Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

2024 MT 303

Cross v. State

Montana Supreme Court

Decided December 11, 2024

Montana Supreme Court · decided 2024-12-11

Opinion - Published - Justice Baker - Affirmed

Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Elrod v. Burns · San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

Decided 2024-12-11

                                                                               12/11/2024


                                      DA 23-0572
                                                                           Case Number: DA 23-0572


          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                      
2024 MT 303



PHOEBE CROSS, a minor by and through
his guardians Molly Cross and Paul Cross;
MOLLY CROSS, an individual; PAUL CROSS,
an individual; JANE DOE, an individual;
JOHN DOE, an individual; JUANITA HODAX,
on behalf of herself and her patients,
KATHERINE MISTRETTA, on behalf of
herself and her patients,

          Plaintiffs and Appellees,

     v.

STATE OF MONTANA; GREGORY GIANFORTE,
 in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of Montana; AUSTIN KNUDSEN,
in his official capacity as Attorney General;
MONTANA BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS; MONTANA BOARD OF
NURSING; MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
CHARLIE BRERETON, in his official capacity
as Director of the Montana Department of
Public Health and Human Services,

          Defendants and Appellants.



APPEAL FROM:      District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
                  In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV 23-541
                  Honorable Jason Marks, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

           For Appellants:

                  Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael D. Russell,
                  Michael Noonan, Thane Johnson, Alwyn Lansing, Assistant
                  Attorneys General, Helena, Montana
      Emily Jones, Special Assistant Attorney General, Jones Law Firm,
      PLLC, Billings, Montana

For Appellees:

      Alex Rate, Marthe Y. VanSickle, Akilah Deernose, ACLU of
      Montana, Missoula, Montana

      Malita Picasso, ACLU Foundation, New York, New York

      Matthew P. Gordon, Heather Shook, Courtney Schirr, Sara Cloon,
      Kayla Lindgren, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, Washington

      Peter C. Renn, Kell Olson, Lambda Legal Defense and Education
      Fund, Los Angeles, California

      Elizabeth O. Gill, ACLU Foundation, San Francisco, California

      Nora Huppert, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Chicago,
      Illinois

For Amicus Curiae Montana Family Foundation:

      Derek J. Oestreicher, Montana Family Foundation, Laurel, Montana

For Amicus Curiae Compassion & Choices:

      Peter Michael Meloy, Meloy Law Firm, Helena, Montana

For Amici Curiae Elliot Page and Fifty-Six Other Individuals:

      Colin Gerstner, Gerstner Adam Law, PLLC, Billings, Montana

      Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP,
      New York, New York

      Sydney Duncan, Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
      New York, New York

For Amici Curiae Biomedical Ethics and Public Health Scholars:

      Michelle T. Weinberg, Michelle T. Weinberg, PLLC, Missoula,
      Montana

      Katelyn Kang, Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, Cooley LLP, New York,
      New York



                              2
         For Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics and Additional National
         and State Medical and Mental Health Organizations:

               Jon Moyers, Moyers Kohn Law, Billings, Montana

               D. Jean Veta, William R. Isasi, Covington & Burling, LLP,
               Washington, District of Columbia

         For Amici Curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and National
         Center for Lesbian Rights:

               Rob Farris-Olsen, Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola, PLLP,
               Helena, Montana

               Jordan D. Hershman, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Boston,
               Massachusetts


                                         Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 2024

                                                   Decided: December 11, 2024


Filed:
                            r-6tA•-if
               __________________________________________
                                Clerk




                                     3
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1        The State of Montana appeals the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction

temporarily enjoining the 2023 Legislature’s Senate Bill 99 (“SB 99”), which proscribes

the use of medications and surgery to treat gender dysphoria in minors. We consider two

issues:

          1. Do Plaintiffs have standing to challenge SB 99?

          2. Did the District Court manifestly abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
          in granting preliminary injunctive relief?

We affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2        The Montana State Legislature passed SB 99 during the 2023 Legislative Session.

S. 99, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2023), codified in §§ 50-4-1001 to 1006, 37-2-307,

53-6-135, MCA. The bill’s stated purpose is “to enhance the protection of minors and their

families . . . from any form of pressure to receive harmful, experimental puberty blockers

and cross-sex hormones and to undergo irreversible, life-altering surgical procedures prior

to attaining the age of majority.” Section 50-4-1002, MCA. SB 99 proscribes the use of

certain treatments and surgical procedures for “a female minor to address the minor’s

perception that her gender or sex is not female.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(a), MCA. The

surgical procedures that SB 99 prohibits for “female minors” include, but are not limited

to, “a vaginectomy, hysterectomy, oophorectomy, [and] ovariectomy.”                  Section

50-4-1004(1)(a)(i), MCA.        SB 99 also prohibits administering to “female minors”

“supraphysiologic doses of testosterone or other androgens,” and “puberty blockers such


                                               4
as GnRH agonists or other synthetic drugs.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(a)(ii)-(iii), MCA.

Likewise, SB 99 prohibits different treatments and surgical procedures for “a male minor

to address the minor’s perception that his gender or sex is not male.”

Section 50-4-1004(1)(b), MCA. For “male minor[s],” SB 99 prohibits surgical procedures

including but not limited to, “a penectomy, orchiectomy, vaginoplasty [and] clitoroplasty.”

Section 50-4-1004(1)(b)(i), MCA. SB 99 prohibits “supraphysiologic doses of estrogen”

and “puberty blockers such as GnRH agonists” that “delay or suppress pubertal

development in male minors.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(b)(ii)-(iii), MCA. SB 99 exempts

these treatments and surgeries from its prohibitions, however, if not knowingly used to

“address a female minor’s perception that her gender or sex is not female,” and similarly

exempts them if not knowingly used to address “a male minor’s perception that his gender

or sex is not male.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA.

¶3     SB 99 further imposes professional consequences on a health care professional who

knowingly violates its provisions. It declares that a physician or health care professional

who provides a prohibited procedure or treatment has “engaged in unprofessional conduct

and is subject to discipline.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(a), MCA. The law directs “the

appropriate licensing entity or disciplinary review board” to suspend the person’s “ability

to administer health care or practice medicine for at least 1 year.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(a),

MCA. It also grants the “parents or guardians of the minor subject to the violation . . . a

private cause of action for damages and equitable relief.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(b), MCA.

A health care professional or physician’s professional liability insurance may not include



                                             5
coverage for damages assessed against the person for providing a prohibited procedure or

treatment. Section 50-4-1006, MCA.

¶4     SB 99 contains additional prohibitions. Among them, public funds may not be

directly or indirectly used to provide the prohibited procedures or treatments; an individual

or entity who pays for a prohibited procedure or treatment may not deduct the amount paid

from their state taxes; Montana Medicaid and children’s health insurance programs may

not reimburse or provide coverage for prohibited procedures or treatments; and State

properties may “not be knowingly used to promote or advocate the use of social

transitioning” or the prohibited procedures or treatments. Section 50-4-1004(3), (5), (6),

(7), MCA.       The attorney general may bring actions to enforce compliance.

Section 50-4-1004(11), MCA.

