State v. Robinson

                This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter

                                

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

                             STATE OF UTAH,
                                Appellee,
                                   v.
                       FLOYD CORRY ROBINSON,
                             Appellant.

                            No. 20210293
                        Heard May 15, 2023
                       Filed December 7, 2023

                           On Direct Appeal

                    Fifth District, St. George
               The Honorable G. Michael Westfall
                         No. 051500271

                                Attorneys:
    Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Daniel L. Day, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
                   Salt Lake City, for appellee
           Nicolas D. Turner, St. George, for appellant

  JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
           JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.


   JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court:

                          INTRODUCTION
   ¶1 Nearly fourteen years after Floyd Corry Robinson pleaded
guilty to aggravated murder and child abuse, he moved the district
court, under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
correct what he claimed was an unconstitutional sentence.
Robinson asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional because
his counsel was ineffective and because the State suppressed
                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

favorable evidence. The court denied Robinson’s motion on the
ground that his claims were not cognizable under rule 22(e).
    ¶2 Robinson appeals, contending that the district court erred
in concluding that he failed to identify relevant grounds to
challenge his sentence under rule 22(e). He posits that the grounds
he asserted in his motion fall within rule 22(e)’s sweep because the
rule generally allows for challenges to allegedly unconstitutional
sentences. But Robinson relies on precedent interpreting a version
of the rule that does not apply to his case, and his interpretation of
the applicable rule is untethered to its plain language. Because
Robinson did not identify a viable ground to challenge his sentence,
the court did not err in denying his motion.
    ¶3 Robinson alternatively contends that the district court
erred in construing his motion according to its caption rather than
its substance. Although Robinson invoked rule 22(e), he claims his
motion was more in line with a petition for relief under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) and that the court erred by
not construing it as such. Even if the grounds Robinson asserted
were not cognizable under rule 22(e), both the caption and
substance of his motion indicated his intent to invoke the rule. The
court did not err in construing the filing as what it purported to be.
    ¶4 Finally, invoking Anders v. California, 

 (1967),
and State v. Clayton, 

 (Utah 1981), Robinson asks us to
review four additional issues that his appellate counsel does not
endorse. We do not reach the merits of those issues because we hold
it is procedurally improper for appellate counsel to file a
hybrid-Anders brief, simultaneously seeking review of both
frivolous and nonfrivolous issues.
                         BACKGROUND
    ¶5 In 2005, Robinson shot and killed his ex-girlfriend in front
of her three children. The State charged Robinson with aggravated
murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and child
abuse. After nearly two years of pretrial motions and discovery, the
State and Robinson reached a plea agreement in which Robinson
pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and child abuse in exchange
for the State dismissing the charges of aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. The State also agreed not to seek the death
penalty and stipulated to a twenty-years-to-life prison sentence.
The district court ultimately sentenced Robinson to an
indeterminate term of twenty years to life for aggravated murder
and a consecutive indeterminate term not to exceed five years for
child abuse.
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                         Opinion of the Court

    ¶6 Since his conviction, Robinson has sought to challenge his
plea and sentence through various means, including by filing at
least two failed PCRA petitions. At issue in this case is Robinson’s
pro se motion titled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Under
URCrP 22(e),” filed in 2020 in his criminal case. In that motion, and
in an associated request to submit the matter for decision, Robinson
maintained that his sentence required correction because it violated
his constitutional rights. Specifically, he asserted that his trial
counsel acted ineffectively and that the State suppressed favorable
evidence.
   ¶7 The district court denied Robinson’s rule 22(e) motion,
concluding that he “fail[ed] to identify any of the relevant grounds,
or otherwise comply with the [r]ule.” The court also noted that the
grounds identified in Robinson’s motion “may be more suited for
a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” under rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
   ¶8    Robinson appeals.
            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
   ¶9 Robinson asserts that the district court erred in denying his
rule 22(e) motion to correct his sentence when it concluded that the
constitutional violations he alleges—ineffective assistance of
counsel and suppression of favorable evidence—are not cognizable
under rule 22(e). We review the grant or denial of a rule 22(e)
motion for correctness, giving “no deference to the district court.”
State v. Houston, 

