Sanderson v. Agotness

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                  

Mitchell S. Sanderson,                                   Plaintiff and Appellant

      v.

Judge Kari Agotness,                                    Defendant and Appellee



                                 No. 20240054

Appeal from the District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, the
Honorable Jay D. Knudson, Judge.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Mitchell S. Sanderson, Park River, ND, self-represented, plaintiff and appellant;
on brief.

Andrew Moraghan, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for defendant
and appellee; on brief.
                             Sanderson v. Agotness
                                 No. 20240054

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Mitchell S. Sanderson appeals from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his civil case against Judge Kari Agotness, awarding her attorney’s
fees, and denying his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief of judgment. We
modify the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and affirm the judgment as
modified.

                                        I

[¶2] On October 30, 2023, Sanderson commenced this action against Agotness,
seeking $200 million in damages and demanding that Agotness be investigated
for alleged criminal conduct. Sanderson served his summons and complaint on
Agotness and the Office of Attorney General. Agotness filed the summons and
complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 5(d)(2)(A)(iv), filed a N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss and requested attorney’s fees. Sanderson did not respond to the
motion to dismiss or the request for attorney’s fees. The district court granted
Agotness’s motion to dismiss, found Sanderson’s claims were frivolous, and
awarded attorney’s fees to Agotness. After judgment was entered, Sanderson
filed a motion for relief of judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) with the district
court. Before receiving a ruling on the motion, Sanderson filed a notice of appeal.
We temporarily remanded the case for the district court to consider the Rule
60(b) motion, which later was denied. Sanderson timely appealed from that
order.

[¶3] Sanderson lists 11 issues on appeal. We limit our consideration to
Sanderson’s challenge to Agotness’s judicial immunity defense, which is
dispositive, the motion for relief from judgment, and the award of attorney’s
fees.




                                        1
                                         II

[¶4] Sanderson claims the district court erred in dismissing his claims based on
Agotness’s judicial immunity because Agotness lacked personal jurisdiction to
adjudicate issues in the underlying action.

[¶5] Dismissals under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) are reviewed de novo and will be
affirmed if this Court is unable to “discern a potential for proof to support [the
complaint].” Krile v. Lawyer, 

, 

 (quoting Nelson
v. McAlester Fuel Co., 

, 

). Here, the three-page
complaint consisted of a jurisdictional statement listing the parties, 11
conclusory claims without factual context or support, a demand for $200 million
in damages, and requested a criminal investigation of Agotness. Sanderson also
claimed Agotness had the burden of disproving his claims.

[¶6] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Bismarck Fin. Grp. LLC v. Caldwell, 

, 

 (quoting
Johnson & Maxwell, Ltd. v. Lind, 

 (N.D. 1980)). Section 8(a)(1),
N.D.R.Civ.P., requires that a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” A claim fails if the
defendant “is unable to frame an appropriate responsive pleading.” Gowin v.
Hazen Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 

 (N.D. 1981).

[¶7] North Dakota law protects judges from civil claims arising out of the
performance of their judicial duties. Section 32-12.2-02(3)(d), N.D.C.C., provides:
“[n]either the state nor a state employee may be held liable . . . for . . . a claim
resulting from a decision to undertake or a refusal to undertake any judicial . . .
act.” “Judicial immunity is a long-standing common law doctrine that protects
judges from civil liability for their judicial decisions[.]” Riemers v. State, 

, 

. Judges lose immunity if acting “in clear absence of
jurisdiction.” 

 (citing Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 

 (7th Cir.
2000)). Sanderson claims Agotness had no authority to act in the underlying case
because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.


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He argues the court lacked jurisdiction because he improperly served the
defendant by mailing the summons and complaint in the underlying case.
Because service was defective, he claims Agotness was required to dismiss the
case rather than rule on any issues.

[¶8] We explicitly rejected Sanderson’s claim the district court was without
jurisdiction in his action against Myrdal. Sanderson v. Myrdal, 

,
__ N.W.3d __ (“We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff
may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over a defendant who admits personal
jurisdiction on the basis of defects in the plaintiff’s service of process on the
defendant. Sanderson’s jurisdiction argument is without merit.”). Our holding
in the Myrdal case is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. Riverwood
Commercial Park, L.L.C. v. Standard Oil Co., Inc., 

, 

(“The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar courts from relitigating
claims and issues in order to promote the finality of judgments, which increases
certainty, avoids multiple litigation, wasteful delay and expense, and ultimately
conserves judicial resources.”) (cleaned up). Because the district court had
jurisdiction, Agotness was acting within her capacity as a judge when she
resolved the issues in the Myrdal case. Therefore, judicial immunity applies.

