12/11/2024
DA 23-0572
Case Number: DA 23-0572
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2024 MT 303
PHOEBE CROSS, a minor by and through
his guardians Molly Cross and Paul Cross;
MOLLY CROSS, an individual; PAUL CROSS,
an individual; JANE DOE, an individual;
JOHN DOE, an individual; JUANITA HODAX,
on behalf of herself and her patients,
KATHERINE MISTRETTA, on behalf of
herself and her patients,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA; GREGORY GIANFORTE,
in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of Montana; AUSTIN KNUDSEN,
in his official capacity as Attorney General;
MONTANA BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS; MONTANA BOARD OF
NURSING; MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
CHARLIE BRERETON, in his official capacity
as Director of the Montana Department of
Public Health and Human Services,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV 23-541
Honorable Jason Marks, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael D. Russell,
Michael Noonan, Thane Johnson, Alwyn Lansing, Assistant
Attorneys General, Helena, Montana
Emily Jones, Special Assistant Attorney General, Jones Law Firm,
PLLC, Billings, Montana
For Appellees:
Alex Rate, Marthe Y. VanSickle, Akilah Deernose, ACLU of
Montana, Missoula, Montana
Malita Picasso, ACLU Foundation, New York, New York
Matthew P. Gordon, Heather Shook, Courtney Schirr, Sara Cloon,
Kayla Lindgren, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, Washington
Peter C. Renn, Kell Olson, Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Los Angeles, California
Elizabeth O. Gill, ACLU Foundation, San Francisco, California
Nora Huppert, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Chicago,
Illinois
For Amicus Curiae Montana Family Foundation:
Derek J. Oestreicher, Montana Family Foundation, Laurel, Montana
For Amicus Curiae Compassion & Choices:
Peter Michael Meloy, Meloy Law Firm, Helena, Montana
For Amici Curiae Elliot Page and Fifty-Six Other Individuals:
Colin Gerstner, Gerstner Adam Law, PLLC, Billings, Montana
Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP,
New York, New York
Sydney Duncan, Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
New York, New York
For Amici Curiae Biomedical Ethics and Public Health Scholars:
Michelle T. Weinberg, Michelle T. Weinberg, PLLC, Missoula,
Montana
Katelyn Kang, Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, Cooley LLP, New York,
New York
2
For Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics and Additional National
and State Medical and Mental Health Organizations:
Jon Moyers, Moyers Kohn Law, Billings, Montana
D. Jean Veta, William R. Isasi, Covington & Burling, LLP,
Washington, District of Columbia
For Amici Curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and National
Center for Lesbian Rights:
Rob Farris-Olsen, Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola, PLLP,
Helena, Montana
Jordan D. Hershman, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts
Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 2024
Decided: December 11, 2024
Filed:
r-6tA•-if
__________________________________________
Clerk
3
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The State of Montana appeals the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
temporarily enjoining the 2023 Legislature’s Senate Bill 99 (“SB 99”), which proscribes
the use of medications and surgery to treat gender dysphoria in minors. We consider two
issues:
1. Do Plaintiffs have standing to challenge SB 99?
2. Did the District Court manifestly abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
in granting preliminary injunctive relief?
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 The Montana State Legislature passed SB 99 during the 2023 Legislative Session.
S. 99, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2023), codified in §§ 50-4-1001 to 1006, 37-2-307,
53-6-135, MCA. The bill’s stated purpose is “to enhance the protection of minors and their
families . . . from any form of pressure to receive harmful, experimental puberty blockers
and cross-sex hormones and to undergo irreversible, life-altering surgical procedures prior
to attaining the age of majority.” Section 50-4-1002, MCA. SB 99 proscribes the use of
certain treatments and surgical procedures for “a female minor to address the minor’s
perception that her gender or sex is not female.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(a), MCA. The
surgical procedures that SB 99 prohibits for “female minors” include, but are not limited
to, “a vaginectomy, hysterectomy, oophorectomy, [and] ovariectomy.” Section
50-4-1004(1)(a)(i), MCA. SB 99 also prohibits administering to “female minors”
“supraphysiologic doses of testosterone or other androgens,” and “puberty blockers such
4
as GnRH agonists or other synthetic drugs.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(a)(ii)-(iii), MCA.
Likewise, SB 99 prohibits different treatments and surgical procedures for “a male minor
to address the minor’s perception that his gender or sex is not male.”
Section 50-4-1004(1)(b), MCA. For “male minor[s],” SB 99 prohibits surgical procedures
including but not limited to, “a penectomy, orchiectomy, vaginoplasty [and] clitoroplasty.”
Section 50-4-1004(1)(b)(i), MCA. SB 99 prohibits “supraphysiologic doses of estrogen”
and “puberty blockers such as GnRH agonists” that “delay or suppress pubertal
development in male minors.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(b)(ii)-(iii), MCA. SB 99 exempts
these treatments and surgeries from its prohibitions, however, if not knowingly used to
“address a female minor’s perception that her gender or sex is not female,” and similarly
exempts them if not knowingly used to address “a male minor’s perception that his gender
or sex is not male.” Section 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA.
¶3 SB 99 further imposes professional consequences on a health care professional who
knowingly violates its provisions. It declares that a physician or health care professional
who provides a prohibited procedure or treatment has “engaged in unprofessional conduct
and is subject to discipline.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(a), MCA. The law directs “the
appropriate licensing entity or disciplinary review board” to suspend the person’s “ability
to administer health care or practice medicine for at least 1 year.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(a),
MCA. It also grants the “parents or guardians of the minor subject to the violation . . . a
private cause of action for damages and equitable relief.” Section 50-4-1004(2)(b), MCA.
A health care professional or physician’s professional liability insurance may not include
5
coverage for damages assessed against the person for providing a prohibited procedure or
treatment. Section 50-4-1006, MCA.
¶4 SB 99 contains additional prohibitions. Among them, public funds may not be
directly or indirectly used to provide the prohibited procedures or treatments; an individual
or entity who pays for a prohibited procedure or treatment may not deduct the amount paid
from their state taxes; Montana Medicaid and children’s health insurance programs may
not reimburse or provide coverage for prohibited procedures or treatments; and State
properties may “not be knowingly used to promote or advocate the use of social
transitioning” or the prohibited procedures or treatments. Section 50-4-1004(3), (5), (6),
(7), MCA. The attorney general may bring actions to enforce compliance.
Section 50-4-1004(11), MCA.
¶5 The District Court drew its terminology from the parties’ expert declarations and
reports. At birth, infants generally are assigned a sex, as the District Court wrote, “based
on their external genitalia, internal reproductive organs, and chromosomal makeup.” “Sex”
is a “distinct biological classification,” which “makes us male or female.” “Gender” is the
“social and cultural concept” denoting “the roles, behaviors, and identities that society
assigns to girls and boys, women and men, and gender-diverse people.” “Gender identity
refers to a person’s subjective feelings about their core sense of belonging to a particular
gender.” A person is “cisgender” if their gender identity matches their sex assigned at
birth. “Transgender” describes a person whose gender identity is incongruent with their
sex assigned at birth. “Gender dysphoria” designates the diagnosable condition, which can
6
lead to clinically significant distress, arising from the incongruity between a person’s sex
and gender identity.