, 

.
    ¶10 Robinson also contends that the court erred in construing
his rule 22(e) motion according to its title rather than its substance.
Both parties ask us to review this question for correctness.
Robinson asserts that the standard we use to review a district
court’s interpretation of a rule of procedure applies, while the State
cites the standard of review applicable to a court’s grant or denial
of a rule 22(e) motion. The authority the parties cite does not specify
the standard we should apply in reviewing the district court’s
decision now at issue—its decision to construe Robinson’s filing as
a rule 22(e) motion rather than as a petition for post-conviction
relief—and we question whether correctness is the appropriate
standard. See, e.g., Workers Comp. Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 

, ¶ 15 n.5, 

 (stating that “district courts have broad
discretion in determining whether to construe a motion under rule
59 or rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure” and that “if a
motion is not captioned as a rule 59 or rule 60(b) motion and does
not cite to rule 59 or rule 60(b), a district court does not err in failing
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                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

to construe it as such”). However, because both parties argue this
issue under a correctness standard of review, we apply that
standard here without endorsing its application in a future case.
    ¶11 Robinson raises four additional issues pursuant to Anders
v. California, 

 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 

(Utah 1981). But we need not address the standards of review
applicable to those issues because, as discussed infra ¶¶ 38–42, we
hold it is procedurally improper to file a hybrid-Anders brief.
                            ANALYSIS
 I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ROBINSON’S
                   RULE 22(e) MOTION
    ¶12 Robinson contends that the district court erred in denying
his rule 22(e) motion. Specifically, he argues that the court erred in
concluding that the grounds he identified as the bases for his
motion—ineffective assistance of counsel and suppression of
favorable evidence—are not cognizable under rule 22(e). We
disagree with Robinson and conclude that the court correctly
interpreted the rule.
    ¶13 “When interpreting a rule, we use our general rules of
statutory construction.” Wyatt v. State, 

, 

 (cleaned up). Thus, we begin our review of whether the district
court correctly interpreted rule 22(e) by looking at the rule’s plain
language. See id.; see also Clark v. Archer, 

, 

. “If a rule’s language is clear and unambiguous, analysis of the
rule’s meaning ends.” Clark, 

.
   ¶14 The language in rule 22(e) is straightforward.
Subparagraph (e)(1) requires a court to correct a sentence if it fits
into one of six enumerated categories. It states:
       The court must correct a sentence when the sentence
       imposed:
            (A) exceeds       the    statutorily   authorized
            maximums;
            (B) is less than statutorily required minimums;
            (C) violates Double Jeopardy;
            (D) is ambiguous as to the time and manner in
            which it is to be served;
            (E) is internally contradictory; or



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                        Opinion of the Court

              (F) omits a condition required by statute or
              includes a condition prohibited by statute.
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(1).
    ¶15 Subparagraph (e)(2), in turn, requires a court to correct an
unconstitutional sentence, but only under specific circumstances.
It states:
        The court must correct the sentence of a defendant
        who can prove that the sentence is unconstitutional
        under a rule established or ruling issued by the
        United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme
        Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after sentence
        was imposed, and the rule or ruling was not dictated
        by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
        conviction or sentence became final.

 R. 22(e)(2). 1
   ¶16 In seeking to correct his sentence under rule 22(e),
Robinson does not contend that the bases he identified in his
motion fall within any of the six enumerated categories in
subparagraph (e)(1). Nor does he contend that his challenges meet
the requirements of subparagraph (e)(2). Rather, Robinson
maintains that rule 22(e) is not intended to be exhaustive in its
scope and that this court’s rule 22(e) precedent allows all
“constitutional-based” challenges to a sentence to be raised under
the rule.
    ¶17 Robinson recognizes that the current language of rule 22(e)
“appear[s]” to limit the scope of the rule’s application. But, relying
on State v. Candedo, 

