[Cite as State v. Thompson,
2024-Ohio-3165.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-230656
C-230657
Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. 23CRB-18751A
23CRB-18752A
vs. :
CHRISTOPHER THOMPSON :
O P I N I O N.
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-230657; Affirmed in Part and Reversed
in Part, and Cause Remanded in C-230656
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 21, 2024
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Victoria Gooder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Thompson appeals his convictions for
aggravated menacing and obstructing official business. He challenges his convictions
on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and additionally asserts that the trial
court erred in sentencing him on the obstructing-official-business charge.
{¶2} Because testimony established that Thompson shouted at officers that
he had a gun and to shoot him, which the trial court reasonably found to be an implied
threat that he would use the gun against the officers in an apparent attempt to induce
officers to shoot him, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict
Thompson of aggravated menacing.
{¶3} We further hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict
Thompson of obstructing official business where, after Thompson exited a building,
he ignored a police officer’s lawful order to stop and instead re-entered the building.
{¶4} Finally, we sustain Thompson’s second assignment of error because the
trial court sentenced Thompson beyond the authorized range on the obstructing-
official-business conviction. We reverse Thompson’s sentence and remand the cause
to the trial court for resentencing on the obstructing-official-business conviction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. Facts
{¶5} In October 2023, Cincinnati police officers responded to a 911 call
reporting a burglary in a home. The caller identified Thompson as the suspect and
reported that Thompson was armed. Officers searched Thomson’s information and
determined that he had an active felony warrant for a probation violation.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶6} Officer Kerregan testified that he arrived at the home and met the 911
caller who told officers that her daughter was still in the home. Kerregan waited
outside of the house for additional officers to arrive. Before the additional officers
arrived, Thompson exited from a door at the side of the house. Kerregan noticed
Thompson and told him to show his hands and to stop. Thompson turned around,
walked back into the house, and slammed the door closed.
{¶7} Seconds later, officers heard screams coming from inside the home. As
the officers were planning to force their way in, the 911 caller’s daughter appeared in a
side window of the house. Officers determined that she was unharmed.
{¶8} Thompson then opened a second-story window in the front of the home.
Kerregan testified that Thompson looked at Kerregan and shouted, “I have a gun,
shoot me, shoot me, I have a gun.” On cross-examination, Kerregan testified that his
body-worn camera footage captured Thompson saying, “I ain’t got no gun.” The trial
court listened to the footage and found that a woman yelled, “[H]e doesn’t have a gun,
he doesn’t have a gun,” and that Thompson shouted in response, “[N]o, I have a gun.
Shoot me, shoot me.”
{¶9} Kerregan “got into a position of cover behind a pillar that was in front
of the house.” Kerregan testified that he took cover “in case [Thompson] did have a
firearm. In case I were to take fire from him, I would at least have something to stop
the bullets.” Thompson’s hands were hidden below the window, and while Kerregan
did not see if Thompson had a weapon, the 911 call and Thompson’s statements led
Kerregan to believe that Thompson was armed. Kerregan believed that Thompson
“was trying to commit suicide by cop. So I was fearing that if he did have a firearm, he
was going to use it against me in order to get me to use my firearm against him.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶10} Kerregan told Thompson to show his hands, but Thompson refused.
Four other officers forced their way into the house. The officers found Thompson in
the upstairs room and saw that he did not have a gun. The officers arrested Thompson.
{¶11} The State charged Thompson with one count each of obstructing official
business (R.C. 2921.31), possession of drugs (R.C. 2925.11), aggravated menacing
(R.C. 2903.21(A), and resisting arrest (R.C. 2921.29). The possession charge was
dismissed before trial.
B. The trial court convicted Thompson of aggravated menacing and
obstructing official business
{¶12} After the State rested, the trial court granted Thompson’s Crim.R. 29
motion and acquitted him on the resisting-arrest charge, but it denied the portion of
the motion seeking dismissal of the obstructing-official-business and aggravated-
menacing charges. The trial court found Thompson guilty of obstructing official
business and aggravated menacing.
{¶13} As to the obstructing-official-business charge, the trial court noted that
Thompson had an outstanding felony warrant. It determined that when Thompson
exited the house and Kerregan ordered him to show his hands and approach the
officers, Thompson instead re-entered the house and slammed the door closed. The
trial court found that this constituted obstructing official business.
