[Cite as Akron v. Beasley,
2024-Ohio-3089.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
CITY OF AKRON C.A. Nos. 30745
30746
Appellee
v.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
CORTEZ BEASLEY ENTERED IN THE
AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
Appellant COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE Nos. 22 CRB 04807
22 TRD 07551
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 14, 2024
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Cortez Beasley appeals from his convictions in the Akron Municipal Court. This
Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
I.
{¶2} Over the course of July 3, 2022, and the early morning hours of July 4, 2022, Mr.
Beasley was present for a protest that turned riotous. The protest occurred in downtown Akron
and ultimately caused significant property damage throughout the city. Responding officers from
the Akron Police Department, its mobile field force, its SWAT team, the Summit County Sheriff’s
Office, and the Ohio State Highway Patrol, worked to control the crowd. As conditions
deteriorated, responding officers repeatedly announced orders to disperse throughout the city.
They also deployed smoke and tear gas when those commands were ignored. Mr. Beasley was
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one of the individuals the police arrested as they worked to clear the roadways for safety vehicles.
He was charged with failure to disperse in Criminal Case 22CR04807.
{¶3} Two days later, officers observed Mr. Beasley operating his car in the wrong lane
of travel. Officers activated their cruiser’s lights and attempted to stop him as he traveled
eastbound in the westbound lane of traffic on a two-lane road. The officers followed Mr. Beasley
for two blocks until accelerating, cutting off his car, and forcing him to stop. Mr. Beasley was
charged with a marked lanes violation in Traffic Case 22TRD07551.
{¶4} The State tried Mr. Beasley’s two charges together, along with two additional
charges filed under separate case numbers. A jury found him guilty of failure to disperse. The
trial court then found him guilty of a marked lanes violation. The trial court sentenced Mr. Beasley
in each matter, and he appealed from both sentencing entries. This Court consolidated the two
appeals for briefing, argument, and decision. Mr. Beasley raises two assignments of error for
review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
DEFENDANT CORTEZ BEASLEY’S CONVICTIONS REST ON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Beasley argues his convictions are based on
insufficient evidence. Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of
law, which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying
out this review, our “function . . . is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
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any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id.
Failure to Disperse
{¶6} Revised Code Section 2917.04(A) provides:
Where five or more persons are participating in a course of disorderly conduct in
violation of section 2917.11 of the Revised Code, and there are other persons in the
vicinity whose presence creates the likelihood of physical harm to persons or
property or of serious public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, a law
enforcement officer or other public official may order the participants and such
other persons to disperse. No person shall knowingly fail to obey such order.
A person acts knowingly when he “is aware that [his] conduct will probably cause a certain result
or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of the circumstances when [he]
is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Failure to disperse is a fourth-
degree misdemeanor if a person’s failure to obey “creates the likelihood of physical harm to
persons or is committed at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind.”
R.C. 2917.04(C)(3).
{¶7} Mr. Beasley argues his conviction for failure to disperse is based on insufficient
evidence because the State failed to prove two elements of that offense. Specifically, he argues
the State failed to prove he (1) knowingly disregarded an order to disperse, and (2) was engaged
in disorderly conduct in a group of at least five people at the time of that order. For the following
reasons, we will not address Mr. Beasley’s second argument.
{¶8} “This Court has repeatedly held that when an appellant sets forth specific grounds
in a [Criminal Rule] 29 motion, [he] forfeits all other arguments on appeal.” State v. Vanest, 2017-
Ohio-5561, ¶ 27 (9th Dist.). In moving for acquittal on his charge of failure to disperse, Mr.
Beasley argued there was no evidence he heard an order to disperse such that he knew an order
had been given and knowingly failed to obey it. He did not challenge any of the remaining
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elements of his offense. Thus, he did not argue that the State failed to prove he was engaged in
disorderly conduct in a group of at least five people. Because he asserted a specific ground in his
Criminal Rule 29 motion, he forfeited additional sufficiency arguments for review. See id. Accord
State v. Sebring,
2023-Ohio-2911, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, we limit our review to the single
argument he preserved.
{¶9} Captain Michael York acted as operations chief at the incident command center the
police established to monitor the protest that began on the afternoon of July 3, 2022. From his
position there, he was able to watch live video feeds supplied by officers in the field, city cameras,
and a helicopter. He testified that the protest remained fairly calm until about 9:30 p.m. Around
that time, Captain York testified, riotous activity commenced with individuals throwing items at
the police station, breaking windows, knocking over barricades, setting fires, and destroying
property. Captain York estimated that the police arrested about 50 people that evening. He
testified that people were only subject to arrest after the mayor had declared a state of emergency,
officers had given orders to disperse for several hours, officers had used smoke and tear gas to
remove people from areas, and people still were not leaving.