¶5     The District Court drew its terminology from the parties’ expert declarations and

reports. At birth, infants generally are assigned a sex, as the District Court wrote, “based

on their external genitalia, internal reproductive organs, and chromosomal makeup.” “Sex”

is a “distinct biological classification,” which “makes us male or female.” “Gender” is the

“social and cultural concept” denoting “the roles, behaviors, and identities that society

assigns to girls and boys, women and men, and gender-diverse people.” “Gender identity

refers to a person’s subjective feelings about their core sense of belonging to a particular

gender.” A person is “cisgender” if their gender identity matches their sex assigned at

birth. “Transgender” describes a person whose gender identity is incongruent with their

sex assigned at birth. “Gender dysphoria” designates the diagnosable condition, which can



                                             6
lead to clinically significant distress, arising from the incongruity between a person’s sex

and gender identity.

¶6     Plaintiff Phoebe Cross is a transgender minor who currently receives treatment

banned by SB 99. Plaintiffs also include Molly and Paul Cross, Phoebe Cross’s parents,

as well as John and Jane Doe, parents of non-party Joanne Doe, a transgender minor

currently receiving treatment banned by SB 99. The remaining Plaintiffs, Dr. Juanita

Hodax, a pediatric endocrinologist, and Dr. Katherine Mistretta, a Board-Certified Family

Nurse Practitioner, Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, and Doctor of Nursing

(hereinafter “Provider Plaintiffs”), provide treatments that SB 99 bans.1          Defendants

include, among others, the State of Montana; Gregory Gianforte, in his official capacity as

Governor of the State of Montana; and Austin Knudsen, in his official capacity as Attorney

General for the State of Montana.

¶7     Plaintiffs filed this action in May 2023 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs alleged that SB 99 violated numerous Montana constitutional rights, including

their rights to privacy and equal protection. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction

pursuant to § 27-19-201, MCA.           In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submitted

declarations and an expert report indicating that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are

safe, effective, and often medically necessary for minors with gender dysphoria. They

presented written expert testimony supporting their argument that untreated gender




1
 Additional Plaintiffs Scarlett Van Garderen and her parents were voluntarily dismissed from the
case during appeal after Scarlett turned 18.
                                               7
dysphoria can lead to significant lifelong distress, clinically significant anxiety and

depression, self-harming behaviors, and an increased risk of suicidality.

¶8     Plaintiffs presented additional evidence that the World Professional Association for

Transgender Health’s (“WPATH”) Standards of Care Version 8 are the accepted and

appropriate standard of care for the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of gender

dysphoria. Broadly, these treatments are called “gender-affirming care,” a term we will

use throughout this Opinion.       One of Plaintiffs’ experts reported that the use of

puberty-delaying medication and gender-affirming hormone therapy are two methods that

the WPATH standard of care recommends for treating gender dysphoria.                 Surgery,

Plaintiffs’ expert reported, is rarely recommended for minors with gender dysphoria under

the WPATH standard of care.

¶9     Through an expert report and declarations, the State submitted evidence supporting

its arguments that the international medical community has retreated from WPATH

standard of care treatments; that there is not medical consensus around using puberty

blockers and cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors; and that

gender-affirming care harms minors.

¶10    The District Court held that Plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction under

§ 27-19-201(1), MCA, because they met Montana’s four-part, conjunctive preliminary

injunction test.

                              STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11    We review justiciability issues, such as standing and ripeness, de novo. Weems v.

State, 
2019 MT 98, ¶ 7
, 
395 Mont. 350
, 
440 P.3d 4
 (Weems I) (citation omitted). “This

                                              8
Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for a manifest

abuse of discretion.” Montanans Against Irres. Dens. v. State, 
2024 MT 200, ¶ 8
, 
418 Mont. 78
, 
555 P.3d 759
 (MAID) (citing Driscoll v. Stapleton, 
2020 MT 247
, ¶ 12, 
401 Mont. 405
, 
473 P.3d 386
). A trial court abuses its discretion by acting “arbitrarily, without

employment of conscientious judgment, or exceed[ing] the bounds of reason resulting in

substantial injustice.” Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 5
, 
409 Mont. 378
, 
515 P.3d 301
 (citation and quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion is

“‘manifest’ when it is ‘obvious, evident, or unmistakable.’” Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 5
 (quoting Driscoll, ¶ 12).

¶12    We review a district court’s interpretation of the law de novo when its decision on

a preliminary injunction was based on legal conclusions. Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 5
 (citing Driscoll, ¶ 12). “In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction,

neither the District Court nor this Court will determine the underlying merits of the case

giving rise to the preliminary injunction, as such an inquiry is reserved for a trial on the

merits.” BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman, 
2019 MT 67, ¶ 7
, 
395 Mont. 160
, 
437 P.3d 142
 (citation omitted). In reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary

injunction, we do not “reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute [our] judgment regarding

the strength of the evidence for that of the district court.” Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 41
 (citation and quotation marks omitted).




                                             9
                                       DISCUSSION

¶13    1. Do Plaintiffs have standing to challenge SB 99?

¶14    “The judicial power of Montana’s courts, like the federal courts, is limited to

‘justiciable controversies.’” Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Reg’l Airport Auth. Bd., 
2010 MT 26, ¶ 6
, 
355 Mont. 142
, 
226 P.3d 142
 (citation omitted). Standing is a justiciability

doctrine that is “employed to refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim, on the ground

that even though the claim may be correct the litigant advancing it is not properly situated

to be entitled to its judicial determination.” 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, &

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531, 1-2 (3d ed. 2008).

“[S]tanding is a threshold, jurisdictional requirement in every case,” Heffernan v. Missoula

City Council, 
2011 MT 91, ¶ 29
, 
360 Mont. 307
, 
255 P.3d 80
 (citation omitted), which a

court must evaluate at every stage of the litigation. Barrett v. State, 
2024 MT 86, ¶ 18
, 
416 Mont. 226
, 
547 P.3d 630
 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 561
, 
112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137
 (1992)).

¶15    The State asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing because they “neither pled nor

demonstrated any injury fairly traceable to most of SB 99’s provisions.” It follows, the

State argues, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the entirety of SB 99.

Plaintiffs respond that the named parties established their standing to bring these claims

and that the State “cite[s] no binding authority to support [its] assertion that a plaintiff

raising a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must plead injury-in-fact for

every conceivable application of the challenged statute.”



                                             10
¶16    The State asserts that Provider Plaintiffs lack both first- and third-party standing to

challenge SB 99. The State does not dispute, however, that at least one plaintiff, Youth

Plaintiff Phoebe Cross, has standing under SB 99 § 4(1). “In a multi-plaintiff case such as

here, the standing of any one plaintiff is sufficient for a claim to proceed and, upon finding

that one plaintiff has standing, ‘the standing of the other parties [does] not merit further

inquiry.’” Barrett, ¶ 19 (quoting Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 
2010 MT 79, ¶ 45
,

356 Mont. 41
, 
230 P.3d 808
). This standing principle—that only one plaintiff must have

standing for a claim to proceed—is also well-established in federal law.2 See Biden v.

Nebraska, 
600 U.S. 477, 489
, 
143 S. Ct. 2355
, 2365 (2023) (citation omitted) (“If at least

one plaintiff has standing, the suit may proceed.”). Additionally, Providers’ standing

derives, at minimum, from the threatened loss of their ability to practice medicine or face

other penalties.   This is a concrete injury that entitles them to pursue their claims.

