Slip opinions decided 2024 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW — NONCONFORMING USE — ABANDONMENT — BURDEN OF PROOF: The trial court abused its discretion in affirming the Board of Zoning Appeal's ("the BZA") decision where it was undisputed that a legal, nonconforming use had existed, plaintiff provided evidence to show continuance of the nonconforming use before his purchase of the property, and the BZA improperly placed the burden to disprove voluntary abandonment of the nonconforming use on plaintiff.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW —FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — PROBABLE CAUSE — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — ALLIED OFFENSES: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence found in his car where investigators intercepted a jail call instructing defendant to go to a specific location to retrieve contraband and police witnessed defendant at that location on the same day and leaving with a bookbag. Officers had probable cause to stop defendant and perform a warrantless search of his vehicle under the automobile exception where officers had reasonable grounds to believe there was contraband in the vehicle. The trial court committed plain error in failing to merge defendant's convictions for possessing marijuana and trafficking in marijuana.

VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR – R.C. 2323.52: The trial court did not err in finding defendant to be a vexatious litigator where defendant has habitually and persistently engaged in vexatious conduct by repeatedly filing unnecessary and supernumerary pleadings and motions which serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another party are not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or are imposed solely for delay.

CLASS ACTION – CIV.R. 23 – MORTGAGE SATISFACTION RECORDING – R.C. 5301.36: The trial court did not err when it relied on the version of R.C. 5301.36 that was in effect at the time of its decision to certify a class seeking damages for violations of the statute. The trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff and the rest of a class of mortgagors and property holders seeking damages for violations of R.C. 5301.36 had standing where the statute creates a cause of action for mortgagors and property holders seeking damages for the failure to record the satisfaction of a mortgage in violation of R.C. 5301.36. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it certified a state-wide class of mortgagors and property owners for violations of R.C. 5301.36 that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic where the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant's pandemic-based defenses are determinable on a classwide basis and the trial court is in the best position to assess the feasibility of gathering and analyzing classwide evidence.

STANDING — CIV.R. 17 — REAL PARTY IN INTEREST — CIV.R. 59 — NEW TRIAL — IMPROPER HABIT EVIDENCE — REVERSIBLE ERROR: The trial court did not err in allowing plaintiff to purse a claim for past medical expenses at trial where the record does not establish that the insurer was the sole real party in interest under Civ.R. 17 as to the claim for past medical expenses and no argument was presented that the trial court erred in its joinder determination regarding the insurer under Civ.R. 19. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant defendants' motion for a new trial where the record established that the jury relied upon improperly admitted habit evidence when reaching its conclusion. [See Concurrence: The trial court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel an opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff about a prior inconsistent statement.]

The sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence support Burks' convictions of felonious assault, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, tampering with evidence, and having a weapon while under disability, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing the Howard charge to the jury, and Burks did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court erred, however, in failing to impose the indefinite sentencing scheme required by the Reagan Tokes Law, and we remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law.

The trial court did not err in finding BWC was entitled to summary judgment on appellants' claim for unjust enrichment because the evidence showed BWC did not retain any benefits conferred by appellants upon it. Neither did the trial court hold that there was a rational basis for BWC's differing treatment of employers based on whether the employers participated in the Large Deductible Program versus the Individual Retro Program, because the trial court's statement presented in a footnote to that effect was merely dicta. However, the trial court erred in finding it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' claim premised on violation of equal protection. Appellants' equal protection claim was brought not as a private cause of action seeking relief for the violation itself, but rather as an alternative basis for the same relief sought under its unjust enrichment claim. As such, the Court of Claims retains subject matter jurisdiction over the ancillary constitutional claim. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

State's appeal. The trial court did not err in sustaining appellee's motion to suppress cell-phone data obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued by a local municipal court and served on AT&T's legal-compliance office in North Palm Beach, Florida. The trial court correctly held that the municipal court lacked authority to issue a warrant to be executed outside of its territorial jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in designating the State's firearms witness as an expert in muzzle-to-target distance determinations. The jury's verdicts were supported by legally sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in precluding appellant from introducing evidence of the victim's alleged prior violent tendencies. Appellant has not demonstrated that juror misconduct led to improper verdicts. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. Under the totality of the circumstances, the traffic stop of a vehicle in which appellant was a passenger was reasonable, and the use of a canine unit did not unnecessarily prolong the stop the officer had been diligently engaged in completing the traffic citation when the dog arrived within 15 minutes of the stop. Reasonable suspicion was not required to support appellant's removal from the vehicle. Judgment affirmed.

A co-venturer was not precluded from maintaining a breach of contract action against another co-venturer prior to an accounting or settlement of the joint venture. The trial court did not err in applying partnership law, which applies to joint ventures and allows actions to be brought without an accounting. The court correctly instructed the jury that a co-venturer must give notice of withdrawal before a joint venture may be terminated, and no notice was given here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding appellant's accountant from testifying as to issues that had already been decided in a prior action between the parties or as to legal opinions and irrelevant matters. Appellant waived any issue concerning answers to jury interrogatories by failing to raise this before the jury was discharged. Finally, the court did not err in refusing to grant appellant's motion for an order requiring the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to produce appellees' tax returns. Appellees had provided the needed signed forms on two occasions, but the IRS did not respond to requests that the returns be produced. The trial court correctly concluded that it could not order the IRS to comply. Moreover, appellant received copies of the tax returns from appellees' tax preparer, who verified that the returns were copies of the returns filed with the IRS. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court's overruling of non-party appellants' motion to quash and objections to defendant's subpoenas is not a final, appealable order because (1) no records were ordered disclosed to the defendant and (2) the trial court has scheduled an in-camera review to determine which records, if any, should be disclosed. Under these circumstances, the overruling of the motion to quash and the objections neither determined the action with respect to the subpoenas nor prevented a judgment in appellants' favor, as required for a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Appeal dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order.

insurance agent license, revoked, final order, service, serve, R.C. 119.12, R.C. 119.09, R.C. 3905.061

Appellant's conviction for aggravated possession of drugs was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The juvenile court's decision granting permanent custody of appellant's two children to a local children services agency was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence indicated that the children's best interests would be served by a grant of permanent custody rather than a decision returning the children to appellant given appellant's history of substance abuse and mental health issues, the children's stated wishes not to be returned to appellant, and appellant's lack of a suitable home for the children.

Probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying an heir's application to be appointed administratix of the decedent's estate.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress where appellant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by officers. Rather, evidence demonstrated officers had responded to appellant's home to perform a wellness check, and appellant was not handcuffed, threatened, overpowered, tricked, or coerced into speaking with officers about his efforts to self-medicate by huffing a can of aerosol duster.

For an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review in an administrative appeal, sufficiently detailed reasoning should be specified in the common pleas court's order. Sufficient detail was not provided in the common pleas court's decision necessitating a remand.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to village. Although the village failed to fully comply with statutory notice requirements regarding appellant's interest in a vehicle that the village seized pursuant to a criminal forfeiture, the village is shielded from civil liability by sovereign immunity where the applicable code sections did not expressly impose liability for failure to comply.

APPELLATE REVIEW - denial of a stay pending arbitration in a commercial construction contract is not a final appealable order R.C. 2711.02(D)

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - petition for writ of mandamus requirement of R.C. 2969.25 to provide affidavit of inmate of prior actions is mandatory.

Motion to Vacate Forfeiture

Relator's affidavit of prior civil actions failed to include all information mandated by R.C. 2969.25(A). Strict compliance with the statute is required. Accordingly, relator's original action in mandamus is dismissed.

Defendants, healthcare providers and doctors, appealed trial court's denial of summary judgment arguing that they were immune from suit as a result of the enactment of 2019 Ohio H.B. 606, which expanded the qualified statutory immunity from suit granted to healthcare providers during the period of the COVID-19 emergency. On review, appeal dismissed. Trial court's decision denying summary judgment was not a final order, and aside from the statutory exception for political subdivisions under R.C. Chapter 2744, Ohio courts do not allow for interlocutory review of a denial of summary judgment based on immunity.

The trial court did not err in sealing the records of defendant's convictions.

magistrate's decision, failure to file transcript in trial court, failure to file objections

Revised Code Chapter 2506—standing

R.C. 3119.79 required a recalculation of child support.

Felony sentencing - sentencing entry's order that appellant pay $5,000 mandatory fine was contrary to law when trial court did not pronounce this sentence in open court and in appellant's presence trial court did not plainly err by requiring appellant to pay prosecution costs trial court did not plainly err by imposing consecutive sentences record did not clearly and convincingly show that consecutive sentences were contrary to law

Sufficient Evidence Manifest Weight of the Evidence Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) Trespass R.C. 2909.01(C) occupied structure residential purpose of the dwelling

Guilty plea theft as a fifth-degree felony possession of fentanyl-related compound as a third-degree felony jointly recommended prison sentence postrelease control consequences of violating postrelease control totality-of-the-circumstances

Motion for leave to file motion for new trial newly discovered evidence witness recantation Crim.R. 33(A)(6) unavoidably prevented clear and convincing proof. A trial witness's recantation of testimony can be newly discovered evidence if the court finds that the new testimony is credible and if the new testimony would materially affect the outcome of the new trial. The only eyewitness to the shooting recanted her testimony that the victim did not have a gun that night. In an affidavit, she stated that not only did the victim have a gun on the night in question, he fired first at the defendant before the defendant fired back. This witness also explained in the affidavit why she lied on the witness stand at trial. Because the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the fact that this witness would one day change her mind and decide to recant her testimony, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial.

Forcible rape kidnapping Amber Alert allied offenses R.C. 2941.25 merger waiver consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) Reagan Tokes Law. The defendant agreed that the offenses to which he pleaded guilty were separate for the purposes of R.C. 2941.25, and as a result, waived his right to challenge the merger issue in the direct appeal. In addition, the defendant failed to demonstrate that consecutive-sentence findings were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Affirmed.

Postconviction petition untimely ineffective assistance trial counsel exculpatory disclose bias jurisdiction res judicata waiver unavoidably prevented discovery recusal prejudice. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief because the claims were barred by res judicata or otherwise failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 2923.23(A).

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) consecutive-sentence review R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentences. After conducting a thorough review of the record, this court does not find that the record clearly and convincingly fails to support the trial court's consecutive- sentence findings.

Consecutive sentences findings support in record aggregate sentence. The trial court made the required consecutive-sentence findings and those findings are not unsupported by the record. Further, appellant's argument that running his two prison sentences concurrently resulted in an excessive aggregate sentence is not well taken. Judgment affirmed.

Rape rape-shield law R.C. 2907.02(D) confrontation Boggs hearing sufficiency age Crim.R. 33 recanting communications. - Sufficient evidence was presented supporting defendant's conviction for rape of a child under the age of 13. Viewing the victim's testimony in favor of the state, a rational trier of fact could find that the testimony demonstrated that at the time of the rape, the victim was less than 13 years of age. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, after a Boggs hearing, that the defendant failed to prove that the victim's prior allegations of sexual activity were fabrications or totally unfounded the evidence fell within R.C. 2907.02(D) protection and thus, not admissible under the rape-shield statute. Defendant's Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial was properly denied because no direct evidence was presented that the victim recanted her testimony or accusations the source of the evidence was from the sworn testimony of two individuals who believed they received communications from the victim.

Domestic violence protection order magistrate's decision timely objections transcript Civ.R. 65.1 Loc.R. 27. - Domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision and refusing to address the merits of petitioner's objections, including evidentiary rulings, because petitioner failed to timely file the transcript of the magistrate's hearing as required by Civ.R. 65.1 and Loc.R. 27 of the domestic relations court. Because domestic relations court did not consider the transcripts, this court cannot consider the transcripts submitted on appeal.

Nunc pro tunc appellate mandate final appealable order. A nunc pro tunc entry, correcting the trial court's clerical omission in the original sentencing entry based on the appellate mandate from a direct appeal, is not an order from which a defendant can file another appeal. Dismissed.

Drug possession trafficking consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) nunc pro tunc divested of jurisdiction clerical error. The trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings were clearly and convincingly supported by the record such that consecutive sentences were not improper. The trial court was divested of jurisdiction when appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and therefore, the trial court's subsequent nunc pro tunc entry is a nullity. Upon remand, the trial court shall issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the clerical error in the original sentencing journal entry.

Breach of contract noncompetition agreement side work absence of assignments of error App.R. 16(A)(3) App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) bench trial manifest weight of the evidence lost profits reasonable certainty. Appellant's brief contained no assignments of error as required for appellate review under App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) and App.R. 16(A)(3). Even if appellant's "issues presented for review" were treated as assignments of error, appellant showed no reversible error. Trial court's determinations that appellee was damaged as a result of appellant's breach of noncompetition agreement and that evidence of appellant's profits from performing prohibited side work was, under the particular facts and circumstances at issue, a reasonable measure of appellee's lost profits resulting from appellant's breach of the noncompetition agreement were supported by competent, credible evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant's brief does not comport with App.R.16(A)(7) no transcript filed, presume regularity. The appellant did not participate in proceedings, yet challenged violations of due process and fair trial without any legal authority failure to prosecute dismissal of motions, affirmed.

Termination of parental rights permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence manifest weight of the evidence child abandoned R.C. 2151.011. The juvenile court's finding that appellant had abandoned her child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights and awarding permanent custody to the agency.

Writ of procedendo summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) mootness ruling on motions R.C. 2969.25 affidavit of prior civil actions affidavit of indigency affidavit of statement of inmate account. A request for writ of procedendo to compel rulings on motions that were filed mostly in 2014 through 2016 was denied as moot where the respondent issued rulings on the motions during the pendency of the action. The request was also denied because the complaint was procedurally defective for failure to include affidavits required by R.C. 2969.25.

Habeas corpus, excessive bail, felonious assault, self-defense, and abuse of discretion. The court held that a $100,000 bond was excessive for a charge of felonious assault given the petitioner's ties to the community, work history, lack of a criminal record, his lack of financial resources, and possibility of self-defense. The court set bail at $15,000.

Jury composition manifest weight/sufficiency

Manifest weight and sufficiency, violation of CPO

manifest weight of the evidence, R.C. 959.131(D)(2), necessary sustenance, underweight, diagnostic testing

Criminal Revocation of Community Control Consecutive Sentences Appellate Counsel's Access to Presentence Investigation Report Because the trial court made the required findings to impose consecutive sentences and properly incorporated them into the sentencing entry at the time it revoked community control, and because those findings were supported by the record, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences although appellate counsel is entitled to access the presentence investigation report for purposes of appeal, counsel is not entitled to a copy of the report and thus, Gallia County's policy of only permitting in-person review of the report was not unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to law.

POLITICAL SUBDIVSION IMMUMITY - APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL - DEFAMATION – POLITCAL SUBDIVISION EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY: The trial court erred by denying defendant political subdivision's motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was immune from liability where there remained no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not an employee of defendant but an independent contractor: the plaintiff worked for a separate agency, received his paychecks from that agency, received no payments from defendant, was not required to sign off on defendant's policies but had to follow his agency's policies, and defendant did not have authority over the agency's employees. Where the trial court denies a motion in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and is a final order under R.C. 2744.02(C) and, because a determination of immunity can be made prior to investing time, effort, and expense of courts, attorneys, parties, and witnesses, where only issues of law exist as to the issue of immunity, an appellate court may decide the appeal based on those issues of law. Defendant, a political subdivision that provided services to developmentally-disabled individuals, was engaging in a governmental function and was entitled to the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A) and because plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that one of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) applied, defendant is immune from liability. While the tort of defamation may be either negligent or intentional, plaintiff alleged only intentional conduct, and political subdivisions are immune from intentional torts. The trial court erred in failing to find that the employees of the political subdivision were immune from liability where plaintiff failed to show that the employees' actions or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of their employment or that their acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

CONTRACTS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – FRAUD – BREACH – EVIDENCE: The trial court did not err in failing to convert defendants' fraud counterclaim into an affirmative defense where there is no evidence indicating that defendants mistakenly designated fraud as a counterclaim. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where defendants did not clearly explain the nature of the breach that they allege excuses their performance. The trial court did not err by excluding evidence where there is no indication in the record that the trial court did not consider all evidence summited on summary judgment. The trial court did not err in failing to award damages for credit card debt where the amount owed was omitted from the summary judgment motion and was not included in overall computation of damages requested. [But see DISSENT: The trial court's order granting summary judgment was not a final, appealable order where an inextricably, intertwined issue remains outstanding and the interest of sound judicial administration is not served by permitting a piecemeal appeal.]

On application for reinstatement.

On certification of default.

On certification of default.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

MANIFEST WEIGHT — IDENTIFICATION — REVERSAL: Convictions for offenses involving a shooting death captured on home video surveillance footage are against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant's identity as the shooter was established by one witness's opinion that the perpetrator depicted in the surveillance video was defendant and the state's theory that defendant mistook victim for another person. Witness testified to identifying defendant as the shooter in the seconds' long, low quality, black-and-white surveillance footage based on his gait and clothing. On review, surveillance footage did not contain sufficient detail for jury to find this identification credible where shooter's clothing unremarkable, defendant's gait not described as unique such that it could reasonably suffice as a credible identifying factor, witness never described seeing defendant walk for an appreciable distance, no physical evidence connected defendant to the crime scene, no eyewitnesses to the shooting testified at trial, no compelling motive evidence was presented, and the jury was not provided with adequate evidence to compare, for themselves, defendant's gait to that of the shooter. Additionally, the state's theory that defendant shot the victim because he was related to and looked like someone else was not reasonably supported by credible evidence. Moreover, the state's claim that the other person was connected to the crime scene was not borne out by the record and relied on the improper stacking of inferences. Defendant's convictions for offenses stemming from an entirely separate incident, however, are not against the manifest weight of the evidence where victim positively identified defendant in a photo array and in-court as the person who shot him and his brother. Judgment reversed, in part, and cause remanded.

Claimant was not entitled to mandamus when he voluntarily dismissed his right to participate action in a common pleas court but did not refile the action, and failed to invoke the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction within five years from the date of the last payment of medical benefits or compensation. Writ of mandamus denied.

The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against appellant on his claim that Greenville Township Board of Zoning Appeals members violated Ohio's Open Meetings Act by privately discussing his appeal immediately before conducting a hearing. Any pre-hearing discussion constituted deliberation in a quasi-judicial proceeding to which the legislation did not apply. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider whether R.C. 2901.12(H)(3) permitted the State to pursue charges in Champaign County based on an alleged course of criminal conduct involving some offenses that arose in Champaign County and another offense that did not occur in Champaign County. Nevertheless, our decision has no impact on the defendant's final judgment of acquittal, as he cannot be placed twice in jeopardy.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a competency evaluation. In addition, the indefinite prison term imposed by the trial court for appellant's second-degree felony aggravated possession of drugs offense is not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion to proceed under a pseudonym where the court weighed the relevant factors and concluded that appellant had failed to show that her privacy interest substantially outweighed the presumption of open judicial proceedings. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—Petitioner who requested to inspect records maintained by Department of Job and Family Services and who received responsive records from department in electronic-file format has not shown by clear and convincing evidence a right to inspect requested records "in their native electronic format"—An office is responsible for producing only public records over which it has custody and control—Mandamus relief will not be granted when such relief has not been requested in writ petition—Writ denied.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Former R.C. 309.16—Vagueness—Mootness—Limited writ granted.

Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms, finding settlement agreement placed on record in open court was consent decree, and wife failed to challenge that agreement in trial court by filing timely objections, waiving challenge on appeal.

Felonious assault manifest weight ineffective assistance of counsel)

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to review the trial court's findings and weighing of factors under R.C. 2929.12. Appeal that asks this court to reconsider the sentence in light of those factors may be summarily denied.

Judge Duhart. Permanent custody. Termination of parental rights. Drug abuse by mother and father. On-going relationship and contact between mother and father. Dishonesty. Housing issues. Father failed to rectify the conditions which caused his parental rights to previously be involuntary terminated. Best interests.

Zmuda. Dismissal proper where plaintiff sued a party that was not sui juris and then failed to amend its complaint to name a proper party within the one-year commencement period as required by Civ.R. 3(A).

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, finds that appellant waived challenge to return of allegedly improperly seized evidence due to guilty plea.

Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms the conviction for numerous drug offenses no error in denial of motion to compel the CI to testify in the state's case, failure to qualify expert resulted in no prejudice, and no error in imposition of consecutive sentences.

domestic violence, objections, plain error, ineffective assistance, other acts

subject matter jurisdiction of juvenile court, grandparent visitation as ancillary to unmarried parents' custody case

res judicata – Civ.R. 60(B) – substitute for appeal – courts costs – attorney fees

Pro se defendant appeals entries denying various post-conviction motions. Defendant's assignments of error concerned earlier, un-appealed decision and exceeded the scope of the appeal. Case dismissed. State's request to designate defendant a vexatious litigator denied. Defendant's appeal was frivolous but defendant had not "habitually" filed frivolous appeals.

The domestic relations court did not err by denying appellant's motion for attorney fees, or by finding appellant was voluntarily unemployed and imputing income to appellant for child support determination purposes, where no abuse of discretion occurred given the record before the court supported the domestic relations court's decisions.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the husband's Civ.R. 60(B) motion without a hearing. Husband failed to include sufficient support for his claim of lack of capacity to enter into a separation agreement, and the record demonstrated that he had read and understood the agreement. Without sufficient support to show otherwise, the motion amounted to nothing more than an attempted and impermissible modification of the separation agreement without the consent of his ex-wife.

Appellant waived his challenge to the trial court's decision denying his motion to continue his trial date upon appellant entering a guilty plea to one count of first-degree misdemeanor theft.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction Where record was unclear as to when commission received notice of appeal, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not appropriate.

Speedy Trial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Guilty Plea. The entry of a guilty plea generally waives the right to challenge a conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds on appeal. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) does not require a trial court to expressly inform the defendant that a guilty plea waives the constitutional right to a speedy trial.

R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) Notice at sentencing of reserved prison terms Resentencing. The trial court erred in sua sponte resentencing the defendant in an attempt to correct an oversight that occurred at the original sentencing hearing.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Merger Revival of Guilty Verdict. Evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound when there was no evidence that the defendant intended to sell the drugs or knew they were transported for the purpose of sale. Since the trafficking charge was the selected verdict when the possession verdict was merged for the purpose of sentencing, it fails. This failure on appeal revives the possession verdict, which is supported by the evidence. The matter is remanded for the purpose of sentencing on the possession guilty verdict.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Possession of a Deadly Weapon while Detained at a Correctional Facility. The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was in possession of an item capable of inflicting death while incarcerated in a prison.

Criminal law—Postconviction relief—R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23—Recantation evidence—Trial court could have no jurisdiction to entertain untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief unless petitioner established (1) that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering that victim had doubts about victim's trial testimony and (2) that he would not have been convicted but for constitutional error at trial—R.C. 2953.23 requires a petitioner to submit evidence of specific facts beyond supporting affidavit's date to explain why petitioner was unable to timely obtain an affidavit from recanting witness—A conviction based on false testimony is not a constitutional violation unless the state had knowledge of testimony's falsity—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Rape - GSI - Consecutive Sentencing

Judgment reversed. The trial court properly ruled that appellant's failure to refile the complaint in his worker's compensation appeal under R.C. 4123.512 within a year from its dismissal, as allowed by the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), barred him from demonstrating his right to participate in the workers' compensation fund, and the employer was therefore entitled to judgment. However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the commission to vacate its orders, charge payments to the Surplus Fund, or determine the existence or non-existence of the employer's liability, as the scope of review under R.C. 4123.512(D) is limited to determining only "the right of the claimant to participate or to continue to participate in the fund upon the evidence adduced at the hearing of the action."

Relator, a bargaining unit employee, has standing under R.C. 4117.11 to pursue an unfair labor practice charge against respondent/employer alleging that the employer interfered with relator's right to arbitrate his grievance by unilaterally determining that the notice of intent to arbitrate was untimely submitted by respondent/union. SERB abused its discretion when it concluded probable cause did not exist to believe respondent/employer committed the ULP because the timeliness of a notice is a question of arbitrability that should have been submitted to the arbitrator in the first instance. SERB abused its discretion by dismissing one of relator's ULP charges against respondent/union without providing any explanation or reasoning for the decision. SERB abused its discretion in dismissing relator's ULP charge against respondent/union alleging unfair representation where the evidence showed that the union knew relator wished to arbitrate the grievance but failed to timely notify respondent/employer, as required by the CBA, based on erroneous instructions from relator's private counsel. Objections overruled, relator's motion for summary judgment granted, and writ of mandamus issued.

Relator's objection to a magistrate's decision, which recommended that this court dismiss relator's action for a writ of mandamus, is sustained. Relator sought a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, to provide him with a copy of a Risk Assessment Report and other nonconfidential documents regarding relator, an inmate. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), but respondent improperly relied on evidence beyond the face of relator's complaint and of which this court may not take judicial notice. Because respondent's motion to dismiss was based on evidence outside of relator's complaint, dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is improper, and the matter is remanded to the magistrate with instructions to issue an order converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and to issue a new decision addressing the motion under the standards set out in Civ.R. 56. Relator's remaining objections were moot.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing remand from Supreme Court of Ohio State v. Gwynne standard of review consecutive sentencing entry R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) reconsideration granted former opinion vacated same legal standard that was in place prior to December 2022.

CIVIL LAW - homeowner association assessment fees property lien small claims court the purpose of small claims court collateral estoppel res judicata.

CRIMINAL LAW - consecutive sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G) R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) R.C. 2929.14 R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 appellate courts give deference to the trial court, and the sentence must be clearly and convincingly not supported by the record or otherwise contrary to law before a reviewing court can modify the sentence.

JUVENILE LAW - grant of legal custody abuse of discretion standard of review best interests of the child.

CIVIL - R.C. 121.22 Open Meetings Act summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) leave to file motion for summary judgment Civ.R. 56(B) attachments to pleadings Civ.R. 56(E) meeting defined as any prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its members impromptu discussions observation space executive session deliberations formal action.

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights permanent custody natural mother magistrate's decision failure to object ineffective assistance of counsel Juv.R. 40(D) R.C. 2151.414 guardian ad litem for parent appearing to be mentally incompetent R.C. 2151.281 plain error ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.

methamphetamine – criminal trespassing – railroad tracks – suppression ruling – reasonable suspicion – probable cause – search incident to arrest – res judicata

magistrate decision, Civ.R. 53, untimely objections

motion to suppress, probable cause to search, automobile exception to the warrant requirement, Reagan Tokes.

Gross sexual imposition rape mental health records amendment to indictment Crim.R. 29 manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel leading questions sexually violent predator specifications postrelease control. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to compel the victim's privileged mental health records. The state did not have the records in its possession, the treatment was sought because of the victim's suicidal ideation and not because of the sexual assaults, and the defendant failed to make a showing that they contained any material or exculpatory evidence. The evidence was sufficient to support the gross sexual imposition and rape convictions. Further, the weight of the evidence supported the convictions. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the state's use of leading questions with the child victims. It is well established that trial courts have discretion in allowing leading questions with children who are victims of sexual offenses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to amend the indictment. The amendments did not change the name or the identity of the offenses. The defendant's failure to object to the trial court's judgment on the sexually violent predator specifications constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. Nonetheless, the specifications were supported by sufficient evidence as based on the trial testimony.

Quadruple homicide sufficient evidence arson gunshot Evid.R. 404(B) domestic abuse text messages autopsy photographs DNA blood Evid.R. 703 shoes Evid.R. 701 gasoline Reagan Tokes. - Defendant's convictions upheld where state presented sufficient evidence by means of DNA and cell phone evidence, that the defendant shot and killed his ex-fiancé, the mother of his child, and an innocent-bystander neighbor, and then set fire to the home killing his child and another child. Evid.R. 404(B) other acts of prior domestic abuse was properly admitted to show a strained relationship between the defendant and his ex-fiancé, and to prove identity of the killer. No abuse of discretion in admitting select autopsy photographs of each victim because they permitted the jury to understand the state's theory of the case. Trial court properly permitted DNA expert to opine based on the DNA mixtures and percentages, that defendant wore the jeans that contained the female victim's blood. Opinion testimony from the officers that the shoes worn by the person of interest in home-surveillance videos looked like the shoes recovered from defendant's home was admissible. The shoes contained both gasoline, the accelerant used to set the fire, and the female victim's blood.

Motion for summary judgment legal malpractice expert testimony disgorgement. Due to the complexities of the claims, allegations, and legal issues raised in the plaintiff-appellant's legal-malpractice case, the plaintiff-appellant was required to produce expert testimony to establish that its attorneys breached the requisite standard of care. The plaintiff-appellant's allegations of malpractice against its attorneys contemplate the communications, strategies, and tactical decisions involved in resisting a change in control and structuring, drafting, and negotiating contracts and compensation agreements for various bank executives. The evaluation of such matters, especially in the context of the banking and regulatory industry, is not within the general experience or knowledge of a layperson. Because the plaintiff-appellant failed to present expert testimony, the trial court properly found that no genuine issues of material fact remained and granted summary judgment in favor of its attorneys. Summary judgment was also proper as to the plaintiff-appellant's disgorgement claim since disgorgement is a remedy for a claim and not a claim for relief under Ohio law.

R.C. 5101.35 administrative appeal due deference Medicaid benefits Ohio Adm.Code 5160:1-3-05.1 resource limit countable resources life insurance policy Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6-2-03, notice statutory interpretation reasonable efforts exclusion. In an administrative appeal, the trial court erred in finding that ODJFS's decision to deny Medicaid benefits to appellant was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Courts are not required to give "due deference" to administrative agencies. An agency interpretation is simply one consideration a court may sometimes take into account in rendering the court's own independent judgment as to what the law is. Appellant received defective notice of the denial of her claim for Medicaid benefits because the notice did not properly notify her of the reason she was denied. The notice did not give appellant any indication which of her resources put her over the resource limit and cited an existing administrative code section that did not exist at the time appellant filed for benefits. The reasonable-efforts exclusion in former Ohio Adm.Code 5160:1-3-05.1(C)(6) does not cover personal property and does not apply in this case. Appellant did not have the ability to access the cash surrender value of her life insurance policies because she had executed an irrevocable assignment of the policies to a funeral home. Under Ohio Medicare law, an irrevocable assignment of a life insurance policy means that the policy is excluded as a countable resource. Therefore, the life insurance policies were not countable resources and appellant was under the resource limit.

Aggravated vehicular homicide R.C. 2903.06(a)(2) recklessness R.C. 2901.22(c) jury instructions abuse of discretion sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant drove dump truck from work site toward highway with a raised bed and hit overhead support and sign. Sign and its support then hit pick-up truck travelling on highway, killing the driver. Defendant was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2) for driving recklessly and causing the death of another. Trial court instructed jury in conformity with Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.17 (2023) and R.C. 2901.22 and declined to give further instruction on negligence and recklessness as requested by defendant. Because the instructions given were a correct statement of the law and were not incomplete, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain conviction and not against the manifest weight where the state presented evidence that defendant was aware of the risk of driving the dump truck with the bed raised, the dump truck and its warning lights regarding the raised bed were fully functional, and defendant was running late, did not use a spotter, and had headphones on when he was driving towards the highway.

Final appealable order disposition R.C. 2505.02. A juvenile court must provide a disposition for each offense for which a child is adjudicated delinquent. The juvenile court was required to issue a disposition for all counts, even a misdemeanor count to create a final order that disposes of the matter and renders the findings appealable. Having failed to render a disposition as to Count 8, the appeal must be dismissed.

PARENTAGE — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL — DUE PROCESS — EQUAL PROTECTION — R.C. 3111.95(A) — MARRIAGE: The trial court erred in failing to consider whether the parties would have been married at the time of the child(ren)'s conception—absent Ohio's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage— before finding that the same-sex consenting partner of a woman subject to nonspousal artificial insemination could not be recognized as a legal parent of the child(ren) under Ohio law.

SANCTIONS — FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT — R.C. 2323.51 — CIV.R. 11 — CIV.R. 10(D)(2) — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT: Where appellant attorney filed several medical-malpractice complaints without the affidavits of merit or motions to extend required by Civ.R. 10(D)(2) and then voluntarily dismissed the actions under Civ.R. 41, the trial court erred in awarding sanctions against appellant attorney when there was no evidence that the underlying claims lacked merit and it cannot be said that no reasonable attorney would engage in the strategy employed by counsel based on existing law. [But see DISSENT: The trial court did not err in awarding sanctions where the attorney willfully violated the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.]

Judgment affirmed. The evidence was not legally insufficient to support appellant's convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated murder, and tampering with evidence, nor were they against the manifest weight of the evidence. Any privilege appellant enjoyed to remain on the property terminated when he shot the victim, extensive ballistic and forensic evidence linked appellant to the murder weapon, which he sold days after the murder, and appellant confessed to the crime in a letter written and given to prison officials. The trial court did not err when imposing the firearm specification because it was mandatory under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a), and was not at the trial court's discretion under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) as appellant argues.

Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision. We therefore grant respondent's motion and dismiss relator's complaint for a writ of procedendo.

On appeal of common pleas court decision affirming order of State Medical Board of Ohio permanently denying application to reinstate license. The common pleas court correctly held that the board's order denying petition based on reciprocity for out of state suspension was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and was in accordance with law. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's motion to supplement the record with extrinsic evidence, as that evidence was only relevant to challenge the basis of petitioner's out-of-state suspension, and petitioner's right to due process was not violated as he received fair notice of the precise nature of the charges against him and the hearing on those charges. Assignments of error overruled and judgment affirmed.

The trial court's designation of appellee as the sole legal custodian and residential parent of the minor children was not an abuse of discretion. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to deviate from the amount of child support provided in the guidelines. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in failing to make required findings during sentencing hearing however, matter remanded to trial court for limited purpose of issuing nunc pro tunc entry incorporating the required findings in its sentencing entry.

Respondent's motion to dismiss granted action dismissed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. The law enforcement officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was under the influence and, as he got out of his vehicle, an officer observed drugs in plain view inside the vehicle. At that point, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle. Judgment affirmed.

Conceded error. The trial court did not properly advise appellant pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act and did not properly advise him about post-release control after finding him guilty of felonious assault. The State concedes the error. The judgment entry also erroneously states that appellant pled guilty instead of no contest. Judgment reversed in part and remanded for resentencing and correction of the judgment entry as to the nature of the plea. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.

Appellant's notice of appeal was timely despite being filed over 90 days after the date of the final judgment, because the clerk of court failed to serve appellant's attorney with a copy of the judgment. Appellant was not permitted to file objections to the trial court's judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 53, because the trial was conducted by an acting judge rather than a magistrate. The trial court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for attempted trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present was based on sufficient evidence the evidence established that appellant acted knowingly and used stealth and force. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel from asking certain proffered questions of a responding sheriff's deputy the questions were not relevant, asked for hearsay, and were not based on a proper foundation. The trial court did not err in failing to provide a jury instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment where there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellants had made full payment for cattle purchased pursuant to an oral contract. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant, as an estate administrator, filed wrongful death, survivorship, and related causes of action against two police officers who, in response to a domestic violence dispatch, did not arrest or otherwise take charge of the abuser a short time after the officers left the home, the abuser fatally shot the domestic violence complainant and her daughter. The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant's petition for discovery was properly dismissed because the information sought was not available under either R.C. 2317.48 or Civ.R. 34(D). Appellant's common law wrongful death and survivorship claims were properly dismissed because, under the facts set forth in the amended complaint, the appellee-officers did not have a special relationship with the decedents or any statutory mandate to arrest or otherwise take charge of the person who murdered them as such, as a matter of law, appellant could not establish the duty element of the wrongful death and survivorship claims. The amended complaint also asserted a cause of action under R.C. 2307.60, which allows a crime victim to pursue a cause of action against the perpetrator for the damages caused by the crime, alleging that the police officers were guilty of criminal conduct - dereliction of duty - under R.C. 2921.44(E). The trial court correctly dismissed this claim because R.C. 2921.44(E) requires the duty to act, and appellant did not articulate an express duty imposed upon the officers to arrest or otherwise take charge of the individual who murdered the decedents. Appellant's argument that the officers had a duty under R.C. 2921.44(A) is waived because she did not raise it in the trial court. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, because that complaint did not add any causes of action that were not included in the first amended complaint. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—Inmate's complaint challenging conviction does not state a claim upon which mandamus relief may be granted—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Requested records are security records exempt from disclosure when public office presents evidence showing that information in requested records is directly used for protecting and maintaining public office's safety—Security records exempt from disclosure are not public records and therefore are not subject to redacted release—Writ denied.

