Jeremy Spencer Woolsey, Petitioner and Appellant
v.
State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee
No. 20240109
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central
Judicial District, the Honorable Donald Hager, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.
Tracy E. Reames, Fargo, ND, for petitioner and appellant; submitted on brief.
Andrew C. Eyre, Assistant State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, ND, for respondent
and appellee; submitted on brief.
Woolsey v. State
No. 20240109
McEvers, Justice.
[¶1] Jeremy Woolsey appeals from an order summarily dismissing his
application for postconviction relief. We affirm, concluding the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, does not apply to juvenile
adjudications.
I
[¶2] In January 2024, Woolsey applied for postconviction relief from his 2010
juvenile adjudication, alleging he did not enter a voluntary and intelligent guilty
plea in his juvenile case because he was denied the right to counsel, causing him
to be unaware of the consequences of the adjudication. He also alleged the
existence of newly discovered evidence. The State answered and moved for
summary dismissal, arguing postconviction relief is unavailable in juvenile
delinquency cases and the application was untimely. Woolsey responded to the
motion. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal,
concluding postconviction relief is unavailable.
II
[¶3] Woolsey argues the district court erred in concluding that postconviction
relief is not available in juvenile adjudications.
[¶4] Under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, “A
person who has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime may institute a
proceeding applying for relief.” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1) (emphasis added). The
purpose of the Act is to “furnish a method to develop a complete record to
challenge a criminal conviction.” Davies v. State,
.
Under the Juvenile Court Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.2, “An order of disposition or
other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of crime
and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction.”
N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-16(1); see also N.D.C.C. § 27-20-33(1) (repealed 2021) (same
language); State v. Moses,
(stating that
1
“N.D.C.C. § 27-20-33 provides a general rule that a juvenile adjudication is not a
conviction of crime” (quotations omitted)). In Moses, we recognized the firearm
prohibition statute expressly created an exception to the general rule, allowing
“a juvenile adjudication to be a conviction only for the limited purpose of
deciding whether a person is prohibited from possessing a firearm.”
2022 ND
208, ¶ 10
.
[¶5] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act contains many references to a
“conviction,” see N.D.C.C. §§ 29-32.1-01, -03, -04(2), -11(3), -12(2), but does not
make reference to juvenile adjudications. Given the plain language of chapter 29-
32.1 that relief is from a criminal conviction (or sentence) and the general rule
that a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction of crime, we conclude the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, does not apply to juvenile
adjudications.
[¶6] Woolsey argues it would be unjust to deny juveniles a procedure for relief
where adults in the criminal context have such a procedure. This procedure,
however, exists. Under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16, a party may move for relief from a
juvenile order, including when “newly discovered evidence so requires.”
N.D.R.Juv.P. 16(a)(3). Because Woolsey did not move under the juvenile
procedure rules, that issue was not before the district court, and is not before this
Court.
III
[¶7] We have considered the parties’ other arguments and determined they are
either without merit or unnecessary to our decision. The order is affirmed.
[¶8] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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