[Cite as In re A.E.F.,
2024-Ohio-2213.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: CASE NO. 2024-T-0009
A.E.F.
Civil Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 2020 JC 00004
OPINION
Decided: June 10, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Thomas E. Zena and Miriam M. Ocasio, 4822 Market Street, Suite 301, Youngstown,
OH 44512 (For Appellant, Kandis Forney).
Bryant Youngblood, Jr., pro se, 2351 Goleta Avenue, Youngstown, OH 44504
(Appellee).
Alissa A. Kegarise, Amsden Legal, LLC, 1835 Taft Avenue, Niles, OH 44446 (Guardian
Ad Litem).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Kandis Forney (Mother), appeals the December 14, 2023
judgment entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division
adopting the magistrate’s decision to modify the shared parenting plan for the minor child
A.E.F. (DOB 7-7-2015) between appellant and appellee, Bryant Youngblood Jr. (Father).
{¶2} Mother raises two assignments of error, both of which argue the trial court
abused its discretion by modifying the shared parenting plan to name Father as residential
parent for school purposes for A.E.F.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find Mother’s
assignments of error to be without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
adopting the magistrate’s decision to modify the shared parenting plan. The magistrate’s
decision correctly applied the law to the facts before the court. The court did not abuse
its discretion by determining that Mother’s move to Maple Heights less than six months
after entering the Shared Parenting Plan created a change in circumstances for A.E.F.
and that modification to the Shared Parenting Plan was in her best interest under the best
interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) through (j) and R.C. 3109.04(F)(2).
{¶4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} Mother and Father are the parents of A.E.F. The parties entered into a
Shared Parenting Plan, which the trial court adopted on January 27, 2022. The relevant
terms of the Shared Parenting Plan provided that Mother would be the residential parent
for school attendance purposes, but that the parties would
share responsibility for decisions concerning the upbringing, education,
medical care, dental care, spiritual care and all matters concerning the
general welfare of the child. For this purpose, both parents shall consult
each other and confer together on matters affecting the welfare of their
child, taking into account the best interests, and as far as possible, the
desires of said child.
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{¶6} Father’s parenting time was from Thursday to Sunday one week followed
by Friday to Monday the next week during the school year.
{¶7} On September 27, 2022, Father filed a Motion to Modify Shared Parenting
Plan. He requested a modification so that he could be designated the residential parent
for school attendance purposes because Mother left the area and relocated to Maple
Heights without notifying Father. As a result of the move, Mother changed A.E.F.’s school
without consulting Father.
{¶8} On October 11, 2022, Mother filed a Notice of Change of Address, notifying
the court of her new address in Maple Heights.
{¶9} Also on October 11, Mother filed a Motion to Terminate Shared Parenting
Plan so that she could be legal custodian to further determine all other parenting issues.
{¶10} The trial court set the matter for a hearing and re-appointed the Guardian
ad Litem (GAL) who had previously been appointed when the Shared Parenting Plan was
first put in place.
{¶11} The court conducted a hearing on May 31, 2023, and July 6, 2023. Father,
Mother, and the GAL testified, and the magistrate conducted an in camera interview with
A.E.F.
{¶12} A.E.F. was enrolled in St. Rose Catholic School in Girard, Ohio. At the start
of a new school year, Mother enrolled A.E.F. in Holy Family Catholic School in Parma,
Ohio. Father testified that he found out that Mother had moved, changed A.E.F.’s doctor,
dentist, and school a few weeks before school started. He received this information from
the My Family Wizard app, used to facilitate the parties’ shared parenting. He said Mother
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never directly contacted him about the change. He was only notified because Mother
updated the information in the app.
{¶13} Father said that his work schedule is flexible and allowed him to continue
his pickup and drop offs at the school in Parma, despite the 1 hour and 13-minute drive.
He picked up A.E.F. after school on either Thursday or Friday on alternating weeks during
the school year. This meant that he would have to pick A.E.F. up from school on
Thursday, drop her off on Friday, and then pick her up again after school on Friday. He
said he did not anticipate this arrangement when entering into the Shared Parenting
Agreement.
{¶14} Father said that Mother enrolled A.E.F. in cheerleading after school without
notifying him. The practices took place on Friday afternoons, with games on Saturday
and Sunday, all during his parenting time. He did not object to the activity, but did take
issue with not being notified about an extracurricular that would occur exclusively during
his parenting time. In addition, Mother signed A.E.F. up for choir without notifying Father.
Choir practice took place on Thursdays after school, which affected Father’s parenting
time every other week.