, ¶¶ 10–11, 

, he argues
that we previously rejected a narrow reading of the rule and that
his constitutional challenges fall within Candedo’s reach.
   ¶18 Robinson is correct that in Candedo we read rule 22(e)
broadly. There, we held that “[b]ecause an illegal sentence under
rule 22(e) includes constitutional violations, an appellate court
must allow a petitioner to raise constitutional . . . challenges[] to [a

__________________________________________________________
    1  The only other provision in rule 22(e) is procedural.
Subparagraph (e)(3) states: “A motion under (e)(1)(C), (e)(1)(D), or
(e)(1)(E) must be filed no later than one year from the date the facts
supporting the claim could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence. A motion under the other provisions may
be filed at any time.” UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(3).
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                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

petitioner’s] sentence under rule 22(e).” Id. ¶ 11. But Candedo does
not aid Robinson’s position because, in that case, we analyzed an
earlier version of rule 22(e)—a version with “sweeping language”
that has since been removed. See State v. Brooks, 

(Utah 1995).
   ¶19 Before 2017, rule 22(e) stated in its entirety: “The court may
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.” UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e) (2008). Because the
rule did not define “illegal sentence,” we originally guided its
application by identifying in our caselaw examples of illegal
sentences. For example, in State v. Telford, we explained that “rule
22(e) may be employed to correct a sentence under circumstances
where the sentencing court had no jurisdiction, or to correct a
sentence beyond the authorized statutory range.” 

, ¶ 5
n.1, 

.
   ¶20 Then, in State v. Yazzie, we adopted a definition of “illegal
sentence” that had been embraced by federal courts. 2 See 

, ¶¶ 13–14, 

 (citing United States v. Dougherty, 

 (10th Cir. 1997)). We stated that an “illegal
sentence” within the meaning of rule 22(e) is
       one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and
       manner in which it is to be served, is internally
       contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed
       by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the
       sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of
       conviction did not authorize.

 ¶ 13 (quoting Dougherty, 

).
    ¶21 And one year later, in Candedo, we held that the definition
of “illegal sentence” we adopted in Yazzie was “sufficiently broad
to include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the
sentence.” Candedo, 

. Invoking the final clause of
the adopted definition, we concluded that an unconstitutional
sentence is one “not authorized by the judgment of conviction,”
and thus a substantive due process challenge to a sentence fit


__________________________________________________________
   2 The version of rule 22(e) in effect at the time Yazzie was decided

was “based on an antecedent in the federal rules—rule 35(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which until 1987 authorized
federal courts to correct illegal sentences.” State v. Prion, 

, 

 (cleaned up).
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                        Opinion of the Court

within the rule’s scope. 

 ¶¶ 13–14 (cleaned up); see also State v.
Houston, 

, ¶¶ 21–22, 

.
    ¶22 Robinson points to our previous cases to support his claim
that rule 22(e) provides a vehicle to correct his sentence based on
his trial counsel’s alleged constitutionally ineffective assistance and
the State’s alleged unconstitutional suppression of favorable
evidence. But Candedo does not apply to Robinson’s challenges. In
2017, years before Robinson filed his rule 22(e) motion, the rule was
amended. 3 And although it grew in size, it shrank in scope.
    ¶23 Among other things, the rule no longer refers to an “illegal
sentence.” 4 See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e). That nomenclature was
removed, and the “sweeping” language underpinning the court’s
decision in Candedo was replaced with subparagraph (e)(1) and six
specific categories of sentences that require correction. See 

 R.
22(e)(1); see also State v. Hurwitz, 

, 

 (recognizing that with the 2017 amendment to rule 22(e), the
“sweeping language” of the rule was replaced with language more
limited in scope); State v. Wilkerson, 

, 

 (same). And although the amended rule incorporated some of
the categories included in Yazzie’s definition of “illegal sentence,”
it did not incorporate all of them.5 Notably, subparagraph (e)(1)
does not include “a sentence which the judgment of conviction did
not authorize”—the category the Candedo court pointed to in

