J-S29040-23
2023 PA Super 228
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TERRY ALLEN PATTERSON :
:
Appellant : No. 376 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0004889-2021
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2023
Appellant, Terry Allen Patterson, appeals from the judgments of
sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County after it
found him guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
knowingly possessing a controlled substance, driving under the influence
(DUI), and of violating the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition against driving with
a suspended license for a prior DUI.1 The sole issue on appeal is the trial
court’s ruling that the initial seizure was lawful under the public servant
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(d)(2); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(i), respectively.
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exception to the warrant requirement where appellant’s car partially blocked
the left lane of a limited access highway. After careful review, we affirm.
The suppression hearing was held on June 13, 2022, with a single
witness, Sergeant Adam Shope, a nine-year veteran of the Northwest Regional
Police Department with specialized training and ample experience in
recognizing when motorists are DUI. Trial Court Opinion, 2. In its written
opinion, the trial court summarized its factual findings with respect to the
initial stop as follows:
At approximately 8:18 p.m. on November 15, 2021, Sergeant
Shope was on patrol traveling eastbound on Route 283 when he
observed vehicles in the left lane merging into the right lane to
avoid a vehicle stopped on the left shoulder of the highway.
Sergeant Shope observed a white Nissan Rogue parked on the left
shoulder of Route 283 East, at mile marker 16.8 (referred to as
the “Snyder’s Road overpass” at the evidentiary hearing and in
memoranda), in a sixty-five miles-per-hour speed limited zone.
The Nissan was parked with its left tires near the edge of the
highway's asphalt abutting the grass median and with its right
tires well into the left lane of Route 283 East, blocking a significant
portion of the lane. In response, Sergeant Shope activated his
emergency lights, pulled up behind the vehicle, exited his vehicle,
and approached the driver. Sergeant Shope both attested and
testified that the basis for his initiating contact with the Defendant
was to ascertain the Defendant’s well-being and render any
necessary aid.
Trial Court Opinion, 2 (footnote omitted).
The Sergeant was not sure whether the car was disabled or why it was
otherwise stopped in traffic. N.T. Suppression 6/13/23, 6, 35. Notably, he
activated his emergency lights for both the safety of the stopped car and
himself. Id. at 6-7. The trial court’s finding that the car blocked “a significant
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portion” of the left travel lane was fully supported by the video evidence
introduced at the suppression hearing:
Exhibit CW#1, In-Car-Video (Front): time 1:10.
Immediately upon speaking with Appellant, who was in the driver’s seat
alone in the car, Sergeant Shope recognized the blank stare, confusion,
disorientation, and sluggish movements of a person under the influence.
Appellant was unable to answer simple questions, including why he had
parked the car as he had. Sergeant Shope directed him to exit and stand by
the front of the patrol car. The officer ran Appellant’s information, and learned
he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI. While continuing to
speak with him, Sergeant Shope made additional observations that supported
his belief Appellant was operating the car while impaired. A second officer
arrived at the scene, and saw a wet cigarette inside the car, which he
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recognized to be consistent with the use of phencyclidine (PCP). Upon a search
of Appellant incident to arrest, Sergeant Shope discovered a large amount of
cash and a baggie containing 11 separate packets of crack cocaine and
another baggie of cocaine powder. A subsequent blood test revealed there
was PCP in Appellant’s system. Trial Court Opinion, 3-4.
Appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered. He
specifically alleged that the initial detention, when the officer pulled in behind
his stopped car with emergency lights activated, was without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. In addition to Sergeant Shope’s testimony, video
evidence from the patrol car and body cameras was introduced at the
suppression hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted
Appellant’s request to file a brief. On November 2, 2022, the court denied
suppression, and listed the matter for trial.
The trial court filed its opinion addressing the suppression claim
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) on November 7, 2022. It held that Sergeant
Shope initiated a detention when he pulled his patrol car behind Appellant’s
parked car on the highway with the emergency lights activated. It agreed with
appellant that Sergeant Shope neither had probable cause of a Motor Vehicle
Code violation nor reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that point in
time. Trial Court Opinion, 7.2 Nonetheless, the court ruled that under the
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2 The trial court declined to consider whether Sergeant Shope had probable
cause of a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition on standing or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine the seizure was
lawful. Relying on Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017),
the trial court held that “Sergeant Shope was able to articulate specific
objective facts that reasonably suggested his assistance was needed to
mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11.