{¶15} Despite wanting modification, Father wanted to maintain a shared parenting
arrangement. He said that he would not have filed for modification but for Mother’s move
to Maple Heights and changing A.E.F.’s school. He said he would reenroll A.E.F. in St.
Rose.
{¶16} Mother testified that she decided to move to Maple Heights in March 2022
and completed the move in May. She said that she believed her prior counsel had filed a
notice with the court of her change of address. However, this did not occur. She admitted
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that she did not consult with Father before changing A.E.F.’s school or before signing
A.E.F. up for cheerleading and choir. She said she signed A.E.F. up for cheerleading
without knowing what day practice would be until “well after she was signed up for it and
it happened to be on Friday.”
{¶17} She said that she believed it was within her discretion to choose the school
for A.E.F. because she had been designated the residential parent for school purposes
and was paying for the schooling. She said she notified her attorney of her move and
believed that he notified the court of her move.
{¶18} Mother said because she has to pick up her other children after school, she
is not able to take A.E.F. to Father’s home after school. The drive from her home to the
school in Parma was approximately 30 minutes.
{¶19} Mother testified that despite filing a motion to terminate the Shared
Parenting Plan, she believed the Shared Parenting Plan could continue.
{¶20} Both parties acknowledged some tardiness issues with A.E.F.’s school
attendance. Mother said that she dropped A.E.F. off for school on time, but that she
dawdled on her way to class, causing her tardiness. However, according to the GAL’s
interview with school officials, A.E.F.’s tardiness was primarily due to Mother’s arriving
late. Mother was responsible for A.E.F. being tardy 19 of 29 times.
{¶21} The GAL testified Mother’s move had created travel issues for pickup and
drop offs and that some of A.E.F.’s extracurricular activities in Maple Heights were during
Father’s parenting time. Based on her investigation, the GAL found several of Mother’s
claims about shared parenting issues with Father to be questionable.
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{¶22} Mother’s counsel suggested that the GAL had a bias against Mother that
she had carried over from her initial appointment to the case. The GAL responded to this
saying, “I would say not necessarily. I mean, I’m human, so, you know, I knew that I had
thought that originally, but I did recommend a shared parenting at that time, which did
occur. And I try to be, you know, completely as objective as possible in every case, so I
wouldn’t say that.” In her initial appointment, the GAL had recommended that Mother be
the residential parent for school purposes.
{¶23} The GAL recommended that the Shared Parenting Plan be modified. Her
recommendation was for Father be named as the residential parent for school purposes
and to modify parenting time to accommodate school and work schedules. She said
A.E.F. had done well in both schools and agreed with Mother’s counsel that there was
“not a big margin” between the parents as to which would be best as residential parent
for school purposes.
{¶24} The magistrate issued a Magistrate’s Decision on July 31, 2023. The
magistrate stated that in order to modify the Shared Parenting Plan, the court must find a
change in circumstances, a modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the
child, and the harm likely from the change of environment is outweighed by the advantage
of the change.
{¶25} The court found a change in circumstances “occasioned by the Mother’s
decision to move to Maple Heights less than six months after entering into a Shared
Parenting Plan.” The move caused both parents to have a substantial drive to
accommodate A.E.F.’s school attendance and extracurricular activities.
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{¶26} The magistrate made the following findings under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a)
through (j):
(a) Both parents wished to have some form of shared parenting.
(b) The in camera interview with A.E.F. indicated that she was happy and welladjusted in both schools.
(c) A.E.F. being well bonded with both parents and extended family.
(d) A.E.F. being comfortable in both homes and schools. The magistrate noted
A.E.F.’s tardiness at school being a problem, but “more so with the Mother.”
(e) There were no reported physical or mental health issues.
(f) That Mother used poor communication and unilaterally moved to Maple
Heights, making “the parenting time schedule more difficult.” Father’s
continued parenting time under the schedule was “due to his efforts of driving
the child to/from school over an hour one way.”
(g) There were no outstanding issues with child support payments.
(h) There was no evidence of either parent being subject to conviction for abuse
or neglect.
(i) There was no evidence that either parent engaged in willful denials of the other
parent’s parenting time.
(j) There was no evidence either parent intended to relocate from their current
residencies.
{¶27} Next, the magistrate considered the factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a)
through (E):
(a) Both parents had a limited ability to cooperate and make decisions jointly with
respect to A.E.F. The parties “parallel parent rather than co-parent. Each has
enrolled the child in activities without notification to the other.”
(b) Both parties encourage sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child
and the other parent.