See Dodds v. Tierney, 
2024 MT 48
, ¶¶ 24-26, 
415 Mont. 384
, 
544 P.3d 857
 (rejecting

argument that doctor lacked standing despite allegations of harm to his reputation, license,

and employability); Mishler v. Nev. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
896 F.2d 408, 410-11

(9th Cir. 1990) (professional license is a protected property right for purposes of due

process) (citing Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 
353 U.S. 232, 238-39
, 
77 S. Ct. 752
, 755-

56 (1957)). Our precedent also is settled that healthcare providers have standing to

challenge statutes as violative of their patients’ rights to privacy under the Montana



2
   Though not binding, federal law is “persuasive authority for interpreting the [Montana
Constitution’s] justiciability requirements [in] Article VII, Section 4(1).” Plan Helena, ¶ 6
(citation omitted).
                                             11
Constitution. Armstrong v. State, 
1999 MT 261, ¶ 13
, 
296 Mont. 361
, 
989 P.2d 364
;

Weems I, ¶¶ 1, 12 (citing Armstrong, ¶ 13); see also Wiser v. State, 
2006 MT 20, ¶¶ 10-12, 14-20
, 
331 Mont. 28
, 
129 P.2d 133
 (considering denturists’ claim that administrative rule

violated their patients’ constitutional privacy rights).

¶17    The State cites no legal authority in support of its argument that the Plaintiffs had

to show injury from each subsection of the statute to acquire standing to challenge it. “We

are not obligated to develop arguments on behalf of parties to an appeal, nor are we to

develop legal analysis that may lend support to a party’s position.” Beck v. Dimar, 
2024 MT 176
, ¶ 29, 
417 Mont. 444
, 
554 P.3d 130
 (citation omitted). The State has not

demonstrated an error of law in the District Court’s ruling that the Plaintiffs had standing

to bring their claims.

¶18     2. Did the District Court manifestly abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
in granting preliminary injunctive relief?

¶19    “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”

MAID, ¶ 10 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 24
, 
129 S. Ct. 365, 376
 (2008)). In 2023, the Montana Legislature amended Montana’s preliminary injunction

standard, adopting the federal four-factor standard as enunciated in Winter, 
555 U.S. at 20
,

129 S. Ct. at 374
. 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 43, § 1. An applicant must establish the following

four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction:

       (a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits;
       (b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
           relief;
       (c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant’s favor; and
       (d) the order is in the public interest


                                              12
Section 27-19-201(1), MCA. Attaching the new Montana standard to federal law, the

statute expresses the intent of the Legislature “that the language in subsection (1) mirror

the federal preliminary injunction standard, and that interpretation and application of

subsection (1) closely follow United States [S]upreme [C]ourt case law.”                Section

27-19-201(4), MCA. Deviating from Montana’s prior standard, “[t]he current test is

conjunctive. That is, the applicant for an injunction bears the burden of establishing the

likelihood of each element: success on the merits; irreparable harm; balance of the equities;

and public interest.” MAID, ¶ 12.

¶20    Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, the record we consider on appeal

of a preliminary injunction is “the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court,

the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by

the clerk of the district court.” M. R. App. P. 8(1). See also Porretti v. Dzurenda, 
11 F.4th 1037
, 1047 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and emphasis omitted) (noting that review of factual

findings on a preliminary injunction appeal is limited to the “record available to the district

court when it granted or denied the injunction motion”); Wilson v. Williams, 
961 F.3d 829
,

833 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); (“Our task is . . . to review the record that was before

the district court at the time the preliminary injunction was entered.”) N.M. Dep’t of Game

& Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
854 F.3d 1236
, 1254 n.23 (10th Cir. 2017) (refusing to

consider “extra-record material” the department submitted for first time on appeal of

preliminary injunction).




                                              13
Likelihood of Success on the Merits

¶21    In analyzing the first factor of the preliminary injunction test, the District Court

concluded that the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of both

their Montana constitutional equal protection and right to privacy claims. For the right to

privacy claim, the District Court applied our holding in Armstrong

       [E]xcept in the face of a medically[] acknowledged, bona fide health risk,
       clearly and convincingly demonstrated, the legislature has no interest, much
       less a compelling one, to justify its interference with an individual’s
       fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure
       from a health care provider that has been determined by the medical
       community to be competent to provide that service and who has been
       licensed to do so.

Armstrong, ¶ 62. The District Court examined the parties’ disagreement whether the

treatments prohibited by SB 99 constituted a bona fide health risk. Considering the parties’

conflicting evidence, the court held that the State did not clearly and convincingly

demonstrate that the proscribed treatments present a bona fide health risk to minors. It

found that “the medical community overwhelmingly agrees that the treatments proscribed

by SB 99 are the accepted standard of care for treating gender dysphoria in minors.” The

District Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ evidence, which demonstrated that surgical

procedures are rarely recommended for minors with gender dysphoria, undercut the State’s

argument that SB 99 sought to minimize harm by banning gender-affirming surgical

procedures. The District Court noted that it did not need to conclusively resolve disputed

facts at the preliminary injunction stage, writing, “trial is the appropriate stage for ultimate

fact finding on the science presented in this matter.” The District Court concluded that



                                              14
Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their right to privacy

claim.

¶22      Montana’s right to privacy is contained in Article II, Section 10, of the Montana

Constitution, which guarantees that “[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the

well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling

state interest.” The right to privacy is fundamental; its protection “exceed[s] even that

provided by the federal constitution.” Armstrong, ¶¶ 34-35 (citations omitted). That the

right to privacy is separately protected in the Montana Constitution “reflects Montanans’

historical abhorrence and distrust of excessive governmental interference in their personal

lives.” Gryczan v. State, 
283 Mont. 433, 455
, 
942 P.2d 112, 125
 (1997); accord Weems v.

State, 
2023 MT 82
, ¶ 35, 
412 Mont. 132
, 
529 P.3d 798
 (Weems II) (noting a delegate’s

comment that the “right to be let alone” is “the most important right of them all” (quoting

Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, Vol. V, p.

1681)). “Montana’s constitutional right to privacy ‘broadly guarantees each individual the

right to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in

partnership with a chosen health care provider free from governmental interference.’”

Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20
 (quoting Armstrong, ¶ 14). We apply strict

scrutiny when a fundamental right, such as the right to privacy, is affected. Stand Up Mont.

v. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch., 
2022 MT 153
, ¶ 10, 
409 Mont. 330
, 
514 P.3d 1062
 (citation

omitted); Armstrong, ¶ 34 (citation omitted); Weems II, ¶ 43. The strict scrutiny standard

requires that the State demonstrate the challenged law is narrowly tailored to serve a

compelling government interest and only that interest. Stand Up Mont., ¶ 10.

                                             15
¶23    The State contends that the District Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because “[t]he right to privacy is

bounded by the State’s police power.” Drawing from Wiser v. State, the State argues that

the fundamental right to privacy “is necessarily subordinate to reasonable restraint and

regulation by the state in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative—police power.” Wiser,

¶ 24 (citation omitted).

¶24    The State insists that the District Court’s application of Armstrong was in error

because the challenged statute there prohibited a constitutionally protected medical

procedure. Here, the State continues, the safety and efficacy of gender-affirming care are

questionable, and therefore the medical care proscribed by SB 99 is not constitutionally

protected. The State also maintains that Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State—

in which we held that the right to privacy does not guarantee an individual’s access to a

particular drug—should provide the standard for Plaintiffs’ asserted privacy right. Mont.

Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 
2012 MT 201, ¶ 24
, 
366 Mont. 224
, 
286 P.3d 1161
 (MCIA).