On February 6, 2023, after a colloquy, Appellant waived a jury trial. The
bench trial was conducted by the same judge who ruled on the suppression
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parking a car on “a limited access highway unless authorized by official trafficcontrol devices.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353(a)(2)(vii). It ruled that the
Commonwealth’s reliance on a violation of that section was an “after-the-fact
justification […] for the stop rather than its genesis.” Trial Court Opinion, 7.
Because we have determined that the stop was lawful under the public servant
exception of the community caretaking doctrine, we will not address the
Commonwealth’s argument that probable cause for a Motor Vehicle Code
violation also existed at the moment of seizure (see Brief for Appellee, 15-
18). We note that, in general, probable cause exists where the totality of the
circumstances shows that “the facts and circumstances within the police
officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be
arrested.” Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012).
The officer’s subjective intent “play[s] no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996). All that matters is that the officer’s conduct was objectively
reasonable, i.e., a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have
believed that he had probable cause.
Id. “[T]he fact that the officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”
Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
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motion. Trial was based on stipulated facts supported by documentary
evidence and incorporated suppression hearing testimony. The trial court
found defendant guilty of the four counts charged. Appellant waived a
presentence investigation and proceeded immediately to sentencing. The
court imposed an aggregate term of two to six years’ imprisonment.3
Appellant filed a timely appeal.4 In his Rule 1925(b) Statement, he
asserted it was error to deny suppression, “where the stop and seizure of
[Appellant’s] vehicle was not justified under the public servant exception to
the warrant requirement in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and
therefore, any contraband or items found on his person, property or in the
vehicle searched should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal
seizure.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement. The trial court issued an order
on April 3, 2023, specifically relying on its previously filed opinion in response
to Appellant’s claim.
On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we apply the
following standard of review:
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3 The trial court also terminated probation under a separate docket number.
See CP-36-CR-0006650-2019.
4 The notice of appeal contained a typographical error noting two dates (one
of which was correct) for the judgement of sentence. The caption of the appeal
reflects that it is taken from the February 6, 2023 judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(en banc) (correcting caption when appellant misstates where appeal lies).
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[We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound
by those findings and may reverse only if the [suppression] court’s
legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on the allegations of
legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
binding on the appellate court, ‘whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.’ Thus,
the conclusions of law of the [suppression court] are subject to
our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones,
988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).
At the suppression hearing, Appellant challenged only the “stop and
detention” that initiated the confrontation between him and Sergeant Shope,
and declined to otherwise contest the officer’s conduct during the traffic stop
or the probable cause for arrest. N.T. Suppression 6/13/22, 3-4, 12-13. The
trial court recognized in its opinion that Appellant’s suppression claims “focus
solely on his initial stop and detention.” Trial Court Opinion, 4. And, in his
brief, Appellant challenged only the trial court’s application of the public
servant exception to the warrant requirement for the initial stop and
detention. Brief for Appellant, 4. We will, therefore, limit our analysis to the
lawfulness of the initial seizure.
There was no dispute at the suppression hearing that Sergeant Shope
seized Appellant when he initiated an investigative detention by pulling in
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behind the stopped car with the emergency lights activated. Indeed, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “a reasonable person, innocent of
any crime, would … interpret the activation of emergency lights on a police
vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d
at 621. It held that even when the citizen’s car was already parked on the
shoulder of a highway, the “Appellant was seized and subjected to an
investigative detention.” Id. At 625; see also Commonwealth v. Gindraw,
297 A.3d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2023).
The question, therefore, is whether the public servant exception of the
community caretaking doctrine justified that seizure. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained that the community caretaking doctrine:
… has been characterized as encompassing three specific
exceptions [to the warrant requirement]: the emergency aid
exception, the automobile/inventory exception, and the public
servant exception, also sometimes referred to as the public safety
exception.
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 626-627; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 851.
“Each of the exceptions contemplates that the police officer’s actions be
motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation
of criminal activity.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 627.