__________________________________________________________
   3 Neither party disputes that Robinson’s rule 22(e) motion, filed

in 2020, is governed by the current version of rule 22(e), which was
last amended in 2019. Like the 2017 amendment, the current
version of the rule has limited scope.
   4 In 1987, the same language was removed from the federal

counterpart to rule 22(e), leaving federal offenders with the option
of challenging the constitutional validity of their sentences through
a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under Title 18,
section 2255 of the United States Code. Prion, 

, ¶ 22 n.8.
   5 Categories found in subparagraphs (e)(1)(D)–(F) appear to be

taken nearly verbatim from the definition adopted in Yazzie.
Compare UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(1)(D)–(F), with Yazzie, 

. The category in subparagraph (e)(1)(C) appears to have been
inspired by Prion. Compare UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(1)(C), with Prion,

 (“A sentence imposed in contravention of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is an illegal sentence—even under a
narrowly circumscribed construction of rule 22(e).” (cleaned up)).
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                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

support of its view that rule 22(e) generally authorized challenges
to unconstitutional sentences. 6 See Candedo, 

, ¶¶ 12–13.
Further, while subparagraph (e)(2)—added in 2019—mandates the
correction of an unconstitutional sentence, it authorizes that
correction only if the alleged constitutional violation is grounded
in a rule or ruling that was established or issued after the
defendant’s “sentence became final.” UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(2).
    ¶24 With these amendments, our caselaw interpreting a prior
version of rule 22(e) does not govern. We look instead to the plain
language of the present rule to determine whether Robinson’s
challenges fall within its scope. See Wyatt, 

. If rule
22(e) still contained the language we interpreted in Candedo, we
would apply it. But because that language is gone, there is no basis
in the rule to apply the standard we articulated there.
    ¶25 That leaves us only to ask whether Robinson’s challenges
fall within the scope of rule 22(e)’s plain language. As even
Robinson concedes, they do not. See supra ¶ 16. His challenges
based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and the State’s
suppression of favorable evidence are not found among the
categories listed in subparagraph (e)(1). See UTAH R. CRIM. P.
22(e)(1). And although his challenges are constitutional in nature,
they do not fit within subparagraph (e)(2) because the rulings on
which he grounds his challenges—Strickland v. Washington, 

 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 

 (1963)—were issued
decades before his 2006 sentence became final. See UTAH R. CRIM. P.
22(e)(2).
   ¶26 Even so, Robinson contends that his claims are cognizable
under rule 22(e) because, he argues, the rule is not intended to be
exhaustive in scope. He asserts that the “plain language” of the rule
sets forth the instances in which a court is “required” to correct a
sentence and does not “strictly limit the means [by] which a
sentence could be constitutionally challenged.” In other words,
Robinson contends that rule 22(e) is open-ended. In his view, it
requires the correction of a sentence on the grounds identified but
also allows for the correction of a sentence on other, unstated
grounds.

__________________________________________________________
   6 Subparagraphs (e)(1)(A) and (B) of rule 22—which refer to

