#29933-a-JMK
2023 S.D. 7
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
…
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JERREN DONALD MANNING, Defendant and Appellant.
…
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
…
THE HONORABLE GREGG C. MAGERA
Judge
…
THOMAS J. COGLEY
Aberdeen, South Dakota Attorney for defendant
and appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
PAUL S. SWEDLUND
Solicitor General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.
…
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
OCTOBER 3, 2022
OPINION FILED 02/01/23
#29933
KERN, Justice
[¶1.] In May 2019, a jury found Jerren Manning guilty of two counts of first-
degree rape and two counts of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen.
The court sentenced Manning only on the rape convictions, imposing two
consecutive sixty-year terms in the state penitentiary. Manning appeals, raising
multiple issues including that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions, that the submission of the sexual contact charges to the jury violated
the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the court allowed improper bolstering
of witnesses, that the courtroom was improperly closed to the public during voir
dire, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Further, Manning
claims that his sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment
and constitutes an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] In 2017, Jeremy and Amanda Ahoe lived in Aberdeen along with their
three children, A.A. age eight, B.A. age six, and S.A. age three. Jeremy owned a
construction and rental company, and Amanda worked as a certified nursing
assistant. Manning, who was married with one child, also lived and worked in
Aberdeen. Jeremy and Manning were close friends, with Jeremy serving as the best
man in Manning’s wedding. Manning would often pick up A.A. and B.A. after
school and babysit all three children at the Ahoe home for a few hours until one of
their parents got home from work or Manning had to leave for work. At times,
Manning watched the children up to four days a week.
-1-
#29933
[¶3.] On multiple occasions, Jeremy would come home after work and find
Manning alone with B.A. in her upstairs bedroom while his other two daughters
were in different parts of the house. In the fall of 2018, Jeremy came home from
work early one day and discovered that the door to his office, located on the main
floor of their home, was closed. He opened the door and found B.A. and Manning
alone in the office. Although he was suspicious, Jeremy did not immediately
confront Manning about the situation, but instead returned to work.
[¶4.] Later that evening, Jeremy asked B.A. about being alone in the office
with Manning. B.A. eventually disclosed to both her parents that Manning had
touched her, but she did not describe the extent of the touching. Amanda stated
that B.A. was “sad and overwhelmed” when she talked about what happened.
Jeremy and Amanda debated back and forth about what to do with this information
and decided not to call law enforcement. Amanda, however, did call the school and
inform them that Manning was no longer permitted to pick up the children.
[¶5.] On the afternoon of October 4, 2018, Officer Jordan Mejeske of the
Aberdeen Police Department was contacted by the principal of the Ahoe girls’
elementary school, who informed him that a student had reported a possible sexual
assault of her sister. Officer Mejeske went to the school and talked to the principal,
the school counselor, and the reporting student’s teacher, but did not meet with
either A.A. or B.A. He then contacted the Central South Dakota Child Assessment
Center (CAC) to set up a forensic interview for B.A. He also contacted Amanda and
told her that law enforcement would be investigating the report and that she should
not discuss the situation with the children.
-2-
#29933
[¶6.] B.A. was interviewed and examined on October 11, 2018, at the CAC
by Angela Lisburg, a family nurse practitioner. During the interview, B.A. stated
that Manning had touched her more than one time. B.A. explained that sometimes
Manning would do the touching upstairs at their house, and sometimes downstairs
in her dad’s office. B.A. said that Manning would touch her with his private part,
that sometimes it would go in her bottom, and that Manning put his private part in
her bottom more than one time. She stated that Manning would pull her clothes
“half down” when he put his private part in her bottom. Lisburg asked B.A. how it
felt when Manning’s private part was in her bottom, to which she replied, “Not that
really bad, but it does hurt.” According to B.A., Manning would be on his knees and
B.A. would sometimes be laying down on her back and sometimes on her stomach.
She said that sometimes she was on her tummy on the chair in the office and
Manning would give her his phone so that she could play a game. While she was on
the phone, he would put his private part in her bottom.
[¶7.] B.A. stated that there was one time her daddy “noticed” that she was
alone in the office with Manning. That time, she was in the office laying down on
her back with the door to the office closed. Her dad came into the house, so she had
to pull her pants up and Manning put his private part back in his pants before her
dad came into the office. Lisburg asked B.A. if Manning or her dad said anything,
and B.A. replied “no.”
