[Cite as State v. Easter,
2024-Ohio-1389.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-42
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022CR0393
:
NATHAN A. EASTER : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on April 12, 2024
...........
ANTHONY C. SATARIANO and RONALD P. KELLER, Attorneys for Appellant
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee
.............
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Nathan A. Easter appeals from his convictions for
cruelty against a companion animal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On August 11, 2022, Bellbrook Police Sergeant Gregory Williams and his
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partner, Officer Stephanie Bennington, were dispatched to a residence on Barnett Drive
on a report of a domestic violence incident. The victim reported that she and her
husband (Easter) had been involved in a verbal altercation, that Easter had attempted to
strangle her, and that Easter had shot the family dog and then strangled the dog with a
zip tie and a leash. The victim left the home with her two small children and went to a
nearby Sugarcreek Township Police Department.
{¶ 3} When the officers arrived at the home, they stationed themselves across the
road from the house due to the concern that Easter was armed. As the officers were
setting up a perimeter around the residence, Sgt. Williams heard a “wailing sound,” which
he believed to be coming from the family dog. The officers then used a loudspeaker
system to urge Easter to exit the home. Easter ultimately exited the home and was
arrested.
{¶ 4} Sgt. Williams asked Easter for permission to search the house. Easter
denied the request; he stated that he wanted to hear what his wife said about whether
the home could be searched. A little later, another officer again asked for permission to
search the home, and Easter explicitly denied the request.
{¶ 5} The officers eventually sought and received permission to enter the home
from Easter’s wife. The officers entered the home and backyard and began to search
for the dog. Officers observed a freshly dug hole in the backyard. They also found zip
ties. After observing blood and fecal matter inside the home, Sgt. Williams instructed
Off. Bennington to start an evidence log and to begin taking photographs of the scene.
The officers ultimately located the dog, dead, outside of the backyard fence with a blue
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leash wrapped around its neck.
{¶ 6} Easter was indicted on one count each of attempted felonious assault,
disrupting public services, endangering children, abduction, unlawful possession of
dangerous ordinance, and tampering with evidence and on two counts of cruelty against
a companion animal. The counts of disrupting public services and unlawful possession
of dangerous ordinance were later dismissed by the State.
{¶ 7} Easter filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the officers’
entry of the home and search of the surrounding premises. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court overruled the motion; it found that the officers had had the right to
enter the premises under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant
requirement.
{¶ 8} The matter proceeded to trial. On the second day of trial, the defense was
provided with a copy of a videotape which contained statements made by Easter’s wife
during the time she was at the Sugarcreek Township Police Department. There is no
dispute that the prosecutor did not have knowledge of the existence of the videotape until
just prior to providing it to the defense. The record indicates that the parties and the trial
court held discussions about the videotape, but some of these discussions are not a part
of the record. On the third day of trial, defense counsel orally requested a mistrial due
to the late receipt of the videotape. The court overruled the motion.
{¶ 9} The jury convicted Easter on both counts of cruelty against a companion
animal and entered not guilty verdicts on the remaining counts. Easter was sentenced
accordingly.
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{¶ 10} Easter appeals.
II. Suppression
{¶ 11} Easter’s first assignment of error states as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE FACTS IN THE
RECORD TO THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD IN DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ORIGINALLY FILED
NOVEMBER 15TH, 2022 AND SUPPLEMENTED MARCH 21ST, 2023 IN
SO MUCH AS THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED AN
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTED ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 11,
2022, ELIMINATING LAW ENFORCEMENT’S NEED TO SECURE A
WARRANT OR CONSENT BEFORE SEARCHING THE 2426 BARNETT
DR., BELLBROOK, OHIO PROPERTY.
{¶ 12} Easter asserts the trial court erred in concluding that the police were
permitted to enter the residence and its backyard due to exigent circumstances.
{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9,
88
S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without a warrant, are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357,
88 S.Ct. 507,
19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “The burden is on [the government to establish] an exemption from
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the constitutional process ….” State v. Peterson, 173 Ohio App.3d 575, 2007-Ohio-
5667,
879 N.E.2d 806, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 14} One such exception is exigent circumstances that reasonably allow the
conclusion that emergency aid is needed. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460,
131
S.Ct. 1849,
179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). The emergency-aid exception allows law
enforcement officers to make a warrantless entry into a home or curtilage to render aid if
they reasonably believe there is the immediate need for assistance to protect life or
prevent serious injury. State v. Dunn,
131 Ohio St.3d 325,
2012-Ohio-1008,
964 N.E.2d
1037, ¶ 20-22. The emergency aid exception applies where there is an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that the subject is in need of immediate aid. Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 406,
126 S.Ct. 1943,
164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
{¶ 15} Ohio courts, including this one, have extended the exigent circumstances
exception to situations involving animal welfare. State v. Glowney, 2d Dist. Montgomery
Nos. 27896 and Montgomery Nos. 27897, 2019-Ohio-3390, ¶ 38; State v. Powell, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 27580,
2017-Ohio-8669, ¶ 30; State v. Neanover, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2020-06-066,
2021-Ohio-540, ¶ 18; State v. Kilburn, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA96-12-