sentences imposed in violation of statutory minimums and
maximums—may have taken inspiration from this part of the
“illegal sentence” definition, but the rule’s language is specific and
thus far more limited.
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                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶27 We reject this reading of rule 22(e) because the rule’s plain
language does not bear it out. Rule 22(e) is a procedural tool that
requires courts to correct sentences on grounds it identifies, and it
is an exception to the general rule that the PCRA is the sole remedy
for a person challenging the legality of a sentence. See UTAH CODE
§ 78B-9-102(1)(a), (2)(b). No language in the rule supports
Robinson’s invitation to read it as vesting the courts with the
authority to correct sentences on other, unidentified grounds. We
therefore reject Robinson’s argument that even if the district court
was not required to correct his sentence, the court had the
discretion to do so under rule 22(e).
   ¶28 In sum, because Robinson’s challenges are not cognizable
under rule 22(e), the district court did not err in denying Robinson’s
rule 22(e) motion. 7
      II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED
                   ROBINSON’S MOTION
   ¶29 Robinson contends, in the alternative, that the district
court erred in construing his filing as a rule 22(e) motion rather than
a petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that because the
court recognized that “[t]he ‘substance’ of the pleading was a Rule
65C petition,” the court should have construed it as such.
    ¶30 The State counters that the court correctly construed
Robinson’s motion because it “had all the essential markings of a
rule 22(e) motion.” Specifically, the State asserts that Robinson filed
his motion “under rule 22(e),” with a rule 22(e) caption, “in a
criminal case,” stating “reasons why [he] believed his sentence was
illegal.” We agree with the State that the district court did not err
in construing Robinson’s filing as a rule 22(e) motion.


__________________________________________________________
   7 Robinson’s motion was minimal in nature, and the factual

bases for it were undeveloped. He provided additional detail in his
request to submit, some of which suggests that he was challenging,
at least in part, his underlying conviction rather than his sentence. To
the extent he intended to use rule 22(e) as a vehicle to challenge his
conviction rather than his sentence, his motion would fail for the
additional reason that rule 22(e) can be used only to challenge a
sentence, not a conviction. See Archuleta v. State, 

,

 (“Of course, [rule 22(e)] applies only when a sentence,
not a conviction, is being challenged.”).

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                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

    ¶31 For starters, Robinson captioned his motion as a “Motion
to Correct Illegal Sentence Under URCrP 22(e)” and twice affirmed
his intention to move under rule 22(e) in his request to submit for
decision. In that request, Robinson reminded the court that he had
moved “under Rule 22(e)” to correct his sentence, and he asked the
court to submit for decision his “motion filed under Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e).”
    ¶32 Robinson further demonstrated his intent to move under
rule 22(e) by seeking a specific form of relief provided by that rule.
He did not simply ask the court to vacate his sentence; rather, he
asked the court to “correct” it—a framing unique to rule 22(e).
Compare UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)(1), with UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(o)(1).
He also claimed that his sentence was “illegally imposed.” And
although the reference to an “illegal sentence” is no longer found
in rule 22(e), see supra ¶ 23, that terminology was associated with
rule 22(e) for decades, see, e.g., supra ¶¶ 19–21.
    ¶33 The balance of Robinson’s motion consisted of one
statement. He wrote: “I believe this sentence to be illegally imposed
because . . . Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Intentional
Suppression of Evidence Favorable to the Defendant.” Robinson
now contends that this assertion should have compelled the court
to evaluate the motion under the PCRA rather than rule 22(e), but
the balance of his filing did not suggest that he intended to invoke
the PCRA. He did not reference the PCRA or rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs PCRA petitions. See UTAH
CODE § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (“Procedural provisions for filing and
commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.”). Further, Robinson did not attempt to comply
with even one of the many procedural requirements imposed by
rule 65C. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(d)–(e) (imposing content and
attachment requirements for a PCRA petition). And further still,
Robinson filed his motion in his original criminal case; 8 had he
intended to invoke the PCRA, he would have initiated a petition in




__________________________________________________________
   8 On appeal, Robinson contends that it was the clerk who filed

his motion in the criminal case. But Robinson’s filing includes his
criminal case number, handwritten on the form. That handwriting
appears to match the other handwriting in the filing, including
Robinson’s printed name and signature.
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                        Opinion of the Court

a separate proceeding. 9 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-102(1)(a)
(“Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are governed by the
rules of civil procedure.”).
   ¶34 Yet, despite the absence of any indication that Robinson
intended to move under the PCRA rather than rule 22(e), he
contends that the court erred in not treating his invocation of rule
22(e) as “an improper caption.” (Quoting Armstrong Rubber Co. v.
Bastian, 

