, DA 23-0572: PHOEBE CROSS, a minor by and through his guardians
Molly Cross and Paul Cross; MOLLY CROSS, an individual; PAUL CROSS, an
individual; JANE DOE, an individual; JOHN DOE, an individual; JUANITA
HODAX, on behalf of herself and her patients; KATHERINE MISTRETTA on
behalf of herself and her patients, Plaintiffs v. STATE OF MONTANA; GREGORY
GIANFORTE, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Montana; AUSTIN
KNUDSEN, in his official capacity as Attorney General; MONTANA BOARD OF
MEDICAL EXAMINERS; MONTANA BOARD OF NURSING; MONTANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; CHARLIE
BRERETON, in his official capacity as Director of the Montana Department of Public
Health and Human Services, Defendants.
The Montana Supreme Court has upheld a District Court order temporarily blocking a law
passed by the 2023 Legislature that bans use of all medications and surgery to treat gender
dysphoria in minors. The court agreed unanimously that the plaintiffs—transgender youth,
their parents, and medical professionals who provide the banned forms of treatment—had
shown a preliminary likelihood of success on their claim that the law violated Montana’s
express constitutional right to privacy.
The Montana Constitution’s privacy clause protects a private medical decision involving
an individual and their healthcare provider from infringement by the State without a
compelling state interest. That privacy right empowers an individual to make medical
judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen
health care provider free from the interference of the government. When, as here, a statute
impacts individual privacy rights, the State must demonstrate that the legislation is justified
by a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling
interest.
The Court agreed that the State has a compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological wellbeing of a minor. On the record presented to the District Court,
however, the State did not make a preliminary showing that the statute was narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The Court noted that the law affords no room for decisionmaking by a patient in consultation with their doctors and parents. The statute instead is a
complete ban, prohibiting individualized care even when such treatment is determined, in
the judgment of a medical professional working with their patients, to be in the patients’
best interest and given with informed consent.
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This synopsis has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It constitutes no part of the
Opinion of the Court and may not be cited as precedent.
The evidence at this stage of the case showed that the prohibited medical interventions are
not used for youth prior to the onset of puberty, and the most invasive (surgical) treatments
are not recommended for patients before they turn eighteen. On the strength of the potential
harm to those patients the statute targets, the District Court reasonably concluded that the
Plaintiffs made an adequate preliminary showing of harm and that the balance of equities
tips toward preliminary relief pending full consideration of the merits.
The case will return to the District Court for the parties to develop the evidence fully at a
trial, where their experts may testify and offer insight on any new research. The trial court
will at that time resolve conflicts in the evidence and consider any new legal developments
relative to the parties’ claims.
Two members of the Court would have gone further and held that the Plaintiffs also showed
they were likely to succeed on their claims that the law violated the constitutional right to
equal protection of the law because transgender discrimination is, by nature, sex
discrimination and transgender youth should be treated as a “suspect class” entitled to
heightened protection under the law. Because the law treats transgender youth differently,
they agreed with the District Court that it should be temporarily blocked on that basis as
well.
One member of the Court, while agreeing with the preliminary injunction against the law’s
medical restrictions, would have allowed one provision of the statute to take effect that
prohibits Medicaid funding of gender-affirming care for minors.
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