¶25    Plaintiffs respond that the District Court’s application of the Armstrong standard

was not in error. They point to this Court’s decisions repeatedly affirming that the Montana

Constitution guarantees “the right of each individual to make medical judgments affecting

her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen health care provider free

from the interference of the government.” Armstrong, ¶ 39; accord Weems II, ¶¶ 35-50

(citation omitted); Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20
 (citation omitted); Planned

Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 
2024 MT 228, ¶ 23
, 
418 Mont. 253
, 
557 P.3d 440
 (citation

omitted); Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 
2024 MT 178, ¶ 22
, 
417 Mont. 457
, 554

                                             
16 P.3d 153
. Without clearly and convincingly establishing that gender-affirming care poses

a “medically[] acknowledged bona fide health risk,” which Plaintiffs maintain the State did

not do, the State’s police power does not allow it to infringe on an individual’s fundamental

right to privacy. Armstrong, ¶ 59; see also Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20

(quoting Armstrong, ¶¶ 34, 62); Weems II, ¶ 47.

¶26    Plaintiffs argue that Wiser and MCIA are distinguishable from the expansive right

to privacy we defined in Armstrong. They maintain that Wiser is inapposite because the

denturists there were not licensed by the State to provide the medical care in question. In

contrast, Provider Plaintiffs are licensed by the State to provide the medical care they use

to treat gender dysphoria in minors, the same care they use to treat minors with medical

conditions that are not subject to SB 99’s prohibitions.             See Wiser, ¶¶ 14-20;

§ 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA. Plaintiffs distinguish MCIA, maintaining that our holding there

concerned a singular drug, medical marijuana, that federal law criminally prohibited for all

purposes. MCIA, ¶ 32. Here, Plaintiffs argue, gender-affirming care is not criminally

prohibited, nor does SB 99 categorically ban the use of gender-affirming medications and

procedures; rather, SB 99 bans this form of care for only one purpose.

See § 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA.

¶27    Plaintiffs contend that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

determined that the State did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that

gender-affirming care poses a bona fide health risk to minors. In reaching its conclusion,

they maintain, the District Court “conducted a thorough review of the extensive evidence

filed by both parties and reasonably exercised its discretion” to find that Plaintiffs’

                                             17
evidence sufficiently demonstrated “that the medical community overwhelmingly agrees

that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are the accepted standard of care for treating gender

dysphoria in minors.”

¶28    In Armstrong, we held that the Legislature generally has no interest in restricting

“an individual’s fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure

from a health care provider that has been determined by the medical community to be

competent to provide that service and who has been licensed to do so.” Armstrong, ¶ 62;

accord Wiser, ¶ 15 (citation omitted); Weems I, ¶ 19 (citation omitted); Stand Up Mont.,

¶ 14 (citing Armstrong for the principle that “a private medical decision involving an

individual and healthcare provider . . . [is] constitutionally protected from infringement by

the state without a compelling state interest”). That privacy right empowers an individual

“to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership

with a chosen health care provider free from the interference of the government.”

Armstrong, ¶ 39. Plaintiffs are correct that we have repeatedly reaffirmed Montana’s broad

personal autonomy privacy right as recognized in Gryczan and Armstrong. See Weems II,

¶ 36 (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20
; Planned Parenthood,

2024 MT 228, ¶ 23
 (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood, 
2024 MT 178, ¶ 22
. The

Legislature may restrict this fundamental right to privacy only when it can demonstrate a

medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk. Armstrong, ¶ 62. In those instances, the

law must be tailored narrowly so that it is “the least onerous path that can be taken to

achieve the state objective.” Weems II, ¶ 44 (quoting Wadsworth v. State, 
275 Mont. 287, 302
, 
911 P.2d 1165, 1174
 (1996)).

                                             18
¶29    Wiser and MCIA are two narrow exceptions to the Armstrong standard. In Wiser, a

group of denturists challenged a State Board of Dentistry rule that required denturists to

refer partial denture patients to dentists before providing partial dentures. Wiser, ¶¶ 8-11.

The denturists argued that the rule infringed upon patients’ state constitutional right of

privacy to seek care from the medical professional of their choice. Wiser, ¶ 14. We

clarified that “Armstrong did not hold that there is a right to see a health care provider who

is not licensed to provide the services desired.” Wiser, ¶ 16. Because the denturists were

not licensed to provide the services in question, we rejected their privacy claim. Wiser,

¶¶ 16, 20.

¶30    In MCIA, plaintiffs challenged a state law that restricted their access to medical

marijuana. MCIA, ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiffs there maintained that our analysis in Armstrong

applied because the law infringed their right to privacy. MCIA, ¶ 28. We held that, unlike

Armstrong, plaintiffs’ “alleged affirmative right to access a particular drug ha[d] not been

constitutionally protected under the right to privacy,” and that therefore plaintiffs’ claim

did not fall under our analysis in Armstrong. MCIA, ¶ 28. In denying plaintiffs’ claim, we

relied heavily on marijuana’s illegality under the Controlled Substances Act, which

undermined their claim that the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed their access to

medical marijuana. MCIA, ¶ 32.

¶31    Both MCIA and Wiser are distinguishable from this case.            In contrast to the

denturists in Wiser, the State licensed Provider Plaintiffs to provide the care proscribed by

SB 99. Wiser, ¶ 16. Compared to MCIA, in which the law at issue restricted a single drug

for all uses, SB 99 prohibits a host of procedures and medications, but only if used to treat

                                             19
gender dysphoria. See § 50-4-1004(1), MCA, MCIA, ¶¶ 2-3. Further, the procedures and

medications proscribed by SB 99 are not “unequivocally illegal,” as was medical marijuana

when we decided MCIA. MCIA, ¶ 32.

¶32   The exceptions to Montana’s expansive right to privacy that we recognized in MCIA

and Wiser do not apply here. Like Armstrong, SB 99 proscribes lawful medications and

procedures administered by competent and licensed health care providers. See Armstrong,

¶ 62. The Legislature did not make gender-affirming care unlawful. Nor did it make the

treatments unlawful for all minors.    Instead, it restricted a broad swath of medical

treatments only when sought for a particular purpose. The record indicates that Provider

Plaintiffs, or other medical professionals providing gender-affirming care, are recognized

as competent in the medical community to provide that care. See Armstrong, ¶ 62. Like

in Armstrong, the law puts governmental regulation in the mix of an individual’s

fundamental right “to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and

health in partnership with a chosen health care provider.” Armstrong, ¶ 39. The District

Court therefore did not err in applying the Armstrong standard.

¶33   To succeed on its request for preliminary relief in a constitutional challenge, an

applicant must “‘establish a prima facie case of a violation of its rights under’ the

constitution.” Weems I, ¶ 18 (quoting City of Billings v. Cty. Water Dist. of Billings

Heights, 
281 Mont. 219, 227
, 
935 P.2d 246, 251
 (1997)). The federal standard is similar:

      The courts use a bewildering variety of formulations of the need for showing
      some likelihood of success—the most common being that plaintiff must
      demonstrate a reasonable probability of success. But the verbal differences
      do not seem to reflect substantive disagreement. All courts agree that


                                           20
       plaintiff must present a prima facie case but need not show a certainty of
       winning.

Wright & Miller, § 2948.3. “Prima facie means literally at first sight or on first appearance

but subject to further evidence or information.” Weems I, ¶ 18 (quoting Prima facie,

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶34    The issuance of a preliminary injunction does not, as the State argues, necessarily

conflict with the principle that a statute is presumed constitutional.         A preliminary

injunction is “not equivalent to a ‘holding’ that the statute is unconstitutional,” and

therefore the presumption of a statute’s constitutionality “does not alter the movant’s

burden to present a prima facie case at the preliminary injunction stage.”               Planned

Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 33
. As with any preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs’ burden

here is to present a prima facie case that SB 99 violates their constitutional rights.