130,
1998 WL 142412, *3-4 (Mar. 30, 1998).
{¶ 16} In this case, the evidence demonstrated that the officers had been advised
that Easter shot the family dog. At the scene, the officers also heard noises which they
believed to be made by the dog and which indicated to them that the dog was alive and
in need of aid. As noted by the trial court, the footage from the officers’ bodycam
recordings supported the finding that the officers had entered the property to search for
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the dog.
{¶ 17} Appellate “review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.
As the trier of fact, a trial court “is in the best position to weigh … evidence … and
evaluate [the credibility of] witness[es],” so an “appellate court must accept the trial court's
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.”
Id., citing State v.
Fanning,
1 Ohio St.3d 19,
437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Graves, 12th Dist. Clermont
No. CA2015-03-022,
2015-Ohio-3936, ¶ 9, citing State v. Cruz, 12th Dist. Preble No.
CA2013-10-008,
2014-Ohio-4280, ¶ 12. Accepting the trial court's findings of fact as
true, “the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the
[trial court's legal] conclusion[s],” whether the “facts satisfy the applicable … standard.”
Burnside at ¶ 8, citing Fanning and State v. McNamara,
124 Ohio App.3d 706,
707 N.E.2d
539 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶ 18} Based upon the evidence presented, we conclude the trial court did not err
in denying the motion to suppress. The search of the home and surrounding premises
was reasonable because the officers believed an injured animal was on the premises and
in need of aid. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.1
1
We realize that the officers relied upon the wife’s consent to enter the home and that,
based upon Easter’s refusal to consent to a search at the scene, the wife’s consent was
likely ineffective. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126, S.Ct. 1515,
164 L.Ed.2d
208 (2006). But irrespective of an officer’s subjective belief, the analysis turns on an
objective determination of whether the search was authorized by the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Lane, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230126,
2023-Ohio-4044, ¶ 11, citing City of
Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3, 6,
665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996); State v. Maddox, 2021-
Ohio-586,
168 N.E.3d 613, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
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III. Mistrial
{¶ 19} Easter’s second assignment of error provides as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
GRANT A MISTRIAL WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS PROVIDED WITH A
VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM FOR THE FIRST
TIME DURING THE SECOND DAY OF THE JURY TRIAL.
{¶ 20} Easter asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a mistrial.
{¶ 21} Generally, the decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial rests in a trial
court's sound discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 480,
739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). To establish
an abuse of discretion premised upon a failure to grant a mistrial, material prejudice must
be demonstrated. State v. Adams,
144 Ohio St.3d 429,
2015-Ohio-3954,
45 N.E.3d 127,
¶ 198. “Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial
is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin,
62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127,
580 N.E.2d 1 (1991).
{¶ 22} Easter claims the videotape of the victim made while she was at the
Sugarcreek Township Police Department contained exculpatory and impeachment
evidence. Thus, his motion for a mistrial was based upon the claim that the failure to
provide the tape to him earlier constituted a violation of Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Easter argues that he was unable to effectively
use the videotape during trial. Specifically, he claims “[i]t would be impossible to
effectively use a piece of evidence when it can’t be referenced in opening statements or
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used to cross examine or impeach numerous State witnesses.” He further claims the
late disclosure made “it impossible to fully and fairly formulate a defense strategy.”
{¶ 23} Brady requires the government “to turn over evidence that is both favorable
to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment.” State v. Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d 131,
2014-Ohio-2966,
16 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 154. In Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady at 87. However, no
Brady violation occurs so long as the evidence is disclosed to a defendant in time for its
effective use at trial. State v. Ketterer,
126 Ohio St.3d 448,
2010-Ohio-3831,
935 N.E.2d
9, ¶ 36.
{¶ 24} In this case, the videotape was not marked or admitted into evidence as an
exhibit. The content of the videotape also was not proffered into evidence during the
discussions about the videotape and the requested mistrial. Thus, other than Easter’s
general assertions, we have no basis for concluding the tape contained impeachment or
exculpatory evidence. In any event, defense counsel had the opportunity to study the
videotape prior to conducting cross-examination of the victim. Further, the record
contains no indication that the defense requested and/or was denied the right to re-cross-
examination of any of the State’s prior witnesses regarding the content of the videotape.
Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the videotape contained exculpatory or
impeachment evidence. More importantly, we cannot conclude that Easter was
prevented from effectively utilizing any such evidence. Therefore, we find that Easter
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has failed to demonstrate a Brady violation and has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.
{¶ 25} The second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 26} Both of Easter’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
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EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