Per Mayle, J., challenging trial court's consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 is precluded by State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649. Imposing different restitution amounts at sentencing hearing and in sentencing entry was harmless amount was agreed to in plea agreement and acknowledged in intervention in lieu of conviction plan, and appellant did not show other evidence of prejudice. Trial court was not required to consider appellant's ability to pay agreed restitution.

Per Mayle, J., evidence of complicity/constructive possession supported convictions. Speedy trial right not violated where delays were chargeable to defendant and triple-count provisions did not apply. Trial counsel not ineffective for not cross-examining witness more thoroughly. Consciousness of guilt instruction warranted where defendant found in Arizona two years after bench warrant issued. Remand needed for consecutive sentences findings.

Sulek, J. The indictment properly notified appellant of the charges against her. Appellant's convictions for felonious assault were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence. Postrelease control was not properly imposed. Crim.R. 7 intent physical harm dangerous weapon or ordnance.

Sulek, J. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a prison sentence following appellant's admission to a community control violation.

The domestic relations court did not err by denying appellant's motion for a new trial in a highly contentious divorce case where appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(1), (A)(2), (A)(8), or Civ.R. 59(A)'s unnumbered catch-all provision, which provides that "a new trial may also be granted in the sound discretion of the court for good cause shown."

Defendant evaded arrest after police chase. Responding officer did not see the defendant's face. Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity and convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Police located the defendant's credit card and a cell phone connected to the defendant in the vehicle. Circumstantial evidence established the defendant's identity.

The trial court did not err by accepting appellant's guilty pleas to three felony offenses where the trial court complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C) and appellant stated that he understood the effect of entering a guilty plea has on a defendant as provided for by Crim.R. 11(B)(1).

Trial court's decision to award permanent custody of child to children services agency was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where older siblings had been removed from the home because of domestic violence, child was born prematurely and with special needs, and mother failed to remedy the problems that led to the child's removal.

Appellant's appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Absent a remand from a higher court, a trial court is without jurisdiction to decide a post-guilty plea motion after the appellate court has affirmed the appellant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94 (1978). WITH: Dissenting Opinion.

Trial court erred in disqualifying plaintiffs' attorney as a necessary witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

appellate review of aggravated murder sentence, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3).

theft, sufficiency of evidence, manifest weight

qualified domestic relations order, QDRO, divorce decree, contributory, noncontributory, retirement, pension, modification

identifying statements, hearsay, Evid.R. 803(2), excited utterance, ineffective assistance, Evid.R. 404(B), other-acts evidence, cumulative-error doctrine, Reagan Tokes Law, court costs, R.C. 2947.23(C).

Mootness of Appeal. This appeal is moot because defendant-appellant does not challenge the underlying convictions, but instead only challenges the sentence he has already completed.

Oil and gas—Regulatory takings—Court of appeals did not comply with remand order to weigh parties' evidence in deciding whether state's suspension of operations at private company's saltwater-injection well constituted a total or partial government taking of property—Court of appeals violated law-of-the-case doctrine by deciding that a private company lacks a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate saltwater-injection well—Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Prohibition—Inmate's complaint fails to contain a short and plain statement of a claim showing that he is entitled to writ—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Termination of shared parenting plan hearsay

Ohio consumer sales practice act

Child custody relocation out-of-state

resentencing hearing res judicata

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Possession of Drugs confrontation clause Officer's testimony about unavailable declarant's testimonial statement was proper because it was used to explain the officer's subsequent investigative activities jail phone call authentication Evid.R. 901 Crim.R. 52(B) plain error "auditory testimonial theory:" sponsoring witnesses heard audio recording at the time it was made "silent witness theory:" sponsoring witness testifies as to the reliability of the process or system that produced the evidence manifest weight of the evidence.

CRIMINAL - Sentencing motion to correct judgment Crim.R. 36 nunc pro tunc R.C. 2941.25 merger trial court's judgment entry of sentence was irregular and plainly erroneous Crim.R. 52(B) plain error defects in sentencing entry are voidable, not void appellant failed to challenge his sentencing on prior direct appeal res judicata.

CRIMINAL - Jail-time credit R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) R.C. 2967.191(A) a defendant held on bond is not entitled to jail-time credit for presentence detention if he is serving a sentence on an unrelated case R.C. 2967.191 requires application of all due jail-time credit and a stated prison sentence must be shortened by the amount of time spent in jail.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Postconviction civil in nature App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal.

APPLELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeals App.R. 5(A) provides a remedy for filing an untimely criminal appeal.

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus adequate remedy in the course of law

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus affidavit of prior civil actions R.C. 2969.25(A)

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

Appeal dismissed. See Judgment Entry.

Mandamus—Petition failed to state a mandamus claim because appellant had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law and failed to show that trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) by notarizing affidavit under false jurat that stated affidavit was sworn to and subscribed in attorney's presence when it was not—Public reprimand.

The magistrate's decision contained no error of law or other defect on its face. Therefore, we adopt as our own the magistrate's decision finding that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that relator was not entitled to TTD compensation. Accordingly, relator's request for a writ of mandamus is denied.

Juvenile court did not plainly err in admitting into evidence the guardian ad litem's report and relying on that report in determining that granting permanent custody of minor child to public children services agency was in the minor child's best interest

The trial court did not err in its determination that appellant's other claims were subsumed within the legal malpractice cause of action as they arose from appellee's legal representation in the course of the attorney-client relationship. The trial court did not err by dismissing appellant's legal malpractice claim as both the date of termination and the cognizable event occurred more than one year from the date the complaint was filed. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion of ODRC to dismiss after finding that it lacked subject jurisdiction over appellants' claim for tampering with evidence, and further finding appellants' claim regarding ODRC's failure to investigate was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2743.16(A). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting the motion of OAPA to dismiss after finding that appellants' complaint failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted because OAPA is entitled to immunity from those claims pursuant to the public duty rule, codified at R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a). Judgment affirmed.

Untimely appeal nothing to do with the underlying complaints.

POSTCONVICTION — COUNSEL — JUVENILE OFFENDER — SENTENCING: The common pleas court abused its discretion by dismissing six timely-filed postconviction claims without first holding an evidentiary hearing: petitioner demonstrated substantive grounds for relief entitling him to a hearing where petitioner presented evidence outside the record raising an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging the eyewitness and informant testimony at trial and in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence at sentencing.

SENTENCING – NUNC PRO TUNC: Sentences that were not reversed in defendant's previous appeal were not subject to review by the trial court on remand. The cause must be remanded for the trial court to correct defendant's sentence with a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect the sentence actually announced by the court.

CHILDREN – PERMANENT CUSTODY – NOTICE – WAIVER – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – R.C. 2151.414 – BEST INTEREST: Where father had constructive notice of the magistrate's decision, failed to file objections, and waived any issue regarding notice, a remand was not warranted. Where the magistrate only considered facts in evidence in reaching her permanent custody decision, there was no procedural error. Where the juvenile court properly balanced the best-interest factors, the juvenile court's permanent custody decision was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 3107.07 – consent to adoption – due process – manifest weight of the evidence – reviewing court – determination in the first instance

permanent custody, best interest

Voluntary intoxication, rape, sufficiency of the evidence

Sentencing - Disproportionate Sentence - R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12 Prosecutor's Sentencing Recommendation - Consideration of Dismissed Counts of Indictment

Court speaks only through its journal Knapp v. Edwards Lab - No transcript presume regularity in the trial court

Writ of Habeas Corpus

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, res judicata, prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective on appeal. The issues raised in support of the application for reopening, with the exception of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, are barred from further review by the doctrine of res judicata. In addition, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel on appeal. Application for reopening is denied.

California marriage laws Ohio marriage laws complaint for annulment ex parte petition delayed marriage certificate California residency consent nullity of marriage void ab initio vexatious litigator service of process. Judgment affirmed. An ex parte petition establishing the fact of marriage in California is not proof of a valid marriage when it was obtained without the consent of both parties. The nonconsenting party is entitled to an annulment, and the marriage is void ab initio.

Final appealable order motion to intervene preliminary injunction receivership. Trial court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene was not a final appealable order where appellant had filed a separate civil case raising the same issues raised in its intervenor complaint. Additionally, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for preliminary junction was also not final and appealable. At the time the trial court denied the motion, appellant was not a party to the case and did not have standing to appeal. Finally, the trial court's order requiring appellant to pay rent to the court was an order intended to maintain the receivership property and was likewise not final and appealable.

Felony sentencing impartiality of trial court Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court considered the appropriate statutory factors when sentencing the defendant to an aggregate prison term of five-to-six years. Despite the trial court's harsh comments, the defendant's right to a fair proceeding was not prejudiced because his prison sentence, after pleading guilty to several felonies, is not contrary to law. The Reagan Tokes Law is not facially unconstitutional.

Spousal support R.C. 3105.18 equity. Reversed and remanded. The spousal support award does not contain sufficient details to conclude that the support award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law, and accordingly, the award cannot be affirmed in this appeal.

Motion for continuance abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Chaney's motion for continuance. Chaney had ample time to retain new counsel, assess the plea agreement, strategize, and obtain potential mitigation evidence before and after his plea hearing. A continuance would have inconvenienced the defendants, victims, family members, and counsel, who were all present for the sentencing hearing, as well as the court, which was prepared to sentence Chaney and his codefendant. Moreover, the trial court had information regarding the mitigation evidence Chaney sought to obtain through his presentence-investigation report. Additional information would have little to no impact on Chaney's plea deal or sentence, which was within an agreed-upon sentencing range, in light of the seriousness of the crimes he committed. Finally, Chaney chose to be represented by two attorneys at his sentencing hearing and his right to be represented by counsel of his choice was not violated.

Robbery R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) manifest weight physical harm R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) bruise reasonable inference corroborate victim credible testimony. Affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellant's conviction for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The victim provided credible testimony that she sustained a bruise when the appellant pushed her onto a paved street when physically taking a cell phone from her. The victim was not required to seek medical treatment or present photographs to corroborate her testimony. All of the elements for the robbery offense were satisfied.

Gross sexual imposition sufficient indictment manifest weight evidence vacate credible allied offense merger plain error separate dissimilar harm. Defendant's convictions on two counts of gross sexual imposition were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the state failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that defendant committed a third act of gross sexual imposition. The trial court did not commit plain error by imposing separate sentences on the two counts of gross sexual imposition.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea abuse of discretion Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court's imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law is not a violation of appellant's constitutional rights.

Guilty plea strict compliance constitutional right restitution invited error allocution. The trial court strictly complied with its advisement to the defendant of his constitutional right of compulsory process when it asked if the defendant understood that he had the right to subpoena witnesses to testify in his favor at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion with its restitution order because the defendant invited any error there may have been with it by agreeing to it. Further, the victim provided a statement about her damages. Although the trial court did not allow the defendant to present a PowerPoint presentation, the defendant was afforded full and fair allocution. The defendant was permitted to speak at length to express his remorse, describe the state he was in at the time he committed the crimes, describe the network of support he has, and state his hope for his future.

Felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12 consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) failure to comply R.C. 2929.14(C)(3), 2921.331(B) and (D). The court properly considered the felony sentencing statutes, R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, when imposing defendant's prison sentence. The court properly imposed a consecutive sentence for failure to comply. However, the court failed to make the mandatory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences for the other felonies of which defendant was convicted.

Declaratory judgment adversarial action estate father natural son adoption birth certificate birth record declaration of paternity acknowledgment paternity R.C. 3705.09 R.C. 3705.09(G) R.C. 2105.06 out of wedlock illegitimate R.C. 3111.04 R.C. 3111.05 next of kin parent-child relationship parentage decedent. Affirmed probate court's decision against the appellant in a declaratory judgment action. An adversarial action was brought by the appellant, who was seeking to be declared a legal son of a decedent with a right to inherit from the decedent's estate. The appellant's birth record, which identified another man as his father, was established pursuant to R.C. 3705.09(G) upon a declaration of paternity, not by adoption. There is no legal basis for an amended birth certificate to effectuate an adoption. The declaration of paternity was legally determinative of the issues raised in the case.

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 12 of 22 consecutive months best interest clear and convincing evidence ineffective assistance of counsel. - Juvenile court's judgment awarding permanent custody of the minor child to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the child had been in agency custody for at least 12 of 22 consecutive months and the evidence clearly and convincingly established that a grant of permanent custody was in the child's best interest Mother failed to satisfy the two-prong test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice due to counsel's alleged deficiencies.

R.C. 2953.32 motion to seal records interpretation of statute. The trial court improperly denied offender's motion to seal his records without first setting and conducting a hearing on the motion as statutorily required under R.C. 2953.32.

Marsy's Law early termination community-control sanctions notice opportunity to be heard. Trial court abused its discretion and violated R.C. 2930.161(A) and 2930.161(B) when it terminated the defendant's community-control sanctions and failed to give the victim notice of the early termination and an opportunity to be heard.

Mandamus, pending motion, Civ.R. 58(B), moot. - The relator's complaint for mandamus is moot because the respondent - judge has fulfilled her duty, under Civ.R. 58(B), and ordered the clerk to serve notice of the subject judgment entry. An action for a writ of mandamus becomes moot when the requested relief is attained.

Mandamus procedendo failure to state a claim R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit of prior civil actions R.C. 2969.25(C) certified institutional cashier's statement moot. The relator has failed to state a claim for relief. In addition, the relator has failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25, which requires the inclusion of a sworn affidavit of prior civil actions and a certified copy of the institutional cashier's statement setting forth the balance in the inmate's account.

Magistrate's decision recommending denial of request for writ of mandamus, statutory damages, and court costs adopted. The magistrate did not err by determining that relator failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the purported records request was directed to the public office or person responsible for the records sought. Relator was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs because the purported records request was not directed to the public office or person responsible for the records sought.

The trial court did not err when awarding sanctions in favor of appellees under R.C. 2323.51. It was frivolous conduct to sue entities that had no connection to the plaintiffs and were not parties to the original agreement they entered into, to sue an entity that did not exist at the time of contracting, and to refuse to dismiss those entities as defendants. Nor did the trial court err when overruling appellant's motion for sanctions based on alleged frivolous conduct because the subjects of the motion were non-parties who did not engage in a conspiracy to avoid service, but actually provided appellant with an address for proper service. Because there were no reasonable grounds for the appeal, appellees' motion for sanctions under App.R. 23 is granted.

Appellant's motion seeking a final appealable order under Crim.R. 32(C) was incorrectly construed as an untimely motion for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 but was properly denied. After severance of the counts in the criminal indictment and their resolution in two separate judgments, appellant failed to appeal from the second judgment to raise the argument that all counts had to be resolved in a single final appealable order. The argument that he was entitled to a separate case number for the second set of counts does not demonstrate prejudice, and the trial court referenced all counts in both judgment entries. Judgment affirmed

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas erred in granting summary judgment in favor of respondent-appellee, the Registrar of the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, in realtor-appellant's action for a writ of mandamus ordering respondent-appellee to vacate his driver's license suspension pursuant to R.C. 4509.40, or alternatively for declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court erroneously concluded that a judgment that has gone dormant and cannot be revived is not "stayed" or "satisfied" for purposes of R.C. 4509.40. Based on its erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court concluded that relator-appellant did not have a clear legal right to relief in mandamus and was not entitled to declaratory relief. The trial court also erred by holding that relator-appellant had an adequate remedy at law. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Because appellant failed to support his arguments alleging errors occurring at his community control revocation proceedings with a transcript or alternative record under App.R. 9, this court must presume the validity of those proceedings and affirm.

LANDLORD-TENANT — RETALIATION CLAIM — R.C. 5321.02 — CIV.R. 12(B)(6): Because trial court did not fully consider the sufficiency of tenant's retaliation claim against landlord under R.C. 5321.02(A), the trial court erred in finding tenant failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted and dismissing the retaliation claim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Trial court did not err, however, in dismissing tenant's breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims against landlord. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

ATTORNEY FEES – PROF.COND.R. 1.5 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – DUE PROCESS – CONTINUANCE – CROSS-EXAMINATION – JURISDICTION – AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION – APP.R. 4(B)(2): Where a reviewing court is able to discern how the trial court arrived at an award of attorney fees and costs and to conduct a meaningful review of that award, the trial court does not err in failing to provide an explanation for the award. The trial court did not err in failing to separately discuss the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 where the record failed to establish that the factors were not included in the lodestar calculation. When awarding attorney fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying an increased hourly rate to historical work that was performed when a lower hourly rate was in effect where the motion for fees and costs had been pending for approximately nine years, an expert opined on the reasonableness of the increased rate, and no competing expert testimony was introduced. Where plaintiff failed in the obligation to parse defendant's billing records and identify instances of improper billing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the total amount of fees and costs requested. The trial court did not arbitrarily exclude plaintiff from a remand hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded where plaintiff had previously been granted two continuances over defendant's objection, the trial court offered to allow plaintiff to participate by Zoom and to consult with his counsel during the hearing, the fee motion had been pending for nine years, and plaintiff failed to establish how his representation was impeded by his nonappearance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for a continuance that was sought because plaintiff suffered from COVID where plaintiff had already obtained two continuances over defendant's objection, the motion that was the subject of the hearing for which a continuance was sought had been pending for nine years, and the trial court offered to allow plaintiff to participate by Zoom. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the plaintiff's due-process rights by limiting the cross-examination of defendant's counsel to one hour. Where the trial court issued an award of attorney fees and costs on the same date that the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted an affidavit of disqualification filed by plaintiff, and where the record does not establish whether the award was issued before the affidavit was accepted, the trial court did not issue the award of fees absent jurisdiction. Where appellant failed to file a suggestion in the court of appeals that it remand the matter to the trial court to resolve postjudgment motions that were filed after the notice of appeal was filed, as is required by App.R. 4(B)(2), the appellate court was not required to remand the matter and stay the appeal.

Civ.R. 60(B) — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment where the plaintiff failed to present any argument as to why she was entitled to relief under any specific provision of Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5) and failed to assert any rationale for her delay in filing the motion until well over a year after final judgment.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL — PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY: Where defendant's counsel failed to submit trial transcripts despite being ordered to show cause why transcripts were not ordered at the state's expense, the appellate court must presume the regularity of the trial proceedings and affirm the trial court's judgment.

VENUE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – RECKLESS – PROTECTION ORDER – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – KNOWINGLY: Defendant's conviction for violating a protection order must be reversed where the state failed to present evidence establishing venue beyond a reasonable doubt and that defendant acted recklessly. The sufficiency and weight of the evidence established that defendant knowingly caused physical harm to the victim of the domestic-violence offense.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — CIV.R. 34(D) — DISCOVERY : The trial court erred in granting respondent's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for discovery where the allegations in the petition—when taken as true—were sufficient to meet the requirements for Civ.R. 34(D).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — R.C. 2305.11(A) — DEFAMATION — FALSE LIGHT — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: Where plaintiff's claims of defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arose from the same allegedly tortious conduct that had occurred beyond the one-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.11(A), plaintiff's claims were time-barred, and the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

On application for reinstatement.

The trial court erred in concluding that appellant's jury demand was untimely, when it was filed on or before the third day following appellant's receipt of notice of the continued trial date, and in denying him a jury trial based on the untimeliness of the request. The Ohio Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over a party's request that a judge be removed from a case for bias, prejudice, or any other reason. As such, this court is without jurisdiction to rule upon appellant's assertion that the trial judge should have recused herself from the case. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err when it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellee met its burden under Civ.R. 56 to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact existed to warrant a trial. Appellant did not respond to the motion, and hence did not meet his burden. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by: (1) failing to award appellant a particular automobile (2) failing to find appellee in contempt and liable for financial misconduct in connection with damage to the marital residence (3) failing to let appellant question appellee about discrepancies in her income tax returns after she had asserted Fifth Amendment rights (4) awarding sole custody of the parties' children to appellee or (5) awarding appellee the tax exemptions for the parties' two minor children. The court did abuse its discretion by finding that appellee was not liable for one-half of a marital debt to the Internal Revenue Service. Contrary to the court's finding, an eviction judgment appellee paid was not a premarital debt and was instead owed by both parties. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the amounts each party will be credited against the IRS debt and the eviction judgment, with an order for reimbursement as needed.

The trial court did not err in excluding appellant from a child's witness competency hearing the witness was presumed to be competent, no request to be present was made by appellant, and appellant's counsel, who was present at the hearing, did not object to appellant's absence. Appellant's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are meritless and therefore, when considered together, do not demonstrate cumulative error. There was no error in sentencing appellant under the Reagan Tokes Act. Judgment affirmed

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee-mortgagee in a foreclosure action where mortgagee failed to establish that it had sent a notice of default to appellant-mortgagor. The record does not establish that the trial court erred by overruling mortgagor's motion to enforce a settlement agreement where mortgagor was unable to make the payment required by the settlement agreement, the trial court rescinded the settlement agreement, the trial court reactivated the case on the active trial docket, and the case was then voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41. The record does not establish that the mortgagee failed to file its foreclosure action within the applicable statute of limitations. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Imposition of sentence for violation of post-release control

Zmuda, writing for the majority affirmed judgment where juvenile court's findings were supported by the weight of the clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating permanent custody with the agency was in the best interests of the child.

Judge Duhart. Permanent custody. Mother deceased. Father has alcohol and anger issues and an extensive criminal record. Incarceration. Housing. Employment.

Sulek, J. In a child custody proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motions for a continuance and for change of venue. The trial court's decision terminating father's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court did not err in terminating mother's parental rights because its findings that the children services agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, the children could not be placed with mother in a reasonable time or should not be placed with mother, and mother demonstrated a lack of commitment to the children were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court errs where it determines that rent provision of lease could not be waived. Trial court's finding in favor of lessor on breach of contract claim is against the manifest weight of the evidence where lessor clearly and unequivocally waived the requirement of lessee to pay rent and where lessor breached the lease by attempting to lock lessee out of the premises.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant's request for a writ of prohibition, but the error was not prejudicial because appellant was not entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of law. Although the trial court erred by relying on res judicata to grant appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's mandamus claim, the error was not prejudicial because appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus as a matter of law.

Per Mayle, J., the parties' agreement relating to a rental property is ambiguous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the extrinsic evidence presented to the magistrate did not clarify the intent of the agreement or by construing the agreement against the landlord, who drafted it. The trial court was permitted to rely on the magistrate's credibility determinations to find that the tenant complied with the agreement's terms, as construed by the trial court.

Competing purchase agreements Civ. R. 60(B)

Anders brief/no non-frivolous issues found

Elections—Prohibition—R.C. 2961.02—Writ sought to compel board of elections to remove candidate for Ohio House of Representatives from primary-election ballot—A person is incompetent to hold a public office under R.C. 2961.02 if (1) person was convicted of a disqualifying offense, (2) public office "involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity," and (3) person's conviction has not been expunged, reversed, annulled, or pardoned—Office of state representative does not involve substantial management or control over property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity—Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law in keeping candidate for Ohio House of Representatives on primary-election ballot—Writ denied.

sexual abuse – rape – less than ten years of age – sufficiency – weight – other acts – delayed disclosure – siblings

The juvenile court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, by allowing the introduction of appellant's supposed confession into evidence where appellant was not subject to custodial interrogation, nor did the juvenile court err in the conditions it imposed upon appellant as part of his probation, given that appellant's adjudication as a delinquent child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant's sentence was contrary to law where the trial court failed to make each of the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing. WITH: Dissenting Opinion.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellants' claims alleging a breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing where appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this case arising out of the alleged interference with the appellants' inheritance.

Defendant appeals domestic violence conviction. Sufficient evidence presented that defendant and victim resided together. Court did not plainly err by failing to consider self-defense. No evidence presented that tended to support conclusion that defendant acted in self-defense.

Sufficiency Manifest Weight Verdict Forms Jury Instructions. Although the convictions were supported by the evidence, verdict forms did not comply with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) requiring reversal and a reduction to the lowest level of the offenses.

CRIMINAL - consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), appropriate findings, supported by record guilty plea, right to bench trial, no requirement to advise.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Petition for writ of mandamus requirement of R.C. 2969.25 to provide affidavit of inmate of prior actions is mandatory R.C. 2731.04.

manifest weight/sufficiency ineffective assistance of counsel jury instructions

EVIDENCE — SEARCH AND SEIZURE: The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm obtained via a Terry pat-down search did not constitute plain error where the defendant was suspected of drug activity, made movements and glances toward his vehicle, and was observed with a heavy bulge in his pocket. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

CIV.R. 15 – MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT – ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE – WAIVER: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint where the amendment was not timely and would have been futile. Where defendants informed plaintiff that they intended to waive the attorney-client privilege, despite asserting it in discovery, three months before the trial was scheduled and six months before the trial actually took place, defendants offered to reopen depositions at their expense, and plaintiff did not file a motion in limine regarding the waiver and admission of related evidence at trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling plaintiff's objection to defendants' waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

PROHIBITION — JUVENILE – SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION – R.C. 3127.15 — UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT: Mother's petition for a writ of prohibition is denied because the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the children: the children have no home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because the orders placing them with out-of-state relatives were dissolved and thus the relatives do not qualify as persons acting as parents under the Act, and the children and parents have a significant connection to Ohio.

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS – CIVIL CONSPIRACY – JUSTIFICATION: The trial court did not err when it granted defendant bank's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's tortious-interference claims because there was no genuine issue of material fact pertaining to the bank's claim of justification as a defense to those claims. The trial court did not err when it granted defendant bank's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's civil-conspiracy claim because there were no other torts upon which to base a claim of civil conspiracy.

Because the trial court, in granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss, failed to enter judgment on all of plaintiff's claims and did not certify that there was no just reason for delay, the judgment entry appealed from is not a final appealable order and this court is without jurisdiction to review it. Appeal Dismissed.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering charging order against membership interest of judgment debtors in limited liability company with payment of unpaid balance of previously issued judgment. Entry of a new advertising sign lease did not extinguish judgment debtors' obligation to compensate judgment creditor under previously issued judgment.

The trial court erred as the refiled complaint was timely filed under Ohio's savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A). The one-year period prescribed in R.C. 2305.19 concludes after counting the number of months, 12, from the commencing date, January 6, 2022, and ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month, i.e., January 6, 2023. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

Trial court did not err by denying homeowner's motion to enforce settlement agreement. Evidence indicated the parties had not reached an agreement on essential terms, a necessary party was not included in negotiations, and terms in the motion differed from the terms of the purported agreement. Judgment affirmed.

OVI – R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant's conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant's admission to consuming alcohol prior to driving and poor performance on standardized field sobriety tests—in conjunction with breathalyzer test registering a breath alcohol concentration level of 0.125 and trooper's testimony describing defendant's marked lanes violation, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and odor of alcohol—proved that defendant operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Furthermore, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting the breathalyzer test evidence is without merit because defendant failed to object to the admission of such evidence in the trial court and did not argue plain error on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Because defendant vacated the leased premises, the appeal of the judgment granting plaintiff restitution of the leased premises is moot.

Trial court abused its discretion when it quashed a subpoena issued to a child protective services agency seeking records pertaining to an incident of sexual abuse by a police officer employed by appellee/University. Appellant, who was later sexually abused as a minor by the same officer, established good cause to obtain the records in that the records likely contain facts relevant to her claim against the University for negligent retention and supervision. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct an in camera review of the records to determine if they are discoverable. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Relator filed no objections to the magistrate's decision concluding that some evidence in the record supported the decision of the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System to terminate relator's disability benefits. Because there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, it is adopted and the request for a writ of mandamus is denied.

Permanent custody trial court's judgment placing cihld in children services agency's permanent custody is not against the manifest weight of the evidence child had been in agency's temporary custody for nearly two years when agency filed permanent-custody motion and placing child in agency's permanent custody is in his best interest guardian ad litem's purported superintendence-rule violation is not reversible error trial court not required to appoint independent counsel for child when child did not consistently and repeatedly express a strong desire to live with his parents.

Judgment on the Pleadings, Civ.R. 12(C)

Civ.R. 53 – record – alternative technology

Judgment on the Pleadings, Civ.R. 12(c), legal malpractice, statute of limitations

involuntary manslaughter – juror misconduct – trial court record

R.C. 3107.07 – consent to adoption – more than de minimis contact – abuse of discretion – justifiable cause – manifest weight of the evidence

R.C. 3105.18, retirement age, change of circumstances, abuse of discretion, manifest weight, spousal support

ineffective assistance of counsel, request for substitute counsel, due process requirements for probation violation hearing, imposition of sentence, waiver, plain error.

settlement agreement – attorney fees – American Rule – bad faith – contract provision

Permanent Custody - Reasonable Efforts - Due Process

Divorce - Incarcerated Pro se Plaintiff - Dismissal of Complaint

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Father's appeal of permanent custody

Mandamus—Relator failed to comply with personal-knowledge requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2) in affidavit filed with petition—Cause dismissed.

Misdemeanor assault double jeopardy sufficiency of the evidence qualified immunity manifest weight of the evidence law enforcement reasonable force. Former police officer's conviction for misdemeanor assault affirmed, when he used unreasonable force in arresting the victim. Political subdivision immunity does not apply to criminal cases. A second trial for assault is not the same as being retried for unlawful restraint.

Murder attempted murder joinder bifurcation Confrontation Clause hearsay excited utterance Evid.R. 103(A) plain error authentication Evid.R. 404(B) opening the door impeachment weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence self-defense. Affirmed. There is no merit to appellant's eight assignments of error, in which the appellant claims that his convictions should be reversed because the trial court denied a motion to sever the trial proceedings the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses the state failed to authenticate a video played repeatedly for the jury during trial the trial court impermissibly permitted the state to introduce "other act" evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) his convictions are against the weight of the evidence or based on insufficient evidence the trial court failed to provide a jury instruction for a lesser-included offense and that the trial court failed to provide a curative instruction after a testifying police officer revealed that the appellant was in jail.

Stay due process abuse of discretion default judgment sanctions damages. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion for a stay in eviction proceedings against the defendants to wait for a ruling on defendants' Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment of the foreclosure proceedings the stay did not violate plaintiff's due process rights the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for default judgment where two of the defendants had answered and the other defendants had not been properly served the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions without a hearing because there was no arguable basis for an award of sanctions the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's damages claim because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendants caused any damage to the property.

Declaratory judgment undue influence will estate subject-matter jurisdiction R.C. 2107.11, domicile Civ.R. 60, motion for reconsideration expert witness trial exhibits closing arguments. The probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint for declaratory judgment when the overwhelming evidence was that the deceased was domiciled in Cuyahoga County. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting closing arguments or cross-examination of witnesses or in not reviewing with appellant each of the exhibits before they were entered into evidence.

Service Civ.R. 4.2 Civ.R. 4.1 authorized or statutory agent business address. Vacated and remanded. Service of the complaint upon an individual associated with a business entity that is sent to an authorized or statutory agent's address, who is registered as the agent for that business entity, does not comport with the civil rules for service of process when there is no evidence that the statutory agent's address is a regular place of business for the individual.

Summary judgment cross motions de novo review contract real estate transaction R.C. 5302.30 disclosure form good faith duty to disclose materially and adversely affect use of property caveat emptor "as is" clause.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) clear and convincing. Judgment affirmed. This court is unable to clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings where the record demonstrates that appellant engaged in a pattern of extreme, life-threatening violence against three different victims and had a criminal history of engaging in such conduct.

Contempt visitation interference prejudice right to appeal. Dismissed and remanded. Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice caused by the trial court's interlocutory denial of contempt proceedings, and therefore, the appellant does not have the right to appeal the decision.

Motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities motion to show case continuing jurisdiction Civ.R. 75(J) service on opposing party dismissal for want of prosecution dismissal without prejudice Civ.R. 41(B) Civ.R. 75(P) appellate jurisdiction Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio Constitution R.C. 2505.02(B) special proceeding affects a substantial right. Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Trial court's dismissal of appellant-father's motions to show cause and to modify parental rights and responsibilities for want of prosecution was without prejudice where dismissal was not based on the merits and father could refile his motions. Ruling did not affect a substantial right, under the specific facts of the case, where father did not claim that his motions could not be refiled for further consideration by the trial court if he were to properly invoke its continuing jurisdiction or that he would be prejudiced or that there were certain rights he would be relinquishing if he had to refile his motions.

Res judicata. Appellant's assignment of errors are barred by res judicata.

Ineffective assistance Motion to withdraw

Attempted murder felonious assault manifest weight

Guilty plea, Crim.R. 11

Without a transcript of the bench trial proceedings to assess Nationwide ATM's assignments of error, we conclude the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision finding in favor of appellee. Judgment affirmed.

SEX OFFENSES – SENTENCING – TIER CLASSIFICATION – NUNC PRO TUNC: Where, at defendant's first sentencing hearing, before entering his pleas, the trial court informed defendant that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender and notified him of his registrations duties, defendant indicated that he understood those duties, and defendant signed the notification-of-duties-to-register form and at a second sentencing hearing, the trial court declared that defendant was a Tier III offender after ensuring that defendant understood that he was still classified as a Tier III offender and there were no objections to this procedure and the tier classification was inadvertently omitted from the second sentencing entry, the cause must be remanded for the trial court to correct the sentencing entry by a nunc pro tunc order to include the Tier III classification.

Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to certify relator's name to primary-election ballot—Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions in invalidating relator's declaration of candidacy and petition—Relator did not correctly withdraw her candidacy under R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a)—Relator's attempt to file a second declaration of candidacy and petition was prohibited under R.C. 3501.38(I)(1)—Writ denied.

App.R. 25 motion to certify a conflict conflict must be on the same rule of law, not facts.

The trial court erred in granting appellees' Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings on all counts after consideration of res judicata and immunity, there remained one viable claim. However, because appellant did not respond to the motion for judgment on the pleadings and did not raise any issues for the trial court to consider, he waived any potential errors that could have been brought to the trial court's attention. We decline to find plain error on the trial court's part for dismissing the case for want of prosecution. Judgment affirmed. (Welbaum, J., dissenting.)

The trial court did not err by failing to suppress appellant's statements to detectives where appellant validly waived his Miranda rights and where appellant's statements were not the product of impermissible, coercive police conduct. In addition, the trial court properly admitted certain records from Google at trial as self-authenticating documents under Evid.R. 902(11). Because the Google records were not testimonial in nature, their admission did not violate appellant's right of confrontation. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court was not required to make consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when it revoked appellant's community control sanctions and imposed consecutive prison sentences. Appellant had previously agreed to consecutive sentences in the event of revocation and was bound by his agreement. Appellants' sentences, therefore, are not subject to review on appeal under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Judgments affirmed. (Epley, P.J., concurring in judgment only.)

Appellant's convictions for failure to stop after an accident and failure to maintain an assured clear distance ahead were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness identified appellant as the driver of the vehicle that crashed into the back of a stationary car on an exit ramp of an interstate and left the scene of the accident. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing appellant's case for lack of prosecution. The litigation's history indicates that appellant was dilatory in conducting discovery, failed to comply with court deadlines, and had received a number of continuances. Appellant's last-minute attempts to delay trial, including filing a frivolous appeal, also displayed disregard for the court system. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the trial date. Under established factors governing evaluation of continuances, no factors weighed in appellant's favor. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-car dealership's motion to set aside the default judgment on liability and to file its answer out of time. In calculating the amount of appellee-car buyer's damages, the trial court reasonably used a subsequent appraisal value, as offered by appellee, as the actual value at the time of the sale. However, the trial court erred in its calculation of actual damages by using the total cost of the vehicle, including finance charges and other costs, as the vehicle's represented value. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculation of actual and treble/punitive damages.

The trial court did not err in finding that the offense of attempted aggravated assault is an offense of violence, thus permitting the court to impose a prison sentence. The trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors in sentencing appellant to a prison term. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment entry granting a plaintiff's Civ.R. 60(B) motion, thereby vacating a prior entry dismissing the divorce due to the parties failing to provide trial notebooks and reinstating the divorce, is not final and appealable under the relevant provisions of R.C. 2505.02(B). Motion to dismiss granted appeal dismissed.

Record evidence supported conviction for retaliation where defendant admitted to leaving a voicemail with a sheriff's detective, asking him to "tell" six public officials—who were involved in an unrelated criminal prosecution against her years before—that she "want[ed] my money, or they can kiss their kids goodbye" and that if she did not get her money in the next 24-hours, they would "be dead, in the next four weeks."

Trial court committed Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) error. Judgments reversed. Osowik.