¶6 Plaintiff Phoebe Cross is a transgender minor who currently receives treatment
banned by SB 99. Plaintiffs also include Molly and Paul Cross, Phoebe Cross’s parents,
as well as John and Jane Doe, parents of non-party Joanne Doe, a transgender minor
currently receiving treatment banned by SB 99. The remaining Plaintiffs, Dr. Juanita
Hodax, a pediatric endocrinologist, and Dr. Katherine Mistretta, a Board-Certified Family
Nurse Practitioner, Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, and Doctor of Nursing
(hereinafter “Provider Plaintiffs”), provide treatments that SB 99 bans.1 Defendants
include, among others, the State of Montana; Gregory Gianforte, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Montana; and Austin Knudsen, in his official capacity as Attorney
General for the State of Montana.
¶7 Plaintiffs filed this action in May 2023 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs alleged that SB 99 violated numerous Montana constitutional rights, including
their rights to privacy and equal protection. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction
pursuant to § 27-19-201, MCA. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submitted
declarations and an expert report indicating that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are
safe, effective, and often medically necessary for minors with gender dysphoria. They
presented written expert testimony supporting their argument that untreated gender
1
Additional Plaintiffs Scarlett Van Garderen and her parents were voluntarily dismissed from the
case during appeal after Scarlett turned 18.
7
dysphoria can lead to significant lifelong distress, clinically significant anxiety and
depression, self-harming behaviors, and an increased risk of suicidality.
¶8 Plaintiffs presented additional evidence that the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health’s (“WPATH”) Standards of Care Version 8 are the accepted and
appropriate standard of care for the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of gender
dysphoria. Broadly, these treatments are called “gender-affirming care,” a term we will
use throughout this Opinion. One of Plaintiffs’ experts reported that the use of
puberty-delaying medication and gender-affirming hormone therapy are two methods that
the WPATH standard of care recommends for treating gender dysphoria. Surgery,
Plaintiffs’ expert reported, is rarely recommended for minors with gender dysphoria under
the WPATH standard of care.
¶9 Through an expert report and declarations, the State submitted evidence supporting
its arguments that the international medical community has retreated from WPATH
standard of care treatments; that there is not medical consensus around using puberty
blockers and cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors; and that
gender-affirming care harms minors.
¶10 The District Court held that Plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction under
§ 27-19-201(1), MCA, because they met Montana’s four-part, conjunctive preliminary
injunction test.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 We review justiciability issues, such as standing and ripeness, de novo. Weems v.
State, 2019 MT 98, ¶ 7,
395 Mont. 350,
440 P.3d 4 (Weems I) (citation omitted). “This
8
Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for a manifest
abuse of discretion.” Montanans Against Irres. Dens. v. State, 2024 MT 200, ¶ 8,
418
Mont. 78,
555 P.3d 759 (MAID) (citing Driscoll v. Stapleton,
2020 MT 247, ¶ 12,
401
Mont. 405,
473 P.3d 386). A trial court abuses its discretion by acting “arbitrarily, without
employment of conscientious judgment, or exceed[ing] the bounds of reason resulting in
substantial injustice.” Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State,
2022 MT 157, ¶ 5,
409 Mont.
378,
515 P.3d 301 (citation and quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion is
“‘manifest’ when it is ‘obvious, evident, or unmistakable.’” Planned Parenthood,
2022
MT 157, ¶ 5 (quoting Driscoll, ¶ 12).
¶12 We review a district court’s interpretation of the law de novo when its decision on
a preliminary injunction was based on legal conclusions. Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT
157, ¶ 5 (citing Driscoll, ¶ 12). “In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
neither the District Court nor this Court will determine the underlying merits of the case
giving rise to the preliminary injunction, as such an inquiry is reserved for a trial on the
merits.” BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman,
2019 MT 67, ¶ 7,
395 Mont. 160,
437 P.3d
142 (citation omitted). In reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction, we do not “reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute [our] judgment regarding
the strength of the evidence for that of the district court.” Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT
157, ¶ 41 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
9
DISCUSSION
¶13 1. Do Plaintiffs have standing to challenge SB 99?
¶14 “The judicial power of Montana’s courts, like the federal courts, is limited to
‘justiciable controversies.’” Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Reg’l Airport Auth. Bd., 2010
MT 26, ¶ 6,
355 Mont. 142,
226 P.3d 142 (citation omitted). Standing is a justiciability
doctrine that is “employed to refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim, on the ground
that even though the claim may be correct the litigant advancing it is not properly situated
to be entitled to its judicial determination.” 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531, 1-2 (3d ed. 2008).
“[S]tanding is a threshold, jurisdictional requirement in every case,” Heffernan v. Missoula
City Council,
2011 MT 91, ¶ 29,
360 Mont. 307,
255 P.3d 80 (citation omitted), which a
court must evaluate at every stage of the litigation. Barrett v. State,
2024 MT 86, ¶ 18,
416
Mont. 226,
547 P.3d 630 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561,
112 S. Ct.
2130, 2137 (1992)).
¶15 The State asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing because they “neither pled nor
demonstrated any injury fairly traceable to most of SB 99’s provisions.” It follows, the
State argues, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the entirety of SB 99.
Plaintiffs respond that the named parties established their standing to bring these claims
and that the State “cite[s] no binding authority to support [its] assertion that a plaintiff
raising a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must plead injury-in-fact for
every conceivable application of the challenged statute.”
10
¶16 The State asserts that Provider Plaintiffs lack both first- and third-party standing to
challenge SB 99. The State does not dispute, however, that at least one plaintiff, Youth
Plaintiff Phoebe Cross, has standing under SB 99 § 4(1). “In a multi-plaintiff case such as
here, the standing of any one plaintiff is sufficient for a claim to proceed and, upon finding
that one plaintiff has standing, ‘the standing of the other parties [does] not merit further
inquiry.’” Barrett, ¶ 19 (quoting Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, ¶ 45,
356 Mont. 41,
230 P.3d 808). This standing principle—that only one plaintiff must have
standing for a claim to proceed—is also well-established in federal law.2 See Biden v.
Nebraska,
600 U.S. 477, 489,
143 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2023) (citation omitted) (“If at least
one plaintiff has standing, the suit may proceed.”). Additionally, Providers’ standing
derives, at minimum, from the threatened loss of their ability to practice medicine or face
other penalties. This is a concrete injury that entitles them to pursue their claims.
See Dodds v. Tierney,
2024 MT 48, ¶¶ 24-26,
415 Mont. 384,
544 P.3d 857 (rejecting
argument that doctor lacked standing despite allegations of harm to his reputation, license,
and employability); Mishler v. Nev. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
896 F.2d 408, 410-11
(9th Cir. 1990) (professional license is a protected property right for purposes of due
process) (citing Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs,
353 U.S. 232, 238-39,
77 S. Ct. 752, 755-
56 (1957)). Our precedent also is settled that healthcare providers have standing to
challenge statutes as violative of their patients’ rights to privacy under the Montana
2
Though not binding, federal law is “persuasive authority for interpreting the [Montana
Constitution’s] justiciability requirements [in] Article VII, Section 4(1).” Plan Helena, ¶ 6
(citation omitted).