{¶10} Lieutenant Matthew Whitmire was on duty at the protests, acting as part of the
police department’s mobile field force. He testified that he witnessed property being damaged
around 11:00 p.m. At that point, he and his team formed a line in front of the police station.
Lieutenant Whitmire testified that he began speaking through a megaphone and advising people
in the crowd to leave. He specifically advised people they would be subject to arrest and/or
chemical munitions if they did not leave. As he was making announcements, a member of the
crowd threw a bottle of water and struck one of his fellow officers. Lieutenant Whitmire testified
that his team then began deploying smoke to force the crowd to disperse.
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{¶11} Lieutenant Whitmire testified that he and his team marched south. As they
marched, they made announcements in which they ordered people to disperse. Lieutenant
Whitmire described at least six different locations throughout the city at which he made
announcements as his team continued walking south. He also testified that other teams around the
city were making similar announcements, ordering people to disperse. If he or members of his
team did not have a megaphone handy, Officer Lieutenant testified, they simply kept yelling out
the order to disperse. He also testified that officers in cruisers were using the PA systems on their
cruisers to announce the orders to disperse.
{¶12} Sergeant Todd Sinsley was on duty at the protests, acting as part of the SWAT
team. He testified that his team was activated at 11:00 p.m. At that point, he was aware
announcements to disperse had already been made. He testified that he and his team members
were given sheets of paper with the prescribed announcement and were instructed to continue
repeating the order to disperse as they were addressing the people who remained in the area.
{¶13} Sergeant Sinsley was familiar with Mr. Beasley. He identified Mr. Beasley as an
individual shown in a video. The video depicted Mr. Beasley sitting on the hood of his car in the
area of the protests around 5:17 p.m. A different video showed Mr. Beasley taking burning
material from one dumpster and moving the burning material to a second dumpster shortly after
11:00 p.m. Sergeant Sinsley testified that he encountered Mr. Beasley several hours later when
the SWAT team reached an area of Main Street near the Spaghetti Warehouse. At that point,
Sergeant Sinsley testified, his team had been tasked with arresting people who were blocking the
roads and preventing the fire department from being able to respond to the fires in the city. He
testified that it was impossible for the police to arrest everyone, so they focused on the people who
were the most problematic, who had resisted the most, or who had already been warned multiple
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times or told to leave for many hours. Sergeant Sinsley testified that the police never stopped
making the announcements, ordering people in the crowd to leave.
{¶14} Sergeant Sinsley testified that he saw Mr. Beasley standing in the roadway with a
group of people. Although other people around him were leaving, Mr. Beasley was standing there
impeding the flow of southbound traffic. Regarding Mr. Beasley, Sergeant Sinsley testified:
He had been told [to] leave the area -- I mean . . . realistically, if you’re dropped in
the middle of this in the middle of the night, there’s no way you’re not
understanding that this is not good, we need to leave. There’s gas being deployed.
There’s people yelling. There’s a Mobile Field Force in their shields and batons
standing in front of you. Something’s not right here. I should probably leave.
Sergeant Sinsley stated that Mr. Beasley and the other members of his group tried to walk away
when the SWAT team moved forward to arrest them, but the team succeeded in stopping Mr.
Beasley before he got to the sidewalk. He testified that Mr. Beasley was arrested around 1:35 a.m.
{¶15} Mr. Beasley argues the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he heard
and knowingly disregarded an order to disperse. He notes that the scene of the riot was chaotic
and not every officer making announcements had a megaphone or PA system. According to Mr.
Beasley, he presented evidence that any announcements made without a megaphone “likely went
unheard.” He argues that evidence of blanket dispersal orders was insufficient to prove the mens
rea element of his offense.
{¶16} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Beasley knowingly
disregarded an order to disperse. See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus.
The jury heard evidence that the police announced orders to disperse throughout the city for several
hours by megaphone, by PA system, and by voice. They heard evidence that officers marched
through the city, deployed smoke, released tear gas, and attempted to push crowds out. There was
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evidence that Mr. Beasley was present at the scene of the protest/riot for a significant length of
time, as he was seen on videos at several points throughout the evening and was not arrested until
1:35 a.m. Sergeant Sinsley testified that, just before Mr. Beasley’s arrest, he saw Mr. Beasley
blocking the flow of traffic as the police continued pushing the crowd to the south and making
announcements. He also specifically testified that Mr. Beasley “had been told [to] leave the area
. . . .” Based on the foregoing evidence, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Mr.