¶35    The record shows that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion when

it concluded that Plaintiffs presented a prima facie likelihood of success on their right to

privacy claim.    For example, the District Court conscientiously weighed the State’s

evidence in support of its argument that SB 99 sought to protect minors from harmful,

experimental treatments.     On this argument, the District Court examined the State’s

evidence that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has not approved puberty

blockers for use in treating gender dysphoria. The District Court also considered the State’s

evidence that the international community has retreated from gender-affirming care. In

response, Plaintiffs submitted evidence indicating that the treatments proscribed by SB 99

are well-studied and that once the FDA approves a drug generally, the agency permits


                                              21
health care providers to prescribe the drug for off-label use, which occurs frequently for

many drugs. Plaintiffs also presented evidence showing that leading United States medical

organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American Psychological

Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, endorse and cite the WPATH

standard of care as authoritative for treating gender dysphoria. The WPATH standard of

care, Plaintiffs asserted, specifically recommends treatments for gender dysphoria in

minors, such as puberty blockers, which SB 99 proscribed.

¶36    On the basis of the parties’ evidentiary submissions, the District Court concluded

that Plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are not

harmful or experimental, and under Armstrong, do not present a medically acknowledged,

bona fide health risk to minors. Armstrong, ¶ 62. The District Court found that because

the State did not demonstrate on the preliminary injunction record that the treatments

proscribed by SB 99 presented this risk, the State did not have a compelling interest and

thus could not meet strict scrutiny.

¶37    The statute’s impact on individual privacy rights triggers strict scrutiny review,

which requires the State to demonstrate that “the legislation [is] justified by a compelling

state interest and [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest.”

Armstrong, ¶ 34 (citing Gryczan, 
283 Mont. at 449
, 942 P.3d at 122). Though the State

has a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a

minor,” a statute implicating their privacy rights must be narrowly tailored to serve that

interest. Planned Parenthood, 
2024 MT 178, ¶ 36
 (citation omitted). SB 99 affords no

room for decision-making by a patient in consultation with their doctors and parents. The

                                            22
statute is a complete ban, prohibiting individualized care tailored to the needs of each

patient based on the exercise of professional medical judgment and informed consent.

¶38    At this stage of the proceedings, the District Court conscientiously weighed the

parties’ evidence and made no error of law when it applied the Armstrong standard to the

evidence. Our role is not to reweigh conflicting evidence or to question a district court’s

assessment of the strength of the evidence on a preliminary injunction appeal. Planned

Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶ 41
 (citation omitted). The District Court properly reserved

final resolution of the parties’ conflicting evidence for trial on the merits, writing that “[t]he

Court’s ruling here will not affect the ultimate fact-finding decision on this issue at trial.”

¶39    Finally, the court’s decision not to parse out particular provisions of the statute from

the injunction was within its discretion in light of the preliminary nature of the relief. The

Dissent would reverse the decision to enjoin the Medicaid restriction, applying

rational-basis review. Dissent, ¶ 70. But we recently held that strict scrutiny applies to a

statute disqualifying or restricting “otherwise eligible recipients . . . from certain public

healthcare benefits based on their exercise of their fundamental right to privacy as

guaranteed under the Montana Constitution.” Planned Parenthood, 
2024 MT 228, ¶ 23
.

Given its preliminary determination that the Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their

claimed privacy infringement, the District Court correctly applied strict scrutiny to the

entire measure. We see no “obvious, evident, or unmistakable” abuse of discretion in the

District Court’s conclusion on the first preliminary injunction factor. Planned Parenthood,

2022 MT 157, ¶ 5
 (quoting Driscoll, ¶ 12).



                                               23
¶40    The State maintains, however, that the District Court could not have weighed and

drawn conclusions from the conflicting evidence without holding a hearing at which the

parties’ experts could testify and subject themselves to cross-examination. The State cites

federal circuit cases, which generally expound the importance of building an adequate

factual basis for a trial court to rule on a preliminary injunction. E.g. U.S. v. Gila Valley

Irr. Dist., 
31 F.3d 1428
, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“On a motion for a

preliminary injunction an adequate presentation of the facts is necessary.”). For additional

support, the State relies on Doe v. University of Cincinnati for the simple assertion that

“cross-examination has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth.”

Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 
872 F.3d 393, 401
 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The State

also points the Court to the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Gila Valley that “[o]n a motion for

a preliminary injunction . . . [t]he opposing party must be afforded the opportunity to

cross-examine the moving party’s witnesses and to present evidence.” Gila Valley Irr.

Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442.

¶41    In response, Plaintiffs insist that the decision to permit oral testimony at a

preliminary injunction hearing was within the District Court’s discretion.         Plaintiffs

analogize to Planned Parenthood, where we affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a

preliminary injunction although the parties were not allowed the opportunity to present live

testimony or cross-examine witnesses. Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶¶ 39-41, 53-54, 60
. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs argue, the State conceded that

it had a full opportunity to be heard despite the District Court’s refusal to hear oral

testimony.

                                             24
¶42    The District Court correctly stated at the scheduling conference, “[W]e don’t have

a trial before the trial with a preliminary injunction, even under the federal standard.” As

we held in Planned Parenthood, a district court is not obligated to hear live testimony at

the preliminary injunction stage of proceedings simply because the parties present

conflicting testimony; rather, resolution of conflicting testimony “must be reserved for trial

on the merits.” Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157
, ¶ 41.

¶43    The federal circuit courts do not uniformly require live testimony at a preliminary

injunction hearing. See Valentine v. Collier, 
956 F.3d 797
, 801 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding

it “unclear . . . why [it] matters” that a party did not present live testimony at preliminary

injunction hearing, noting that “[i]t has long been true that parties can present evidence at

the preliminary-injunction stage with declarations or affidavits”); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line

Co., LLC v. 6.04 Acres, 
910 F.3d 1130, 1169
 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)) (“An evidentiary hearing is required for entry of a preliminary

injunction only where facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must be

made to decide whether injunctive relief should issue.” . In the Ninth Circuit it is not an

abuse of discretion for a federal district court to refuse to hear oral testimony at a

preliminary injunction hearing as long as “the parties have a full opportunity to submit

written testimony and to argue the matter.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 
13 F.3d 1313, 1326

(9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

¶44    The State’s Ninth Circuit authority, Gila Valley, does not provide otherwise. There,

the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that on a motion for a preliminary injunction, “[t]he

opposing party must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the moving party’s

                                             25
witnesses and to present evidence.” Gila Valley Irr. Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442 (citation

omitted). The court then clarified, however, that the Ninth Circuit “has held that a

preliminary injunction may be granted or denied on the basis of affidavits” if the party is

not “denied the opportunity to be heard.” Gila Valley Irr. Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442.

¶45    The State’s exchange with the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing

confirms that the State had a full opportunity to be heard. During the hearing, the District

Court asked the State twice if its refusal to hear live testimony prevented the State from

presenting any specific information or live witnesses. First, the State answered that its

objection was grounded in “[n]one other than the inherent limitation of out-of-court

testimony.” The District Court then asked, “But there wasn’t a witness that you weren’t

able to get an affidavit from that you would have been able to achieve live testimony with?”

