminating to Davis.

       {¶ 24} Appellant did not proffer any evidence that this witness was prepared to

cooperate in his defense or provide any testimony that would have been of some benefit

to his defense. Thus, there is no basis for Davis to conclude that the failure to investigate,

locate and even call the ex-girlfriend to testify, prejudiced his defense.

       {¶ 25} The record of the trial indicates that counsel’s continued insistence on

repeating the elaborate theoretical criminal scheme of the absent ex-girlfriend drew an

objection from the prosecution. The prosecution was troubled how, even if ex-girlfiend

were to appear at trial, counsel could “get her to admit to these criminal activities.”

When noted that there was no obstruction to the defense having subpoenaed this witness,

the trial court also pointed out that he “can’t have it both ways.”




7.
       {¶ 26} We must conclude that counsel’s deliberate actions were a conscious trial

strategy to somehow blame these offenses on the absent witness. In consideration of the

totality of the evidence that was placed before the jury, we cannot conclude that counsel’s

efforts falls outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

       {¶ 27} Having found nothing in the record to support a conclusion that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate, locate or call the ex-girlfriend as a witness

at trial, we find the appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken and denied.

       {¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, Davis asks “Did the trial jury err when it

found Mr. Davis guilty because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding and

the finding was not sustained by the manifest weight of the evidence?”

       {¶ 29} Davis presents no argument in support of either of these propositions other

than to repeat his claims that the state presented no eyewitness, there was a lack of a

confession and of fingerprints at the crime scene or in the U-Haul vehicle and lack of any

communication between the victim and Davis. Essentially, appellant argues that all the

evidence was circumstantial and therefore, insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.

       {¶ 30} Other than these broadsided statements, appellant offers nothing more

specific with respect to the elements of the individual crimes for which he was convicted

and the evidence presented. He cites to State v. Tibbetts, 
92 Ohio St.3d 146, 161-63
, 
749 N.E.2d 226
 (2001) in support of his argument in this assignment. In that case, the court

upheld the double murder and aggravated robbery convictions of Tibbetts largely based




8.
upon circumstantial evidence. The court also found the arguments on sufficiency of the

evidence and the verdict being against the manifest weight of the evidence to be not well-

taken.

                                 Sufficiency of the Evidence

         {¶ 31} In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant fails to address the

elements required to sustain any of the convictions.

         {¶ 32} Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal standard that tests whether the

evidence introduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a verdict. State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386
, 
678 N.E.2d 541
 (1997). We examine the evidence in a light

most favorable to the state and decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found

that the state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements of the

crime. State v. Jenks, 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
, 
574 N.E.2d 492
 (1991), superseded by state

constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 
80 Ohio St.3d 89
,

684 N.E.2d 668
 (1997); State v. Yarbrough, 
95 Ohio St.3d 227
, 
2002-Ohio-2126
, 
767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 78
.

         {¶ 33} Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question

of law. 
Thompkins at 386
. In determining whether a conviction is based on sufficient

evidence, an appellate court does not assess whether the evidence is to be believed, but

whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction. See

Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus; Yarbrough at ¶ 79.




9.
       {¶ 34} All evidence admitted against the appellant at trial may be considered on a

claim of insufficient evidence. Yarbrough at ¶ 80. Appellee could meet its burden at trial

using circumstantial evidence. State v. Duke, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-001, 2021-Ohio-

1552, ¶ 26. While inferences cannot be built on inferences, several conclusions can be drawn

from the same set of facts; and a series of facts and circumstances can be used as a basis for

ultimate findings. Id., quoting State v. Lott, 
51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168
, 
555 N.E.2d 293
 (1990).

       {¶ 35} For the following reasons, we further disagree with appellant.

       {¶ 36} Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such character that an ordinary

person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person’s own

affairs. R.C. 2901.05(E).

                     Murder, Aggravated Murder, Aggravated Robbery,
                          Aggravated Burglary and Kidnapping

       {¶ 37} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of murder and aggravated

murder, appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about March 6, 2019,

in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant caused the death of the victim as the proximate result of

committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or

second degree, in this case the offenses of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and

kidnapping.