Beasley was aware of the orders to disperse and knowingly disregarded those orders. See State v.
Kiss, 1992 WL 67615, *4 (9th Dist. Apr. 1, 1992). Accordingly, we reject his argument that his
conviction for failure to disperse is based on insufficient evidence. Mr. Beasley’s first assignment
of error is overruled to the extent it addresses that conviction.
Marked Lanes Violation
{¶17} Akron Municipal Code 72.02 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for
traffic, or wherever traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substantially
continuous lines in the same direction, the following rules apply:
A. A vehicle shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single
lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver
has ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
B. On a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for two-way
movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when
overtaking and passing another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and
such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or when preparing for a
left turn, or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic
moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is posted with signs to give
notice of such allocation. On a roadway of three or more lanes, a center lane can
be designated as a two-way left turn lane by standard signs and street markings, and
operation of vehicles in said lane shall be for the purpose of deceleration and
waiting to make a safe left turn only.
The code section is substantively identical to Revised Code 4511.33. See R.C. 4511.33(A)(1)-(2).
In applying that statute, this Court has held that, to establish a marked lanes violation, “the State
8
must present evidence ‘that the driver of a vehicle moving either between lanes of traffic or
completely out of a lane of traffic failed to ascertain the safety of such movement prior to making
the movement.’” State v. Ross, 2013-Ohio-1488, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Barner, 2004-
Ohio-5950, ¶ 14.
{¶18} Officer Warren Spragg testified that he and his partner began working a double
shift on the afternoon of July 6, 2022. As they were responding to a dispatch just before midnight,
they spotted Mr. Beasley driving his car in the wrong direction on Tallmadge Avenue.
Specifically, Officer Spragg saw Mr. Beasley driving eastbound in the westbound lane of traffic
on the two-lane road. He and his partner activated their cruiser’s lights to execute a traffic stop,
but Mr. Beasley continued driving. Officer Spragg testified that Mr. Beasley continued to drive
for two blocks until their cruiser maneuvered around him, cut him off, and caused him to stop his
car in the eastbound lane. Officer Spragg stated that, at the time of the incident, there was no other
eastbound traffic that would have prevented Mr. Beasley from driving in the correct lane or using
it to stop when the officers signaled him to pull over. Officer Spragg testified that Mr. Beasley’s
act of driving in the wrong lane was unsafe for the public.
{¶19} Officer Thomas Phillips acted as Officer Spragg’s partner at the time of Mr.
Beasley’s traffic stop. He confirmed that they saw Mr. Beasley driving his car eastbound in the
westbound lane of traffic on Tallmadge Avenue and forced him to stop after he ignored their
cruiser’s lights for two blocks. There was no testimony that any officers saw Mr. Beasley change
lanes or otherwise leave the westbound lane of traffic until Officer Spragg and Officer Phillips
forced his car into the eastbound lane to execute their traffic stop.
{¶20} Mr. Beasley argues his conviction for a marked lanes violation is based on
insufficient evidence because there was no evidence he operated his car outside a single lane of
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travel or otherwise departed from his lane of travel in an unsafe manner. The State acknowledges
that the officers on scene misidentified Mr. Beasley’s offense as a marked lanes violation rather
than citing him for operating his car in the wrong lane of travel. Even so, the State asks this Court
to uphold Mr. Beasley’s conviction based on evidence that his car crossed into the eastbound lane
when Officer Spragg and Officer Phillips cut him off and forced him to stop.
{¶21} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we cannot conclude
that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Beasley’s conviction for a marked lanes
violation. See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus. That offense requires
proof that a driver moved his car “either between lanes of traffic or completely out of a lane of
traffic” without ascertaining the safety of that movement. Ross,
2013-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 11 (9th
Dist.), quoting Barner,
2004-Ohio-5950, at ¶ 14. The evidence here only showed that Mr. Beasley
continuously operated his car within a single lane of traffic, albeit in the wrong direction. We
cannot conclude that his actions in leaving that lane of traffic based on officers forcing him to do
so gave rise to a marked lanes violation. Accordingly, his conviction for a marked lanes violation
is reversed. Mr. Beasley’s first assignment of error is sustained to the extent it addresses that
conviction.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING VIDEO
EVIDENCE OF RIOTING IN WHICH DEFENDANT BEASLEY HAD NOT
PARTICIPATED AND A BOLO NOTICE PERMITTING AN INFERENCE OF
EARLIER WRONGDOING.
{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Beasley argues the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted certain evidence at trial. For the following reasons, we reject his
argument.