{¶14} Regarding the aggravated-menacing charge, the trial court found that
Thompson said he had a gun in direct response to the woman stating that Thompson
did not have a weapon. The trial court determined that Thompson intended to convey
a threat and that Kerregan believed Thompson would cause him serious physical
harm, noting that Kerregan took cover behind a wall.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶15} On the aggravated-menacing charge, the trial court sentenced
Thompson to 180 days in jail and credited him with 18 days for time served. On the
obstructing-official-business charge, the trial court sentenced Thompson to 180 days
with credit for 18 days, suspended the remaining 162 days, and placed Thompson on
two years of community control. The trial court stayed both sentences pending appeal.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
1. First assignment of error: weight and sufficiency
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that his convictions
were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Sufficiency of the evidence
a. Standard of review
{¶17} A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge tests whether the State
produced adequate evidence on each element of the offense. State v. Wright, 2024-
Ohio-851, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
appellate courts ascertain whether reasonable fact finders could have determined that
the State proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Kendrick, 2023-Ohio-1763, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). This court does not weigh the evidence and
when faced with evidence subject to more than one possible interpretation, we adopt
an interpretation of the evidence consistent with the trial court’s judgment.
Id.
b. Aggravated menacing
{¶18} R.C. 2903.21, Ohio’s aggravated-menacing statute, provides, “No
person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious
physical harm to the person or property of the other person.” R.C. 2903.21(A). “A
person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). The State must prove that the victim subjectively feared
substantial physical harm. State v. Landrum, 2016-Ohio-5666, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). That
belief can be shown through circumstantial evidence.
Id.
{¶19} “Serious physical harm” is defined as:
(a) Any . . . condition of such gravity as would normally require
hospitalization . . . ;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity,
whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial
incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or
that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to
result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged
or intractable pain.
R.C. 2901.01(5).
{¶20} Sufficient evidence supports Thompson’s conviction for aggravated
menacing. Officer Kerregan testified that Thompson, after appearing in the upstairs
window, looked directly at Kerregan and yelled, “I have a gun, shoot me, shoot me, I
have a gun.” Thompson yelled this while holding his hands below the window so that
Kerregan could not see if Thompson had a weapon. Though someone did shout that
Thompson did not have a weapon, the trial court found that Thompson stated, “[N]o,
I have a gun. Shoot me, shoot me,” in direct response to that statement. Kerregan
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
testified that he believed that Thompson was attempting to “commit suicide by cop”
and Kerregan took cover behind a pillar to avoid being shot.
{¶21} Thompson argues that his statements were designed to cause the
officers to shoot him rather than to make the officers think he would harm them.
Thompson cites to cases in which this court has held that a defendant’s possessing a
holstered firearm was insufficient to support an aggravated-menacing charge where
the defendant did not brandish or threaten to use the firearm. See State v. Hamm,
2020-Ohio-4691, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). Thompson further suggests that “the subjective
belief of harm to police is a potential threat in every suicide by cop scenario and one
that should not be subject to prosecution.”
{¶22} While it is true that possessing a firearm is not synonymous with
threatening to use it, under the facts of this case, a reasonable fact finder could
determine that Thompson knowingly caused Kerregan to believe that Thompson
would attempt to shoot at him, risking serious physical harm. Thompson
acknowledges that he was trying to cause the police to harm him. Thompson’s implied
threat to fire a gun to prompt Kerregan to shoot him was sufficient to support an
aggravated-menacing charge. Finally, there is nothing in the aggravated-menacing
statute that precludes a police officer from being the alleged victim in cases like
Thompson’s. There is no basis for reading this blanket exception into the statute. We
accordingly hold that there is sufficient evidence to support Thompson’s aggravated-
menacing conviction.
c. Obstructing official business
{¶23} R.C. 2921.31(A) provides, “No person, without privilege to do so and
with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that
hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful
duties.” To support a conviction for obstructing official business, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) performed an act; (2) without
privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public
official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that
hampered or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.” In re Payne,
2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). A person acts purposely when the person intends to
cause a specific result. R.C. 2901.22(A).
{¶24} Not every delay or inconvenience to a police officer constitutes a
violation of the obstructing-official-business statute. State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-
4387, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.). Instead, the statute prohibits only affirmative acts that create a
“substantial stoppage” of a police officer’s official business. Id. at ¶ 23. “A ‘substantial
stoppage’ is not a set period of time; rather the defendant’s act must ‘actually hamper
or impede’ the officer’s performance of official duties.” Id.
{¶25} If an officer may lawfully detain an individual, and the individual is
aware the officer is attempting to detain the individual, the individual may not walk
away from the officer without violating the obstructing-official-business statute. Id.,
citing State v. Easterling, 2019-Ohio-2470, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.). Several courts have held
that a defendant’s retreating into a home after being ordered not to move constitutes
obstructing official business. See
Easterling at ¶ 40 (“Easterling did not merely refuse
to cooperate; he engaged in the affirmative conduct of disobeying the officer’s order to
stop and not return to the house, entering his home, and pushing against the door to
prevent the officers from apprehending him.”); see State v. Harris,
2015-Ohio-5378,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
¶ 8 (9th Dist.) (“Mr. Harris’s retreat into his house after being ordered . . . to put his
hands on top of his head and to talk with him constituted an overt act that was
sufficient to support his conviction for obstructing official business.”); State v. Shoe,
2018-Ohio-3006, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (“Shoe’s repeated trips into his residence and away
from Officer Calvert’s investigation, which had the effect of delaying Officer Calvert
from finding out Shoe’s identity, also constitute an affirmative act.”).
