IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2024 ND 175
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Trent Daniel Rolland, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20230313
Appeal from the District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, the
Honorable Nicholas D. Thornton, Judge.
REMANDED WITH JURISDICTION RETAINED.
Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
Jayne M. Pfau, State’s Attorney, Forman, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Adam J. Justinger, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
State v. Rolland
No. 20230313
Crothers, Justice.
[¶1] Trent Rolland appeals from a criminal judgment entered following his
conditional pleas of guilty to gross sexual imposition, luring minors by
computer, sexual assault, and contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of
a minor. He argues the district court erred when it decided he was competent to
stand trial and denied his motions to suppress evidence. The court did not make
findings to explain the basis for its decision that Rolland was fit to proceed. The
judge that presided over Rolland’s competency hearing is no longer sitting. We
therefore retain jurisdiction and remand for a period of 60 days for the district
court to decide the preliminary issue of whether Rolland was fit to proceed
before entering his conditional guilty plea.
I
[¶2] Law enforcement was called to a traffic accident involving Rolland and the
victim, a minor. Upon speaking with the victim, law enforcement learned
Rolland was communicating with the victim using the social media application
SnapChat, and sending her text messages and explicit photographs. The victim
also alleged Rolland had sexual contact with her. Rolland was subsequently
charged with luring a minor and arrested. Rolland’s smartphone was seized
during the arrest, and he was transported to the Richland County jail.
[¶3] While at the Richland County jail, law enforcement told Rolland he was in
custody and not free to leave. Law enforcement read Rolland his Miranda rights
before questioning him. The officer conducting the interview asked Rolland if he
understood the rights read to him, and Rolland answered in the affirmative.
During the one-hour interview, Rolland made several admissions regarding the
alleged criminal conduct. Rolland also provided law enforcement with the
locations on his phone of the messages and photographs, and passwords
necessary to access the photos and messages. Following the interview, law
enforcement obtained a warrant to search Rolland’s phone. The State
subsequently amended its complaint against Rolland to add additional charges.
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[¶4] Rolland underwent three psychological evaluations performed by two
licensed psychologists, Dr. Juli Nevland and Dr. Shannon Weisz. Following the
examinations Rolland filed a motion to dismiss, arguing he was not fit to
proceed. The district court ordered a trial competency evaluation, which was
completed by Dr. Mark Rodlund. At the competency hearing, the court received
reports detailing the doctors’ opinions. Rolland objected to admission of Dr.
Rodlund’s report arguing it was untimely. The district court overruled the
objection reasoning Rolland had sufficient time to review the report. Dr. Weisz
opined Rolland did not fully understand the proceedings against him. Dr.
Rodlund testified Rolland was competent to stand trial.
[¶5] Rolland also filed a motion to suppress evidence gathered during the
custodial interview arguing he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waive his constitutional right to remain silent and an additional motion to
suppress evidence arguing the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement. The district court heard testimony from the officers
that arrested Rolland, interviewed him, and searched his phone. An audio
recording of the interview was admitted into evidence.
[¶6] The district court entered a single order denying Rolland’s motions to
suppress and his motion to dismiss. Rolland entered a conditional plea of guilty
and now appeals from the subsequently entered judgment. On appeal, Rolland
argues the court erred when it decided he was competent to stand trial, when it
decided the search of his cell phone was constitutional, and when it decided he
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.
II
[¶7] Rolland argues the district court erred in finding he was competent to
stand trial. He claims the court-ordered competency evaluation was completed
after the statutory deadline and therefore the court should not have considered
the competency report. He also argues the court’s determination that he is
competent to stand trial is not supported by the evidence.
[¶8] “It is well established that due process prohibits the criminal prosecution
of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” State v. VanNatta, 506 N.W.2d
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63, 65 (N.D. 1993) (citing Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437 (1992); Drope v.
Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966); State v. Heger,
326 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1982)). “An individual who lacks fitness to proceed may
not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense.” N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-04-04.1(2). “Section 12.1-04-08, N.D.C.C., authorizes the suspension or
dismissal of criminal proceedings if the court finds a defendant is not competent
to assist in a defense and also authorizes the court to make a referral for other
appropriate services, treatment, or civil commitment.” State v. Holbach,
2014 ND
14, ¶ 8,
842 N.W.2d 328.
A
[¶9] Rolland argues the district court erred as a matter of law when it
considered Dr. Rodlund’s report because the report was filed past the deadline
set by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-07, which provides:
“1. Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant’s fitness to
proceed, the court shall order the defendant be examined by a
tier 1a mental health professional.
2. An examination must occur within fifteen days from receipt of
material necessary to examine the fitness of the individual and
notice of entry of the order served upon the tier 1a mental health
professional. Attorneys shall disclose any materials necessary to
examine the fitness of the individual to the tier 1a examiner
contemporaneously with the order. For good cause shown, the
court may grant an extension allowing an additional seven days
to complete the examination.”