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{¶23} “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Evid.R. 403(A). “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and unless it
has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, an
appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court.” State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49,
64 (2001). “[T]his Court is mindful that the exclusion of evidence under [Evidence Rule] 403(A)
is even more of a judgment call than determining whether the evidence has logical relevance in
the first place.” (Cleaned up.) State v. Zappa,
2022-Ohio-243, ¶ 30 (9th Dist.), quoting State v.
Thompson,
2016-Ohio-4689, ¶ 25 (9th Dist.).
{¶24} Mr. Beasley challenges the admission of two pieces of evidence at trial. The first
is a compilation video the State played for the jury. The video depicted various aspects of the
riotous activity that transpired during the evening of July 3, 2022, into the early morning hours of
July 4, 2022. Mr. Beasley argues the video was inflammatory because it depicted riotous activity
beyond that which he was involved, there was no dispute that a riot had occurred, and the State
could have relied solely on officer testimony to describe the riotous activity.
{¶25} The second piece of evidence Mr. Beasley challenges is a printout of a be on the
lookout (“BOLO”) notice the police department issued its officers before the riot. The BOLO
notice depicted Mr. Beasley, his name, his height, his address, and pictures of his car. Several
officers testified that the notice allowed them to recognize Mr. Beasley at the scene of the
protest/riot. No one testified as to the underlying reason a notice was issued for Mr. Beasley. Even
so, he argues he was prejudiced by its admission because it created “a subtle inference” that he
was someone known to police and likely to have committed other crimes or bad acts.
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{¶26} We will begin by addressing the compilation video the State played. Mr. Beasley’s
failure to disperse charge required the State to prove that (1) he knowingly disregarded an order to
disperse, (2) he participated in a course of disorderly conduct with at least five people, (3) the
presence of persons in the vicinity created a likelihood of physical harm to people or property or a
serious public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and (4) his failure to obey created a likelihood
of physical harm to persons or was committed at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or
emergency. See R.C. 2917.04(C)(3). The compilation video showed the size of the crowd around
Akron at the time of the riots, the amount of physical damage to property being caused, the serious
public inconveniences being caused, and the fires burning throughout the city as officers struggled
to stop the rioting. It was, therefore, probative of several elements of Mr. Beasley’s offense. It
also was probative of the State’s argument that, even if Mr. Beasley somehow did not hear one of
many direct orders to disperse as he claimed, any reasonable person in his position would have
known he or she should leave the area.
{¶27} “[T]he rules of evidence do not attempt to bar all prejudicial evidence—to do so
would make reaching any result extremely difficult. Rather, only evidence that is unfairly
prejudicial is excludable.” State v. Crotts, 2004-Ohio-6550, ¶ 23.
“Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis
for a jury decision. Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional
sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish, the
evidence may be unfairly prejudicial. Usually, although not always, unfairly
prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than intellect.”
Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172 (2001), quoting Weissenberger’s Ohio
Evidence, § 403.3, at 85-87 (2000).
{¶28} Upon review, we cannot conclude that the trial court went so far as to abuse its
discretion when it admitted the compilation video at trial. Mr. Beasley has not shown that the
12
State offered the video to appeal to the jury’s emotions. Rather, the record reflects the video aided
the State in establishing several elements of Mr. Beasley’s offense, including the mens rea element
that he was contesting at trial. To the extent Mr. Beasley’s assignment of error concerns the
admission of the compilation video, it is overruled.
{¶29} We likewise reject Mr. Beasley’s argument insofar as it concerns the BOLO notice.
As noted, a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over an objection under Evidence Rule 403(A)
is only subject to reversal if it caused a defendant to be materially prejudiced. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d
at 64. The BOLO notice only contained Mr. Beasley’s picture, his name, his height, his address,
and pictures of his car. It did not contain any information as to the basis for the notice. Nor did
the State elicit any testimony from officers as to the basis for the notice. The State relied on the
notice strictly as an identification tool that had allowed officers to recognize Mr. Beasley and his
car. Mr. Beasley’s argument that the notice created “a subtle inference” of nefarious activity on
his part is tentative at best. He has not shown that the trial court acted unreasonably,
unconscionably, or arbitrarily when it admitted evidence of the notice at trial. Accordingly, his
second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶30} Mr. Beasley’s first assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.
His second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Akron Municipal Court is
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for the municipal court to enter a
judgment of acquittal on Mr. Beasley’s conviction for a marked lanes violation.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and cause remanded.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal
Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KENDRA N. DAVITT and LOUIS E. GRUBE, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
DEBORAH S. MATZ, Director of Law, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN and BRIAN D.
BREMER, Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellee.