 (Utah 1983).) Robinson argues that
because the district court observed that the grounds on which
Robinson challenged his sentence “may be more suited for a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,” the court was required to
construe his filing as a PCRA petition. We again disagree.
    ¶35 For one, these circumstances are unlike those found in the
cases where we have expressed the view that “an improper caption
is not fatal” to a motion. Armstrong, 

; see also Howard
v. Howard, 

, 276–77 (Utah 1960); Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor
Comm’n, 

, 

. In Armstrong, we
interpreted a motion under procedural rules that fit the motion’s
timing and substance despite the party’s failure to cite a rule in the
motion’s body or text. 657 P.2d at 1347–48. In Howard, we
overlooked a party’s framing of a filing as a “Notice of Intention to
Move for New Trial” where its substance demonstrated that it was
“in fact a motion for a new trial.” 

. Despite the
caption, the party referred to the document as a motion, articulated
the legal grounds for the motion, and attached a supporting
affidavit. 

 at 276–77. And in Frito-Lay, we concluded that the Utah
Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion in reviewing a
motion seeking agency review under the authority available to it
rather than construing the motion under rule 60 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which did not apply. 

, ¶¶ 22–24.
    ¶36 In these cases, the party seeking relief failed to cite a
procedural basis for its motion (Armstrong), improperly labeled its
filing but made its intent clear in the body of its filing (Howard), or
sought relief available to it but cited a rule that did not apply
(Frito-Lay). In contrast, Robinson expressly invoked a rule
procedurally available to him and did not otherwise suggest in his
 __________________________________________________________
   9 Robinson had previously been advised (including during an

appearance where he was represented by counsel) that the criminal
case concluded with his sentence and that if he intended to seek
relief under the PCRA, he would need to start a separate
proceeding.
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                         STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

motion that he sought a different form of relief. Robinson’s caption
matched the substance of his motion, even if the grounds he
asserted did not warrant relief under rule 22(e).
    ¶37 Further, it would have been presumptuous for the district
court to assume that Robinson did not intend to move under rule
22(e) simply because the court rejected the basis for his motion.
Robinson expressly invoked rule 22(e) and appeared intent on
testing his theory that the grounds he identified entitled him to a
corrected sentence under that rule. Even now on appeal, Robinson
(through legal counsel) maintains that a sentence can be corrected
under rule 22(e) if ineffective assistance of counsel or the
suppression of favorable evidence is shown. See supra ¶¶ 16, 22.
Although the district court—and ultimately this court—disagree
with Robinson’s view, his argument was not so frivolous that the
district court should have unilaterally denied Robinson the right to
make it. 10 Cf. Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, 

, 

 (“The plaintiff, like the appellant, controls
the claims to be litigated by the court. And the court lacks the
power to second-guess the pleading decisions of the parties—to
search the record for claims that were not pleaded by the parties
but that we might prefer to resolve.” (cleaned up)).
    III. WE DO NOT REACH ROBINSON’S ANDERS ISSUES
    ¶38 As part of Robinson’s opening brief, counsel describes four
issues that Robinson “requested be included in” his appeal.
Although counsel does not state that he views the issues as
frivolous, he invokes Anders v. California, 

 (1967), and
State v. Clayton, 

 (Utah 1981), which establish the
procedure to be followed when appointed counsel cannot identify
a nonfrivolous issue for appeal and seeks to withdraw. Robinson’s
counsel recognizes that it is unnecessary to raise the Anders issues

__________________________________________________________
   10 Robinson also contends that because he was appearing pro se

in the district court, the court should have “accorded [him] every
consideration that may be reasonably indulged.” (Quoting Noor v.
State, 

, ¶ 51 n.64, 

 (cleaned up).) This is true,
but it was far from apparent that construing Robinson’s motion as
a PCRA petition would have better advanced his cause. Rule 22(e)
is more limited in scope, but it does not contain the procedural bars
found in the PCRA for cognizable constitutional claims. See
generally UTAH CODE § 78B-9-106; see also Archuleta v. State, 