       {¶ 38} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of felonious assault, in

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on




10.
or about March 6, 2019, in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant did knowingly cause serious

physical harm to the victim.

       {¶ 39} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of aggravated robbery in

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on

or about July 6, 2019, in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant in attempting or committing a

theft offense, as defined in R.C. 2913.01, inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical

harm on another.

       {¶ 40} In order to prove aggravated robbery, appellee must also prove a “theft

offense.” A “theft offense” includes “theft,” defined by R.C. 2913.02(A), as, “No person,

with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert

control over either the property or services in any of the following ways: (1) Without the

consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (2) Beyond the scope of the

express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (3) By

deception; (4) By threat; or (5) By intimidation.

       {¶ 41} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of aggravated burglary in

violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on

or about March 6, 2019, in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant by force, stealth, or deception,

trespassed in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied

portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than his accomplice is

present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately




11.
occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, in this case, assault, by inflicting

physical harm on another.

         {¶ 42} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of kidnapping in violation of

R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about

March 6, 2019, in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant did by force or threat, restrain the

liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the

victim or place the other person in fear.

         {¶ 43} In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of tampering with evidence in

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on

or about March 6, 2019, in Lucas County, Ohio, appellant did, knowing that an official

proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, alter,

destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its

value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation.

         {¶ 44} Upon our review, we find that the prosecution established the following

facts.

                                     The Murder Scene

         {¶ 45} On March 6, 2019, responding officers arrived at the scene of the

murder by 5:15p.m. They found victim’s body lying on the floor, completely nude,

bound at the ankles with green t-shirt material and at the wrists by an electronic

charger cord. Clumps of the green t-shirt material were near the body. Victim had




12.
ligature marks around his neck and was obviously deceased. Dresser drawers had

been left open, with clothes thrown about the room.

      {¶ 46} Victim’s wife told officers that he had left for work at 6 a.m., returned

at 7 a.m. because he forgot his wallet, and then left again. She left at noon but

returned at 4:45 p.m.

      {¶ 47} At about 4 or 4:30, a neighbor saw a “mom-van” bearing a U-Haul

logo parked near victim’s house. A man walked from the house to the van with a

big blue duffel bag. He entered the front door of the house, which didn’t appear to

be locked. The man was a white male of average height and build, and the U-Haul

was gone when police arrived.

      {¶ 48} The coroner testified that Victim died of strangulation. Victim’s hyoid

bone was fractured, and there was an area of hemorrhage nearby, indicating that the

fracture occurred while victim was still alive.

                           Report to Wyoming Authorities

      {¶ 49} On March 21, 2019, a person referred to as the ex-girlfriend of

appellant reported to the Laramie County, Wyoming Sheriff that Davis was involved

in a homicide in Toledo. She reported information about a U-Haul, consistent with

the neighbor’s report of seeing a U-Haul near victim’s house. Ex-girlfriend and

Davis had stayed in the same apartment in North Platte, Nebraska, and a search

warrant of the unit was executed.




13.
                 Search warrant of North Platte, Nebraska apartment

       {¶ 50} A search of the rental unit in North Platte resulted in the recovery of

several items from victim’s home that victim wife identified. These items included

an HP laptop, a cell phone, charging cord, jewelry and DVD’s. Officers discovered

two blue canvas bags that matched the description of the witness who saw the man

walking to and from the van parked near the victim’s house.

       {¶ 51} The HP laptop’s operating system had been reinstalled on March 7,

2019. A user account for Davis was set up on Skype after the reinstall. Numerous

searches had been performed regarding a murder in Toledo, Ohio and a document in

unallocated space on the hard drive referred to the victim’s wife. The ex-girlfriend’s

own laptop had been restored to its factory settings. Victim’s cell phone had also been

wiped and restored to factory settings.

       {¶ 52} Davis was discovered in the rental unit on March 15, 2019. He vacated the

unit that day.

