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2024 ND 122

Stephens v. Lee

North Dakota Supreme Court

Decided June 20, 2024

North Dakota Supreme Court · decided 2024-06-20

When determining a parent's motion to relocation a child out of state, a district court must first determine if the non-relocating parent consented or if an existing order or decree permits relocation. If neither was met, the court must determine the merits of the relocation by applying the Stout-Hawkinson factors. The district court's findings under the Stout-Hawkinson factors and denying the motion to relocate is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(2). The district court's findings on the statutory best interest factors and granting the motion to change primary residential responsibility is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(2).

Relies on Kienzle v. Selensky · Larson v. Larson

Decided 2024-06-20

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT
                         STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                      
2024 ND 122



Mariya Stephens,                                              Plaintiff and Appellant

      v.

Kevin Lee,                                                    Defendant and Appellee

      and

State of North Dakota,                              Statutory Real Party in Interest


                                     No. 20230381

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the
Honorable Stacy J. Louser, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Theresa L. Kellington, Bismarck, ND, attorney for plaintiff and appellant.

Christene A. Reierson, Minot, ND, attorney for defendant and appellee.
                                  Stephens v. Lee, et al.
                                      No. 20230381

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Mariya Stephens appeals from a district court’s judgment and amended judgment
denying her motions to relocate and for primary residential responsibility. Mariya Stephens
alleges the court erred by denying her motion to move out of state, and erred in awarding
Lee primary residential responsibility. We affirm.

                                             I

[¶2] Kevin Lee and Mariya Stephens married in February 2017. They have one child,
A.N.L., born in 2019. Mariya Stephens served in the Air Force when they moved to Minot,
North Dakota, and separated from the Air Force in November 2022. Lee was not in the Air
Force when he and Mariya Stephens divorced. The couple stipulated to a divorce, which
was finalized on December 23, 2020.

[¶3] Under the divorce judgment Mariya Stephens received primary residential
responsibility of A.N.L. and Lee received parenting time. Paragraph 67 of the judgment
states that if Mariya Stephens had a permanent change of duty station A.N.L. would
relocate with her to maintain consistency. Paragraph 73 of the judgment states if Mariya
Stephens relocated because of military employment that Lee consents to A.N.L. relocating
with her. The judgment provided that A.N.L.’s medical information would be accessible
by either party, that they would communicate with each other, keep “the lines of
communication open to ensure both parties can participate in the child’s extracurricular
activities,” are welcome to attend all events without interference from the other parent, and
to let Lee access A.N.L.’s 529 education savings account.

[¶4] Lee testified that he and Mariya Stephens co-parented amicably until Mariya
Stephens started dating Charles Stephens in 2021. Mariya and Charles Stephens married in
August 2021. They have two children together. Charles Stephens is not a named party, but
interjected himself into the relationship by making Lee communicate through him about
A.N.L.

[¶5] Exhibits provided by Mariya Stephens and Lee, and testimony from Charles
Stephens, indicated Charles Stephens communicated to Lee, throughout 2022 and early
2023, that the Stephens family was planning to relocate. In September 2022, Mariya and


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Charles Stephens contracted and put down money to build a home in King George,
Virginia. The Stephens family told Lee that they planned to move and Lee either did not
respond or replied, via text message, with “sounds good.” Mariya Stephens believed she
had Lee’s consent to relocate either under the divorce judgment or his text messages and
emails. On April 27, 2023, Mariya Stephens filed a motion for relocation. Mariya Stephens
relocated before the district court could act on the motion.

[¶6] On May 9, 2023, Lee objected to Mariya Stephens’s relocation and requested the
district court deny her motion to relocate to Virginia. The same day, Lee moved to amend
the divorce judgment to give him primary residential responsibility for A.N.L. with Mariya
Stephens having parenting time. Lee also filed a motion for contempt due to Mariya
Stephens’s alleged violations of the judgment. On May 31, 2023, the district court required
the Stephens family to return to North Dakota with A.N.L. A hearing on the motion to
relocate was held on June 13, 2023, with a second hearing on August 8, 2023.

[¶7] On October 9, 2023, the district court denied Mariya Stephens’s motion to relocate
because the Stout-Hawkinson factors disfavored relocation. The court awarded Lee primary
residential responsibility and granted his motion to amend the judgment. The court denied
Mariya Stephens’s motion to amend the judgment and found the statutory best interest
factors e, k, and l favored Lee and the remainder were not applicable or favored both
parties. The court also found Mariya Stephens must give Lee access to A.N.L.’s 529
education savings account.