(c) There was no evidence of any potential for domestic violence or parental
kidnapping.
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(d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other posed “some impediment
of continuing under a plan of shared parenting. The parenting time under the
plan is more difficult to implement due to the child attending school in the Parma
area which is actually some distance from both parties’ residences, but farther
for the Father.”
(e) The GAL recommended that the Shared Parenting Plan continue, but that it be
modified for Father to be designated as the residential parent for school
purposes.
{¶28} Based on these findings, the magistrate determined modification to the
Shared Parenting Plan would be in A.E.F.’s best interests. The magistrate designated
Father as the residential parent for school purposes and made Father responsible for all
tuition, fees, and costs associated with school attendance.
{¶29} Mother filed an Objection to the Magistrate’s Decision on August 14, 2023,
and, after the transcript was prepared, filed a Supplemental Objection to the Magistrate’s
Decision on November 29, 2023.
{¶30} Mother argued the move and the new school did not qualify as a change in
circumstances, there was no evidence that Father had been deprived of parenting time,
and the magistrate’s decision was “a punishment” for her misunderstanding.” She
suggested a better resolution would be to modify the pickup and drop off location for
A.E.F. “for the convenience of both parties, with no other changes of any kind.”
{¶31} On November 30, 2023, Mother filed a Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Objection to the Magistrate’s Decision. In the Supplemental Memorandum,
Mother argued the GAL had demonstrated a “predisposition of negativity toward the
Mother and that she allowed that to carry over into this case.” Mother said the GAL
admitted there was no change in circumstances and no basis for modification.
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{¶32} On December 14, 2023, the trial court adopted the Magistrate’s Decision.
The court reviewed all relevant evidence and motions and found no abuse of discretion,
that the magistrate determined the factual issues, and appropriately applied the law. The
trial court ordered the modification of the Shared Parenting Plan as set forth by the
magistrate, including that Father be named as the residential parent for school purposes.
{¶33} Mother timely appealed, raising two assignments of error.
Assignments of Error and Analysis
{¶34} Mother’s assignments of error state:
{¶35} “[1.] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in reallocating parental
rights and responsibilities of the minor child and designating the Appellee as residential
parent, and legal custodian, of the minor child.”
{¶36} “[2.] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in modifying the terms
of the shared parenting plan previously adopted by the court.”
{¶37} Mother argues that the trial court erred by modifying the shared parenting
plan. Specifically, Mother argues the move and changing A.E.F.’s school without notifying
Father was “solely a misunderstanding, and nothing more.” She states that beyond this,
“the record is void of proof that Mother intentionally failed to follow the terms of the shared
parenting agreement in failing to notify Father of a change of address.” She believes the
GAL was biased against her and that the trial court erred because there was no evidence
to “warrant a modification of the shared parenting plan, either in the reallocation of the
parenting plan, or a modification of the terms of the parenting plan.”
{¶38} “[D]ecisions involving the custody of children are accorded great deference
on review.” In re K.R., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0050, 2011-Ohio-1454, ¶ 28. “Thus,
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any judgment of the trial court involving the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Id.
“When reviewing an appeal from a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision, an
appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting
the decision.” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Betteley, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L057, 2015-
Ohio-5067, ¶ 17.
{¶39} “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ is one of art, connoting judgment exercised
by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the record.” State v. Underwood, 11th
Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 2009-Ohio-208, ¶ 30, citing State v. Ferranto,
112 Ohio St.
667, 676-678 [
148 N.E. 362] (1925).” State v. Raia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0020,
2014-Ohio-2707, ¶ 9. Stated differently, an abuse of discretion is “the trial court’s ‘failure
to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’”
Id., quoting State v. Beechler,
2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54,
2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11
(8th Ed.Rev.2004). “When an appellate court is reviewing a pure issue of law, ‘the mere
fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error[.] *
… By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the discretion of the trial
court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a different result is not
enough, without more, to find error.’”
Id., quoting Beechler at ¶ 67.
{¶40} “The highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard is particularly
appropriate in child custody cases since the trial judge is in the best position to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and there ‘may be much that is evident in the parties’
demeanor and attitude that does not translate well to the record.’” In re K.R., 2011-Ohio-
1454 at ¶ 30, quoting Wyatt v. Wyatt, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2004-P-0045, 2005-Ohio-
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2365, ¶ 13. “In so doing, a reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence, ‘but must ascertain
from the record whether there is some competent evidence to sustain the findings of the
trial court.’” Id., quoting Clyborn v. Clyborn,
93 Ohio App.3d 192, 196,
638 N.E.2d 112 (3d
Dist.1994).