Duhart. Affirming rape conviction, as it is supported by both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence.

Summary judgment of foreclosure

Motion to suppress mixed question of law and fact probable cause totality of the circumstances field-sobriety tests ARIDE tests horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test modified Romberg test lack-of-convergence test, Crim.R. 7, amending the indictment, abuse of discretion, manifest weight of the evidence, chain of custody

Permanent custody—trial court's permanent custody decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the parent's pattern of behavior in allowing harmful individuals near her children supported trial court's finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), and the totality of the evidence supported the trial court's best-interest determination

Elections—Prohibition and mandamus—Writs sought to compel board of elections to remove zoning-amendment referendum from primary-election ballot—Relators failed to demonstrate that board of elections abused its discretion or disregarded applicable law in certifying referendum for placement on ballot—Writs denied.

Within the context of a guilty plea, a presentence interview with a probation officer is not a critical stage in which a defendant's right to counsel attaches under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The probation officer conducting the PSI interview is not acting on behalf of the state, but rather, is acting as a neutral information gatherer for the sentencing judge. Appellant was not subject to a custodial interrogation and was not compelled by the threat of arrest or some other penalty that foreclosed his right to remain silent during the presentence investigation interview. Appellant waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination during the PSI interview process when he voluntarily answered the probation officer's questions regarding the circumstances surrounding the sexual battery offenses. The trial court did not delegate its sentencing authority to the PSI writer and appellant's sentence was not contrary to law.

The constitutional guarantee of a fair trial does not necessarily mean a trial free of all error. Even if the trial court admitted some improper hearsay, not every error requires that a conviction be vacated, or a new trial granted. In this case, there was no impact on the verdict, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the remaining evidence clearly established appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, appellant failed to prove error, much less plain error, with regard to his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and improper jury instructions.

Offender's conviction for gross sexual imposition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in admitting the victim's forensic interview under R.C. 801(D)(1)(b).

Pro se appellants appeal decision denying breach of contract claim. Court did not abuse discretion denying request for continuance. Court provided sufficient time to present case and offered ability to file post-trial affidavits, which appellants declined.

Reserved Sentence Ripeness. An appellate challenge to a prison-term reserved for a potential community control violation is not ripe until the reserved term of imprisonment is imposed for a community control violation in a sentencing order.

Manifest Weight Credibility Determination Thirteenth Juror. The finders of fact are free to believe some, all, or none of a witness's testimony. The fact that the jury did not believe the defendant's testimony does not render a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE CRIMINAL TRESPASSING OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS. The defendant-appellant's criminal-trespassing convictions are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant-appellant's obstructing-official-business conviction is based on insufficient evidence.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 Workers' compensation COVID-19 Occupational disease. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, as plaintiff-appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his claim that COVID-19 was a compensable occupational disease.

Landlord-Tenant Civ.R. 8 Notice Pleading Negligence per se open and obvious. Trial court did not err by determining that open and obvious nature of pothole precluded common law claim by tenant against landlord. However, trial court erred by determining complaint did not sufficiently raise a claim of a violation of the landlord-tenant act where complaint asserted negligence and that plaintiff was a tenant.

Voluntariness of guilty plea Trial court participation in plea negotiations Post-release control. Comments made by the trial court and the court's limited participation in the plea negotiation process did not coerce defendant-appellant's guilty pleas. However, in one of these consolidated cases, the trial court did err in the imposition of post-release control.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Jury Instructions Self-Defense. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense.

Drug Trafficking Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity Jury Instructions R.C. 2925.03 R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) R.C. 2923.31(E) R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). Defendant-Appellant's convictions for drug trafficking and for engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Despite failure in the jury instructions to define the threshold dollar amount for drug trafficking to qualify as a predicate offense to engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, the omission did not result in a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Motion to dismiss indictment Double Jeopardy Vehicular Manslaughter, Vehicular Homicide, Aggravated Vehicular Homicide. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of double jeopardy.

CRIMINAL - Motion to suppress evidence appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact warrantless arrest probable cause investigative stop R.C. 2921.31(A) obstructing official business.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Sentencing continued criminal cases must be a sentence which amounts to disposition of a cause before there is a basis for appeal premature appeal.

CIVL - summary judgment common law public utilities utility easements compensation costs of relocation public way R.C. 4939.01(N) dedication plat public improvements R.C. 727.23

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) pandering sexually oriented material involving minors necessary to protect the public from future harm repeat offenses great or unusual harm mental health of offender element of the offense

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Robbery sufficiency of the evidence in attempting or committing a theft offense contemporaneous one continuous occurrence injury occurred while committing theft offense ongoing offense immediately fleeing

CRIMINAL - grand jury transcripts particularized need Crim.R. 6(E) ineffective assistance of counsel

CRIMINAL LAW - sex offender classification retroactive application Megan's Law Adam Walsh Act applicable statutory scheme determined by operation of law depending on date offense committed void/voidable analysis inapplicable motion to reclassify should not be recast as motion for postconviction relief.

CRIMINAL LAW- manifest weight ineffective assistance of counsel admission of evidence, abuse of discretion failure to object Google records cell phone records.

CRIMINAL LAW - violation of civil protection order messages sent potentially threatening not specifically relating to permissible communications supervised visits circumstantial evidence both parties lived in Portage County and no evidence presented that they were outside the county venue established sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence adequate, credible evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to dismiss conviction former Crim.R. 32(B) claimed void judgment voidable issues could have previously raised res judicata.

Judicial error structure error plain error

Certificate of Qualification for Employment

Special immigrant juvenile status

Special immigrant juvenile status

Pretrial Motion to withdraw guilty plea Post-judgment motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim. R. 32.1 Abuse of Discretion Competency Hearing, R.C. 2945.37 Waiver of Competency Hearing Stipulation to Competency Evaluation Report Reagan Tokes Law R.C. 2967 Constitutionality State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.

App.R. 26 application for reconsideration timeliness App.R. 30 no obvious error fully considered res judicata

operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs denial of continuance not abuse of discretion trial counsel was not ineffective third-degree felony OVI due to prior OVI conviction

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted complaint failed to provide any specific operative facts in support of a particular cause of action

CRIMINAL LAW – manslaughter grand theft of a motor vehicle guilty plea consecutively sentenced to a total indefinite prison term of 12 years (minimum) to 16 and one-half years (maximum) indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2929.13, and its imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b)-(c) is supported by the record judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – Trial court's failure to consolidate cases does not constitute an abuse of discretion where no motion to consolidate is filed and there is no evidence in the record demonstrating consolidation was warranted pursuant to Civ.R 42. A reviewing court must presume the validity of the lower court proceedings where no transcript of the proceedings in made a part of the record, and the appellant does not avail herself of the alternatives in App.R. 9(C) and (D).

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to award contract damages against Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) for its breach of the parties' settlement agreement entered into to resolve an appropriation matter instead of going to trial. Furthermore, the parties' agreement is clear that the issue of damages was left to the trial court should the issue arise. Therefore, the trial court did not err in awarding expectation damages to appellee. Nor did the trial court err in finding that ODOT breached the parties' agreement as the record clearly shows ODOT was unable to convey the Parking Mitigation Property as promised in the agreement and in fact stipulated to same. Finally, the trial court did not err in in finding ODOT liable for IHV's attorney fees. Ohio law is clear that where a party breaches a settlement agreement entered into to resolve litigation and the breach causes the other party to incur attorney fees in continuing the litigation, such fees are properly awarded by a court as compensatory damages. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying Abdullahi's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, Abdullahi did not demonstrate the requisite prejudice from his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, Abdullahi did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did not err in imposing an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law.

Appellant's aggravated arson plea was not unconstitutional, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to enforce the state's plea agreement to a ten-year arson registration requirement, state did not breach the plea agreement's term for a ten-year registration requirement, prosecutor's failure to provide a bill of information was not prejudicial, and the trial court did not err by imposing costs.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – DUE PROCESS: Because defendant failed to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court did not consider the purposes of felony sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors, this court presumes the trial court considered them. The trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to due process because it did not consider the testimony regarding uncharged instances of abuse in determining its sentence.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – PLEAS – ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where defendant was provided proper procedural protections, and the law and facts giving rise to defendant's alleged defense existed at the time he pleaded guilty.

CHILDREN — PARENTAL TERMINATION — EVIDENCE: The juvenile court's judgment granting permanent custody of the children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services ("JFS") was supported by ample competent and credible evidence where the record shows that, while mother began to comply with services before the trial on JFS's motion, she had not remedied the issues that had caused the removal of the children from her home.

Divorce imputed income support awards attorney fees

Service of notice of zoning appeal and whether evidentiary hearing was required

Post-Sentence Motion to W/D Guilty Plea - Crim.R. 32.1 - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Failure to Comply with Crim.R. 11 & 31(B) - Res Judicata

Sufficiency/Weight/Ineffective assistance/Restitution

No Pro Se or State brief filed

motion to dismiss indictment, Crim.R. 12, general issue, registration requirement, Megan's Law

adjudication, medical records, fact testimony of treating nurse practitioner, dispositional hearing, R.C. 2151.35(B)(1), 30-day provision not addressed by Supreme Court

note – mortgage – validity – magistrate's decision – objections – findings – signature – authentication

Disclosure of Confidential Records - D.V. - Manifest Weight

adoption by maternal grandmother best interest of the child R.C. 3107.161(B)(C) no abuse of discretion

RECONSIDERATION – App.R. 26(A) second pro se application the record establishes this court neither made an obvious error nor misstated the record regarding a gun being used in Appellant's altercation with the victim upon consideration of his first application, Appellant did not demonstrate any obvious errors or raise any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion this court was not persuaded that we erred as a matter of law and we denied his first pro se application for reconsideration App.R. 26(A) does not provide for second or successive reconsiderations accordingly, Appellant's second pro se application for reconsideration is denied.

R.C. 2701.03 Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo civil conspiracy negligent infliction of emotional distress intentional infliction of emotional distress political subdivision immunity R.C. 2744.01, R.C. 274.02 R.C. 2744.03

Abuse of discretion postrelease control

Receivership - Lis Pendens - R.C. 2735.04(B) and (D)

WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – R.C. 2923.13 – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Where defendant's social security card and paperwork in his name were found in the apartment where weapons were recovered, a photograph on defendant's social media depicted him holding three weapons on the balcony of that apartment, one of the weapons in the photograph appeared to be the same weapon found in the room containing defendant's personal documents, and where defendant, in recorded jail calls, discussed the location of one of the recovered weapons and expressed awareness that a copy of the search warrant had been left behind in the apartment, defendant's conviction for having weapons while under disability was supported by the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

Sentencing failure to notify of PRC

SIERAH'S LAW — R.C. 2903.41 — VIOLENT OFFENDER DATABASE — RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION — EQUAL PROTECTION: Application of Sierah's Law to violent offenders who committed a qualifying offense prior to the law's effective date, were sentenced before the law took effect, and were serving a term of confinement for that offense on the law's effective date does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, trial court did not err in denying defendant's post-conviction motion for exclusion from the violent offender database registry requirements imposed upon him by Sierah's Law. Judgment affirmed.

These are two appeals from post-divorce decree custody-related orders. One appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it is an appeal from the denial of a request for emergency temporary custody, which is not a final, appealable order. The other appeal is from the trial court's disposition of appellant's challenge to the magistrate's resolution of requests for the reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Appellant fails to demonstrate any error in the second appeal. Appeal dismissed in case No. 23AP-226, and judgment affirmed in case No. 23AP-259.

The trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on adverse possession as that concept is neither a defense to the crime charged nor does it apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. Neither did the trial court plainly err in refusing to give an instruction on abandonment. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of criminal trespassing and that conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgement affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed the final orders of the Division of Unclaimed Funds of the Ohio Department of Commerce requiring appellants to report and remit their respective unclaimed funds liabilities under R.C. 169.03. Appellants do not identify any evidentiary deficiency to counter the trial court's conclusion that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the final orders. Judgments affirmed.

Trial court decision granting children services agency's motion to terminate mother's parental rights and denying maternal grandfather's motion for custody affirmed. Trial court's decision was supported by sufficient evidence, agency complied with requirements of Ohio kinship caregiver law, and trial court was not required to appoint separate counsel for one of the children and mother lacked standing to challenge the decision as the child had never expressed a wish to be placed with the mother.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Daniel.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Daniel and State v. Hacker.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Daniel and State v. Hacker.

Writ of procedendo proceed to judgment summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) R.C. 2969.25 affidavit of prior civil actions moot. Relator's request for writ of procedendo to direct respondent judge to rule on two motions filed in underlying criminal cases was denied as moot when, during the pendency of the action, respondent entered judgment on the pending motions.

Writ of mandamus legal right to relief legal duty adequate remedy at law App.R. 29(C)(1) substitution of parties waiver of service motion for summary judgment no legal duty postrelease control R.C. 2967.28 adequate remedy at law R.C. 2969.25 affidavit of indigency affidavit of statement of inmate account. A request for writ of mandamus to vacate any period of postrelease control imposed in an underlying criminal case was denied where relator did not identify any legal duty on the part of respondent to grant the requested relief and relator's complaint was procedurally defective for failure to provide a necessary affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(C).

Permanent custody legal custody extension of temporary custody. Judgment affirmed. The weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that (1) the children cannot be placed with either of their parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either of their parents (2) reasonable efforts were made to prevent the children's removal and for reunification and (3) permanent custody to the agency would be in the children's best interest. In consideration of all the best interest factors, along with the GAL's opinion that permanent custody to the agency would be in the children's best interest, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's denial of alleged Father's request for legal custody to one of two paternal aunts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not extending the temporary custody order. The children were approximately 16 months old at the time of trial and Mother and alleged Father had not made significant progress on their case plans. The children had been with their foster family since birth and were bonded to them and doing well. The record demonstrates that permanent custody was in the children's best interest.

Guardian ad litem fees motion for fees Loc.Juv.R. 15(D)(5). Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in prematurely granting the guardian ad litem's motion for fees without a hearing before 14 days elapsed pursuant to Loc.Juv.R. 15(D)(5).

Gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) sufficiency of evidence touching bottom. Where the alleged victim repeatedly and unequivocally testified at trial that defendant never touched her "butt" or "bottom" when he ran his hand up her leg and no other witness observed the touching, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for gross sexual imposition based on his touching the alleged victim's "bottom" as charged.

Court's dismissal of case with prejudice lack of statutory or constitutional violation that would bar further prosecution plain error prosecutorial vindictiveness ripeness. Judgment reversed. The trial court's dismissal with prejudice of the state's case was plain error because there was no statutory or constitutional violation that would bar further prosecution. The defendant's claim of vindictive prosecution was not ripe because, at the time of the dismissal, no new charges had been filed.

Reagan Tokes Law constitutionality. The Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional, and appellant was properly sentenced thereunder. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Trafficking possession R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) R.C. 2925.11(A) drugs manifest weight chain of custody reliable sufficiency complicity jury instruction allied offenses R.C. 2941.25. Appellant's convictions for trafficking and drug possession were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The testimony effectively established a proper chain of custody and the reliability of the testing process and results. Circumstantial evidence established appellant not only possessed the drugs but trafficked them and was complicit with his codefendant. The trial court did not err in providing a jury instruction on complicity. The trial court committed plain error in failing to merge appellant's convictions for trafficking and drug possession as to the same drug as allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25.

Improperly furnishing firearm to a minor R.C. 2923.21(A)(3) sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's conviction for improperly furnishing a handgun to a minor was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence at trial established that appellant told police officers that she had given her handgun to her 18-year-old son to protect himself because the area was dangerous and he was being bullied. While appellant and her son testified that she had not given him the firearm and that he had retrieved it from her safe, the factfinder was in the best position to determine the witnesses' credibility. Judgment affirmed.

Bench trial eviction damages motion for sanctions untimely filing of trial brief abuse of discretion continuance inherent authority to manage proceedings supervisory control of docket manifest weight of the evidence competent, credible evidence bias cumulative error. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for sanctions and continuing the trial. The trial court also did not err in declining to award appellant late fees, loss of rental income, back rent, water and sewer fees, and damages beyond those related to the window blinds and the flooring, or in its award of the remainder of the security deposit to appellee. The trial court's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, appellant has not demonstrated bias, and there was no cumulative error.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) 90-day period to file timely application, untimely filed, failure to establish good cause for untimely filing of application. The applicant has filed an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening beyond the 90-day period for filing a timely application per App.R. 26(B)(2)(b). The applicant has failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of the application for reopening.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel successive applications untimely application good cause. The successive, untimely application to reopen was denied where there is no right to successive applications under App.R. 26(B) and the application was untimely filed without a showing of good cause for the delay.

Modification contract arbitration, de novo compel stay discovery intent unambiguous. In the absence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings without an evidentiary hearing or a trial.

Confrontation clause ongoing emergency past event. Trial court's admission of caller's statements in 911 call did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements related to an ongoing emergency.

Felonious assault manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where witness testimony contained minor inconsistencies. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Cumulative error did not deprive appellant of a fair trial.

Board of Tax Appeals reduction property value personal property. - Appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proving by competent and probative evidence their right to decrease the value of real properties because of a transfer of personal property included in a prior sale. The BTA's determination was neither unreasonable nor unlawful.

Joinder Crim.R. 8(A) photographs authentication Evid.R. 901(A) motion to suppress voir dire challenge for cause impeachment expert testimony personal knowledge Daubert Evid.R. 702 Evid.R. 703 ballistics evidence sufficiency manifest weight aggravated murder murder felonious assault criminal damaging carrying a concealed weapon ineffective assistance of counsel age as a sentencing factor. Trial court acted within its discretion in joining two cases arising from two separate incidents where the offenses were committed at different locations on different dates and were, therefore, simple and direct. Photographs from crime scene were properly authenticated by an officer who supervised the investigation. Motion to suppress was properly denied where there was no evidence that the search warrant affidavit contained untruthful statements. Denial of motion to excuse juror for cause due to anti-gun sentiments was not an abuse of discretion where the juror stated that she could keep an open mind, would hold the government to its burden of proof, and would listen to the evidence objectively. Trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination where defense counsel repeatedly asked objectionable questions and ultimately admitted at side bar that there was no evidence the witness had been reprimanded for dishonesty. Ballistics expert was qualified to testify regarding ballistics testing even though he did not perform the testing himself because he reviewed the examiner's work and had personal knowledge of the testing. Trial court properly admitted ballistic evidence indicating that shell casings found at multiple crime scenes were discharged from the same gun where the methodology used for the ballistics testing had been accepted by multiple courts as meeting the standards outlined in Daubert for admission of scientific evidence. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's felonious assault and criminal damaging convictions where surveillance video showed the defendant shooting at the victim in a parking lot where cars were damaged by bullets. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's carrying a concealed weapon conviction where surveillance video showed the defendant walking around the store without the firearm visible but later use the gun to shoot at the victim. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault convictions where surveillance video showed the defendant and his associate waiting for victim's car to arrive and showed the defendant shoot at the victim's car almost immediately upon its arrival. Defendant was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel even though counsel opened the door to gang affiliation because there was no evidence that the defendant belonged to a gang and the question was intended to show that other young men frequented the gas station where the murder occurred and could be the real culprits. Defendant was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel for failing to use a peremptory challenge, failing to challenge the qualifications of the state's ballistics expert, or in failing to challenge the reliability of the ballistics methodology because any objections on these grounds would have been properly overruled. The trial court erred in failing to consider defendant's age as a mitigating factor. Defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by cumulative errors.

Material witness warrant R.C. 2937.106 through 2937.18 R.C. 2941.48 probable cause standing of defendant ineffective assistance of counsel failure to object cell phone mapping lay witness tactical decision manifest weight of the evidence circumstantial evidence. The trial court did not err in ordering the material witness warrant, and appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Motion for new trial Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination confession attempted murder Crim.R. 33(A)(6) newly discovered evidence. Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for new trial is reversed. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder. Subsequently, the defendant's brother confessed to shooting the victim, in writing and orally during an interview with attorneys from the prosecutor office's conviction-integrity unit. The confessions are consistent with evidence presented at trial. These confessions amount to newly discovered evidence, and the court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

California marriage laws Ohio marriage laws complaint for annulment ex parte petition delayed marriage certificate California residency consent nullity of marriage void ab initio vexatious litigator service of process. Judgment affirmed. An ex parte petition establishing the fact of marriage in California is not proof of a valid marriage when it was obtained without the consent of both parties. The nonconsenting party is entitled to an annulment, and the marriage is void ab initio.

Rape GSI sufficiency jury instruction stepfather force alternative definition of force sexual battery. It is undisputed appellant engaged in sexual activities with 18-year-old M.B., whose mother and appellant were married for six years, and the issue at trial was whether the state proved the element of force to sustain convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition. While M.B.'s testimony might have indicated some degree of physical force was used by appellant, the trial court instructed the jury that the element of force can also be proven by evidence that the victim's will was overcome by fear or duress alone. The jury instruction was given in error because the alternative definition of force does not apply to an adult child pursuant to Supreme Court of Ohio precedent. The erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial and deprived appellant of a fair trial because it allowed the jury to convict appellant with less evidence for force, especially where the victim's testimony was equivocal on the issue in this case. Appellant's conviction of rape and GSI are therefore reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Furthermore, appellant's conviction of sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), Ohio's incest statute, is reversed due to insufficient evidence because the stepfather-stepchild relationship had dissolved as a result of appellant's divorce from M.B.'s mother.

Operating vehicle under the influence impeding or blocking traffic sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The defendant's convictions for the OVI and impeding or blocking traffic offenses were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the weight of that evidence based on the trial evidence demonstrating that the defendant (1) fell asleep while stopped at a traffic intersection, thereby blocking police officers from proceeding through the intersection in their lane of travel, and (2) was intoxicated.

Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentences R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) R.C. 2929.144(B) constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine due process right to a jury trial R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Trial court erred in failing to impose indefinite sentences on qualifying second-degree felonies that were subject to the Reagan Tokes Law. Defendant did not present any novel issues or new theory challenging the constitutional validity of any aspect of the Reagan Tokes Law left unaddressed by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences.

guilty plea to felonious assault counsel not ineffective evidence did not support self-defense instruction court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in advising Appellant of non-constitutional rights

stepfather adoption out of state parent statements of intent to visit without corresponding action de minimis contact exceptions R.C. 3107.07 visitation order supervised visit no-contact order.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against appellant, who sought injunctive relief against a municipality. Appellant did not appeal from notices and orders concerning property violations and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to the common pleas court. As a result, appellant's claim was precluded. For the same reasons, appellant failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Judgment affirmed.

The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody to Children Services was supported by sufficient evidence and the weight of the evidence. Judgments affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for gross sexual imposition was supported by sufficient evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give a curative jury instruction after appellant's mother engaged in disruptive behavior in the gallery and after the victim had an emotional outburst while testifying. Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial or, alternatively, a curative jury instruction after the jury observed the disruptive behavior of appellants' mother and the victim's emotional outburst. The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the victim's emotional outburst during its closing argument. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's post-verdict motion for new trial without holding a hearing or reviewing the medical records that were at issue in the motion. Judgment affirmed.

Even assuming that appellees failed to give timely written notice of their exercise of a real-estate purchase option, that failure did not terminate the parties' option-to-purchase agreement. Appellants breached the agreement by declaring the option terminated and by refusing to sell the property to appellees at the agreed price. Although appellees often paid their rent during a five-day grace period and twice paid after the grace period, appellants never declared the lease void and did not purport to terminate the option-to-purchase agreement on the basis of delinquent payments. Appellants waived any argument about the option-to-purchase agreement lacking consideration by failing to raise the issue at trial. Finally, a defective or missing acknowledgement does not affect the validity of a real-estate transaction in the absence of fraud. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's denial of appellant's petition for a civil stalking order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress where the search warrant at issue was supported by probable cause. Appellant's convictions for having weapons while under disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a separate closing argument for the bench trial portion of the case after giving a closing argument during the jury trial portion of the case. Trial counsel also was not ineffective in declining to present additional mitigating evidence at sentencing. Finally, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred in disclosing the victim's medical records to counsel for the parties without conducting a privacy analysis and then a weighing of the victim's rights against the defendant's rights as required by R.C. 2930.071(A)(3) and (4).

Per Sulek, P.J., where the trial court fails to address discretionary costs, including costs of confinement, at the sentencing hearing, but imposes those costs in the sentencing entry, the imposition of confinement costs is contrary to law.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's dismissal of petitioner's untimely petition for post-conviction relief, as petitioner provided no support for his claim of newly discovered evidence based on his ignorance of the filing deadline and facts he possessed at the time of trial.

Sulek, J. City was immune from liability where it detained owner's vehicle during a drug trafficking investigation. R.C. Chapter 2744 R.C. 2981.11

Duhart. Affirming arbitration award and dismissing appellant's request to vacate the award under R.C. 2711.10 or to modify the award under R.C. 2711.11.

Judge Duhart, Suspension, Modification, or Waiver of Court Costs and Financial Sanctions, Request for Modification of Order for Return of Trial Exhibits Moot.

Permanent custody best interests

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Defendant's conviction for sexual imposition was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where testimony and video footage showed defendant repeatedly touched the victim on or about her breast as she backed away from defendant and until she used her own hand to remove defendant's hand, where defendant then used his backside to nudge the victim toward the wall, where the two were mere acquaintances, and where defendant exclaimed he owed the victim an apology after being confronted with security camera footage. Additionally, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred where the prosecutor's characterization of defendant's conduct was consistent with the victim's testimony or where the prosecutor's closing arguments, in their entirety, consistently asked the jury to also consider the surrounding circumstances of the case when determining defendant's guilt.

abuse of discretion, Crim.R. 29(A), manifest weight, Crim.R. 33(A)

Appellant's pleas of no contest to single counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated vehicular assault were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where the trial court complied with the requirements for accepting pleas of no contest set forth under Crim.R. 11(C).

suppression, untimely, manifest weight, abuse of discretion

motion to compel, motion for protective order, trade secrets, R.C. 1333.61(D)

permanent custody, prior involuntary termination of parental rights to siblings applies to both prongs of permanent custody test, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), alternative first-prong findings, best interest

having weapon under disability – improperly handling firearm in motor vehicle – sufficiency – firearm – operability – manifest weight – credibility – jail call – harmless error – cumulative error

CRIMINAL LAW - Anders v. California guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consecutive sentencing R.C. 2929.14(C) revocation of community control.

CRIMINAL LAW - right to counsel ineffective assistance of counsel trial strategy denial of motion for mistrial R.C. 2945.83 jury instruction duty to retreat self-defense manifest weight of the evidence selective prosecution.

Appellant's conviction for voyeurism was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state proved appellant, with the intent to view the private areas of another, hid a Ring camera in his bathroom and recorded the buttocks and pubic area of a home-health aide. The trial court complied with the dictates of Crim.R. 32(A) and afforded appellant the right to allocution at sentencing as appellant was personally addressed by the court and permitted to read a statement and present any evidence in support of mitigation of punishment.

Defendant appeals sentence that included a sentencing enhancement of remaining time on postrelease control. Defendant argued that the court erred in calculating his time remaining on postrelease control. Record reflected that the department of corrections, not trial court, calculated time remaining. Defendant failed to cite any evidence substantiating claim of inaccurate calculation.

The trial court's finding of an implied contract was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where roofer provided quotes for services (which were not signed by the customer), payment was made to the roofer, and the roofer began providing the quoted services. While the roofer incorrectly asserted in his complaint that he had a written contract with his customer, the complaint still put his customer on notice of the nature of the action and the roofer's claim to relief of money damages for services provided. The record also reflected the parties never questioned the nature of their dispute and claims to relief.

The juvenile court did not err in granting permanent custody of child to the children services agency where Mother's failure to progress in her own mental health treatment prevented her from establishing a healthy parent-child relationship and providing the necessary attention for child's extensive medical and developmental problems.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's pro se motion requesting additional days of jail-time credit for the time appellant spent at a non-lockdown facility as part of community control sanctions imposed upon him following his guilty plea to one count of third-degree felony burglary where the time appellant spent at that facility did not constitute "confinement" for purposes of R.C. 2967.191(A).

Appellant's application for long term care Medicaid was appropriately denied where the record reflects that the applicant had excess resources and failed to provide the agency with the necessary verifications.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated burglary kidnapping potential juror misconduct mistrial plain error separation of witnesses ineffective assistance of trial counsel harmful testimony removal of jurors prior convictions sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Adoption of magistrate's decision abuse of discretion motion to terminate shared parenting plan R.C. 3109.04 contempt of court failure to address issue in objection to magistrate's decision finding of fact not supported by testimony or evidence.

Motion to suppress Warrantless search Exigent circumstances. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant-appellant's motion to suppress, as the warrantless entry into appellant's home was justified by exigent circumstances.

Motion to suppress Warrantless search Exigent circumstances. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant-appellant's motion to suppress, as the warrantless entry into appellant's home was justified by exigent circumstances.

Evid.R. 403(A) Evid.R. 403(B) plain-error review manifest weight of the evidence witness-credibility determination. Defendant-appellant failed to develop a plain-error argument on appeal, and thus we will not fashion one for him. Hence, we will not address his evidentiary arguments. The defendant-appellant's failure-to-comply conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 2151.414 Permanent custody Manifest weight of the evidence App.R. 9 Record on appeal. The judgment of the trial court granting permanent custody to the children's services agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the record on appeal was sufficient for appellate review.

R.C. 2953.08 Felony Sentence Presumption of Regularity Jointly Recommended Sentence. The appellant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating any error alleged on appeal. If the trial court imposes a jointly recommended sentence that is authorized by law, R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) states that the felony sentence is not reviewable under R.C. 2953.08. Further, a presumption of regularity attaches to the proceedings at the trial court.

Postconviction motion to dismiss indictment res judicata motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial Crim.R. 33 clear and convincing standard. Defendant-appellant's postconviction motion to dismiss the indictment is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court did not abuse err by not holding an evidentiary hearing on defendant-appellant's motion.

Easement-plain language contained in easement established that appellant has a 30-foot-wide easement that extends from his property to County Road 550.

Disobeying a green light as reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop

Civil law—Municipal taxation—Temporary state law that directed municipalities where an employee's principal place of work was located to collect municipal income tax from the employee when the employee performed work outside that municipality does not violate state or federal Constitutions—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Workers' compensation—Violation of specific safety requirements—Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4)—Industrial Commission abused its discretion in granting additional award—Record did not contain some evidence supporting Industrial Commission's finding that purpose of an outdoor yard where vehicles were stored or staged for transport was conducting type of work that would classify the outdoor yard as a "workshop" under Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5—Industrial Commission erred by deciding that claimant was injured in a "workshop," and this conclusion precludes a finding that employer failed to comply with Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4)—Court of appeals' judgment granting writ of mandamus affirmed.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress statements in a custodial interrogation because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a gunshot residue test as the results involved the collection of highly evanescent evidence, taken with minimal intrusion on the defendant, and was supported by probable cause. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of text messages between the defendant and the victim under Evid.R. 404(B) to show intent, motive and state of mind of the defendant. Defendant's counsel's performance also fell within the wide range of reasonable professional behavior expected of attorneys and the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed the final orders of the Division of Unclaimed Funds of the Ohio Department of Commerce requiring appellants to report and remit their respective unclaimed funds liabilities under R.C. 169.03. Appellants do not identify any evidentiary deficiency to counter the trial court's conclusion that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the final orders. Judgments affirmed.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's untimely, successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Civ.R. 12(C), statute of limitations

Statute of Limitations - Savings Statute - R.C. 2323.451 - Civ.R. 15(D) - Medical Malpractice - Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

Motion to suppress Manifest weight of the evidence

Post-conviction relief petition without hearing

RES JUDICATA – BACK PAY – REINSTATEMENT – CONTEMPT OF COURT: Defendant school board was precluded on res judicata grounds from arguing that it could not pay back pay to plaintiff teacher or reinstate her to her position as a kindergarten teacher because those matters could have been, but were not, raised in the first appeal in this cause. The trial court provided an opportunity for defendant to purge itself of contempt when the court did not impose sanctions for more than two months after it entered its contempt order, which contained the conditions necessary for defendant to purge itself of contempt.

CIV.R. 60(B) – SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT: The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to vacate an entry of satisfaction of judgment in a cognovit action under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) where plaintiff argued that defendant had repudiated a mutual release by filing an action in New York state court: plaintiff failed to show that the continued enforcement of the satisfaction of judgment would be inequitable, because the New York court had yet to determine whether the mutual release applied to the New York litigation, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it acted reasonably in waiting nearly four years after defendant filed the New York case to file its motion to vacate.

JUVENILE – SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION – UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT – ABUSE – EXPERT TESTIMONY – NEGLECT – DEPENDENCY – CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE – PERMANENT CUSTODY – R.C. 2151.413 – REASONABLE EFFORTS – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court has jurisdiction over the children where the children have no home state under Ohio's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because the orders placing them with out-of-state relatives were dissolved and thus the relatives do not qualify as persons acting as parents under the Act, and where the children and parents have a significant connection to Ohio and substantial evidence is available in Ohio concerning the children's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. The juvenile court properly adjudicated a child as abused where there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether the child died by homicide or natural causes, the juvenile court credited the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services' experts over the parents' experts, and competent, credible evidence supported the juvenile court's credibility determination. The juvenile court properly adjudicated the children as neglected and dependent where the parents did not adequately care for the children, the children were on restrictive diets and gained healthy weight after leaving the parents care, and one child died by homicide in the home by a parent. R.C. 2151.413 does not require the juvenile court to make a finding that there were reasonable efforts to reunify the family where the agency seeks permanent custody by complaint instead of by motion. The juvenile court properly granted permanent custody to the agency where it made the required reasonable-efforts findings and clear and convincing evidence supported its findings that the children cannot or should not be placed with a parent and that a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was in the best interest of the children.

Criminal law—R.C. 2901.05—Self-defense jury instruction—Appellant entitled to self-defense jury instruction because he met his burden of production by presenting legally sufficient evidence for each element of defense—Court of appeals' judgment reversed, and cause remanded to trial court.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to inform client of lack of professional-liability insurance—One-year suspension and restitution ordered.

guilty plea – ineffective assistance – record – plain error

domestic violence civil protection order—manifest weight—present fear of harm

sufficient evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, stipulation, weapons under disability, ineffective assistance of counsel

forfeiture – plain error – post-release control

rape, child, minor, penetration, mistrial, questioning, abuse of discretion

CIVIL – Second motion to certify conflict, which constitutes ninth post-judgment motion/application challenging merits opinion, is overruled as pro se Appellants have previously exhausted their rights under App.R. 25 and 26.

Trial court did not err in suppressing statements based on Miranda violation.

CRIMINAL – The trial court's finding with respect to the imposition of consecutive sentence need not immediately follow the imposition of sentence. The trial court's use of conditional language in its findings does not invalidate the consecutive sentences.

Criminal Sufficiency Manifest Weight The judgment of the trial court is affirmed where the convictions for murder and felonious assault are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence appellant failed to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of counsel where the errors alleged were either presumed to be sound trial strategy or where the alleged deficiency did not result in prejudice.

motion to suppress traffic stop R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) reasonable suspicion probable cause duration of the traffic stop driving under suspension marijuana automobile exception

Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct—Indefinite suspension with no credit for time served under interim felony suspension.

Workers' compensation—R.C. 4123.57(B)—Scheduled-loss compensation—A claimant seeking scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) must affirmatively demonstrate with medical evidence the loss for which compensation is sought—Medical evidence demonstrating injured worker did not suffer any injury to his eyes or ears in industrial accident and was unable to participate in definitive visual or auditory testing prior to death due to anoxic brain injury substantiates Industrial Commission's denial of scheduled-loss compensation for loss of sight and hearing—Medical evidence demonstrating injured worker did not suffer any injury to his arms and legs in industrial accident combined with medical opinion that had injured worker recovered from anoxic brain injury he would have recovered use of his arms and legs substantiates commission's denial of scheduled-loss compensation for arms and legs—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Statute of Limitations

motion to certify conflict App.R. 25 application for reconsideration App.R. 26(A) no certifiable conflict

Attorneys—Misconduct—Multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including neglecting client matters, failing to refund unearned legal fees, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and knowingly failing to respond to demands for information in connection with a disciplinary matter—Permanent disbarment and restitution ordered.

Wrongful death construction negligence discretionary immunity. Plaintiff's son died when a bag of sand from a construction site was thrown over an overpass. The court found that defendant was not immune from liability because it did not consider putting vandal fencing around the construction area. Further, the court found that the criminal activity of a third party, not defendant's negligence, was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. Therefore, judgment was entered in favor of defendant.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Permanent disbarment and restitution ordered.