[¶8] In November 2023, the district court amended child support and entered judgment.
Mariya Stephens timely appealed.

                                            II

[¶9] Mariya Stephens argues the district court erred in denying her motion to relocate.
She argues that she did not need Lee’s consent due to language in the divorce judgment
and, in the alternative, that Lee consented to the relocation through text messages and
emails. “A parent with primary residential responsibility for a child may not change the
primary residence of the child to another state except” when the other parent consents or
by decree or court order that includes parenting time for the non-relocating parent.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07(1). “The parent moving for permission to relocate has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence the move is in the child’s best interests.”
Larson v. Larson, 
2016 ND 76, ¶ 21
, 
878 N.W.2d 54
.


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                                             A

[¶10] Mariya Stephens claims the judgment provided her Lee’s consent to move out of
state. The judgment provides: “[i]f there is a permanent change of duty station, A.N.L. will
relocate with Mariya [Stephens] to maintain consistency, and Kevin [Lee] would then have
extended parenting time as arranged between the parties” and “[t]he parties agree that if
Mariya [Stephens] has to relocate due to her military employment, she has consent to do
so, and the parties will work out details for a parenting time schedule for Kevin [Lee] if
that event occurs.”

[¶11] Our method of reviewing a family law judgment is well established:

       “When a stipulation is incorporated into a judgment, ‘the agreement is
       interpreted and enforced as a final judgment and not as a separate contract
       between the parties.’ When the language of a judgment is clear and
       unambiguous, the judgment must be construed to give effect to the
       unambiguous language, but ‘if the language of a judgment is ambiguous, we
       give great weight to a district court’s construction of its own decree,’ unless
       the court misapplies the law in interpreting the judgment.”

Kienzle v. Selensky, 
2007 ND 167, ¶ 10
, 
740 N.W.2d 393
 (cleaned up).

[¶12] Mariya Stephens and the district court discussed her relocation to Virginia:

       “The Court: Okay. I’m going to jump forward a little bit to this Virginia
       move. And I’m struggling on that one as well, quite frankly. My
       understanding of your position, and correct me if I’m wrong—
       The Witness: Yes, Ma’am.
       The Court: Is that because this was a permanent change in station, you did
       not need Mr. Lee’s consent; is that right?
       The Witness: No, Ma’am. That’s why we sought his consent prior.”

Because of the admission that her move was not due to the military’s change of her duty
station the judgment provisions providing Lee’s consent did not apply. The district court
did not err in concluding the judgment did not provide consent for her to relocate A.N.L.
out of state.

                                             B

[¶13] Mariya Stephens argues in the alternative that Lee gave her consent to relocate in
text messages and emails. The standard of review for a motion to relocate requires:


                                             3
      “A district court’s decision on a motion to relocate is a finding of fact, which
      will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. In applying the
      clearly erroneous standard, we will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness
      credibility, retry a custody case, or substitute our judgment for the trial
      court’s decision merely because this Court may have reached a different
      result. This Court also held that a trial court may draw inferences from facts
      presented and may make a finding of fact based upon an inference supported
      by the evidence.”

Nelson v. Nelson, 
2024 ND 31, ¶ 6
, 3 N.W.3d 133 (internal citations omitted).

[¶14] The district court found Lee did not consent to Mariya Stephens’s relocation with
A.N.L. in the fall of 2022. The court also found Mariya Stephens did not provide Lee with
the date of their relocation until after the Stephens family left North Dakota. The text
messages and emails Mariya Stephens claims show the parties discussed A.N.L.’s potential
move did not amount to Lee’s consent to the move. The court did not clearly err in finding
Lee did not consent to the move.

                                            III

[¶15] Mariya Stephens claims the district court erred in making its findings under the
Stout-Hawkinson factors and in denying her motion to relocate A.N.L. out of state. The
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P.
35.1(a)(2).

                                           IV

[¶16] Mariya Stephens claims the district court erred in making its findings on the
statutory best interest factors and in granting Lee’s motion to change A.N.L.’s primary
residential responsibility to Lee. The court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and we
summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

                                            V

[¶17] We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude they are either
without merit or not necessary to our decision.

                                           VI

[¶18] The district court did not misapply the law when concluding the divorce judgment
did not provide Mariya Stephens with Lee’s consent for her to move A.N.L. out of state,

                                             4
and did not err by denying her motion and by granting Lee’s motion to change primary
residential responsibility. We affirm.

[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




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