[¶8.] Lisburg also asked B.A. about the touching that happened upstairs,
and B.A. stated that “it’s the same thing” as happened downstairs. B.A. explained
that the touching upstairs would occur in her bedroom on the bed and that it
-3-
#29933
happened more than one time. B.A. described lying on her back on the bed, with
Manning kneeling on the floor. Later in the interview, B.A. indicated that Manning
would tell her to “lay down and lift yourself up.” When later asked to clarify this,
B.A. said “I would be lifting my legs up and he would tell me to put them on his
shoulder.”
[¶9.] B.A. recounted that on one occasion she was upstairs looking for a
battery when Manning came into the room and told her to come lie down on her
bed. She told him no. Lisburg asked B.A. to describe this incident in more detail.
B.A. said that Manning picked her up and told her that if she did not lie down he
would not come over again. She said she was scared because he said it in a mean
voice. She said that her sister was coming upstairs, and she pulled her pants up.
When asked to clarify what Manning did in the bedroom, she said he “did the same
thing as he does every single time.”
[¶10.] Lisburg asked B.A. if anything ever came out of Manning’s private
part, and B.A. responded that white stuff would come out and go on Manning’s
hands. He would have to wash his hands a lot to get it off. Sometimes it would spill
on the ground next to the chair in the office and Manning would use a baby wipe to
clean it up. He would then flush the baby wipe down the toilet. Lisburg asked B.A.
to describe what Manning’s body would be doing when his private part was in her
bottom. B.A. responded that it would be “going forward.” B.A. also stated that
sometimes Manning would tell her not to tell her dad.
[¶11.] After the interview, several items of physical evidence and samples
believed to contain potential DNA evidence were collected from the Ahoe home.
-4-
#29933
Investigators swabbed both the office chair and floor in Jeremy’s office and sent the
samples to the state laboratory in Pierre for testing.
[¶12.] A Brown County grand jury indicted Manning specifying the type of
crime and location of the offenses to wit: Count 1—first-degree rape in violation of
SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/office); Count 2—first-degree rape in violation of
SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/ bedroom); Count 3—sexual contact with a child
under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL 22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/office);
Count 4—sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL
22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/bedroom).
[¶13.] A two-day jury trial began on May 22, 2019. After opening
statements*, the State called Officer Majeske, Kristina Dreckman (a forensic
scientist from Pierre), Amanda, Jeremy, A.A., B.A., and Lisburg. Manning called
his ex-wife and testified on his own behalf.
[¶14.] Amanda testified about Manning’s willingness to babysit the girls,
stating that he once offered to watch them overnight. The offer arose after Manning
heard that she and Jeremy wanted to attend a concert in Sioux Falls. Although
Manning offered to stay overnight with the girls, Amanda testified that she was not
comfortable leaving them with a male for this length of time. After they had
decided not to go because they did not have a babysitter, Manning kept “pushing
the idea of babysitting them.” He even told Amanda that he thought about buying
the tickets for them so that they could attend.
* Manning initially reserved his right to make an opening statement, but after
the close of the State’s case he waived this right, instead proceeding directly
with his case-in-chief.
-5-
#29933
[¶15.] Amanda also testified that on one occasion Manning came over to help
her clean the house, something he had never done before. He told her that he felt
obligated to help her because he had stayed at their home after he and his wife had
an argument. Amanda relayed that Manning cleaned the kitchen and was
scrubbing the floors when she left for work that day. The children later told her
that Manning cleaned the office as well. Amanda testified that she found rugs from
the office hanging outside after they had apparently been hosed down.
[¶16.] Jeremy testified about the times he had found B.A. and Manning alone
in the office and bedroom together. Regarding the occasion where he found
Manning alone with B.A. in the office, he testified that when he opened the door
B.A. ran to the other side of the room, prompting him to ask Manning, “what’s going
on?” to which Manning “didn’t really reply.” Jeremy also testified that he and his
wife had sex in the office on multiple occasions, which was likely why investigators
found his sperm cell DNA in the office. Amanda confirmed this activity, testifying
that she and Jeremy often had sex in the office because it had a door which they
could lock to ensure the children did not enter the room. Jeremy also testified that
he had never asked Manning to clean the floor in the office.
[¶17.] A.A., who was nine years old at the time of trial, testified that she
knew B.A. and Manning had been alone in the office of their home with the door
closed. She also testified that on one occasion when she was checking on B.A.’s
whereabouts, she saw Manning in B.A.’s bedroom pulling up her pants.
[¶18.] B.A., who was seven at the time of trial, testified, albeit very briefly.