The State admitted it was “[n]ot . . . aware of” any witnesses from whom it was unable to

get an affidavit. This colloquy shows that the District Court’s limitation on oral testimony

did not prevent the State from having a “full opportunity to submit written testimony and

to argue the matter.” Stanley, 
13 F.3d at 1326
 (citations omitted).

¶46    A district court has broad discretion in matters of trial administration and the

admission of evidence. State v. Rossbach, 
2022 MT 2, ¶ 20
, 
407 Mont. 55
, 
501 P.3d 914

(citation omitted) (trial administration decisions are reviewed under abuse of discretion

standard); Steer, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
245 Mont. 470, 475
, 
803 P.2d 601, 603-04
 (1990)

(citation omitted) (discretionary trial court rulings are those “encompassing the power of

choice among several courses of action, each of which is considered permissible”). The

District Court acted within its discretion when it determined that the presentation of live

                                            26
testimony—which in this case involves extensive expert testimony and fact witnesses—

should await trial on the merits. The court did not err as a matter of law in its conduct of

the hearing. It ruled within the bounds of reason that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of

success on the merits of their privacy claim.

Irreparable Harm

¶47      An applicant for a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that the applicant is

likely    to   suffer   irreparable   harm   in    the   absence    of   preliminary    relief.

Section 27-19-201(1)(b), MCA. Both this Court and federal courts have recognized that

harm is irreparable if legal remedies, like an award for damages, are an inadequate remedy.

Flying T Ranch, LLC v. Catlin Ranch, LP, 
2022 MT 162, ¶ 19
, 
409 Mont. 478
, 
515 P.3d 806
 (citation omitted) (“[m]oney damages are not considered irreparable harm”); E. Bay

Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 
993 F.3d 640
, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Life

Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 
8 F.4th 531
, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Together

Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 
32 F.4th 82
, 85 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (noting

that “adequate legal remedies foreclose injunctive relief”). Conversely, economic harm

alone generally is not considered irreparable. Netzer Law Off., P.C. v. State, 
2022 MT 234, ¶ 18
, 
410 Mont. 513
, 
420 P.3d 335
 (affirming district court’s conclusion that minimal

economic harm is insufficient to justify preliminary injunctive relief); E. Bay Sanctuary

Covenant, 993 F.3d at 677; Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., 
910 F.3d at 1165
 (citation

omitted) (“economic harm will not satisfy the irreparable-harm element in many cases”);

Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 
348 F.3d 1182, 1189
 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A



                                              27
showing of irreparable injury must be likely; speculative injury is insufficient. MAID, ¶ 15

(citing Winter, 
555 U.S. at 22
).

¶48    When a plaintiff’s claim is grounded in the right to privacy, we have “recognized

harm from constitutional infringement as adequate to justify a preliminary injunction.”

Weems I, ¶ 25 (citations omitted). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right

is involved, such as the right to free speech or freedom of religion, most courts hold that

no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Wright & Miller, § 2948.1;

see also Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 
661 F.2d 328, 338
 (5th Cir. 1981)

(citation omitted) (irreparable injury is established when constitutional right of privacy is

threatened or being impaired); Melendres v. Arpaio, 
695 F.3d 990, 1000
 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 373
, 
96 S. Ct. 2673, 2690
 (1976)). (“It is well

established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.’”).

¶49    Concluding that Plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that SB 99 infringed on

their fundamental right to privacy, the District Court found that they had established the

irreparable injury factor. Plaintiffs’ declarations further convinced the District Court that

SB 99’s prohibitions would likely lead to increased depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation,

and suicide attempts for Provider Plaintiffs’ patients. Youth Plaintiff Phoebe Cross’s

declaration also attested that taking away his gender-affirming care would leave him

“fearful for [his] life.”

¶50    The State argues that the District Court erred in finding for Plaintiffs on the

likelihood of irreparable harm factor.      Relying on its evidence that the treatments

                                             28
proscribed by SB 99 cause “grievous physical, psychological, and emotional injury,” the

State asserts that the Plaintiffs’ evidence is “subject to significant legitimate criticism that

seriously undermines its reliability and scientific validity.” The State implicitly asks the

Court to reweigh the parties’ evidence, asserting that “there is a substantial amount of

evidence from all over the world that gender transition procedures do not, in fact, alleviate

gender dysphoria, but instead lead to exacerbated mental health problems and even more

significant distress.” With an appeal of a preliminary injunction, however, we do not

“determine the underlying merits of the case” and will not “reweigh conflicting evidence

or substitute [our] judgment regarding the strength of the evidence for that of the district

court.” Planned Parenthood, 
2022 MT 157, ¶¶ 5, 41
 (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

¶51    Plaintiffs’ alleged injury—loss of the constitutional privacy right—is irreparable

with a monetary remedy, which makes their claim appropriate for a preliminary injunction.

See Flying T Ranch, LLC, ¶ 19; Weems I, ¶ 25; E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993

F.3d at 677. Given the Plaintiffs’ evidence that the most lasting and permanent forms of

gender-affirming care are rarely performed on minors; that, without an injunction, minor

patients would suffer severe psychological distress; and that SB 99 infringed on their

fundamental right to privacy, Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. It

was not a manifest abuse of discretion for the District Court to conclude that the Plaintiffs

made an adequate preliminary showing of harm to warrant the preservation of their rights

in status quo pending a full trial.



                                              29
¶52    The State takes issue with the District Court’s reference to preserving the status quo,

contending that this is no longer part of Montana’s preliminary injunction standard.

See Driscoll, ¶ 26. This is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed

that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the

parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 
600 U.S. 339
,

346, 
144 S. Ct. 1570
, 1576 (2024) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 
451 U.S. 390, 395
,

101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834
 (1981)); see § 27-19-201(4), MCA (expressing intent that

“interpretation and application” of the new standard “closely follow United States

[S]upreme [C]ourt case law”). Consistent with this standard, we long have recognized that

“[d]uring a show cause hearing on a preliminary injunction, the district court should restrict

itself to determining whether the applicant has made a sufficient case to warrant preserving

a right in status quo until a trial on the merits can be had.” Knudson v. McDunn, 
271 Mont. 61, 65
, 
894 P.2d 295, 298
 (1995) (citing Porter v. K & S P’ship, 
192 Mont. 175, 181
, 
627 P.2d 836, 839
 (1981)). The District Court did not err when it relied on preservation of the

status quo in its preliminary injunction order.

Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest

¶53    The third preliminary injunction factor asks whether “the balance of the equities tips

in the applicant’s favor.” Section 27-19-201(1)(c), MCA. The final factor requires the

applicant to establish that “the order is in the public interest.” Section 27-19-201(1)(d),

MCA. The public interest factor “is another way of inquiring whether there are policy

considerations that bear on whether” to grant an injunction. Wright & Miller, § 2948.4.

“When the government opposes a preliminary injunction, these two factors ‘merge into one

                                             30
inquiry.’” Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 
2024 MT 227, ¶ 34
, 
418 Mont. 226
,

557 P.3d 471
 (quoting Porretti, 11 F.4th at 1047); accord Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418, 435
, 
129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762
 (2009).

¶54    Enjoining SB 99, the State argued, would cause it irreparable injury that outweighed

Plaintiffs’ injury absent an injunction. The District Court determined conversely that the

risk of adverse effects to Youth Plaintiffs’ health, “including increased risk of suicidality,”

outweighed the harms to the State. The District Court also reasoned that preliminarily

enjoining SB 99 served the public interest because “[i]t is always in the public interest to

prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” See Planned Parenthood, 
2024 MT 227, ¶ 36
 (quoting Melendres, 
695 F.3d at 1002
); Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S.