                                     U-Haul Rental

       {¶ 53} Davis rented the U-Haul in Gillette, Wyoming on February 22, 2019, at

9:02 a.m. The van was rented for two days, with a beginning mileage of 2,878 miles.

On March 15, 2019, the van was reported abandoned. It was recovered on March 18,

2019 at 2:52 at 1404 W. Rodeo Road, next door to the address of the rental unit that




14.
police searched. When the van was recovered, its odometer showed 6,590 miles, over

3,000 miles more than when it was rented.

                                Pawnshop Transactions

      {¶ 54} Law Enforcement Automated Data Systems records showed that Davis

pawned victim’s wedding band on March 6, 2019 at 6:27 p.m. at the Cashland at 3247

W. Alexis Road, Toledo, Ohio. The next day, on March 7, at 3:12 p.m., Davis pawned

a camcorder at the Pawn King in Moline, Illinois. On March 9, 2019, he sold 60

DVD’s at AAA Ultimate Pawn in Lincoln, Nebraska. On March 11, 2019, at 11:02

a.m., he sold a DVD player with a carrying case and a charger in North Platte,

Nebraska. Davis’ driver’s license was used to make each sale.

                                     DNA testing

      {¶ 55} DNA analysis of the swab of the end of the charging cord used to bind

victim’s wrist revealed a mixture of DNA. The two major contributors had profiles

consistent with victim and Davis, and the frequency of the occurrence of a profile

identical to that of Davis was 1 in 10 million. Swabs of the cloth around the

victim’s neck revealed a similar mixture, with a frequency of 1 in 10,000.

                               Toledo Police Interview

      {¶ 56} When Toledo Police detectives spoke with Davis on April 2, 2019, he

admitted he had been in Toledo.




15.
       {¶ 57} In a sufficiency analysis, an appellate court does not assess whether the

evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant

would support a conviction. See Jenks, 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
, 
574 N.E.2d 492
, at paragraph

two of the syllabus; Yarbrough, 
95 Ohio St.3d 227
, 
2002-Ohio-2126
, 
767 N.E.2d 216, at ¶ 79
 (noting that courts do not evaluate witness credibility when reviewing a sufficiency

of the evidence claim).

       {¶ 58} Contrary to appellant’s claim, we find that the state produced evidence to

link Davis to this murder. And, this evidence, if believed, established that the state

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of these crimes for which he

was convicted.

       {¶ 59} Therefore, we find that the record contains sufficient evidence to support

appellant’s convictions for Murder, Aggravated Murder, Felonious Assault, Aggravated

Robbery, Aggravated Burglary, Kidnapping and Tampering With Evidence.

       {¶ 60} Appellant’s second assignment of error on the issue of sufficiency of

evidence is found not well-taken and is denied.

                                      Manifest Weight

       {¶ 61} Without any additional argument, Davis also claims the verdict was against

the manifest weight of the evidence. When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a

trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate

court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact finder’s resolution of the




16.
conflicting testimony. State v. Wilson, 
113 Ohio St.3d 382
, 
2007-Ohio-2202
, 
865 N.E.2d 1264
, ¶ 25, quoting Thompkins, 
78 Ohio St.3d at 387
, 
678 N.E.2d 541
.

       {¶ 62} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine whether, in

resolving any conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and thereby created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

must be ordered. State v. Jasso, 6th Dist., Fulton No. F-22-001, 
2023-Ohio-209, ¶ 21-26
,

citing 
Thompkins at 387
. A conviction should be reversed on manifest weight grounds

only in the most exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the

conviction. 
Id.

       {¶ 63} Upon our review of the record, we find the jury did not lose its way and the

judgment convicting Davis of Murder, Aggravated Murder, Felonious Assault,

Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Burglary, Kidnapping and Tampering With Evidence

and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶ 64} Appellant’s second assignment of error on the issue of manifest weight is

found not well-taken and denied.




17.
                                       Conclusion

       {¶ 65} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant

to App.R. 24(A)(4).

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.


       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.




Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE




       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.




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