The State engaged in a short colloquy with her to establish that she knew the
-6-
#29933
difference between the truth and a lie. B.A. promised that everything she would
say in court would be the truth, and the circuit court placed her under oath. B.A.
acknowledged that she knew Manning because he babysat her and her sisters. She
also agreed that something bad happened while he was at the house. The State
asked B.A. if she told Lisburg during the recorded interview about the things that
happened with Manning and if what she told Lisburg was the truth. B.A. testified
that she did tell Lisburg about what happened and that she told the truth. The
State then asked B.A. what Manning did with his private part and she whispered
that Manning put his private part in her bottom. The State ended its examination
and Manning’s counsel did not cross examine B.A. After B.A.’s testimony, the State
offered the DVD of B.A.’s forensic interview which was played for the jury.
[¶19.] The State next called Lisburg, who testified about her credentials as a
family nurse practitioner and her extensive experience interviewing children. In
addition to conducting B.A.’s forensic interview, she also physically examined her
genitalia and perianal regions. Lisburg’s examination revealed no signs of physical
trauma. Lisburg testified that in the majority of child sexual abuse cases it is
normal to find no signs of physical trauma. She explained that this occurs because
the tissues in these areas heal “very quickly and often completely without any
evidence of scarring.”
[¶20.] The State also called Kristina Dreckman, a forensic scientist at the
South Dakota State Forensic Lab. She testified that she received several items that
had been collected from the Ahoe home. After briefly explaining the nature of DNA
to the jury, Dreckman stated that of the items collected, only two contained DNA
-7-
#29933
evidence. A swab taken from a chair in the office contained a DNA mixture from
three individuals, the major contributor being Amanda. Manning, Jeremy, and B.A.
were all excluded as contributors to that sample. The other sample, taken from a
stain on a floor mat in the office, revealed sperm cell DNA matching Jeremy and
excluding Manning.
[¶21.] At the conclusion of the State’s case, Manning moved for a judgment of
acquittal on all counts, contending there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
allegations. The circuit court denied the motion.
[¶22.] In his defense, Manning first called his ex-wife, Breana Olson. She
was asked about her sexual intimacy with Manning and the size of his penis. She
described it as around eight or nine inches long with a width a little less than a
silver dollar. She described experiencing a tear in her vaginal area prior to their
marriage as a result of sexual penetration by Manning. On cross examination, she
testified that Manning preferred small breasts and shaved pubic hair.
[¶23.] Manning testified in his own defense. He stated that the only time he
had been alone in a room with any of the girls was the day that Jeremy came home
early and found him in the office with B.A. He explained that after he picked the
girls up from school and took them home, he was in the office. B.A. opened the door
and came into the office asking for some chapstick. Because of the weight of the
coats hanging on the back of the office door, Manning testified that it bounced back
and partially closed. He said he hung out in the office because Jeremy allowed him
to smoke pot in there. He also testified that the day he cleaned the rugs and mat in
the office, Jeremy had asked him to do so. He denied ever sexually abusing B.A.
-8-
#29933
On cross-examination he acknowledged that B.A. was raped by someone, as she
described, but reiterated that he was not the perpetrator. He also claimed his penis
was so large that it would have caused physical trauma to B.A. if he had in fact
committed the alleged sexual acts.
[¶24.] The jury returned a verdict finding Manning guilty of all four counts.
Manning admitted the part II information alleging that he was a habitual offender,
having been convicted in 2010 of felony child abuse. The court ordered a
presentence investigation report and a psychosexual evaluation and scheduled a
sentencing hearing for July 17, 2019. At the beginning of the hearing, the State
requested that the circuit court sentence Manning on only the rape convictions
because the sexual contact convictions were based on the same factual
circumstances as the rape charges. Defense counsel did not object but requested
that the court “either strike or vacate” the sexual contact convictions. The court
denied the request to vacate but only entered judgments of conviction and sentences
on the rape convictions. The court sentenced Manning to serve sixty years in the
state penitentiary on each of the rape counts to be served consecutively.
[¶25.] Manning’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2019, but
then moved for substitute counsel to handle the direct appeal. The circuit court
appointed new counsel, but this Court dismissed the appeal on December 3, 2019,
after Manning failed to file a brief. Manning later filed a pro se petition seeking a
writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his
attorney’s failure to pursue his appeal. Manning was appointed new counsel, and
the circuit court agreed to issue an order vacating Manning’s sentence so that he
-9-
#29933
could be resentenced in order to restore his right to appeal. A hearing was held on
January 26, 2022, at which the circuit court resentenced Manning to the same
sentence originally given and issued amended judgments of conviction for the two
rape counts.
[¶26.] Manning raises a number of issues on appeal which we consolidate and
restate as follows:
1. Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on the two rape charges.
2. Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on the two sexual contact
charges in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
3. Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses at
trial by the circuit court and the prosecution.