11
Constitution. Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 13,
296 Mont. 361,
989 P.2d 364;
Weems I, ¶¶ 1, 12 (citing Armstrong, ¶ 13); see also Wiser v. State,
2006 MT 20, ¶¶ 10-12,
14-20,
331 Mont. 28,
129 P.2d 133 (considering denturists’ claim that administrative rule
violated their patients’ constitutional privacy rights).
¶17 The State cites no legal authority in support of its argument that the Plaintiffs had
to show injury from each subsection of the statute to acquire standing to challenge it. “We
are not obligated to develop arguments on behalf of parties to an appeal, nor are we to
develop legal analysis that may lend support to a party’s position.” Beck v. Dimar,
2024
MT 176, ¶ 29,
417 Mont. 444,
554 P.3d 130 (citation omitted). The State has not
demonstrated an error of law in the District Court’s ruling that the Plaintiffs had standing
to bring their claims.
¶18 2. Did the District Court manifestly abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
in granting preliminary injunctive relief?
¶19 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
MAID, ¶ 10 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24,
129 S. Ct. 365,
376 (2008)). In 2023, the Montana Legislature amended Montana’s preliminary injunction
standard, adopting the federal four-factor standard as enunciated in Winter,
555 U.S. at 20,
129 S. Ct. at 374. 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 43, § 1. An applicant must establish the following
four factors to obtain a preliminary injunction:
(a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits;
(b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief;
(c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant’s favor; and
(d) the order is in the public interest
12
Section 27-19-201(1), MCA. Attaching the new Montana standard to federal law, the
statute expresses the intent of the Legislature “that the language in subsection (1) mirror
the federal preliminary injunction standard, and that interpretation and application of
subsection (1) closely follow United States [S]upreme [C]ourt case law.” Section
27-19-201(4), MCA. Deviating from Montana’s prior standard, “[t]he current test is
conjunctive. That is, the applicant for an injunction bears the burden of establishing the
likelihood of each element: success on the merits; irreparable harm; balance of the equities;
and public interest.” MAID, ¶ 12.
¶20 Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, the record we consider on appeal
of a preliminary injunction is “the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court,
the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by
the clerk of the district court.” M. R. App. P. 8(1). See also Porretti v. Dzurenda, 11 F.4th
1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and emphasis omitted) (noting that review of factual
findings on a preliminary injunction appeal is limited to the “record available to the district
court when it granted or denied the injunction motion”); Wilson v. Williams,
961 F.3d 829,
833 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); (“Our task is . . . to review the record that was before
the district court at the time the preliminary injunction was entered.”) N.M. Dep’t of Game
& Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
854 F.3d 1236, 1254 n.23 (10th Cir. 2017) (refusing to
consider “extra-record material” the department submitted for first time on appeal of
preliminary injunction).
13
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
¶21 In analyzing the first factor of the preliminary injunction test, the District Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of both
their Montana constitutional equal protection and right to privacy claims. For the right to
privacy claim, the District Court applied our holding in Armstrong
[E]xcept in the face of a medically[] acknowledged, bona fide health risk,
clearly and convincingly demonstrated, the legislature has no interest, much
less a compelling one, to justify its interference with an individual’s
fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure
from a health care provider that has been determined by the medical
community to be competent to provide that service and who has been
licensed to do so.
Armstrong, ¶ 62. The District Court examined the parties’ disagreement whether the
treatments prohibited by SB 99 constituted a bona fide health risk. Considering the parties’
conflicting evidence, the court held that the State did not clearly and convincingly
demonstrate that the proscribed treatments present a bona fide health risk to minors. It
found that “the medical community overwhelmingly agrees that the treatments proscribed
by SB 99 are the accepted standard of care for treating gender dysphoria in minors.” The
District Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ evidence, which demonstrated that surgical
procedures are rarely recommended for minors with gender dysphoria, undercut the State’s
argument that SB 99 sought to minimize harm by banning gender-affirming surgical
procedures. The District Court noted that it did not need to conclusively resolve disputed
facts at the preliminary injunction stage, writing, “trial is the appropriate stage for ultimate
fact finding on the science presented in this matter.” The District Court concluded that
14
Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their right to privacy
claim.
¶22 Montana’s right to privacy is contained in Article II, Section 10, of the Montana
Constitution, which guarantees that “[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.” The right to privacy is fundamental; its protection “exceed[s] even that
provided by the federal constitution.” Armstrong, ¶¶ 34-35 (citations omitted). That the
right to privacy is separately protected in the Montana Constitution “reflects Montanans’
historical abhorrence and distrust of excessive governmental interference in their personal
lives.” Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 455,
942 P.2d 112, 125 (1997); accord Weems v.
State,
2023 MT 82, ¶ 35,
412 Mont. 132,
529 P.3d 798 (Weems II) (noting a delegate’s
comment that the “right to be let alone” is “the most important right of them all” (quoting
Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, Vol. V, p.
1681)). “Montana’s constitutional right to privacy ‘broadly guarantees each individual the
right to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in
partnership with a chosen health care provider free from governmental interference.’”
Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20 (quoting Armstrong, ¶ 14). We apply strict
scrutiny when a fundamental right, such as the right to privacy, is affected. Stand Up Mont.
v. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch.,
2022 MT 153, ¶ 10,
409 Mont. 330,
514 P.3d 1062 (citation
omitted); Armstrong, ¶ 34 (citation omitted); Weems II, ¶ 43. The strict scrutiny standard
requires that the State demonstrate the challenged law is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest and only that interest. Stand Up Mont., ¶ 10.
15
¶23 The State contends that the District Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because “[t]he right to privacy is
bounded by the State’s police power.” Drawing from Wiser v. State, the State argues that
the fundamental right to privacy “is necessarily subordinate to reasonable restraint and
regulation by the state in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative—police power.” Wiser,
¶ 24 (citation omitted).
¶24 The State insists that the District Court’s application of Armstrong was in error
because the challenged statute there prohibited a constitutionally protected medical
procedure. Here, the State continues, the safety and efficacy of gender-affirming care are
questionable, and therefore the medical care proscribed by SB 99 is not constitutionally
protected. The State also maintains that Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State—
in which we held that the right to privacy does not guarantee an individual’s access to a
particular drug—should provide the standard for Plaintiffs’ asserted privacy right. Mont.
Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 2012 MT 201, ¶ 24,
366 Mont. 224,
286 P.3d 1161 (MCIA).
¶25 Plaintiffs respond that the District Court’s application of the Armstrong standard
was not in error. They point to this Court’s decisions repeatedly affirming that the Montana
Constitution guarantees “the right of each individual to make medical judgments affecting
her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen health care provider free
from the interference of the government.” Armstrong, ¶ 39; accord Weems II, ¶¶ 35-50
(citation omitted); Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20 (citation omitted); Planned
Parenthood of Mont. v. State,
2024 MT 228, ¶ 23,
418 Mont. 253,
557 P.3d 440 (citation
omitted); Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State,
2024 MT 178, ¶ 22,
417 Mont. 457, 554
16
P.3d 153. Without clearly and convincingly establishing that gender-affirming care poses
a “medically[] acknowledged bona fide health risk,” which Plaintiffs maintain the State did
not do, the State’s police power does not allow it to infringe on an individual’s fundamental
right to privacy. Armstrong, ¶ 59; see also Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT 157, ¶ 20
(quoting Armstrong, ¶¶ 34, 62); Weems II, ¶ 47.