With respect to the public servant exception under Pennsylvania law,
the Livingstone Court recognized that “the role of police is not limited to the
detection, investigation, and prevention of criminal activity,” in that “officers
engage in a myriad of activities that ensure the safety and welfare of our
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Commonwealth’s citizens.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also
Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 569 (Pa. 2018) (noting the “wide
variety” of community caretaking “laudable endeavors” expected of police
officers relating to the health and safety of the citizenry in applying the
emergency aid exception).
In recognition of the many different tasks assigned to police officers, the
Livingstone Court adopted a test of “reasonableness” to evaluate the officer’s
motivation under the exception, because “it is not realistic or wise to expect
an officer to ignore the nature of his or her role in law enforcement—or its
inherent dangers—in order for the public servant exception … to apply.”
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637.
Thus, so long as a police officer is able to point to specific,
objective, and articulable facts which, standing alone reasonably
would suggest that his assistance is necessary, a coinciding
subjective law enforcement concern by the officer will not negate
the validity of that search under the public servant exception.
Id.; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“Livingstone specifically rejected
that … an investigation must be ‘totally divorced’ from the detection of criminal
activity”).
The Court set forth a three-element test for determining when the public
servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community
caretaking doctrine may properly be invoked:
the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts
which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that
assistance was needed; the police action must be independent
from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal
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evidence; and, based on a consideration of the surrounding
circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to
rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance
has been provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will
be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (emphasis supplied).
The trial court applied Livingstone to the facts of this case and found
that all three elements were satisfied. First, it held that the officer “was able
to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his
assistance was needed to mitigate peril” because “essentially half” of
Appellant’s car was parked “in the left lane of a limited access highway,”
thereby putting Appellant “at risk of injury or death from a rear end collision.”
Trial Court Opinion, 11. The court noted further that the officer’s observation
of several cars being “forced to change lanes in order to avoid such a collision”
with Appellant’s car supported the officer’s intervention to minimize the peril
presented. Id. Second, it found that the officer’s “actions were independent
from detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence,” based on
the officer’s written reports and credited testimony that his “sole objective in
initiating the traffic stop was to check on the well-being of the occupant, who
was not visible to him until making contact.” Id. Third, the court found that
the “only reasonable and narrowly tailored means available to Sergeant Shope
to render assistance and mitigate peril was to initiate a traffic stop with his
emergency lights activated to ward off other drivers.” Id. (distinguishing this
case from the facts presented in Livingstone).
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Appellant argues on appeal only that the trial court’s finding with respect
to the first element of the Livingstone test was erroneous. He contends that
the fact that his car “was partially in the left lane of travel of the two[-]lane
road was not sufficient by itself to justify the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 18
(emphasis in original). According to Appellant, in light of the officer’s stated
aim to check “on the welfare of the motorist when he pulled in behind
[Appellant’s car,]” the officer “was unable to articulate thereafter any specific
and objective facts what would reasonably suggest that [Appellant] was in
need of assistance at the time of the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 17.
We have no difficulty concluding, as did the trial court, that any
reasonable officer would believe her assistance is needed upon finding a car
stopped and blocking the left travel lane of a high-speed portion of a limited
access highway. These are “specific and articulable facts which, viewed
objectively and independent of any law enforcement concerns” fully
support the public servant exception. Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 636
(emphasis supplied). Indeed, absent extraordinary reasons, it would have
been a dereliction of duty for a police officer to ignore such an apparent and
immediate safety hazard on a highway. It also was reasonable to assume that
either the car or motorist was in distress from the fact that the car was stopped
in such a precarious position.
Appellant’s argument focuses exclusively on his own supposed need for
caretaking. It skips over what is obvious. The stopped car, fully half of which
was in the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-hour speed zone and blocking
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a “significant portion” (at least a third) of that lane, thereby forcing other cars
to move from the left to the right lane to avoid a collision, was the peril the
officer needed to address. That peril, and the risk of serious accident and
injury presented, was to the other motorists on the highway as much as it was
to the motorist of the stopped car. By pulling in behind the car stopped in the
driving lane of the highway and activating his emergency lights for the “safety”
of the stopped car and himself “because [they] were pretty much blocking the
left lane of travel,” N.T. Suppression, 6/13/22, 6-7, the officer manifested his
duty to “ensure the safety and welfare of our Commonwealth’s citizens.”