Civ.R. 53(D), Retaliation R.C. 4112.99. Plaintiff's retaliation claim pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 was tried to before a magistrate who recommended judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff filed objections arguing that the magistrate erred in finding that (1) plaintiff was required to file incident reports under defendant's incident reporting policy and plaintiff violated said policy by failing to file such incident reports, (2) plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's investigation and pre-disciplinary meeting was pretext for retaliation, and (3) plaintiff failed to prove a causal connection between plaintiff's protected activity and defendant's adverse employment actions. Upon independent review, the Court overruled plaintiff's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision and recommendation as its own.

Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment discrimination hostile work environment probationary employment direct evidence. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination and hostile work environment harassment because defendant terminated plaintiff's probationary employment for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and did not engage in hostile work environment harassment as a matter of law. Judgment for defendant.

Inmate negligence battery excessive force O.A.C 5120-9-01 magistrate Civ.R. 53(D). Plaintiff was handcuffed after he disobeyed several orders from ODRC staff and suffered minor temporary numbness. The magistrate found, through testimony from corrections officers and ODRC medical staff, that plaintiff was unable to prove his claims because ODRC used the minimum amount of force necessary to control the situation and the handcuffs were removed within a reasonable time. Therefore, the magistrate recommended judgment in defendant's favor.

Summary Judgment, Qualified Immunity, Civ.R. 56(C), 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), Civil Conspiracy, Wrongful Termination. Defendant established that tolling statues did not apply to Plaintiff's claims for civil conspiracy and wrongful termination in violation of public policy as the state of Ohio has consented to be sued in only one forum – the Court of Claims. Additionally, the Court held that the savings statute did not apply to Plaintiff's third attempt at filing the same claims. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims for conversion, intellectual theft, unjust enrichment, and lost opportunities were held to be untimely filed. Plaintiff's initial cause of action originated more than four years prior to the filing of this case. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

On objections by both parties, the Court overruled the objections, denied multiple motions to strike and a motion to amend a previous filing, and adopted the Report and Recommendation. In denying the motions to strike and the motion to amend, the Court held that proceedings under R.C. 2743.75 are special statutory proceedings, and the parties may not exceed the bounds of the statutory procedure, or the briefing schedule issued by the Special Master. The Court ordered Respondent to produce the documents recommended by the Special Master with limited redactions of identification numbers and physical addresses. The Court also ordered that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by the Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Public Records R.C. 149.011(G) R.C. 149.43(B)(1) A party suing to enforce a public records request must prove that the materials he seeks are records if their status as such is disputed, and must do so with clear and convincing evidence An official's personal notes, made to personally focus his thoughts or aid his recollection are not records if they are not shared with other officials or preserved as part of his office's general records Notes' status as non-records are reinforced when the information they contain is captured in official recordings of the office's proceedings A public office satisfies its R.C. 149.43(B)(1) obligation to make public records available if it offers to make the records available and the requester fails to act on the offer.

After neither Requester nor Respondent filed timely written objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation, the Court found that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation and adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to produce certain records to Requester in accordance with the Special Master's recommendations.

Public Records R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(jj) and (A)(17)(a) R.C. 149.43(B)(1)149.43(A)(1)(jj) and (A)(17)(a) exempt two things from public record status: the "image of a child" and "information that could lead to the identification of a child when the law enforcement agency knows or has reason to know the person is a child[.]" A child's residential address is information that could identify a child If a record contains both information exempted from public record status and public record information the public record information must be made available unless the exempt material is inextricably intertwined with the record as a whole A record containing both public record and exempted information must be produced unless the exempted information is so pervasive that redaction would thoroughly eviscerate the record as a whole The public office has the burden of proving such intertwining, and any doubts are resolved against complete withholding, The extent of any redaction must be carefully restricted.

Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment res judicata claim preclusion negligence Sup.R. 42(C). Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata after having had the same claims against the same defendant dismissed by the court in a previous case. Judgment for defendant.

Gross sexual imposition, sufficiency manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R 803(4) admissibility of social worker's testimony and video recording of child victim's interview, exceptions to hearsay, medical diagnosis and treatment venue R.C. 2901.12, continuing course of conduct.

R.C. 2907.02(D) rape shield hearing day of trial plain error motion in limine authentication social media posts. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(D) on the day of trial. A review of the record demonstrates that appellant did not object to the court holding the hearing the day of trial rather than three days prior pursuant to the statute. Accordingly, appellant waived all but plain error. We find that the appellant did not demonstrate that the court plainly erred because its holding in disallowing the evidence of the victim's prior sexual encounters was consistent with Eighth District precedent, and appellant did not demonstrate that holding the hearing earlier would have affected the outcome of trial. Further, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the state's motion in limine regarding apparent printouts of social media posts. The exhibits were not authenticated through testimony of the alleged sender and appellant did not make a proffer to try to authenticate them by other means. Judgment affirmed.

Civil contempt show cause attorney fees fines purge agreed judgment entry contract interpretation. Trial court properly found Mother in contempt of court for unreasonably withholding parenting time from Father after Father completed a ten-panel drug test required for unsupervised visitation even though one of the results of the test was delayed. Trial court properly required Mother to reimburse Father for the cost of an unnecessary ten-panel toenail test since the test was unnecessary and Mother required it before she would release the child to the Father for visitation. Trial court properly denied Father's request for attorney fees where Father failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of the fees with an itemized statement and evidence of the parties' respective incomes.

Sierah's Law violent offender database VOD R.C. 2903.41 constitutionality Retroactivity Clause Ohio Constitution Article II, Section 28 separation of powers motion to vacate presumption of enrollment timeliness notice R.C. 2903.42(A)(2)(b). The application of Sierah's Law to offenders who committed their offense before the law's effective date does not violate Ohio's Retroactivity Clause or the separation-of-powers doctrine. The offender filed a motion to vacate the requirement that he remain enrolled in the violent offender database ("VOD") established by Sierah's Law, but he did so months after he was released from prison. Therefore, the offender failed to comply with R.C. 2903.42(A)(2)(b) (requiring such a motion be made prior to release) and his motion was properly denied. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction provided adequate notice to the offender prior to his release about the VOD enrollment obligations, his right to file a motion seeking to rebut the presumption that he be enrolled and the procedure for filing that motion. The notice could have more clearly stated that the motion must be made prior to release, but the notice was reasonably calculated to inform the offender of the deadline for making a motion and informed him that he could review the relevant legislation in the library upon request. The record reflects that the offender largely ignored the ODRC's notice while he was incarcerated. When he did review it and realized that it applied to him, he still only briefly scanned the relevant section explaining the procedure for filing a motion. He never requested a copy of the legislation from the library. Under these circumstances, his failure to file a timely motion could not be attributed to insufficient notice or excusable neglect. Judgment affirmed.

Obstructing official business Parma Cod.Ord. 606.14(a) overt act refusal to give police name and date of birth. - Evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for obstructing official business where the defendant merely refused to give police his name and date of birth but did not engage in any overt act that hindered or impeded the police investigation.

Gross sexual imposition manifest weight of the evidence plain error grand jury burden of proof presumption of innocence. The trial court's statements relating to grand jury proceedings did not impact the defendant's presumption of innocence or otherwise amount to plain error where the trial court subsequently and repeatedly instructed the jury as to the applicable legal standards and burden of proof at trial. The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Felony sentencing appellate review R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) purposes and principles of sentencing R.C. 2929.11 seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.12 clear and convincing evidence mitigating factors particular language specific findings. A trial court, when crafting a felony sentence, may consider evidence that the defendant failed to appear for a presentence-investigation interview, failed to cooperate with the probation office, and failed to turn himself in when a capias was issued before sentencing. The defendant knew he was required for sentencing but refused to turn himself in he was arrested around nine months later and brought back before the court for sentencing. Although the trial court did not specifically comment on the underlying facts of the case — other than this failure to appear — before announcing its sentence, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing or the R.C. 2929.12 factors before imposing sentence. The court stated that it had considered all required factors of the law. The court ordered and reviewed a presentence-investigation report. It considered the materials submitted by the defendant in mitigation. It heard argument from the prosecutor and defense counsel on the factors. The defendant spoke to the court on his own behalf before sentence. His sentence fell within the permissible statutory range. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2921.331 mandatory advisement consecutive sentence Crim.R. 11 not a complete failure to comply prejudice. Where the appellant did not show any prejudice resulted from the trial court's incomplete advisements on consecutive sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2921.331, the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

Res judicata individual capacity limited liability company settlement and release manifest weight of the evidence hearsay App.R. 16(D) damages setoff to jury award breach of contract attorney fees contingency fee agreement lodestar prejudgment interest. - Jury verdict finding that defendant breached a sublease with plaintiff affirmed and trial court's award of attorney fees in favor of plaintiff affirmed. Plaintiff's earlier settlement with other signatories on the sublease was not res judicata to plaintiff's claims against defendant, who signed the sublease in his individual capacity plaintiff could bring its breach-of-contract claim as a limited liability company plaintiff's settlement and release of defendant in an unrelated lawsuit did not bar plaintiff's claims against defendant in this case the jury's verdict finding that defendant breached the sublease was not against the manifest weight of the evidence defendant did not support his argument that two witnesses gave hearsay testimony by reference to the record as required by App.R. 16(D) plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of damages to support the jury's damages award plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party because the sublease expressly provided that plaintiff could recover its attorney fees upon defendant's breach of the sublease trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding the total amount of attorney fees requested by plaintiff because the court could properly consider that counsel had a contingency fee agreement with plaintiff trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest because a party granted judgment on a contract claim is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law.

Mandamus, agreed sentence, community control, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, appeal, declaratory judgment, prohibitory injunction. - The relator seeks a writ of mandamus to prevent enforcement of an agreed sentencing provision that provides for the unannounced inspection of the relator's home by the Animal Protective League. The relator possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by prosecuting an appeal from the sentencing journal entry that imposed the condition of unannounced inspections of the relator's home. In addition, the relator actually seeks a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction over which the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear. Complaint for mandamus is dismissed.

Rape gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) touching digital penetration Evid.R. 803(4) hearsay medical diagnosis and treatment plain error prosecutorial misconduct closing argument demeanor credibility Crim.R. 29 acquittal sufficiency sexual contact R.C. 2907.01(B) sexual conduct gratification time frame R.C. 2907.01(A) manifest weight evidence. Affirmed appellant's convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the child's statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment under Evid.R. 803(4), and no plain error was shown. No prosecutorial misconduct occurred with regard to remarks made during closing argument as to the victim's demeanor in the courtroom. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal when sufficient evidence was presented to prove the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Restitution R.C. 2929.18(A) Marsy's Law economic loss related to convictions jail-time credit R.C. 2967.191(A). - Trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution because the amount was not based on the economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. Trial court's calculation of jail-time credit is reversed and remanded for a recalculation because the defendant was not incarcerated solely on the current case.

Consecutive sentence R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings. Reversed. Based on the arguments and concessions presented by the parties, the trial court erred in concluding that the law required the sentences imposed for violations of community control sanctions to be served consecutive to the sentences imposed on the new offenses committed while the offender was serving the community control sanctions.

Civil stalking protection order abuse of discretion preponderance of evidence mental distress. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the element of mental distress. Mental stress need not be incapacitating or debilitating, and actual treatment by a professional is not required to prove mental distress. The trial court here was permitted to rely on its knowledge and experience in determining whether mental distress has been caused.

Arbitration waiver declaratory judgment omitted counterclaim compulsory counterclaim. No authority supports appellant's claim that appellee, as the principal of a company that is not a party in the instant case, is bound by the latter's conduct in a prior dismissed case and should be deemed as having acted inconsistently with his right to arbitration, where appellee, not the company, is the party to the contract containing the arbitration provision. The trial court properly granted appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings in this declaratory judgment action.

Motion to vacate void sentence not guilty plea arraignment petition for postconviction relief R.C. 2953.23(A). - Defendant's sentence was not void for lack of personal jurisdiction because the defendant voluntarily appeared at his arraignment and pleaded not guilty, thereby waiving any challenge to the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him trial court properly considered defendant's motion to vacate void sentence as a petition for postconviction relief and, because the petition was untimely filed and did not meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A), properly dismissed it.

Due process evidentiary hearing transcript. - Juvenile court's judgment rendered after an evidentiary hearing affirmed because the appellant did not provide the transcript of the hearing and thus, the appellate court presumed regularity in the juvenile court's proceedings and appellant failed to demonstrate any violation of due process.

Manifest weight permanent custody best interests of child CCDCFS R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence reunification R.C. 2151.419 case plan incarceration. Judgment affirmed. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in B.B.C.'s best interest. Accordingly, the court's decision to grant permanent custody is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, the juvenile court complied with the requirements of R.C. 2151.419 in its journal entries granting temporary custody and made reasonable-efforts findings in its final judgment entry granting permanent custody of B.B.C. to CCDCFS. Lastly, the R.C. 2151.419 requirement to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child's home generally does not require CCDCFS to make unreasonable efforts to attempt reunification with an incarcerated parent.

Permanent custody - father

CONTRACTS – DAMAGES – JURISDICTION/VENUE: In a breach of contract case, the trial court did not err in failing to award damages for labor costs that were alleged to have been incurred for moving parts in reliance on the contract where there was competent, credible evidence supporting its decision. The trial court erred in granting judgment for breach of contract in favor of nonparties and parties who did not assert a breach of contract claim. The trial court did not err in finding a breach of contract where competent, credible evidence supported finding that the breaching party was the proximate cause of the damages, the damages were foreseeable, and the further performance of the nonbreaching party was excused. The trial court did not err in determining that the nonbreaching party properly mitigated its damages where further mitigating measures would have been extraordinary.

PROCEDURE/RULES – CIV.R. 60(B) – RIPENESS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – REAL PROPERTY – MUNICIPAL –RECONSIDERATION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion and reinstating the 2019 judgment against plaintiff without an express finding of excusable neglect because a trial court is not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion where a party does not request them under Civ.R. 52. The parties agree that the reinstated judgment should be corrected to credit a voluntary payment by plaintiff and remove nuisance-abatement costs barred by the applicable statute of limitations: These issues with the reinstated judgment are ripe for appellate review because there is a live judgment against plaintiff secured by liens against plaintiff's real property. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant on its counterclaim for unpaid Vacated Building Maintenance License ("VBML") fees for one of plaintiff's seven properties: Once defendant established that plaintiff owned the properties subject to the VBML program, the dates the properties were acquired, and that plaintiff had failed to apply for the VBMLs, the trial court was capable of determining the fees owed by applying the VBML fee-structure contained in the municipal code however, defendant did not establish the date that plaintiff failed to apply for the VBML for one of his properties and thus the trial court could not calculate the fees owed on that property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration when it considered the arguments of the parties and concluded that two of plaintiff's properties constituted separate buildings subject to separate VBMLs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT – TRADE SECRETS – R.C. 1333.61: The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant employee where the noncompete agreement was unenforceable because it was overly broad in geographic and temporal scope, and the trial court did not err when it declined to modify the noncompetition agreement because reforming the agreement to comply with the rule of reasonableness would require completely rewriting the agreement. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's trade-secrets claim where there were no genuine issues of material facts that the allegedly confidential information did not qualify as trade secrets under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act because the plaintiff employer did not take sufficient measures to maintain confidentiality of the information. The trial court did not err in declining to enforce the liquidated-damages provision of the noncompetition agreement because the agreement was unenforceable.

On trial court decision overruling petitioner's motion for leave to file motion for new trial and untimely petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner failed to identify any single piece of evidence or facts that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering, and therefore failed to show how such evidence was either potentially exculpatory as required for new trial or provided a necessary basis for postconviction relief. Judgment affirmed.

Admissibility of evidence—Statements made by juvenile after he was read his Miranda rights were properly admitted at trial because he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Public-records requests—Relator showed that records custodian failed for approximately 180 days to comply with his obligation under R.C. 149.43(B) to produce requested document—Relator awarded $1,000 in statutory damages.

A trial court's failure to inform appellant that a jury verdict must be unanimous to convict him did not render appellant's guilty plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Judgment affirmed.

In response to a knock on the driver's side window of his parked car, appellant opened his door and conversed with a sheriff's deputy who requested and received consent to search the vehicle. Given that appellant authorized the deputy to search the car during a consensual encounter, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Judgment affirmed.

When the complaining witness failed to appear for trial, the trial court found that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule applied to the use of her prior statements at trial, because appellant had sent a threatening letter to her from jail and had had repeated contact with her by phone notwithstanding a no-contact order. Appellant waived any argument that the trial court erred in finding forfeiture by wrongdoing by subsequently entering a guilty plea to intimidation. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated in defense counsel's alleged failure to advise appellant to plead no contest, and the record reflects that the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting appellant's guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody of three children to their uncle in Arizona. Mother and Father failed to complete their case plan objectives, which included addressing mental health, drug use, and parenting issues, and granting legal custody to the uncle was in the best interest of the children. Judgments affirmed.

The traffic stop of the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger was not prolonged to allow for a canine air sniff, and the dog's alert to the presence of drugs provided probable cause for the vehicle to be searched. The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. The record establishes that appellant's no contest plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Because appellant was sentenced to a term of community control sanctions, the trial court did not err by not including a jail-time credit calculation in the judgment entry. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by ordering appellant to register as an arson offender. The registry does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Judgment affirmed.

Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Convictions and death sentences affirmed.

Bad Faith Claims Handling Arbitration

Osowik - Crim.R. 11 ( C)(2)(a) requires a trial court to advise a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony, during his plea hearing on a new felony case, of the trial court's authority under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate the defendant's existing postrelease control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation. State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766. Appellee concedes error. Guilty plea is vacated. Reversed and remanded.

Per Mayle, J., there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed aggravated burglary when he trespassed by "force, stealth, or deception" when he entered his ex-girlfriend's apartment by breaking a window, at night, wearing a full facemask, and assaulted her and her daughter, even though he still retained a key to the property. Defendant's aggravated burglary conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because he still had some belongings at the apartment and retained a key.

Trial court sentencing clerical error. Judgment affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, for nunc pro tunc entry. Osowik

Osowik. Affirming dismissal of action on grounds of mootness

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Relator failed to clearly and convincingly show that records custodian failed to send the records he had requested or that records custodian had failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B) at time of filing of complaint—Writ denied as moot and statutory damages denied.

Judge Duhart, hearsay, plain error, manifest weight of the evidence.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Requested records provided—Writ and statutory damages denied.

Trial court did not err in denying Father's motion to modify his spousal and child support payments as his income did not substantially change. Trial court did not err by not finding Mother in contempt as Father failed to meet his burden of proof that she had interfered in his allotted parenting time. Trial court erred by finding Father was subject to a ten-day suspended jail sentence for a previous contempt sanction that had already been purged. Mother did not cross-appeal on basis that the trial court did not find Father engaged in frivolous conduct, therefore R.C. 2323.51 was inapplicable and Mother's claim for additional attorney's fees was waived.

Father appeals from decision granting legal custody to maternal grandparents. Father alleged ineffective assistance of counsel but Father's arguments were entirely speculative. Father failed to demonstrate abuse of discretion in legal custody decision. Father failed to make progress on case plan despite having 17 months to do so following release from prison.

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight, best evidence rule, hearsay rule, R.C. 2903.211.

denial of motion to intervene, arguments raised below and on appeal

motion to enforce settlement agreement

The trial court properly imposed postrelease control.

The trial court's decision that the state disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the testimony at trial proved that appellant did not have a reasonable or honest belief that he was in imminent danger at the time he threatened the victim. Likewise, appellant's conviction for aggravated menacing is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the testimony at trial established that appellant knew he would probably cause the victim to believe he would seriously harm her by ordering her to stay on the ground, after threatening to shoot her in the face, and continued to point a firearm in her direction.

The trial court did not err by failing to consider and decide whether appellant had a present or future ability to pay a mandatory fine imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) where the trial court specifically stated it had done so within its judgment entry, nor did appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to file an affidavit of indigency where the record did not support appellant's claim that there was a reasonable probability the trial court would have found him indigent and unable to pay that fine had his trial counsel filed the necessary affidavit.

accounting, executor, distribution in kind, plain error, Civ.R. 53

Consecutive Sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) Felony Sentencing Review Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides a basis for an appellate court to determine whether a trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings are supported by the record. The appellant cannot establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if it is an argument that only speculates about the contents of materials that exist outside of the record.

Void judgment, subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, manifest weight, reasonable efforts, best interest, effective assistance of counsel. Trial court did not lose jurisdiction when it had subject matter jurisdiction and respondent waived service agreeing to personal jurisdiction. Agency testified that reasonable efforts to reunify the family were made and trial court made the required findings. Trial court's determination to grant permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the child had been in the custody of the agency for 16 out of the prior 22 months and termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Trial court did not err in denying the motion for legal custody of child, trial court did not err in granting a stay of the proceedings while an appeal by a third party was pending. Respondent was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Manifest Weight Obstructing Justice. Conviction for obstructing justice supported by the evidence.

R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) Physical-Harm Robbery Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The State's evidence that defendant-appellant committed robbery was legally sufficient and his conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective in a manner that prejudiced him. The trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft for the robbery count.

Receiving stolen property manifest weight

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT- petition for habeas corpus lack of jurisdiction R.C. 2725.03 petition must be filed in county institution is located.

JUVENILE - custody termination of shared parenting Juv.R. 40(D) magistrate's decision objections independent review transcript R.C. 3109.04 plain error unsuitability finding not required in allocating parental rights and responsibilities between parents.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely appeal App.R. 4(A)(1) motion to dismiss granted.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS – OVI SUSPENSION: In a prosecution for driving under an OVI suspension, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that defendant failed to satisfy the initial burden to demonstrate that the state conducted a warrantless seizure: defendant's motion to suppress argued that defendant had been driving a vehicle registered to defendant's daughter, the officer did not cite defendant with any other violations, and the officer testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing, but could not recall the reason for initiating the traffic stop.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely appeal duplicate appeal dismissed.

CIVIL - arbitration provision, loser pays clause, whether clause unconscionable, no factual findings in record and/or circumstances surrounding the agreement, reversed and remanded.

CRIMINAL - sentencing state's appeal suspended sentence prison term or community control required sentence not authorized by statute mootness sentence served by defendant relief can be afforded on appeal no legitimate expectation of finality jurisdiction to resentence

CRIMINAL - community control sanctions technical violation R.C. 2929.15(E)(2) ineffective assistance of counsel speed trial violations preliminary hearing R.C. 2945.71(C) triple-count provision R.C. 2945.71(E) jail-time credit R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i)

CIVIL- Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 breach of contract Recreational Vehicle Parks R.C. 3729.12 campsite use agreements campsite users license no breach where campground owners discontinued unwritten policy allowing the transfer of campsite use agreement with sale of private recreational vehicle where the policy was revocable and the campsite use agreement was nonassignable tortious interference with a business relationship campground owner had privilege to limit the transfer of campsite use agreements.

CIVIL - Modifying child support R.C. 3119.79 permits a court to modify child support if there is a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated when the court issued the original child support order child support gross income R.C. 2705.031(B)(1) R.C. 3121.43 collecting child support payments R.C. 3119.23 provides a list of non-exhaustive factors for a court to consider when modifying child support Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires a court to rule on objections, but it does not state that a magistrate cannot amend its decision.

Habeas corpus—Petitioner failed to include commitment papers showing that imprisonment lacks legal authority, as required by R.C. 2725.04(D)—Writ denied.

Elections—Prohibition—Mandamus—Disqualification of counsel—Relator, a village mayor, failed to show that she was entitled to writ of prohibition preventing respondent village from setting date for recall election or preventing respondent boards of elections from conducting that election—Relator failed to show that she was entitled to writ of mandamus ordering respondent boards of elections to remove recall election from ballot—Writs denied—Relator's motion to disqualify counsel for respondent village denied.

permanent custody – reasonable efforts – plain error – R.C. 2151.353 – R.C. 2151.419 – prior involuntary termination of parental rights of a sibling of the child

App.R. 26(B)(5) applicant bears burden of establishing a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel motion to certify a conflict App.R. 25 factually distinct rule of law.

CIVIL – domestic relations divorce termination of marriage marital residence marital property versus separate property R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)-(6), (B), (D), and (H) Appellee met his tracing burden and Appellant failed to produce any evidence challenging that traceability the record establishes and the trial court properly found that Appellant failed to demonstrate any separate property interest the trial court awarded Appellee the full amount of his premarital and separate interest in the marital residence the trial court's decision does not go against the manifest weight of the evidence judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW – kidnapping abduction robbery assault trial by jury sentenced to five years (minimum) to seven and one-half years (maximum) in prison sufficiency the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion manifest weight the jury chose to believe the State's witnesses no cumulative error Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law judgment affirmed.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST – uninsured motorist policy automobile accident abuse of discretion standard of review the trial court did not err in determining that the date of accrual for prejudgment interest should be the date Appellants refiled their complaint in Mahoning County trial courts have discretion in determining a reasonable date of accrual Appellants' position that the date of accrual for an award of prejudgment interest is always the date of the accident is both misplaced and unfounded under Ohio law judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW – kidnapping abduction robbery assault trial by jury sentenced to three years (minimum) to four and one-half years (maximum) in prison sufficiency the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion manifest weight the jury chose to believe the State's witnesses no cumulative error judgments affirmed.

CIVIL – summary judgment Civ.R. 56 insurance contract motion to vacate Civ.R. 60(B) reconsideration the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to vacate since the motion was an improper substitute for an appeal of a final order Appellant failed to show he had a meritorious defense Appellant did not set forth which Civ.R. 60(B) ground for relief he was claiming to be entitled judgment affirmed.

failure to merge offenses was not plain error.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel juror misconduct voir dire extraneous influence Remmer hearing death penalty specifications R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct specification principal offender prior calculation and design selective prosecution mitigation evidence R.C. 2929.04(C) proportionality review independent weighing of aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors R.C. 2929.05(A) sentence of a codefendant disparate treatment of codefendants abuse of discretion relevant evidence. An application for reopening was denied where the proposed assignments of error — challenging the failure of a trial judge to allow additional questioning of a juror, the failure to dismiss capital specifications, and in denying the applicant the ability to present evidence of the treatment of codefendants at the penalty phase of a death penalty trial — did not present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Motion in limine Evid.R. 702 medical malpractice medical expert testimony proximate cause motion for summary judgment and Civ.R. 56. Where the plaintiff-appellant's medical expert's opinion was rendered with the requisite medical probability and sufficiently described proximate cause, the trial court abused its discretion when it granted defendants-appellees' motion in limine to exclude the medical expert's opinion testimony on causation. Where the plaintiff-appellant's medical expert testimony created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants-appellees' acts were the proximate cause of the deceased's injuries and death, the trial court erred when it granted defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment political subdivision city immunity stormwater sewer system pond private property property owners aesthetic maintain repair taking trespass natural watercourse reasonable use. Affirmed the judgment of the trial court that granted the motion for summary judgment of the city of Brecksville upon determining the city is entitled to political-subdivision immunity and that denied the appellants' motion for summary judgment. Appellants failed to produce evidence upon which to establish the pond at issue and its outlet structure, which are located on private property, are part of the city's public stormwater sewer system. The R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) exception to the general grant of immunity to a political subdivision did not apply to the case. The record also did not support appellants' claims that a taking or trespass has occurred.

Civ.R. 15(B) motion to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence abuse of discretion implied consent motion to modify custody separate argument App.R. 12(A)(2) App.R. 16(A)(7). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father's motion to amend his pleadings to conform to the evidence to allow him to seek a change in custody where (1) father had not filed a motion to modify the judgment entry allocating parental rights and responsibilities, (2) mother, who was proceeding pro se, prepared for and argued her motion to terminate or modify father's parenting time, not a motion to change custody, and (3) the juvenile court found that to consider a change in custody without a motion would be a denial of due process and fundamentally unfair. Appellate court could disregard assignment of error related to juvenile court's dismissal of father's motion to modify custody where father did not separately argue the assignment of error in his appellate brief.

Substantial impairment rape R.C. 2907.02 lay evidence Evid.R. 701 abuse of discretion sufficiency of the evidence. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by sustaining an objection to the defendant's question regarding a specific gradation of a victim's level of intoxication, and there was sufficient evidence that the defendant raped the victim, who was not his spouse, while she was substantially impaired due to voluntary intoxication.

Production of documents COVID 19 negligence medical records time data physician-patient privilege waiver exception relevance discovery interrogatories medical malpractice civil action motion to compel abuse of discretion de novo review protected health information R.C. 2317.02 causally or historically related exceptions confidentiality treatment HIPAA nonparty patient diagnosis. Appellants claimed immunity in a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit under H.B. 606. Appellants claimed alleged failure to treat decedent in a timely manner was due to the Appellants' prioritization of COVID patients. Appellee requested nonparty patient data to challenge Appellants' defense. Appellants objected to the discovery request, arguing the nonparty patient data was protected from disclosure under HIPAA and privileged under R.C. 2317.02. The trial court conducted an in camera review of disputed discovery responses. The trial court properly granted Appellee's motion to compel the responses for the health data that was not traceable to individual patients, however the trial court erred in ordering the disclosure of patient data that consisted of communications between the provider and patient for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment.

Resentencing hearing limited remand R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) statutory findings court not required to provide reasons or support for findings. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences at appellant's resentencing hearing. The court made the required statutory findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences, and it was not required to provide any reasons or support thereof.

Petition for postconviction relief abuse of discretion convictions for sexually oriented offenses ineffective assistance of counsel decision to not present expert testimony trial strategy. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's petition for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel's decision to not present the defense's expert witness, whose report contained potentially damaging opinions for the defense and, in some respects, corroborated the state's case, was trial strategy.

Gross sexual imposition pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance possessing criminal tools Crim.R. 32 motion to withdraw guilty plea made during sentencing hearing highly competent counsel abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made during sentencing hearing nothing in the record indicated that the defendant was not represented by highly competent counsel and, the court was not required to inquire as to counsel's experience.

Foreclosure order of confirmation of sale final, appealable order Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment motion for reimbursement of advances failure to appeal. Following JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Loseke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111983, 2023-Ohio-1893, orders of confirmation of sale were final, appealable orders and appellants could not use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for a timely appeal. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' Civ.R. 60(B) motions for relief from orders of confirmation of sale.

Procedendo, postconviction-relief petition, mootness. The court dismissed as moot a procedendo action seeking rulings on postconviction-relief petitions when the respondent judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the subject petitions.

guilty plea to promoting prostitution properly classified as Tier I sex offender under R.C. 2950.01(E)(1)(a) R.C. 2950.01(B)(2) exceptions do not apply nunc pro tunc order to correct clerical error mistake with reporting requirement

jury verdict in favor of defendant-insurance company on uninsured motorist claim inconsistent jury interrogatories as to proximate cause jurors failed to sign interrogatories errors rose to level of plain error

Sufficiency or the evidence manifest weight of the evidence drug possession, R.C. 2925.11 circumstantial evidence constructive possession

Consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings by trial court standard of review for consecutive sentence findings State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851

Manifest weight of the evidence

Adoption Best interest of children

Appellant failed to appear at the final divorce hearing and thus did not produce evidence at trial relevant to the property division or spousal support. As such, appellant waived any error in the trial court's property division and spousal support determinations. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not commit plain error by making comments and taking a recess during appellant's bench trial, and its conduct did not deprive appellant of the effective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole legal custody of two children to their material grandmother. Although the trial court found a change of circumstances (the divorce of the grandparents, who had legal custody of the children prior to the divorce), it reasonably concluded that it was in the best interest of the children for maternal grandmother, rather than Mother, to have legal custody. Judgments affirmed.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding temporary custody of appellant's children to a children's services agency. The court's decision was supported by competent, credible evidence. Appellant's trial counsel also did not act ineffectively by failing to call appellant's therapist as a witness. This choice was a matter of trial strategy, and appellant's unsubstantiated statement at trial that his therapist would have testified as to his completion of his case plan was irrelevant. Judgments affirmed.

The probate court erred by dismissing appellant's adoption petitions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where appellant was a lawful permanent resident who was attempting to adopt her two grandchildren, who also were lawful permanent residents. The probate court abused its discretion by dismissing the adoption petitions for failure to prosecute solely due to appellant's failure to advance court costs after the court found appellant was indigent. Judgments reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to challenge the veracity of allegations in two search-warrant affidavits. Appellant failed to make a substantial threshold showing of false statements or material omissions in the affidavits. The record does not portray ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's handling of the Franks issue. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to sever the 18 charges for which he was indicted. Joinder of all the charges was appropriate given that the evidence supporting each charge was simple and direct. The trial court also correctly determined that appellant's various rape, kidnapping, abduction, and assault offenses were not allied offenses of similar import that merged. Judgment affirmed.

No speedy-trial violation occurred where the trial court postponed appellant's trial date due to appointed counsel's motion to withdraw and the appointment of new counsel. Speedy-trial time was tolled during the delay at issue pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E), which tolls speedy-trial time for any period of delay "necessitated" by a defendant's motion. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, finds that the trial court did not err in granting Erie County Department of Job and Family Services (ECDJFS) motion for permanent custody, and denying Grandmother's motion for legal custody, where the evidence supported that permanent custody was in the child's best interest.

prior conviction pending appeal used to enhance OVI offense, R.C. 4511.19(G)

Defendant convicted of multiple counts of rape appeals from his conviction.

Appellant's conviction of fourth-degree misdemeanor domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(C) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim's testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish all the essential elements of the crime.

The domestic relations court did not err by dismissing appellant/cross-appellee's motion to modify spousal support where the domestic relations court's general reservation of jurisdiction over the issue was not done in accordance with R.C. 3105.18(E)(2), nor did the domestic relations court err by denying appellee/cross-appellant's motion for attorney fees where that decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for a self-defense jury instruction in a murder case.

Probate court failed to hold a hearing on guardian's final account as mandated by R.C. 2109.32, thereby depriving nursing home of the opportunity to file exceptions to the account pursuant to R.C. 2109.33. Reversed and remanded.

permanent custody, manifest weight of the evidence, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), best interest

Manifest Weight Witness Credibility Trier of Fact. The jury, as the finder of fact, is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness that appears at trial. A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury found the State's evidence more credible than the Defense's evidence. A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury chose not to believe the defendant's account of what transpired.

Custody Change in Circumstances Failure to Object. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that change in circumstances occurred.

The trial court properly informed defendant-appellant of the consecutive nature of her sentences. The trial court did not err by ordering defendant-appellant to pay court costs, fines, fees, court-appointed counsel fees, and reimbursement fees.

Mootness of Appeal. This appeal is moot because defendant-appellant voluntarily completed the jail term without seeking a stay from the trial court, the jail term was imposed for the non-felony offense of violating a no-contact order, and there was no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that defendant-appellant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights because of the challenged judgment apart from the already-served sentence itself.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated trafficking in drugs aggravated possession of drugs sufficiency of the evidence confidential informant corroboration of testimony constructive possession circumstantial evidence manifest weight of the evidence witness credibility.

CRIMINAL LAW - property code violations misdemeanors personal jurisdiction named defendant limited liability company void judgment.

CRIMINAL LAW - theft other acts evidence, intent, absence of mistake, highly probative, failed to demonstrate prejudiced the jury, invited error manifest weight, jury was free to believe state's version of events, credibility of witnesses.

CRIMINAL LAW- sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G) prison sentence community control sanctions compliance with the statutory requirements.

sufficiency, manifest weight, sentencing, unlawful threat of harm

Victims of crime. Objections overruled. Magistrate's decision adopted. Applicant's claim denied.

Victims of crime. No objections filed. Magistrate's decision adopted. Claim remanded for economic loss calculations.

Victims of crime work loss R.C. 2743.51(G) collateral source R.C. 2743.51(B)(5) attorney's fees R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b). Magistrate recommended claim be remanded to Attorney General for economic loss calculations. Original calculations contained errors, however, claim for attorney's fees was properly denied.

Victims of crime. Magistrate's decision adopted. Claim remanded for further investigation.

Victims of crime. No objections filed. Magistrate's decision adopted. Claim remanded for economic loss calculations.

Victims of crime R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b) civil protection order fees. Applicant proved that the civil protection order she obtained physically separated herself from the offender. Claim for civil protection order fees granted. Magistrate recommended claim be remanded for economic loss calculations.