[¶10] On April 18, 2022, the district court entered an order for a competency and
criminal responsibility evaluation. Rolland argues: “According to the record, it
appears that the Order was received by the North Dakota State Hospital (NDSH)
on April 26, 2022.” In support of his claim, Rolland cites a docket entry with a
copy of the April 18, 2022 evaluation order, but it includes nothing to indicate
either the hospital or Dr. Rodlund received notice of the order on that date. The
15-day deadline does not begin until “receipt of material necessary to examine
the fitness of the individual and notice of entry of the order served upon the tier
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1a mental health professional.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-07(2). Rolland has not
established if or when Dr. Rodlund was served with notice of the order as
required by law to start the 15-day deadline. On this record, the district court did
not err when it considered Dr. Rodlund’s report.
B
[¶11] Rolland argues the evidence does not support the district court’s decision
that he is competent to stand trial. The standard for determining if a criminal
defendant is competent to stand trial is set forth in State v. Gleeson:
“The United States Supreme Court has summarized the test
for determining if an accused is mentally competent to stand trial.
A defendant is incompetent when he lacks (1) sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. This test is
essentially codified at section 12.1-04-04, N.D.C.C., which states: No
person who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against the person or to assist in the
person’s own defense shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the
commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.”
2000 ND 205, ¶ 9,
619 N.W.2d 858 (cleaned up). “The crux of being able to
‘consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ is
being able to ‘confer coherently with counsel and provide necessary and relevant
information to formulate a defense.’” Kuntz v. State,
2022 ND 189, ¶ 6,
981
N.W.2d 848 (quoting VanNatta,
506 N.W.2d at 65, 68). “The prosecution must
show by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant is competent to stand
trial.” VanNatta, at 65.
[¶12] Whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is a question of fact for the
district court, which finding is reviewed by this Court under our clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Dahl,
2010 ND 108, ¶ 6,
783 N.W.2d 41. “A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it
is not supported by any evidence, or if, although there is some evidence to
support the finding, a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
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a mistake has been made.” Heckelsmiller v. State, 2004 ND 191, ¶ 5,
687 N.W.2d
454.
[¶13] The district court determined Rolland was competent to stand trial,
concluding “he has the ability to understand the proceedings now pending in
this Court against him, effectively communicate with counsel, and to assist in his
defense should he choose to do so.” These statements are simply a recitation of
the legal standard the court was required to apply. They do not provide a basis
for us to review the court’s decision. “When factual issues are involved in
deciding a motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”
N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(d). “‘We cannot properly review a decision . . . if the district
court fails to make adequate findings explaining the basis for its ultimate
conclusion.’” State v. Knox,
2016 ND 15, ¶ 10,
873 N.W.2d 664 (quoting State v.
Juntunen,
2014 ND 86, ¶ 3,
845 N.W.2d 325). “‘A reviewing court needs to know
the reasons for the trial court’s decision before it can intelligently rule on the
issues, and if the trial court does not provide an adequate explanation of the
evidentiary and legal basis for its decision, we are left to merely speculate
whether the court properly applied the law.’” Knox, at ¶ 10 (quoting Estate of
Nelson,
2015 ND 122, ¶ 8,
863 N.W.2d 521). We are unable to decide whether the
district court erred when it determined Rolland was competent to stand trial
because the court did not make findings explaining the basis for its decision.
[¶14] The preliminary issue of whether Rolland was fit to proceed must be
decided before we can address whether he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea due to a constitutional violation. See Dodge v. State,
2020 ND 100, ¶ 15,
942 N.W.2d 478 (“An incompetent criminal defendant cannot enter a valid guilty
plea.”). A person’s fitness to proceed may change over time. State v. Rogers,
2018
ND 244, ¶ 21,
919 N.W.2d 193. Whether Rolland currently is fit to proceed is not
relevant to the question of whether he was fit to proceed before entering his
conditional guilty plea. See
id. (remanding for a new competency hearing to
decide whether a defendant was fit to proceed at the time of an improperly
closed competency hearing and subsequent change of plea). The judge that
presided over Rolland’s competency hearing is no longer sitting. On remand, the
district court must determine whether Rolland was fit to proceed when he
entered his conditional guilty plea. That decision must be based on the record
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when Rolland filed his motion to dismiss. The court must conduct an additional
competency hearing to assess the evaluators’ testimony and credibility. See
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-07(5) (stating the court must hold a hearing when the findings
of a competency report are contested).
III
[¶15] We retain jurisdiction and remand for a period of 60 days from the filing
of this opinion for the district court to decide the preliminary issue of whether
Rolland was fit to proceed before entering his conditional guilty plea.
[¶16] Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
[¶17] The Honorable Chief Justice Jon J. Jensen recused himself after oral
argument and did not participate in this decision.
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