4. Whether the circuit court improperly closed the courtroom
during the jury selection phase of Manning’s trial.
5. Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion.
6. Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
7. Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors.
Analysis
1. Whether the circuit court erred by denying
Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
two rape charges.
[¶27.] Manning first challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion for
judgment of acquittal. “Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de
-10-
#29933
novo.” State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 21,
970 N.W.2d 814, 823 (quoting State v.
Ware,
2020 S.D. 20, ¶ 12,
942 N.W.2d 269, 272). “We consider ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Snodgrass,
2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 51,
951 N.W.2d
792, 808). In doing so, we “will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the
credibility of witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” State v. Seidel,
2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 32,
953 N.W.2d 301, 313 (quoting State v. Brim,
2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6,
789 N.W.2d 80, 83). This is because “the jury is . . . the exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.”
Id. (quoting State v.
Jensen,
2007 S.D. 76, ¶ 7,
737 N.W.2d 285, 288). “[W]e accept the evidence and the
most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.”
Id. “If the evidence, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom sustains a reasonable theory of guilt, a guilty verdict will not be
set aside.” State v. Otobhiale,
2022 S.D. 35, ¶ 37,
976 N.W.2d 759, 772 (quoting
State v. Stone,
2019 S.D. 18, ¶ 38,
925 N.W.2d 488, 500).
[¶28.] The jury convicted Manning of two counts of rape in the first degree in
violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1). Rape in the first degree is “an act of sexual
penetration . . . if the victim is less than thirteen years of age[.]”
Id. It is
uncontested that B.A. is under the age of thirteen. Sexual penetration is defined as
“an act, however slight, of sexual intercourse, . . . anal intercourse, or any intrusion,
however slight, of any part of the body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body.” SDCL 22-22-2.
-11-
#29933
[¶29.] Manning argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish
penetration because the DNA evidence excludes him as the source of the semen
found in the office and that a penis of his size would leave evidence of trauma on a
seven-year-old victim, which was not present.
[¶30.] Regarding the first count of rape that occurred in the office, B.A.’s
testimony taken alone is sufficient to sustain the conviction. “[W]hen a conviction
turns in large part upon the credibility of witnesses, a circuit court properly leaves
‘to the jury the pervasive issue of credibility and considering the evidence as a
whole[.]’” Seidel, 2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 36,
953 N.W.2d at 314 (quoting State v. Guthrie,
2001 S.D. 61, ¶ 50,
627 N.W.2d 401, 422). B.A. acknowledged that bad things
happened with Manning and when asked what happened she told the jury that
Manning put his private part in her bottom. In addition, B.A.’s forensic interview,
which was played for the jury, contained B.A.’s description of how Manning’s
private part went in her bottom. If the jury believed this evidence, as it appears
they did, then the penetration element is effectively established, and this evidence
alone is sufficient to find Manning guilty of first-degree rape.
[¶31.] Although “there is no requirement that the testimony of a child
witness be corroborated,” State v. Smiley,
2004 S.D. 119, ¶ 6,
689 N.W.2d 427, 429,
there were other facts presented at trial to support B.A.’s testimony. Her
statements were corroborated by testimony from her father who found B.A. and
Manning alone together in the office with the door closed when he came home
unexpectedly from work. The testimony from Amanda about Manning encouraging
her and Jeremy to go to a concert in Sioux Falls so that he could babysit the girls
-12-
#29933
overnight and Manning’s decision to hose down the rugs from the office further
corroborates B.A.’s story. A.A.’s testimony that B.A. and Manning were alone in the
office with the door closed along with Olson’s testimony about Manning’s sexual
preferences also substantiate B.A.’s account.
[¶32.] The second count of rape that occurred in the bedroom upstairs can
also be sustained by B.A.’s testimony alone. While the only evidence of penetration
on this charge is B.A.’s statements in her interview that “the same thing” happened
in her bedroom as happened in the office and that Manning “did the same thing as
he does every single time,” a reasonable inference can be drawn from these
statements that penetration took place in the bedroom as well. Reasonable
inferences can also be made from B.A.’s statements during her interview about
white stuff coming out of Manning’s private part and him having to wash his hands
a lot to remove it to show that he committed this crime. B.A.’s account of lifting her
legs up and Manning telling her to put her legs on his shoulder when they were in
her bedroom would also support the jury’s conclusion of Manning’s guilt. B.A.’s
statements are corroborated here by A.A.’s testimony that she walked into B.A.’s
bedroom on one occasion as Manning was pulling B.A.’s pants up.