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 849 (noting
that, even where the stopped car is “legally parked on the shoulder of the
roadway,” the activation of emergency lights serves the purpose of “providing
greater visibility to both the Troopers and the vehicle they were pulling behind
… [and] also signal to other vehicles in the surrounding area to either slow
down or move over”).
This concern for the safety of other motorists on a highway, in addition
to the motorist of the stopped car, is encompassed within the community
caretaking doctrine. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-448
(1973) (adopting community caretaking doctrine and ruling that police
“concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an
intruder removed a revolver from the trunk” of a car that had been in single
car accident warranted entry into the trunk); State v. McCormick,
494
S.W.3d 673, 687 (Tenn. 2016) (quoted in Livingstone: community
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caretaking encompasses “the possibility of a person in need of assistance or
the existence of a potential threat to public safety”); Ullom v. Miller, 705
S.E.2d 111, 121 (W.Va. 2010) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking
“encompasses a non-investigatory, non-criminal role of police officers to help
to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens”);Williams v. State,
962 A.2d
210, 217 (Del. 2008) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking doctrine
“permits police officers to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in
peril”).
Appellant relies on the particular circumstances of Livingstone and an
unpublished memorandum of this Court to provide a laundry list of factors not
present here, which he argues undermines the trial court’s conclusion there
was a need for action by the officer: no inclement weather; no signs of
accident; no indication that the car was not parked as close as practicable to
the grass of the median; no hazard lights activated; and no calls or complaints
about a car in need of assistance or “disrupting the flow of traffic.” Brief for
Appellant, 17-18. Appellant’s argument challenges only the weight given by
the trial court to salient factors. Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 852; see also
Commonwealth v. Vaughn,
2021 WL 3702577, *5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-
precedential decision) (“The crux of Appellant’s argument . . . that there were
no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance . . . goes to the
weight of the evidence presented”). As such, it is contrary to the standard of
review obligating this Court to consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence
and so much of the defense evidence that remains uncontradicted.
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Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 619. “[I]t is within the suppression court’s sole
province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given to their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d
1117, 1123 & 1126 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (deferring to suppression
court’s weighing of testimony given on direct- and cross-examination).
In Livingstone, the Supreme Court found the circumstances presented
were insufficient to warrant an intrusion under the public servant exception:
a car “pulled over onto the right shoulder of the road; the engine running, but
hazard lights not activated” on an interstate highway. Livingstone, 174 A.3d
at 614. Although not stated by the Court, it is a fair inference that the car
“pulled over onto the right shoulder” was not blocking traffic. These
observations by the state trooper did not rise to “specific and objective facts
that would reasonably suggest that Appellant needed assistance.” Id. at 638.
Similarly, we have ruled that a trooper’s observation of a car “legally parked
on the shoulder” where “the driver appeared to be looking at her phone or
digging through her purse and was slumped over towards the passenger seat”
was insufficient to warrant an intrusion. Commonwealth v. Savino, 2021
WL 4171450, *1 & *6 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision). In both
cases, the cars were safely stopped on the side of a highway, engine running
– indicating the stop could be temporary – and with no other sign of distress.
In direct contrast, Appellant’s car was not safely stopped, and, instead, was
blocking a significant portion of the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-
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hour zone. The salient factor here, not present in either Livingstone or
Savino, was that the stopped car presented a real hazard to other drivers.
As the Supreme Court observed:
there are many reasons why a driver might pull to the side of a
highway: the driver may need to look at a map, answer or make
a telephone call, send a text message, pick something up off the
floor, clean up a spill, locate something in her purse or in his
wallet, retrieve something from the glove compartment, attend to
someone in the back seat, or, . . . enter an address into the
vehicle’s navigation system.
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634-35 (footnote omitted). We agree that “pulling
to the side of the road to perform any of these activities is encouraged, as a
momentary distraction while driving may result in catastrophic
consequences,” when the car is safely pulled over and out of the way of traffic.
Id. However, we can think of no reason, and Appellant has offered none, that
should give a reasonable officer a moment’s hesitation to stop and investigate
why this car was blocking the left travel lane.