Restitution order abuse of discretion

manifest weight of the evidence

Manifest Weight - Robbery

ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – WEIGHT - SUFFICIENCY: Defendant's conviction for assault was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim, even though she did not know defendant's name, identified defendant from a photo lineup and in court as the person on her left side who struck her several times with a closed fist consistent with a lump on the left side of the victim's face.

ASSAULT – R.C. 2903.13 – KNOWINGLY – PHYSICAL HARM – EVIDENCE – SUFFICIENCY: Defendant's conviction for the assault of a police officer was supported by sufficient evidence where the evidence established that defendant, after refusing to comply with a request that he submit to handcuffs, tussled with the officer and held her in a bear hug, causing the officer to experience bruising and soreness to her arm.

The magistrate's decision contained no error of law or other defect on its face. Therefore, we adopt as our own the magistrate's decision finding that that the actions sought in relator's complaint have already performed, and therefore he cannot show he is entitled to either an extraordinary writ of mandamus or procedendo. Accordingly, relator's request for a writ of procedendo and/or a writ of mandamus is denied. Complaint dismissed.

permanent custody, best interest, R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)

misdemeanor assault conviction supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence Appellant forced to proceed through sentencing unrepresented after attorney permitted to withdraw at sentencing hearing and court denied continuance state concedes error although Appellant served jail sentence, court declines to apply mootness doctrine and remands for resentencing with counsel.

Application to reopen App.R. 26(B) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel timeliness good cause and counsel's failure to inform client about App.R. 26(B). This court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen as untimely. The failure of appellate counsel to inform a client about App.R. 26(B) does not state good cause.

Voluntary manslaughter mens rea knowingly self-defense sufficiency manifest weight motion to dismiss suppressed evidence Reagan Tokes. The state provided sufficient evidence that appellant acted knowingly when he shot and killed the victim. Appellant admitted that he shot the victim but claimed he did so in self-defense. This court has found that when a defendant admits to shooting the victim but claims to have done so in self-defense, the defendant concedes that his or her actions were done knowingly. Further, the factfinder did not clearly lose its way in finding that appellant did not shoot the victim in self-defense because evidence in the record demonstrates that appellant was the initial aggressor because he told eyewitnesses that if the victim hit him he was going to kill him before walking over to the victim, putting his arms behind his back, and saying, "Go ahead, hit me again. Think I'm playing, hit me again." When the victim swung, appellant pulled out his gun and shot the victim. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to dismiss based on his assertion that the state suppressed evidence. Appellant did not establish that the state willfully or inadvertently suppressed evidence because the appellant's motion acknowledged that the state never had the evidence appellant wanted. Finally, appellant's indefinite sentence is not contrary to law because the Ohio Supreme Court found that the Regan Tokes Law is constitutional on its face.

Foreclosure summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) deposition cross-examination of affiant Civ.R. 56(F) service of subpoena Civ.R. 45. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to U.S. Bank when an opposition to summary judgment was never filed despite the trial court allowing for two extensions of time. Further, the party opposing summary judgment arguments that U.S. Bank was "hiding" a subpoenaed witness were improper where the out-of-state, nonparty witness was not properly served with the subpoena.

Domestic relations child support App.R. 3 and App.R. 4. The trial court did not err in finding appellant's motion to modify child support moot when the court's previous order disposed of the issue and appellant chose not to have this court review the previous interlocutory order but rather only the judgment entry finding appellant's motion moot.

Bindover discretionary transfer probable cause abuse of discretion amenability factors rehabilitation subject-matter jurisdiction ineffective assistance of counsel strategy. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by transferring the defendant's case to the adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B). Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel during the amenability proceedings by failing to present more persuasive arguments.

Felonious assault complicity self-defense sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence jury instruction inferior offense plain error ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's conviction for felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The state demonstrated that appellant was complicit with her sister in committing felonious and that the jury did not lose its way in convicting her because there was evidence that appellant aided, assisted, encouraged, or supported her sister in committing the felonious assault. Appellant met her burden in claiming that she acted in self-defense when she claimed that the victim hit her first, she was scared, injured, and smaller than the victim. The state met its burden in proving that she did not act in self-defense because evidence demonstrated that appellant was the initial aggressor and was not in fear of eminent bodily harm because a video of the fight showed appellant standing over the victim and hitting her while the victim laid there. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because while counsel did not request a jury instruction for the inferior offense of aggravated assault, we find that his decision to do so was a means of trial strategy because his theory of the case was self-defense. Finally, the court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury on aggravated assault. As stated, the theory of the defense case was self-defense. Judgment affirmed.

Delinquency sufficiency of the evidence discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle other acts evidence Evid.R. 404(B) Evid.R. 403 abuse of discretion. Sufficient evidence was presented to support an adjudication of delinquency for discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a rap video into evidence because the danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probative value, and the court stated that it would consider the evidence only for the proper purpose of identifying the suspect.

Manifest weight of the evidence manifest miscarriage of justice inconsistent testimony, corroborating evidence. Defendant was convicted after trial of kidnapping, rape, and felonious assault with sexual motivation and sexual predator specifications following a prolonged physical and sexual assault of the victim who sustained severe injuries. Defendant argues that the rape and specification convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence due to inconsistencies and contradictions in the victim's testimony. Defendant argued that because of the severity of the victim's physical injuries, the jury did not properly consider the import of those inconsistencies and contradictions. Inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's testimony do not entitle a defendant to a reversal of a trial. Because the jury heard the inconsistencies and any explanations and had the ability to weigh the credibility of the victim's testimony and where other evidence, including DNA evidence, corroborated her testimony, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Motion to quash subpoena, motion for protective order, final appealable order, abuse of discretion, testimony of attorney engaged in proceeding. Defendant filed motion to disqualify prosecutor and to dismiss his criminal case alleging that the assistant prosecutor assigned to the case intentionally withheld evidence and caused prejudice. Defendant did not subpoena the assistant prosecutor but orally requested her testimony at the time of the hearing on his motions. The state filed a motion to quash and for a protective order to prevent defendant from calling the assistant prosecutor to testify at hearing. A trial court's denial of a motion to quash or motion for protective order is generally a final, appealable order, and the court reviews the denial of such motion for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or misapplies the correct legal standard. Attorneys engaged in the prosecution of a case are prohibited from acting as both a witness and advocate in the same proceeding. However, if there are exceptional circumstances and no other means of presenting relevant and material evidence, a prosecuting attorney may offer testimony in a criminal case in which they are engaged. The record could not support a finding the assistant prosecutor's testimony was the only evidence available to defendant because there were other witnesses to testify about the collection, storage, and transmission of the evidence defendant alleged was withheld as well as records of what was provided in discovery. Because the trial court did not find that the assistant prosecuting attorney's testimony was the only testimony available, it abused its discretion by denying the motion to quash and for protective order.

Crim.R. 32.1 Crim.R. 11 manifest injustice postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not demonstrate a manifest injustice or that a fundamental flaw occurred during the plea proceedings.

Reverse bindover aggravated robbery category-two offense firearm motion to withdraw guilty plea manifest injustice. Trial court properly denied request for reverse bindover where juvenile defendant pleaded guilty to an offense that was subject to mandatory bindover to adult court. Trial court acted within its discretion in denying juvenile defendant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea where there was evidence that the prosecutor or the court erroneously promised the juvenile defendant that he would be eligible for reverse bindover.

Consecutive sentences proportionality finding R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). - Appellant's consecutive sentences were not contrary to law because although the trial court did not use the express statutory language in finding that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the danger the appellant posed to the public — the second part of the proportionality finding — considering the trial court's statements at sentencing in their entirety, the record reflected that the court considered both the seriousness of appellant's conduct and the danger he poses to the public and determined that the comparison supported the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Methods of service special process server personal service personal jurisdiction default hearing. Default judgment vacated. It was not clear whether plaintiffs obtained personal service on the defendant via a special process server.

Adjudication delinquency disposition sufficiency manifest weight evidence self-defense burden. Juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for grand theft and tampering with evidence is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The state satisfied its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that the juvenile did not commit the offenses in self-defense.

Mandatory bindover probable cause identification evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt. Judgment affirmed and remanded. The juvenile court's role in bindover proceedings is that of a gatekeeper because it is charged with evaluating whether sufficient credible evidence exists to warrant transfer to adult court. The state's burden in a bindover proceeding is to produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt. A juvenile court's probable cause determination in a bindover proceeding involves questions of both fact and law. An appellate court will defer to the juvenile court's determinations regarding witness credibility but will review de novo the legal conclusion whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged. The juvenile court's determination that the state's evidence did not raise more than a mere suspicion of guilt is affirmed. The state failed to present sufficient credible evidence — probable cause — on the issue of identification to warrant transfer of the case from juvenile court to adult court. The investigating detective did not identify the juvenile from the video evidence the second person on the video (also unidentified) appeared to be looking for something on or about the victim's person the entire incident occurred in under 30 seconds at night the masked perpetrator attacked the victim from behind and immediately tackled him to the ground and there was no evidence that the juvenile had threatened the victim, or even knew where he lived.

Conceded error Loc.App.R. 16(B) Crim.R. 11 plea erroneous journal entry consecutive sentences plain error. - Defendant never pleaded guilty to offenses. Accordingly, the trial court entered an erroneous journal entry indicating that the defendant pleaded guilty and the court found her guilty. The trial court committed plain error by imposing consecutive sentences on those offenses and ordering those sentences consecutive to another case.

Juvenile court did not err when it granted PCC of appellant's child to the agency because clear and convincing evidence in the record established, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.(B)(1)(a), the child could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time or should not be placed with appellant, and appellant did not challenge the juvenile court's conclusion that PCC was in the best interest of the child. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err as a matter of law in finding that there is evidence of an educational impact supporting this transfer. The hearing officer's and the State Board's consideration of the location of the Property was entirely appropriate as part of the balancing of factors required when considering a transfer of school districts. Neither did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that the Board's decision was supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The evidence showing the intent of the Petitioners to reside on the Property with their children and the location of the Property in relation to the Deer Cliff Run subdivision is reliable, probative and substantial evidence fully supporting the hearing officer's conclusion that the Property should be in the same school district as that of the Deer Cliff Run subdivision. This court may not reweigh the evidence, rebalance the factors, and substitute its judgment for that of the State Board where there is reliable, probative and substantial evidence supporting the decision of the hearing officer and ultimately the State Board. Judgment affirmed.

application for reconsideration App.R. 26 denial of motion for leave to amend answer to include affirmative defense of political subdivision immunity no obvious error no issue raised that was not fully considered

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Judicial Notice

Anders, consecutive sentences

Failure to give jury instruction manifest weight

Criminal law—Robbery—Court of appeals erred in determining that evidence was insufficient to support trial court's conclusion that appellee committed a theft offense and that in doing so, he threatened to inflict physical harm on two different people—R.C. 2911.02(A) (defining robbery as threatening to inflict physical harm on another while committing a theft offense) does not require that theft victim be person who was threatened—A defendant may not assert error on appeal based on late disclosure of evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory that was not disclosed until trial unless defendant raised the issue in trial court by requesting continuance or mistrial or by some other means—Appellee forfeited claim that he was entitled to new trial based on state's purported violation of Brady v. Maryland—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded for court of appeals to consider appellee's remaining assignments of error.

In considering appellant's pro se petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court properly determined that its subject-matter jurisdiction was not at issue. The petition was successive and untimely, and appellant did not establish that his untimely filing was justified under either of the exceptions set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A). As such, appellant was not entitled to a hearing on his petition. Judgment affirmed.

Conceded error. The trial court erred by not informing appellant at the sentencing hearing of the jail time credit, if any, to which he was entitled and by not including the jail time credit calculation in the judgment entry. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant's conviction for menacing by stalking was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in imposing maximum and consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to tax certificate holder on its foreclosure action. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Mother was not in contempt for missed parenting time, missed FaceTime calls, or a lack of communication. The trial court also did not err when it found no change in circumstances that justified a reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Because the trial court found no change in circumstances, it did not err by failing to do a best interest of the child analysis, which is only necessary after finding a change in circumstances. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it calculated child support. Judgment affirmed.

The judgment of the trial court was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant served her prison term, was released from prison, and is not on post-release control or other supervision. Because appellant has challenged only the trial court's decision to impose a prison term rather than community control sanctions, there is no relief that can be provided. Appeal dismissed as moot.

The probate court erred in entering a default judgment against appellant in a concealment action. R.C. 2109.50 et seq. set forth a special proceeding which requires the probate court to investigate and make a finding of guilt or innocence based on the evidence presented when someone is accused of concealment or embezzlement of assets of a guardianship. Because the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, the court is required to compel the accused's appearance to be examined, which can be accomplished by committing the person to jail, if necessary. The trial court failed to comply with these statutory provisions when appellant failed to appear at a hearing. The court also erred in entering a default judgment, which is not contemplated by the statutes in question. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Self-defense ineffective assistance of counsel, Crim.R. 29 motion

Mandamus, R.C. 505.371, Joint Fire District, County Auditor, Withdrawal from Joint Fire District

Trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing the claims with prejudice. The opposing party in this case did not file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. In addition, it is unclear whether the trial court dismissed the claims under the Civ.R. 12(B) standard of dismissal or granted summary judgment under the Civ.R. 56 standard. However, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of logistics company where the record shows that it established a Carmack Amendment claim by virtue of an assignment of rights from its customer.

Mother appeals decision adjudicating newborn son dependent. Children service's agency submitted clear and convincing evidence of circumstances giving rise to a legitimate risk of harm to the son if left in Mother's care. Mother had an active children services case, history of drug abuse, lacked suitable housing, and had not resolved issues leading to her other children's removal.

Trial court did not err in issuing a civil stalking protection order against respondent but trial court erred in imposing a firearm restriction for the duration of the order.

CRIMINAL - murder R.C. 2903.02(A) self-defense R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) weight of the evidence imminent danger of death or great bodily harm bona fide belief Batson challenge peremptory challenge

CRIMINAL - motion to withdraw guilty plea postsentence motion coercion threatened with maximum sentence appropriate to advise client of consequences prejudice favorable outcome abuse of discretion evidentiary hearing manifest injustice ineffective assistance of counsel

CIVIL - summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) contracts consideration promissory estoppel misrepresentation of fact negligence negligent misrepresentation statute of limitations R.C. 2744.04(A) contribution R.C. 2307.25(A) declaratory judgment Ohio EPA R.C. Chapter 6111 justiciability injunctive relief

SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ordinance, took effect in due time, even if lacked true emergency status, failed to challenge ordinance, void, impaired obligation of employment contract severance clause valid vague assertion violated public policy no genuine issues of material fact, appellee entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

CIVIL - declaratory judgment injunctive relief summary judgment R.C. 3313.411 unused school facility community school located within the territory of the district R.C. Chapter 3314 charter contract.

CRIMINAL LAW- community control sanctions revocation R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2953.08(G) sentencing entry recites R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 trial court considered the required statutory principles and factors.

JUVENILE LAW - Termination of parental rights best interest of child appellate standard of review importance of maintaining sibling relationships guardian ad litem does not recommend permanent placement affirmed.

CIVIL - complaint for in rem foreclosure married couple separate assets promissory note made by husband to wife for $100,000 note included confession of judgment provision domiciliaries and residents of Pennsylvania contract entered in Pennsylvania funds located in Pennsylvania Pennsylvania law governs mortgage secured promissory note real property located in Ohio Ohio court has subject matter jurisdiction over foreclosure actions relating to real property in a respective county Ohio lacks jurisdiction to enforce promissory note entered in Pennsylvania no error in denying motion for summary judgment.

CRIMINAL LAW- intervention in lieu of conviction ILC restitution R.C. 2505.02 not a final appealable order.

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights R.C. 2151.414 best interest of the child sufficient, credible evidence consistent with manifest weight of the evidence

CRIMINAL LAW- jury instructions polygraph results plain error analysis ineffective assistance of counsel manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2907.05 R.C. 2907.02 R.C. 2907.21 sufficiency of evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion for leave to file a motion for new trial convicted murder 1995 newly discovered evidence allegedly unavoidably prevented not equivalent to unaware jurors' affidavits R.C. 2945.33 alleged misconduct no presumption of prejudice could have obtained clear and convincing evidence communication was purportedly equivalent to Allen charge no error.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea of guilty felony of the first degree possession of cocaine plain error judge who accepted plea did not pronounce sentence by assignment assignment expired duly elected judge entered sentence judicial notice sentence not contrary to law.

Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor manifest weight witness credibility inconsistent testimony Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as substantive evidence of guilt plain error ineffective assistance of counsel of failure to object to testimony Crim.R. 52(B) R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) R.C. 2907.01(A) R.C. 2907.04(A) R.C. 2907.04(B)(3)

Objections overruled and magistrate's decision recommending denial of writ of mandamus adopted. Industrial Commission did not err by applying R.C. 4123.56(F) to claim for temporary total disability compensation because that claim remained pending as of the effective date of the statute. Magistrate did not err by finding there was some evidence to support Commission's decision that relator was capable of performing job duties with accommodations.

Judgment affirmed dismissing complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant failed to raise the issue of equitable tolling before the Court of Claims and therefore waived it for purposes of appeal. To the extent appellant sought to appeal issues relating to an alternative ground for dismissal or for rejecting his motion for summary judgment, such appeal was moot because the Court of Claims did not reply on the alternative ground and did not rule on the motion for summary judgment.

The magistrate's decision is adopted after having found no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions or law. Relator has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the requested relief or that the commission is under a clear legal duty to provide such relief.

The trial court erred when dismissing appellants' claims for conversion and replevin under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The trial court relied on matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment and providing the notice required by Civ.R. 12(B). In addition, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence by citing to inconsistencies in the record and concluding that appellants could not prove their claims, which appellants are not required to do at the pleading stage under the notice pleading standard of Civ.R. 8(A). Appellee's motion to strike appellants' reply brief is overruled because the appellants did not raise new assignments of error of the brief.

Mandamus, R.C. 2969.25(C)

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25(C)

Prohibition, R.C. 2969.25(C)

Assault theft felonious assault jury trial manifest weight witness credibility sufficiency complicit jury instructions on complicity drone and remote control hearsay abuse of discretion Confrontation Clause-waived truth of the matter asserted police conduct harmless error cumulative evidence national database-VIN number OLEG Reagan Tokes Law constitutional: due process, right to a jury trial, double jeopardy, separation-of-powers Crim.R. 29 Crim.R. 52(A) Evid.R. 801 Evid. R. 802 Evid.R. 803 Evid.R. 804 R.C. 2901.22(A) & (B) R.C. 2913.01(C) R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) & (B)(2) R.C. 2913.03(A) & (F)

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the judgment denying the motion to suppress, as police had basis to initiate traffic stop and extend the stop, based on odor of burnt marijuana and based on expired registration.

legal custody – best interest of the child – six-month extension of temporary custody – manifest weight of the evidence – significant progress on the case plan – clear and convincing evidence

legal custody – preponderance of the evidence – manifest weight of the evidence – six-month extension of temporary custody

legal custody, best interest

R.C. 3705.15 Birth Certificate

Suppression traffic stop K9 detection of drugs

Custody child support for high income earner retroactivity of child support order

Public Records R.C. 149.43(B)(2) A public records request is not overbroad if it the requester sets discernable bounds to what it seeks by identifying the subject matter, officials with knowledge of the subject matter, and a relevant time frame Nothing in the text of R.C. 149.43 precludes requests comprehensively addressing a topic if the request is sufficiently clear A request is not overbroad simply because there are many responsive records The undue burden concept of Civ. R. 26(B)(6)(b) does not apply to public records requests a requester does not seek "complete duplication of the voluminous files kept by government agencies" if it only seeks a subset of a type of record A public office denying a public records request on the grounds that the request seeks a "complete duplication of the voluminous files kept by government agencies" has the burden of proving the volume of the records involved.

Inmate-petitioner's affidavit of prior civil actions supporting his petition for writ of prohibition failed to satisfy R.C. 2969.25(A), as it failed to include several civil actions petitioner had previously filed, and petitioner did not file objections to magistrate's decision recommending dismissal of petition for failure to comply with statute. Magistrate's decision adopted and petition dismissed.

On Respondent's objection, the Court sustained the objection to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted, in part, the Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to produce certain evidence. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by the Requester, excepting attorney fees.

In consolidated cases, after neither party filed timely written objections to a Special Master's Report and Recommendation that recommended a judgment in favor of Respondent, the Court found that there was no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation.

On Respondent's objections, the Court sustained Respondent's first objection that challenged whether requested documents were records. The Court found Respondent's second, third, and fourth objections were moot. The Court rejected the Special Master's Report and Recommendation.

On Respondent's objections to a Report and Recommendation, the Court overruled the objections and adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to produce all emails responsive to Requester's first public records request. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by the Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Defendant's assignment of error challenging the trial court's calculation of jail-time credit was rendered moot when defendant was released from incarceration therefore, appeals must be dismissed.

Judgment reversed. The trial court erred by sustaining an objection which was never made and by rendering judgment without considering all the evidence. Because appellant's income decreased significantly in the year prior to trial, the court erred by failing to explain why it refused to reserve jurisdiction to modify the spousal support award.

On personal guarantors' appeal of trial court's denial of motion to quash filing and execution of foreign state judgment. Under Georgia law, guarantors failed to assert alleged defense of personal jurisdiction, guarantors' consent to jurisdiction and express waiver of objections to jurisdiction in guarantee agreement were valid and enforceable, and guarantors have failed to present any basis upon which an Ohio court could hold that Georgia judgments were void or any reason that trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to quash. Assignment of error overruled and judgment affirmed.

mandamus, R.C. 149.43, motion to dismiss, public records request, records pertaining to probation and parole proceedings exempt

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for tortious interference with contract and business relations. An essential element of a tortious interference claim is interference by an outside party to the contract or business relationship, but plaintiff does not name any party that interfered with its contracts and business relationships other than defendants. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for civil conspiracy. Because employees of the state of Ohio are all employed by the same legal entity, they cannot conspire with each other under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for quantum meruit because the evidence shows that plaintiff did not confer a benefit on defendant. The trial erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. Questions of fact remain regarding whether defendant breached the contract and the amount of damages plaintiff sustained. Moreover, under the continuing breach theory of accrual, plaintiff potentially has timely claims for breach of contract to pursue.

sufficient evidence of possession drugs manifest weight of the evidence lack of demand for expert testimony on lab report effective assistance of counsel felony sentence.

Parental rights permanent custody R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time R.C. 2151.414(E) factors best interest of the child R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) reasonable efforts due process rights. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that at least one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applied and that it was in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. The agency made reasonable efforts to refer Mother for services and effectuate reunification with her child. Mother's due process rights were not violated when the trial court granted permanent custody to the agency.

Breach of contract Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment genuine issue of material fact. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on a breach-of-contract claim where the plaintiff's claims were not based on a valid contract between the parties.

Civ.R. 60(B)(5) standing res judicata. - Trial court's decision denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion without conducting a hearing upheld where the grounds challenging the plaintiff's standing to foreclosure on appellant's property were raised and rejected in her prior appeal. Res judicata bars appellant's attempt to relitigate the issues previously raised or issues that she could have previously raised during summary judgment and on appeal.

Accelerated appeal operating a vehicle under the influence OVI administrative license suspension Bureau of Motor Vehicles BMV appeal timeliness. Affirmed the municipal court's order dismissing an appeal of a Bureau of Motor Vehicles administrative license suspension imposed when a driver refused a chemical test after being arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The driver failed to comply with the statutory deadline for filing an appeal from the suspension. While the driver alleged that the arresting officer and the BMV were dilatory in instituting and informing him of the suspension, the driver still waited three months to file his appeal even after receiving notice of the suspension. That delay long exceeds the statutory deadline for this kind of appeal.

Contempt. The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate's decision finding the appellant in contempt.

Sentencing R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Trial court did not clearly and convincingly err in sentencing appellant to prison where appellant pleaded guilty to charges that carried a presumption of prison and there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of prison. The trial court further was not required to place findings on the record. The trial court's journal entry noting that it had considered all of the required factors was sufficient.

Coroner deputy coroner R.C. 313.19 declaratory judgment amend death certificate coroner's verdict judgment on the pleadings. Trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings and dismissed deputy coroner where complaint failed to state a claim against the deputy coroner on which relief could be granted. Trial court erroneously granted judgment on the pleadings and dismissed coroner where there was an issue of fact in the pleadings as to whether the named coroner was the proper party on which relief could be granted.

R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 felony sentencing sentence contrary to law. Appellant, a repeat felon, pled guilty to robbery, a felony of the third degree, for committing a bank robbery in which he handed the teller a note that he said he had a gun. The trial court stated that it considered all required factors and principles of felony sentencing according to the Revised Code, noted the nature of the crime, the effect of robbery on victims, and recited Honey's criminal history in imposing a 36-month sentence. Appellant argued the sentence was contrary to law. He stated that the trial court's questioning of why the charges were reduced and its statements regarding the effect of the robbery on victims were impermissible considerations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. A sentence is contrary to law where (1) the sentence falls outside the statutory range for the particular degree of offense, or (2) the trial court failed to consider the statutory purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The trial court imposed a 36-month sentence for robbery a term of imprisonment authorized by law, and the record reflects the trial court considered the purposes and principles and applicable factors of felony sentencing. The sentence imposed was not contrary to law.

Trafficking R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) drug possession R.C. 2925.11(A) possession of criminal tools R.C. 2923.24(A) forfeiture specifications motion to suppress search vehicle odor suspected marijuana cocaine sufficiency manifest weight. Affirmed appellant's convictions for trafficking, drug possession, and possession of criminal tools, as well as the forfeiture specifications on each count. The trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress where the officers had probable cause to search appellant's motor vehicle after smelling the odor of raw marijuana. The appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Final, appealable order sua sponte Office of Child Support Services Recommendation R.C. 3119.60 R.C. 3119.63 arrearage motion motion to modify support refile motion to modify postdecree motion continuing jurisdiction lack of service Civ.R. 75 personal jurisdiction Civ. R. 4 service of process presumptive service no rebuttal evidence. The trial court's order was a final, appealable order even though the court did not adopt an Office of Child Support Services Recommendation. The trial court rendered a final, appealable order when it dismissed Husband's motion for judicial review under R.C. 3119.63 since Husband would be foreclosed from presenting his arguments on the recommendation outside this appeal. The trial court's dismissal of Husband's support modification motion was a final, appealable order because while Husband could refile a motion to modify support, he would be entitled to a support reduction retroactive only to the date of the new filing. The trial court's dismissal of Husband's arrearages motion was not a final, appealable order since Husband could refile the motion and obtain appropriate relief in the future. The trial court erred when it found Husband's motion for judicial review filed pursuant to R.C. 3119.63 was subject to Civ.R. 75(J) and the related service requirements. The trial court erred when it dismissed Husband's motion for support modification for lack of service when husband served the motion in accordance with Civ.R. 75(J) and Civ.R. 4 to 4.6 and demonstrated good cause for why the motion was not filed within six months after its initial filing.

Involuntary manslaughter aggravated assault reserve prosecution preclusion res judicata. Affirmed. Defendant conceded that the death of the victim directly resulted from the conduct underlying his conviction for aggravated assault, to which a claim of self-defense cannot be raised, and therefore, the conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not in error.

Present-sense impression Evid.R. 803(1) hearsay Evid.R. 801 inconsistent testimony credibility abuse of discretion manifest weight sufficiency force aggravated burglary R.C. 2911.11 R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the victim's statements because they were admissible as a present-sense impression. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Gocan's statements because they were inadmissible hearsay and not relevant. In addition, there was sufficient evidence of "force" to sustain a conviction for aggravated burglary. Finally, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way thus, appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Vandalism serious physical harm drug possession possession of criminal tools sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence forfeiture jury instructions admission of firearm evidence allied offenses merger of drug trafficking and possession. The state presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find Stubbs guilty of drug possession, possession of criminal tools, and vandalism. Stubbs's convictions were also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the trial court erred when instructing the jury that the state's burden when proving forfeiture was preponderance of the evidence, the error was harmless because the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that the elements of forfeiture were met. Stubbs was not prejudiced by the admission of firearm evidence, and even if he was, the error was harmless because evidence of Stubbs's guilt was overwhelming. The trial court erred when it did not merge drug possession with drug trafficking because the two offenses are allied offenses of similar import. However, the trial court did not err when it did not merge drug trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) (sell or offer to sell) and 2925.03(A)(2) (prepare for shipment or distribution) because they are not allied offenses of similar import. The case was remanded for merger and resentencing.

Contempt procedural due process Sixth Amendment R.C. 2705.03. Trial court erred when it held appellant-attorney in contempt of court for late arrival to the second day of trial where the court never advised parties when to appear on that date, the jury was ordered to return at 12:45 p.m., and counsel arrived at 1:30 p.m., the same time the parties were set to arrive on the first day of trial. Trial court erred when it summarily punished the attorney in contempt when late arrival is an indirect contempt entitling the recipient to the procedural safeguards set out in R.C. 2705.03. Trial court violated defendant-appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it removed his retained counsel due to perceived issues of competence that were not supported by the record and without giving defendant-appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Ineffective assistance of counsel guilty plea consecutive sentences mandatory fine. Appellant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a guilty plea where the record does not reflect that counsel gave improper advice and counsel negotiated the dismissal of multiple charges in exchange for the plea. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record accordingly, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences must stand. Additionally, the trial court appropriately addressed the minimum and maximum sentence. Finally, the trial court properly imposed a mandatory fine. In order to waive the fine, an affidavit averring the appellant is indigent and unable to pay the fine must be filed. As that requirement was not met, the trial court was required to impose the mandatory fine.

Confrontation domestic violence endangering children trespass firearm nontestimonial excited utterance hearsay exception sufficiency manifest weight. Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the trial court's admission of the victim's nontestimonial statements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the victim's out-of-court statements pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the prohibition against hearsay. Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Gross sexual imposition rape sexual battery soliciting telephone harassment Crim.R. 16 R.C. 2945.12 Crim.R. 43(A) parental-status jury instruction force effective assistance of counsel strategy consecutive sentences disproportionality finding. - The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to exclude the victim's cell phone records as a sanction for the state's inadvertent violation of Crim.R. 16. The court's determination that the defendant's absence from trial was due to the defendant's own actions was supported by competent and credible evidence and thus, the court did not err in proceeding with trial in the defendant's absence. Defendant's convictions for sexually related offenses were upheld when the evidence demonstrated that the defendant used his parental status to force, compel, and manipulate the victim to engage in sexual activity and conduct. Based on the evidence, the trial court properly provided the parental-force jury instruction. Counsel was not ineffective in their strategic decision to acknowledge defendant's conduct as immoral and disgusting, but focus on the lack of evidence corroborating the elements of the offenses. Case remanded for resentencing on consecutive sentences when the trial court did not engage in a full consecutive-sentence analysis when it failed to make the full disproportionality finding.

Ineffective assistance of counsel sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is overruled where he failed to cite to caselaw or statutes in support of his argument that trial counsel erred when he failed to "bifurcate" the having weapons while under disability charges. Appellant's conviction for abduction was supported by sufficient evidence where after appellant shot the victim, he and his mother prevented her from leaving the residence and calling a family member, appellant held a gun all or a majority of the time, and he did not take the victim to the hospital for 20-30 minutes while she bled profusely. Appellant's convictions were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Victim's inconsistencies on minor matters did not make her testimony regarding the shooting less credible. The possibility that the victim was using drugs was speculative because none of the items found at the defendant's home were ever tested for drugs and the victim denied they were hers. Other evidence challenging the investigation and the lack of certain evidence did not detract from the victim's testimony and her injuries.

R.C. 2929.14 consecutive sentences aggregate sentence modification R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Appellant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences is sustained. This court does not hold a firm conviction and belief that the evidence supports the imposition of the aggregate sentence imposed, and the sentence is modified pursuant to this opinion.

PROCEDURE/RULES – COMPLAINT: The trial court did not err in granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint where plaintiffs failed to name the defendants in the body of the complaint and failed to assert any claims against them. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' alternative motion for leave to amend the complaint where plaintiffs failed to tender a proposed amended complaint or to explain how they would resolve the complaint's deficiencies. See Olthaus v. Niesen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230142, 2023-Ohio-4710, ¶ 27.

SENTENCING: Defendant's convictions for driving left of center, failing to stop after an accident, and failing to comply with the signal of a police officer were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where two officers observed and pursued defendant fleeing the scene of a collision. Defendant's sentences for failure to stop and failure to comply were contrary to law because the financial sanctions he received differed from what was announced at the sentencing hearing.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — NOTICE — EXCEPTION: Any potential error arising from the failure of plaintiffs to receive notice of the trial court's entry granting the defendant's motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim was harmless where the trial court would have been permitted to sua sponte dismiss the complaint without notice as it is obvious that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on the facts alleged in their complaint.

EVIDENCE — TAMPERING — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — MIRANDA: The trial court correctly found that defendant's pre-Miranda statements were made during a noncustodial interview and it did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where defendant voluntarily offered incriminating statements after detectives provided Miranda warnings. There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's tampering-with-evidence conviction where defendant, knowing that police would investigate the shooting that occurred inside of her home, admitted to finding the deceased's phone after the shooting and placing it inside of her purse.

CHILDREN – PERMANENT CUSTODY – STANDARD OF REVIEW – JUV.R. 40(D) – R.C. 2151.414 – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when it granted permanent custody to the children services agency where appellant mother had not demonstrated long-term stability and sobriety, as required by her case plan, and the court properly considered all of the best-interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D). An appellate court does not review a juvenile court's permanent-custody decision for an abuse of discretion rather, the court reviews the decision under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, based upon the parties' arguments.

RAPE – ATTEMPT – MANIFEST WEIGHT – EXPERT TESTIMONY – HEARSAY: The child-victim's testimony that defendant performed oral sex on the victim and placed his penis on the outside of her "butt" constituted sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for rape and attempted rape. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court reasonably concluded that a sexually-transmitted-infection diagnosis did not constitute newly discovered evidence because defendant experienced symptoms of the infection before trial. It was harmless error for the trial court to admit evidence containing a physician's conclusion that there is a high likelihood that sexual abuse had occurred based on nothing more than the victim's statements because the state did not mention the expert's testimony during closing argument and the trial court did not rely on that statement to reach its judgment. The trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony on delayed disclosure from a social worker with specialized information and extensive experience conducting forensic interviews who demonstrated her knowledge of the subject at trial. The trial court did not err when it allowed an expert witness to testify that the child-victim's behavior during the forensic interview was consistent with children who have experienced sexual abuse, because that testimony assisted the trier of fact's understanding of the nature of the child's behavior while disclosing abuse and the expert declined to testify about whether the abuse had occurred. The trial court did not err in admitting a recording of the child-victim's statements during a forensic interview, where the interviewer testified that the purpose of the interview was to determine if a physical examination or mental-health treatment was necessary, the child understood the need to be truthful, and the questions in the interview were not leading.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Permanent disbarment.

Habeas corpus—Parole revocation—Appellant's petition failed to state with sufficient specificity facts that would entitle him to habeas relief—Court of appeals' judgment granting warden's motion to dismiss affirmed.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment premises liability negligence attendant circumstances open and obvious workers' compensation. Workers' compensation was plaintiff's sole remedy for damages after an injury on an uneven sidewalk. Additionally, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff because the sidewalk's defective condition was open and obvious, and no attendant circumstances were present at the time of the injury. Judgment rendered for defendant.

The trial court's judgment granting custody of the parties' two minor children to the appellee did not constitute an abuse of discretion and was not against the weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Per Mayle, J., the evidence reasonably supported finding that appellant fled after raping victim, so trial court did not err by giving consciousness-of-guilt instruction based on flight. Trial court's pattern jury instruction was not tailored to the facts of the case, making it potentially misleading to the jurors, but the error was harmless. Because the instruction allowed the jury to reach its own conclusion about the import of the flight evidence, it was neutral in its effect and not prejudicial.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing where the petition failed to state a substantive ground for relief. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the de facto date of the termination of the parties' marriage, in dividing marital and nonmarital property, or in rejecting appellant's claims of financial misconduct. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not properly raised on appeal from a divorce proceeding. Judgment affirmed.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court correctly confirmed registration of a foreign parenting decree under R.C. 3127.35. Appellant failed to establish that the decree "has been modified" within the meaning of R.C. 3127.35(D)(2). A Missouri court issued orders temporarily overriding a North Carolina custody order, but the Missouri court dismissed its cases and terminated its jurisdiction, so the Missouri orders did not affect the validity of the North Carolina order, as required to preclude registration in Ohio.