[¶33.] Manning’s argument that a penis his size would leave evidence of
trauma was disputed by Lisburg who testified that the lack of physical trauma was
the norm in sexual abuse cases. Further, the jury was not obligated to accept
Manning’s theory regarding the absence of any physical trauma as evidence that
the crimes did not occur. Additionally, the lack of DNA evidence does not prevent
the jury from finding him guilty through other evidence. Taking the evidence in the
-13-
#29933
light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to convict
Manning of both rape charges. The circuit court did not err in denying Manning’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts.
2. Whether the circuit court erred by denying
Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
two sexual contact charges in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
[¶34.] Manning next argues that the circuit court should have granted his
motion for judgment of acquittal on the sexual contact charges because they were
based on the same conduct as the rape charges. He claims the submission of these
charges to the jury violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. Both the
United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution forbid double
jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 9. “These provisions shield
criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for
the same criminal offense if the Legislature did not intend to authorize multiple
punishments in the same prosecution.” State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 26,
889
N.W.2d 404, 412 (quoting State v. Dillon,
2001 S.D. 97, ¶ 13,
632 N.W.2d 37, 43).
“The prohibition against double jeopardy . . . ‘protect[s] against three types of
governmental abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Babcock,
2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31,
952
N.W.2d 750, 760 (quoting State v. Garza,
2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10,
854 N.W.2d 833, 837).
Only the third type of abuse is at issue here.
[¶35.] This Court has stated, “[w]e do not believe that the legislature
intended the sexual contact statute to apply to touching incidental to rape.” State v.
-14-
#29933
Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1981). When the charges alleged relate to the
same act, “the offenses of rape and sexual contact are mutually exclusive.”
Id.
Therefore, a defendant may not receive multiple punishments for rape and sexual
contact with a minor under the age of sixteen arising out of the same conduct.
[¶36.] Here, the indictment included one count of rape and one count of
sexual contact for the conduct in the office. It also included one count of rape and
one count of sexual contact for the conduct in the bedroom. The jury found Manning
guilty of all four counts. The charges were not made in the alternative nor were
they required to be. What the double jeopardy clause prohibits is “multiple
punishments for the same offense.” Babcock,
2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31,
952 N.W.2d at 760
(quoting Garza,
2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10,
854 N.W.2d at 837). The State is not required to
pick between two viable theories that are supported by the evidence. In Manning’s
case, the circuit court emphasized that Manning was being sentenced only on the
rape charges. Although Manning relies on Brammer and Bausch to support his
claim that his rights were violated, the cases are distinguishable. In both cases,
this Court vacated sexual contact convictions and sentences arising out of the same
conduct on which the defendant was also convicted and sentenced for rape.
Brammer,
304 N.W.2d at 114-15; Bausch,
2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 29,
889 N.W.2d at 413.
Here, because there were no judgments of conviction entered on the sexual contact
charges and Manning was not sentenced on those charges, Manning’s double
jeopardy rights were not violated.
[¶37.] Nonetheless, Manning contends that the sole fact that the State
pursued four crimes against him instead of two constitutes a violation of his double
-15-
#29933
jeopardy rights. Manning claims that his indictment was multiplicitous.
“Multiplicity . . . is the splintering of a single offense into separate counts in an
indictment.” Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31,
952 N.W.2d at 760 (quoting State v.
Muhm,
2009 S.D. 100, ¶ 19,
775 N.W.2d 508, 514). “The ‘principal danger that the
multiplicity doctrine addresses’ is the risk that a defendant might receive multiple
punishments for a single offense.” U.S. v. Roy,
408 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting U.S. v. Webber,
255 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2001)). Manning did not
receive multiple punishments for a single offense. Further, because rape and sexual
contact are two separate offenses that are mutually exclusive if based on the same
underlying conduct, they are not multiplicitous. The circuit court did not err by
denying Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
3. Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses
at trial by the circuit court and the prosecution.
[¶38.] Next, Manning alleges that the court and the prosecution improperly
vouched for the credibility of the child witnesses in this case. “Improper vouching
‘invite[s] the jury to rely on the government’s assessment that the witness is
testifying truthfully.’” Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 45,
951 N.W.2d at 806 (quoting
State v. Goodroad,
455 N.W.2d 591, 594 (S.D. 1990)). It is well established that it is
within “the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness.”
Id. (quoting State v. McKinney,
2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 32,
699 N.W.2d 471, 481).
[¶39.] At the beginning of A.A.’s testimony, the circuit court had a colloquy
with her in the presence of the jury in which it discussed the difference between the
truth and a lie and the importance of telling the truth in court. The State
conducted a similar colloquy at the beginning of B.A.’s testimony, also in the
-16-
#29933
presence of the jury. Manning submits that these exchanges improperly bolstered
the credibility of the witnesses. He also contends that the prosecutor improperly
vouched for B.A.’s credibility during closing argument when he stated:
Now, why should you believe [B.A.’s] testimony? That’s the
number one thing we’re here for. Why should you believe it?