Marshals Serv., 
977 F.3d 817
, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t

of Educ., 
845 F.3d 217, 222
 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Pryor v. School Dist. No. 1,

99 F.4th 1243
, 1254 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ evidence indicated that

other non-party minors with gender dysphoria would be harmed if SB 99 were not enjoined,

which further convinced the District Court that the public interest would be served by

preliminarily enjoining SB 99.

¶55    The statute at issue here prevents a wide range of treatment even when such

treatment is determined, in the judgment of a medical professional working with their

patients, to be in the patients’ best interest and given with informed consent. The evidence

showed that the proscribed medical interventions are not used for youth prior to the onset

of puberty, and the most invasive (surgical) treatments are not recommended for patients

before they turn eighteen. On the strength of the potential harm to those patients the statute

                                              31
targets, the District Court reasonably concluded that the balance of the equities tips toward

preliminary relief pending full consideration of the merits. Its analysis of the last two

preliminary injunction factors was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The court did not

manifestly abuse its discretion, and its injunction was not overbroad.

¶56    Finally, both parties have submitted notices of supplemental authority, citing recent

cases considering challenges to various laws regarding gender-affirming care. Without

exception, the additional authority pertains to claims grounded in the equal protection

clause or otherwise based on alleged unlawful discrimination. Some of the authorities also

reference new developments in research and evidence that was not part of the record

presented to the District Court in the preliminary injunction proceedings. Because, on the

record here, the District Court’s conclusions on Montana’s express privacy protections are

sufficient to uphold its preliminary injunction, we affirm on that basis. The parties will

have the opportunity during the merits proceeding for full development of the record,

where their experts may offer insight on any new research, and for briefing on the current

case law relative to their claims.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶57    The District Court made no error of law and did not manifestly abuse its discretion.

We affirm its grant of a preliminary injunction on the basis of Plaintiffs’ right to privacy

claim. The case will proceed to trial, at which point the District Court will finally resolve

the disputed facts and issue a final determination on the constitutional issues presented.


                                                  /S/ BETH BAKER


                                             32
We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA


 Justice Laurie McKinnon, concurring.

 ¶58    I concur in the Court’s decision to uphold the preliminary injunction on Plaintiffs’

 right to privacy claim. I write separately because I believe Plaintiffs’ equal protection

 claim should likewise be addressed by the Court.

 ¶59    This Court’s review of a preliminary injunction is a deferential question that asks

 whether the district court manifestly abused its discretion. Stensvad v. Newman Ayers

 Ranch, Inc., 
2024 MT 246, ¶ 8
, 
418 Mont. 378
, __ P.3d __. This limited review for

 purposes of injunctive relief makes sense: the parties have minimal opportunity to

 develop the record; the district court judge must work quickly and from a narrow set of

 facts; this Court can only review the limited information before it. There is much left to

 be litigated on the merits in this case, especially considering the thorny social, scientific,

 and legal landscape from which it arises, and courts should have the benefit of a more

 complete record before making ultimate decisions on the merits. See Stensvad, ¶ 27

 (explaining how this Court’s preliminary injunction test seeks to preserve intensive

 merits litigation for the post-injunctive relief stage). But there is a line between deciding

 narrowly for the purposes of an appeal of a preliminary injunction and refusing to decide

 the issue which is front and center to the controversy. By entirely ignoring the parties’


                                             33
    equal protection arguments, this Court crosses that line, leaving the parties and the

    District Court without necessary guidance on questions of law entirely appropriate for

    this Court to address at this juncture. This Court’s avoidance of a claim squarely before

    us puts the parties at a disadvantage going forward on the merits case.

    ¶60    Aside from the question of standing, the vast majority of the parties’ arguments

    and the District Court’s Order focuses on the unique equal protection issues presented by

    this case—novel legal issues on which the parties and the District Court require this

    Court’s instruction before trial proceeds. While a prohibition on gender-affirming care

    must be evaluated under Montana’s right to privacy precedent, the prohibition on

    gender-affirming care is fundamentally about the nature of sex and suspect class

    discrimination as it applies in the equal protection context. Gender-affirming care is

    currently being litigated on equal protection grounds around the country, and the United

    States Supreme Court is poised to take up the issue this term, see L.W. v. Skrmetti, 
73 F.4th 408
 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Skrmetti, 
144 S. Ct. 2679
 (2024). These cases are instructive in certain ways, but they cannot answer what

    this Court is being asked: how sex/gender discrimination and suspect class discrimination

    should be handled under the unique equal protection provision of the Montana

    Constitution. In fact, Plaintiffs’ complaint is made up of claims exclusively under the

    Montana Constitution. No other Court can answer these questions. The Montana

    Constitution stands on its own, as does Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge.1


1
  We have held repeatedly that the Montana Constitution provides greater protection under its
equal protection provision. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 
2004 MT 390, ¶ 15
, 
325 Mont. 148
,
                                               34
 ¶61     The District Court’s Order points out a critical gap in our equal protection

 jurisprudence, specifically, that this Court “has not yet explicitly identified the level of

 scrutiny applicable to classifications that are sex-based, nor has it explicitly stated that

 sex is a suspect class.” At the federal level, defining the classes for equal protection

 purposes is driving a prudential rift, because that class definition determines what

 standard of scrutiny is applied under the U.S. Constitution. Many competing theories

 pervade.    For example, in Skrmetti, the Sixth Circuit found that the law did not

 discriminate on sex because it banned gender-affirming care for minors of both sexes.

 Skrmetti, 73 F.4th at 419-20. The Eleventh Circuit has held that legislation blocking

 gender-affirming care “targets specific medical interventions for minors” and does not

 classify “on the basis of any suspect characteristic under the Equal Protection Clause.”

 Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Alabama, 
80 F.4th 1205
, 1227 (11th Cir. 2023). Appellants

 argue similarly. Of course, the question in Skrmetti will be analyzed and decided under

 the federal constitution and precedent––not Montana’s Constitution and precedent.

 ¶62     Montana’s constitutional equal protection provision and this Court’s precedent

 stands apart and in addition to the minimum safeguards provided by our federal

 counterpart. They provide clear direction as to the appropriate tier of scrutiny. When

 legislation infringes on fundamental rights, including within the equal protection

 framework, it receives strict scrutiny because the interest discriminated against is a



104 P.3d 445
. Thus, we need not and should not lock-step with the U.S. Constitution’s
interpretation of similar language. See State v. Covington, 
2012 MT 31, ¶¶ 20-21
, 
364 Mont. 118
,
272 P.3d 43
 (explaining that this Court “will undertake a unique, state constitutional analysis”
when there is support for greater protection under the state constitution).
                                              35
    fundamental right. See Planned Parenthood v. State, 
2024 MT 178, ¶ 29
, 
417 Mont. 457
,

    
554 P.3d 153
; Snetsinger, ¶ 17 (“Strict scrutiny applies if a suspect class or fundamental

    right is affected.”). At least two fundamental rights are implicated here: the right to be

    free from discrimination based on sex which necessarily includes transgender status as

    explained below, and the right to privacy already addressed by the Court.2 Strict scrutiny

    is undoubtedly the appropriate tier of scrutiny.