Appellant's successive petition for postconviction relief was untimely and barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Osowik - Appellant's misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in its imposition of consecutive sentences. The consecutive sentencing findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgments affirmed.

Civ.R. 12(C), R.C. 2744.03, R.C. 128.32, immunity, judgment on the pleadings

Per Duhart, J., the nine factors that courts generally consider in evaluating a presentence motion to withdraw a plea all weigh against granting the motion, thus court did not abuse its discretion when it denied motion. Appellant failed to establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient, thus he cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

No trial court sentencing error. Judgment affirmed. Osowik

Petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied without a hearing where the defendant, who claimed that he would have accepted plea if his counsel had shown him state's evidence, relied entirely on his own affidavit and where the evidence was inconsequential, especially in light of other, direct evidence of his guilt, which defendant was made aware of before refusing the plea offer.

App.R. 16(A)(7), untimely petition for post-conviction relief, extraordinary writs

Appellant's convictions for assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense when he sprayed pepper spray into the victims' faces. Appellant cannot provoke an assault or voluntarily enter an encounter and then claim a right of self-defense.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee, a group home for wayward boys, where appellant, the administrator of her late son's estate, failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact existed that could subject appellee to liability for negligent supervision under a theory of in loco parentis.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of Rules of Professional Conduct—Indefinite suspension with no time credited for interim suspension is appropriate sanction for attorney convicted of a felony stemming from attempt to engage in sexually motivated conduct with underage victim.

Court of appeals' judgment reversed on the authority of In re Z.C. and cause remanded to court of appeals.

Legal Custody. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting grandparents legal custody of children trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that parent's visits with children be subject to grandparents' discretion trial court's order that parties are not to engage in "negative communication" is not ambiguous.

Because determinations regarding weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are within the province of the trier of fact, we find the trial court's decision granting a DVCPO for one year upon evidence of physical violence and verbal threats is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Judicial Release R.C. 2929.20(K). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant-appellant's judicial release and reimposing his original prison sentence with credit for time already served.

Ability to Pay Waiver of Mandatory Fine Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The trial court properly considered appellant-defendant's present and future ability to pay before assessing a mandatory fine. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Crim.R. 11 Ability to Pay Mandatory Fine. Defendant-appellant did not demonstrate that his plea was anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court properly considered defendant-appellant's present and future ability to pay before assessing a mandatory fine.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized incident to May 27, 2020 search because R.C. 2967.131, which authorizes warrantless searches of individuals or felons on post-release control, is not unconstitutional.

Vehicular Manslaughter Failure to Yield R.C. 2903.06(A)(4) R.C. 4511.43(A). The evidence at trial supported a finding that defendant-appellant violated R.C. 4511.43(A) by not yielding the right-of-way to the victim's vehicle. The defendant-appellant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Felonious Assault R.C. 2903.11 Abduction R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) Evid.R. 804(B)(1) Evid.R. 616 Merger of Offenses R.C. 2941.25. The trial court did not err in admitting the victim's testimony from the preliminary hearing, not allowing defendant-appellant to introduce evidence of a false accusation made against him, or not merging defendant-appellant's offenses together. Defendant-appellant's convictions for felonious assault and abduction were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAIR DEBT COLLECTIONS PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) CIV.R. 8. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee. Defendant-appellant failed to allege a FDCPA violation in the manner contemplated by the civil rules.

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Assault R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) failure to file Crim.R. 12.2 Notice of Self-Defense ineffective assistance of counsel it is reasonable trial strategy to not pursue self-defense claim where evidence is conflicting and where trial counsel argues for a lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault.

CIVIL - Declaratory judgment summary judgment to obtain a declaratory judgment, there must be an actual or justiciable controversy justiciability requires the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff to be present and not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events speedy relief.

CRIMINAL LAW - theft R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) criminal damaging R.C. 2909.06 Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence sufficient evidence to support convictions convictions consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence.

CIVIL LAW - summary judgment Civ.R. 56 union cemetery pursuant to R.C. 759.27 R.C. 759.39 de novo standard of review trial court failed to consider application of contract principles.

CRIMINAL LAW - community control sanctions revocation consecutive prison terms R.C. 2953.08(G) contrary to law R.C. 2929.14 suspended sentence improper.

CIVIL - Ohio's Open Meetings Act minutes do not reflect location of meeting or members present executive session discussed matters not statutorily authorized exhibits sworn statements no seal not specified under Civ.R. 56(C) appointment and employment not a special meeting advance notice identify purpose employment enveloped scope of discussions during executive session.

JUVENILE - transfer of jurisdiction custody matters Massachusetts, R.C. 3127.21 UCCJEA inconvenient forum abuse of discretion magistrate decision.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea post-sentencing competency evaluation abuse of discretion competent, credible evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW - gross sexual imposition rape of child under 13 years of age eight counts of felony-one rape sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence delayed reporting physical evidence not conclusive victim did not behave as though she feared appellant filial duties force requirement not as high authority sexual conduct weight of evidence supports conviction conviction supported by sufficient evidence.

CRIMINAL - Having Weapons While Under Disability R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) manifest weight of the evidence, sufficiency of the evidence firearm specification R.C. 2941.145 a firearm specification is an enhancement to the underlying charge R.C. 2901.05 self-defense committing Having Weapons While Under Disability does not involve the use of force.

new arguments on appeal evidence de hors the record res judicata postconviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

CIVIL - When a person sentenced to death whose competency is in question attempts to waive his statutory right to counsel pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(J)(1), the trial court must determine whether the petitioner has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.

defense counsel did not render ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to request a presentence investigation (PSI) at plea hearing prior to sentencing.

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

consecutive sentences, post release control

Appointment of arbitrators

SEXUAL IMPOSITION – SEXUAL CONTACT – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – PURPOSELY – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE – JOINDER: The trial court did not commit plain error when it did not instruct the jury on the meaning of "purposely" in the context of the definition of "sexual contact" where the court instructed the jury to rely on its individual and collective knowledge and understanding of the meaning of any undefined terms. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the definition of "purposely" where it was not plain error for the court to fail to give such an instruction and counsel presented an argument based on the required element of purpose. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining defendant's two counts of sexual imposition against separate victims in a single trial where the evidence of each count was simple and distinct.

PLEAS — CRIM.R. 11 Where the trial court was not bound by the recommended sentence in the plea agreement and explained to defendant the difference in the potential sentence as opposed to what was stated on the plea form, the trial court did not err to defendant's prejudice in deviating from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement, especially where defendant ultimately was sentenced to the four years she had bargained for. Where the trial court explained the clerical error in the written plea form and confirmed defendant's understanding of the correct potential sentence, defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered the guilty plea.

ARBITRATION — CONTRACTS — MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS AND COMPEL ARBITRATION: The trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration where the arbitration clause in the parties' contract stated that it applied to any claims "arising out of" a separate contract and defendants failed to submit an authenticated copy of the separate contract into the record.

Where the trial court granted appellant's late motion for jail time credit requesting 676 days, and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections website reflects the credit was applied, appellate court can provide no further relief and appeal must be dismissed as moot.

Criminal. Crim.R. 11-Knowing, intelligent, voluntary plea. Because we cannot conclude, after considering the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant's guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, or that the trial court erred in the acceptance of the pleas, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Where petitioner alleged ambiguities and a typographical error in his sentencing entry, trial court did not err in granting Respondent's motion to dismiss habeas petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), as sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and thus are not cognizable grounds for habeas relief Petitioner had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a direct appeal or postconviction review.

sufficiency of the evidence – Crim.R. 29 – manifest weight of the evidence – aggravated robbery – identity – forensic evidence

manifest weight of the evidence, public indecency

Rape - GSI - Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor - Manifest Weight - Suppression - Miranda Warnings - Fifth Amendment - Mistrial

Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor sentence contrary to law

Repeat Violent Offender Sentencing

Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Competency Appellate Counsel's Access to Presentence Investigation Report The trial court was not required to make an express determination of competency to stand trial where the defendant stipulated to the competency report and failed to maintain her claim of incompetency the trial court did not err in imposing costs of supervision although appellate counsel is entitled to access the presentence investigation report for purposes of appeal, counsel is not entitled to a copy of the report and thus, Gallia County's policy of only permitting in-person review of the report was not unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to law.

Ohio state highway patrol trooper conducted a lawful traffic stop based on probable cause and the fact that the trooper did not cite Appellant for an underlying traffic violation is not new and material evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 3737 U.S. 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), which would exculpate Appellant or impeach the trooper further, even if Appellant was able to support allegation of Brady violation, nothing suggested that Appellant was prejudiced as required by the third prong of Brady test because Appellant's petition was untimely, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider it and constitutional claim of Brady violation should have been dismissed additionally, had the petition been timely, Appellant's claim would also be barred by doctrine of res judicata where Appellant would have known or should have known prior to filing his direct appeal that trooper did not charge him with underlying traffic violation any argument that State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St. 3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, was relevant or applicable to Appellant's sentencing is misplaced because of factual differences, should have been brought in his direct appeal, and is now barred by res judicata.

Because relator failed to file a postsentence motion in the trial court pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) regarding alleged errors pertaining to jail-time credit, the availability of a plain and adequate remedy at law precludes the issuance of a writ of mandamus on such grounds.

In accordance with magistrate's recommendation, action dismissed.

Magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and the petitioner's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus is sua sponte dismissed.

No objections or transcript filed in trial court to magistrate's decision

SENTENCING – R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) – COMMUNITY-CONTROL VIOLATION – R.C. 2929.15 – POSTRELEASE CONTROL – CRIM.R. 43: Where the community-control violations committed by defendant were both technical and nontechnical, the trial court was not limited to imposing the 90-day limit for technical violations for a fifth-degree felony offense set forth in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i). The trial court erred by failing to provide the required postrelease-control notifications at the sentencing hearing. The trial court violated defendant's Crim.R. 43(A) right to be present during sentencing when it failed to impose a sentence for the offense of aggravated possession of drugs in open court at the sentencing hearing.

JURY WAIVER – R.C. 2945.05: The trial court violated defendant's right to a jury trial when the trial court proceeded to a bench trial without first addressing defendant in open court and confirming that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, as required by R.C. 2945.05.

Period of pre-trial house arrest did not qualify as confinement for purposes of determining jail-time credit therefore, trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for jail-time credit.

Because appellant did not make hearing transcript necessary for resolution of his assigned error part of the appellate record as required by App.R. 9, did not file objections to the magistrate's factual findings or legal conclusions as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), and did not argue on appeal that the domestic relations court committed plain error when it granted wife's motion for contempt for failure to pay child support, we must presume regularity of the proceedings below and validity of the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits of appellant's sole assignment of error. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the pre-decree sale of the marital residence and was a final appealable order. The trial court also did not violate Appellant's due process rights in scheduling briefing deadlines informally. Appellant's third assignment of error stems from an interlocutory order over which this court lacks jurisdiction and is dismissed. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Appellant entered his guilty plea voluntarily because the trial court warned appellant that it could impose a sentence greater than the jointly recommended sentence, and it did not promise any particular sentence to appellant. An appellate court may not reivew a felony sentence for an abuse of discretion. The Reagan Tokes Law is not facially unconstitutional.

CIVIL – In a complaint to compel arbitration, assertion that the grievance was untimely-filed required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, thereby constituting a procedural or subsidiary question to be determined by the arbitrator, rather than a threshold question to be determined by the trial court.

dereliction of duty charges dismissed Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967) Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) State did not meet burden of proof that it did not use Garrity materials dismissal proper remedy

CIVIL – summary judgment Civ.R. 56 de novo review oil and gas lease is a contract subject to the same rules of interpretation as other written agreements by its own express terms, the Term Royalty Conveyance was limited to the oil and gas lease in effect at the time and only burdened subsequent oil and gas leases upon the occurrence of certain conditions precedent the record reveals none of the conditions precedent occurred the trial court did not err in applying a plain reading of the Term Royalty Conveyance anti-washout provision last antecedent rule the Term Royalty Conveyance ended at the same time as the Mason Dixon Lease, just as the parties intended rule against perpetuities R.C. 2131.08 warranty of title slander of title the language of the contract is clear judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – On summary judgment, the plaintiff has no obligation to disprove the defendant's affirmative defenses. There is no independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing apart from a breach of the underlying contract. Appellant failed to demonstrate federal preemption of a breach of contract claim on a credit card account.

CRIMINAL LAW – felonious assault aggravated burglary guilty plea consecutively sentenced to a total indefinite prison term of 14 years (minimum) to 18 years (maximum) Reagan Tokes Law the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2929.13, and its imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) is supported by the record judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – In action for replevin and conversion, party seeking return of personal property must execute an affidavit in conformance with R.C. 2737.03 to demonstrate ownership in order to survive motion for summary judgment.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal property sold in tax foreclosure plaintiff has no interest in the property complaint properly dismissed vexatious litigator

Permanent custody case plan housing basic needs reasonable time domestic violence mental health referral reasonable diligent best interests clear and convincing evidence manifest weight. Competent, credible evidence supported the court's finding that it was in child's best interest to award permanent custody to CCDCFS and that the child could not be placed with his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed his parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), 2151.414(E)(1), (4), (14), and (16). The juvenile court's judgment granting the agency's motion for permanent custody and terminating Mother's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Involuntary manslaughter juvenile court mandatory transfer R.C. 2152.12 probable cause complicity guilty plea waiver. Affirmed. The defendant's argument regarding whether an offender under the age of majority is subject to mandatory transfer to the general division has been overruled in State v. Bond, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110520, 2022-Ohio-1246, and any argument pertaining to the factual foundation of the probable-cause determination cannot be challenged based on the defendant's guilty plea to improper discharge and involuntary manslaughter offenses.

Consecutive sentences community control probation-violation hearing suspended sentence notification imposition of prison ineffective assistance of counsel. The imposition of consecutive sentences upon revocation of community control was improper where the court did not notify the defendant of the possibility of suspended sentences being run consecutively. The trial court's imposition of prison was proper. The defendant received effective assistance of counsel.

Legal custody magistrate's decision objections timely transcript Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) independent review abuse of discretion adopted prematurely. Reversed the decision of the juvenile court that prematurely adopted the magistrate's decision and committed the child to the legal custody of the child's father. The juvenile court entered final judgment when mother had timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) and her request to file a transcript was granted, but the transcript was not yet submitted. The matter was remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to permit mother to file the requested transcript and to then conduct the independent review required by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d).

Rape gross sexual imposition sufficiency manifest weight digital penetration sexually violent predator specification. Defendant's rape and gross sexual imposition convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and the weight of the evidence, except for one in which the evidence was not sufficient to support a rape conviction but was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of gross sexual imposition. Trial court's guilty finding on sexually violent predator specifications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the trial court erroneously found the defendant guilty on one specification that required proof of a prior conviction of sexually violent offense but there was no evidence of a prior conviction.

Aggravated menacing domestic violence, harassment by inmate community-control sanctions prison term felony sentencing. The court's discretionary imposition of prison was not contrary to law when defendant violated a bond condition while awaiting sentencing.

Involuntary manslaughter gross abuse of a corpse corrupting another with drugs death consecutive sentence separate cases findings R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) support R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sentencing entry nunc pro tunc Reagan Tokes Law indefinite sentence. Affirmed appellant's convictions and sentence, but remanded the matter to the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that incorporates its consecutive-sentence findings. The trial court made all the required consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and the consecutive sentences were upheld under the R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) standard. R.C. 2929.14(C) does not distinguish between multiple counts in a single case and multiple counts in separate cases. Multiple sets of findings were not required. Rejected constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law.

Independent contractor employer employee employment relationship manifest weight overtime Federal Labor Standards Act Ohio Minimum Wage Standards Act wages right to control economic reality test Bostic test prompt payment. The trial court did not err in finding appellant an independent contractor as opposed to an employee. Persons claiming employee status must prove they are employees right to control the manner of work is the chief test in determining whether one is employee or independent contractor.

Crim.R. 8(A) joinder of offenses Crim.R. 14 severance plain error other acts test simple and direct test Evid.R. 404(B) prejudice ineffective assistance of counsel futile act imposition of sentences on firearm specification having weapons while under disability R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e). Defendant did not show that the trial court's failure to, sua sponte, sever offenses relating to three separate incidents for trial constituted an obvious error or that there was a reasonable probability that any alleged error resulted in prejudice, affecting the outcome of the trial. The offenses relating to the three incidents were charged together under Crim.R. 8(A) because they were of the "same or similar character" and were "based on two or more acts or transactions connected together" that were part of a "course of criminal conduct" occurring in close proximity, in or around the same geographic area, over a relatively short period of time. Evidence of the other offenses may have been admissible other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) if the offenses related to each incident had been tried separately because defendant used the vehicle he stole in the first incident to facilitate his crimes in the second incident, there were a number of striking similarities between the manner in which the offenses in the three incidents were committed, suggestive of a modus operandi, and evidence offered in support of the kidnapping and rape charges in the second incident would have arguably been admissible to rebut defendant's claim of consent in the third incident (and vice versa). The evidence supporting each offense was simple and direct without significant overlap or conflation of proof, and the state presented substantial evidence supporting defendant's convictions. Defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to request severance where defendant did not show a motion to sever, if filed, would have been successful and or that he was prejudiced by the joinder of the offenses at issue. Trial court did not commit plain error in imposing sentences on the firearm specifications attached to having weapons while under disability charges where the parties stipulated to the admissibility of judgment entry establishing defendant's prior first-degree felony conviction and it could be reasonably inferred from the facts that less than five years had passed since defendant was released from prison or postrelease control for the prior offense, satisfying the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(e).

Magistrate's decision custody Civ.R. 75 R.C. 3105.73 abuse of discretion App.R. 18(C) attorney fee award reasonableness. Reversed in part and remanded. Appellant failed to demonstrate error with the guardian ad litem's appointment solely in that capacity and not as counsel to the children, but the domestic relations court erred in awarding attorney fees based on a heavily redacted fee bill.

Medical negligence delivery R.C. 2305.252(A) peer review privilege privileges suspended revoked Evid.R. 611 Evid.R. 613 motion in limine relevancy Evid.R. 401 unfairly prejudicial Evid.R. 403(B) impeachment cross-examination. - Defendant-physician did not withstand his threshold burden of establishing the existence of a committee that met the statutory definition of peer review committee contained in R.C. 2305.25(E). Trial court's determination that peer review committee privilege shielded defendant-physician about hospital privilege status was in error. Nevertheless, the trial court properly limited examination about hospital privileges because the probative value of whether defendant-physician's hospital privileges were suspended or revoked following the child's delivery was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. No abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to limit cross-examination of defendant-physician about the status of his privileges.

Manifest weight having weapons while under disability firearm specifications. The defendant's conviction for having a weapon while under disability, with a 54-month firearm specification, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where a witness testified that she saw the defendant enter an apartment with a firearm on his hip and later saw him move the firearm to a coat pocket.

Felonious assault deadly weapon sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 702(C) expert testimony police officer testimony ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence or based on insufficient evidence. The police officer's testimony was properly admitted by the trial court. The appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Hearsay excited utterance exception felonious assault sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of the evidence. - Trial court did not improperly consider hearsay testimony in bench trial because the defendant's statement to his neighbor regarding who shot him was not hearsay under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule defendant's conviction for felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Crim.R. 11 plea hearing motion for new attorney on day of trial Sixth Amendment right to counsel Crim.R. 44. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a new attorney. The request was made on the day of trial. Appellant's plea was in compliance with Crim.R. 11.

Administrative appeal zoning variance motion to dismiss mootness. The trial court properly dismissed an administrative appeal as moot where the appellant failed to obtain a stay or seek an injunction and construction of the fence in question had already begun.

Contempt of court, direct contempt, contemptuous conduct, punishment, sufficiency of journal entry, standard of review, abuse of discretion. The trial court held appellant in direct contempt following an outburst from the gallery in a courtroom. The outburst caused the deputy sheriff to move to remove appellant and the court stopped the proceedings. The court summarily imposed a $100 fine and ordered that appellant remain in custody until the fine was paid. A trial court has both inherent and statutory authority to summarily punish acts of misbehavior in the presence of the court that obstructs the administration of proceedings. An outburst in a courtroom that disrupts court proceedings may be punishable by direct contempt. The punishment imposed must be reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the conduct. The journal entry of contempt must contain the facts upon which the contempt was found because it is critical for the reviewing court to be able to examine the facts upon which the trial court based its direct contempt finding. Because a court has summary power to punish contempt, the contemnor does not have the right of allocution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to direct contempt proceedings. A finding of direct contempt is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The trial court's finding of contempt for an outburst that stopped the court's proceedings is not an abuse of discretion. Appellant did not have the right to allocution because the court has both inherent and statutory power to punish a contemnor for direct contempt. A $100 fine for contempt and an order not to leave until the fine was paid was proportionate to the disruption caused and reasonable. The journal entry finding appellant in contempt affirmatively states the reason for the contempt finding and did not preclude appellate review.

Final appealable order R.C. 2505.02 dismissal without prejudice divorce GAL fees newly filed action jurisdiction. Judgment is vacated. The domestic relations court's judgment in the newly filed, underlying action awarding the GAL fees incurred in the dismissed 2019 case is a final and appealable order because this order, if not immediately appealable, would not afford appropriate relief to the parties in the future. Furthermore, the domestic relations court was without jurisdiction to order the GAL fees in the underlying action because the 2019 case was dismissed without prejudice and is treated as though it never commenced.

Temporary custody abused child R.C. 2151.031(D). The trial court erred when it adjudicated J.I. to be abused. The trial court erred when it adopted the magistrate's decision committing the children to the temporary custody of CCDCFS.

Crim.R. 33 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial hearing newly discovered evidence recanting witness abuse of discretion conclusory assertions. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying, without a hearing, defendant's motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(6) and (B) based on (1) affidavits related to the testimony of a recanting witness and (2) the discovery of municipal court records allegedly showing another witness lied at trial regarding the date he performed court-ordered community service. Defendant presented no evidence detailing his efforts, if any, to timely discover recanting witness testimony or explaining why any such efforts would have been unavailing. Likewise, defendant provided no affidavits or other evidence detailing how he learned of the existence of the municipal court records and why he, his attorneys or his private investigator could not have timely discovered them. Defendant's conclusory assertions that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the new evidence he sought to support a motion for a new trial did not require a hearing on his motion for leave.

Jurisdiction subject-matter jurisdiction probate court estate bar association Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(f) Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss R.C. 2109.50 separation agreement fee-sharing dispute. Probate court correctly concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over concealment actions filed in that court because the actions were a dispute between the two law firms regarding the division of shared legal fees arising out of a separation agreement between the law firms and individual attorneys and therefore jurisdiction is exclusively with the state or local bar association pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 1.5.

Jury panel, venire, challenge, admission of evidence, excited utterance, Evid.R. 803(B)(2), manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant was charged with murder, felonious assault, and having weapons while under disability following the death of the mother of one of his children. The victim was killed by a single gunshot to the back of her head, and her body was found at the side of her house. Defendant's son testified that his mother and defendant were arguing and that after he heard a gunshot, defendant left the house. The son looked for his mother and found her lying on the ground outside. The victim's daughter testified that after she heard a gunshot, defendant came into the house and said it was no big deal and then left the house. Before trial, defendant objected to the venire because it did not contain any African-American men. The trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss the venire because there was no evidence that African-American men were unfairly represented in venires in Cuyahoga County or systematically excluded from jury service. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing body-camera footage of police arrival at the scene of the murder because the statements were excited utterances where they were made by declarants that observed a startling event and they were still under the stress of the event. Circumstantial and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and the state is not required to present DNA or fingerprint evidence to meet its burden of persuasion. Although there was no DNA evidence and the weapon used to kill the victim was not recovered, the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Community-control sanctions community-control conditions R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a) R.C. 2929.25(B) R.C. 2929.25(D)(2) expiration of community-control sanctions App.R. 12(A)(1) and modify. The housing court did not abuse its discretion where the court imposed modified terms of community control pursuant to its authority under R.C. 2929.25(B). The housing court did not erroneously extend appellant's term of community-control sanctions, but imposed the term stated in the original sentencing judgment entry. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1), this court remands the case so that the trial court can modify the judgment entry and delete confusing and incorrect conditions of community control.

Abuse of discretion presentence motion Crim.R. 11 vacate plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hicks's presentence motion to withdraw plea. Including that Hicks had a change of heart due to the influence of others no manifest injustice occurred to require Hicks's plea be vacated where it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and the trial court did not completely fail to inform Hicks of the maximum penalty he face trial court complied with Crim.R. 11, speculation that "others" committed the offense without more is not enough to vacate plea sentence is contrary to law where the trial court ordered a term of years at the oral sentencing hearing, which was different than what was ordered on the JE clerical mistake to be corrected by nunc pro tunc JE to provide Hicks with complete notifications of the consequences face for violations postrelease-control supervision.

Probable cause for bindover sufficiency and weight of the evidence hearsay juror misconduct opinion testimony ineffective assistance of counsel. Juvenile court did not err in binding over appellant to adult court where evidence established all elements of the crime and there was sufficient evidence to identify appellant as one of the perpetrators to meet the probable cause standard necessary for bindover. There was sufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions, where there was video of the entire incident and sufficient evidence identifying appellant as one of the suspects. Although mother denied identifying her son, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that contradicted her testimony to show the state presented sufficient evidence as to all elements of the charges. However, the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conviction for having weapons while under disability where they introduced certified copies of the appellant's prior adjudications, which included his name, birth date, and physical description, but no one in the state's case-in-chief testified as to appellant's birth date and physical description. Appellant's convictions were supported by the greater weight of the evidence. It was not plain error when the trial court allowed the case to continue when a juror overheard one of the appellant's family members speaking loudly about the case and that juror felt what he heard influenced his ability to continue. The trial court removed that juror, questioned the remaining jurors, and determined that although some were aware of a loud conversation by appellant's family members, none of them heard what was said, and felt they could continue to impartially deliberate. The trial court erred when it allowed the state's video expert to testify about his opinion of the contents of surveillance video however, the error was harmless. The witness testified about the colors of clothing, he did not attempt to identify the suspects, and he was subject to cross-examination on those opinions. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney opened the door for redirect testimony or when he failed to request a new trial after the jury incident. There was sufficient evidence even without the complained-of testimony for the jury to find appellant guilty therefore he failed to establish prejudice. Further, appellant was not prejudiced by the video expert's testimony, as the appeals court could not find that the outcome would have been different if the evidence had not been allowed.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Appellant's guilty plea following the trial court's denial of bail rendered moot his argument that the trial court should not have denied him bail, and the matter is not one of great public or general interest such that we may consider it despite its mootness. Moreover, appellant's argument that the trial court should not have denied bail is without merit under any of the standards of review applied by other appellate courts. He was indicted for a qualifying offense, and there was strong evidence that he committed the offense, that he posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and that no release conditions would reasonably assure the safety of that person or the community. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The trial court erred in granting appellee jail-time credit for days he served in prison for an unrelated case while the current case was pending. Further, the sentences in the current case were imposed consecutively to those in the unrelated case, and jail-time credit is not available in such situations. Judgment reversed only as to jail-time credit and remanded for issuance of a new judgment entry omitting jail-time credit.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee on appellant's race discrimination and sex discrimination claims. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's application for DNA testing, motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial, and request to obtain the discovery in appellant's trial court case under the Ohio Public Records Act. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's statement during a plea hearing about appellant's two offenses not merging as allied offenses did not invalidate his guilty plea. The trial court's tentative assessment of the issue repeated what defense counsel already had told appellant and was supported by case law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's 18-month concurrent sentences for domestic violence and vandalism are not contrary to law. Appellant's argument that the trial court should have sentenced her to community control, rather than prison, is precluded by State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649. Judgment affirmed.

No objections or transcript filed in trial court to magistrate's decision

Motion to withdraw plea

Sulek, J. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's Crim.R. 36 motion to correct the record.

Judge Duhart. Permanent custody. Mother. Drug issues. Methamphetamines. Lack of employment. Filthy, cluttered, smelly house with bugs, animal wastes. Truancy concerns. Suspected sexual abuse. Lack of dental care for the child.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to continue sentencing hearing, where it had granted an earlier request and where the purpose of defendant's motion was occasioned by a collateral criminal proceeding in another county. Trial court was under no duty to postpone sentencing hearing indefinitely, especially where the defendant bore the responsibility for the circumstances giving rise to the need for the request.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court's rejection of insanity defense was not against manifest weight of evidence. State's experts testified that appellant knew his conduct was wrongful, and defense expert conceded that appellant "was not incapable of recognizing any wrongfulness to his behavior." Court properly weighed recordings made in aftermath of the shootings and did not substitute its own standard.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed.

motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), breach of contract, fraud, settlement agreement, attorney fees, frivolous conduct

disqualify, disqualification, counsel, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion

The trial court did not err by denying a petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) without first holding a hearing where, although the trial court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata, the petition did not provide sufficient evidence to establish substantive grounds for relief that would have required the trial court hold a hearing on appellant's petition.

Mother appeals order denying contempt motion against Father and granting Father's motion to modify the shared parenting plan. Magistrate applied the correct standard in assessing whether a parent should be held in contempt for failing to facilitate the other parent's parenting time. Mother argued that court erred by failing to find a change of circumstance before modifying shared parenting plan. Change-of-circumstance finding only required for modifying the shared parenting decree and specifically with respect to a change in custodial parent.

The trial court erred by imposing sanctions under Civ.R. 37(C) where neither the trial court's findings nor the record evidence shows a violation of the Civ.R. 26(E) duty to supplement discovery responses.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a contractor where pro se property owner did not file a response to the contractor's motion for summary judgment.

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for new trial, abuse of discretion

REMISSION OF PENALTY BOND FORFEITURE R.C. 2937.39 SURETY. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by remitting only $70,000 of a collective $150,000 surety bond.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IMPORTUNING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. The defendant-appellant's importuning conviction is based on sufficient evidence. The trial court made the appropriate findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences.

CRIMINAL - R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)(C)(2) Gross Sexual Imposition Disseminating Materials Harmful to Juveniles R.C. 2907.31(A)(3)(F) manifest weight of the evidence insufficient evidence sexual contact sexual arousal or gratification the jury, as factfinder, was free to believe or disbelieve witness testimony and determine credibility R.C. 2901.22(C) recklessly R.C. 2907.01(E) harmful to juveniles prurient interest.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), appellate review, R.C. 2929.12 factors consecutive sentences, deferential review, record contains evidence that supports trial court's findings.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing Anders gross sexual imposition two counts plea of guilty under 13 years of age consecutive sentences R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) maximum sentences supported by the record Jones not contrary to law reconsidered Gwynne decision reinstated consecutive sentencing review that existed prior to December 2022 requisite findings made.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - petition for writ of habeas corpus R.C. 2725.01 motion to dismiss moot bond reinstated released from confinement.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - petition for writ of prohibition motion to dismiss failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted statutory authority intervention in lieu of conviction R.C.2951.041 stay of proceedings court-ordered intervention plan successful completion of plan results in dismissal of charges violation of plan may result in imposition of sentence.

On request for immediate interim remedial suspension.

Mandamus—R.C. 149.43—Public-records requests—Statutory damages—Writ granted in part and denied in part—Relator awarded $2,000 in statutory damages.

Criminal law—Definition of "motor vehicle" in R.C. 4501.01(B) is used for penal laws and applies to offense of aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a)—R.C. 4501.01(VV)'s qualifying language regarding principal purpose of a vehicle does not look to how vehicle was used at time of charged conduct but vehicle's principal purpose—The record was insufficient to support appellee's convictions for aggravated vehicular assault because vehicle being operated at time of charged conduct was a "utility vehicle"—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in finding that Miller failed to plead a claim for declaratory relief. The allegations in the Amended Complaint clearly show that Miller is not a party to the Federal Transit Administration ("FTA") Master Agreement therefore, he cannot bring claims pursuant to it, whether they be direct claims or claims via declaratory judgment. Furthermore, Miller has cited to no authority supporting its right to bring a private cause of action under the FTA Master Agreement. Neither did the trial court err in finding that Hocking Athens Perry Community Action, as Project Administrator ("HAPCAP") did not breach the Contract and in dismissing Miller's claim for breach of the Procurement Regulations. The Contract clearly and unambiguously provides that HAPCAP has the sole and exclusive option to extend the Contract and has the right to reject any pricing quoted for additional periods. It further clearly does not require HAPCAP to issue a second Request for Proposal ("RFP"), and neither does the Procurement Regulations. Finally, the trial court did not base its dismissal of Miller's Amended Complaint for failure to join a necessary party but instead pointed out that it had warned Miller to join Barons yet Miller had failed to do so. Judgment affirmed.

Because appellant did not establish grounds for accepting the application for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.74(B)(1), the trial court was not required to comply with R.C. 2953.75 in connection with appellant's petition for postconviction relief. R.C. 2953.21(I) precluded appellant from raising the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during postconviction proceedings as grounds for relief in an appeal from the denial of his petition. Judgment affirmed.

Plaintiff-appellant, a woman allegedly injured while being transported from a hospital wheelchair to her husband's car, failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants based on the complaint containing time-barred medical claims pursuant to R.C. 2305.113(A) and (E) and after previously denying appellant's Civ.R. 75(F) motion for an extension of time to oppose summary judgment and striking appellant's subsequent attempt to file an untimely brief in opposition to summary judgment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff-appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from a judgment of dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's claim arose out of an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, and defendant was a Kansas corporation. In dismissing plaintiff's claim, the trial court held that the lawsuit had no connection to Franklin County, Ohio, and was therefore beyond the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, as defined in R.C. 1901.18(A). Because plaintiff's claim did not fall within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, he could not establish the existence of a meritorious claim. Nor did plaintiff establish the other prerequisites for relief from judgment, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Judgment affirmed.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — R.C. 2305.113 — MEDICAL CLAIM — STATUTE OF REPOSE — R.C. 2305.15: The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff patient's claim for vicarious liability against defendant hospital based on the medical-claim statute of repose where R.C. 2305.15 is only applicable to toll claims against the person who is alleged to be out of the state, absconded, or concealed, and there is no claim that the hospital was ever out of the state, absconded, or concealed. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff patient's claim for negligent credentialing against defendant hospital based on the medical-claim statute of repose where this court's precedent establishes that the claim is a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff patient's claims for fraud in the concealment and constructive fraud against defendant doctors based on the medical-claim statute of repose where this court's precedent establishes that the claims are medical claims under R.C. 2305.113 and the last culpable act regarding these claims was the date of the underlying surgery.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - SEARCH AND SEIZURE – OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE – EVID.R. 403(A) – PLAIN ERROR - CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the execution of a search warrant in which defendant argued that the warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched where even though the warrant designated the wrong apartment letter, the affidavit in support of the warrant consistently stated that the evidence would be found at the apartment on the second floor of a two-story building on the northwest corner. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the execution of a search warrant where, even though the affidavit supporting the warrant did not contain a notary seal, the affidavit met the specific requirements of R.C. 2933.23 and Crim.R. 41(C)(1), and those provisions prevail over the more general statutes governing notaries and their certifications, and suppression is only warranted for rule violations of a constitutional magnitude. The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting other-acts evidence of five controlled buys that occurred before the execution of a search warrant at defendant's residence under Evid.R. 404(B) or in failing to exclude that evidence under Evid.R. 403(A), where due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the outcome of the trial would not have been otherwise. Defendant's conviction for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented competent, credible evidence that defendant constructively possessed drugs found in the basement of an apartment building including tear-offs from plastic baggies, lottery tickets, firearms, digital scales and other items related to drug trafficking along with several documents bearing defendant's name and address. The trial court did not err in failing to grant defendant's request to fire counsel made at the sentencing hearing, to investigate whether new counsel was appropriate or whether defendant should be permitted to represent himself where defendant had changed counsel numerous times, his request to fire counsel was not timely made, he did not demonstrate good cause to change counsel, and the trial court had no choice but to impose a mandatory sentence. The appellate court need not address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant failed to specify where counsel was ineffective for failing to object.

FELONIOUS ASSAULT – EVIDENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT: Defendant's conviction for felonious assault was not against the weight of the evidence where the victim testified that defendant hit her five or six times with a gun causing two black eyes and lacerations on her forehead, left eyebrow, and scalp that required stitches, and the factfinder found the victim's testimony to be credible.

CONSTITTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – PROBABLE CAUSE: The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to suppress a gun and drugs found in his car where the record provided competent and credible evidence that the police officer observed defendant with a gun and knew he was under a disability, and the officers had probable cause to believe defendant committed the offense of having a weapon while under a disability.