{¶41} R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), addresses the modification of a shared parenting
plan and “requires the trial court to find (1) a change in the circumstances of the child and
(2) that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child before
modifying a decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities.” In re K.R. at ¶ 47.
{¶42} R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) provides:
(E)(1)(a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights
and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts
that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at
the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child, the child's residential parent, or either of the
parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is
necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these
standards, the court shall retain the residential parent designated by the
prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is
in the best interest of the child and one of the following applies:
(i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the residential parent
or both parents under a shared parenting decree agree to a change
in the designation of residential parent.
(ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or of both
parents under a shared parenting decree, has been integrated into
the family of the person seeking to become the residential parent.
(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the
child.
{¶43} R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides:
(2) In addition to a modification authorized under division (E)(1) of this
section:
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…
(b) The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting
approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared
parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court
determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the
children or upon the request of one or both of the parents under the
decree. Modifications under this division may be made at any time.
The court shall not make any modification to the plan under this
division, unless the modification is in the best interest of the children.
{¶44} In contrast, R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c), addresses termination of a shared
parenting plan, and merely requires the trial court to find that shared parenting is not in
the best interest of the child. In re K.R. at ¶ 47. “Thus, while modification requires the
court to find a change in circumstances in addition to the child's best interest, termination
only requires the court to find that termination of the plan is in the child's best interest.”
Id.
{¶45} “In determining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the
children, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the
factors enumerated in” R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (F)(2). R.C. 3109.04(F)(2).
{¶46} The factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) are:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division
(B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as to the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the
wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
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(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting
time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments,
including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child
support order under which that parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to [certain criminal
offenses] …;
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared
parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s
right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to
establish a residence, outside this state.”
{¶47} The factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) are:
(a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, with
respect to the children;
(b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection,
and contact between the child and the other parent;
(c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other
domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent;
(d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the proximity
relates to the practical considerations of shared parenting;
(e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the child
has a guardian ad litem.” R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a)-(e).
{¶48} The term “change in circumstances” is not statutorily defined. Matter of
G.M., 2017-Ohio-8144,
98 N.E.3d 795, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.). However, case law provides that
“‘the phrase is intended to represent an event, occurrence, or situation which has a
material and adverse effect upon a child.’”
Id., quoting Valentine v. Valentine, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2004-12-314,
2005-Ohio-6163, ¶ 9. A slight or inconsequential change in
circumstances cannot form the basis for a change in circumstances.
Id. Rather, the
change “must be of substance.”
Id.
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{¶49} First, the record does not support Mother’s suggestion that the GAL was
biased against her. In fact, the GAL was reappointed to the case, and in her initial
appointment, the GAL recommended that Mother be the residential parent for school
purposes.
{¶50} Next, the magistrate’s decision, which the trial court adopted,
acknowledged the distinction between termination of a shared parenting plan and
modification of a shared parenting plan. The magistrate’s decision specifically noted that
a modification of a shared parenting plan requires the court to find “that there is a change
in circumstances ….”
{¶51} The trial court found that a modification was necessary due to a “change in
circumstances occasioned by Mother’s decision to move to Maple Heights less than six
months after entering into the Shared Parenting Plan.” Despite the flexible work
schedules that both parties had, Mother’s unilateral decision to change schools
significantly increased travel time to accommodate A.E.F.’s schooling. The magistrate’s
decision explained that the move resulted in A.E.F. being tardy at least 29 times because
of the substantial drive that both parents now had to accommodate. Further, Mother’s
move and the travel distance to the new school for both parents affected the parents’
ability to ensure A.E.F. participated in, and the parents attended, extracurricular activities.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a change in circumstances. See
Matter of G.M., 2017-Ohio-8144 at ¶ 19.
{¶52} Based on this change in circumstances, the trial court determined that it
was in the best interest of A.E.F. to “continue under the existing Shared Parenting Plan
with modifications to that plan.” The magistrate explained why modifications were
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necessary to serve A.E.F.’s best interest and set forth its findings as to each of the best
interest factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) through (j) and the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2).
{¶53} In ruling on Mother’s objection to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court
reviewed the motions and evidence and overruled Mother’s objections. We find no error
in law in the trial court’s determination. Further, we accord great deference to the trial
court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision and the record contained competent
evidence to support the trial court’s findings. In re K.R., 2011-Ohio-1454 at ¶ 13.
{¶54} Accordingly, Mother’s assignments of error are without merit.
{¶55} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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