¶26 Plaintiffs argue that Wiser and MCIA are distinguishable from the expansive right
to privacy we defined in Armstrong. They maintain that Wiser is inapposite because the
denturists there were not licensed by the State to provide the medical care in question. In
contrast, Provider Plaintiffs are licensed by the State to provide the medical care they use
to treat gender dysphoria in minors, the same care they use to treat minors with medical
conditions that are not subject to SB 99’s prohibitions. See Wiser, ¶¶ 14-20;
§ 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA. Plaintiffs distinguish MCIA, maintaining that our holding there
concerned a singular drug, medical marijuana, that federal law criminally prohibited for all
purposes. MCIA, ¶ 32. Here, Plaintiffs argue, gender-affirming care is not criminally
prohibited, nor does SB 99 categorically ban the use of gender-affirming medications and
procedures; rather, SB 99 bans this form of care for only one purpose.
See § 50-4-1004(1)(c), MCA.
¶27 Plaintiffs contend that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the State did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that
gender-affirming care poses a bona fide health risk to minors. In reaching its conclusion,
they maintain, the District Court “conducted a thorough review of the extensive evidence
filed by both parties and reasonably exercised its discretion” to find that Plaintiffs’
17
evidence sufficiently demonstrated “that the medical community overwhelmingly agrees
that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are the accepted standard of care for treating gender
dysphoria in minors.”
¶28 In Armstrong, we held that the Legislature generally has no interest in restricting
“an individual’s fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure
from a health care provider that has been determined by the medical community to be
competent to provide that service and who has been licensed to do so.” Armstrong, ¶ 62;
accord Wiser, ¶ 15 (citation omitted); Weems I, ¶ 19 (citation omitted); Stand Up Mont.,
¶ 14 (citing Armstrong for the principle that “a private medical decision involving an
individual and healthcare provider . . . [is] constitutionally protected from infringement by
the state without a compelling state interest”). That privacy right empowers an individual
“to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership
with a chosen health care provider free from the interference of the government.”
Armstrong, ¶ 39. Plaintiffs are correct that we have repeatedly reaffirmed Montana’s broad
personal autonomy privacy right as recognized in Gryczan and Armstrong. See Weems II,
¶ 36 (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood, 2022 MT 157, ¶ 20; Planned Parenthood,
2024 MT 228, ¶ 23 (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood,
2024 MT 178, ¶ 22. The
Legislature may restrict this fundamental right to privacy only when it can demonstrate a
medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk. Armstrong, ¶ 62. In those instances, the
law must be tailored narrowly so that it is “the least onerous path that can be taken to
achieve the state objective.” Weems II, ¶ 44 (quoting Wadsworth v. State,
275 Mont. 287,
302,
911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (1996)).
18
¶29 Wiser and MCIA are two narrow exceptions to the Armstrong standard. In Wiser, a
group of denturists challenged a State Board of Dentistry rule that required denturists to
refer partial denture patients to dentists before providing partial dentures. Wiser, ¶¶ 8-11.
The denturists argued that the rule infringed upon patients’ state constitutional right of
privacy to seek care from the medical professional of their choice. Wiser, ¶ 14. We
clarified that “Armstrong did not hold that there is a right to see a health care provider who
is not licensed to provide the services desired.” Wiser, ¶ 16. Because the denturists were
not licensed to provide the services in question, we rejected their privacy claim. Wiser,
¶¶ 16, 20.
¶30 In MCIA, plaintiffs challenged a state law that restricted their access to medical
marijuana. MCIA, ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiffs there maintained that our analysis in Armstrong
applied because the law infringed their right to privacy. MCIA, ¶ 28. We held that, unlike
Armstrong, plaintiffs’ “alleged affirmative right to access a particular drug ha[d] not been
constitutionally protected under the right to privacy,” and that therefore plaintiffs’ claim
did not fall under our analysis in Armstrong. MCIA, ¶ 28. In denying plaintiffs’ claim, we
relied heavily on marijuana’s illegality under the Controlled Substances Act, which
undermined their claim that the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed their access to
medical marijuana. MCIA, ¶ 32.
¶31 Both MCIA and Wiser are distinguishable from this case. In contrast to the
denturists in Wiser, the State licensed Provider Plaintiffs to provide the care proscribed by
SB 99. Wiser, ¶ 16. Compared to MCIA, in which the law at issue restricted a single drug
for all uses, SB 99 prohibits a host of procedures and medications, but only if used to treat
19
gender dysphoria. See § 50-4-1004(1), MCA, MCIA, ¶¶ 2-3. Further, the procedures and
medications proscribed by SB 99 are not “unequivocally illegal,” as was medical marijuana
when we decided MCIA. MCIA, ¶ 32.
¶32 The exceptions to Montana’s expansive right to privacy that we recognized in MCIA
and Wiser do not apply here. Like Armstrong, SB 99 proscribes lawful medications and
procedures administered by competent and licensed health care providers. See Armstrong,
¶ 62. The Legislature did not make gender-affirming care unlawful. Nor did it make the
treatments unlawful for all minors. Instead, it restricted a broad swath of medical
treatments only when sought for a particular purpose. The record indicates that Provider
Plaintiffs, or other medical professionals providing gender-affirming care, are recognized
as competent in the medical community to provide that care. See Armstrong, ¶ 62. Like
in Armstrong, the law puts governmental regulation in the mix of an individual’s
fundamental right “to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and
health in partnership with a chosen health care provider.” Armstrong, ¶ 39. The District
Court therefore did not err in applying the Armstrong standard.
¶33 To succeed on its request for preliminary relief in a constitutional challenge, an
applicant must “‘establish a prima facie case of a violation of its rights under’ the
constitution.” Weems I, ¶ 18 (quoting City of Billings v. Cty. Water Dist. of Billings
Heights, 281 Mont. 219, 227,
935 P.2d 246, 251 (1997)). The federal standard is similar:
The courts use a bewildering variety of formulations of the need for showing
some likelihood of success—the most common being that plaintiff must
demonstrate a reasonable probability of success. But the verbal differences
do not seem to reflect substantive disagreement. All courts agree that
20
plaintiff must present a prima facie case but need not show a certainty of
winning.
Wright & Miller, § 2948.3. “Prima facie means literally at first sight or on first appearance
but subject to further evidence or information.” Weems I, ¶ 18 (quoting Prima facie,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶34 The issuance of a preliminary injunction does not, as the State argues, necessarily
conflict with the principle that a statute is presumed constitutional. A preliminary
injunction is “not equivalent to a ‘holding’ that the statute is unconstitutional,” and
therefore the presumption of a statute’s constitutionality “does not alter the movant’s
burden to present a prima facie case at the preliminary injunction stage.” Planned
Parenthood, 2022 MT 157, ¶ 33. As with any preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs’ burden
here is to present a prima facie case that SB 99 violates their constitutional rights.