NEW TRIAL — POSTCONVICTION: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's Crim.R. 33(A)(6) motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing where the motion lacked merit: defendant failed to attach the potential alibi witness's affidavit to his motion and, even if the alibi witness would have testified as defendant claims, the new testimony did not disclose a strong probability of a different result if a new trial is granted and merely contradicted evidence at trial considering defendant's admission that he had been present with his codefendant when the crimes occurred. The common pleas court did not err by dismissing defendant's successive petition for postconviction relief where defendant could not meet the jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 2953.23: defendant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts underlying his postconviction claims where he was present at all relevant times during his trial and sentencing hearing and knew that his trial counsel had failed to object to the admission of certain evidence and the nature of the sentencing hearing and where defendant knew prior to trial of a potential alibi witness and had been present with this witness when his codefendant had allegedly confessed to them that he had committed the crimes alone.

CUSTODY – SUBJECT-MATTER JURISIDICTION – UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT – R.C. 3127.15 – R.C. 3127.17 – FOREIGN CUSTODY DECREE: Pursuant to R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) and (2), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify a Texas custody decree under R.C. 3127.17 because there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Ohio was the home state of the child six months prior to the commencement of the action or that Texas declined to exercise jurisdiction.

CIV.R. 56 — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — EVIDENCE — ACTION ON AN ACCOUNT — ACCOUNT STATED: In an action on an account, the trial court did not err in considering an affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of summary judgment where the affiant averred that she had access to and had reviewed the pertinent account records, and that the statements in her affidavit pertaining to the account were based on personal knowledge of the account records, and where defendant failed to submit any evidence to the contrary. Where, in an action on an account, the defendant failed to object to the authenticity of credit-card statements submitted by plaintiff in support of summary judgment, defendant's argument that the trial court erred in considering the statements is waived for purposes of appeal. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action on an account where the evidence submitted in support of summary judgment was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for money owed on the account and defendant failed to submit any evidence in response to show that the established amount was incorrect. The trial court did not err by failing to hold a case-management conference prior to ruling on a summary-judgment motion where there is no requirement to do so prior to ruling on a dispositive motion and where defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to hold a case-management conference prior to ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

suppression hearing, manifest weight, attempted burglary, burglary, R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), scope of assignment of error

res judicata, motion for leave to file motion for new trial, Crim.R. 33(B)

sufficiency, sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, substantial impairment

Declaratory judgment zoning de novo standard of review

nonsupport of dependents, restitution, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), economic loss, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

Withdrawal of counsel

The trial court complied with our remand instructions, from State v. Sylvester, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-530, 2022-Ohio-3798, by resentencing appellant to concurrent prison terms. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment of the trial court reversed and remanded for court to indicate the basis for its valuation of the marital residence.

ASSAULT — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: Where the trial court as the factfinder properly gave more weight to the victim's testimony, after finding it more credible than defendant's testimony, and where there was physical evidence of the assault, the trial court did not err in finding defendant guilty of assault.

CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive misdemeanor sentences where each sentence was within the statutory range for first-degree misdemeanors, the total aggregate sentence was within the 18 month threshold of R.C. 2929.41(B)(1), and the trial court considered appellant's conduct, behavior, and rehabilitation in determining the sentences.

DIVORCE – MARITAL DEBT – MARITAL PROPERTY – R.C. 3105.171 – SPOUSAL SUPPORT: Husband did not need to object at the close of evidence to preserve an evidentiary objection made during the trial before a magistrate for review by the trial court. The trial court did not err when it allocated a substantial portion of marital debt to wife as a sanction under R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) for failure to comply with the court's discovery orders. The trial court did not err in determining that a vehicle was not marital property when the uncontroverted evidence showed that, although the vehicle was titled in husband's name, husband's adult daughter had made all payments for the vehicle, the vehicle was intended for her exclusive use and benefit, and husband did not deposit the proceeds from an insurance payment after the vehicle was totaled in an accident. The trial court abused its discretion when it entered an award of spousal support where the court did not explain its basis for deciding the amount and the duration of support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require husband to reimburse wife for life insurance premiums paid by wife during the pendency of the divorce where wife did not request relief from the court from continuing to make payments and it would be inequitable to require husband to bear the cost of the policy without notice. The trial court erred when it set a deadline for wife to turn over to husband proof of payments for the couple's child's school expenses to the day after the court mailed the decree of divorce to the parties.

DISCOVERY – ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE – CIV.R. 26: The trial court did not err when it ordered production of defendant insurer's claims file up to the date of a benefits payment where plaintiffs insureds alleged that defendant unreasonably delayed the processing, handling, and payment of their benefits claim in bad faith. The trial court did not err when it ordered the production of defendant insurer's claims file without conducting an in-camera inspection for privileged attorney-client communications where defendant's conclusory statements failed to establish the existence of privileged documents.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 56 – COMMON CARRIER – NEGLIGENCE – BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE: Where defendant, a common carrier, moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence claim and satisfied its initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it breached the applicable duty of care by failing to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers consistent with the practical operation of the system, and where plaintiff failed to meet her reciprocal burden of setting forth specific facts to show the existence of a triable issue of fact, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant.

Termination of parental rights manifest weight clear and convincing evidence R.C. 2151.414 R.C. 2151.413 best interest of the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. Judgment affirmed. Clear and convincing evidence exists upon which the juvenile court could have determined that (1) permanent custody was in the best interest of the children and (2) the children cannot or should not have been placed with the parents.

Municipal court, common pleas court, declaratory judgment, jurisdiction to vacate judgments, jurisdiction of Cleveland Municipal Court, void judgments, mandamus, prohibition, judicial resources, conflicting judgments, and discretion to issue writs. This court issued a writ of prohibition to the common pleas court not to adjudicate a declaratory judgment claim seeking to declare judgments of the municipal court void. The court in the exercise of its discretion ordered the common pleas court to return the entire case to the Cleveland Municipal Court in the interest of judicial efficiency and to avoid risking conflicting judgments.

Motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5) reasonable time abuse of discretion. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5) as untimely filed where appellants did not meet the "reasonable time" requirement of Civ.R. 60(B) because they offered no explanation regarding why they waited nearly ten years after judgment to file the motion.

Sealing convictions, R.C. 2953.33(B)(1), intervention in lieu of conviction, R.C. 2951.041(E), notice. Vacated. A trial court lacks the authority under R.C. 2953.33(B)(1) to seal a conviction without the filing of an application, notice to the state, and a hearing on the matter.

Rape gross sexual imposition sufficiency manifest weight digital penetration sexually violent predator specification. Defendant's rape and gross sexual imposition convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and the weight of the evidence, except for one in which the evidence was not sufficient to support a rape conviction but was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of gross sexual imposition. Trial court's guilty finding on sexually violent predator specifications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the trial court erroneously found the defendant guilty on one specification that required proof of a prior conviction of sexually violent offense but there was no evidence of a prior conviction.

Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Association collective bargaining agreement arbitration award overpayments recoupment equitable estoppel. The county overpaid several grievants in 2021 by mistake, and when the county realized its mistake, it unilaterally deducted the grievants' pay over three pay periods in 2022. The issue on appeal is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he determined that the county's unilateral recoupment of the 2021 overpayment by deducting the grievants' 2022 pay did not comport with the provisions of the CBA. Our review indicates the arbitrator did not exceed his powers because the arbitration award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the arbitrator's application of equitable estoppel is supported by a detailed analysis of the arbitration and court precedent. Because we find no statutory grounds exist to vacate the arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, the trial court's judgment affirming the award is affirmed.

Admission of testimony hearsay Confrontation Clause plain error Evid.R. 801 prearrest silence Fifth Amendment substantive evidence of guilt course of investigation ineffective assistance of counsel failure to object prior bad acts Evid.R. 404 propensity. The trial court did not allow hearsay testimony or testimony that violated appellant's right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In addition, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Withdraw of guilty plea jurisdiction pending appeal. - Trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas because appeals were pending in both the appellate court and the Ohio Supreme Court. The trial court's consideration of the motions were inconsistent with the reviewing courts' jurisdiction to decide the issue on appeal.

Competency competence to plead guilty R.C. 2945.37 sua sponte due process indicia of incompetence ineffective assistance mental illness schizophrenia Reagan Tokes indefinite sentence separation of powers trial by jury. The trial court did not deny the defendant due process of law when it accepted his guilty plea without ordering, sua sponte, a competency hearing. The defendant reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia during the plea colloquy and had a history of substance abuse, homelessness and other instability in his life. But the record did not contain sufficient indicia of incompetence to hold that the defendant's right to a competency hearing was constitutionally guaranteed or that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to raise the issue of competency. The defendant answered the trial court's questions appropriately and without any signs of confusion or misunderstanding. Nothing in the record demonstrates that he was struggling to understand what was occurring at the plea hearing so as to put the trial court on notice that a competency evaluation was warranted. The record does not reflect anything out of the ordinary in his behavior and demeanor in the courtroom and his counsel at no point suggested that he was unable to assist in his defense. The defendant's constitutional arguments related to indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law were overruled pursuant to State v. Hacker, Ohio Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.

Rape R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) sexual contact R.C. 2907.01(B) sexual arousal or gratification Confrontation Clause Rape Shield Law. The state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant touched the victim's buttocks, vagina, and breasts to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of sexual arousal or gratification to convict the defendant of gross sexual imposition. The trial court did not err when it denied the defendant's request to cross-examine the victim regarding her alleged prior allegation that she was pregnant with defendant's child when there was nothing to indicate that she had made the prior statement. The trial court did not err when it granted the state's request to limit the defendant's cross-examination of the victim's father about a report that he made to child and family services ten years previously.

Felonious assault improperly discharging a firearm endangering children criminal damaging having a weapon while under disability motion for mistrial discovery violation sanction discretion Crim.R. 16 fair trial new trial Crim.R. 33 due process Crim.R. 29 acquittal sufficiency admission of evidence Evid.R. 901 Evid.R. 602 harmless error Crim.R. 52(A). Affirmed appellant's convictions for felonious assault and related counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motions for a mistrial and imposing a less severe sanction for a discovery violation under Crim.R. 16 where appellant was not prevented from receiving a fair trial, nor did the court err in denying appellant's request to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal when sufficient evidence was presented to prove the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of video evidence under the silent witness theory pursuant to Evid.R. 901, in permitting the lead detective to testify to the contents of the video pursuant to Evid.R. 602, or in the admission of several exhibits and any error in this regard was harmless at best.

Murder discretionary SYO specification age 13 plea agreement blended sentence ineffective assistance of counsel stipulation. - Juvenile did not demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the plea agreement that minimized his risk of more years in adult prison before parole did not contain any stipulation that the juvenile agreed that the trial court would impose the discretionary SYO. Juvenile did not demonstrate that the outcome of the case would be different, i.e., the trial court would not have imposed a blended sentence, if counsel advocated stronger or provided more mitigation evidence because the court found that the nature of the offense and that the juvenile was already not abiding by the rules in juvenile detention, warranted the imposition of the discretionary SYO.

Delinquency adjudication rape sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's delinquency adjudications for rape and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record contains evidence that the appellant forced the victim to engage in fellatio. Further, the court did not clearly lose its way in adjudicating the appellant delinquent despite the fact that the victim did not report the rape for two years. Furthermore, the fact that no physical evidence was introduced does not make the adjudications against the manifest weight of the evidence because there is no requirement that physical evidence be presented.

Mandamus—Public Records Act—Statutory damages—On remand, court of appeals correctly held that requester was not entitled to statutory damages—Requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered public-records requests by certified mail—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Civil law—Civ.R. 38—Civil-jury-trial demands—Trial court's local rule did not require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a jury deposit—Under Civ.R. 38(D), a party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court.

Partial trial court error in convicting and sentencing appellant on five counts of violating municipal junk motor vehicle ordinance. Judgment affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. Osowik.

Trial court did not err when it denied motion to suppress evidence appellant's sentence was supported by the record and not contrary to law.

Trial court's order denying defendant's motion to vacate default judgment did not address whether appellant rebutted presumption of service. Reversed and remanded for court to make a credibility determination regarding appellant's testimony that he never received the summons and complaint.

Per Mayle, J., in this FELA action, even if trial court had excused untimeliness of plaintiff's expert disclosure and memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff failed to present summary-judgment quality evidence in opposing railroads' motion. Expert reports attached to opposition brief were not authenticated and could not be considered. Without expert testimony, he could not defeat summary judgment.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's denial of postconviction relief petition, as petition challenged counsel's effectiveness in failing to file a motion to suppress in underlying case as affecting a knowing guilty plea, with the suppression issue waived by the plea and the validity of the plea otherwise barred by doctrine of res judicata.

Sulek, J., writing for the majority, holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's presentence motion to vacate his guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

Deferring to the juvenile court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility, the court's findings of delinquency on charges of rape and attempted rape were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Insofar as the State concedes that there was no evidence that appellant engaged in sexual contact with the victim for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person, the finding of delinquency on a charge of gross sexual imposition was supported by insufficient evidence. Adjudication affirmed in part and vacated in part remanded for a new disposition.

Where a mandamus petition, in an action under the Public Records Act, fails to allege that a request was made for records that are subject to the Act, the case is properly dismissed under Civ.R.12(B)(6).

State's appeal. The trial court erred in sustaining appellee's motion to suppress and in concluding that police officers did not have probable cause for his arrest for domestic violence. An officer responded to a report of domestic violence and, based on his conversation with the complainant, he had reasonable grounds to believe that appellee had committed domestic violence. This officer instructed fellow officers near appellee's location to arrest him as the "preferred course of action" in a domestic violence situation pursuant to R.C. 2935.03(B)(3)(b). The officers' collective knowledge justified appellee's arrest. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Per Mayle, J., vehicular assault, operating a motor vehicle without being in reasonable control, and speeding offenses that stemmed from same event were not the "same offense" for double-jeopardy purposes. Although the evidence underlying the charges might overlap, the elements of the offenses do not, and the double-jeopardy analysis considers elements, not evidence.

The trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the opinion testimony of an expert witness on the age of the children depicted in nudity-oriented or sexually oriented material or in designating appellant both a Tier I and Tier II sex offender based upon the offenses for which he was convicted. Judgment affirmed.

The record does not reflect that the trial court placed the burden of proof on self-defense on appellant at his bench trial for domestic violence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant filed the motion the morning of the sentencing hearing, which was almost seven months after the plea hearing, he did not have any defense to the offenses, and he appeared to simply have had a change of heart. The trial court did not err in refusing to give jail-time credit to appellant for time that accrued while he was incarcerated on a previous, unrelated conviction. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea and trial court did not consider defendant's silence as a lack of remorse.

Criminal law—Sentencing—R.C. 2953.08(G)—R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)—The trial court made the findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and those findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

postconviction relief, mental health evaluation, recanting witness, substantive grounds for relief, dismissal without hearing

motion to suppress – hearing – OVI – Crim.R. 47 – sufficiency

valuation of a business abuse of discretion burden on appeal

Trial court erred in convicting defendant of domestic violence because there was insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly caused physical harm to the mother of his child.

Appellant's no contest plea to one count of first-degree misdemeanor receiving stolen property was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where the trial court properly advised appellant as to the effect of a no contest plea in accordance with Crim.R. 11(E) and the trial court's recitation of the facts satisfied the explanation-of-circumstances requirement set forth by R.C. 2937.07.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's pro se Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss where appellants' alleged claims of breach of contract, loss of consortium, and intentional interference with a contract were, in actuality, claims alleging a breach of a promise to marry or alienation of affection, amatory claims that were abolished by R.C. 2305.29.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellants' four children to appellee, a local county's children services agency, where the juvenile court's decision complied with the necessary statutory requirements for granting permanent custody and was in the children's best interest.

The trial court erred by denying a motion for a preliminary injunction without a hearing where the trial court considered only one factor of the relevant analysis. No single element on consideration of a motion for a preliminary injunction is dispositive. Moreover, the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunctive relief then served as an inappropriate basis for rending the discovery dispute moot.

Guilty Plea - Sentencing - Jones Standard - No Transcript

Second Amendment - Plain Error - Weapons Under Disability - Manifest Weight - Suppression - IAC

Felony sentencing unnecessary burden on resources

Failure to stop after accident, R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(b) knowingly definition, R.C. 2901.22(B) sufficiency of evidence manifest weight of evidence missing trial DVD on appeal

RECONSIDERATION – App.R. 26(A) the record establishes this court did not apply an incorrect standard, did not make findings outside the record, and did not unduly punish the Stares by affirming the trial court's judgment upon consideration of the App.R. 26(A) application, the Stares have not demonstrated any obvious errors or raised any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion this court is not persuaded that we erred as a matter of law application denied.

App.R. 25 motion to certify a conflict conflict must be on the same rule of law, not facts.

CRIMINAL – Appellant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from preindictment delay where speculation regarding missing evidence and witnesses was required to conclude that evidence and witnesses were relevant and to the defense, and would minimize or eliminate the impact of the state's evidence and bolster the defense. Further, the defendant must offer evidence of witness's unavailability in the form of defense counsel's testimony regarding the efforts undertaken to locate the witness.

administrative appeal affirming trial court decision upholding civil service commission decision which upheld the city's amended removal order terminating employee prior trial court remand for order to state the reasons for removal did not render first removal order void ab initio Appellant not entitled to reinstatement with back pay from the date of first removal order through date of amended removal order remand did not violate civil service rule stating "no material amendment" can be made to the removal order after the employee appeals to the commission issuance of amended removal order as instructed does not necessarily mean Appellant was an employee at time of issuance.

CIVIL - Competent, credible evidence regarding best interest factors supports a juvenile court's decision awarding custody to the child's father, where temporary non-parent caretakers allowed child to become morbidly obese and intentionally prohibited the child's father from maintaining a visitation schedule with the child.

default judgment on money due on promissory note trial court had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction Appellant failed to meet test set out in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Arc Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), for relief from judgment misspelling of fist name in complaint was invited error

Post-conviction application for DNA testing, R.C. 2953.73 eligible offender R.C. 2953.74 outcome determinative, R.C. 2953.71 abuse of discretion

CIVIL – summary judgment Civ.R. 56 negligence loss of consortium injuries sustained from an employee falling out of a trailer Pennsylvania license plate the record reveals Appellee, an Ohio limited liability company, did not own, maintain, or control the subject trailer from which Appellant fell Appellee did not owe Appellants any duty, and in turn, did not breach any duty judgment affirmed.

Evid.R. 404(B) other-acts evidence drug use opportunity intent preparation knowledge Evid.R. 401 Evid.R. 403(A) unfair prejudice invited error plain error inextricably intertwined limiting instructions Reagan Tokes Law

Summary Judgment R.C. 955.28(B) Harborer Landlord. A plaintiff may establish liability for a dog-bite by demonstrating that the defendant was the owner, keeper, or harborer of the dog. If the dog is owned or kept by a tenant, the landlord may be liable if he or she was a harborer of the dog. A harborer is a person who has possession or control of the premises where the dog lives. The ability to admit or exclude people from the property is the key indicator of control.

Rape Sufficient Evidence Criminal Rule 29 Manifest Weight of the Evidence. Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for rape when testimony and DNA tests showed that sexual conduct occurred and victim testified to force. Conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Since the evidence was sufficient, the trial court did not err in denying the criminal rule 29 motion for acquittal.

R.C. 2152.12 Juv.R. 30 Probable Cause Hearing Amenability Hearing Complicity. The juvenile court did not err in conducting a joint probable cause hearing or in transferring defendant-appellant's case from the juvenile court to the general division of the common pleas court for criminal prosecution. Defendant-appellant's due process and confrontation rights were not violated.

Manifest weight, ineffective assistance of counsel. Conviction for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when jury could determine the credibility of the witness and observe security footage of the incident. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue complicity did not apply when complicity was not charged and the jury was not instructed on complicity.

Judicial Release R.C. 2929.20(J) Felony Sentencing R.C. 2953.08 Clear and Convincing Evidence. Before granting an eligible offender's motion for judicial release, the trial court must make the findings required under R.C. 2929.20(J) and specifically list the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors that were presented at the hearing.

CIVIL - malicious prosecution negligence invasion of privacy loss of consortium infliction of emotional distress violations of the administrative code failure to state a claim Civ.R. 12(B)(6) absolute quasi-judicial immunity political subdivision immunity R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) political subdivision employee immunity R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) scope of employment malicious purpose, bad faith, wanton or reckless manner notice pleading

DIVORCE - division of property equitable spouse's debt separate obligation in-kind distribution of retirement assets most benefit to the parties.

CRIMINAL - postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 hearing on petition ineffective assistance of counsel Rule 11 colloquy valid plea false promises actual innocence withdrawal of plea

CIVIL - summary judgment age and ancestry discrimination doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion alternative theory, moot.

CRIMINAL - Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor consecutive sentences course of conduct harm to the victim R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2929.12 recidivism factors

ORIGINAL ACTION - procedendo affidavit of prior civil actions R.C. 2969.25(A)

APPELLATE REVIEW – motion to remove magistrate R.C. 2505.02(B) special proceeding no substantial right affected no final, appealable order appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - operating a vehicle under the influence defendant has a due process right to testify in his defense reversible error harmless error Crim.R. 52(B) reopen proceedings abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL LAW - suspended sentence subject to community control community control revocation no contact order R.C. 2953.08 inapplicable to misdemeanor sentencing R.C. 2929.21 R.C. 2929.22 R.C. 2929.41 R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings not required to impose consecutive misdemeanor sentence R.C. 2929.22(B) factors to be considered when sentence is imposed presumption court considered R.C. 2929.22(B) factors.

CIVIL LAW - motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B) proper service abuse of discretion active participation collateral estoppel de novo final order not required summary judgment Civ.R.56(C) fraudulent transfer quit claim deed without consideration R.C. 1336.04 R.C. 1336.05.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - App.R. 16 record references interlocutory orders merge into final order magistrate's decision extension to file objections abuse of discretion Civ.R. 53(D)(5) good cause excusable neglect Civ.R. 6 newly retained counsel Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii) plain error Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c).

CRIMINAL LAW - guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of plea de novo review totality of the circumstances Crim.R. 11 does not require trial court to advise defendant about the potential for judicial release plea invalid where court provides inaccurate information regarding judicial release on which the defendant relies in entering a plea eligibility to file judicial release contingent on length of aggregate sentence imposed R.C. 2929.20 dialogue between court and defendant is the focus of review of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of plea.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw guilty plea post-sentencing competency evaluation abuse of discretion competent, credible evidence.

Prohibition—Petition for writ of prohibition failed because appellant had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law and failed to show that trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to comply with requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C)—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Manifest Weight - Sufficiency of Evidence - Aggravated Trafficking and Aggravated Possession

Civ.R. 60(B), Civ.R. 70

Objections to magistrate's decision overruled and requested writ of mandamus denied Industrial Commission properly construed R.C. 4123.56(F) and some evidence supported commission's decision to deny TTD compensation.

The magistrate did not err in finding R.C. 4123.58(G) is not unconstitutionally retroactive or in determining relator is entitled to a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to (1) specifically state the evidence the commission relied on in reaching its decision, and (2) briefly explain the reasoning for its decision that relator did not demonstrate new and changed circumstances. Limited writ of mandamus granted.

Mandamus action for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) after employee died from nitrogen asphyxiation. Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding nitrogen was not a toxic gas when interpretation added words to the plain language of former Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(4) and rendered the phrase "hazardous concentrations" devoid of meaning. Relator's objection sustained and limited writ granted.

The trial court did not deprive appellant of due process during the divorce proceedings, did not abuse its discretion in allocating parental rights and responsibilities under R.C. 3109.04, did not deprive appellant of due process in the contempt proceedings, and did not err in amending the contempt entry through Civ.R. 60(A). Additionally, the judgment entry finding appellant did not purge her contempt was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not err in granting directed verdicts in an automobile injury case where the plaintiff did not have expert medical testimony to show proximate cause between the accident and soft-tissue injuries and did not provide evidence of his vehicle's value immediately before and immediately after the accident. The trial court did not err in denying a motion for a new trial and plaintiff did not show any evidence of judicial bias.

Relator's action for mandamus is dismissed because the affidavit did not contain all of the information required by R.C. 2969.25(A). Strict compliance is required, and dismissal is proper.

Finding no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate's decision, we adopt magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we sua sponte dismiss this action.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as appellant has failed to establish a manifest injustice warranting withdrawal of the plea.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing action for failure to prosecute under Civ.R. 41(B)(1).

Court of Claims did not err when it dismissed appellant's complaint against ODRC alleging false imprisonment because the facts alleged in the complaint conclusively show that ODRC confined appellant pursuant to a facially valid judgment entry of conviction and sentence. Judgment affirmed.

EVIDENCE — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — PROBABLE CAUSE — EVID.R. 612: The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs and a firearm obtained during a search of defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant where the affidavit supporting the warrant application failed to establish a nexus between the evidence of illegal drug activity that police sought to seize and the place they sought to search, and therefore, issuance of the search warrant was without a substantial basis for probable cause and violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [But see DISSENT: There was probable cause to issue the search warrant for defendant's residence because the affidavit in support of the warrant contained sufficient nexus linking the defendant's residence with the drug transactions with confidential informants that were verified by police officers.] Although the trial court erred under Evid.R. 612 in failing to preserve notes used to refresh a state's witness's recollection after it withheld the notes from review by defendant's counsel, the error was harmless regarding defendant's conviction for failing to comply with a signal of a police officer because the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence apart from the witness's testimony.

POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.23: The common pleas court did not err by dismissing defendant's successive petition for postconviction relief where defendant could not meet the jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 2953.23: defendant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts underlying his postconviction claims where he did not need access to his case file to know that his trial counsel had failed to call the victims' mother's boyfriend as a witness. The trial court's failure to serve defendant with the judgment entry denying his first petition for postconviction relief did not prevent defendant from exercising his right to appeal where the time to appeal that judgment had been tolled and where defendant actually filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's first petition for postconviction relief where the postconviction claims were either barred by res judicata or did not present substantive grounds for relief.

Permanent-custody proceeding-nonparent lacked standing to appeal permanent-custody decision as it pertained to termination of parental rights and denial of legal custody when nonparent did not file a legal-custody motion during the permanent-custody proceeding nonparent lacked standing to challenge child's best interest as it related to granting him legal custody when he failed to file a motion that requested legal custody nonparent had standing to challenge trial court's finding that change in circumstances had occurred to warrant removing the child from his legal custody and placing her in the agency's temporary custody nonparent waived all but plain error to trial court's change-in-circumstances finding by failing to properly object to the magistrate's decision trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by finding a change in circumstance.

Appellant's convictions for involuntary manslaughter, trafficking in drugs and corrupting another with drugs were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

permanent custody, denial of second six-month extension, conflict between child's wishes and recommendation of guardian ad litem

legal custody, denial of untimely request for continuance

App.R. 16(A)(7), summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, reciprocal burden

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, mistake of fact defense.

App.R. 26(B), application to reopen, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, timeliness, reliance on counsel, reliance on clerk, lack of notice, and good cause. This court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen because it was untimely. Lack of notice of the decision from appellate counsel does not state good cause. Lack of notice from the clerk does not state good cause. Proposed assignments of error were not persuasive. The trial court made the necessary findings to impose consecutive sentences. Defendant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

App.R. 26(B) ineffective assistance of trial counsel ineffective assistance of appellate counsel murder complicity cross-examination proof beyond a reasonable doubt perjury inconsistencies in testimony defendant's decision to testify and record support. This court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen. The applicant's claims concerning perjury and withholding exculpatory evidence did not have record support. Inconsistencies in witnesses' testimonies do not show perjury. The applicant's decision not to testify was confirmed by the record and does not support the claim that counsel did not allow her to testify. Moreover, the decision whether or not to testify is a strategic decision not questionable through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Applicant's counsel followed the strategy of trying to show a reasonable doubt through the absence of certain evidence. This court will not second-guess such strategic decisions.

App.R. 26(B) ineffective assistance of counsel allied offenses, violation of a protection order menacing by stalking, telecommunications harassment incorporating argument and genuine issue. The court granted the application to reopen because appellate counsel's attempt to "short-cut" an argument by merely incorporating it into the brief was deficient representation. The argument that violating a protection order merged with telephone harassment presented a genuine issue that deserved to be heard on the merits.

Crim.R. 11 guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily Sierah's Law, R.C. 2903.41 through 2903.44 R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) mandatory prison term Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) regarding mandatory imprisonment and consecutive service of the firearm specification, but appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The trial court failed to make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings on the record or in the judgment entry, advise the appellant of Sierah's Law's registration obligations, and apply the Reagan Tokes Law to the involuntary manslaughter sentence.

Anders brief motion to withdraw. The trial court dismissed two of appellant's multiple rape convictions after, on appellant's direct appeal, this court found insufficient evidence to support those convictions. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Based on our review of the record, there are no meritorious claims and the appeal is wholly frivolous.

Motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) default judgment bootstrapping. Appeal dismissed. By appealing the June 29, 2023 journal entry denying appellants' second motion for relief from judgment, appellants are attempting to bootstrap arguments that are time barred. Appellants are attempting to utilize the instant appeal (their second Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment) to improperly seek review of alleged errors that they failed to timely appeal (the grant of default judgment). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

As-applied constitutional Second Amendment firearm having weapons while under disability freedom to marry sufficient constructive possession plain error. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to conclude that the defendant's convictions for having weapons while under disability were unconstitutional as applied. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a constitutional challenge to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2)-(3). The having-weapons-while-under-disability statute does not infringe on an individual's fundamental freedom to marry. Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence.

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.414 best interest Kinship Caregiver Law R.C. 2151.4116 - 2151.4119 legal custody constitutional rights substantive due process. There is no reversible error with respect to the Kinship Caregiver Law. The trial court's judgment denying mother's motion for legal custody to maternal aunt and granting permanent custody to the agency was affirmed. The trial court's judgment finding that it was in the child's best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not violate mother's substantive due process rights as applied to the facts of her case.

Divorce equal division assets debt marital home real property retirement assets future date R.C. 3105.171(C) R.C. 3105.171(J)(1). Reversed in part the division of property in a divorce action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing assets and debts in accordance with the parties' stipulations on nearly all issues or in ordering an equal division of the remaining assets and debts, which included retirement assets and the marital home. However, the trial court abused its discretion in using a future date after the end of the marriage for determining an equal division of the real property. The case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to equally divide the equity in the marital home that existed on the termination of marriage date.

Breach of loan agreement default judgment Civ.R. 55 abuse of discretion sovereign citizen Moorish American National frivolous arguments debt evasion. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's argument against the trial court's judgment granting default judgment against appellant that he is a "Moorish American National" and therefore not subject to common law contractual rights is summarily overruled.

Felony sentencing appellate review agreed sentence sentencing range R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) trafficking R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) possessing criminal tools R.C. 2923.24(A) mandatory fine R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) R.C. 2925.03(D)(1) indigency plain error. The prison sentences imposed on the defendant for drug trafficking and possession of criminal tools are not reviewable on appeal by operation of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). The sentences were authorized by law and the aggregate sentence was within the range jointly recommended by the defendant and the state pursuant to a plea agreement. While the defendant disagreed with the trial court's weighing of certain sentencing factors, he made no argument that the sentences fell outside the statutory ranges for the offenses or failed to comport with any mandatory sentencing provision. Nor did the defendant challenge his sentence on constitutional grounds or assert any argument with respect to the validity of his plea. The imposition of a mandatory fine on the trafficking count was not plain error. The trial court considered the defendant's present and future ability to pay the fine and the defendant failed to show he was unable to pay it. He had been employed, had stable housing and close family ties, retained counsel at the trial and appellate levels and was arrested while in the possession of multiple cell phones and hundreds of dollars in cash.

Parental rights permanent custody manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2151.414 clear and convincing evidence best interests of the child abuse of discretion. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the child was in the agency's custody for 12 months or longer for a consecutive 22-month period and that it was in the best interests of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody of the child to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

child endangering verdict after jury trial sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

denying reclassification motion filed in 1988 criminal case regarding his sexual predator label where appellant argues his classification and registration requirements were the result of a 2010 judgment issued in a civil action he filed wherein the court mistakenly reinstated a non-existent label essentially asking criminal court to modify civil court's judgment.

original action mandamus public records request inmate filing requirements R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit of prior actions and appeals

R.C. 149.43(B) public record request burden on applicant to show "justiciable claim" Application for DNA testing considering only evidence from the trial is error Appellant had burden to show there was no prior definitive DNA test R.C. 2953.71(U) trial court was required to reject the application R.C. 2953.74(A).

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee and denying summary judgment to appellants

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate or waive court costs.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's denial of petition for post-conviction relief, as affidavit claimed as new evidence addressed issue argued at trial, and evidence of guilt was overwhelming, despite the claim regarding new evidence.

Complaint for negligence filed by administrator of decedent's estate, against attorney who served as guardian of decedent's estate, was subject to four-year statute of limitations for fiduciaries under R.C. 2305.09(D). Administrator took immediate title to guardianship assets upon ward's death, therefore, claim accrued, at the latest, when administrator was appointed. Complaint filed against guardian more than four years after administrator's appointment was untimely.

Motion to sever properly denied where evidence of each crime was simple and direct and state could have introduced evidence of joined offenses under Evid.R. 404(B). Convictions not against sufficiency or weight of evidence. Weapon under disability conviction did not merge with felonious assault convictions. Consecutive sentences findings were not clearly and convincingly not supported by record. Court did not properly impose discretionary costs on record at sentencing hearing.

Under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' separation agreement, husband and wife were to share equally in proceeds from sale of property after subtracting out taxes and insurance from purchase price. Although lender had mortgage that exceeded the amount of the purchase price of the property, agreement did not provide that outstanding mortgage would be subtracted from the purchase price before calculating wife's share of proceeds.

Relator's original action for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Adult Parole Authority to grant him additional days of jail-time credit is moot because relator has been released from incarceration. Finding no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law, we adopt the magistrate's decision, grant the parole authority's motion for summary judgment, and deny realtor's request for a writ of mandamus.

OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS – EVIDENCE – PURPOSELY – SUBSTANTIAL STOPPAGE – MOOTNESS: Defendant's obstruction-of-official-business conviction under R.C. 2921.31 was not supported by sufficient evidence because defendant did not create a "substantial stoppage" in the police officer's investigation where the delay caused by defendant's behavior lasted approximately 20 seconds, and the state provided no evidence of defendant's hampering or impeding the investigation beyond that de minimis delay. [But see DISSENT: The cause is moot because defendant completed the sentence prior to filing the appeal, defendant did not demonstrate anything to indicate he served the sentence involuntarily, and defendant already suffers the collateral disabilities of a misdemeanor conviction for obstruction of official business.]

JUVENILE – PLAIN ERROR – EVIDENCE – LAY TESTIMONY – REASONABLE EFFORTS – PERMANENT CUSTODY – SUFFICIENCY – MANIFEST WEIGHT – BEST INTEREST – R.C. 2151.413: The juvenile court's admission of expert testimony by a lay witness was not plain error when the testimony largely overlapped with other admitted evidence. The juvenile court's removal of Mother's youngest child was not plain error when Mother stipulated to interim custody, and there is no evidence that her stipulation was not knowing and voluntary. The magistrate's finding that the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification was not plain error when the agency provided Mother with services, and Mother had difficulty engaging with services due to two periods of incarceration. The juvenile court properly granted permanent custody to the agency when clear and convincing evidence supported its finding that a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was in the best interest of the children.

Judgment Lien - Foreclosure - Summary Judgment - Laches - Recording of Lien - Order of Payment of Proceeds

Summary judgment personal injury

The trial court did not err in finding that police officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle and that seized contraband was properly obtained pursuant to the Fourth Amendment's inventory search exception. Judgment affirmed.

Appellants vacated the residence following an eviction action, rendering their appeal on the forcible entry and detainer claim moot. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him to plead no contest to the indicted charges. Appellant also failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue in his motion to suppress that an investigating officer used an unduly suggestive procedure to identify him. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) when it accepted appellant's guilty plea to attempted murder. There was no indication that the court's single misstatement about the degree of the offense, which was made toward the end the plea colloquy, affected appellant's understanding of the nature of the offense or the maximum penalty involved. The trial court did not err in increasing appellant's sentence during the sentencing hearing. The court explained that its original pronounced sentence was a "mistake," and there was no suggestion that the court increased the sentence based on impermissible factors or considerations. Judgment affirmed.