[¶9] “Judicial immunity is defined by the governmental functions it protects,
not the motives of the officers performing those functions.” Riemers, 2007 ND
APP. 2, ¶ 8 (citing 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 64 (2007). “Judges have absolute
immunity because of the special nature of their responsibilities[.]” Loran v. Iszler,

 (N.D. 1985). “Even if the judges disregard clear case or
statutory law, their actions were judicial acts, and judicial immunity bars [ ]
claims for money damages.” Riemers, at ¶ 8. Judicial acts are decisions regarding
“what the law is, and what the rights of the parties are, with reference to the
transactions already had[.]” State ex rel. Mason v. Baker, 

 (N.D.
1939). Here, all of the acts alleged by Sanderson exclusively stem from
Agotness’s decisions while presiding over a case in which Sanderson was the
plaintiff (No. 50-2023-CV-00129). “A district judge acting within his jurisdiction
is not subject to a damage action.” Loran, 

 (citing Root v. Rose,

, 

 (1897)). Agotness has complete immunity from claims



                                         3
relating to judicial decisions she made while presiding over the underlying case.
As a result, the district court here did not err by dismissing Sanderson’s case.

                                        III

[¶10] Sanderson claims the district court erred in awarding Agotness’s
attorney’s fees she incurred in defending against this action.

[¶11] This Court reviews an award of attorney’s fees under the abuse of
discretion standard. Gratech Co., Ltd. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 

, 

. “A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary,
unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the
law.” 

 (internal citations omitted).

[¶12] Sanderson argues the district court erred in finding his claims were
frivolous and awarding attorney’s fees. “A claim is frivolous when there is such
a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not have
expected that a court would render judgment in his favor.” Dietz v. Kautzman,

, 

 (citing Peterson v. Zerr, 

(N.D. 1991)). “Judicial immunity . . . [is a] well-established and long-standing
legal doctrine[].” Riemers, 

. Because Sanderson did not
request any form of relief not barred by judicial immunity, his claims are without
merit.

[¶13] Sanderson also argues the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees
because Agotness filed the summons and complaint with the court, not him.
Attorney’s fees in a frivolous action are not awarded based on who was first to
file but on the prevailing party who was sued on a meritless claim. N.D.C.C. §
28-26-01(2). Section 28-26-01(2), N.D.C.C., states:

      “In civil actions the court shall, upon a finding that a claim for relief
      was frivolous, award reasonable actual and statutory costs,
      including reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Such
      costs must be awarded regardless of the good faith of the attorney or
      party making the claim for relief if there is such a complete absence
      of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not have
      thought a court would render judgment in that person’s favor[.]”


                                         4
(Emphasis added.) Sanderson did not provide a legal or factual response to the
judicial immunity defense that would permit his claims to proceed. Because of
this, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the claims were frivolous
and awarding attorney’s fees to Agotness.

[¶14] While the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s
fees to Agotness, the amount awarded is incorrect. Counsel for Agotness filed a
letter with the court asking to amend the attorney’s fees award from $3,213.80 to
$2,787.45 due to a computational error. Because the case was on appeal when the
error was discovered, the district court is unable to correct it. See N.D.R.Civ.P.
60(a) (correction based on clerical mistake; oversights and omissions). Sanderson
did not object to the request to reduce the attorney’s fees award. We reduce
Agotness’s attorney’s fee recovery to $2,787.45, and affirm the award as
modified.

                                        IV

[¶15] Sanderson argues the district court erred in denying his “[m]otion for
[r]elief from judgment.”

[¶16] In February 2024, Sanderson filed a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief of
judgment from the district court’s order finding the claim was frivolous and
granting attorney’s fees. The motion was denied. Sanderson’s argument on
appeal is “Judge Knutson should have granted the Motion for Relief from
Judgment! All legal arguments in this Motion are true and accurate demanding
relief!”

[¶17] “Generally, issues not adequately briefed or argued on appeal will not be
considered.” First State Bank v. Moen Enters., 

 (N.D. 1995).
Sanderson did not include reference to N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or other supporting
law in his table of contents or the argument portion of his brief. “We ‘will not
consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed,’
or ‘engage in unassisted searches of the record for evidence to support a litigant’s
position.’” Hoever v. Wilder, 

, 5 N.W.3d 544 (quoting State v. Noack,

, 

). Because Sanderson failed to adequately brief
his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) claim, we decline to further consider the issue.

                                         5
                                       V

[¶18] It is unnecessary to address other issues raised on appeal because they are
either without merit or unnecessary to the decision. We affirm the dismissal of
this matter based on judicial immunity. We modify the amount of attorney’s fees
awarded, and affirm the judgment as modified.

[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr




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