    ¶63    As the District Court noted, transgender discrimination is, by nature, sex

    discrimination. This logic is supported in part by Bostock v. Clayton County, 
590 U.S. 644
, 
140 S. Ct. 1731
 (2020), where the Supreme Court held that discrimination based on

    transgender status is sex discrimination. In the gender-affirming care case currently

    pending before the Supreme Court, however, Tennessee advances the Sixth Circuit’s

    reasoning that Bostock’s holding is limited to the Title VII context, receiving a lower

    standard of scrutiny in other contexts. Appellants argue similarly before this Court. But

    again, the Montana Constitution’s equal protection provision offers a critical

    distinction—like Title VII, it explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus,

    even if the Supreme Court limits Bostock’s recognition of transgender status-based sex

    discrimination to the Title VII context, the Montana Constitution is not limited in the

    same way. Bostock’s logic is sound: “[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person

    for being . . . transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”


2
  One might also posit that the right to equal protection of the laws is itself a fundamental right
warranting strict scrutiny based on its presence in the Declaration of Rights, regardless of the
classifications being challenged. Nevertheless, this Court has developed a three-tier framework
for the appropriate standard of scrutiny in an equal protection challenge. See Snetsinger, ¶ 17.
                                                36
Bostock, 590 U.S. at 660, 
140 S. Ct. at 1741
. By declining to engage with this question

now, we leave this critical definition open to lock-stepping by complicity in whatever

direction the United States Supreme Court decides to take. This Court should take the

opportunity to clearly state that discrimination based on sex as explicitly contained in the

equal protection clause includes discrimination on the basis of transgender status.

¶64    I would therefore affirm the District Court’s finding that SB 99 discriminates

based on sex and that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review; not because it

is more analogous to the federal “heightened scrutiny” standard for sex discrimination as

the District Court reasoned, but because Article II, Section 4 is unequivocal in its

intolerance for discrimination, which includes discrimination based on sex. Article II,

Section 4 “provides even more individual protection” than its federal counterpart,

Snetsinger, ¶ 15, so we need not parse federal gender discrimination law in search of an

analogous level of scrutiny.

¶65    Moreover, this Court should separately and additionally hold that transgender

status is a suspect class. Plaintiffs’ District Court briefing makes a compelling case as to

why transgender status is a suspect class that also triggers strict scrutiny. The District

Court noted its belief “that transgender persons comprise a suspect class” based on the

federal definition. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 28
, 
93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294
 (1973) (defining a suspect class as one “saddled with such disabilities,

or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a

position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the

majoritarian political process”). But given this Court’s lack of precedent on defining a

                                           37
suspect class under the Montana Constitution, the District Court “decline[d] to fully

engage in this analysis.” This Court has been explicitly asked to clarify this question on

appeal, yet declines to do so without explanation. Like the District Court, I would agree

that transgender persons comprise a suspect class.

¶66    Thus, critically, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny on at least three

separate bases. I would conclude the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion

in granting the preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the

merits on both their equal protection and right to privacy claims because SB 99 cannot

survive strict scrutiny; Plaintiffs will face irreparable harm if SB 99 is allowed to go into

effect; and the balance of equities and public interest favors granting the injunction.

¶67    The parties briefed the equal protection issue extensively and will proceed to trial

on the merits of their equal protection claim. We do the District Court and the litigants a

disservice when we avoid articulating the simple rule that discrimination on the basis of

transgender status is sex discrimination, sex discrimination receives strict scrutiny, and

that transgender persons comprise a suspect class also triggering strict scrutiny. Ignoring

the most substantive legal arguments of the case is not an act of judicial restraint or

deciding the case narrowly. It is an unjustifiable avoidance of a cornerstone question

which, if unanswered, will create further litigation; waste resources and time; and create

needless expense as the trial proceeds on the merits. More importantly, our avoidance

will delay resolution of this issue for those most affected by our decision––transgender

persons seeking medical care in time-sensitive scenarios. We ought to resolve this claim

that has been correctly and aptly raised before this Court.

                                             38
                                                  /S/ LAURIE McKINNON


Justice Ingrid Gustafson joins the Concurrence of Justice Laurie McKinnon.


                                                  /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON


Justice Jim Rice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶68    I concur with the Court’s holding affirming the District Court’s entry of a

preliminary injunction enjoining SB 99’s medical restrictions. A legislative prohibition of

an approved medical procedure must satisfy the high bar of being narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest in addressing a bona fide health risk. Further, the status quo is

that the treatments now restricted by SB 99 have been, and are, ongoing. Thus, under

application of these standards, I concur with the Court that the District Court did not

manifestly abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiffs had satisfied the conjunctive

factors for issuance of the preliminary injunction regarding SB 99’s medical restrictions to

preserve the status quo pending trial in the proceeding.

¶69    However, it should also be noted that both the medical and legal grounds regarding

the subject treatment of minors addressed by SB 99 are moving under our feet, and the

status quo itself is becoming a moving target, even as this litigation continues. As the

Court notes, Opinion, ¶ 35, the FDA has not approved puberty blockers for use in treating

gender dysphoria. The State has filed several notices of supplemental authority providing

further national and international decisions recognizing growing concerns over the medical

benefit of this treatment and the legitimate basis for state intervention. See TransActual

                                             39
CIC v. Sec’y of State for Health and Soc. Care, [2024] EWHC 1936, ¶¶ 194-95 (England

High Court of Justice) (citing a study described as the “best and most-up-to-date scientific

evidence available” which concludes “any benefits of puberty blockers were (save in one

‘very narrow’ respect) unproven or non-existent.”); and Alabama v. United States Sec'y of

Educ., No. 24-12444, 
2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21358
, at *3-4 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024)

(noting that “every court to consider the issue across the nation—seven district courts and

two courts of appeals—preliminarily enjoined enforcement” of a new Title IX rule, 
89 Fed. Reg. 37,522
 (May 6, 2024), which would have required healthcare providers and states to

perform and pay for gender-transition procedures). Other states have likewise restricted

gender-affirming care. See L.W. v. Skrmetti, 
83 F.4th 460
 (6th Cir. 2023) (reversing

preliminary injunction entered against state bans on gender-affirming care enacted in

Tennessee and Kentucky because a likelihood of success on the merits of substantive due

process and equal protection claims not demonstrated). This small sampling is enough to

highlight both the changing legal landscape and the gravity of the governing principle that

neither this decision from our Court nor the District Court’s decision should affect in any

way the ultimate outcome, which must be based on advancing medical science and law in

regard to a serious concern over minors receiving this treatment.

¶70    I would reverse the District Court’s enjoinder of the funding prohibition of SB 99,

see 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 306, § 8, which was codified as § 53-6-135, MCA, particularly

in light of the broad enjoinder of the new Title IX rule by the federal courts. As such, there

is no current federal mandate for Medicaid funding of gender-affirming care. See Texas v.

Becerra, No. 6:24-cv-211-JDK, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117573
, (E.D.

                                             40
Tex. July 3, 2024). Further, funding decisions fall within the Legislature’s primary

constitutional duty and responsibility over spending decisions, and I believe they should

be subject to rational basis review. See Timm v. Mont. Dep’t. of Pub. Health & Hum.

Servs., 
2008 MT 126, ¶ 34
, 
343 Mont. 11
, 
184 P.3d 994
 (“[T]here is no fundamental right

to receive Medicaid benefits in Montana.”); Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 317-18
,

100 S. Ct. 2671, 2688-89
 (1980) (“[F]reedom of choice in the context of certain personal

decisions [] does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary . . . .”).

¶71    I concur and dissent.


                                                  /S/ JIM RICE




                                             41

/2024/mt/303 · .json · Public domain