[Cite as State v. Robinson,
2023-Ohio-825.]
COURT OF APPEALS
KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vsCase Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16
SARAH M. ROBINSON
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case Nos. 21CR03-0042 and
22CR06-0117
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 15, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
CHARLES T. MCCONVILLE TODD W. BARSTOW
NICOLE E. DERR 261 West Johnstown Road
KNOX COUNTY PROSECUTORS Suite 204
117 East High Street, Suite 234 Columbus, Ohio 43230
Mount Vernon, Ohio 43050
Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant Sarah M. Robinson appeals the July 25, 2022, judgment of
conviction and sentence of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is State
of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On March 9, 2021, in Knox County case 22CA000015, the Knox County
Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in
violation of R.C. §2925.11(A).
{¶3} On June 2, 2022, in Knox County case 22CA000016, Appellant was charged
by information with one count of Assault, in violation of R.C. §2903.13(A) and one count
of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence in violation of R.C.
§4511.19(A)(1)(a). Later on June 2, 2022, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the
charges in both cases.
{¶4} On July 21, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing
Appellee presented the facts that on January 6, 2021, Appellant was stopped for a traffic
violation, a canine sniff indicated the presence of narcotics. After a search of the vehicle,
law enforcement found a small amount of methamphetamine. Appellee also presented
facts that on May 13, 2022, Appellant operated a motor vehicle involved in an accident.
She was unsteady on her feet and slurring her speech. She became combative with law
enforcement officers and bit a patrolman.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶5} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises the following
Assignment of Error:
Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 3
{¶6} “I. APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTER HER PLEAS OF GUILTY, IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION SIXTEEN OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
I.
{¶7} In Appellant’s first Assignment of Error, Appellant argues she did not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. We disagree.
{¶8} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527,
660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
{¶9} Crim.R. 11 governs rights upon plea. In pertinent part, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
states:
Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waving the rights to jury trial,
to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶10} The standard for a trial court’s Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) constitutional
notifications is strict compliance. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200,
897 N.E.2d 621. “Strict compliance does not require an exact recitation of the precise
Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 4
language of the rule, but instead focuses on whether the trial court explained or referred
to the right in a manner reasonably intelligent to that defendant.” State v. Schmick, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95210,
2011-Ohio-2263, ¶8.
{¶11} “ ‘This Court along with several courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court,
has held there is no requirement that a trial court inform a defendant of his right to a
unanimous verdict.’” State v. Johnston, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 17CA000022, 2017-Ohio-
8593, ¶12, quoting State v. Rogers, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2008-0066, 2009-Ohio-
4899; State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321,
810 N.E.2d 927,
2004-Ohio-3167, ¶44-
46; State v. Barnett, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060950,
2007-Ohio-4599; State v.
Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26008,
2012-Ohio-1712, ¶12.
{¶12} Appellant points to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos
v. Louisiana, 206 L.Ed.2d 583,
140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020) in support of revisiting our decision
in Johnston. In Ramos, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a
unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense. However, Ohio has
always recognized unanimity.
{¶13} In State v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No 109852, 2021-Ohio-2676, ¶17-18,
the Eighth District Court of Appeals spoke directly to this issue:
Ohio has long recognized that a nonunanimous jury verdict is
unconstitutional and void. Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296, 296 (1853). Work
had been charged with assault and battery and convicted by a jury of six
men in probate court. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the legislation
regulating the practice of probate courts was unconstitutional and void
Knox County, Case Nos. 22 CA 15 and 22 CA 16 5
because it provided for a jury of six. Id. The court went to find that because
the right to a trial by jury is so fundamental, “the number of jurors cannot be
diminished, or a verdict authorized short of a unanimous concurrence of all
the jurors. Id. at 306. In 1933, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this court’s
decision finding a Cuyahoga County rule allowing for juries of six
unconstitutional. Cleveland R. Co v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 282,
188
N.E. 1 (1933). Decades later, in July 1973, Crim.R. 23 went into effect,
creating a uniform statewide rule that “[i]n felony cases juries shall consist
of twelve.” Crim R. 23(B)
The Ramos decision explicitly recognized Ohio’s long history of
requiring unanimity, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court in Work referred to
unanimity as “one of ‘the essential and distinguishing features of the trial by
jury.’” Ramos at 1423, quoting Work. Further, this right is explicitly protected
in Crim.R. 31(A) and implicitly protected in the Ohio Constitution. Thus, the
Ramos decision did not recognize a new constitutional right for criminal
defendants in Ohio like Scott. Further, neither Crim.R. 11(C) nor Ramos
impose an obligation on courts to inform a defendant about the exact
contours of a jury trial.
{¶14} We agree with the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Defendants have always
possessed the right to be convicted by a unanimous jury verdict. The Ramos decision
did nothing to alter that right nor the specific requirements of the Crim.R. 11 plea
colloquy.
{¶15} Even though Appellant is correct that, had her case proceeded to a jury trial,
unanimity would have been required for a conviction and the trial court did not explicitly
inform her of unanimity requirement, neither Crim.R. 11 nor Ramos require the trial court
to do so.
{¶16} Upon review of the record, we find the trial court strictly complied with
Crim.R. 11. Appellant was informed of her right to a jury trial, indicated she understood
the right, and that she was waiving that right by pleading guilty. Therefore, Appellant’s
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
{¶17} Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Knox County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
JWW/br 031