Well, [B.A.] came up here, she testifies under oath. You heard
us go through the whole colloquy about what it means to tell the
truth, the difference between truth and a lie. She talked about
all those things with me. She talked about it a little bit with the
judge. She told the judge I promise you I’m going to talk about
only the truth in here today.
. . . She knew people get in trouble if they don’t tell the
truth. She told us that. When she doesn’t tell the truth at
home, she gets in trouble.
[¶40.] Manning did not object to either colloquy prior to the children’s
testimony, nor did he object to the statements in the State’s closing argument.
“[W]hen ‘an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial,’ this Court may
conduct a limited review to consider ‘whether the circuit court committed plain
error.’” State v. Bryant, 2020 S.D. 49, ¶ 19,
948 N.W.2d 333, 338 (quoting State v.
Buchhold,
2007 S.D. 15, ¶ 17,
727 N.W.2d 816, 821). “To establish plain error, an
appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and
only then may this Court exercise its discretion to notice the error if, (4) it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
(quoting State v. McMillen,
2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 13,
931 N.W.2d 725, 729–30).
[¶41.] Here, the colloquies could not be categorized as improper vouching,
and the court did not err by permitting them. Ensuring that a child witness
understands the difference between the truth and a lie is different than ensuring
the jury that the witness’s statements are true. Requiring child witnesses to
-17-
#29933
promise that they will tell the truth in an age appropriate fashion is “the same
promise” any other witness makes at trial when they take an oath to tell the truth.
See State v. Westerfield, 1997 S.D. 100, ¶ 12,
567 N.W.2d 863, 867 (quoting United
States v. Leslie,
759 F.2d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that a provision in a plea
agreement requiring a witness to testify “truthfully” does not rise to the level of
improper vouching because it is the same promise made by anyone testifying at
trial).
[¶42.] As for the statements made in the State’s closing, “the State is
permitted to make fair comments on the credibility of witnesses during final
argument.” Jenner v. Leapley,
521 N.W.2d 422, 428 (S.D. 1994). The statements
made by the prosecutor concentrated more on what was actually said during the
colloquy and did not express “a direct opinion as to whether the child[] [was] telling
the truth.” State v. Koepsell,
508 N.W.2d 591, 593 (S.D. 1993). Indeed, the
statements about B.A. understanding that telling a lie could get her in trouble were
made in the specific context of foundational questioning to ensure B.A. understood
the moral obligation to tell the truth. This was not an argument in which the
prosecutor was attempting to bolster an adult’s testimony with the suggestion that
the witness would run the risk of punishment or adverse consequences if the
witness did not tell the truth. For these reasons, there was not an improper
bolstering of witnesses.
-18-
#29933
4. Whether the circuit court improperly closed the
courtroom during the jury selection phase of
Manning’s trial.
[¶43.] Manning contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the
courtroom was closed during the voir dire phase of his jury trial. “A violation of the
right to a public trial is among the narrow class of errors regarded as structural,
and it is, therefore, not subject to further review for harmlessness.” State v. Uhre,
2019 S.D. 8, ¶ 12,
922 N.W.2d 789, 795. A structural error “necessarily renders a
trial fundamentally unfair” to the point that “automatic reversal is required.”
Guthmiller v. Weber,
2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16,
804 N.W.2d 400, 406. The United States
Supreme Court has identified a violation of the right to a public trial as a structural
error.
Id. (citing Neder v. U.S.,
527 U.S. 1, 8,
119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833,
144 L. Ed. 2d
35 (1999)). The right to a public trial extends to the voir dire stage of trial. Presley
v. Georgia,
558 U.S. 209, 213,
130 S. Ct. 721, 724,
175 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2010).
[¶44.] Manning bases his contention that the courtroom was closed on a non-
notarized “affidavit” provided by his mother, Tammy Dudley, dated August 5,
2021—more than two years after Manning’s trial. Dudley asserted that she
attempted to attend jury selection but was told that no one was allowed in the
courtroom. She stated that there was a piece of paper hanging by the courtroom
door that said “closed” next to Manning’s name.