, 

 (“[T]he PCRA’s time and procedural bars do
not apply to claims brought under rule 22(e).”).
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                        Opinion of the Court

given that he identifies nonfrivolous issues for review, but he
nevertheless invites the court to consider Robinson’s issues should
we “find that Anders applies.”
    ¶39 In Anders, the U.S. Supreme Court designed “a
prophylactic framework” intended to safeguard an indigent
defendant’s right to appellate counsel when counsel finds that the
client’s direct appeal is “wholly frivolous.” 11 See Smith v. Robbins,

 (2000) (cleaned up); see also Anders, 

. In such a circumstance, and after “conscientious examination,”
counsel “should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw” “accompanied by a brief” “referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 

; accord Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169–70.
    ¶40 This framework is “designed both to provide the appellate
courts with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel
have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeal to
the best of their ability,” and “to help the court make the critical
determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that
counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” Penson v. Ohio, 

 (1988) (cleaned up). Because the impetus for filing an Anders
brief is to receive the court’s permission to withdraw on the ground
that the appeal is frivolous, an Anders brief “is not expected to serve
as a substitute for an advocate’s brief on the merits.” See McCoy v.
Wis. Ct. App., Dist. 1, 

, 439 n.13 (1988). Rather, the court
reviews the brief to ensure that the indigent party received
constitutionally adequate representation on appeal and to
determine “whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel
should be permitted to withdraw.” See 

.
     ¶41 We adopted the Anders framework in 1981, see Clayton, 639
P.2d at 169–70, and have since incorporated it into our appellate
rules, see UTAH R. APP. P. 27(d)(3). Both authorities make clear that
an Anders brief may be filed where appointed counsel determines
there are no nonfrivolous issues to present. In Clayton, we stated
that an Anders brief could be filed along with a motion to withdraw
if, “after a conscientious examination,” appointed counsel finds the
case to be “wholly frivolous.” Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169–70 (cleaned
up). And rule 27(d)(3) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
__________________________________________________________
   11 Because Robinson has been appointed counsel for purposes

of his appeal from the denial of his rule 22(e) motion, we assume,
without deciding, that the Anders framework applies in this
context.
                                  13
                        STATE v. ROBINSON
                       Opinion of the Court

describes an Anders brief as one filed pursuant to Anders “in cases
where counsel believes no nonfrivolous appellate issues exist.”
    ¶42 Here, Robinson’s counsel filed a hybrid brief in which he
presented two issues he viewed as meritorious along with four
issues presented at Robinson’s request “pursuant to Anders.”
Although we have no doubt that counsel’s action is well
intentioned, hybrid-Anders briefs are not allowed under our rules
or precedent. As shown above, the Anders framework is properly
invoked only where counsel determines an appeal is “wholly
frivolous” and seeks to withdraw. Because neither condition was
met here, Anders was not properly invoked, and thus we do not
consider the four Anders issues included as part of Robinson’s
brief. 12
                          CONCLUSION
    ¶43 The district court properly denied Robinson’s rule 22(e)
motion because his alleged grounds for correcting an illegal
sentence are not cognizable under the plain language of the rule.
And although Robinson’s rule 22(e) motion is ultimately
unsuccessful, the court did not err in construing that filing
according to its caption and substance. Finally, we do not consider
the four additional issues that Robinson raises pursuant to Anders
because hybrid-Anders briefs are procedurally improper. We
affirm.




__________________________________________________________
   12  Although this is our first time weighing in on the
appropriateness of hybrid-Anders briefing, our court of appeals has
previously rejected such filings. See State v. Balfour, 

, ¶ 20 n.5, 

 (declining to consider Anders issues raised
in a hybrid brief on the ground that the Anders framework did not
apply); Butterfield v. Cook, 

 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(declining to expand Anders to include cases which have both
frivolous and nonfrivolous issues). But see State v. Gomez, 

, 

 (per curiam) (reaching arguments raised
in a hybrid-Anders brief and determining that the Anders issues
were “wholly frivolous”).
                                    14