{¶26} The trial court convicted Thompson of obstructing official business
because Thompson went back into the house after he had stepped outside and
Kerregan ordered him to stop. Though Thompson argued at trial that he was not fully
out of the house, the trial court found that Thompson had completely exited from the
house and walked down the exterior stairs. Officers knew that Thompson had an
outstanding felony warrant and could lawfully arrest him when he was outside of the
house. See State v. Smith, 2005-Ohio-2560, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). Re-entering the house
was an affirmative act that delayed the officer’s ability to serve the warrant. Officers
did not manage to arrest Thompson until well after he re-entered the house,
establishing a substantial stoppage.
{¶27} Thompson argues that he did not act purposely to obstruct the police as
the police never announced that he was under arrest. But in Harris, there was
sufficient evidence of obstruction where, despite the officers never stating that Harris
was under arrest, he “came partially out” of his apartment, refused to comply with
officers’ orders to put his hands on his head and step outside to talk, and instead re-
entered his home. Harris at ¶ 3, 8. Moreover, this court has held that flight from a stop
to ensure officer safety can constitute obstructing official business. See State v.
Lohaus,
2003-Ohio-777, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). There is no requirement under the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
obstructing-official-business statute for the State to show that a defendant was under
arrest, provided the officer can lawfully detain the person.
{¶28} Here, although Kerregan never specifically stated that Thompson was
under arrest, Kerregan, with his gun drawn and pointed at Thompson, instructed
Thompson to stop and to show his hands. Under these facts, a reasonable fact finder
could infer that Thompson acted purposely to obstruct the officers.
{¶29} We hold that the State produced evidence sufficient to support
Thompson’s convictions.
Manifest weight
a. Standard of review
{¶30} A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge argues that the State
failed to carry its burden of persuasion at trial. Kendrick, 2023-Ohio-1763, at ¶ 16 (1st
Dist.). An appellate court sits “as a ‘thirteenth juror’” and must “independently ‘review
the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Kizilkaya,
2023-Ohio-3989, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), quoting
State v. Powell,
2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). Reversal under this standard is
reserved for “exceptional cases[]”where the evidence heavily weighed against
conviction. State v. Nicholson,
2024-Ohio-604, ¶ 71.
b. Aggravated menacing
{¶31} Having reviewed the record, we hold that Thompson’s aggravated-
menacing conviction is not against the weight of the evidence. The main issues in the
case are (1) whether Thompson stated that he had a gun, and (2) whether his
statement, “I have a gun, shoot me,” is a threat of serious physical harm. Officer
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Kerregan on cross-examination agreed that Thompson did state, “I ain’t got no gun.”
But the trial court, after listing to the body-worn camera footage, found that an
unidentified woman said that Thompson was unarmed, and Thompson responded
that he was armed. Having independently reviewed the evidence, we cannot say that
the trial court’s interpretation of the video is incorrect. Finally, the trial court’s finding
that Thompson’s statement knowingly communicated a threat of serious physical
harm was reasonable because Thompson’s attempt to cause the police to shoot him
carried an implication that he would use a gun against the police.
c. Obstructing official business
{¶32} Likewise, Thompson’s obstructing-official-business conviction is not
against the weight of the evidence. The video shows Thompson exiting from the house.
He saw uniformed officers with their guns drawn. The officers told Thompson to show
his hands and to “step out here.” Thompson quickly returned into the house and
slammed the door closed. The trial court did not lose its way in convicting Thompson
of obstructing official business.
{¶33} We overrule Thompson’s first assignment of error.
2. Second assignment of error: Thompson’s sentence
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court
erred in sentencing him to 180 days in jail, with 18 days of credit and 162 days
suspended, for the obstructing-official-business conviction when the maximum
authorized sentence was 90 days. The State concedes the error.
{¶35} An appellate court may “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence . . . or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court
for sentencing” if the sentence is “contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶36} The trial court convicted Thompson of obstructing official business
under R.C. 2921.31, a second-degree misdemeanor under these circumstances. R.C.
2921.31(B). The maximum authorized sentence for a second-degree misdemeanor is
90 days. See R.C. 2929.24(A)(2). The trial court erred in sentencing Thompson to 180
days, with credit for 18 days and 162 days suspended, as that term exceeds the
maximum sentence authorized by law. We sustain Thompson’s second assignment of
error, reverse Thompson’s sentence for the obstructing-official-business conviction,
and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing on that conviction.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶37} We sustain Thompson’s second assignment of error, reverse his
sentence on the obstructing-official-business conviction, and remand the cause for
resentencing on that conviction. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment accordingly.
CROUSE and KINSELY, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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