¶35 The record shows that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion when
it concluded that Plaintiffs presented a prima facie likelihood of success on their right to
privacy claim. For example, the District Court conscientiously weighed the State’s
evidence in support of its argument that SB 99 sought to protect minors from harmful,
experimental treatments. On this argument, the District Court examined the State’s
evidence that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has not approved puberty
blockers for use in treating gender dysphoria. The District Court also considered the State’s
evidence that the international community has retreated from gender-affirming care. In
response, Plaintiffs submitted evidence indicating that the treatments proscribed by SB 99
are well-studied and that once the FDA approves a drug generally, the agency permits
21
health care providers to prescribe the drug for off-label use, which occurs frequently for
many drugs. Plaintiffs also presented evidence showing that leading United States medical
organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American Psychological
Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, endorse and cite the WPATH
standard of care as authoritative for treating gender dysphoria. The WPATH standard of
care, Plaintiffs asserted, specifically recommends treatments for gender dysphoria in
minors, such as puberty blockers, which SB 99 proscribed.
¶36 On the basis of the parties’ evidentiary submissions, the District Court concluded
that Plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case that the treatments proscribed by SB 99 are not
harmful or experimental, and under Armstrong, do not present a medically acknowledged,
bona fide health risk to minors. Armstrong, ¶ 62. The District Court found that because
the State did not demonstrate on the preliminary injunction record that the treatments
proscribed by SB 99 presented this risk, the State did not have a compelling interest and
thus could not meet strict scrutiny.
¶37 The statute’s impact on individual privacy rights triggers strict scrutiny review,
which requires the State to demonstrate that “the legislation [is] justified by a compelling
state interest and [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest.”
Armstrong, ¶ 34 (citing Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 449, 942 P.3d at 122). Though the State
has a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a
minor,” a statute implicating their privacy rights must be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. Planned Parenthood,
2024 MT 178, ¶ 36 (citation omitted). SB 99 affords no
room for decision-making by a patient in consultation with their doctors and parents. The
22
statute is a complete ban, prohibiting individualized care tailored to the needs of each
patient based on the exercise of professional medical judgment and informed consent.
¶38 At this stage of the proceedings, the District Court conscientiously weighed the
parties’ evidence and made no error of law when it applied the Armstrong standard to the
evidence. Our role is not to reweigh conflicting evidence or to question a district court’s
assessment of the strength of the evidence on a preliminary injunction appeal. Planned
Parenthood, 2022 MT 157, ¶ 41 (citation omitted). The District Court properly reserved
final resolution of the parties’ conflicting evidence for trial on the merits, writing that “[t]he
Court’s ruling here will not affect the ultimate fact-finding decision on this issue at trial.”
¶39 Finally, the court’s decision not to parse out particular provisions of the statute from
the injunction was within its discretion in light of the preliminary nature of the relief. The
Dissent would reverse the decision to enjoin the Medicaid restriction, applying
rational-basis review. Dissent, ¶ 70. But we recently held that strict scrutiny applies to a
statute disqualifying or restricting “otherwise eligible recipients . . . from certain public
healthcare benefits based on their exercise of their fundamental right to privacy as
guaranteed under the Montana Constitution.” Planned Parenthood,
2024 MT 228, ¶ 23.
Given its preliminary determination that the Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their
claimed privacy infringement, the District Court correctly applied strict scrutiny to the
entire measure. We see no “obvious, evident, or unmistakable” abuse of discretion in the
District Court’s conclusion on the first preliminary injunction factor. Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT 157, ¶ 5 (quoting Driscoll, ¶ 12).
23
¶40 The State maintains, however, that the District Court could not have weighed and
drawn conclusions from the conflicting evidence without holding a hearing at which the
parties’ experts could testify and subject themselves to cross-examination. The State cites
federal circuit cases, which generally expound the importance of building an adequate
factual basis for a trial court to rule on a preliminary injunction. E.g. U.S. v. Gila Valley
Irr. Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“On a motion for a
preliminary injunction an adequate presentation of the facts is necessary.”). For additional
support, the State relies on Doe v. University of Cincinnati for the simple assertion that
“cross-examination has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth.”
Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati,
872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The State
also points the Court to the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Gila Valley that “[o]n a motion for
a preliminary injunction . . . [t]he opposing party must be afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the moving party’s witnesses and to present evidence.” Gila Valley Irr.
Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442.
¶41 In response, Plaintiffs insist that the decision to permit oral testimony at a
preliminary injunction hearing was within the District Court’s discretion. Plaintiffs
analogize to Planned Parenthood, where we affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a
preliminary injunction although the parties were not allowed the opportunity to present live
testimony or cross-examine witnesses. Planned Parenthood,
2022 MT 157, ¶¶ 39-41,
53-54, 60. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs argue, the State conceded that
it had a full opportunity to be heard despite the District Court’s refusal to hear oral
testimony.
24
¶42 The District Court correctly stated at the scheduling conference, “[W]e don’t have
a trial before the trial with a preliminary injunction, even under the federal standard.” As
we held in Planned Parenthood, a district court is not obligated to hear live testimony at
the preliminary injunction stage of proceedings simply because the parties present
conflicting testimony; rather, resolution of conflicting testimony “must be reserved for trial
on the merits.” Planned Parenthood, 2022 MT 157, ¶ 41.
¶43 The federal circuit courts do not uniformly require live testimony at a preliminary
injunction hearing. See Valentine v. Collier,
956 F.3d 797, 801 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding
it “unclear . . . why [it] matters” that a party did not present live testimony at preliminary
injunction hearing, noting that “[i]t has long been true that parties can present evidence at
the preliminary-injunction stage with declarations or affidavits”); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line
Co., LLC v. 6.04 Acres,
910 F.3d 1130, 1169 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)) (“An evidentiary hearing is required for entry of a preliminary
injunction only where facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must be
made to decide whether injunctive relief should issue.” . In the Ninth Circuit it is not an
abuse of discretion for a federal district court to refuse to hear oral testimony at a
preliminary injunction hearing as long as “the parties have a full opportunity to submit
written testimony and to argue the matter.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal.,
13 F.3d 1313, 1326
(9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
¶44 The State’s Ninth Circuit authority, Gila Valley, does not provide otherwise. There,
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that on a motion for a preliminary injunction, “[t]he
opposing party must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the moving party’s
25
witnesses and to present evidence.” Gila Valley Irr. Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442 (citation
omitted). The court then clarified, however, that the Ninth Circuit “has held that a
preliminary injunction may be granted or denied on the basis of affidavits” if the party is
not “denied the opportunity to be heard.” Gila Valley Irr. Dist., 31 F.3d at 1442.
¶45 The State’s exchange with the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing
confirms that the State had a full opportunity to be heard. During the hearing, the District
Court asked the State twice if its refusal to hear live testimony prevented the State from
presenting any specific information or live witnesses. First, the State answered that its
objection was grounded in “[n]one other than the inherent limitation of out-of-court
testimony.” The District Court then asked, “But there wasn’t a witness that you weren’t
able to get an affidavit from that you would have been able to achieve live testimony with?”