Conceded error. The trial court erred in permitting service by publication where the affidavit in support of service by publication failed to identify any effort to ascertain the appellant's address and did not indicate that the residence could not be ascertained with reasonable diligence. Judgments vacated remanded for further proceedings.

The juvenile court did not err when it transferred appellant's felony case to adult court. The court found he was older than 14 at the time of his offense, there was probable cause to believe he committed the act charged, and he was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. The juvenile court also did not err in transferring the misdemeanor assault count to adult court both the plain language of the statute and Ohio case law point to transferring the entire "case." Finally, the adult court did not err by sentencing appellant to prison. The record does not demonstrate that the court failed to consider factors contained in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). Judgment affirmed.

guilty plea to two counts of murder trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in advising Appellant plea entered knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently

Evid. R. 404(B), other acts evidence exceptions to admission of other acts evidence no contest plea motion in limine on appeal functional equivalent drug possession, R.C. 2925.11(A) constructive possession

R.C. 2743.48, R.C. 2743.14, wrongful imprisonment, attorney general

mootness, appellate review of administrative agency decisions, abuse of discretion, R.C. 3119.31(B)(1).

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) – breathalyzer test – result below legal limit – relevant evidence – expert testimony

medical malpractice, new trial, Civ.R. 59, harmless, substantial rights, impeachment, pathology reports

sufficiency, manifest weight, verdict form, abuse of discretion, plain error

I respectfully dissent as I believe that the general division of the common pleas court lost subject matter jurisdiction in this matter when Mr. Isaifan's estate was opened in probate court.

statute of limitations, defamation, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, R.C. 2305.11, Civ.R. 56(E), waiver

R.C. 3319.16, termination, principal, subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, moot

R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(a), R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(b), hearing officer, Review Commission, unlawful, unreasonable, against the manifest weight of the evidence, duty of hearing officer

murder – drive by shooting – Cybercheck – expert testimony – plain error – sufficiency – weight

sufficiency, manifest weight, post-release control

sanctions, timely, R.C. 2323.51(B)(1), Civ.R. 11, subject matter jurisdiction

Judge Duhart, Right of Allocution, Clerical Errors in Judgment Entry, Nunc Pro Tunc

zoning resolution, R.C. 2744.03, immunity, bad faith, Civ.R. 12(C)

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing prison term presumption community control sanctions allegedly contrary to law R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) multiple felonies of the fourth or fifth degree prior felony convicition no presumption R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b) court had discretion no error.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeals App.R. 5(A) motions for delayed appeal fail to assert reasons for delay.

CRIMINAL - restitution victim not a party to proceedings court lacks jurisdiction to issue orders to victims in criminal proceedings

JUVENILE - permanent custody termination of parental rights continuance abuse of discretion parent's participation in hearing incarcerated parent need for permanency best interest of child delay in seeking continuance granting continuance would not have changed outcome of proceedings due process ineffective assistance of counsel

CRIMINAL - Violating a Protection Order R.C. 2919.27 motion to withdraw plea prior to sentencing Crim.R. 32.1 four-factor Peterseim test appellant failed to provide transcript of plea hearing trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to withdraw plea.

Trial court order granting the motion to quash a deposition subpoena filed by a non-party Ohio legislator and modifying the subpoena pursuant to Civ.R. 45(C) to permit plaintiff-appellees to submit twenty written deposition questions was not a final, appealable order where plaintiff-appellees has not submitted any deposition questions and the record was insufficiently developed to establish that the questions would result in the disclosure of any information protected by legislative privilege. Motion to dismiss granted appeal dismissed.

Trial court did not err in denying motion, whether construed as a petition for postconviction relief or a motion for relief from judgment. As a postconviction petition, petition was untimely, and appellant conceded he was aware of facts at time of trial and report was not new evidence. Neither was relief justified under Civ.R. 60(B) when motion was untimely and appellant failed to address required elements or set forth a basis for relief. Judgment affirmed.

PROHIBITION – CIV.R. 60(B) –SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENFORCEMENT – SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — EMINENT DOMAIN: General division of common pleas court does not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction over city's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) or motion to enforce settlement agreement in eminent domain action where property owner claimed settlement documents materially differed from terms of parties' agreement and refused to execute the settlement documents. Objections to magistrate's decision overruled magistrate's decision adopted writ of prohibition denied.

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the 2008 corrected judgment entry nunc pro tunc to reflect the sentence imposed in 2002 without holding a resentencing hearing. Appellant's motion for resentencing is also barred by res judicata.

Trail court erred when it equally divided the premarital equity in the parties' residence because the weight of the evidence showed that home was purchased prior to the marriage, appellant paid the downpayment out of his own separate bank account, and appellee failed to produce any evidence to support her claim that she contributed more than $1,300 toward the down payment. Judgment reversed.

Finding no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law, we adopt the magistrate's decision and grant relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its fee-controversy letter regarding a fee dispute between realtor and her former legal counsel and to conduct further proceedings as may be required to resolve the dispute in accordance with law.

Judgment affirmed. The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting appellants' contention that the Ohio Elections Commission refused to allow appellants' attorney to testify. The common pleas court did not err by rejecting appellants' due process violation claim, because the substance of the complaints alleged violations of R.C. 3517.10(A)(1) and (2) and 3517.13(B) and (C), and because appellants knew the charges against them and had a reasonable opportunity to defend against those charges at the hearings before the commission. Pursuant to R.C. 3517.992(A)(1), the commission properly imposed the fine against the candidate, Allen Freeman, for his committee's violation of R.C. 3517.13. Because appellants did not raise their vicarious liability argument during the administrative proceedings, they waived the argument. The $50,000 fine was authorized by law, and the commission properly imposed the fine against both Freeman and his committee.

The decision of the magistrate, to which no party filed objections, is adopted. Because the claimant was unable to work as a direct result of the allowed surgery that was necessitated by his workplace injury, he is entitled to temporary total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.56(F). Writ of mandamus granted.

Commission failed to engage in complete analysis of whether job offer was made in good faith before terminating claimant's TTD compensation over refusal of suitable alternate employment. Relator's objections to magistrate decision sustained in part and overruled in part limited writ of mandamus granted.

The magistrate properly determined that the commission did not abuse its discretion and that there was some evidence to support invoking the commission's continuing jurisdiction because of a mistake of fact and denying temporary total disability compensation. Compensation was based on claimant's testimony that he was unable to work due to occupational illness and the medical evidence did not support the assertion. Writ of mandamus denied.

Court of appeals' judgment reversed on the authority of Smith v. Ohio State Univ. and cause remanded.

The trial court properly granted defendant summary judgment where the defendant presented evidence that the sign complied with zoning regulations at the time it was constructed and is thus considered legally nonconforming under the Middletown Development Code. In addition, Plaintiff's argument that the sign was not constructed in conformance with the certificate amounts to mere speculation. Nothing in the record remotely speaks to or supports the assertion.

Juvenile court erred by not mandatorily binding over appellees to the general division of the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) where there was probable cause to believe appellees were complicit in committing murder and aggravated murder. Reversed and remanded.

The trial court properly denied Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgement notwithstanding the as to their tortious interference with inheritance claim where the Plaintiffs relied exclusively on the presumption that where a fiduciary relationship exists between a donor and donee, undue influence occurred. Additionally, defendant presented evidence that the donor was of sound mind before his death despite his physical decline. Plaintiffs' assignments of error as to their conversion claim are moot or harmless because jury found in their favor as to their primary claim of civil theft. It was error for the trial court to deny Plaintiffs treble damages as to their civil theft claim because R.C. 2307.61 gives the trial court no discretion to do so if the Plaintiffs properly elected to pursue treble damages, overruling Justice v. Justice, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-03-074, 2005-Ohio-1802. WITH Dissenting Opinion.

The trial court did not err by summarily dismissing appellant's pro se petition for postconviction relief without a hearing where the doctrine of res judicata barred appellant's claims alleging his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel given that appellant failed to provide the necessary "outside-the-record" evidence to avoid dismissal of his pro se postconviction relief petition without the need for the trial court to first hold a hearing on the matter.

The domestic relations court did not err by finding appellant in contempt under R.C. 2705.02(A) for violating her and appellee's shared parenting plan in regard to appellee's parenting time schedule nor did the domestic relations court err by ordering appellant to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses to appellee in accordance with R.C. 3105.73(B) based upon appellant being found in contempt.

Permanent Custody Manifest Weight of the Evidence Best Interest Reasonable Efforts. The trial court's judgment terminating parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification under the circumstances presented in this appeal.

FELONY SENTENCING R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12. Defendant-appellant's sentence is not contrary to law because his sentence is within the sentencing range and the trial court properly considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Motion to Suppress Voluntary Statements Totality of the Circumstances Coercive Tactics. Voluntary confessions are admissible. A statement is not voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement obtained the confession through coercion or improper inducement. Under this test, the existence of a coercive police tactic is a predicate to finding a confession was involuntary. If a coercive tactic was found, an appellate court must then examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the defendant's will was overborn by the coercive tactic.

R.C. 3107.07(A) Consent to Adoption Right to Counsel. An indigent parent may waive his or her right to counsel expressly or through conduct. A waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. A natural parent's consent to adoption is not required if, in the year preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, the natural parent failed without justifiable cause to either engage in more than de minimis contact with the child or to provide for the maintenance and support of the child as required by a judicial decree or by law.

Ineffective assistance of counsel Motion to withdraw Abuse of discretion Motion to extend deadline. Generally, parties to a civil proceeding are unable to challenge a civil judgment on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance from retained trial counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a request to extend the deadline to file transcripts.

Motions for a new trial Crim.R. 33 Unavoidably prevented from the discovery of new evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the new trial motion filed by defendant-appellant.

Reunification Custody Determination Paternity Reasonable Efforts Best Interest of the Child. Trial court was not required to make a reasonable efforts finding when the children were being returned to the home of one of the two parents and the Agency took no position on which home as it determined both were acceptable. Trial court did not err in determining that placement in father's home was in the best interest of the child when both parents requested an arrangement similar to shared parenting and that was what was ordered. The trial court merely placed the child with father for the purpose of education, which maintained the current school district.

Wills Anti-Lapse R.C. 2107.52 Retroactivity Law of the Case Doctrine. Law of the case doctrine prevented trial court from altering this court's prior decision in Diller I. Further, even if the law of case doctrine did not apply, statute could not be applied retroactively here because it impaired vested rights of appellee.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentences aggregate sentence R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 contrary to law

Criminal law—Sixth Amendment—Right to face-to-face confrontation—Harmless error—Trial court erred in allowing witness to testify by video at trial without making sufficient case-specific findings of necessity, in violation of defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation under Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution—In light of other evidence presented against defendant at trial, confrontation error was harmless—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Though R.C. 2969.25(A) is not grounds for dismissal here, dismissal of the action is appropriate nonetheless due to Holloway's failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) and 2731.04.

The trial court erred in concluding that it was not the appropriate venue to rule on defendant's application to seal the records of the dismissal of a charge against defendant for aggravated robbery.

SELF-DEFENSE — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL — CRIM.R. 12.2 — COUNSEL: Although the trial court acted inconsistently in admitting and weighing defendant's self-defense arguments despite holding them "waived" because defendant failed to file notice of self-defense as required by Crim.R. 12.2, the inconsistency was harmless because defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by it. Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel because of trial counsel's failure to file a notice of self-defense as required by Crim.R. 12.2 because defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by the failure to file the notice.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – MOTION TO SUPPRESS – PRIVATE SEARCH – WARRANTLESS SEARCH: The trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress where drugs were discovered by hospital staff in defendant's backpack during a routine inventory, hospital staff gave defendant's belongings to police, and the subsequent, warrantless police search did not exceed the scope of the private, nongovernmental search by hospital staff.

JUVENILE — SEALING — EXPUNGMENT —RESTITUTION: The juvenile court erred in denying one of 20 applications for sealing and expungement of juvenile adjudications where the court used the applicant's unpaid restitution as a ground for determining if the applicant was rehabilitated, and evidence established that the applicant was otherwise rehabilitated as demonstrated through the juvenile court's granting the applicant's 19 other applications for sealing and expungement.

ASSAULT — SELF-DEFENSE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — IMPEACHMENT — EVID.R. 609: Where defendant's honest belief of imminent bodily harm was not objectively reasonable, the trial court did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice with respect to its finding that the state had disproven at least one element of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Where defendant's counsel did not actually impeach the state's witness regarding a prior criminal conviction under Evid.R. 609 and agreed to move on after the trial court struck the witness's testimony regarding the prior conviction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the witness's prior criminal conviction.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS – CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION – MIRANDA: The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements on the grounds that he was not advised of his Miranda rights because the questioning occurred during an investigative detention after a traffic violation and not a custodial interrogation. [See CONCURRENCE: Considering, in full, defendant's arguments regarding his passport and the entire length of the body-camera video admitted into evidence, custody is a closer call, but the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.] [But see DISSENT: Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood himself to be in custody where defendant was blocked in by three police cars with their lights on and questioned about matters unrelated to the traffic stop, defendant's passport was not returned prior to questioning, a language barrier was present between defendant and the officers, and defendant's passenger was arrested.]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — NEW TRIAL — CHARACTER EVIDENCE — OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE —HARMLESS ERROR — CUMULATIVE ERROR — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — STANDING —PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: Defendants were not entitled to a new trial following the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs in a medical-malpractice trial where any evidentiary errors the trial court committed were harmless. The trial court properly denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it correctly awarded plaintiffs past and future medical expenses: plaintiffs were the real parties in interest and had standing to seek past medical expenses where plaintiffs' insurer had not paid all of plaintiffs' medical expenses and had agreed to collect reimbursement of its lien from plaintiffs' award and plaintiffs' future medical expenses were not speculative. The trial court properly awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest where plaintiffs' attempt to withdraw their prejudgment-interest motion had no effect as the trial court had already denied the motion before it was withdrawn and plaintiffs' subsequent motion to set aside the denial revived the issue the trial court's bad-faith finding was supported by competent credible evidence. Defendants were not entitled to a credit against the plaintiffs' judgment where the plaintiffs settled with other defendants for the same injury because the verdict against the defendants included intentional torts, which precluded a setoff.

sentencing factors, R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12

permanent custody, prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), best interest

Statutory Interpretation Sealing of Criminal Record

On Respondent's motion, the Court granted Respondent's motion to stay execution of the Court's final judgment. The Court ordered that the Court's final judgment in this case is stayed until Respondent's appeal to the Tenth District Court of Appeals is concluded. The Court further ordered that no bond, obligation, or other security is required from Respondent in accordance with Civ.R. 62(C).

On motion and objections, the Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, Respondent's Request for Clarification, overruled Requester's Response to a Special Master's Supplemental Report and Recommendation, and overruled Respondent's Objections to the Supplemental Report and Recommendation. The Court adopted the Supplemental Report and Recommendation and ordered Respondent to produce certain documents to Requester. The Court assessed court costs to Respondent. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by the Requester, excepting attorney fees. And the Court expressly incorporated by reference a Decision and Entry issued on February 9, 2024.

On Respondent's objections, the Court overruled Respondent's Objections To The Recommendations Of The Special Master, denied Respondent's Motion To Dismiss, and denied Requester's Motion To Strike. The Court adopted the Special Master's Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to produce all public records responsive to Requester's public-records request. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Self-defense aggravated assault involuntary manslaughter abuse of discretion specific instances of conduct character evidence victim's prior conduct Evid.R. 404(A) Evid.R. 405 provocation rage fear jury instructions inferior offense lesser included offense. Judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited evidence of victim's prior conduct to specific instances known to the appellant that tended to show appellant's state of mind. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not instruct on the inferior offense of aggravated assault or the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter because the appellant testified that she shot the victim because she was in fear.

Standing declaratory judgment reciprocal easement agreement condominium instruments declaration and bylaws condominium unit owners' association summary judgment res judicata. The trial court's judgment granting summary judgment to the condominium unit owners' association was affirmed. Appellant was not an interested person under the condominium declaration. Therefore, appellant lacked standing to seek declaratory judgment concerning the relationship between the condominium owners' association and the condominium owners. Appellant's claims pertaining to the reciprocal easement agreements were barred by res judicata.

Divorce abuse of discretion res judicata de facto termination of marriage date Evid.R. 611(A) one-day trial parties' income spousal support witness credibility division of property double-dipping student-loan debt attorney fees findings of fact and conclusions of law failure to grant stay pending appeal qualified domestic relations order.

Building Code violation community-control sanctions community-control violation res judicata voidable sentences judgment of conviction violation of community control financial sanctions mootness. Judgment affirmed. The trial court's imposition of a community-control sanctions violation in the amount of $25,000 was not an abuse of discretion because defendant was given proper notice of the consequences of violating community control and the $25,000 fine was authorized by statute. We are unable to review defendant's challenge to the community-control sanction banning appellant from selling, gifting, or transferring his properties because such argument is barred by res judicata. We are also unable to review defendant's error alleging that the trial court should have granted his motion to stay the fine pending appeal because this court granted defendant such relief after the instant appeal was filed in this court.

Divorce final decree business valuation fair market value of business expert witnesses manifest weight spousal support tax responsibility. Affirmed. Plaintiff-appellant Adriana Granada appeals her final divorce decree, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation of the family business and in accepting defendant-appellee Israel Rojas's expert witness in making such valuation. Granada also contests the trial court's decision to refrain from awarding spousal support as well as the trial court's failure to address any potential tax liability. Granada's assigned errors are without merit and overruled.

See companion cases Machen v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112453, 112454 & 112479

Instagram authentication evidentiary foundation ineffective assistance of counsel Bruton rule manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2903.11(A) Evid.R. 901 video evidence Evid.R. 801(D)(2) jury procedural history witness testimony. Defendant-appellant contested her convictions for felonious assault. The trial court erred when it admitted social media evidence without proper authentication however the error was harmless. Instagram messages attributed to testifying codefendant were admissible. Appellant failed to prove that counsel's performance was both deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Convictions affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel, self-defense, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1), manifest weight. Appellant's trial counsel was not deficient when he did not argue self-defense because there was no evidence in the record to support such a claim. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The testimony from the surviving victim was corroborated by physical evidence, witness testimony, and 911 calls.

Sufficiency of the evidence, weight of the evidence, jail-time credit, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i)-(ii), Reagan Tokes Law. Appellant's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court is empowered under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i)-(ii) to consider the arguments of the parties at the sentencing and conduct a hearing if requested to determine the proper amount of jail-time credit to which a prisoner is entitled. Application of the Reagan Tokes Law to qualifying sentences is mandatory.

Affirmed in part. The domestic relations court did not err in finding that the marital home was Husband's separate property despite evidence that the mortgage, expenses, and upkeep of the property were paid from commingled funds the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the domestic relations court abused its discretion in calculating child support based on the husband's income averaged over three years the domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wife violated the domestic relations court's mutual restraining order by not paying a utility bill for the marital home during the pendency of the divorce proceedings domestic relations court erred in not calculating a 10 percent downward deviation in Husband's child support obligation domestic relations court abused its discretion in ordering Husband to pay Wife cash medical support because the parties agreed in the shared parenting plan to split the children's medical expenses equally domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion in determining the effective date of Husband's child support obligation.

R.C. 2903.01(A), aggravated murder sufficiency of the evidence, Evid.R. 403, prejudicial photographs bench trial denial of request for new appointed counsel. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support the essential elements of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's allowance of multiple autopsy photographs did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In a bench trial, an appellate court presumes that the trial court relied on material, relevant, competent evidence in reaching a judgment. Appellant failed to demonstrate proper grounds for the appointment of new counsel.

Foreclosure tax certificates liens praecipe for order of sale slander of title. To prevail on a claim of slander of title, a plaintiff must prove (1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title (2) the statement was false (3) the statement was made with malice or made with reckless disregard of its falsity and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages. Intervenor-appellant's claim of slander of title based on the tax certificates recorded by cross-claimant-appellee and the praecipe for order of sale the latter filed to collect the remaining balance on the tax certificates cannot be established under the unique circumstances of this case.

Debt collection final appealable order Civ.R. 4 Civ.R. 56 Civ.R. 58 Civ.R. 60 motion for summary judgment. Affirmed. Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review an untimely appeal of a final judgment, and appellant cannot use a motion for relief for judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) as a substitute for that untimely appeal.

Termination of parental rights clear and convincing evidence court findings. The trial court's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record when it terminated appellants' parental rights. Specifically, the court's finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was supported because while appellants each completed case plan services at one point during the pendency of the case, evidence in the record demonstrated that they did not benefit from those services and, therefore, the issues that lead to the children's removal remained to be an issue for each of the appellants. Judgment affirmed.

Dismissal of complaint doctrine of lis alibi pendens. Trial court erred in dismissing complaint based on the doctrine of lis alibi pendens where second action was filed in the same court and involved different claims seeking different relief than those asserted in the first action.

Complaint for a writ of mandamus dismissed. The decision of the magistrate recommending dismissal for the complaint's failure to adhere to the pleading requirements of the Ohio Civil Rules, to which no party objected, is adopted.

CONTEMPT – CRIM.R. 36: The trial court abused its discretion when it found defendant in contempt in five cases, because each conviction was based on the same underlying behavior and the record does not reveal five acts that threatened the trial court's administration of justice therefore, defendant may only be convicted of one count of contempt for her behavior. Where the docket erroneously states that defendant was convicted by plea when the record clearly shows that defendant did not plead guilty to contempt, the cause must be remanded under Crim.R. 36 for correction of the record.

ENTRAPMENT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE — CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS — IMPROPER HANDING OF A FIREARM IN A MOTOR VEHICLE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on entrapment where defendant was charged with carrying concealed weapons and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle because the defendant presented no evidence that the criminal design originated with the police or that the police induced him to place the firearms in his vehicle.

PLEAS – CRIM.R. 11: The trial court did not err in accepting defendant's guilty pleas even though it sentenced defendant to a longer sentence than the sentence the state and defendant had agreed to where the trial court informed defendant prior to accepting his pleas that it was not bound by that agreement and defendant indicated that he understood. Defendant's guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily where the court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) by failing to inform defendant during the plea colloquy of the maximum sentence that could be imposed, and therefore, the pleas must be vacated.

JUVENILE — PROCEDURE/RULES — SANCTIONS : The juvenile court did not err by denying Father's motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 37(D) for Mother's failure to attend her deposition where its denial was based on Father's lack of cooperation with Mother and his failure to take remedial action.

Appellant appeals from the trial court's judgments revoking his community control in two cases. In his 2021 case, the revocation judgment did not order him to pay restitution, although restitution was included in his original judgment of conviction. Appellant's challenge to the validity of the original restitution order is not properly before us in this appeal. Appellant did not raise any assignments with respect to his 2019 case. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant to a jail term after he failed to comply with purge conditions related to non-payment of child support. Although appellant was incarcerated at the time of sentencing, appellant had failed to comply with the purge conditions before being incarcerated. Any issue as to the court's failure to award jail-time credit is moot because appellant completed the sentence and no relief is possible. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. Police officers obtained the consent of the homeowner to enter a residence and go upstairs to speak with appellant. The officers did not request permission to search and were familiar with the homeowner, and the circumstances did not cause the officers to doubt the homeowner's authority to authorize entry. The officers relied in good faith on the homeowner's consent to enter. When appellant's girlfriend closed a tarp on a doorway upstairs in a manner that caused officers to be concerned for their safety, a protective sweep was warranted, and drugs were found in plain view. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's appeal is moot as the sentence has been served and he has shown no collateral disability or loss of rights as a result of his conviction. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not impermissibly consider factors outside of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 in sentencing appellant to 18 months in prison. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's untimely and successive motion for new trial and petition for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The trial court also did not err in overruling appellant's motion to engage in post-conviction discovery. Judgment affirmed.

vexatious litigator R.C. 2323.52 arguments not raised to trial court are waived on appeal appellant's burden to demonstrate error on appeal.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the judgment, finding no coercion in the plea, and no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, without hearing.

Civil replevin search warrant failure to state a claim

Contempt - Violation of Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order

summary judgment, foreclosure

Motion to strike motion to enforce settlement agreement

S.Ct.Prac.R. 403.(A)—Appeal not accepted for review—Memorandum in support of jurisdiction filed on behalf of appellant deemed frivolous—Imposition of sanctions unnecessary because appellant's counsel has previously been declared to be vexatious litigators and appellee was not represented by counsel and did not file documents in this matter.

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affidavit dismissed as to judge's presiding over Ward v. Ross—Affidavit granted as to judge's presiding over Jackson v. Ward to avoid appearance of impropriety.

Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant had standing as a "party to the proceeding" under R.C. 2701.03(A) to seek judge's disqualification from presiding over juvenile-court delinquency proceeding in which affiant's child was the alleged delinquent child—Affiant failed to show that judge is interested in underlying case or "otherwise is disqualified" under R.C. 2701.03(A)—Disqualification denied.

pro se, guardian, ward, removal of guardian, App.R. 16(A)(7)

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(A), R.C. 2969.25(C)

Defendant appeals decision in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff named two defendants in complaint but judgment was entered against only one defendant. The claim against the second defendant was unresolved and there was no final appealable order.

The trial court's injunction was not vague where it prohibited the defendant landowner from using its property "in any way inconsistent" with local zoning regulations and identified the types of business that the landowner was prohibited from allowing to operate on the property. Additionally, the plaintiffs had standing under R.C. 519.24 because their property was located near the defendant's property and the businesses on defendant's property caused various nuisances specific to plaintiffs. Finally, the plain language of R.C. 519.24, a special statute, makes injunctions issued under that statute different from injunctions issued under Civ.R. 65 because the statute is explicitly not limited to preserving the status quo. Defendant takes no issue with the court's factual findings, including that the companies operating on its property did so in violation of local zoning ordinances and can thus be removed from the property entirely pursuant to R.C. 519.24.

Defendant appeals domestic violence conviction. Conviction was supported by sufficient evidence that defendant had knowledge of causing the victim physical harm. Defendant's argument that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional as applied was waived.

Defendant shot at police and struck one of them. Defendant appeals convictions for felonious assault and other crimes. Greater weight of evidence did not demonstrate that defendant acted in self-defense. Defendant created the situation giving rise to the shooting. Defendant failed to establish that counsel performed deficiently by not submitting the "use of force" policies of the responding police agencies. Defendant's aggregate sentence in prison was not cruel and unusual. Defendant's conduct was egregious.

Allocation of Marital Debt - Assessment of Costs - Finding of Financial Misconduct

Involuntary manslaughter and endangering children - Sufficient evidence supported appellant's involuntary-manslaughter and endangering-children convictions appellant's failure to secure loaded guns in a locked location inaccessible to children and his failure to properly supervise the three weapons-curious children created a substantial risk of serious harm to his two children and their overnight guest appellant's conduct or failure to act caused the death of 11-year-old child as a proximate result of committing endangering children, even though appellant did not actually fire the weapon appellant's conduct or failure to act was a substantial factor in causing the child's death the child's death was a foreseeable risk of appellant's failure to secure loaded guns in a lock location inaccessible to children and failure to properly supervise the three weapons-curious children - Trial court did not plainly err by permitting law enforcement officer to testify about his gun-safety and gun-storage practices officer's testimony helped explain how a reasonable parent might choose to store guns so as to reduce risk that children will be able to access loaded weapons - Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise 31 objections to various testimony - Cumulative error doctrine did not apply - Appellant's sentencing argument meritless based upon State v. Hacker, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2535, __ N.E.3d __.

Trial court properly articulated the R.C. 2929.20(J) factors to support a grant of judicial release.

Permanent-custody proceeding-trial court's decision to place children in agency's permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when parents remained addicted to drugs despite nearly two years of agency involvement.

Recording of Criminal Proceedings Crim.R. 22 Side-bar conferences Chambers conferences Sufficiency of the Evidence Manifest Weight of the Evidence Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The trial court did not err by the purported inadequacy of the record since the defendant-appellant was unable to demonstrate any prejudice, let alone, material prejudice. The defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-drugs conviction is based on sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective as to pre-trial events or at trial.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Crim.R. 32.1 Presentence Motion to Withdraw Plea Consecutive Sentencing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Because the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences and those findings are supported by the record, defendant-appellant's consecutive sentences are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

Adoption De minimus maintenance and support Consent R.C. 3107.07 Notice of the Adoption Petition R.C. 3107.11 14-day Objection Period Harmless Error. The trial court did not err by determining that respondent-appellant's consent to the petitioner-appellee's adoption of G.A.J. was not required under R.C. 3107.07(K).

Sufficient Evidence Manifest Weight Aggravated Possession of Drugs. Possession can be actual or constructive. Constructive possession exists where a person is able to exercise dominion and control over an item even if he or she is not found in physical control of the item in question. The State may establish constructive possession through circumstantial evidence alone. Mere physical proximity is not sufficient to establish constructive possession. However, close physical proximity can be used to support a finding of constructive possession if other facts that suggest dominion and control are presented at trial.

Guilty Plea Waiver Crim.R. 5 Consecutive Sentences. Appellant waived any issues with regard to Crim.R. 5 by pleading guilty. Consecutive sentences were not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless assault and convicted appellant of felonious assault of a peace officer because the evidence, when construed in appellant's favor, permitted a reasonable trier of fact to find that appellant acted recklessly rather than knowingly. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial.

DIVORCE – FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT – MARITAL ASSET VALUATION – MARITAL ASSET DIVISION – R.C. 3105.171: Trial court erred in valuing and dividing marital assets, assigning marital debt to husband as separate property, and in finding that husband engaged in financial misconduct. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CIVIL - foreclosure foreign judgment lien motion to vacate full faith and credit lack of jurisdiction collateral attack res judicata motion to dismiss counterclaims summary judgment homestead exemption equity lien priority.

JUVENILE - parenting time visitation motion to modify abuse of discretion best interest of child R.C. 3109.051(D) right to visitation invited error

CRIMINAL LAW - suppression hearing mixed question of law and fact marked lanes R.C. 4511.33 traffic violation provides probable cause trial court correctly applied the law to the facts.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea Crim.R. 11 de novo review ineffective assistance of counsel sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G) supplemental brief supplemental assignment of error R.C. 2967.193 Crim.R. 36.

CIVIL - parental rights and responsibilities continuing jurisdiction appealed orders App.R. 12(A)(1)(a)

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely appeal App.R. 4(A)(1) 30 days lack of jurisdiction.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) motion for leave to file a delayed appeal concurrently with the filing of the motion, notice of appeal must be filed in the trial court.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Motion for reconsideration is a nullity does not extend the time to appeal a final judgment App.R. 4 Civ.R. 58(B), untimely appeal.

CIVIL - motion for interpleader filed after final judgment all appellate avenues exhausted judgment is a nullity not appealable even if valid order, res judicata stipulations valid appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - speedy trial motion to dismiss alleged constitutional and statutory speedy trial violations cruelty to animals deposit 90 days after arrest or service of summons clock allegedly commenced at probable cause hearing no violation no unreasonable delay.

CRIMINAL LAW - misdemeanor theft separate felonies in a different district R.C. 2929.41 concurrent sentences sentencing occurred for both cases on the same date time-served dismiss moot.

R.C. 2711.10(D) — ARBITRATION — COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENT: In a dispute concerning a township employee's termination, the trial court erred in vacating the arbitrator's award of reinstatement and making the employee whole under R.C. 2711.10(D) where nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement prevented the arbitrator from awarding any remedy inherent within the relief requested in the employee's written grievance in order to provide the employee with a full and adequate remedy under the provision of the collective-bargaining agreement relevant to the arbitrator's decision. The trial court erred in vacating the arbitrator's award under R.C. 2711.10(D) where it vacated the award due to a perceived error in the arbitrator's exercise of her powers under the collective-bargaining agreement.

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), sentencing error, adequate remedy

dismissal of indictment, negotiated plea

Denial of timely filed petition for postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21(A) findings of fact and conclusions of law R.C. 2953.21(D) R.C. 2953.21(H). Trial court erred in denying appellant's timely petition for postconviction relief without making findings of fact and conclusions of law judgment reversed and case remanded for the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by R.C. 2953.21.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening consecutive sentences allied offenses bifurcation joinder of offenses. The appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective on appeal. Proposed assignments of error that dealt with the imposition of consecutive sentences, allied offenses, and joinder of offenses for trial are without merit. The appellant was not prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise the three proposed assignment of error on appeal.

Crim.R. 33 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial hearing newly discovered evidence recanting witness abuse of discretion unavoidably prevented from timely discovering new evidence findings of fact and conclusions of law. Trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motions for leave to file a motion for a new trial without a hearing as it related to witness' recantation of his trial testimony. Appellants submitted documents that, on their face, together with other evidence in the record, could support their claims that they were unavoidably prevented from discovering witness' recantation within the required time frame. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to file a motion for a new trial without a hearing based on new information allegedly contained within transcripts from other appellant's trial. Appellant did not submit documents with his motion that, on their face, supported his claim that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering any such new evidence. Crim.R. 33 does not require trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial.

Motion to suppress R.C. 306.35(Y) plain meaning RTA officers authority jurisdiction within transit facilities Fourth Amendment Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution unreasonable searches and seizures. Affirmed. R.C. 306.35(Y) is unambiguous. Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, GCRTA officers are granted with the authority to act as peace officers within transit facilities owned, operated, or leased by the GCRTA. The plain language of R.C. 306.35(Y) does not support the interpretation proposed by the state. Furthermore, under Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 26, the GCRTA officers' attempted traffic stop on a public road for an allegedly minor misdemeanor and Thomas's subsequent arrest at her home nearly one month later was outside the GCRTA officers' statutory authority and violated the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures established by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed any evidence obtained by the GCRTA police officers.

Speedy trial R.C. 2945.72 Marsy's Law. The appellee's speedy trial rights were not violated by the victims' filing an appeal, because the time tolled in accordance with R.C. 2945.72(E) and (H).

Manifest weight of the evidence conflicting testimony credibility determination. Defendant was convicted after trial of abduction and assault. Defendant asserted on appeal his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence because of contradictions in the victim's testimony and her actions as well as contradictions with other testimony. The determination of credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony and evidence rest solely with the finder of fact, and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact. After review of the record, the finder of fact did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice necessitating reversal of defendant's convictions.

Menacing by stalking R.C. 2903.211 protective order sufficiency manifest weight admissibility authentication Evid.R. 901(A) mistrial abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The court properly denied Hamrick's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal because his menacing by stalking conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. Furthermore, his convictions of menacing by stalking and violation of protection order were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Duo messages at issue were admissible because they were properly authenticated by H.C. under Evid.R. 901. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hamrick's motion for a mistrial because the state did not willfully fail to turn over evidence in discovery.

Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal sufficiency of the evidence circumstantial evidence probative value knowingly manifest weight of the evidence inconsistent testimony direct identification unnecessary. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, and appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) third-degree felony sentencing impact statements R.C. 2929.19 sentencing review App.R. 16(A)(7). Affirmed. The trial court properly sentenced the defendant to five years in prison on his guilty plea to a third-degree felony, gross sexual imposition offense under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), and the offender has not demonstrated error with citations to relevant authority regarding the court's decision to consider impact statements from friends and family of the victim or to impose the particular sentence entered.

Petition for postconviction relief evidentiary hearing res judicata ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendant-appellant Jerome Garrett's untimely amended petition for postconviction relief when all the evidence submitted in support of his petition had already been considered and rejected by this court during his direct appeal, barring Garrett's claims by res judicata. Because Garrett did not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence prompting the postconviction petition, the trial court also did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Summary judgment unpaid legal services expert report self-serving affidavit Civ.R. 54(C). Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff law firm on its claim for unpaid legal services. The law firm's motion for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit and specific, corroborating evidence. The trial court properly found the defendant's affidavit submitted in opposition to the law firm's motion was self-serving. Although the affiant claimed that the law firm overcharged it, the supporting documentation was deficient in lending support to that claim. The amount of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff law firm was proper under Civ.R. 54(C). Although it is a different amount than prayed for in the complaint, the plaintiff's documentation supports the amount.

Improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle under the influence sufficiency manifest weight child support community control. Appellant's improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where competent, credible evidence established that appellant was intoxicated and there was evidence of alcohol and marijuana in his car. Condition of community control that required appellant to establish a child-support order was an abuse of discretion where the community-control condition was not related to the offense.

Nunc pro tunc plea and sentence. The trial court's journal entries reflecting appellant's plea and sentence incorrectly stated the crime that appellant pleaded guilty to. Case remanded for issuance of nunc pro tunc journal entries.