By weighing the testimony elicited on cross-examination in isolation of
the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s argument both violates the
standard of review and fails to give any weight to the peril presented by his
stopped car. Certainly, there is nothing in Livingstone that requires the
existence of activated hazard lights, inclement weather or the like to warrant
an intrusion under the public servant exception. The question to be answered
is not whether specific circumstances were present but whether the officer can
“point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably
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suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance.”
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634. Rote reliance on a check list would undermine
the Supreme Court’s stated belief that “[r]equiring an officer to articulate
specific and objective facts … will cabin reliance on the exception and enable
courts to properly assess its employment.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 635. As
the Supreme Court recognized the public servant exception could arise in a
“myriad of [police] activities” and not just those limited to a few factors. Id.
at 629.
Examining the specific factors cited by Appellant, moreover,
demonstrates that each must be reviewed within the totality of the
circumstances to be properly weighed. For example, Appellant cites the lack
of calls or complaints about a car disrupting traffic. But no calls were needed
for the officer to reasonably assess the situation here, because he personally
saw that the stopped car was “disrupting the flow of traffic” from the fact that
several cars had to move from the left lane to the right to safely pass by it.
The presence of inclement weather may be significant in certain situations,
particularly where an officer’s concern includes the possibility of a prior
accident or of a motorist seeking help by wandering away from the car, but,
here, the officer’s reasonable concern was directed at a future accident.
Inclement weather might make that concern even greater, but the lack of it
did not render the situation safe.
We agree that activated hazard lights in many circumstances would
support an officer’s belief that a citizen required assistance (and likely
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welcomed it). See Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“the presence of Gindraw’s
vehicle on the side of the road after midnight in a dark area with its hazard
lights flashing provided the experienced trooper with specific, objective, and
articulable facts to suggest he might require assistance”). The absence of
activated hazard lights should not automatically preclude application of the
public servant exception where other signs of distress are present. Similarly,
the fact that Appellant’s car was stopped on a narrow shoulder, seemingly
parallel to, and “as close as possible to the median,” Brief for Appellant, 18,
might indicate that the motorist possessed all of his faculties when he stopped
his car on a highway, but certainly was outweighed (and undermined) by the
fact that the car “was blocking a significant portion of” the driving lane. Trial
Court Opinion, 2.
We therefore agree with the trial court that Sergeant Shope “was able
to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his
assistance was needed to mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11. The record
amply supports the trial court’s finding that the first element of the
Livingstone test for the public servant exception was satisfied.
Appellant has not challenged the trial court’s rulings with respect to the
remaining two elements. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and find
the trial court’s rulings are supported by the record evidence at the
suppression hearing. As Sergeant Shope testified, and the trial court found,
his actions were motivated by concern for the motorist and the peril presented
by the stopped car blocking the travel lane, which “were independent from
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detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence” and “would have
been a dereliction of duty” for him to ignore. Trial Court Opinion, 11. Finally,
Sergeant Shope’s interaction with Appellant constituted a minimal intrusion,
as it was limited to an approach to the driver’s side window to inquire on
Appellant’s reasons for having parked the car as he had.5 There was no show
of force by the officer, and the initial confrontation was brief, approximately a
minute, and a proper way to confirm whether assistance was needed to move
the car out of the way of traffic. Trial Court Opinion, 11. This level of
interaction was “commensurate with the perceived need for assistance.”
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637; Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 854 (where car was
stopped on shoulder of road and not blocking travel, the “intrusion was
minimal” because it was short and not conducted for the purpose of detecting
crime).
Appellant did not contest that the officer acquired reasonable suspicion
and then probable cause of DUI after the initial confrontation. See
Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (“Once assistance has been provided or the
peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence”). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying
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5 Sergeant Shope testified that when he first made contact with Appellant, he
tried “to ask some information about his trip, what was going on, things like
that. [Appellant] was very dazed and confused, seemed very disoriented. I
had a very tough time getting simple answers from him.” N.T. Suppression
6/13/22, 8-9. Appellant did not provide an answer to the officer’s inquiries
with respect to his welfare or why he had stopped his car “where he did” and
his movements were “very sluggish.” Officer Shope believed at that time that
Appellant “was showing clues of impairment.” Id., 9.
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suppression of physical evidence following Sergeant Shope’s investigative
detention of Appellant.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/2023
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