The State admitted it was “[n]ot . . . aware of” any witnesses from whom it was unable to
get an affidavit. This colloquy shows that the District Court’s limitation on oral testimony
did not prevent the State from having a “full opportunity to submit written testimony and
to argue the matter.” Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1326 (citations omitted).
¶46 A district court has broad discretion in matters of trial administration and the
admission of evidence. State v. Rossbach,
2022 MT 2, ¶ 20,
407 Mont. 55,
501 P.3d 914
(citation omitted) (trial administration decisions are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard); Steer, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
245 Mont. 470, 475,
803 P.2d 601, 603-04 (1990)
(citation omitted) (discretionary trial court rulings are those “encompassing the power of
choice among several courses of action, each of which is considered permissible”). The
District Court acted within its discretion when it determined that the presentation of live
26
testimony—which in this case involves extensive expert testimony and fact witnesses—
should await trial on the merits. The court did not err as a matter of law in its conduct of
the hearing. It ruled within the bounds of reason that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of
success on the merits of their privacy claim.
Irreparable Harm
¶47 An applicant for a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that the applicant is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.
Section 27-19-201(1)(b), MCA. Both this Court and federal courts have recognized that
harm is irreparable if legal remedies, like an award for damages, are an inadequate remedy.
Flying T Ranch, LLC v. Catlin Ranch, LP, 2022 MT 162, ¶ 19,
409 Mont. 478,
515 P.3d
806 (citation omitted) (“[m]oney damages are not considered irreparable harm”); E. Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden,
993 F.3d 640, 677 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Life
Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc.,
8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Together
Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc.,
32 F.4th 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (noting
that “adequate legal remedies foreclose injunctive relief”). Conversely, economic harm
alone generally is not considered irreparable. Netzer Law Off., P.C. v. State,
2022 MT 234,
¶ 18,
410 Mont. 513,
420 P.3d 335 (affirming district court’s conclusion that minimal
economic harm is insufficient to justify preliminary injunctive relief); E. Bay Sanctuary
Covenant, 993 F.3d at 677; Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co.,
910 F.3d at 1165 (citation
omitted) (“economic harm will not satisfy the irreparable-harm element in many cases”);
Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City,
348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A
27
showing of irreparable injury must be likely; speculative injury is insufficient. MAID, ¶ 15
(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 22).
¶48 When a plaintiff’s claim is grounded in the right to privacy, we have “recognized
harm from constitutional infringement as adequate to justify a preliminary injunction.”
Weems I, ¶ 25 (citations omitted). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right
is involved, such as the right to free speech or freedom of religion, most courts hold that
no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Wright & Miller, § 2948.1;
see also Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach,
661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citation omitted) (irreparable injury is established when constitutional right of privacy is
threatened or being impaired); Melendres v. Arpaio,
695 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373,
96 S. Ct. 2673, 2690 (1976)). (“It is well
established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.’”).
¶49 Concluding that Plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that SB 99 infringed on
their fundamental right to privacy, the District Court found that they had established the
irreparable injury factor. Plaintiffs’ declarations further convinced the District Court that
SB 99’s prohibitions would likely lead to increased depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation,
and suicide attempts for Provider Plaintiffs’ patients. Youth Plaintiff Phoebe Cross’s
declaration also attested that taking away his gender-affirming care would leave him
“fearful for [his] life.”
¶50 The State argues that the District Court erred in finding for Plaintiffs on the
likelihood of irreparable harm factor. Relying on its evidence that the treatments
28
proscribed by SB 99 cause “grievous physical, psychological, and emotional injury,” the
State asserts that the Plaintiffs’ evidence is “subject to significant legitimate criticism that
seriously undermines its reliability and scientific validity.” The State implicitly asks the
Court to reweigh the parties’ evidence, asserting that “there is a substantial amount of
evidence from all over the world that gender transition procedures do not, in fact, alleviate
gender dysphoria, but instead lead to exacerbated mental health problems and even more
significant distress.” With an appeal of a preliminary injunction, however, we do not
“determine the underlying merits of the case” and will not “reweigh conflicting evidence
or substitute [our] judgment regarding the strength of the evidence for that of the district
court.” Planned Parenthood, 2022 MT 157, ¶¶ 5, 41 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
¶51 Plaintiffs’ alleged injury—loss of the constitutional privacy right—is irreparable
with a monetary remedy, which makes their claim appropriate for a preliminary injunction.
See Flying T Ranch, LLC, ¶ 19; Weems I, ¶ 25; E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993
F.3d at 677. Given the Plaintiffs’ evidence that the most lasting and permanent forms of
gender-affirming care are rarely performed on minors; that, without an injunction, minor
patients would suffer severe psychological distress; and that SB 99 infringed on their
fundamental right to privacy, Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. It
was not a manifest abuse of discretion for the District Court to conclude that the Plaintiffs
made an adequate preliminary showing of harm to warrant the preservation of their rights
in status quo pending a full trial.
29
¶52 The State takes issue with the District Court’s reference to preserving the status quo,
contending that this is no longer part of Montana’s preliminary injunction standard.
See Driscoll, ¶ 26. This is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 600 U.S. 339,
346,
144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 395,
101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981)); see § 27-19-201(4), MCA (expressing intent that
“interpretation and application” of the new standard “closely follow United States
[S]upreme [C]ourt case law”). Consistent with this standard, we long have recognized that
“[d]uring a show cause hearing on a preliminary injunction, the district court should restrict
itself to determining whether the applicant has made a sufficient case to warrant preserving
a right in status quo until a trial on the merits can be had.” Knudson v. McDunn,
271 Mont.
61, 65,
894 P.2d 295, 298 (1995) (citing Porter v. K & S P’ship,
192 Mont. 175, 181,
627
P.2d 836, 839 (1981)). The District Court did not err when it relied on preservation of the
status quo in its preliminary injunction order.
Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest
¶53 The third preliminary injunction factor asks whether “the balance of the equities tips
in the applicant’s favor.” Section 27-19-201(1)(c), MCA. The final factor requires the
applicant to establish that “the order is in the public interest.” Section 27-19-201(1)(d),
MCA. The public interest factor “is another way of inquiring whether there are policy
considerations that bear on whether” to grant an injunction. Wright & Miller, § 2948.4.
“When the government opposes a preliminary injunction, these two factors ‘merge into one
30
inquiry.’” Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 2024 MT 227, ¶ 34,
418 Mont. 226,
557 P.3d 471 (quoting Porretti, 11 F.4th at 1047); accord Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418,
435,
129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762 (2009).
¶54 Enjoining SB 99, the State argued, would cause it irreparable injury that outweighed
Plaintiffs’ injury absent an injunction. The District Court determined conversely that the
risk of adverse effects to Youth Plaintiffs’ health, “including increased risk of suicidality,”
outweighed the harms to the State. The District Court also reasoned that preliminarily
enjoining SB 99 served the public interest because “[i]t is always in the public interest to
prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” See Planned Parenthood,
2024
MT 227, ¶ 36 (quoting Melendres,
695 F.3d at 1002); Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S.
Marshals Serv.,
977 F.3d 817, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t
of Educ.,
845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Pryor v. School Dist. No. 1,
99 F.4th 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ evidence indicated that
other non-party minors with gender dysphoria would be harmed if SB 99 were not enjoined,
which further convinced the District Court that the public interest would be served by
preliminarily enjoining SB 99.