[¶45.] Relying on the document from his mother, Manning filed a motion for a
new trial on September 7, 2021. A motion for new trial must be served and filed
within ten days after the filing of the judgment. SDCL 23A-29-1. Manning
requested this motion to be held in abeyance until the amended judgments of
-19-
#29933
conviction were issued. It is unclear whether this motion was addressed at the
January resentencing hearing, as no transcript of this hearing is contained in the
record. Further, there is no order in the record granting or denying the motion for
new trial. However, “SDCL 15-6-59(b) permits a circuit court to take no action on a
motion for a new trial, and a motion for a new trial is deemed automatically denied
if the circuit court fails to timely rule upon the motion.” State v. Timmons, 2022
S.D. 28, ¶ 20,
974 N.W.2d 881, 888. A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶ 19.
[¶46.] There is no evidence in the record to corroborate Dudley’s unsworn
statement. There is no mention at any point in the trial transcript of the courtroom
being closed, nor is there a closure order in the record. Further, Manning
acknowledged in his motion for new trial that if the courtroom was ever closed, he
and his counsel were unaware of it. Based on this lack of evidence, we conclude
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manning’s motion for a
new trial.
5. Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion.
[¶47.] The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
“cruel and unusual punishment[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This restriction
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. “[W]hen the question
presented is whether a challenged sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, we conduct a de novo review.” State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8,
¶ 31,
874 N.W.2d 475, 486.
-20-
#29933
[¶48.] In determining whether a noncapital sentence is in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, we must decide whether the sentence is “grossly
disproportionate to its corresponding offense.” State v. Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13,
877
N.W.2d 75, 80 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001,
111 S. Ct. 2680,
2705,
115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment)). “To do so, we first compare the gravity of the offense—i.e., ‘the
offense’s relative position on the spectrum of all criminality’—to the harshness of
the penalty—i.e., ‘the penalty’s relative position on the spectrum of all permitted
punishments.’”
Id. (quoting Chipps,
2016 S.D. 8, ¶¶ 35–38,
874 N.W.2d at 489).
This analysis will “typically mark[] the end of our review” as gross
disproportionality is rarely found. Chipps,
2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38,
874 N.W.2d at 489
(quoting State v. Garreau,
2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 9,
864 N.W.2d 771, 775). However, “[i]f
the penalty imposed appears to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offense, then we will compare the sentence to those ‘imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction’ as well as those ‘imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.’”
Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 291,
103 S. Ct. 3001,
3010,
77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)).
[¶49.] We begin by examining the gravity of the offense. Manning was
convicted of two counts of first-degree rape. “Rape is a heinous crime[.]” State v.
Yeager,
2019 S.D. 12, ¶ 6,
925 N.W.2d 105, 109. “Child rape ‘may be devastating in
[its] harm,’” to the individual victim.
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S.
407, 407,
128 S. Ct. 2641, 2644,
171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008)). Along with any physical
injury to the victim, rape can also cause grievous “mental and psychological
-21-
#29933
damage. Because it undermines the community’s sense of security, there is public
injury as well.” Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 598,
97 S. Ct. 2861,
2869,
53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977)). Thus, it is clear that the gravity of Manning’s
crimes is comparatively high on the spectrum of all criminality.
[¶50.] Turning to the harshness of the sentence, the circuit court sentenced
Manning to two consecutive sixty-year terms. First-degree rape is a class C felony
which is punishable by up to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary in addition
to a $50,000 fine. SDCL 22-22-1(1); SDCL 22-6-1(3). The spectrum of all permitted
punishments in South Dakota includes the possibility of death and mandatory life
imprisonment. Manning argues that his sentence is essentially a life sentence.
Although this term of years is lengthy, and the sentence is at the higher end of the
spectrum of all permitted punishments, Manning’s term of years sentence when
compared to the gravity of the offense, raping a child, is not grossly
disproportionate, thus ending our review of his constitutional claim.
[¶51.] In addition to his Eighth Amendment challenge, Manning also argues
that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to two sixty-year terms
to be served consecutively. An abuse of discretion analysis differs from an Eighth
Amendment analysis. “We generally review a circuit court’s sentencing decision for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Klinetobe,
2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26,
958 N.W.2d 734, 740.
“An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the
range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or
unreasonable.”
Id. (quoting State v. Holler,
2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 10,
944 N.W.2d 339,
342).
-22-
#29933
[¶52.] “Circuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing.” Klinetobe, 2021
S.D. 24, ¶ 28,
958 N.W.2d at 741 (quoting Holler,
2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 17,
944 N.W.2d at
344). When fashioning an appropriate sentence, a circuit court should be guided by
“the traditional sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and
general—rehabilitation, and incapacitation[,]” weighing them “on a case-by-case
basis[.]”
Id. (quoting State v. Toavs,
2017 S.D. 93, ¶ 10,
906 N.W.2d 354, 357). As
part of its consideration, “[t]he sentencing court should have access to ‘the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.
Information which should be available to the court includes general moral
character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or
inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.’”
Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Holler,
2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 18,
944 N.W.2d at 344).
[¶53.] Here, we do not conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in
sentencing Manning. To assist in fashioning an appropriate sentence for Manning,
the circuit court ordered court services to prepare a presentence investigation report
(PSI) and obtain a psychosexual evaluation (PSE). The PSI contained, among other
things, information regarding Manning’s criminal history, family history, education,
employment history, social circumstances, and attitudes/orientation. The PSE
contained further information on topics such as Manning’s mental state, personality
functioning, psychosocial history, and psychosexual history. The circuit court noted
at sentencing that it considered both reports when applying the traditional
sentencing factors to arrive at its decision.
-23-
#29933
[¶54.] There were many aggravating factors present in both reports that
support the circuit court’s decision to impose a lengthy sentence. Manning has a
prior felony conviction for abuse/cruelty to a minor less than seven years of age. His
juvenile criminal history includes an incident of sexual contact with a child under
sixteen. The psychosexual evaluator diagnosed Manning with antisocial personality
disorder and pedophilic disorder with a poor prognosis for treatment. Importantly,
Manning was found to be a “high-risk for sexual reoffense,” meaning that he is “a
poor candidate for probation and/or community placement[,]” and rather should be
placed in a “highly secure and structured setting[.]” When being interviewed for the
PSE, Manning continued to assert that he did not commit the crimes he was
convicted of and was “unsure whether he would engage in sexual offender specific
treatment programming” if it were offered. The circuit court found that Manning
had failed to accept responsibility for his crimes and that Manning was “a danger to
the community and will likely reoffend.”
[¶55.] While the State recommended fifty years on each of the rape charges,
the circuit court’s sixty-year sentences were not beyond the range of permissible
choices and in the court’s view were necessary to protect the public. The circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Manning’s sentence.
6. Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
[¶56.] Manning alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because of errors committed by his trial counsel: (1) during the jury selection
process, (2) by not moving to dismiss multiplicitous counts in the indictment, and
-24-
#29933
(3) for not objecting to the bolstering of witnesses. He claims that the compilation of
these errors prejudiced him at trial.
[¶57.] As a general rule, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, we will not
address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. We depart from this
principle only when trial counsel was so ineffective and counsel’s representation so
casual as to represent a manifest usurpation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights.” State v. Vortherms, 2020 S.D. 67, ¶ 30,
952 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (quoting
State v. Golliher-Weyer,
2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 8,
875 N.W.2d 28, 31). “This is because the
record on direct appeal typically does not afford a basis to review the performance of
trial counsel.”
Id. Rather, ineffective assistance claims are better heard through a
writ of habeas corpus.
Id. “[T]hrough habeas, an attorney charged with
ineffectiveness can explain or defend actions and strategies[,] [a]nd this Court can
obtain a ‘more complete picture of what occurred.’” Golliher-Weyer,
2016 S.D. 10,
¶ 9,
875 N.W.2d at 31-32 (quoting State v. Thomas,
2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 23,
796 N.W.2d
706, 714).
[¶58.] Manning’s second and third claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
require no further development of the record as we have addressed them, herein, as
part of his claims on direct appeal, concluding they lack merit. Therefore, Manning
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object
to witness bolstering or counsel’s failure to move to dismiss a multiplicitous
indictment.
[¶59.] However, the alleged error regarding the jury selection process that
Manning has raised is not the type of “exceptional circumstance” that would
-25-
#29933
warrant review of this claim on direct appeal. Because further development of the
record regarding this issue would enhance our ability to review this claim, we
decline to address it herein.
7. Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors.
[¶60.] Finally, Manning argues that when taken together, all of the errors
committed at his trial amounted to an unfair trial. “[T]o determine whether a
defendant was denied the constitutional right to a fair trial based on the cumulative
effect of trial errors, we review the entire record to determine if a fair trial was
held.” State v. Delehoy, 2019 S.D. 30, ¶ 20,
929 N.W.2d 103, 108.
[¶61.] Having found no prejudicial error in any of the other issues analyzed,
we fail to find cumulative error as well. To do so “would recognize a degree of error
that is greater than the sum of its parts.” Reay v. Young,
2019 S.D. 63, ¶ 26 n.7,
936 N.W.2d 117, 124 n.7.
[¶62.] Affirmed.
[¶63.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, SALTER and DEVANEY, Justices, and
RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
[¶64.] RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for MYREN, Justice, who
deemed himself disqualified and did not participate.
-26-