¶55 The statute at issue here prevents a wide range of treatment even when such
treatment is determined, in the judgment of a medical professional working with their
patients, to be in the patients’ best interest and given with informed consent. The evidence
showed that the proscribed medical interventions are not used for youth prior to the onset
of puberty, and the most invasive (surgical) treatments are not recommended for patients
before they turn eighteen. On the strength of the potential harm to those patients the statute
31
targets, the District Court reasonably concluded that the balance of the equities tips toward
preliminary relief pending full consideration of the merits. Its analysis of the last two
preliminary injunction factors was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The court did not
manifestly abuse its discretion, and its injunction was not overbroad.
¶56 Finally, both parties have submitted notices of supplemental authority, citing recent
cases considering challenges to various laws regarding gender-affirming care. Without
exception, the additional authority pertains to claims grounded in the equal protection
clause or otherwise based on alleged unlawful discrimination. Some of the authorities also
reference new developments in research and evidence that was not part of the record
presented to the District Court in the preliminary injunction proceedings. Because, on the
record here, the District Court’s conclusions on Montana’s express privacy protections are
sufficient to uphold its preliminary injunction, we affirm on that basis. The parties will
have the opportunity during the merits proceeding for full development of the record,
where their experts may offer insight on any new research, and for briefing on the current
case law relative to their claims.
CONCLUSION
¶57 The District Court made no error of law and did not manifestly abuse its discretion.
We affirm its grant of a preliminary injunction on the basis of Plaintiffs’ right to privacy
claim. The case will proceed to trial, at which point the District Court will finally resolve
the disputed facts and issue a final determination on the constitutional issues presented.
/S/ BETH BAKER
32
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
Justice Laurie McKinnon, concurring.
¶58 I concur in the Court’s decision to uphold the preliminary injunction on Plaintiffs’
right to privacy claim. I write separately because I believe Plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim should likewise be addressed by the Court.
¶59 This Court’s review of a preliminary injunction is a deferential question that asks
whether the district court manifestly abused its discretion. Stensvad v. Newman Ayers
Ranch, Inc., 2024 MT 246, ¶ 8,
418 Mont. 378, __ P.3d __. This limited review for
purposes of injunctive relief makes sense: the parties have minimal opportunity to
develop the record; the district court judge must work quickly and from a narrow set of
facts; this Court can only review the limited information before it. There is much left to
be litigated on the merits in this case, especially considering the thorny social, scientific,
and legal landscape from which it arises, and courts should have the benefit of a more
complete record before making ultimate decisions on the merits. See Stensvad, ¶ 27
(explaining how this Court’s preliminary injunction test seeks to preserve intensive
merits litigation for the post-injunctive relief stage). But there is a line between deciding
narrowly for the purposes of an appeal of a preliminary injunction and refusing to decide
the issue which is front and center to the controversy. By entirely ignoring the parties’
33
equal protection arguments, this Court crosses that line, leaving the parties and the
District Court without necessary guidance on questions of law entirely appropriate for
this Court to address at this juncture. This Court’s avoidance of a claim squarely before
us puts the parties at a disadvantage going forward on the merits case.
¶60 Aside from the question of standing, the vast majority of the parties’ arguments
and the District Court’s Order focuses on the unique equal protection issues presented by
this case—novel legal issues on which the parties and the District Court require this
Court’s instruction before trial proceeds. While a prohibition on gender-affirming care
must be evaluated under Montana’s right to privacy precedent, the prohibition on
gender-affirming care is fundamentally about the nature of sex and suspect class
discrimination as it applies in the equal protection context. Gender-affirming care is
currently being litigated on equal protection grounds around the country, and the United
States Supreme Court is poised to take up the issue this term, see L.W. v. Skrmetti, 73
F.4th 408 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Skrmetti,
144 S. Ct.
2679 (2024). These cases are instructive in certain ways, but they cannot answer what
this Court is being asked: how sex/gender discrimination and suspect class discrimination
should be handled under the unique equal protection provision of the Montana
Constitution. In fact, Plaintiffs’ complaint is made up of claims exclusively under the
Montana Constitution. No other Court can answer these questions. The Montana
Constitution stands on its own, as does Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge.1
1
We have held repeatedly that the Montana Constitution provides greater protection under its
equal protection provision. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2004 MT 390, ¶ 15,
325 Mont. 148,
34
¶61 The District Court’s Order points out a critical gap in our equal protection
jurisprudence, specifically, that this Court “has not yet explicitly identified the level of
scrutiny applicable to classifications that are sex-based, nor has it explicitly stated that
sex is a suspect class.” At the federal level, defining the classes for equal protection
purposes is driving a prudential rift, because that class definition determines what
standard of scrutiny is applied under the U.S. Constitution. Many competing theories
pervade. For example, in Skrmetti, the Sixth Circuit found that the law did not
discriminate on sex because it banned gender-affirming care for minors of both sexes.
Skrmetti, 73 F.4th at 419-20. The Eleventh Circuit has held that legislation blocking
gender-affirming care “targets specific medical interventions for minors” and does not
classify “on the basis of any suspect characteristic under the Equal Protection Clause.”
Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Alabama, 80 F.4th 1205, 1227 (11th Cir. 2023). Appellants
argue similarly. Of course, the question in Skrmetti will be analyzed and decided under
the federal constitution and precedent––not Montana’s Constitution and precedent.
¶62 Montana’s constitutional equal protection provision and this Court’s precedent
stands apart and in addition to the minimum safeguards provided by our federal
counterpart. They provide clear direction as to the appropriate tier of scrutiny. When
legislation infringes on fundamental rights, including within the equal protection
framework, it receives strict scrutiny because the interest discriminated against is a
104 P.3d 445. Thus, we need not and should not lock-step with the U.S. Constitution’s
interpretation of similar language. See State v. Covington,
2012 MT 31, ¶¶ 20-21,
364 Mont. 118,
272 P.3d 43 (explaining that this Court “will undertake a unique, state constitutional analysis”
when there is support for greater protection under the state constitution).
35
fundamental right. See Planned Parenthood v. State, 2024 MT 178, ¶ 29,
417 Mont. 457,
554 P.3d 153; Snetsinger, ¶ 17 (“Strict scrutiny applies if a suspect class or fundamental
right is affected.”). At least two fundamental rights are implicated here: the right to be
free from discrimination based on sex which necessarily includes transgender status as
explained below, and the right to privacy already addressed by the Court.2 Strict scrutiny
is undoubtedly the appropriate tier of scrutiny.
¶63 As the District Court noted, transgender discrimination is, by nature, sex
discrimination. This logic is supported in part by Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S.
644,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), where the Supreme Court held that discrimination based on
transgender status is sex discrimination. In the gender-affirming care case currently
pending before the Supreme Court, however, Tennessee advances the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning that Bostock’s holding is limited to the Title VII context, receiving a lower
standard of scrutiny in other contexts. Appellants argue similarly before this Court. But
again, the Montana Constitution’s equal protection provision offers a critical
distinction—like Title VII, it explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus,
even if the Supreme Court limits Bostock’s recognition of transgender status-based sex
discrimination to the Title VII context, the Montana Constitution is not limited in the
same way. Bostock’s logic is sound: “[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person
for being . . . transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”
2
One might also posit that the right to equal protection of the laws is itself a fundamental right
warranting strict scrutiny based on its presence in the Declaration of Rights, regardless of the
classifications being challenged. Nevertheless, this Court has developed a three-tier framework
for the appropriate standard of scrutiny in an equal protection challenge. See Snetsinger, ¶ 17.
36
Bostock, 590 U.S. at 660, 140 S. Ct. at 1741. By declining to engage with this question
now, we leave this critical definition open to lock-stepping by complicity in whatever
direction the United States Supreme Court decides to take. This Court should take the
opportunity to clearly state that discrimination based on sex as explicitly contained in the
equal protection clause includes discrimination on the basis of transgender status.
¶64 I would therefore affirm the District Court’s finding that SB 99 discriminates
based on sex and that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review; not because it
is more analogous to the federal “heightened scrutiny” standard for sex discrimination as
the District Court reasoned, but because Article II, Section 4 is unequivocal in its
intolerance for discrimination, which includes discrimination based on sex. Article II,
Section 4 “provides even more individual protection” than its federal counterpart,
Snetsinger, ¶ 15, so we need not parse federal gender discrimination law in search of an
analogous level of scrutiny.
¶65 Moreover, this Court should separately and additionally hold that transgender
status is a suspect class. Plaintiffs’ District Court briefing makes a compelling case as to
why transgender status is a suspect class that also triggers strict scrutiny. The District
Court noted its belief “that transgender persons comprise a suspect class” based on the
federal definition. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28,
93
S. Ct. 1278, 1294 (1973) (defining a suspect class as one “saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process”). But given this Court’s lack of precedent on defining a
37
suspect class under the Montana Constitution, the District Court “decline[d] to fully
engage in this analysis.” This Court has been explicitly asked to clarify this question on
appeal, yet declines to do so without explanation. Like the District Court, I would agree
that transgender persons comprise a suspect class.
¶66 Thus, critically, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny on at least three
separate bases. I would conclude the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion
in granting the preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits on both their equal protection and right to privacy claims because SB 99 cannot
survive strict scrutiny; Plaintiffs will face irreparable harm if SB 99 is allowed to go into
effect; and the balance of equities and public interest favors granting the injunction.
¶67 The parties briefed the equal protection issue extensively and will proceed to trial
on the merits of their equal protection claim. We do the District Court and the litigants a
disservice when we avoid articulating the simple rule that discrimination on the basis of
transgender status is sex discrimination, sex discrimination receives strict scrutiny, and
that transgender persons comprise a suspect class also triggering strict scrutiny. Ignoring
the most substantive legal arguments of the case is not an act of judicial restraint or
deciding the case narrowly. It is an unjustifiable avoidance of a cornerstone question
which, if unanswered, will create further litigation; waste resources and time; and create
needless expense as the trial proceeds on the merits. More importantly, our avoidance
will delay resolution of this issue for those most affected by our decision––transgender
persons seeking medical care in time-sensitive scenarios. We ought to resolve this claim
that has been correctly and aptly raised before this Court.
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/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
Justice Ingrid Gustafson joins the Concurrence of Justice Laurie McKinnon.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
Justice Jim Rice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶68 I concur with the Court’s holding affirming the District Court’s entry of a
preliminary injunction enjoining SB 99’s medical restrictions. A legislative prohibition of
an approved medical procedure must satisfy the high bar of being narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest in addressing a bona fide health risk. Further, the status quo is
that the treatments now restricted by SB 99 have been, and are, ongoing. Thus, under
application of these standards, I concur with the Court that the District Court did not
manifestly abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiffs had satisfied the conjunctive
factors for issuance of the preliminary injunction regarding SB 99’s medical restrictions to
preserve the status quo pending trial in the proceeding.
¶69 However, it should also be noted that both the medical and legal grounds regarding
the subject treatment of minors addressed by SB 99 are moving under our feet, and the
status quo itself is becoming a moving target, even as this litigation continues. As the
Court notes, Opinion, ¶ 35, the FDA has not approved puberty blockers for use in treating
gender dysphoria. The State has filed several notices of supplemental authority providing
further national and international decisions recognizing growing concerns over the medical
benefit of this treatment and the legitimate basis for state intervention. See TransActual
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CIC v. Sec’y of State for Health and Soc. Care, [2024] EWHC 1936, ¶¶ 194-95 (England
High Court of Justice) (citing a study described as the “best and most-up-to-date scientific
evidence available” which concludes “any benefits of puberty blockers were (save in one
‘very narrow’ respect) unproven or non-existent.”); and Alabama v. United States Sec'y of
Educ., No. 24-12444, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21358, at *3-4 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024)
(noting that “every court to consider the issue across the nation—seven district courts and
two courts of appeals—preliminarily enjoined enforcement” of a new Title IX rule,
89 Fed.
Reg. 37,522 (May 6, 2024), which would have required healthcare providers and states to
perform and pay for gender-transition procedures). Other states have likewise restricted
gender-affirming care. See L.W. v. Skrmetti,
83 F.4th 460 (6th Cir. 2023) (reversing
preliminary injunction entered against state bans on gender-affirming care enacted in
Tennessee and Kentucky because a likelihood of success on the merits of substantive due
process and equal protection claims not demonstrated). This small sampling is enough to
highlight both the changing legal landscape and the gravity of the governing principle that
neither this decision from our Court nor the District Court’s decision should affect in any
way the ultimate outcome, which must be based on advancing medical science and law in
regard to a serious concern over minors receiving this treatment.
¶70 I would reverse the District Court’s enjoinder of the funding prohibition of SB 99,
see 2023 Mont. Laws ch. 306, § 8, which was codified as § 53-6-135, MCA, particularly
in light of the broad enjoinder of the new Title IX rule by the federal courts. As such, there
is no current federal mandate for Medicaid funding of gender-affirming care. See Texas v.
Becerra, No. 6:24-cv-211-JDK, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117573, (E.D.
40
Tex. July 3, 2024). Further, funding decisions fall within the Legislature’s primary
constitutional duty and responsibility over spending decisions, and I believe they should
be subject to rational basis review. See Timm v. Mont. Dep’t. of Pub. Health & Hum.
Servs., 2008 MT 126, ¶ 34,
343 Mont. 11,
184 P.3d 994 (“[T]here is no fundamental right
to receive Medicaid benefits in Montana.”); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 317-18,
100 S. Ct. 2671, 2688-89 (1980) (“[F]reedom of choice in the context of certain personal
decisions [] does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary . . . .”).
¶71 I concur and dissent.
/S/ JIM RICE
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